Both countries have agreed to sign a peace agreement on Thursday and Armenian PM has been expecting strong support from the international community for this narrative. In the tweet, he also confirmed that there would not be "а new escalation". Both countries, Azerbaijan and Armenia, have an ongoing dispute over Lachin Corridor which is the "only land connection between Armenia and the ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh region in Azerbaijan", reported AP. The road has been blocked by protesters claiming to be environmental activists since mid-December which would stop food supplies to Nagorno-Karabakh’s 120,000 people. Due to this dispute, there have been predictions of a new escalation but the Armenian PM's latest tweet has confirmed that there won't be any. However, there has been no confirmation from Azerbaijan on the same.
Category: 2023
Can Another Armenian Genocide be Stopped?
Photograph Source: VoA News – Public Domain
Filmmaker and Producer Peter Bahlawanian is doing everything in his power to alert the world to the dangers confronting the people of Artsakh, the self-proclaimed Armenian republic located inside western Azerbaijan. To most of the world, this region is known (and was so-named by Stalin in 1921 when the Soviets took over the region) as Nagorno-Karabagh, even though it has long been populated by a majority of Armenians. Bordering Artsakh to the west is the larger nation of Armenia. Both Artsakh and Armenia have been embroiled in conflicts with Azerbaijan ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, yet the world appears largely ignorant about this part of the world, a fact that will be explored in this article as to why.
Beginning in 2021, military forces from Azerbaijan have been occupying the hills that surround and enclose the rural Armenian villages of Artsakh, trapping them in what some residents –all unarmed — liken to concentration camps. For them, memories have been rekindled of the horrific genocide of Armenians by the Turks that killed over 1.5 million Armenians between 1915 and 1917 — especially since Turkey, which has always denied responsibility for the earlier genocide, has allied itself with the Azerbaijanis.
At the time of writing, new conflicts have erupted between Azerbaijani forces and Armenians, triggering fears of a spring offensive aimed at displacing if not eliminating the Armenians of Artsakh. This is not just a local fear. U.S. intelligence is warning of renewed aggression by Azerbaijanis (who are Moslem) against Armenians (who are Christians).
If ever there were a teachable moment, this is it. Bahlawanian, who feels an obligation as part of the Armenian diaspora, has been spreading the word with a new sense of urgency through his film, The Desire to Live, which brings you into the hearts and souls of the surviving residents of Artsakh. In my interview with him, he credits the film’s director, a local woman named Mariam Avetisyan, for “talking to the people in the villages like nobody else could. She could get them to spill their beans, and talk about their lives and what they had lost. Very compelling.”
The film has already won 136 awards from 72 festivals worldwide. Included in the awards is the musical score of composer Alan Derian, whose use of minor Oriental tones accented with staccato drumbeats enhances a sense of tragedy, foreboding, and defiance.
The Desire to Live: What it Tells Us
The film opens, necessarily, with a map, since most people do not know where Artsakh is, let alone even heard of it. (I will discuss this further down, for the Armenians have suffered what I call the “curse of location,” wedged between the Caspian Sea and Black Sea. The lands are rich in minerals, and both bodies of water are highly prized for their abundance of oil and natural gas).
To further orient viewers, the film provides a brief history of the conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, followed by wrenching personal narratives from the people of Artsakh.
We learn how some of the villagers escaped the pogroms that began in 1988 in Somgait, a petro-port on the Caspian Sea some 20 miles south of Baku, the sprawling oil-rich capital of Azerbaijan. More atrocities occurred in Baku in 1990 when Armenians were again hunted down, dragged from their homes, and killed for wanting to form their own republic separate from Azerbaijan.
Other villagers recalled the devastating three-year war between Azerbaijan and Armenia between 1991 and 1994 that killed over 100,000 people on both sides. This happened, Peter explains, when ex-Soviet Republics became independent and created their own territories. “Armenia created its own country and Azerbaijan created its own country Then there was the fight over the land, which was primarily Armenian. 90 percent voted to separate from Azerbaijani rule, but the Azeris wouldn’t accept it.” That, he says, is how that war began.
When hostilities finally ended, “Armenians continued to spend most of their time and energy building their country, while the Azerbaijanis spent their wealth on building their military–which led to the 2020 war.”
Why the military build-up in Azerbaijan? We’ll get to that too.
Most of the horrors of the 2020 war come through in the film with shocking details of collapsed buildings and ravaged farmlands, shattered by Israeli and Turkish drones and missiles. Villagers describe how Azeri forces invaded their homeland and for the next 44 days, bombed their homes, their farms, and their churches, killing 6,800 soldiers and displacing around 90,000 civilians.
Today, the people of Artsakh are suffering under a near 90-days-old blockade that prevents travel along the so-called Lachin Corridor connecting Artsakh and the rest of Armenia, depriving the villagers of food and cutting off their natural gas supplies via a pipeline originating in Armenia.
The Azeris claim that they are legitimately protesting gold mining operations in Artsakh that pose risks to the environment, a rather dubious argument coming from them since Azerbaijan hosts some of the largest oil-polluting operations in the region, if not the world. Peter says they are not real protesters, but rather government employees and soldiers posing as protesters.
The UN’s International Court of Justice in the Hague ruled last month that “Azerbaijan shall take measures to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along the Lachin Corridor in both directions.” Will this ruling be enforced? So far, the blockade continues.
Bahlawanian says the West has been largely silent about the ongoing tragedy, even after then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi flew into Armenia’s capital Yerevan the day before Armenia Independence Day (September 21, 1991). Her visit succeeded in holding the Azeris at bay on September 21st as she pledged US support for the Armenians. Since then, he says ruefully, “not much has happened in Congress.” He was in Armenia at the time of Pelosi’s visit.
“What was behind it?” I asked Peter. “Politics,” he replies. Pelosi’s home state of California has a large Armenian constituency; California’s Rep. Adam Schiff, not one to mince words, has denounced the ongoing attacks as genocide. Congressman John Menendez of New Jersey, whose wife is Armenian, has also spoken out, but the rest of Congress has been muted in response.
Again, one must wonder why, and in the course of our conversation, we sought answers, especially since scenes from Peter’s film are stark reminders of the ongoing war in Ukraine. We concluded that this was no coincidence.
But First, Some Personal and Historical Context
What made our conversation somewhat unique is our “Lebanon connection.” Bahlawanian’s grandfather survived the genocide of 1915 and grew up in an orphanage in Lebanon, as did his grandmother. His parents were born in Lebanon, but eventually moved to Canada where Peter was born.
Beirut, Lebanon is also my place of birth. My grandmother was a missionary-educator who taught biology to Christian Armenian girls in 1900–01 at the American College for Girls in Constantinople (now Istanbul). Her tales of living in Turkey’s Ottoman Empire, which at the time controlled the Middle East, made a deep impression on her son (my father), who after graduating college would take up a teaching position in Lebanon at the American University of Beirut from 1933–35. There, he met my mother, a high school teacher at the American Community School. He fell in love with her - but also through his multi-ethnic students at AUB, with the people of the region. He changed his major at Harvard from European history to doctoral studies in Islamic history, with both fields making him an attractive candidate for espionage during World War II.
He returned to Beirut in 1944 as U.S. Cultural Attaché, his wartime cover for his work as America’s first master spy in the Middle East. From 1944–46, he worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and in 1946–47 for the Central Intelligence Group (CIG, immediate precursor to the CIA). He died in a mysterious plane crash in 1947 following a top secret visit to Saudi Arabia.
One last personal anecdote that explains my concern for the Armenian people. My widowed mother returned to the US with her three young children (I was two months old at the time) and my parents’ much- loved Armenian maid, Mary Bedoian. With my mother’s and grandmother’s help, Mary found an Armenian suitor, Johnny Mekjian, married him and every year, in a gesture of thanks, hosted the Dennett family to an Arabic feast. This was my first introduction to the Middle East — through such tantalizing food as hummus, baba ganoush, shish kebab and tabouli. This was a major reason why I happily agreed to return to Beirut with Mom in the mid-sixties to finish high school at the American Community School. A decade later, following her death, I would become a journalist in the Middle East, based in Beirut. I distinctly remembered seeing Armenian women in brightly-colored costumes going in and out of a large, tin-paneled refugee camp lining the road to the airport.
I would later experience a burning need, not only to investigate the death of my father, but also to tell the truth about that part of the world that most Americans never got from their politicians or the mainstream media. Peter Bahlawanian had a similar goal: To spread awareness of a too-often untold story, in his case, about the suffering and resilience of the Armenian people.
A film is Born.
I asked Peter how and why spreading awareness through filmmaking would become his mission.
As he grew up in Canada, he explained, he was troubled that no one around him seemed to know anything about Armenia. “My grandfather was six years old when he survived the 1915 genocide,” he said. “I figured if my grandparents could survive the genocide, then it was incumbent on me as a member of the Armenian diaspora to explain their history and spread awareness of their plight, past and present.” By creating a business of selling spices retail– all sorts of spices — he was able to self-finance his filmmaking, freeing him from outside pressures to follow official narratives.
Peter has studied filmmaking and has made other documentaries. But it was the war that began in September, 2020 that “lit my fire to make films about what had just happened.” He met up with a young woman from Stepanakert, which is the main city of Artsakh, who filmed the horrors of that 45-day war while working for Artsakh TV. I saw her footage and thought it was beautiful.”
He asked Mariam Avetisyan if she would consider working with him. “That’s how it started. We started filming right away. Then in 2021, we would post an episode every week on YouTube. We did that for months and months. The whole first season came out that way on how the post-2020 war affected the people of Artsakh. Then I started a second season and kept the same crew.”
After the second season he felt Mariam was getting burnt out. “She kept seeing repetitive things happening and not much happened. She kept looking for answers and not finding them.”
That’s where the idea of making a feature-length documentary came up. “Although YouTube is free and a lot of people have access to it,” he explained, there’s so much material online that it’s difficult to attract attention unless you promote it. So, I came up with the idea of doing new footage and combining it with old footage which she gave me. The result is an hour and a half film that will help somebody who has no idea of what’s going on. I started sending it out in October 2021 to festivals and eventually entered over 300 film festivals and we got a lot of traction that way.”
“We did a third season with new episodes last year. The Azeris cut off gas in the middle of winter in Artsakh. We documented that. They have a lot of commitment to survival.”
That’s when I noted that the film’s scenes of destruction in Artsakh were reminiscent of the war in Ukraine.
In one scene, an elder is complaining that “they shoot every day. We are in a true ambush.” Everywhere you look,” he says “you see Azeris. There are drones in the air. Some say they are Russian; others say they are Azeris. Whatever the case, we live in fear.”
In another scene, a woman laments the loss of her 18-year-old son, struck dead by a bomb that also killed 29 people.” I looked for him in every morgue. But they wouldn’t let me see his body. I was told to remember him as he was.”
A young boy describes finding cluster bombs in the place where he used to play. “Our elders prayed that we would not see what they saw. In fact, it appears we witnessed worse. Everyone lost a loved one: a son, a father. a brother.”
Villagers describe how they used to work in the fields. They had cows and pigs. It was a good livelihood. “Now we are not able to farm. They snatch our cows. There are no jobs. The 2020 bombings destroyed livelihoods.”
Worse still, it didn’t make sense. Just as with Ukraine, where bombed-out civilians asked what the unprovoked war was all about, here too many Armenians in Artsakh asked the same question: why?
Peter agreed with the Ukraine analogy. “Absolutely. It’s a prelude to Ukraine and Russia. If President Aliev [of Azerbaijan] would have been held accountable for war crimes for what he did in 2020, I don’t think he would have done what he did by signing a security pact with Russia on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin played a big part in the war in Armenia, with Aliev of Azerbaijan allying himself with President Erdogan of Turkey. Russia and Armenia also have a security pact and Russia didn’t support that pact at all.”
The present prime minister of Armenia, he continued, “came into power a few years ago. His goal was to get away from the Russians and get admitted into the European Union. The more he showed he wanted to go toward the European Union and its democratic values –Armenia has always tried to be a democratic nation with free elections — the more Russia stood in the way and let the hounds free. Now you have the mounting up of Azerbaijan’s military in recent decades. With that, Covid, and Trump you had the makings of a perfect storm. I mention Trump because he also had extensive dealings with Azerbaijan.”
What were Trump’s interests?
“He has huge hotels and other dealings with the Aliev family. I didn’t have proof until it came out afterward in the press.
But the problem was it wasn’t just Trump. I realized Biden came out and condemned the blockade and basically recognized Armenia. But then he had given $100 million in military aid to Azerbaijan.”
Seeking a Geopolitical Explanation: Did Oil and Pipelines Play a Role?
At this juncture, I ventured that I thought the war in Ukraine was actually a proxy energy war pitting the US and its NATO allies against Russia, all of them key players in The Great Game for Oil. The Game — deadly at times — involves intense rivalry among great powers to control oil and protect the pipelines that deliver it. Why? Because oil is the fuel of the military. Germany lost two world wars because its tanks and airplanes ran out of gas. This fact cannot be underestimated. It is the reason why fossil fuels continue to be the most prized and sought-after resources in the world. The competition to control these vital resources is intense.
This reality could also apply to Artsakh. As I suggested to Time Magazine back in August 2020, “The conflict [between Azerbaijan and Armenia] is best understood in the context of pipeline politics involving major powers jockeying for geopolitical influence in the oil-rich Middle East and neighboring Caucasus. American and British oil companies have since the mid-1990s poured billions of dollars into Azerbaijan, whose three major transnational oil pipelines run only a few miles from the Nagorno Karabakh [Artsakh] line of contact.…” Small wonder, I added, “that regional leaders and their intelligence agencies are watching the whole region with heightened concern. A single spark could set off a conflagration that could engulf the entire world.”
That worry persists three years later.
(green) BTC: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (via Georgia, Caspian to Mediterranean) (brown) Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline – parallels BTC (red) Baku-Supsa oil pipeline (via Georgia, Caspian to Black Sea) (blue) Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline (via Russia, Caspian to Black Sea) Source: Wikipedia.
My [extensively footnoted] book, Follow the Pipelines, had concluded that all the post-911 wars in the Middle East were energy and pipeline wars. One could even go back as far as World War I to discover that seizing the oil of Iraq was a “first class war aim” for the British. The British Navy had recently converted its fuel supply from coal (of which Britain had plenty) to the cheaper and more efficient oil (of which Britain had none), causing First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill to ruefully conclude in 1911 that Britain would have to “fight over a sea of troubles” to get enough oil. Great Britain succeeded in its mission and seized Iraq and its oil. In the 1930s, the Iraq Petroleum Company, headquartered in London, built a pipeline that terminated in Haifa, Palestine under the control of the British Mandate. That’s just one example.
Here’s another, concerning Armenia. After World War I, President Wilson had called for the US to assume a mandate on Armenia’s behalf under the aegis of the League of Nations to, among other things, make Baku part of Armenia. But after Soviet forces laid claim to this major oil port, Wilson’s plan for an American mandate in Armenia fizzled out. I recall that an American diplomat said at the time, “Too bad for Armenia, now that it doesn’t have oil.”
Peter agrees that “oil and pipelines play a big part in it. Azerbaijan is super oil-rich. Their fiscal budget toward military spending is higher every year than the whole budget of Armenia. Every year the US sends $100 million in military aid to Azerbaijan.”
Initially, he thought the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia had something to do with Azerbaijan’s Trans-Anatolian Pipeline [TANAP] to Turkey, which received $500 million in funding by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and was completed in 2019.
The Trans-Anatolian Pipelines (TANA)
“I figured that was why the Azeris wanted to take the land. They didn’t want to go around Armenia and Artsakh to get their pipeline to Turkey.” But then he realized that the pipeline was built in Azerbaijan above Armenia and Artsakh, so he figured there was no need to occupy those countries.That got him looking at the mineral resources of Artsakh and Armenia. “There are mines in Artsakh with elements used in microchips which Armenia controls. They have not been harvested. Azerbaijan already sold the mining exploitation rights to the Anglo Asian Mining Company, which is a European-based company with links to the US.” He discovered that the ex-Governor of New Hampshire, John Sununu, is on the board and Sununu’s family has connections to the company. “There’s the link to American political figures involved in the mining. They have already paid Azerbaijan $3 billion to have access to the mine, but it’s not in their control, so now they are doing what they have to do to get it.”
The Curse of Location
Bahlawanian, through his documentaries, has become acutely conscious of the Armenians’ geographic vulnerability. “With all the funds that are coming into Azerbaijan, President Aliev is using the military to take over the entire landscape. It all started with speeches by his ally, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2015. The so-called self-made Sultan of the Turks has Pan-Turkik goals to create one unified area stretching from the Bosphorus in Turkey to China.” Armenia, he suggests, “is a speck on the map which they want to erase. Just like back in the Ottoman time when the Armenians lived under the Turkish Ottoman regime. They see Armenia as irrelevant, and they wanted to get it off the map and turn it into part of Turkey. History is repeating itself.”
Toward the end of the film, several of the villagers state their fears that the genocide of Armenians a century ago is indeed repeating itself, starting with the Azerbaijani pogroms of 1988 in Sumgait and more attacks in 1990 in Baku, both major oil ports on the Caspian Sea. “They would beat people up in buses and throw them out,” recalled one. “They were mocking and humiliating us. ‘Are you Armenian? Go back to your villages.’”
An ex-soldier set the tone — and the title — of this film. “Everyone has fear in their hearts because they have the desire to live. The question is, how long does it take you to overcome the fear?”
“The Armenians lived for decades under the Soviet regime,” Peter told me. “There were little crises but when they decided to separate and ask for sovereignty in Artsakh, that’s when the pogroms happened. Armenians in Baku and Sumgait were beaten up, killed, driven out of their land; that’s when it became real, the memories of genocide. I have a new documentary highlighting this.”
Arteries of Empire and The Bypass Game
After our conversation, I decided to dig even deeper into a possible oil and pipeline connection to the conflicts between Armenians and Azeris. Artsakh’s minerals would clearly benefit the Anglo-Asian Mining Company, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that there were even bigger stakes involved encompassing a wider area. For all the years I investigated my father’s death, I had become a committed pipeline-tracker.
I had discovered the many geopolitical intrigues surrounding a major American pipeline project developed during World War II that affected not only the Middle East, but also Europe and the Soviet Union: The Trans-Arabian pipeline, or TAPLINE. a subsidiary of the Arab American Oil Company (Aramco). This was a multi-million dollar project that would help Europe recover from the war by replacing Communist-run coal mines with US-supplied Saudi oil. An American diplomat in Saudi Arabia and contemporary of my father referred to the planned Trans-Arabian pipeline, or TAPLINE, as “one of the great arteries of empire, the American Empire in the Middle East, I mean, which in fact it was.” During his visit to the American compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in March 1947, Daniel Dennett ruefully observed in a letter home that the Company had taken over the role of the government, on the model of Britain’s imperial East India Company.
The New York Times did a major story about TAPLINE on March 2, 1947, just weeks before my father’s visit to Saudi Arabia to examine the proposed route of the pipeline. The piece, featured in the Sunday edition, was headlined “Pipeline for US Adds to Middle East Issues.” It carried a noteworthy sub-head, “Oil Concessions Raise Questions Involving Position of Russia.” Written by Clifton Daniels, President Truman’s son-in-law, the article revealed that “protection of that investment and the military and economic security that it represents inevitably will become a pivot of world politics and one of the main focal points of rivalry between East and West.” (Emphasis added.) It was Saudi oil, transported by TAPLINE over desert, through Syria’s Golan Heights, and terminating in southern Lebanon that catapulted the United States into superpower status, not just in the Middle East, but the world.
The dotted line shows the projected route of the Trans-Arabian pipeline in March 1947. TAPLINE ended up terminating in southern Lebanon, 124 miles away from Israel. The forked pipeline was built in the 1930s by the Iraq Petroleum Company, the sourthern line terminating in British-controlled Palestine, the northern in French-controlled Lebanon. Credit: Chelsea Green, “Follow the Pipelines”.
After suing the CIA under FOIA, I discovered that my father’s partially declassified “Analysis of Work” written in 1944 revealed that his mission to the Middle East was “to control the oil at all costs.” The Soviet Union, for its part, regarded TAPLINE as “a dangerous auxiliary enterprise of the American effort to establish an air base in Saudi Arabia.” TAPLINE was built in 1949, following the CIA’s first-ever coup that toppled Syria’s nationalist president (a known anti-Zionist who opposed the pipeline’s termination in Israel) and replacing him with a pro-Western, pro-Israel police chief. The pipeline would end up terminating in southern Lebanon, some 124 miles away from Israel, which would become its primary military protector.
Fast-forward half a century to the post-911 years, and we find that the competition between the Russians and the US has continued full force. In 2002, Nightline host Ted Koppel reported on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) connecting the Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea. At the time, the Caspian Sea was viewed by characters like George W. Bush and Haliburton’s Dick Cheney as the new Middle East. According to Koppel, the BTC pipeline became the “anchor of national security interests of the United States in Central Asia and the Caucuses that goes to the heart of an American policy goal; that is the uninterrupted transport of Caspian oil” — to Europe.
Uninterrupted was the catchword, requiring military protection against sabotage. The BTC pipeline, a consortium of eleven energy companies including BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips, was completed in 2005.
The Western-financed BTC pipeline, carrying oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey while bypassing Russia Credit: Chelsea Green, Follow the Pipelines.
Its backers hailed it as a triumph, as it passed through some of the most volatile areas in the world, feeding oil to Turkey and Europe while bypassing Russia and the extensive system of Soviet-built pipelines crisscrossing Europe, including Ukraine.
This map of Russian pipelines in Europe is from an article in Stratfor titled Pipelines for Empire by Robert Novak, who wrote, “Energy, not ideology, is modern Russia’s most powerful tool for influence in Europe.” Couldn’t the same be said about US ambitions in Europe? Novak’s wife is Victoria Nuland, the hawkish neo- conservative who worked for Dick Cheney and helped orchestrate the 2014 coup in Ukraine. She is now a top State Department strategist on the Ukraine war in the Biden Administration. Biden’s goal has been clearly stated: reduce Europe’s reliance on Russian oil and natural gas.
Over the ensuing years, the US poured money into Turkey to train Turkish military officers, who in turn would train the Azerbaijanis in weapons supplied by Washington. In 2008, Georgia (aligned with the West) and Russia came to blows near the route of the pipeline, causing fears of escalation and the start of World War III. Saner heads prevailed, but Russia keeps a watchful eye on what it sees as a Western effort “to redraw the geography of the Caucuses on an anti-Russian map.”
Turkey’s President Erdogan, welcoming the West’s view of his country as an emerging major energy corridor, has also cut deals with the Russians. Turkey serves as the terminal point of three Russian pipelines traveling beneath the Black Sea to Turkey: The Blue Stream Pipeline, inaugurated in 2005, the TurkStream 1 Pipeline, built in 2016–18, and the TurkStream II pipeline, operational in January 2020 — the latter running under now-Russian controlled waters in the Black Sea after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. As I noted, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea are known to hold enormous volumes of oil and natural gas.
But in November 2019, Erdogan switched sides again by announcing yet another pipeline deal with Azerbaijan: the completion of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) running from the Caspian Sea port near Baku to Turkey. Let’s take a look at this map again. It was described in the Associated Press as “a milestone in a major project to help reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas.” Erdogan was once again playing the Russian bypass game that he previously played with the BTC pipeline.
Said Erdogan: “Aside from ensuring the energy needs of our country with TANAP, we aimed to contribute to Europe’s energy supply security.”
Helping both the West and, conversely, Russia to supply energy to Europe. Erdogan has put himself in a powerful position. It appears that neither the US nor Russia want to harm their relations with Turkey and with oil-rich Azerbaijan. Both superpowers supply Turkey and Azerbaijan with military assistance. Russia, Peter discovered, signed a military agreement with Azerbaijan two days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
For their part, both Turkey and Azerbaijan have “Pan-Turkic” aspirations, as previously noted by Bahlawanian and described by journalist Yeghia Tashjian in a July 2020 report for the Armenian Weekly aptly titled, “The Geopolitical and Energy Security Dimensions of the Latest Armenian-Azerbaijani Clashes.”
The Turks, he writes, “believe that the territories stretching from Eastern Europe, Central Asia and some parts of Russia, Iran and China belong to their ancestors, and it is their right to reconquer these lands by arms.” The Azeris, he adds, also believe in a unified Turkic state extending from the Bosphorus to the Xinjiang province of China.
Could these huge sweeps of territory make Turkey and Azerbaijan the aspiring Oil Lords of the World of a revived Ottoman Empire? For as Henry Kissinger, protégé of oil scion Nelson Rockefeller once said, “Who controls the oil controls the world.” Is that why the two most powerful petro-nations in the world, Russia and the US, are exercising their military influence over the region, Armenia be damned? Even wiped out?
Russia under Putin has similar revivalist ambitions, recovering a lost empire while invoking the sacred theme of Mother Russia to justify his invasion of Ukraine. As a largely Christian nation, Russia has always played the role of protector of Christian Armenians, a fact that has not escaped Turkey, a Muslim nation, going back a century when some Armenians sided with Russian efforts to weaken the Ottoman Empire, further inflaming nationalist Turks against Armenians living in Turkey. But now, with the Americans supplying military aid to Azerbaijan and Turkey, first to protect the BTC pipeline in the early 2000s and later, the TANAP pipeline, the Russians have increased their military support of Azerbaijan and effectively allowing the Azeri incursions into Artsakh while ignoring their treaty obligations as Armenia’s protector.
In 2019 Turkey engaged in military drills with Azerbaijan, with participants wearing a badge “showing the maps of Turkey and Azerbaijan as unified and depicting the (overwhelmingly Armenian) regions of Ararat, Kotayk, Armavir, Aragatsotn, Shirak, Lori, Syunik, Meghri and Artsakh in Azerbaijan.”
As Peter explained to me, “Putin was credited with bringing the peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, but he was also part of the beginning of the war. The reason why the war happened was because Putin turned his back on the Armenians and said, ‘OK, Aliev, go ahead. I won’t get involved. Do what you have to do.’ If Putin didn’t want that war to happen, it wouldn’t have happened.”
Lucine Kasbarian, writing for the Armenian website Keghart on the history of Turkey’s dream of empire, connects Pan-Turkism directly with genocide. “Pan-Turkism was a prime motivator for Ottoman Turkey to enter World War I against the Allies in 1914,” she notes. “In a bid for the pan-Turkic goal, Ottoman Turkey aimed to eradicate the indigenous Christian people who lived in what is today called Turkey — that is, Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks.. The threat of a renewed Armenian genocide is a daily reality.”
Most Americans, indeed, most people in the world, are not aware of the oil connection to all these conflicts for the simple reason that oil remains the fuel of the military and, to quote my father, “must be protected at all costs.” In the interest of national security, the oil connection is routinely censored from media analysis and reports. But at what cost in human lives and national treasures?
The Armenians of Artsakh are bracing themselves for an Azeri spring offensive. Their plea is for the survival of their children. Who will care? I recommend this interview of Peter by Kristina Borjesson sounding the alarm for a potential genocide.
The geopolitical dimensions of the wars in Armenia, Artsakh and Azerbaijan need further scrutiny, including of the vast mining industries in the region. But of one thing I am certain: until the major powers of the world move away from gasoline for their military machines, we are going to keep having endless wars and tragic genocides.
Armenian PM announces peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan
WEB DESK
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Thursday announced that there will be a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on joint official statements adopted at the highest level. Armenia and Azerbaijan, both ex-Soviet states, have been engaged in two wars since their independence.
International diplomacy picks up amid rising fears of violence in Karabakh
International diplomacy in the Caucasus is picking up speed as Armenians brace for what many believe will be a new Azerbaijani offensive.
In the last several days United States Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has called the leaders of both countries, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov hosted his Armenian counterpart Ararat Mirzoyan in Moscow, Iran’s deputy foreign minister visited Yerevan and France’s foreign minister announced plans for an April visit to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
It comes as Azerbaijan is making ever more specific threats to Armenia based on unconfirmed “provocations” that Baku is blaming Yerevan for. The two sides are increasingly digging in on the most contentious issue between them: the fate of the Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani blockade of the only road connecting Karabakh to Armenia and the outside world, known as the Lachin Corridor, is now more than three months old with no end in sight.
Blinken called Armenia Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on March 20, and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev the next day. According to the State Department readout, Blinken “reaffirmed the importance of reopening the Lachin corridor to commercial and private vehicles.” At a Senate hearing later in the week, Blinken characterized his conversation with Aliyev as “pressing” the Azerbaijanis to reopen the road.
Aliyev’s readout struck a more combative tone; he repeated the standard denial that there was a blockade at all, citing the Red Cross and Russian peacekeeping vehicles that are allowed to pass. He further argued that 10,000 Armenian military personnel are in Karabakh in contravention of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 war. The figure of 10,000 was a new one and it’s not clear where it came from.
Most remarkably, the Azerbaijani leader implicated the European Union monitoring mission in abetting the “provocations” he attributed to Armenia, in particular alleged arms transfers from Armenia to Karabakh. The Armenian side “had been recently abusing the presence of the European Union's mission in this country to pursue a policy aimed at deliberately escalating the situation,” Aliyev told Blinken.
In a bellicose speech a few days before the conversation with Blinken, Aliyev reiterated his position that the fate of the Karabakh would be the subject only of negotiations between local Armenians and the Azerbaijani government, but he did so in newly aggressive terms.
“There is one condition for them [Armenians] to live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers [the size of the Republic of Armenia] – Armenia must accept our conditions, officially recognize Karabakh as the territory of Azerbaijan, sign a peace treaty with us and carry out delimitation work according to our conditions,” he said. “Only under these circumstances can they live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers.”
It all only reinforced the sense, which has been building for weeks now, that an Azerbaijani offensive is imminent.
But Blinken’s assessment, in the Senate hearing, was rosier. He put the emphasis on the peace negotiations, despite the fact that they appear to have stalled. “There is an opportunity, I don’t want to exaggerate it, but an opportunity to bring a peace agreement to fruition,” he said in response to a question from pro-Armenian Senator Robert Menendez. “This is not something we are imposing on Armenia, we are answering the strong desire expressed by Armenia to help them reach an agreement which would help them end … thirty-plus years of conflict.”
It was a tone that Pashinyan then echoed – somewhat incongruously, given the dire warnings he has been issuing.
“There will be a #peace treaty between #Armenia and #Azerbaijan, and it will be based on the joint official statements adopted at the highest level, he tweeted on March 23. “There won’t be а new escalation! The international community must strongly support this narrative.”
The statement was rewarded by an approving quote tweet from the State Department:
While the two sides have been exchanging draft peace deals, the pace of high-level meetings has slowed down, the last one being in mid-February between Aliyev, Pashinyan, and Blinken on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.
The process has been complicated by the two dueling tracks of negotiations: one led by the EU with support from the U.S., and the other led by Russia. While both Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to favor the Western track, Russia is impossible to ignore given its large footprint in the region, including the large peacekeeping mission that has operated in Karabakh since 2020.
The highlight of Lavrov’s March 20 meeting with Mirzoyan was a discursion by the Russian diplomat about how the Karabakh issue should be resolved. Azerbaijan has been arguing that the status of the Karabakh Armenians is an issue only between them and the Azerbaijani government, and that correspondingly they should not be part of any international negotiations.
Armenia, by contrast, has been insisting on an international guarantee for the rights and security of the Karabakh Armenians in whatever deal it signs with Azerbaijan. In recent weeks Yerevan has been more explicit about what that could entail, including an international (i.e. not only Russian) presence in Karabakh and a demilitarized zone.
The Europeans and Americans have not explicitly weighed in on this issue, but Lavrov did. He said that the issue should be the subject of negotiations between Baku and Stepanakert – in short, the Azerbaijani position – but then went on to approvingly cite examples of other cases in which minority rights were guaranteed by international agreements, seeming to imply that the rights of Karabakh Armenians could be similarly established.
But the examples he chose were curious ones: eastern Ukraine, where the Minsk agreements that Russia and Ukraine signed had provisions on local self-governance; and Kosovo, where the governments of Serbia and Kosovo agreed on some rights for the Serb minority there.
Lavrov described the principle of minority rights thusly: “The right to their native language, the right to teach their children in that language, live and work using that language, maintaining their culture, religion, having the right to self-governance and some sort of special links to their compatriots. In the case of Donbass, that was Russia.”
Leaving aside the details of the situation in eastern Ukraine, Lavrov’s explanation in this context seemed to imply that those rights should be afforded to the Karabakh Armenians, and that Armenia would be the “compatriots” in this scenario.
While there was no official reaction from Baku, a headline in the pro-government analysis website Minval.az referred to “Lavrov’s strange statement on Karabakh.”
And while it hewed closer to Armenia’s position, the response from Yerevan also was lukewarm. Edmon Marukyan, an ambassador-at-large who works on the Azerbaijan brief, suggested that Donbass and the Serbian communities of Kosovo were not good comparisons, he said: Karabakh had long enjoyed a special status in the Soviet Union, while those other territories never did (unlike other examples Lavrov could have, but didn’t choose, like Crimea, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia).
“Hence, while looking for a solution to the NK problem, the International Community should take into account the entire historical legal-political background, otherwise any solution built upon irrelevant examples will lead to the deepening of the problem and its non-resolution,” Marukyan wrote in a tweet.
The next round of diplomacy may, in any case, be on the Russia track; Lavrov said that he was working on arranging a meeting with himself, Mirzoyan, and their Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov.
Armenia’s Constitutional Court rules that ICC obligations in line with national constitution
The Armenian Constitutional Court has recognised that the country’s International Criminal Court (ICC) obligations enshrined in the Rome Statute do not contradict the national constitution, News.am reports.
The ruling was read out by the court’s President Arman Dilanyan. It enters into force immediately.
The move means that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for children’s rights Maria Lvova-Belova will not be able to enter the country as Armenian authorities will be required to detain them following the ICC’s decision to issue arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova.
News.am notes that the Armenian government appealed to the Constitutional Court to ratify the Rome Statute in late 2022 in order to hold Azerbaijan accountable for the crimes committed in unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh.
The country signed the statute back in 1998 but failed to ratify the document after the Constitutional Court ruled in 2004 that several provisions were not in line with the national constitution that was active at the time.
The International Criminal Court headquartered in The Hague issued an arrest warrant against Putin and Lvova-Belova on 17 March. Putin “is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation”, the ICC press release reads. Lvova-Belova is suspected of the same crimes.
Hungarian authorities noted that they would not arrest Putin under the ICC order if he sets foot in the country. Hungary signed and ratified the Rome Statute that lays foundations for the ICC but the document “was not built into Hungary’s legal system”, the Hungarian prime minister’s office stressed.
Can football help normalise relations between Armenia and Turkey?
With Armenia and Turkey facing off Saturday at the EURO 2024 qualifiers, Euronews is taking a look at the troubled history between the two nations. More than a century after the 1915 massacre of more than 600,000 Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman Empire, the neighbours still don't maintain diplomatic relations.
However, football had already served as a bridge between Yerevan and Ankara. That was between 2008 and 2009, with two matches, one in the Armenian capital Yerevan, and the other in the Turkish city of Bursa.
The famous "football diplomacy" paved the way for the signing of the 2009 Zurich Protocols, aimed at improving diplomatic relations.
Despite the pleasant exchanges, these protocols have come to nothing, and this status quo is likely to continue according to journalist Tigrane Yegavin, who stresses that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan "relies too much on his electoral base to be reappointed president".
The Turkish president "relies heavily on an ultranationalist electorate" for his domestic policy, he says. "And you have the geopolitical factor with the alliance with Azerbaijan," Yegavin continues.
It's a relationship that can be summarised by a slogan regularly used by the governments of Ankara and Baku, which consider themselves to belong to "two states and one nation".
In solidarity with Azerbaijan, "the Republic of Turkey unilaterally suspended its relations with Armenia in 1993," after Yerevan's victory in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, notes political scientist Ahmet Insel. Since then, Baku has become a central player in the Armenian-Turkish issue and has been demanding that Yerevan recognise its sovereignty over the disputed territory populated by Armenians.
Ankara aligns itself on the Azerbaijani demands in keeping the Armenian border closed. "The cost of Armenian-Turkish normalisation is too high for the Turkish president," analyses Tigrane Yegavian.
In the second war in 2020, "Turkey supplied drones to Baku, which were decisive" in the Armenian retreat, says Ahmet Insel – a defeat experienced as a national humiliation in Yerevan.
Already at the time of the Zurich protocols in 2009, "the Azerbaijanis were up in arms against this process," says Tigrane Yegavian, adding: "But Turkey is not at all opposed to the opening of the borders if the Armenians manage to put aside the Karabakh question, and above all respond to the demands of the Azeris, i.e. territorial concessions, a corridor in the south of Armenia (editor's note: towards the exclave of Nakhichevan) because the Turks see this country as an important communication route to link them to Azerbaijan."
These concessions requested by Azerbaijan are categorically rejected by Armenia, which it believes invokes its sovereignty. The corridor is also seen as a threat by Iran, which does not want its access to Armenia to be impeded.
Can the Turkish presidential election of 14 May move the lines and allow for a rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara?
"If there is a change of government and majority, we should not expect rapid and significant changes in this area," said Ahmet Insel, as the coalition formed around the candidate Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, composed in particular of nationalist parties, including the IYI Party.
This political group "comes from the far-right nationalist Grey Wolves party and would be very reluctant to overrule the will of Azerbaijan", he says.
"On the other hand, what can change is perhaps adapting a less aggressive and threatening attitude towards neighbouring countries than the attitude deployed lately by President Erdogan's diplomacy," he said, listing the cases of Greece, Libya, Syria and Iraq.
In the event of a victory for the opposition, "we can perhaps expect to have a little calm, a little peaceful relations and, perhaps, prepare the ground for discreet diplomacy to be able to establish relations between Armenia and Turkey at the appropriate time," he says, stressing that positive signals give cause for hope.
"There was an exceptional opening of the Armenian-Turkish border on 7 February, when Armenia sent aid to help the victims of the 6 February earthquake" in southern Turkey, he says.
"Turkish public opinion did not expect such a show of solidarity from the completely fantasised neighbour Armenia," explains Tigrane Yegavian. "In Turkey, there is a whole narrative that is extremely hostile to Armenians, who are still perceived as internal enemies, as traitors or as external enemies who aim to tarnish Turkey's image, because they do not recognise this massacre," he says.
There is a rapprochement and football can add to this dynamic," says Ahmet Insel, who hopes that a dialogue is possible between the two peoples.
"Normalisation and reconciliation are two different things," he says, but "with the establishment of diplomatic relations, exchanges between civil societies will allow much more understanding by the majority of Turks who ignore or refuse to recognise the killings, and this will pave the way for recognition, but it may still take many years" he concedes.
If the current government in Yerevan says it is ready to establish relations with Turkey to get out of its geographical isolation and its ultra-dependence on Russia, it seems that the Azerbaijani obstacle prevents, for the moment, the development of Armenian-Turkish relations.
Watch the report at the link below
‘The thing I miss the most? Freedom’
While I was coming down the Lachin mountain serpentine, my phone started vibrating. It was someone from the Russian military base, which, as is commonly believed, maintains peace and security in the small part of Karabakh that is still controlled by the unrecognised republic.
“Andrey Valeryevich,” the man from the Russian peacekeepers base introduced himself shortly. “I was told you want to cross over to Stepanakert. Why?”
I explained that I had to see how people in Nagorno-Karabakh are living under the blockade organised by Azerbaijani eco-activists.
“The blockade?” Andrey Valeryevich chuckled. “They’re doing great, better than before! It’s us, peacekeepers, who’re under the blockade. The prices are crazy! Take a dozen eggs — three hundred rubles [€3.6] in Russian money. Isn’t that crazy? Three hundred! These ‘blockade victims’, these Armenians, are the ones selling us eggs at such prices!”
The man promised to call me back and then take me to Stepanakert. I never heard from him again.
“There’s a passage to get into Karabakh, but it costs money, 150 thousand [Armenian] drams [about €360] per person,” Armenian politologist Andrias Gukasyan tells me a few days later. “You have to first go to the Russian peacekeepers base in Goris. Why are you so surprised? You’ve come from Russia, you know what it’s like. Although I don’t recommend trying to use your Russian passport.”
Azerbaijani ecologists setting up camp on the road connecting Armenia and Karabakh. The Lachin corridor, December 2022. Photo: Telegram
Immediately upon leaving the Armenian village Tegh, my car stops before an automatic gate. Further away is the territory that has been under the control of Azerbaijan since November 2020. Inside it, there’s a little island — Stepanakert and the surrounding villages, a remnant of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh republic.
From the Armenian side, the border is guarded by an Armenian military police post. This is where Karabakh’s blockade begins. There’s another post like that in Stepanakert, in between the two there are Russian peacekeepers and Azerbaijani “ecologists” who organised the blockade.
“I can’t let you pass further,” Misha tells me, shaking his head. Misha is a police captain who speaks Russian with a barely noticeable accent. “You go further, Azerbaijanis begin shooting, I go to jail because of you.”
A convoy of trucks with Russian military licence plates reaches the gate, coming from Armenia’s territory. Two trucks are white: it’s believed that Russian transport with humanitarian aid looks like that. Misha gives me a warning sign — I’m not allowed to take photos of vehicles.
The Lachin corridor. Photo: Irina Tumakova, exclusively for Novaya Gazeta Europe
As a reminder, this is how the checkpoints came to be. After the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Stepanakert remained under the control of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh republic while the territory around it was taken over by Azerbaijan.
Karabakh and Armenia are connected via the Lachin corridor in the mountains. The corridor’s width is stated at 22 km. In reality, it’s a narrow highway where even two cars aren’t always able to let each other pass. But in the mountains, it twists up in such loops that the total width of this serpentine can really reach a dozen or two kilometres. Moreover, the loops curl up and down, too. Driving here is hard and dangerous, so Azerbaijan is building very expensive roads from its side, carving tunnels in the mountains. For Azerbaijan, Karabakh is an opportunity to “put on a show”, like Russia does in Crimea.
Armenia has also promised to build a straight and safe tunnel, but compared to December 2020, when I departed Karabakh for the last time, the only thing to have changed on the road is the surface. Before, it was full of potholes; now, there’s good asphalt. Also, burnt tanks are no longer piled up on the slopes. This corridor amidst rocks and cliffs, this sole thread connecting the unrecognised Karabakh and Armenia, has been cut off.
According to the trilateral agreement signed on 9 November 2020,
Azerbaijan pledged not to interfere with Armenians’ coming and going to and from Karabakh. The corridor has to remain under the control of Russian peacekeepers, they’re the ones ensuring the aforementioned freedom of movement.
On 12 December 2022, the road was blocked by people from Azerbaijan. They referred to themselves as eco-activists who had to verify the compliance with the environmental protection norms on two Karabakh mines — the Drmbon mine and the Kashen mine. Apparently, the Azerbaijani ecologists were concerned about Armenians most definitely mining copper and molybdenum there and violating rules en masse, all that on the property of Azerbaijan. Everyone knows how much that country values environmental protection.
Thus, the corridor was blocked by two checkpoints — an “ecological” and a “peacekeeping” one. The peacekeepers are not letting ecologists enter Stepanakert, but they’re also not interfering with their blocking of the highway.
A month ago, on 22 February, the UN International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled that uninterrupted movement should be ensured across the Lachin corridor. Azerbaijan assures that the movement is already quite uninterrupted. Armenia claims that Karabakh remains under the blockade.
“I live with my elderly mum, and taking care of her has become much more difficult. Especially on the days they turn off the gas. Because we’re in constant need of hot water, and we have a gas boiler. Two days ago, the gas was turned off again,” local resident Gayane Arustamyan says.
“The blockade? Well, the road hasn’t been blown up. Lately, the food has been available. There are different grains, in general, one can get by. There’s flour, there’s bread. I can’t say that there’s an actual famine. Although, for the past few days, there have been some disruptions again, but the food is being delivered, more or less. It’s just that the prices have skyrocketed because it’s very expensive to deliver stuff here. They have to pay several thousand dollars for every vehicle. Then suddenly something new arrives in the shops and we find out that the Russian peacekeepers are responsible for the delivery. They’re allowed to cross over, the “ecologists” let them through. So [the Russian peacekeepers] deliver food here in their cars. You know, those white trucks. Humanitarian aid? They probably do give out something for free as humanitarian aid, but most of it goes to the shops. Ask any vendor why it’s so expensive, all of them will explain — because the peacekeepers ask for several thousand dollars for every vehicle.”
“From time to time, medication gets delivered too, by the Red Cross. But no one brings adult diapers, for example. They say it’s because they take up too much space, that’s what I was told in several pharmacies.”
“There’s no chicken meat at all, but other meat is available to buy, because it’s local, only that it has become more expensive, one kilo costs 4,400 drams (about 900 rubles, or €11 — author’s note). People have to get animal feed delivered and everything, so meat is getting more expensive with every day. Now, spring has come, people need to start up on their field work, but the Azerbaijani soldiers won’t let them do that, they shoot at the tractors from their checkpoints.”
People queueing up for food handed out under the ticket system. Photo: Ani Balayan
“We have a ticket system for basic necessities. Butter, rice, grains, eggs — there’s enough for everyone with tickets. Vegetables and fruit can be bought for normal prices if you have a ticket, but everything else is very expensive. Unaffordable with our paychecks.”
“The city has been significantly damaged, many people had to close down their businesses. I can’t even describe it. Everything around us is closing down. There’s only a few shops left.”
“After the death of police officers (on 5 March, a car of the unrecognised republic’s police department was shot at, three police officers were killed — editor’s note), we went to the Russian peacekeeper contingent, we wanted to express our protest against everything going on. There’s a lot of blame on our locals too when it comes to the police officers’ death — if you are driving on a military road, you have to be more careful. That’s what I think. But at the same time, the peacekeepers are there exactly so things like that don’t happen. Why even have them at all then? The Russian peacekeepers have this slogan: ‘With us, there’s peace’. So we asked them: with you, there’s peace, are you for real? One of them came out and started butting heads with our boys. But they only talked to each other in loud voices, and that was the end of it. How Russia could be treating us like this, I don’t know. “
“What’s the thing I miss the most? Freedom. You know, if you’re able to get through to us… Can you bring me some tea? Just a simple pack of tea, regular tea…”
The police car that was attacked from the side of Azerbaijan. Photo: Telegram
“According to the trilateral agreement, this road is a humanitarian corridor to connect Armenia with Armenian residents of Karabakh,” this is how Azerbaijani political analyst Ilhar Velidaze explains the recent protests in the Lachin corridor. “However, we are able to follow the cargo movement through satellites and we have observed several times that the road is used for military cargo too, as well as soldiers coming in from Armenia. We couldn’t just act indifferently. Furthermore, armed groups that Armenia claims are the Nagorno-Karabakh defence army are operating on the territory of Azerbaijan. Did anyone even recognise this ‘army’? Finally, Azerbaijan’s natural deposits are being exploited on the territory of Karabakh inhabited by Armenians. These are polymetallic and copper deposits, and the ores were transported through that road illegally, seeing as this is internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan and any economic activity can only be carried out here after alerting Azerbaijan. All of these issues led to tighter controls over the road.”
However, the Lachin corridor is being blocked by people who call themselves “ecologists”. Ilhar Velidaze only recalls this fact after I ask him about how any of it is connected to protecting the environment.
A Russian peacekeeper and an Azerbaijani “ecologist” demonstrating the gesture of Turkish nationalist organisation Grey Wolves. The Lachin corridor, December 2022. Photo: Telegram
“There was a preliminary agreement with Armenia that representatives of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Ecology would be monitoring the territory of Karabakh where these deposits are developed,” he says. “The group arrived with the help of Russian peacekeepers. But the local ‘authorities’, I’m putting this word in quotation marks, interfered with [their work]. We just wanted to determine the damage caused to the environment. Forestlands were destroyed there, there were incidents with pollution of water resources, etc. But the local ‘authorities’ opposed this — and here came the ecologists’ campaign.”
During the four months of the “ecologists’ campaign”, several studies were published in Armenia, the authors of which claim that the activists in the Lachin corridor don’t have very much to do with the environment.
Former Ombudsman of Armenia Arman Tatoyan, founder of Centre for Law and Justice, published a report, which, according to him, proves that the pseudo-ecologists “never had anything to do with environmental issues and… are pursuing political objectives”. Having studied the activists’ social media pages, the Tatoyan foundation concluded that the road was blocked by “former servicemen” and “people who spread the ideas of the terrorist organisation Grey Wolves”.
“The claim that these people aren’t ecologists isn’t backed up by any facts,” Ilhar Velizade opposes. “Onsite studies could be carried out by any group that has come here to examine the situation.”
“I have three children, the oldest will turn ten in May, the middle one is four, and the youngest has just turned three,” Nara says. “My oldest is ill and is always on medication. He’s been suffering from cystic fibrosis and epilepsy since he was a kid. He needs to stay on a diet, he needs to be constantly eating green apples, but here, all the apples disappeared. While they were still being sold, I was shocked by the prices. In Yerevan, apples cost 150 drams, here they were 3,000.”
“Also, we’re only being delivered foods that the people always buy, while something additional, that my child needs, does not get transported here. Things have become a little bit better now; in January, there was nothing in the shops. But in January, many here were saying that they wouldn’t be leaving. Now, those who have children want to leave, because there’s no work here anymore. As for me, I’m a lawyer by trade, but there’s no work for me in Artsakh, so I’m studying to become a social worker.”
A market in Stepanakert. Photo: Ani Balayan
“Several days after the start of the blockade, we ran out of medication for my son, then it disappeared entirely — I couldn’t find it in pharmacies. I decided to take my son to Yerevan for treatment. But I was told it’s impossible to leave.”
“Many pass through, despite the blockade, but not for free. This is how my acquaintances went to Yerevan and back, through the Russian peacekeepers. I’ve heard different prices, up to $1,000 per person.”
A market in Stepanakert. Photo: Ani Balayan
“I got help from our former [State] Minister [of Nagorno-Karabakh] Ruben Vardanyan. After I met with him, I received a phone call from the Health Ministry and was told to prepare documents needed for my son to go to Yerevan. On the evening of 8 February, I got a phone call and was told that tomorrow we would be leaving in a Red Cross car. On 9 February, we were able to leave and stayed in Yerevan for a month. My son got treatment. Then I got a phone call from his school, they told me that if he didn’t go back he would have to retake the school year. I called the Ministry of Health and said that I want to go back because my son needs to go back to school. And we went back, also with the Red Cross. But in a month, we’ll have to go to Yerevan again.”
“One of the medications my son needs is very expensive, and he needs 12 pills a day. The government is currently providing us with it for free. The rest, we buy ourselves. I stocked up for the month we’d stay here back in Yerevan. When it runs out, we’ll have to go again.”
“It’s hard when the power gets turned off. And that happens constantly, every two hours for an hour. They say that moving forward, they will be turning it off every hour. It’s good that they turned the gas back on, at least we have hot water in the house.”
“No supply of medicine”. A sign raising awareness about the situation in Artsakh. Yerevan. Photo: Irina Tumakova, exclusively for Novaya Gazeta Europe
Head of the Conflictology Department of Azerbaijan’s Institute of World and Democracy Arif Yunusov agrees that the “ecologists’” campaign is connected to the two mines that de jure became property of Azerbaijan after the 2020 war but de facto are developed by Karabakh’s Armenians. But the conflictologist has his own explanation of what’s happening on both sides of the Lachin corridor.
“Because of these two mines where copper and molybdenum are extracted there was a conflict between Azerbaijan and Russia,” he says. “There’s this company, Anglo Asian Mining Company, some of its shares are owned by daughters of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev. Back in 1997, Azerbaijan granted [the company] the right of development of all deposits of gold, copper, and molybdenum in the country. But the two mines in question were on the territory controlled by Armenia for 25 years, and at that time their development was carried out by a formally Armenian company, however, its actual owner is a Russian billionaire. After the war, when Azerbaijan got Karabakh back, Ilham Aliyev raised the issue with this Russian company: for quarter of a century, you were extracting our non-ferrous metals, time to strike a deal. It seems they did come to an agreement because Azerbaijan was planning to plead the case in front of an internal court, but there was no case after all. In July of last year, Azerbaijan signed a contract with Anglo Asian Mining Company that included these two mines too, receiving $3 billion in return.”
If Arif Yunusov is to be believed, then
the Anglo Asian Company miners who had paid $3 billion were unable to begin the development of those mines, seeing as de facto the territory is controlled by the Russian peacekeepers. They needed Russia’s consent,
and Russia, it seems, was ready to come to an agreement with Azerbaijan.
Residents of Karabakh heading towards a blockpost with Russian peacekeepers for another attempt at negotiations. Stepanakert, December 2022. Photo: Ani Balayan
“Putin sent Ruben Vardanyan to Karabakh as his representative,” Arif Yunusov continues. “He was conducting secret talks about these mines, but they fell through. But for Putin, the main thing wasn’t the mines. Russia, dissatisfied with Pashinyan, assumed that Vardanyan would gain power in Karabakh, the next step being his candidacy as Armenian Prime Minister. Because as of now, no matter what protests are taking place in Yerevan, at least 60% of Armenians are still backing Pashinyan. Russia needed a new leader of the Armenian opposition, not connected to the ‘previous ones’. And he did become a notorious figure in Armenia. You may recall how Presidents [Robert] Kocharyan and [Serzh] Sargsyan came into power, they’re from Karabakh too. Karabakh is a jumping off point.”
This is Arif Yunusov’s version of events, but it has a right to exist. In Yerevan, I was explained by every second person I talked to — not all Armenians are pro-Pashinyan, but the majority of them hate his predecessors with their entire being, and it’s these former politicians who now make up the Armenian opposition.
Ruben Vardanyan, Russian billionaire of Armenian origin, came back to Armenia in September of last year, went to Karabakh, and was appointed State Minister. After the start of the blockade, he visited Karabakh’s villages, promised to punish vendors for high prices, and in general became a popular man in Stepanakert.
“All the moves made by Vardanyan in Karabakh in these three months were the correct ones,” journalist Naira Arutyunyan admits. “Negative reactions to his work came from three centres: Baku, Moscow, and Yerevan’s government.”
Perhaps, Ruben Vardanyan wasn’t Putin’s messenger. Perhaps, he was one but suddenly decided to start caring about the interests of Karabakh’s Armenians. Or perhaps, the entire thing was about the negotiations about the mines. In February, it came out that Vardanyan was dismissed from his position, as per the condition put forward by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. That was soon after the UN International Court of Justice demanded the Lachin corridor be unblocked. But the “ecologists’” pickets remained.
“We’re no longer talking about eco-activists,” Arif Yunusov clarifies.
“Now, Baku sends students there. If you have [failed in some class], you are asked: want to get a good grade? And so you get on the bus.”
“You stand in the cold for a bit, yell something — that’s it.”
When the condition of Vardanyan’s dismissal was fulfilled, Azerbaijan brought forward another one — this one has as much to do with the environment and ecologists (nothing).
“Now, they’re demanding there be a checkpoint built on that road because the Armenians are allegedly transporting weapons into Karabakh,” Arif Yunusov says. “Azerbaijan is suffering a big reputation loss; furthermore, the blockade makes no sense at all, the Russian peacekeepers deliver everything needed to Karabakh. It’s time for [Azerbaijan] to lift the blockade, but they’re being stubborn and continuing with it. Meanwhile, Russia is not agreeing to a checkpoint being built.”
“My mum is still in Stepanakert,” Naira says. “She’s 92, she has stage 4 cancer; over the past year, she’s barely been out of bed, she had to use diapers. But seeing as there’s no more diapers in Stepanakert due to the blockade, mum has started getting up again.”
“Before, I would constantly visit my mum, to take care of her. My daughter-in-law and I would take shifts — one month I would be with mum, and then she would come in. Mum has an open wound that needs to constantly be treated. When the blockade started, I couldn’t go to take my daughter-in-law’s place. I mean, I could, of course, go to Goris where the Russian peacekeepers base is located. You have to stay there for about two weeks and plead your case, make a deal with them. Yes, all of this takes about two weeks. There are channels one has to go through to make a deal with the peacekeepers, so they transport you to Stepanakert, there’s a tax. All of this is, of course, unofficial. The only official way is to file a request to the Red Cross, and if there’s a real pressing need to go, they take you.”
“In Goris, there’s a live queue of people who arrived to make a deal with the peacekeepers to be taken [to Stepanakert]. I know someone who spent a month there waiting for his turn.
While you’re waiting for the unofficial authorisation from the peacekeepers, you have to stay in a hotel. But if you have a Karabakh registration, then you can stay there for free, the Armenian government allocated money for that. I could go to mum this way, but I’m scared that I won’t be able to go back. My job needs me to have a good connection, but in Karabakh the power gets turned off ten times per day. If I stop working, we won’t be able to make ends meet.”
We hired a sitter for mum, I pay her. I transfer the money to my niece’s bank card, she tries to withdraw it from a cash machine. The cash is also delivered to Karabakh in trucks by the peacekeepers, but there’s never enough money in the cash machines. You have to run around, find out which one has any. Furthermore, a cash machine doesn’t allow withdrawal of more than 20,000 drams. I send my niece 50,000 drams, while she asks me for 40,000, so she would have to go two times and not three.”
“The food is allocated through tickets, but you have to stay in a line to get them. My daughter-in-law is of age, so it’s hard for her to stand. When I send her money, she can at least buy something in the shop nearby.”
“The gas flows to Karabakh through the territory that has been under the control of Azerbaijan since 2020.
Early last year, Azerbaijan cut off gas for the first time. I was with my mum at that time. That was the worst winter out of all that I remember.
The snow was waist-deep. And during the coldest period, the gas got turned off. There, you need gas for heating and hot water. At first, we were confused and didn’t know what to do at all. Then we began to search for stoves in attics and garages. Now, people’ve got wood stoves in their flats, one thing Karabakh has plenty of is wood, for heating.”
“Medication is delivered to Karabakh by the Red Cross. There’s a rehabilitation centre in Stepanakert founded and financed by a British baroness. It immediately turned into a centre of allocating aid. Everyone who needs medicine non-stop was registered there, they also helped people with chronic diseases. At first, the centre had its own medication reserves, but they all were spent. Then the Red Cross started helping with getting medicine. My mum, for example, gets delivered bandages and cotton wool. Unfortunately, they don’t have diapers.”
“I spent my entire life in Hadrut, four generations of my relatives are buried there,” Margarita tells me. “I left the town in the early hours of 8 October 2020. Two days later, Hadrut was taken; 23 people were still there, all of them were killed.”
“I remember the blockade of 1988, it was much worse. We have trade now, the Russian peacekeepers make a deal with someone in Karabakh and bring products in their vehicles. They bring it in as if it were humanitarian aid. A part is, indeed, shared for free but another part is sold in the shops. Half of it is sold to those with tickets, the rest for prices four times more expensive than in Yerevan. Especially vegetables and fruit. That is done basically in the open, everyone knows about this in Stepanakert. Because if you were to ask in the shop why everything’s so expensive, why before tomatoes cost 1,200 drams and now 4,000, you will be straight up told — because we paid one million so that the peacekeepers would transport our cargo in their white vehicles.”
“Then there were reports that they can transport people for 150,000 drams per person. It’s a well-oiled business. You have to either go to the base in Goris or to Khojali. And people are scared that this channel will be closed down too.”
“After the war, my daughter and I stayed in Yerevan because we found jobs here. But half of my family is currently in Stepanakert. My husband has a job here and my son has a business. He founded it back in Hadrut, then in Stepanakert he and his wife took out a loan and built a greenhouse. Last year, they were preparing to sow seeds but then the blockade started. The gas and power were turned off in Karabakh, it was impossible to heat the greenhouse. They sold everything they had grown to be able to cover their debts, barely. Now, they’re considering what they can sow that doesn’t need to be heated at least in spring. But they need to get the chemicals, fertilisers, and the rest from somewhere. They got lucky that my son had bought seeds before the corridor was closed. They live off my husband and daughter-in-law’s paychecks, she was able to get a job in an art school. That’s life — when you try your best time and time again, but still end up with nothing.”
https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/03/24/the-thing-i-miss-the-most-freedom-en
Armenian court rules to abide by ICC, can arrest Putin on Armenian territory [Ukrainian opinion]
Armenia's Constitutional Court ruled on March 24 that the International Criminal Court's (ICC) obligations are in line with its national constitution, Russian independent media Novaya Gazeta reported.
The Armenian Constitutional Court's ruling means that there would be a legal obligation to arrest either Russian dictator Vladimir Putin or Maria Lvova-Belova should they step foot on Armenian territory.
On March 17, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova, the Russian official allegedly overseeing the forced deportations of over 16,000 Ukrainian children to Russia.
Armenia has economic, military, and political connections with Russia, making the ruling significant.
The news comes in stark contrast to Bloomberg's reporting on March 21, which stated that Hungary blocked the release of a joint statement by European Union member states on the ICC arrest warrant for Putin.
Armenia: EU awards €300,000 to Ijevan to implement cultural strategy
The Armenian city of Ijevan has won the EU4Culture project competition and will receive a grant of up to €300,000 from the European Union to implement the city’s Cultural Development Strategy. The project’s official launch event took place today in Ijevan.
The strategy aims to improve cultural infrastructures through continuous creative activities, to ensure a vibrant cultural life closely related to economic development, contribute to the preservation of historical and cultural heritage, improve cultural development capacities and effectively manage the cultural sector. The strategic approaches were presented to the public of Ijevan, and the strategy has been approved by the community council.
The launch event was attended by Andrea Wiktorin, Ambassador of the EU Delegation to Armenia, Vache Terteryan, First Deputy Minister of ICT, Artur Martirosyan, Deputy Minister of ESCS, Hayk Ghalumyan, Governor of Tavush, Natia Micheladze-Bakhsoliani, Head of the Goethe-Zentrum-Eriwan, Anatoly Beifert, Head of the EU4Culture project, and Artur Chagharyan, Head of Ijevan community.
The Ijevan Municipality project, ‘WE ARE OUR MOUNTAINS’, will be implemented in 2023-2024. The main approaches of the project are the decentralised cultural development and the focus on the settlements of Ijevan, as well as the development of creative and proactive thinking among the community residents. The project’s general objective is to build a solid and cooperative cultural field in the extended community of Ijevan by promoting the development of the cultural economy and the preservation of cultural heritage.
The first component of the project – the management of the cultural sector – will be improved by increasing the visibility and recognition of Ijevan’s cultural heritage through intensive communication and branding, an inventory/mapping of tangible and intangible cultural assets of Ijevan will be carried out, and continuous training in the field of cultural management will be provided through experience exchange visits with partner communities and joint through initiatives.
The second component of the project – active cultural and economic life – will be promoted through local creative cultural initiatives. Small grants will be awarded to encourage the collaborative and creative cultural sector and preserve cultural heritage. They will be joint initiatives of business representatives, civil society and individuals who will be trained and present their ideas in the format of “Giving Ideas-Getting Ideas”.
The third component of the project – cooperative, culture-based economic development – will be promoted by holding annual cultural festivals.
The Ijevan municipality will implement the project in cooperation with the “Urban” Sustainable Development Foundation.
The EU4Culture project is funded by the European Union to support culture and the creative sector with a special focus on non-capital cities and towns in the Eastern Partnership Countries. The project is implemented by Goethe Institut (lead), Czech Centres, Danish Cultural Institute and Institut Français de Géorgie.
Find out moreFor additional information, contact Lilit Ghalumyan /Head of Education, Culture, Sports, Youth, Social Support and Health Department of Ijevan Municipality.
https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/armenia-eu-awards-e300000-to-ijevan-to-implement-cultural-strategy/