Skip to main content

Baku court orders 4-month pre-trial jail term for Ruben Vardanyan


YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 28, ARMENPRESS. A court in Baku has ordered Ruben Vardanyan to be jailed for 4 months in pre-trial detention, Azeri news media reported Thursday.

Vardanyan, the co-founder of the Aurora Humanitarian Initiative and former State Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), was arrested by Azeri border guards while trying to leave Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia along with tens of thousands of forcibly displaced persons.

He was flown to Baku to stand trial on fabricated charges of terrorism financing, illegal border crossing and membership to outlawed armed formations.

8 more bodies found in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azeri attack


YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 26, ARMENPRESS. 10 people were found on Monday in Nagorno-Karabakh during ongoing search and rescue operations after the September 19-20 Azeri attack.

8 bodies were also found during the September 25 search operations.

5 of the 10 people were handed over by Azerbaijan to Nagorno-Karabakh. 5 of the 8 bodies were also handed over by the Azeri side, the State Service of Emergency Situations of Nagorno-Karabakh said in a statement.

Armenian central bank increases growth projection from 6,9% to 7,2%


YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 12, ARMENPRESS. The Armenian Central Bank has increased its projection for the country’s economic growth this year from 6,9% to 7,2%, Central Bank Governor Martin Galstyan said Tuesday.

“We’ve slightly revised the economic growth indicator, and instead of the previously projected 6,9 percent we are now forecasting 7,2 percent, mostly due to the high growth in services and construction sectors,” Galstyan said at a press conference.

Azerbaijani president, Blinken discuss opening roads for cargo delivery to Karabakh

Russia – Sept 6 2023
The President of Azerbaijan said that after the opening of the Agdam-Khankendi road, the Lachin-Khankendi road can also be opened "with the application of the rules of the customs and border regime of Azerbaijan"

BAKU, September 6. /TASS/. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev discussed opening roads so that cargo could be delivered to Karabakh during a phone conversation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the press service of the Azerbaijani President reported.

According to it, the conversation took place on the initiative of the US side on September 1. "During the telephone conversation, views on issues related to the opening of the Aghdam-Khankendi and Lachin-Khankendi roads were exchanged. President Aliyev emphasized that the notorious separatist regime Armenia has created and supported in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan deliberately prevents the opening of Aghdam-Khankendi road as well as creates artificial obstacles for its use. <…> Azerbaijan’s President noted that this denial to use Aghdam-Khankendi road is political manipulation, and the statements about the humanitarian or food crisis in this territory are deliberate lies," the report says.

The Azerbaijani president also said that after opening Aghdam-Khankendi road, Lachin-Khankendi road can also be opened "with the application of the rules of customs and border control regime of Azerbaijan". Aliyev also emphasized that Armenia's delivery of cargoes to the Lachin border checkpoint, which it claims have humanitarian purpose, without coordination with the Azerbaijani side "is interference in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan and disrespect for its territorial integrity and sovereignty." "The Azerbaijani president noted that such a policy severely harms the negotiations on the peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan," the report states.

According to the press service, Blinken announced that he would continue efforts aimed at signing a peace treaty and normalizing relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. He emphasized that the US has been keeping in direct contact with Baku and the Karabakh Armenians.

According to the Armenian side, the Lachin corridor, which is the only land route from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, was blocked by a group of Azerbaijanis on December 12, 2022. Baku then officially established a checkpoint on the border with Armenia near the Hakari Bridge. The Azerbaijani side has repeatedly declared its readiness to provide the Armenian population of the region with everything they need via the Aghdam-Khankendi highway.

The unsolved mystery of an ancient grave at Brabourne Road, Kolkata

India – Sept 3 2023


Hidden inside the chaos of Kolkata’s business district, right next to Brabourne Road flyover, is an oasis of peace and calm. Shaded by jamun and mango trees, an old church hides in plain sight.

On any day except Sunday, you will have to wade through a literal ocean of humanity before you arrive here. This is the Armenian Church of the Holy Nazareth — recognised as the oldest church in Calcutta.

It is believed that the original church building — a small wooden structure — was built around 1688. It burnt down in a devastating fire in 1707. The campus was originally a graveyard for the Armenian community. The present church building came up on this graveyard in 1724. If you visit it today, you will find scattered around the church building old tombstones. One of these has piqued the interest of historians for years now and led to much debate and discussion without a definite resolution.

The Armenians have a long history with the subcontinent. The first documented arrival is of a trader named Thomas Cana who reached Malabar in 780 AD. The Ottoman and Safavid conquests of the Armenian lands in the 15th century led to a mass exodus of the community from their motherland and many landed in Mughal north India. One of the more illustrious ones was Abdul Hai who became the Chief Justice of Emperor Jalaluddin Akbar. Slowly, they spread away from Agra to other provinces like Punjab and Bengal. Many Armenians worked as officers in the armies of native rulers.

As winds of fortune showed signs of diversion from the Mughal dynasty to European powers, the Armenians were quick to sniff it. On June 22, 1688, a treaty was signed in London between the English East India Company and the Armenian community in India that granted favourable trading rights to the community as well as equal rights with British subjects regarding the freedom of residence, travel, religion and unrestricted access to civil offices. It coincides well with the construction of the church in what would become the metropolis of Calcutta.

But hidden behind the church building, lies a gravestone that throws up the logical flow of time into a whirlwind. Mesrovb Jacob Seth, the 19th century Armenian historian and writer decoded the gravestone’s message as below:

Trinanjan Chakraborty

This is the tomb of


Wife of the Late Charitable Sookias

Who departed from

This World to

Life Eternal

On the 11 th July, 1630

The year mentioned is 60 years before Job Charnock’s famous landing somewhere near present-day Nimtolla Ghat that put in motion events that saw three small hamlets transform into the second most important city in the entire British Empire. But does it mean that as early as 1630, in the second year of Emperor Shah Jahan’s rule, there was a community of Armenians in this region – back then dominated by forests, marshlands and swamps?

We look for answers to the writings of Mesrovb Jacob Seth. He writes, “Armenians formed their first settlement in Bengal in the year 1665 by virtue of a farman issued by Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb granting them a piece of land at Saidabad, with full permission to form a settlement there.” This does seem to rule out the possibility of an Armenian settlement in what would become Calcutta in future back in 1630. But then how does one explain this oddity?

The simplest explanation is that maybe Mesrovb Jacob Seth made a mistake while translating. After all, the inscriptions on the original gravestone may have become eroded with time so it is not entirely impossible that such a mistake might take place. But Mesrovb Jacob Seth was a foremost authority on Armenian history in the subcontinent and him making such a mistake while not impossible, certainly seems improbable.

In the 18th century, a rich Armenian businessman of Calcutta by the name of Catchick Arakiel sponsored refurbishing of the interiors of the church, construction of a watch-tower, residents for priests and erection of boundary walls for the compound. His son, Agah Moses Catchick Arakiel wrote a letter to an Englishman of the name Hawksworth in 1801. The latter got the letter published in The East Indian Chronologist. Agah Moses writes, “…Shortly after establishment of Calcutta by the English, the Armenians settled amongst them….” This also lines up with the signing of the trade treaty in London in 1688. It is worthwhile noting here that except that of Rezabeebeh, there is no other tombstones in the Church compound that date back to the 17th century.

Writing on this matter, the famous historian Professor CR Wilson states, “Regarding the earliest grave of an Armenian churchyard in Calcutta, the tombstone is dated 11th July, 1630 AD. This has been taken as showing that the Armenians were established in Calcutta as early as 1630. The inference does not seem valid. The instance is isolated. No other tombstones in the churchyard are dated earlier than the 18th century. There is nothing to show the stone is situ. It may well have been brought to Calcutta from elsewhere…..Even if the stone is in situ, it does not prove the existence of an Armenian colony. In India, a person must be buried where he dies. If an Armenian voyager died in a ship near Calcutta, it would be necessary to bury the body here.”

Mesrovb Jacob Seth does mention that Armenians had trade relations with the Dutch at Chinsurah as early as 1645. So it does seem probable that Rezebeebeh mostly died while on a ship voyage somewhere on the Hooghly and was buried on the nearby coast. Years later, when the Armenian community built a settlement in the region, her grave was possibly moved to their graveyard.

While this does seem the most likely explanation, not everyone is satisfied. Thus, the mystery of Rezabeebeh Sookias’ grave continues to this day. But then again, isn’t life rather dull without a whiff of mystery.

Be as that may, if you have never been to the Armenian Church, I do recommend a visit. And do make a point to check out the most mysterious tombstone in Calcutta.

Reference: Kolikata Dorpon (Calcutta Mirror) – Volume I by Radharaman Mitra

Azerbaijan summons French ambassador for sending humanitarian aid to Nagorno-Karabakh

Sept 1 2023
 1 September 2023

Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo accompanying the French humanitarian aid convoy to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry has summoned French Ambassador Anne Boillon and handed her a note of protest against her country for sending a humanitarian convoy to the Lachin Corridor.

On Thursday, Baku accused Paris of interfering in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs and violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity by sending a humanitarian aid convoy to blockaded Nagorno-Karabakh.

France had sent a convoy of 10 lorries to Nagorno-Karabakh — its second in less than a month. The convoy, accompanied by Anne Hidalgo, the mayor of Paris, was blocked from entering the region.

[Read on OC Media: Azerbaijan blocks French convoy from reaching Nagorno-Karabakh, sends its own]

‘These provocative actions, which are a tool of the campaign of lies and manipulation by Armenia, are another example of steps aimed at escalating the situation in the region and encouraging Armenia to continue its revanchist stance, which has intensified in recent days’, stated the ministry. 

The ministry also accused France of endangering the ‘fragile normalisation process promoted by the active efforts of international actors in the region’.

Nagorno-Karabakh has been under varying degrees of blockade since December and has been completely cut off from supplies from Armenia since mid-June as Baku continues to insist that the Lachin Corridor — the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia — was not under blockade.

France has yet to comment on the summoning of its ambassador.

Paris and Baku have been locked in a series of strained diplomatic exchanges over the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, with France repeatedly calling on Azerbaijan to lift the blockade and allow for the passage of humanitarian aid and goods to Nagorno-Karabakh through the corridor.

Baku has instead insisted that Nagorno-Karabakh receives humanitarian aid through Azerbaijani territory, as Paris and Yerevan warn of a worsening humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Le Figaro has reported that France is preparing to submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council for the provision of assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians ‘who are on the verge of starvation due to the blockade of Azerbaijan’.

Azerbaijan has come under increasing international pressure over the closure of the Lachin Corridor.

On Thursday, US State Department Spokesperson Mathew Miller expressed ‘deep concern’ about ‘deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Nagorno-Karabakh resulting from the continued blockage of food, medicine, and other goods essential to a dignified existence’.

‘We reiterate our call to immediately re-open the Lachin corridor to humanitarian, commercial, and passenger traffic’, he said.

Miller urged the officials of Baku and Stepanakert to ‘convene without delay to agree on the means of transporting critical provisions to the men, women, children of Nagorno-Karabakh’.

‘Basic humanitarian assistance should never be held hostage to political disagreements’, stated Miller.

Baku quickly condemned Washington’s statement, with Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Aykham Hajizade stating that the Lachin Corridor was open for ‘Armenian residents in both directions on a daily basis’.

Hajizade pointed to Stepanakert and Yerevan’s rejection of Azerbaijan’s proposal to send supplies to Nagorno-Karabakh through Azerbaijan-controlled territories.

‘[The] constant rejection of the proposals of Azerbaijan once again demonstrates that the situation is not at all humanitarian, but rather political in nature,’ he said.

For ease of reading, we choose not to use qualifiers such as ‘de facto’, ‘unrecognised’, or ‘partially recognised’ when discussing institutions or political positions within Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. This does not imply a position on their status.

Azerbaijan-Türkiye Military Relations in the Shadow of the Negotiations with Armenia

The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Aug 21 2023
Cavid Veliyev
This issue of Turkeyscope focuses on the essence and the impact of the Azerbaijani-Turkish military alliance in the Caucasus. By analyzing the deepening collaboration between the two states, Dr. Cavid Veliyev of Azerbaijan’s Center for Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) highlights the shifting balance of power in the region in favor of the Azerbaijan-Türkiye duo in the face of ongoing tension with Armenia.
August 20, 2023

One of the most important dimensions of Türkiye–Azerbaijan relations is the two countries’ military relationship. Over the course of 30 years, many agreements and protocols have been signed between the two countries, which have contributed to the development of their military relations. The founding principle of this military relationship was to meet the officer training needs of the Azerbaijani army. In subsequent years, this cooperation expanded to include joint military exercises and cooperation in the defense sector. The pinnacle of military cooperation between the two countries was the Shusha Declaration on allied relations signed on June 15, 2021.

This cooperation supported the existence of a strong Azerbaijani army that had a decisive impact not only on the outcome of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (hereafter: “Second Karabakh War”), but also on the diplomatic negotiations that continued thereafter. Even after the Second Karabakh War, effective measures were taken against Armenia’s ongoing provocations. Therefore, achievements in the military field and the shift in the balance of power also affected the outcome of diplomatic negotiations.

Basic agreements regarding Azerbaijan–Türkiye military relations

Four basic agreements were signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey that form the basis of their military cooperation and determine the direction of the relationship: (1) the 1992 Military Training Cooperation Agreement; (2) the agreement on military education, technical, and scientific cooperation signed between the parties on June 10, 1996; (3) the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance on August 16, 2010; and (4) the Shusha Declaration on allied relations on June 15, 2021.

The Military Training Cooperation Agreement, which was signed on August 11, 1992, in Ankara,[1] envisaged meeting the officer training needs of the Azerbaijani army. It remains in force today. Through the agreement, Azerbaijani officers received training in military schools in Türkiye, and Turkish commanders supported the establishment of military schools in Azerbaijan and provided consultancy to the army. According to Hulusi Akar, the former Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of Türkiye, more than 7,000 Azerbaijani Army personnel have received training in Turkish military schools. This agreement was subsequently supplemented by additional agreements and protocols signed between other army units and law enforcement agencies.[2] Between 1997 and 2013, more than 400 gendarmes were sent to Türkiye for training courses.[3]

It has been observed that Türkiye’s support[4] for the transition of the Azerbaijani army to NATO standards increased after the agreement on military education, technical, and scientific cooperation was signed between the parties on June 10, 1996. Following this agreement, and with the support and participation of the Turkish Armed Forces, the Azerbaijan Military Academy, the Azerbaijan Military Air Force School and the Azerbaijan Military Maritime School were restructured and brought up to NATO standards. As part of this process, the Military Academy of the Azerbaijan Armed Forces was established with the support of the Turkish Armed Forces.[5] Officers from Türkiye provided training in these schools and President Haydar Aliyev, who made a speech at the first graduation ceremony in 2001, recommended to the graduates of the Military Academy that they take the Turkish Armed Forces as an example.[6] A further agreement was signed between the two countries’ defense ministries in Baku on March 14, 2008, to ensure that the Azerbaijan Air Force Academy has a structure similar to that of the Turkish Air Force Academy and to determine the duties, authority, and responsibilities of the personnel assigned from the Turkish Air Force in this context. For this purpose, two Turkish officers are assigned to the school: one as the advisor to the school commander, and the other as the head of faculty and student battalion commander.[7]

The Agreement on Strategic Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed by Azerbaijan and Türkiye on August 16, 2010. This agreement envisaged cooperation between the parties on four issues, two of which were in the military field. The first topic involved alignment on military-political and security issues; the second was regarding military and military-technological cooperation.

The parties have agreed that they will provide mutual assistance to each other under Article 51 of the UN Charter in the case of being subject to armed intervention or attack by a third state or states. Under Article 8 of the agreement, it was decided to make all necessary national arrangements for the development of military infrastructure, the preparation of the armed forces, and their supply with the necessary weapons and military technology for the purpose of carrying out joint military operations. Article 9 concerns defense industry products and technological guarantees to facilitate expanded cooperation in the field of defense; the production and creation of defensive products; carrying out joint military exercises and defensive activities; preparation of personnel for the armed forces; and military medicine and medical personnel. It was decided to determine other areas of cooperation through further discussions.

In the period that followed, cooperation between the two countries, especially in the military field, developed rapidly. First, the number of military exercises increased. Second, cooperation in the field of the defense industry has developed following Türkiye’s successful development of a globally competitive defense industry.

Karabakh Victory and Shusha

As a result of the Armenian army’s violation of the ceasefire at the front and attacking civilian settlements on September 27, 2020, the Azerbaijani army counterattacked and liberated its lands from occupation in just 44 days. The military cooperation it had established with Türkiye over the preceding 30 years had a significant impact on the success of the Azerbaijani army, which carried out the most successful military campaign of the modern era. Notably, the Turkish army did not directly participate in this conflict but rather prepared the Azerbaijani army for any type of defensive war.

First, the Azerbaijani army made active use of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 drones, thereby minimizing the loss of troops and enabling it to easily cross the Armenian-held front lines. Second, as in the five-day war of 2016, officers trained in Türkiye demonstrated notable success in this conflict. Third, the Turkish army did not recall the F-16s it had brought to Azerbaijan for an exercise in August, sending a serious message to other countries in the region that would support Armenian occupation. Thus, on the one hand, Azerbaijan–Türkiye military cooperation contributed to the development of the Azerbaijani army, which liberated the occupied Azerbaijani lands; on the other hand, the stance of Türkiye deterred other regional states from intervening in the war itself. President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly stated that Türkiye sent a message to the whole world: do not interfere.[8]

The Second Karabakh War resulted in a Tripartite Declaration[9] signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia with the mediation of Russia on November 10, 2020. This declaration, which imposes important responsibilities on Armenia, has been evaluated as an act of capitulation by Yerevan. This declaration also brought into existence the Turkish–Russian monitoring center[10] in Aghdam, and Russia had to accept an agreement that paved the way for the Turkish army to enter the South Caucasus.

After the war ended, a new normalization process was started between the parties in the region. The priority for this normalization was the fulfillment of the conditions of the November 10 Tripartite Declaration of the parties. Although some conditions of this article have been finalized, some articles remain unfulfilled by Armenia. According to Article 4 of the Tripartite Declaration,[11] Armenian armed forces were obliged to leave the region in parallel with Russian peacekeeping troops entering Karabakh. But Armenian gunmen did not comply, and these gunmen continued to threaten peace in the region.[12] At the same time, the Armenian side used these illegal forces as a tool to support its demands in the ongoing diplomatic negotiations.

After the Second Karabakh War was over, Azerbaijan presented the Armenian side with a five-item proposal[13] as the foundation for signing a peace agreement. The proposed peace agreement would be based on mutual recognition of territorial integrity. The Armenian side accepted the need for a peace agreement but delayed its signing by putting forward various preconditions.[14] According to the Armenian side, the existing geopolitical reality in the region is against them, and changing this requires time.

Beyond these issues, an irredentist group emerged in Armenia and threatened to invade Azerbaijani lands again.[15] They did not accept the post-war situation, they saw Nikol Pashinyan as a problem.[16] And they advocated for a change of power in Armenia and for retaking the lands they had lost by starting the war again.

This group began to receive support from outside Armenia. Some regional and non-regional states wanted to change the new geopolitical reality that had emerged after the Karabakh Victory. To this purpose, they did not hesitate in giving military support to Armenia. While France was discussing giving military aid to Armenia,[17] arms were sent from India.[18] Arming Armenia negatively affected the ongoing peace negotiations between the parties. As a result of the support given from the outside, ceasefire violations began to increase on the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. In short, the possibility of further conflict after the Second Karabakh War had still not been eliminated.

It was in such an environment that the Shusha Declaration on an alliance between Azerbaijan and Türkiye was signed on June 15, 2021.[19] The Shusha Declaration, unlike previous agreements, brought the relations between the two countries to the level of an alliance. This declaration was approved by the parliaments of both countries and was turned into an international bilateral agreement. After the Karabakh Victory, the Azerbaijani army was restructured according to Türkiye’s military model.[20] Land forces, commando units, and a National Defense University (NDU) were established in the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. The aim of the NDU is to develop the command level in the military training domain in order to implement measures to help adapt the Azerbaijani army to the standards of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). A command-and-control center was also established to lead the newly formed land forces, ensure their coordination with other army units, evaluate information correctly, and relay it up the command chain.

After the Second Karabakh War, the number of Azerbaijani Army special units was increased. Later, mountain commando units were formed and received their first training in Türkiye[21] before they were deployed in Azerbaijan. The first of these commando units was formed in the strategically important town of Hadrut and the second commando brigade was established in Kelbajar after its liberation from Armenian occupation. Both were inaugurated by President Aliyev.[22]


The armed aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan since 1991 and consideration of the balance of military power in the South Caucasus led to the development of military relations between Azerbaijan and Türkiye in the post-Cold War period. Between 1992 and 2020, that is, up to the Second Karabakh War, military cooperation between the two countries developed in three directions: (1) military training, in particular, the training of Azerbaijani army officers; (2) military exercises, including increasing the war preparedness of the Azerbaijani army and preparing for the joint action of the two armies in a possible conflict; and (3) cooperation in the field of weapons technology. Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Türkiye has developed continuously over the last 30 years and has produced the following results: first, Azerbaijan has an army with a high combat capability; and second, the Azerbaijani army liberated Karabakh from occupation. Moreover, third, following the Second Karabakh War, the balance of military power in the region changed in favor of Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

After the Second Karabakh War, the Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations, signed between the two countries on June 15, 2021, raised the relationship from a strategic partnership to the level of an alliance. Although this declaration did not cover only the military dimension of the relationship, that aspect was by far the most significant. It was an important statement to protect the new geopolitical reality created in the region after the Karabakh Victory. Today, both militaries have accelerated their efforts to act as a single army, both operationally and in the military-technical realm.

In the post-war situation, Azerbaijan is undergoing a transition to the Turkish Army model.[23] It plans to reach the military-technological level of Türkiye and to continue the training of command and special forces. The common goal of the two armies is to achieve the ability to fight towards common goals in the future.

These developments are also closely related to the Azerbaijan-Armenia normalization process. When we consider that a peace agreement has not been signed between the parties after the war and that revisionist forces in Armenia remain, military power continues to be important for stability in the region.

Dr. Cavid Veliyev is the head of the department of the Center for Analysis of International Relations, based in Baku. He received his PhD in International Relations from Ankara University in 2013. Since 2009, he has worked at the Center Strategic Studies (SAM) under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan where he has served as a head of Foreign Policy Analysis Department between 2015-2019. Dr. Veliyev also served editor in chief of Caucasus International Journal between September 2017 and January 2019. He is an instructor at the Department of Political Science and Philosophy at Khazar University and the representative of OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions. Dr. Veliyev has authored several academic and editorial articles. He has co-edited the books South Caucasus: Energy, Geopolitics Rivalry and Territorial Integrity (Ankara, 2011), Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations (İstanbul, 2018) and Azerbaijan Foreign Policy: 1991-2018 (Baku, 2018). He has been frequently published on Caucasus International Journal, Anadoly Agency, Dailysabah, Hurriyet Daily News, Jamestown Foundation, National Interest, Yeni Safak, Cumhuriyyet Strateji on Turkey and South Caucasus region.

*The opinions expressed in MDC publications are the authors’ alone.

[1] The Law on Approval of the Military Education Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Official government text [Turkey] April 15, 1993. For the full text in Turkish, see here.

[2] About the “Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Turkey regarding the training and supply assistance provided by the Turkish Gendarmerie to the personnel of the General Department of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” Presidential Decree signed on October 31, 1997 by Heydar Aliev, former President of the Republic of Azerbeijan, see original text in Azerbaijani here.

[3] Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, International Relations, Official government report [Azerbaijan], N.D.

[4] Stephen Larrabee and Ian Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (RAND's Center for Middle East Policy, 2003): 105.

[5] Yahya Musayev, “Azerbaijan-Turkey Cooperation in Military-Technical Field (1991-2011),” in Cavid Veliyev, Reşat Resullu, and Kenan Aslanlı eds., Azerbaijan-Turkey: friendship, brotherhood and strategic partnership (Ankara, Berikan Publishing House, 2012) 173-180, esp. 174-175.

[6] Aliyev Heritage [Azerbaijani], “Speech of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev at the first graduation ceremony of the Azerbaijan Military Academy,” August 26, 2001..

[7] International treatiesDunya [Official Gazette, Azerbaijani], February 6, 2009..

[8] Official Presidential Website “Ilham Aliyev`s interview with Turkish Anadolu Agency,” September 28, 2021.

[9] Official Presidential Website, “Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation, Official Presidential Website,” November 10, 2020.

[10] Report News Agency [Azerbeijan], “Turkiye, Russia agreement on Monitoring Center,” January 12, 2020.

[11] Official Presidential Website, “Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation,” October 11, 2020.

[12] Trend News Agency [Azerbaijan], “Illegal Armenian formations and criminal elements remain in Karabakh – President Ilham Aliyev," March 16, 2023.

[13] Report News Agency [Azerbaijan], “Azerbaijan discloses five basic principles for normalization relations with Armenia," March 14, 2022.

[14] Radio Free Europe/Freedom [Armenian/English], “Mirzoyan Says Rights, Security of Karabakh People Key to ‘Comprehensive Settlement,” May 4, 2023.

[15] Ruzanna Stephanian, “Armenian Parliament Refuses to Back Karabakh Self-Determination,” Radio Free Europe [Armenian/English], March 21, 2023.

[16] Lillian Avedian, “Armenia’s opposition mobilizes once again to oust Pashinyan,” The Armenian Weekly, April 27, 2022.

[17] Anush Mkrtchian, “France Said to Mull Military Support For Armenia,” Radio Free Europe [Armenian/English], May 14, 2021.

[18] Manu Pubby, “Arming Armenia: India to export missiles, rockets and ammunition,” The Economic Times [India] October 6, 2022.

[19] Permanent Representation of Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe, “Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey,” June 21, 2021.

[20] Cavid Veliev, “Azerbaijan-Türkiye military cooperation: One nation, one army,” Daily Sabah, December 23, 2022.

[21] Ordu [Azerbaijani], “Turkey trains Azerbaijani commandos” [Türkiyə Azərbaycanlı komandolara təlim keçir], April 20, 2022.

[22] Official Presidential Website, “İlham Aliyev attended the openning of a military unit in Hadrut settlement,” December 24, 2021; and, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the opening ceremony of military unit in Kalbajar district,” June 27, 2022.

[23] APA news [Azerbaijan/English], “President Ilham Aliyev: Azerbaijani Army is developing on basis of Turkish model,” June 13, 2023.

UK is not aware of plans for UN Security Council resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh – embassy


YEREVAN, AUGUST 23, ARMENPRESS. The UK is not aware of plans for a UN Security Council resolution or statement regarding the humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the UK Embassy in Armenia told ARMENPRESS in written comments in response to an inquiry.

ARMENPRESS: Does your country plan to submit a draft resolution following the UN Security Council urgent meeting of August 16 regarding the humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh?

United Kingdom Embassy: The United Kingdom remains deeply concerned at the ongoing disruptions to the Lachin corridor, which threatens the supply of life-saving medication, health care, and other essential goods and services – resulting in humanitarian consequences for the local population.

It is therefore crucial that the ICJ order of February 2023 is respected to ensure unimpeded movement along the Lachin corridor in both directions.

The UK is not aware of plans for a UN Security Council resolution or statement.

"France once again calls on Azerbaijan to abide by its international obligations"

Permanent mission of France

Aug 17 2023


New York,

Thank you Madam President, and thank you also to the representative of OCHA for her briefing.
I welcome the presence here today of the Foreign Minister of Armenia.

I would like to highlight three points.

Firstly, the restrictions and total blockage of traffic on the corridor linking Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh for more than eight months are now causing a humanitarian crisis.

The persistent blocking of the Latchine corridor by Azerbaijan continues to isolate the population of Nagorno-Karabakh from the rest of the world, with no legitimate reason to justify such a situation, which runs counter to the principles of international humanitarian law.
This situation, combined with the interruption of gas and electricity supplies, the drying up of water resources, the difficulties encountered by the population in gaining access to seeds, and the shortage of fuel which is hampering agricultural work, is now degenerating into a humanitarian crisis: the risk of famine and widespread shortages, including of medicines, is imminent.

France deplores the blocking of the humanitarian aid convoy dispatched last July by the Armenian authorities in an attempt to remedy this tragic situation. The restrictions and obstacles imposed on the activities of the ICRC and other humanitarian actors, in violation of international law, are not acceptable.

In view of the gravity of the humanitarian situation, France calls for the unconditional and immediate restoration of the free movement of goods, people and merchandise along the Latchine corridor, in both directions, and for a continuous supply of gas and electricity to the population.

Since our last public meeting, the International Court of Justice issued an order on February 22, 2023. This order indicated provisional measures, which are binding, and require Azerbaijan, in accordance with its obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure the unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and goods along the Latchine corridor in both directions". In its Order of July 6, 2023, noting the precariousness of the situation between the Parties, the Court confirmed "the need for effective implementation of the measure indicated in its Order of February 22, 2023".

As the UN Secretary-General did on August 2, France once again calls on Azerbaijan to abide by its international obligations, and to implement the provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice.

In light of the gravity of the situation, France welcomes the ICRC’s action on the ground, and will reinforce its support. France calls for immediate, free and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations and UN agencies to the populations concerned, and for the reopening of the Latchine corridor.

Madam President,
France remains fully committed to promoting a lasting and just peace in the region.

To this end, we call for a resumption of negotiations aimed at resolving all outstanding issues, including the rights and guarantees of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh. This can only be achieved through dialogue, excluding any use or threat of force.

Alongside the European Union, France will continue to contribute to efforts to promote dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It fully supports and participates in the mediation efforts led by the European Union to promote a process of normalization.

We will support the search for progress on all subjects under negotiation, including the draft peace treaty, border demarcation, humanitarian issues and the opening of communication routes. France stands ready to contribute to these objectives, in liaison with all the parties and stakeholders.

Thank you very much.



New York, le 16 août 2023

Je vous remercie Madame la Présidente, et je tiens également à remercier la représentante du BCAH pour son exposé.
Je salue la présence parmi nous aujourd’hui du ministre des Affaires étrangères de l’Arménie.

Je souhaite insister sur trois points.

Premièrement, les restrictions puis le blocage total, depuis plus de huit mois de la circulation sur le corridor reliant l’Arménie et le Haut-Karabagh, provoquent aujourd’hui une crise humanitaire.

Le blocage persistant du corridor de Latchine par l’Azerbaïdjan continue d’isoler la population du Haut-Karabagh du reste du monde sans qu’aucune raison légitime ne puisse justifier une telle situation, qui va à l’encontre des principes du droit international humanitaire.
Cette situation, combinée aux interruptions de fourniture de gaz et d’électricité, au tarissement des ressources en eau, aux difficultés qui ont été rencontrées par la population pour avoir accès à des semences, à la pénurie de carburant qui entrave les travaux agricoles, dégénère aujourd’hui en crise humanitaire : le risque de famine et de pénuries généralisées, y compris de médicaments, est imminent.

La France déplore le blocage du convoi d’aide humanitaire dépêché en juillet dernier par les autorités arméniennes pour tenter de remédier à cette situation dramatique. Les restrictions et obstacles apportés aux activités du CICR et des acteurs humanitaires, en violation du droit international, ne sont pas acceptables.

Face à la gravité de la situation humanitaire, la France appelle au rétablissement sans conditions et sans délais de la libre circulation des biens, des personnes et des marchandises, le long du corridor de Latchine, dans les deux sens, et d’un approvisionnement continu de la population en gaz et en électricité.

Depuis notre dernière réunion publique, la Cour internationale de justice a rendu une ordonnance, le 22 février 2023. Cette ordonnance a indiqué des mesures conservatoires, qui ont force obligatoire, et qui prescrivent à l’Azerbaïdjan, conformément aux obligations qui lui incombent au titre de la Convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, de « prendre toutes les mesures dont il dispose afin d’assurer la circulation sans entrave des personnes, des véhicules et des marchandises le long du corridor de Latchine dans les deux sens ». Dans son ordonnance du 6 juillet 2023, constatant « la précarité de la situation entre les Parties », la Cour a confirmé « la nécessité d’une mise en œuvre effective de la mesure indiquée dans son ordonnance du 22 février 2023 ».

Tout comme l’a fait le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies le 2 août, la France appelle à nouveau l’Azerbaïdjan à se conformer à ses obligations internationales, et notamment à mettre en œuvre les mesures conservatoires indiquées par la Cour internationale de justice.

Face à la gravité de la situation, la France salue l’action du CICR sur le terrain auquel elle renforcera son appui. La France demande l’accès immédiat, libre, sans entrave des organisations humanitaires et des agences des Nations Unies aux populations concernées et la réouverture du corridor de Latchine.

Madame la Présidente,
La France reste par ailleurs pleinement engagée pour favoriser une paix durable et juste dans la région.

Nous appelons à ce titre à une reprise des négociations, vers le règlement de l’ensemble des questions en suspens, y compris celle des droits et garanties pour la population du Haut-Karabagh. Ce règlement ne peut être atteint que par la voie du dialogue, en excluant tout recours à la force ou toute menace du recours à la force.

Aux côtés de l’Union européenne, la France continuera de contribuer aux efforts pour favoriser le dialogue entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan. Elle apporte son plein soutien et participe aux efforts de médiation menés par l’Union européenne pour promouvoir un processus de normalisation.

Nous appuierons la recherche de progrès sur l’ensemble des sujets en négociation, notamment le projet de traité de paix, la délimitation de la frontière, les questions humanitaires, et l’ouverture des voies de communication. La France se tient à la disposition des parties pour contribuer à ces objectifs, en lien avec l’ensemble des partenaires et des parties prenantes.

Je vous remercie./.