Executive Summary:

• Washington hosted officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and five Central Asian states on September 23 to discuss the Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund and the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) along the Middle Corridor.
• Cargo along the Middle Corridor is rising, but the fragmentation that drives demand for routes bypassing Russia also leaves regional states diversifying in different directions, often trading one dependence for another without a common decision-making body.
• The United States, People’s Republic of China, European Union, Russia, Türkiye, and Iran compete for ports, railways, and rules, so even TRIPP, despite a planned 74 percent U.S. stake, adds an option without removing dependencies.

On September 23, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, the United States convened an event in New York titled “Prosperity Through Peace: Investing in the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and TRIPP,” bringing together officials from the United States, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as private sector representatives, to discuss regional connectivity (Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, September 23). The event also focused on the Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund, a $201 million U.S.-supported nonprofit vehicle for channeling private investment across eight South Caucasus and Central Asian states. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the fund in August, and it remains legally distinct from the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) itself (Modern.az, August 8).

The event revealed a central paradox of the Middle Corridor. Long framed as an alternative to routes through Russia, the corridor has become a platform on which Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Ankara, Tehran, and Brussels pursue distinct objectives. The same geopolitical fragmentation that increased demand for routes bypassing Russia also keeps national, regional, and international initiatives from merging into a unified framework and prevents diversification from producing genuine autonomy. Commercial activity remains robust. Azerbaijan reported over 9.1 million tons of transit freight on its east–west and north–south routes in the first seven months of 2026, with east–west volumes up 16.5 percent (Trend News Agency, August 10). Increase in volume, however, does not equate to integration.

That distinction is most apparent in how participating states approach diversification, which often replaces one dependence with another. In Central Asia, geography and bargaining power differ sharply from state to state. Kazakhstan provides the land bridge and the key Caspian ports, yet Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stressed at the October 8 summit in Avaza, Turkmenistan, that the north–south route through Russia remains “particularly relevant” (The Times of Central Asia, October 9). Uzbekistan sent 83 percent of its Middle Corridor cargo through the Turkmen port of Turkmenbashi, while Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, majority-owned by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), offers a route around Kazakhstan at the price of deeper reliance on PRC investment (Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies, April 3; Akchabar, April 8). Whether cargo departs from Kazakh ports or Turkmenbashi, it must cross the Caspian to reach Azerbaijan, linking Central Asia’s distinct transport strategies to transit routes shaped in part by the South Caucasus.

The South Caucasus states face the same trade-off between diversification and dependence. Azerbaijan, whose ports anchor the western Caspian, balances its alliance with Türkiye against normalized relations with Russia, largely based on north–south trade that traverses Azerbaijani territory (Eurasianet, July 16). Georgia, the corridor’s western outlet to the Black Sea, has made its planned deep-sea port at Anaklia a test of geopolitical alignment. After a PRC-led consortium went unmentioned in Tbilisi’s July 6 announcement, the government proposed state ownership under a “landlord” model, in which the state owns the port and private companies operate it, but with no confirmed partner and no named Western stakeholders (Eurasianet, July 8). Armenia’s maneuverability is constrained by a railway operated since 2008 by a Russian Railways subsidiary, which Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan says discourages Western users, and by reliance on Iranian territory for up to a quarter of its foreign trade (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, April 2026; Report, August 13).

Regional cooperation formats show that competition for control shapes coordination more than a shared interest in efficiency. In 2024, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the Eurasian Transport Route International Association (ETRIA), a Baku-based body to coordinate tariffs and digital tools along the corridor’s southern branch. In February, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia signed a separate protocol in Ashgabat to boost cargo transportation and digitize processes along the corridor (Embassy of Turkmenistan in the United Kingdom, February 11; The Astana Times, February 12). None of these formats brings all eight corridor states into a common decision-making body. The Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund spans all eight, but it is a U.S. investment vehicle, not a regional institution. Without a regional body to set priorities among ports and routes, diversification widens the menu of options without strengthening strategic autonomy, and leaves the choice to outside powers with their own interests.

Outside powers deepen the fragmentation because they compete less for cargo than for control of the nodes it passes through and the rules that govern them. Washington’s stake is the most explicit. Through a planned 74 percent controlling share in the TRIPP Development Company, it seeks a durable foothold on the corridor’s western segment (Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 26). Beijing, by contrast, stays out of that contest and builds around it through its 51 percent stake in the joint venture developing the CKU Railway, opening a southern route that bypasses Kazakhstan (Kaktus Media, April 17). Meanwhile, its apparent exit from Anaklia leaves the Black Sea outlet without a declared sponsor (OC-Media, July 6). The European Union approaches the corridor through its Global Gateway strategy. Its Connectivity Agenda Platform, launched on June 23, came with statements of intent from international financial institutions expected to mobilize up to 2 billion euros ($2.25 billion) for the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus (European Commission, June 23). The European Union and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) finance Kazakhstan’s Aktau port without holding any stake in TRIPP’s governance, so even Western engagement runs on separate tracks (EBRD, September 30, 2025; CivilNet, August 6).

Russia, Türkiye, and Iran answer with positional leverage. Moscow has rejected proposals to transfer the Armenian railway concession to a third party (CivilNet, February 19). Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said Russia’s position must be taken into account because TRIPP is planned to pass through an area guarded by Russian and Armenian border troops, and transit would also have to comply with the rules of the Eurasian Economic Union (TASS, June 29). Moscow has also called for regional states and their immediate neighbors—Russia, Iran, and Türkiye—to shape the solutions, a formula that implicitly excludes Washington, while promoting a north–south corridor linking Russia with Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan (The Times of Central Asia, October 9). Türkiye, Azerbaijan’s security guarantor, supports TRIPP but reportedly makes normalization with Armenia a precondition while building its own Kars–Dilucu railway from eastern Türkiye toward Nakhchivan (CivilNet, May 16). Iran vowed in 2025 to block the route, though Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said on October 7 that Tehran is satisfied with Armenian transparency (Armenpress, October 7). The result is a layered rivalry in which the United States seeks to anchor a western outlet, Russia and Iran defend a north–south axis, and Türkiye and the PRC pursue their own initiatives, leaving participating states to bargain among competing offers.

TRIPP illustrates how these competing offers play out in a single project. Washington has secured a signed framework agreement under which a company it controls would hold development rights for the link between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan (Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 26). Capital and a controlling stake do not determine whose preferences prevail along the route. Armenia retains authority over border control and customs under the published framework, while the Russian, Turkish, and Iranian positions described above remain in place. As a result, TRIPP adds a U.S.-backed option to the corridor without removing the dependencies on Russia and Iran that continue to shape Armenian choices.

Strategic importance, rooted in a favorable geographic position, does not automatically translate into transregional integration, just as diversification does not necessarily confer autonomy. Alternative routes can generate new dependencies even as they reduce existing ones. Whether the Middle Corridor becomes a successful and integrated system will depend less on physical infrastructure than on whether its participants can overcome the geopolitical constraints and great-power interests that created demand for it in the first place.

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