Author: Yeghisabet Arthur

From Saturday onwards, Russia will impose ‘temporary restrictions’ on the import of certain berries and fresh vegetables from Armenia, including tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, greens, and strawberries, citing ‘an increasing number of violations’.

The Russian authorities announced that the restrictions would remain in force ‘until an appropriate algorithm for ensuring the safety of shipped products is developed’.

‘The current situation poses a threat to the phytosanitary status of the country’, Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Services (Rosselkhoznadzor) announced on Friday, further accusing the relevant Armenian agencies of ‘not tak[ing] appropriate measures regarding previously identified violations’.

Russian authorities also cited recorded ‘violations’ as a result of their inspections conducted at the end of May, and also accused Armenia of ‘lack[ing] a traceability system for exporting products to Russia’.

An Armenian lorry driver, waiting in long queues for entering Russia via land border, told RFE/RL on Monday that in response to their inquiries, Russian customs officers ‘don’t say a single word, [they] just laugh and make a heart sign’. The symbol is likely a reference to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s pre-election campaign symbol, in which he makes a heart shape with his hands.

Ahead of and during Armenia’s pre-election campaign for the 7 June parliamentary elections, Russia suspended the sale of alcoholic beverages from several Armenian producers, claiming they do ‘not meet mandatory requirements’. Separately, Moscow fully banned the import and sale of Armenian Jermuk mineral water, as well as flowers.

Russia also sent Armenia a letter reportedly warning it could cut off the tax-free supply of gas, petroleum products, and uncut diamonds if Yerevan proceeds with its EU accession efforts.

Armenia rejects registering some Russian observers

Separately, Armenia ‘informally’ notified Russia of the ‘undesirability of including certain Russian citizens’ as observers in the upcoming parliamentary elections, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on Thursday.

Russia reportedly intended to send three federal MPs and a representative of Karachay-Cherkessia’s electoral commission.

‘We requested the reasons and any reaction to this matter. We have not received an official response from Yerevan, including regarding the reasons for this decision’, Zakharova said.

Zakharova speculated that Yerevan’s decision could be over EU sanctions, and that the ‘this is, so to speak, an act of deference by official Yerevan towards its senior EU [partners]’.

Zakharova then warned of the decision’s possible impact on Russia’s relations with Armenia, calling the decision ‘deeply regrettable and incomprehensible’.

‘But, beyond all this, beyond regret and incomprehension, we are not prepared to accept this logic and will be forced to take this into account in our future work with Yerevan’, Zakharova concluded.

Highlights

• Armenia and the U.S. signed a framework agreement on critical minerals and rare earth supply chain cooperation.
• A new satellite-assisted geological map of Armenia will target minerals overlooked during Soviet-era surveys.
• No commercial deposits or reserves were announced; the initiative represents early-stage strategic positioning.
• Washington is expanding critical mineral partnerships with smaller nations outside China’s industrial influence sphere.
• The AI era is driving governments to reframe geology as a national security priority in the global resource race.

Armenia and the United States are moving deeper into strategic critical mineral cooperation, this time targeting something foundational: a modern geological map of Armenia. The initiative follows a newly signed U.S.-Armenia framework agreement on critical minerals and rare earth supply chains and signals Washington’s growing effort to identify alternative mineral sources outside China’s orbit. For investors, the story is less about immediate production and more about early-stage positioning in a widening geopolitical resource race tied to AI, defense, robotics, and advanced manufacturing.

Satellites, Subsoil, and Strategic Metals

As reported by Panarmenian, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia and the United States will use modern geological and space-based technologies to create a new mineral map of the country. That matters because many minerals now critical to AI systems, semiconductors, defense electronics, EVs, and permanent magnets were historically overlooked when older Soviet-era geological work was conducted. Pashinyan specifically emphasized that rare minerals have become strategically important because of artificial intelligence and modern technology manufacturing.

Washington’s New Frontier Strategy

This is not yet a mining breakthrough. No commercial deposits, feasibility studies, processing plans, or rare earth reserves were announced. But geological mapping is where modern mineral strategy begins. The bigger signal is geopolitical: Washington appears increasingly willing to build critical mineral partnerships in smaller nations sitting outside China’s industrial sphere of influence. For Rare Earth Exchanges™ readers, the story fits a broader pattern now emerging globally: the AI era is forcing governments to rethink geology as national security.

And the race is no longer just about mines. It is about discovering what the West forgot it had.

By Luke Coffey

Armenians go to the polls on June 7 in the country’s first parliamentary election since 2021. The stakes are unusually high. Voters will not only choose a new parliament and, by extension, a prime minister. They will also help determine Armenia’s future trajectory: whether the country continues this difficult but much needed shift toward normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkiye, closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, and greater regional connectivity, or whether it drifts back toward the old days that left it isolated, dependent, and vulnerable.

The election comes at a moment of deep division. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his ruling Civil Contract party are campaigning on stability, normalization with Armenia’s neighbors, and what Pashinyan calls “Real Armenia.” The idea is straightforward but politically sensitive: Armenia should focus on improving the prosperity, sovereignty, and security of the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia rather than pursuing maximalist visions of a “greater Armenia” beyond its borders.

The opposition is fragmented but serious. Among the main challengers is Strong Armenia, associated with Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, whose movement has emerged as a major opposition force. Another is the Armenia Alliance, led by former President Robert Kocharyan, which represents a more nationalist, old-guard opposition current with closer ties to Moscow. The result is a contest not merely between parties, but between competing visions of Armenia’s place in the region.

This election also comes after a historic breakthrough in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations brokered by the Trump administration last year. After decades of conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, Yerevan and Baku have taken steps toward ending the conflict and focusing on stability in the South Caucasus. This process remains incomplete and politically fragile. But it is the most serious opening for peace in a generation.

Pashinyan’s willingness to pursue peace with Azerbaijan has not been universally popular in Armenia. Yet he has been the only Armenian leader in years willing to engage in sustained negotiations with Baku. Although polls suggest Civil Contract is likely to remain the largest party, it may still fall short of the majority needed to govern easily or the support required for constitutional changes.

Three geopolitical issues make the June 7 election especially important.

The first is whether Armenia continues on the path toward peaceful coexistence with its neighbors. As part of the US-brokered process, Azerbaijan has insisted that Armenia amend its constitution to remove what Baku considers implied territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Pashinyan has said the matter should be addressed through a referendum after the parliamentary election. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has made clear that without constitutional changes a final peace agreement cannot move forward. If Pashinyan loses power, the peace process could stall or even collapse.

The second issue is Armenia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation. Since regaining independence in 1991, Armenia has been closely aligned with Moscow. Russia still has a major military presence in Armenia, and Moscow has long shaped the country’s security, energy, and economic choices.

But many Armenians have lost faith in Russia, especially after the 2020 war in with Azerbaijan in Karabakh, when Moscow failed to help in the way many Armenians had expected. In response, Pashinyan has cautiously and slowly moved Armenia closer to the EU and US. Armenia has launched a process aimed at deepening ties with the EU, while its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization remains frozen. The recent visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also raised eyebrows in Moscow. The election will help determine whether this Euro-Atlantic shift continues.

The third issue is regional connectivity. Armenia is landlocked, poor, and has been cut off from major regional transport and infrastructure projects for much of its modern history. Pashinyan’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, unveiled in 2023, envisions Armenia as a hub for trade routes linking the Caspian, Black Sea, Turkiye, and the wider Eurasian landmass. This vision is tied to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, a US-backed proposal to improve connectivity between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory. If implemented, it could bring Armenia new transit revenue, investment, and relevance. It would also reduce the region’s dependence on routes through Russia and Iran, and complement the growing importance of the Middle Corridor.

This explains why outside powers are watching closely. It is not in Russia’s interest to see Armenia move closer to the West, weaken its dependence on Moscow, or normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkiye. Nor is it in Iran’s interest to see new east-west transit routes emerge across the South Caucasus that could bypass Iranian territory. Both Moscow and Tehran have reasons to prefer an Armenia that remains isolated, anxious, and strategically constrained.

Even a Pashinyan victory would not end the uncertainty. A referendum on constitutional changes would still have to follow, and a free and fair vote without outside meddling could prove even more difficult than the parliamentary election itself. The opposition will likely frame the issue as a matter of national identity and sovereignty. Pashinyan will have to persuade voters that peace, normalization, and regional integration are not concessions, but the foundation of a more secure and prosperous Armenia.

For decades, the South Caucasus, in part, has been defined by the closed borders, frozen conflicts, and great-power competition that took place through the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The June 7 election could help determine whether that era begins to end. Rarely does a single election in the region carry such far-reaching geopolitical consequences. Policymakers across Eurasia and the broader region should be paying close attention.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.