WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY HALF CLOSED?
By Aghavni Harutyunian

AZG Armenian Daily
25/05/2006

“I am not desperate about it [Nagorno Karabakh conflict]; I wouldn’t
say I’m optimistic. It depends on the two parties concerned, Armenia
and Azerbaijan.

They have to come to an agreement. We can try to [help] them to do
so, but they need to come to an agreement,” OSCE chairman in office,
Belgian foreign minister Karel De Gucht told RFE/RL. “Sometimes you
have more hope, and sometimes the hope is fading away.

What we must do is continue to the end of the year, to the bitter
end of our chairmanship-in-office, to try to find ways and means to
get out of this frozen conflict,” he said. Among the stambling block
on the way of Nagorno Karabakh regulation Karel De Gucht mentioned
the closed Armenian-Turkish border: “the closure of the border with
Turkey is one of the elements that is complicating the whole conflict.”

Curiously enough the OSCE chairman in office says for the first time
that 2006 will not be a solution year contrary to statements of the
mediating mission. Up to this moment, only the negotiating sides used
to reveal such pessimism. Perhaps, one can assume that the OSCE does
not see the “window of opportunity” on the other side of which “laid”
conflict regulation.

PRIME MINISTER RETURNS FROM ALGERIA WITH ‘STRATEGIC COOPERATION’
By Mustafa Unal, Algeria

Zaman, Turkey
May 24 2006

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the first Turkish prime minister to visit Algeria
after an interval of 21 years, signed a “friendship and cooperation”
agreement with President Abdulaziz Buteflika yesterday.

This agreement, Algeria had previously signed with only Spain,
Portugal and Italy, shows the importance attached to Turkey, and their
relationship that will be based on a more strategic foundation with
this signature.

Erdogan and Buteflika, who met for three hours at Palace Muradiye in
the capital, sent messages of friendship.

Erdogan said the signatures are an investment in the fields of
politics, the military, economy, commerce, and culture between the
two brother countries.

During the sincere talks, Buteflika gave Erdogan the message, “We
consider ourselves as a part of the Ottomans and protect Ottoman
works here.”

Erdogan, reminding that Turkish Minister for Culture and Tourism
Atilla Koc also participated in the visit, emphasized that they would
do everything possible to ensure the restoration of Ottoman works in
the country.

“Let’s make the Mediterranean a peaceful basin again,” Buteflika
said, and stressed, they support Turkey on all issues, including the
Armenian issue.

In the talks, both countries reached a principle agreement in order
to make joint searches for oil, natural gas and metals.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIAN JET’S BLACK BOXES TO BE ANALYZED IN PARIS

Interfax, Russia
May 24 2006

YEREVAN. May 24 (Interfax) – The flight recorders from the Armenian
Airlines Airbus A320 which crashed off the Russian coast near Sochi
on May 3 will be analyzed in Paris, Armenian Civil Aviation Department
press secretary Gayane Davtian told Interfax on Wednesday.

“Both black boxes will be brought first to Moscow, where they will
probably be examined, and possibly a documentary act will be drawn up,
and then to Paris for decoding,” Davtian said.

“The final decision on decoding the black boxes in Paris has already
been taken,” she said.

Civil Aviation Department flight safety division chief Gagik Galstian
will go to Paris from Yerevan as well, she said.

The analysis of the black boxes might take “two or three days,”
she said.

“However, if the black boxes are damaged, decoding might take much
longer,” Davtian said.

DOCUMENT SENT TO MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND FRENCH CABINET MINISTERS

AZG Armenian Daily
25/05/2006

Laws against Genocide Denial: Potential Consequences for Human Rights

May 18, 2006: Today the French National Assembly was set to debate a
bill to criminalize the denial of the Armenian Genocide, but has now
postponed the debate to November. The Turkish ambassador to France was
temporarily recalled in protest of this bill. What are the implications
of the French law for Turkish-Armenian relations and freedom of speech?

The International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, of
which I am currently the chair, deals with genocide in a comparative
manner, including its causes, methods, aftermath and denial. Our
research, based on archival sources both in and outside Turkey,
confirms that over a million Armenians perished in an Ottoman
state-sponsored campaign between 1915 and 1923 as victims of genocide.

Kemal Ataturk, the founder the new Turkish Republic, also publicly
disapproved of the wrongs committed against the Armenians, calling
them “a shameful act,” but the true story of other founding fathers
of modern Turkey, many of whom had been intimately involved in the
Armenian Genocide as perpetrators, was suppressed.

This was despite the fact that the Ottoman government itself found
the leaders of the Young Turk party guilty in absentia of crimes
against the Armenians.

Ever since then, successive Turkish governments have denied what they
euphemistically called “the events of 1915.”

In this respect, I wrote to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan on May
5, 2005, regarding his proposal for a joint group, consisting of
historians and other experts, to study “the events of 1915.” I found
this proposal insincere, given the Turkish state’s numerous attempts to
stifle open discussion of the Armenian Genocide, including prosecuting
over seventy scholars, writers, journalists and publishers on the
grounds that they were denigrating Turkey. In that letter, I made
the following points.

“…the two sides must listen to and hear each other. As part
of this process, a common body of knowledge needs to be created,
so that established facts can help alleviate the polarization of
opinions. This, in turn, will lead to the “peaceful and friendly
environment in which tolerance and mutual respect shall prevail.”

[Note, quote taken from P.M. Erdogan’s proposal.]

I then urged that his government take some simple steps to allow
for a free and open discussion within Turkish society, such as those
listed below.

1) Facilitate critical scholars educating society about the events of
1915 from different points of view and not only from the government’s
perspective.

2) Allow the broadcast of a series of lectures on this issue by
renowned Armenian, Turkish and/or third party scholars, who do not
necessarily reflect the government’s official position, through
Turkish television networks, without any censorship, and with the
accessibility to the public for questions.

3) Allow Turkish academics and intellectuals, whose point of view
challenges the official version of what happened in 1915, to express
their ideas through public lectures, publications, and translations of
Ottoman archival materials, without fear of persecution by the state.

I also asked the government to make it unequivocally and publicly
clear that Article 305 of the Penal Code should not criminalize ideas
which deviate from those of the state’s defined position, such as
the Armenian Genocide issue, and that individuals who say that the
Armenians suffered a genocide will not be persecuted by the state.

The proposed new legislation is intended to give force to the law
passed in 2001 officially recognizing the Genocide by providing
penalties for those engaged in its denial. One should question how
this law, if adopted, would facilitate dialogue between the Armenians
and Turks, which is a stated objective of the 2001 law, or between
the French and the Turks?

Does not this law inadvertently provide new opportunities for the
reactionary elements of Turkish state and society to radicalize the
masses against the French and the Armenians? By using the French law,
which limits freedom of speech as an example, would the Turkish state
not justify laws that promote its policy of denial and therefore make
it even harder to deviate from the official government position on
history? If so, how does that help Turkish civil society in gaining
any awareness on this issue? Does this law advance the language of
reconciliation or the language of conflict? Can such laws bring
a solution to the problem, or do they become part of the problem
themselves? Does using the penal code in France for any limitation
on the discussion of historical events endanger the prime function
of scholars, writers and journalists-to analyze, question, and
debate issues?

Would it not create a slippery slope that would allow the state to
sanction and impose dogmas as to how society should think? Finally, is
this not the very method of limiting freedom of speech that countries
like Turkey use, as the state attempts to control history in order
to control society?

Of course, we do need laws to protect against such problems as racism
and neo-Nazism, and there are legal limits to freedom of speech, such
as libel, fraud, defamation. Therefore, those who argue that freedom
of speech is not absolute are absolutely right. Some observers have
argued that you can not have a law criminalizing Holocaust denial and
not allow a similar law for denying the Armenian Genocide, which is
officially recognized as genocide in France.

The Holocaust denial policy grew out of two things: many European
countries were complicit in the death of the Jews, and punishing
denial of the Holocaust is seen as a form of atonement; and there
was a fear that neo-Nazi and other fascist groups would try to
vindicate themselves by eliminating the Holocaust, while maintaining
racism. Thus, the idea was that suppression of fascism was in part
a matter of suppressing denial of the Holocaust.

On the level of principle, one could argue either for or against
treating all denial of genocide as equal.

But there is the historical context of the Holocaust denial laws that
is different from Armenia, Rwanda, etc. At the same time, if only
the Holocaust cannot be legally denied, then some will take this to
mean that only the Holocaust was a genocide; others will feel that
the suffering of their people is being slighted.

But if we open this up and list all genocides and criminalize denial
of all of them, then our minds would be enormously constrained by
the State. Freedom of inquiry, expression, thought would be limited
in ways that are totally unnecessary and unintended.

Accordingly, are laws such as this a mistake and contrary to freedom
of speech? Some might argue that governments should eliminate all
cases of prosecution of denial, rather than extend the net.

We know Turkey already requires its students to write essays denying
the Armenian Genocide and uses its penal code to stifle human
rights. As recently as three days ago, an opposition deputy in the
Turkish Grand National Assembly presented a bill stipulating prison
terms of up to three years for those who claim that Turkey committed
genocide against Armenians in 1915. (This bill is not very different
from the current Turkish Penal Code article (301) that criminalizes
“denigrating Turkishness,” which is what claiming there was a genocide
of the Armenians apparently does.) If the bill passes, what would
happen to Turkish intellectuals like Taner Akcam, Murat Belge, Halil
Berktay, Hrant Dink, Fatma Muge Gocek, Orhan Pamuk, Ragip Zarakolu,
and others, who openly challenge the Turkish state’s definition of
the Armenian Genocide? Who then would dare attempt to educate Turkish
civil society? How then would Turkey ever have a chance to become
democratic? How then are the Armenian and Turkish people going to
have any kind of dialogue on this issue? If one supports such a law
in France limiting freedom of speech, then should one not also support
such a law in Turkey?

We must do all we can to overcome denial of genocide, by raising
awareness, employing scholarship, applying reason, and means other
than state sanction, to defend truth, justice and human rights. We
must demand that Turkey reform its penal code. The French, German and
other governments of Europe who were bystanders or even participants
in the crime should provide resources in order to bring the parties
together, and give incentives to solve the problem, not widen the
divide. Denial should be against the law only if it is in the context
of a hate or racist argument.

One wonders if these developments can contribute to the peaceful
solution of the problem. Rather than employ the language of conflict,
which exacerbates the problem, the parties should be more dispassionate
and rational, in order to be open to developing other means and
tools that will help with establishing dialogue, and hopefully lead
to normalization of relations.

France, for its part, has an option, as well. Instead of criminalizing
Armenian Genocide denial, which serves to stifle freedom of speech,
it could use its positive influence to support efforts within Turkey
for democratization there.

Freedom of speech and debate on the issue of the Armenian Genocide
in Turkey is the best hope for eliminating government control of this
history. By allowing such debate, Turkey can become open, democratic
and pluralistic. There is no guarantee that Turkey will follow suit,
but France, with its legacy of “freedom, equality and brotherhood,”
and as one of the world’s leaders in democracy and human rights,
must show the way by not itself imposing laws that penalize freedom
of speech on the Armenian Genocide or any historical event.

By Roger W. Smith, Professor Emeritus of Government, College of William
and Mary and Chairman, International Institute for Genocide and Human
Rights Studies.

OSCE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIRS ISSUED STATEMENT

Today, Azerbaijan
May 24 2006

OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, being on a visit in Azerbaijan, issued
joint statement.

According to APA, the statement reads that co-chairs coming together
with OSCE chairman in- office personal representative, in diplomatic
mission is to support the necessity of Nagorno Karabakh conflict
in peaceful way, and stressing the time of solving the problem for
the sides.

“We were received by President Ilham Aliyev, and before that we
met with foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov. We had discussed the
significant aspects of future regulation. We tried to provide condition
for two Presidents’ meeting. Besides it, both countries should prepare
its community to peace not war.

“Our talks in Baku are of constructive character. Tomorrow we will
visit Yerevan, meet with President Robert Kocharian and foreign
minister Vardan Oskanian and hold of the same character talks and
return to the states we represent and inform our leader.”

Co-chairs will also inform the OSCE and international community of
their visit to the region. “At present, it depends on Azerbaijan
and Armenia what will happen. We leave the country in hopes
for development. We are pleased to be in Baku, and we express our
gratitude to President Ilham Aliyev and Azerbaijani people for their
receiving us.”

URL:

YUGOSLAVIA R.I.P.
By Gwynne Dyer

AZG Armenian Daily
25/05/2006

Within days of Montenegro’s successful referendum on independence on
Sunday, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic will be arriving in Brussels
to open talks on joining the European Union, while other Montenegrin
diplomats arrive in New York to seek admission as the 193rd member
of the United Nations. A country that was extinguished 88 years ago
has risen from its grave — and the mini-empire that absorbed it has
finally come to an end.

With Montenegro’s independence, the last vestige of former Yugoslavia
is gone: Serbia has lost its seacoast and reverted to its land-locked
borders of 1918. Yugoslavia was a project that was bloody at the start,
bloody again in the middle, and exceedingly bloody in its last years
in the 1990s. The lesson we should draw from this is: no more shotgun
marriages in the name of tidiness.

As the Ottoman (Turkish) empire retreated down the western side of the
Balkans during the 19th century, half a dozen Christian ethnic groups
who spoke closely related South Slavic dialects were candidates for
nationhood, but not all of them got it. The Slovenes and Croatians
became part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, which eventually absorbed
the Bosnians as well. Serbia and Montenegro became independent states
in 1878, but after the Balkan wars of 1911-12 the Macedonians were
just handed over to Serbia (which almost doubled in size).

As early as the mid-19th century, many Serbs believed that all the
western Balkans should eventually be ruled from Belgrade. In his famous
Nacertanije (Programme) of 1844, Ilija Garasanin, Minister of Internal
Affairs in a Serbia that was still technically under Ottoman rule,
outlined the stages by which Serbian control might gradually extend
to include the whole of the region, and generations of Serbs were
taught to dream of that Greater Serbia.

Their opportunity came with the First World War, which destroyed the
Austro-Hungarian empire and left the Slovenes, Croatians and Bosnians
free to seek their own destinies.

Where they all ended up, however, was in the new, Serb-dominated
state of Yugoslavia. The victorious great powers let the Serbs
have their way in part because they owed Serbia a favour (since it
had fought on the winning side), but mainly because it was a tidier
arrangement than cluttering up the western Balkans with half a dozen
small countries. They even bundled long-independent Montenegro into
the new Yugoslavia (although some Montenegrins immediately revolted
against rule from Belgrade).

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbia from the start: all
of its prime ministers were Serbs, as were 161 of its 165 generals. So
it fell apart at once when Nazi Germany invaded in 1941, and a Croatian
fascist regime set out to take revenge on Serbians and assert its own
independence: over half a million people died in Croatian concentration
camps. Then Communist guerillas took power after the Second World
War and reestablished Serbian domination, killing all those (mostly
Croatians and Bosnians) who had collaborated with the Germans.

Communist Yugoslavia lasted almost half a century, but when it started
to break apart in 1992 the Serbs would not let go, and it took four
wars and a quarter-million deaths before Serbia finally accepted the
loss of its South Slav empire. Even after that the European Union tried
to hold Serbia and Montenegro together, bullying the Montenegrins into
accepting a lopsided two-country federation (Serbia has twelve times
as many people as Montenegro) in 2003. But the Montenegrins insisted
on the right to a referendum on breaking up that union after three
years, and last Sunday they exercised that right.

Kosovo will almost certainly also get official independence from
Serbia by the end of this year, and there will then be seven countries
where fifteen years ago there was only one. It is very untidy, and you
could certainly accuse some of these countries of being driven by the
“narcissism of small differences.”

But THEY cared about these small differences, and bad things happened
when they were ignored.

Serbia wanted to rule the western Balkans, but it never conquered
the other ethnic groups. They were pushed into Serbia’s arms by great
powers that wanted to keep things simple, and the result was almost
a century of resentment and intermittent murder. Now it’s over, and
they have to learn to live alongside one another again. It will be
much easier if they have some larger context in which to submerge
their differences, and there is one at hand: the European Union.

Slovenia is already an EU member, and Croatia and Macedonia are
candidates. Montenegro is applying now, and Serbia would open talks
tomorrow if it could get around the EU’s insistence that it hand over
the worst Serbian war criminals first. Bosnia will take much longer,
as it remains deeply divided between its Serbian, Croatian and Muslim
“Bosniak” communities, and Kosovo isn’t even officially a country yet.

Will the EU actually take them all in? For the sake of peace in
Europe, it should, but it will be up to 27 governments when Romania
and Bulgaria join next year.

Adding the western Balkans would increase the number of EU member
states with full voting rights by another 20 percent while increasing
the total population by only 5 percent. It’s a lot to ask, and we
won’t know the answer for years.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: THE EU’S ROLE

Reuters Alert, UK
May 24 2006

Source: Crisis Group

Georgia, Abkhazia, S. Ossetia

Tbilisi/Brussels, 20 March 2006: To guarantee its own security,
the EU must become more engaged in resolving the conflicts in the
South Caucasus lest they ignite into full-fledged wars in Europe’s
neighbourhood.

Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role,* the latest
report from the International Crisis Group, examines the EU’s efforts
to address tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and points out how the EU can do more.

“Greater engagement is a challenge Brussels has only just begun
to address”, says Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project
Director. “There have been a few promising steps, but there is a long
way to go”.

Thus far, others have taken the lead in promoting conflict settlement
in the region, but over a decade of negotiations led by the UN in
Abkhazia, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, have not produced
comprehensive peace agreements. With its reputation as an “honest
broker”, access to a range of soft and hard power tools, and the lure
of greater integration into Europe, the EU has a greater role to play,
and offers added value to compliment the UN and the OSCE.

To avoid instability on its borders, the EU seeks a ring of
well-governed countries around it. It is further interested in the
South Caucasus to ensure access to Caspian oil and gas, develop
transport and communication corridors between Europe and Asia, and
contain such threats as smuggling, trafficking and environmental
degradation.

As the EU is unlikely to offer membership to Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan any time soon, it must identify innovative means to
impose conditionality on its aid and exercise influence. European
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans are being finalised. These offer
a chance for the EU to enhance its role especially if the peaceful
resolution of the conflicts are defined as commitments.

The new EU Special Representative should observe ongoing negotiations
for the Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. The
Commission has allocated significant funding to rehabilitation in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It should assess how it can start doing
more in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

“The EU is trying to define its role in a new neighbourhood which is
neither at war nor at peace”, says Nicholas Whyte, Director of Crisis
Group’s Europe Program. “If the EU fails to implement its strategic
vision for a secure neighbourhood, its credibility in the region, and
generally vis-a-vis Russia and the U.S., will suffer. More troublingly,
if the South Caucasus conflicts continue to deteriorate, the EU may
find itself unprepared for responding to wars among its neighbours”.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635 Kimberly
Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601 To contact Crisis Group media
please click here *Read the full Crisis Group report on our website:

————- ————————————————– ——

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Instability in the South Caucasus is a threat to European Union (EU)
security. Geographic proximity, energy resources, pipelines and the
challenges of international crime and trafficking make stability in
the region a clear EU interest. Yet, the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have the potential to ignite
into full-fledged wars in Europe’s neighbourhood. To guarantee its own
security, the EU should become more engaged in efforts to resolve the
three disputes. It can do so by strengthening the conflict resolution
dimension of the instruments it applies. As the EU is unlikely to offer
membership to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan even in the medium term,
it must identify innovative means to impose conditionality on its aid
and demonstrate influence. This is a challenge that Brussels has only
begun to address.

Since 2003 the EU has become more of a security actor in the South
Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. It has appointed a Special
Representative for the South Caucasus, launched a European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission, and employed the Commission’s Rapid
Reaction Mechanism to support post “Rose Revolution” democratisation
processes. It has included Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and started Action Plan
negotiations due to end mid-2006. The Commission has allocated some
~@32 million for economic development confidence building programs in
Georgia, and it has cooperated closely with the UN and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Nevertheless, the EU can do more to help resolve conflict in the
region, in particular through the Action Plans currently being
negotiated with each country. For the EU, these are a chance to
enhance and reposition itself in the South Caucasus if they can be
tied to conflict resolution and include specific democratisation,
governance and human rights benchmarks. For the region they may be
an opportunity to map out the reform process concretely. But there
is a long way to go. The EU’s relations are not strong with either
Azerbaijan or, to a lesser extent, Armenia. It does not participate
directly in negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. In and around Nagorno-Karabakh, it has done little for
conflict resolution. It has rarely raised the South Caucasus conflicts
in its high-level discussions with partners and has employed few
sanctions or incentives to advance peace.

To become more effective, the EU must increase its political
visibility. Compared with Russia, the U.S., the UN and the OSCE,
its financial and political engagement in the region has been minimal.

However, as it gives more aid through new and old instruments, its
ability to provide incentives and apply conditionality should grow.

Compared with other actors, the EU can offer added value, with its
image as an “honest broker” free from traditional US/Russia rivalries;
access to a range of soft and hard-power tools; and the lure of
greater integration into Europe.

The arrival of a new Special Representative (EUSR) is an opportune
moment for the EU to strengthen its political presence. The EUSR should
try to become an observer in the three conflict negotiation forums. In
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where the Commission has already allocated
significant funding, efficient and well-targeted assistance can give
weight and credibility to the EU’s diplomatic and political efforts.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, rather then wait for an agreement on the
principles of resolution mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group, the EU
should begin contingency planning to assist peace implementation now.

Sending military and civilian assessment missions to the region could
give new impetus to a negotiation process which seems to be dangerously
running out of steam. Whether or not a peace agreement is eventually
signed, the EU should be prepared to implement confidence building
programs or – in a worst case – to consider a range of options in
case of an outbreak of fighting. Otherwise, having remained out
of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied districts for over a
decade, either war or peace will find it struggling to catch up in
its own neighbourhood.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the European Union and its Member States:

To increase the EU’s visibility and effectiveness as a political actor

1. Open fully-staffed European Commission Delegations in Baku and
Yerevan.

2. Strengthen the EUSR’s regional presence by at a minimum appointing
a EUSR political analyst in each of the three South Caucasus capitals.

3. Start a public awareness campaign in the region about the EU, its
values, institutions, programs and conflict resolution capabilities.

To take full advantage of the negotiating process for European
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans

4. Define the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
as an Action Plan priority for Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the Plan
aimed specifically at ensuring that:

(a) Azerbaijan and Armenia should commit to resolving the conflict
through peaceful negotiations without delay, defining the principles of
an agreement as renunciation of the use of force to settle disputes;
incremental withdrawal of occupied districts; return of displaced
persons; opening of transport and trade routes; and determination of
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a referendum;

(b) Armenia should pledge to encourage the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh
authorities to agree to a peace settlement according to the principles
defined above; and

(c) both states should commit to foster reconciliation, confidence
building and mutual understanding through governmental and
non-governmental channels.

5. Action Plan elements should include clear benchmarking to measure
progress in the development of genuine democracy, good governance,
respect for human rights, the rule of law and free and fair elections;
and the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring mechanism, whose
reports are made public.

6. Increase public ownership and awareness by engaging civil society in
Action Plan preparation and monitoring (particularly in Azerbaijan),
organising conferences, seminars, and media events, and strengthening
the involvement of parliaments and local authorities.

7. Coordinate with other bilateral and multilateral players to ensure
consistency between the Action Plans and the commitments made to the
Council of Europe (CoE), the OSCE, NATO and the UN.

To increase the impact of crisis management and conflict prevention
actions

8. Strengthen the capacity of Commission staff in the region to carry
out post-conflict rehabilitation by offering training in security
sector reform, mediation and reconciliation, confidence building,
and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR).

9. Develop more initiatives focused on confidence building across
ceasefire lines and the soft side of conflict-resolution, such as
working with civil society, media, women, youth and former combatants,
and apply community participation to project planning, implementation,
monitoring and follow-up.

10. Increase engagement with non-recognized entities (Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and promote democratisation,
civil society development and the rule of law, not as recognition of
status but as a means to break their isolation, build confidence and
avoid exclusion from broad EU integration processes.

11. Promote European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
funding opportunities, especially in Azerbaijan, and develop an
interim mechanism to distribute funds to local civil society groups,
possibly through a member state embassy or the Europa House, before
an EU delegation opens in Baku.

12. Support new regional programs in particular for students, teachers,
professors and other professional groups including police, judges,
lawyers and journalists.

To prepare for an eventual Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement and
encourage the parties to compromise

13. Seek agreement for the EUSR to participate in the OSCE Minsk
Group as an observer.

14. In the case of the Commission, carry out a needs assessment study
of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied territories (including
places where IDPs have settled) even before a framework agreement
on the principles of a settlement is agreed between Azerbaijan and
Armenia.

15. In the case of the Council, request the Secretariat to develop
ESDP options in support of peace implementation, send assessment
missions in close cooperation with the OSCE and begin contingency
planning so as to prepare for:

(a) deployment of peacekeepers around Nagorno-Karabakh; and

(b) deployment of a civilian crisis management advisory team to
engage in DDR, security sector reform, mediation, political affairs,
human rights and media issues in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

To support the peaceful resolution of the Georgian-South Ossetian
and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts

16. Expand the Commission’s role in addressing the Georgian-South
Ossetian conflict and finance another tranche of aid to support
projects identified in the OSCE needs assessment.

17. Once Georgia passes the appropriate law and designates a budget
line for its implementation, make funding available to its new property
commission and property restitution fund.

18. Agree a Joint Action to provide financial support for the Joint
Control Commission (JCC) mechanism in April 2006.

19. Request the JCC and the parties to the Geneva process to invite
the EUSR to observe their meetings and activities.

20. Raise the Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazia conflicts
at EU-Russia summits and other high-level dialogue forums.

21. Continue the border management assistance mission and facilitate
communication and cooperation between Georgian and Russian border
guards.

22. Agree a Joint Action to support a Georgian-South Ossetian Special
Coordination Centre and joint policing.

Tbilisi/Brussels, 20 March 2006

Full report at amp;rss=1

ONLY 2 OF 15 BANKS EXPRESSED WISH TO BECOME OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANIES

AZG Armenian Daily
25/05/2006

“Corporate Management of Banking Sector in Armenia” seminar opened
in Yerevan, yesterday. The seminar is organized by the International
Financial Corporation, by RA Central Bank and by the Government
of Netherlands.

Vache Gabrielian, member of RA Central Bank’s Board, told journalists
that they haven’t defined the deadline for the bank’s transfer to the
corporate management system. Only several points of the relevant law
will come to force from July 1, 2006. He stated that the corporate
management system will make the banking activities more effective and
transparent. He said that the main problem of the Armenian banking
sector is the lack of qualified specialists. “I hope that we will
settle this issue with the time,” he said, not excluding that the
representatives of the Armenian Diaspora may be involved in the
banking activities.

There is a great centralization of property in Armenian banks, said IFC
expert Panos Labrapolus presenting the results of a study. He noted
that 15 banks of overall 21 Armenian banks took part in the study
and that the results are based on the answers that the banks gave to
IFC questions. Only 2 of the 15 banks expressed wish to become open
joint stock companies.

Patrick Luternauer, IFC expert, said that the most urgent issue for
the Armenian banks in to secure access and transparency of information
about them. He also emphasized the importance of the work of the
Board of Directors that deals with the settlement of primary issues.

At the same time, he said that it’s good that the Armenian banks
are read to make amendments to their systems and apply corporate
management. It’s worth mentioning that the International Financial
Corporation is the investment branch of the World Bank. Its goal is
to make investments in the private sector companies of the countries
in the transition period. Armenia became IFC member in 1995.

“HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS SLOWED” AI SAYS

BÝA, Turkey
May 24 2006

Torture and ill-treatment continued to be reported, with those detained
for ordinary crimes particularly at risk. Law enforcement officers
continued to use excessive force in the policing of demonstrations;
four demonstrators were shot dead in November”.

BÝA (London) – “During 2005 some of the world’s most powerful
governments were successfully challenged, their hypocrisy exposed
by the media, their arguments rejected by courts of law, their
repressive tactics resisted by human rights activists. After five
years of backlash against human rights in the “war on terror”, the
tide appeared to be turning” says international rights organization
Amnesty International (AI) in its 2006 Report.

“Nevertheless, the lives of millions of people worldwide were
devastated by the denial of fundamental rights” AI exposes and adds:
“Human security was threatened by war and attacks by armed groups
as well as by hunger, disease and natural disasters. Freedoms were
curtailed by repression, discrimination and social exclusion”.

Documenting human rights abuses in 150 countries around the world
the report also Gives considerable space to the situation in Turkey.

Below is the Turkey Section of the report.

TURKEY

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Head of state: Ahmet Necdet Sezer

Head of government: Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Death penalty: abolitionist for all crimes

International Criminal Court: not signed UN Women’s Convention and
its Optional Protocol: ratified

The Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU) formally opened
negotiations for Turkey’s membership of the EU.

Practical implementation of reforms intended to bring Turkish law
into line with international standards slowed in 2005. The law
provided for continuing restrictions on the exercise of fundamental
rights. Those expressing peaceful dissent on certain issues faced
criminal prosecution and sanctions after the introduction of the new
Turkish Penal Code.

Torture and ill-treatment continued to be reported, with those detained
for ordinary crimes particularly at risk. Law enforcement officers
continued to use excessive force in the policing of demonstrations;
four demonstrators were shot dead in November.

Investigations of such incidents were inadequate and law enforcement
officers responsible for violations were rarely brought to justice.

Human rights deteriorated in the eastern and south-eastern provinces
in the context of a rise in armed clashes between the Turkish security
services and the armed opposition Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Background

In June, the new Turkish Penal Code (TPC), Code of Criminal Procedure
and Law on the Enforcement of Sentences (LES) entered into force. The
laws contained positive aspects, with the TPC offering greater
protection from violence to women.

However, the TPC in particular also included restrictions to the right
to freedom of expression. Human rights defenders in Turkey also raised
objections to the punishment regime for prisoners envisaged by the LES.

A revised draft of the Anti-Terror Law was being discussed by a
parliamentary sub-commission at the end of the year; human rights
groups had commented critically on earlier drafts. In September Turkey
signed the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In October
the Council of Ministers of the EU formally opened negotiations for
Turkey’s membership of the EU.

Freedom of expression

A wide range of laws containing fundamental restrictions on freedom
of expression remained in force. These resulted in the prosecution
of individuals for the peaceful expression of opinions in many areas
of public life.

The pattern of prosecutions and judgments also often demonstrated
prosecutors’ and judges’ lack of knowledge of international human
rights law. In some cases comments by senior government officials
demonstrated an intolerance of dissenting opinion or open debate and
seemed to sanction prosecution.

Article 301, on the denigration of Turkishness, the Republic, and the
foundation and institutions of the state, was introduced in June and
replaced Article 159 of the old penal code. Article 159 and Article
301 were frequently applied arbitrarily to target a wide range of
critical opinion. Journalists, writers, publishers, human rights
defenders and academics were prosecuted under this law.

Among the many prosecuted were journalist Hrant Dink, novelist Orhan
Pamuk, Deputy Chair of the Mazlum Der human rights organization Sehmus
Ulek, and academics Bask¹n Oran and ±brahim Kabo¬lu . An international
academic conference on perceptions of the historical fate of the
Armenians in the late Ottoman period, to be held in May at Bosphorus
University in Istanbul was postponed after comments made by the
Minister of Justice, Cemil Cicek, which fundamentally challenged the
notion of academic freedom by portraying the initiative as treacherous.

The conference eventually took place at Bilgi University in
September. However, in December legal proceedings under TPC Articles
301 and 288 were initiated against five journalists who reported on
attempts to prevent the conference. A further restriction on freedom
of expression remained in the broad restrictions on the use of minority
languages in public life.

Frequent prosecutions for speaking or uttering single words in
Kurdish continued to be brought under Article 81 of theLaw on
Political Parties. In May the Court of Appeal ordered the closure
of the teachers’ union, Egitim-Sen, on the grounds that a clause in
its statute defending the right to “mother tongue education” violated
Articles 3 and 42 of the Constitution which emphasize that no language
other than Turkish may be taught as a mother tongue.

Egitim-Sen later revoked the relevant article of its statute in order
to avoid closure.

* In October the prosecutor initiated a case to closedown permanently
the Diyarbakir Kurdish Assocation (Kurd-Der) on various counts,
including the decision to adopt a “non-Turkish” spelling of the word
Kurdish in the association’s name and statute, and provisions in
the association’s statute defending the right to Kurdish language
education. The association had previously been warned to adjust the
disputed elements in its statute and name. Provisions in the Press
Law restricting press coverage of cases under judicial process were
used in an arbitrary and overly restrictive way to hinder independent
investigation and public comment by journalists on human rights
violations. These provisions were also used to hinder human rights
defenders. Legal proceedings were begun against the Chairperson
of the Diyarbak¹r branch of the Human Rights Association (HRA),
Selahattin Demirtas, and Mihdi Perincek, HRA Regional Representative,
in connection with a report they co-authored with others on the
killing of Ahmet Kaymaz and Ugur Kaymaz (see below).

The indictment alleged that the report violated Article 19 of the
Press Law, undermining the prosecutor’s preparatory investigation into
the killings, despite the fact that the authors had no access to the
contents of files on the case which, by court order and for reasons of
security, were unavailable for inspection. The first hearing against
the two began in July.

Torture and ill-treatment

Torture and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials continued
to be reported, with detainees allegedly being beaten; stripped
naked and threatened with death; deprived of food, water and sleep
during detention; and beaten during arrest or in places of unofficial
detention. Reports of torture or ill-treatment of individuals detained
for political offences decreased. However, people detained on suspicion
of committing ordinary crimes such as theft or for public disorder
offences were particularly at risk of ill-treatment.

Reports suggested that there were still many cases of law enforcement
officials completely failing to follow lawful detention and
investigative procedures and of prosecutors failing to ascertain
that law enforcement officials had complied with procedures. Police
also regularly used disproportionate force against demonstrators,
particularly targeting leftists, supporters of the pro-Kurdish
party DEHAP, students and trade unionists (see Killings in disputed
circumstances below). Often those alleging ill treatment, particularly
during demonstrations, were charged with resisting arrest while their
injuries were explained away as having occurred as police attempted
to restrain them.

* In October in Ordu, five teenagers aged between 15and 18 were
detained at the opening of a new shopping centre. The five reported
being beaten, verbally abused, and threatened and having their
testicles squeezed while being taken into custody and while in custody
at the Ordu Central Police Station. They were later released.

Two reported that they were stripped and threatened with rape. Three
were not recorded as having been in police detention. One was
subsequently charged with violently resisting arrest.

Beyond the alleged ill-treatment, which was documented in medical
reports and photographs, other irregularities in the handling of
the detained teenagers by the police and prosecutor demonstrated a
failure to follow legal procedures at any point from the moment of
detention onwards

* In March, in the Sarachane area of Istanbul, demonstrators gathering
to celebrate International Women’s Day were violently dispersed
by police, beaten with truncheons and sprayed with pepper gas at
close range.

Three women were reportedly hospitalized. The scenes drew international
condemnation. In December 54 police officers were charged with using
excessive force; senior officers were not charged, but three received a
“reprimand” for the incident.

Impunity

Investigations into torture and ill treatment continued to be marked by
deeply flawed procedures and supported suggestions of an unwillingness
on the part of the judiciary to bring perpetrators of human rights
violations to justice. An overwhelming climate of impunity persisted.

* In April, four police officers accused of the torture and rape with
a truncheon of two teenagers, Nazime Ceren Salmanoglu and Fatma Deniz
Polattas, in 1999 were acquitted.

More than six years after the judicial process had begun and after
the case had been delayed more than 30 times, a court in Iskenderun
acquitted the officers due to “insufficient evidence”. Lawyers for
the young women announced that they would appeal against the decision.

The two women had been sentenced to long prison terms on the basis of
“confessions” allegedly obtained under torture.

* Fifteen years after the death of university student Birtan Altinbas,
the trial of four police officers accused of killing him continued
in the Ankara Heavy Penal Court No. 2.

Birtan Altinbas died on 15 January 1991 following six days in
police custody, during which he was interrogated on suspicion of
being a member of an illegal organization. The case, which received
international condemnation and was widely reported in the Turkish
press, demonstrated many aspects of the flawed judicial process.

* The trial of four police officers charged with killing Ahmet
Kaymaz and his 12-year-old son Ugur Kaymaz on 21 November 2004 in
the K¹z¹ltepe district of Mardin began in February. The four officers
on trial were not under arrest and were still on active duty. It was
significant that senior officers responsible for the police operation
during which the two individuals were killed were excluded from the
investigation and not charged, supporting the view that in cases of
this kind prosecutors rarely examined the chain of command.

Fair trial concerns

The continuing inequality between prosecution and defence and the
influence of the executive on the appointment of judges and prosecutors
prevented the full independence of the judiciary. While from 1 June
detainees enjoyed the right to legal counsel and statements made in
the absence of lawyers were not admissible as evidence in court,
few prosecutors in the new Heavy Penal Courts (which replaced the
State Security Courts in 2004) attempted to review ongoing cases
where statements were originally made without the presence of legal
counsel and where defendants alleged that their testimony had been
extracted under torture.

Little effort was made to collect evidence in favour of the defendant
and most demands of the defence to have witnesses testify were not met.

Imprisonment for conscientious objection

Conscientious objection was not recognized and no civilian alternative
to military service was available.

* In August, Sivas Military Court sentenced conscientious objector
Mehmet Tarhan to four years’ imprisonment on charges of “disobeying
orders” and refusing to perform military service. He was a prisoner
of conscience.

Killings in disputed circumstances

On 9 November in the Semdinli district of Hakkâri, a bookshop was
bombed, killing one man and injuring others. Three men were charged
in connection with the incident. The alleged bomber was subsequently
revealed to be a former PKK guerrilla turned informant and his
alleged accomplices were two members of the security services, with
identity cards indicating that they were plain-clothes gendarmerie
intelligence officers.

Subsequently, as the prosecutor carried out a scene-of-crime
investigation, the assembled crowd was fired upon from a car, resulting
in the death of one civilian and injury of others. The prosecutor’s
crime scene investigation was postponed. A gendarmerie specialist
sergeant was charged with disproportionate use of force resulting
in death.

AI called upon the government to establish an independent commission
of inquiry to investigate all dimensions of these incidents including
allegations of direct official involvement. During subsequent protests
at the events in Semdinli, three people in the Yuksekova district of
Hakkâri and one person in Mersin were shot dead by police.

During 2005 approximately 50 people were shot dead by the security
forces, over half of them in the south-eastern and eastern provinces.

Many may have been victims of extra judicial executions or the use
of excessive force. “Failure to obey a warning to stop” was a common
explanation provided by the security forces for these deaths.

At least two individuals were alleged to have been assassinated by the
PKK. On 17 February, Kemal Sahin, who split from the PKK to found an
organization allied with the Patriotic Democratic Party of Kurdistan,
was killed near Suleimaniyeh in northern Iraq. On 6 July, Hikmet Fidan,
former DEHAP deputy chair, was killed in Diyarbakir.

An organization calling itself the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons claimed
responsibility for a bomb attack in July on a bus in the Aegean town
of Ku§adas¹ that killed five civilians.

266 Amnesty International Report 2006 TUR

Violence against women

Positive provisions in the new TPC offered an improved level of
protection for women against violence in the family. The new Law on
Municipalities required municipalities to provide shelters for women
in towns with populations of more than 50,000 individuals.

Implementation of this law will require adequate funding for the
establishment of shelters from central government and full co-operation
with women’s organizations in civil society. Further efforts were
needed to ensure that law enforcement officials, prosecutors and the
medical profession were fully versed in the still little-known Law
on the Protection of the Family.

Official human rights mechanisms

Official human rights monitoring mechanisms attached to the Prime
Ministry failed to function adequately and had insufficient powers to
report on and investigate violations. The work of the Prime Ministry
Human Rights Advisory Board, encompassing civil society organizations,
was obstructed and the Board became effectively inactive. Moreover,
in November, former Chair Ibrahim Kaboglu, and Baskin Oran, a board
member, were prosecuted for the contents of a report on the question of
minorities in Turkey commissioned by the Board and authored by Baskin
Oran. The Provincial and Human Rights Boards, set up by the Human
Rights Presidency and also attached to the Prime Ministry, failed
to conduct adequate investigations of human rights violations. Draft
legislation on the creation of an ombudsman failed to advance.

–Boundary_(ID_Di15xj2AuOctfthdfDhTDQ)–

ARMENIA-NATO DEEPENING COOPERATION ISSUES DISCUSSED

National Assembly of RA, Armenia
May 24 2006

On May 23 RA NA Vice Speaker Tigran Torosyan received NATO Secretary
General’s Special Representative Robert Simmons.

During the meeting the issues of cooperation within the framework of
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) between Armenia and NATO
were discussed.RA NA Vice Speaker Tigran Trosyan, referring to the
perspectives of cooperation, mentioned that it will continue both in
NATO PA and in broader aspect, since it is one of the most important
components in ensuring the security system of Armenia. Highlighting the
meaning of constitutional reforms in deepening of democracy process,
human rights protection, formation of full complex of state governance
checks and balances, as well as solving problems of national security,
Mr.Torosyam found natural the existence of political components
in IPAP and hoped that the cooperation with NATO can promote the
successful solution of Euro integration and improvement of regional
relationships to meet conflicts.

Both sides highlighted the issues of holding the forthcoming elections
in conformity to the democracy standards, further expansion of IPAP
development. Mr. Simmons attached importance to the role and meaning of
the Parliament in the issue of NATO relations, mentioning the Armenian
delegation work and the important role of national diplomacy in the
NATO PA. He is here to give mid-term evaluation to IPAP and thinks
that the programme has got positive developments, and the Parliament
may have an active role in the continuation of it.

According to Mr. Simmons, the IPAP is a document that can be completed
and developed; since in the basis it is a protection of democracy
values. According to NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative,
the alliance can promote the development of Armenia-Turkey relations.

On Mr. Simmons’ request, returning to the situation around Armenian
Parliament, Mr. Torosyan mentioned that the rearrangement of political
forces would not affect Armenian foreign policy, NATO relationships
and the regulation of IPAP problems. It was also mentioned that
the Committee on Coordination of Cooperation between Armenia and
European Institutions was created to deepen the cooperation. The
Committee headed by RA President will essentially promote the IPAP
implementation.

Other issues of mutual interests were also discussed during the
meeting.