Month: February 2021

HyperAllergic

Theater Ensemble Targeted in Turkey for Kurdish Performances; Accused
of “Terrorist Propaganda”

By Ayla Jean Yackley
Feb. 18, 2021

ŞANLIURFA, Turkey — What gets a 40-year-old Italian comedy about a
cosmetic surgery mishap banned from the stage? Performing the play in
Kurdish in Turkey, a theater troupe discovered.

Police raided a municipal theater in Istanbul last autumn, just hours
before Teatra Jiyana Nû, the city’s oldest Kurdish-language ensemble,
was to stage Nobel Prize-winning Dario Fo’s 1981 farce Trumpets and
Raspberries. Officers accused the actors of threatening public order.

Another performance was halted in the city of Şanlıurfa in the
country’s predominantly Kurdish southeast in November, and Teatra
Jiyana Nû canceled the rest of the run, anticipating more bans.

“The government views us as political because we believe that the
almost 20 million Kurds living in Turkey have the right to experience
theater in their own language,” said actor Cihad Ekinci, who plays a
surgeon in the adaption called Bêrû (Faceless in Kurdish).

In a country where Turkish is the only official language, speaking
Kurdish is sometimes seen as an act of rebellion. Teatra Jiyana Nû, or
New Life Theater, has struggled to find stages to perform its
repertoire, which includes original works and classics by Bertolt
Brecht and Neil Simon. Though cast members have been detained and
faced police intimidation outside venues, it has managed to perform
Bêrû in a handful of Turkish cities, as well as at festivals in Russia
and Germany, since 2017.

“This was the first time Kurdish theater was given space in the
repertory of the City Theaters — an official, public institution — and
that is what provoked this reaction,” Ekinci told Hyperallergic.


Authorities insist that theater in Kurdish is permissible if it avoids
“terrorist propaganda,” and vowed to investigate whether Teatra Jiyana
Nû acted as a mouthpiece for the armed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
But the play — a lighthearted critique of capitalism written before
the PKK even existed — has been staged in Turkish at public theaters.
The company denies links with the outlawed group, which has waged a
36-year insurgency at the cost of 40,000 lives.

Teatra Jiyana Nû’s travails are part of a broader crackdown that has
not spared the culture community since a peace process with the
militants collapsed in 2015; Erdoğan fended off a military coup the
following year and pivoted to a strident strain of nationalism.

Writers, actors, and scholars are among the tens of thousands of
people in jail as a result. Osman Kavala, a prominent arts benefactor
who supported dialogue between Kurds and Turks, has been incarcerated
for more than three years without a conviction.

“Anti-democratic measures once used solely against Kurds now affect
almost every part of Turkish society,” Ekinci said.

Yet Kurds have borne the brunt of the government’s ire.
Kurdish-language newspapers, broadcasters, even a children’s cartoon
network have been banned. Kurdish artist Zehra Doğan now lives in
exile after nearly three years in jail for painting scenes of military
operations against the PKK.

Thousands of Kurdish activists have been imprisoned, including
politician Selahattin Demirtaş, the former leader of Turkey’s
second-biggest opposition party. Almost every mayor elected from his
party has been replaced with a state-appointed trustee, and their city
theaters have all been shuttered.

Speaking Kurdish has long been perilous in Turkey, where the language
— the mother tongue of as many as 40 million people worldwide — was
illegal until 1991. Four Kurdish lawmakers were jailed for a decade
after taking their oath of office in Kurdish that year.

In the ensuing decades, restrictions eased, and Erdoğan expanded some
rights for Turkey’s largest minority to woo Kurdish voters. He
launched a state TV channel in 2009 that continues to broadcast in
Kurdish.

Yet Kurdish language and literature programs at universities have been
stymied, and independent schools banned, including Istanbul’s
influential Kurdish Institute, which taught thousands after opening in
1992.

The institute’s founder, Musa Anter, is credited as Turkey’s first
Kurdish-language playwright with 1965’s Birîna Reş (Black Wound),
initially performed secretly in basements. Anter was assassinated in
1992 at the age of 72 by unidentified gunmen.

“The Kurdish issue is a state security policy, and since our language
is part of the issue, it too is under pressure,” said linguist Zana
Farqini, who ran the Kurdish Institute, in an interview with
Hyperallergic. “Turkey tells the world Kurdish isn’t banned, but in
truth the state has been largely successful in making Kurdish
invisible again, [and] Kurds have withdrawn into their shells, afraid
to explore their culture.”

This has deprived a generation of art in parts of the country where
Kurdish is the primary language, Mevlüt Güneş, a lawyer in Şanlıurfa,
told Hyperallergic. There, most Kurds over the age of 40 did not
complete enough schooling to master Turkish, and many are illiterate,
he said.

“For them, communication is spoken or visual. You can put my mother in
a room full of books, and she won’t understand a thing. Theater is one
of the few ways she can access culture,” he said.

Bêrû was supposed to provide lawyers with comic relief during the
coronavirus pandemic, but police arrived at Güneş’ bar association
with a summons saying the actors were under investigation for
belonging to a terrorist organization, and the show could not go on.

It is unclear when the ensemble will take the stage; besides the
looming terrorism probe, theaters across Turkey closed in December as
COVID-19 cases peaked.

But it’s not lights out for Teatra Jiyana Nû, which is working on a
new play based on the real-life arrest of a cast member when he
stepped into the wings during a performance in the 1990s. The comedy
of errors includes the other actors’ attempts to prolong the epic to
avoid their own arrest.

“The finale may not be very funny, but it will offer hope. This is
Kurds’ story: There is comedy in our tragedy,” Ekinci said.



 

Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 28

Growing Azerbaijani–Central Asian Ties Likely to Trigger Conflicts
With Russia and Iran

By Paul Goble



Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War (September 29–November
9) has had a transformative effect on the country. It not only changed
the attitudes of its population, whose members now feel themselves to
be heroes rather than victims (see EDM, January 21), but also
bolstered the diplomatic weight and possibilities of the Azerbaijani
government in its dealings with other regional states. In prosecuting
a triumphant war against Yerevan, Baku demonstrated its own ability to
act. But just as importantly, Azerbaijan has shown to peoples and
governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia that it is a force to be
reckoned with, in part thanks to its growing links with Turkey.
Moreover, that alliance makes possible an appealing path to the
outside world for all who join it. That reality is causing countries
east of the Caspian to look westward to and through Azerbaijan in
their economic planning and political calculations.

At the same time, however, these developments are generating concerns
in Moscow and Tehran, which oppose east-west trade routes that bypass
their countries’ territories and instead favor north-south corridors
linking Russia and Iran together. As a result, Azerbaijan’s recent
successes in expanding links with Central Asia set the stage for new
conflicts between Azerbaijan and its Turkic partners, on the one hand,
and Russia and Iran, which have far more significant naval assets in
the Caspian, on the other (see EDM, November 27, 2018 and February 20,
2020; Casp-geo.ru, December 24, 2019; Chinalogist.ru, November 21,
2019).

One of the clearest signs of Baku’s expanded influence in the wake of
its victory is that Turkmenistan has now reached an agreement with
Azerbaijan on the joint exploitation of oil deposits on the Caspian
seafloor. The accord ends that dispute and opens the way for broader
cooperation not only between Baku and Ashgabat but also between
Azerbaijan and the other countries of Central Asia. Symbolic of this
change is that the two countries agreed to rename the field “Dostluk,”
Turkic for “Friendship.” That name replaces the separate names, Kypaz
and Serdar, that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, respectively, had been
using for the deposit in the past (Stanradar.com, January 22; see EDM,
January 27).

Moreover, Kabul, Baku and Ashgabat recently reached another important
agreement: promoting what is known as the Lapis Lazuli corridor,
linking Afghanistan with Turkey via Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. While
cooperation on the transit route itself is years in the making, the
deal to significantly deepen that collaboration was notably reached
after Baku’s victory gave it new influence by demonstrating that
Azerbaijan is a growing force to be reckoned with in the region
(Mfa.gov.tm, January 16; Casp-geo.ru, January 21; see EDM, February
10).

The above two moves are only the most immediately significant of what
has been taking place more generally between Central Asian countries
and Azerbaijan. Another and potentially even more important
development in that regard involves Kazakhstan. In the last month
alone, officials there have announced plans for a radical increase in
the capacity of Port Aktau so that Kazakhstan can export goods via
ship to Azerbaijan for further dispatch to Turkey and Europe
(Casp-geo.ru, February 8, 17). Discussions of such cross-Caspian trade
had been going on since the sea’s five littoral states—the Russian
Federation, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan—agreed in
August 2018 on the delimitation of this body of water. But again,
those talks did not appear likely to take concrete form until after
the November 2020 Russian-brokered ceasefire between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.

The expansion in maritime trade between Central Asia and the South
Caucasus is not something Moscow and Tehran are happy about because it
not only bypasses them but also gives the countries on both sides of
the Caspian greater opportunities for freedom of action. To signal
their common displeasure as well as ability to block such trade unless
the two are given the chance to play a role in its organization,  the
Russian and Iranian navies held a joint exercise on the Caspian even
as the Karabakh war ceasefire accord was being worked out in Moscow
(Deutsche Welle, October 16, 2020; Vesti, October 12, 2020). In the
past two weeks, to underscore their opposition to continued regional
developments, the two countries again held joint naval drills in the
Caspian (EurAsia Daily, February 17).

Such moves, of course, do not mean Moscow and Tehran are about to use
military force to block east-west trade between Central Asia and
Azerbaijan; but they are a sign of the increasing unhappiness of both
about what has happened since Baku’s victory made it a more attractive
partner for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. And Russo-Iranian actions are
a reminder that they have the capacity to cause trouble in the future,
especially since the Russian flotilla in the Caspian far exceeds the
capacity even of the rapidly modernizing but largely coastal defense
and search-and-rescue fleets of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan (Russ-flot.narod.ru, Zakon.kz, accessed February 18,
2021; Topwar.ru, August 16, 2011). At a minimum, joint exercises by
Russia and Iran raise concerns about the broader intentions of those
two countries and the all-too-real risk that one or both may take more
actions in the future to show their capacity to disrupt trans-Caspian
ties.

Many analysts have focused on the impact of Azerbaijan’s victory in
Karabakh on ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran, where they form, by some
estimates, a third or more of the population and are a matter for
concern for Tehran (see EDM, October 22, 2020); other experts have
looked at how the lessons of the Second Karabakh War are influencing
the thinking of leaders in other post-Soviet states with their own
Russian-backed “frozen” conflicts, raising the possibility of military
force being used to resolve these situations (Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
February 9, 2021; see EDM, November 9, 2020, December 16, 2020,
January 5, 2021, January 13, 2021). But perhaps the most important
fallout of Baku’s win on the battlefield is to be found in the new way
that the countries of Central Asia increasingly view it as a bridge to
the West—something that will only increase the influence of Azerbaijan
(and behind it Turkey) in the Turkic republics of that region.



 

                                        Thursday, 

Former Yerevan Mayor Indicted


Armenia - Yerevan Mayor Taron Markarian speaks at an election campaign rally in 
the city's Erebuni district, 21Apr2017.

A law-enforcement agency has brought criminal charges against Yerevan’s former 
Mayor Taron Markarian and three other former government officials.

The Investigative Committee claimed on Thursday that Markarian abused his had 
powers to sell three plots of municipal land to his cronies from in 2011-2014. 
The land belonging to public schools was privatized at knockdown prices, it said 
without specifying financial details of those deals.

In a statement, the committee said that two other former senior officials of 
Yerevan’s municipal administration as well as Arman Sahakian, a former head of 
the Armenian government’s Department of State Property Management, have been 
indicted as part of the same criminal case. It did not elaborate.

Markarian’s lawyer, Benik Galstian, was quick to laugh off the accusations, 
saying that his client regards them as a “farce.” He claimed investigators are 
illegally refusing to share with him all materials of the case and that he does 
not know “what exactly Mr. Markarian is accused of.”

In a Facebook post, Galstian also said that Markarian travelled to Moscow on 
February 7 for medical treatment and returned to Armenia on February 13 two days 
after being notified of his impending indictment.

Markarian, 42, served as Yerevan mayor from 2011-2018. Both he and Sahakian are 
senior members of former President Serzh Sarkisian’s Republican Party of Armenia 
(HHK).

Markarian’s late father Andranik was Armenia’s prime minister from 2000-2007. 
The latter headed the HHK until his sudden death in 2007.



Lawmaker Explains Decision To Leave Tsarukian’s Party

        • Gayane Saribekian

Armenia - Gevorg Petrosian attends a session of the Armenian parliament, May 25, 
2020.

Gevorg Petrosian, an outspoken opposition parliamentarian, said on Thursday that 
he decided to leave Gagik Tsarukian’s Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK) because it 
has been too soft on the country’s government.

He claimed that although the BHK is part of an opposition alliance trying to 
oust Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian many of its senior members have not 
adequately participated in anti-government rallies held after the autumn war in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.

“When I went [to opposition rallies] people shamed me, saying ‘Where is your 
party? Why is it not participating in this rally?’” Petrosian told RFE/RL’s 
Armenian Service.

“We are accused of being false opposition. I don’t want to be labeled false 
opposition,” he said.

The BHK is the sole member of the opposition alliance, called the Homeland 
Salvation Movement, represented in the parliament. The movement is scheduled to 
hold its next rally on Saturday. Tsarukian is expected to attend it. Like other 
opposition leaders, he has repeatedly demanded Pashinian’s resignation.

Petrosian complained that other senior BHK figures did not like his harsh 
anti-government rhetoric. He said they did not stand by him when a leading 
member of Pashinian’s My Step bloc demanded recently an end to his derogatory 
attacks on Pashinian and other senior officials.

Petrosian announced his decision to leave the BHK and remain in the parliament 
as an independent deputy on Tuesday.

The BHK spokeswoman, Iveta Tonoyan, said afterwards that the decision took her 
and her colleagues by surprise. She said that Petrosian did not discuss his 
grievances with them.

Petrosian’s exit reduced to 23 the number of seats controlled by Tsarukian’s 
party in the 132-member National Assembly.

The 48-year-old lawmaker has already had a turbulent relationship with the BHK 
leadership in the past. He left the party in 2010 but rejoined it five years 
later. He was expelled from the party ranks in 2016 only to be elected to the 
parliament on BHK ticket the following year.



Another Sarkisian Trial Defendant Dies

        • Artak Khulian

Armenia -- President Serzh Sarkisian (R) and Agriculture Minister Sergo 
Karapetian (L) visit Armavir province, April 7, 2011.

An Armenian court on Thursday again adjourned a trial of former President Serzh 
Sarkisian following the death of another defendant.
Sergo Karapetian died early in the morning as a result of what the director of a 
Yerevan hospital described as “complications” caused by the coronavirus. The 
72-year-old had served as Armenia’s agriculture minister from 2010-2016 during 
Sarkisian’s rule.

Karapetian’s former deputy and another trial defendant, Samvel Galstian, died 
from COVID-19 one month ago.

Sarkisian, Karapetian, Galstian and two other men went on trial on corruption 
charges one year ago.

Sarkisian stands accused of giving privileged treatment in 2013 to his longtime 
friend and businessman Barsegh Barseghian which allegedly cost the state over $1 
million in losses. According to prosecutors, he made sure that a government 
tender for supplies of subsidized diesel fuel to farmers is won by Barseghian’s 
Flash company, rather than another fuel importer that offered a lower price.

The ex-president rejects the accusations as politically motivated. They are 
reportedly based on Karapetian’s incriminating pre-trial testimony against him.

The former minister was jeered by Sarkisian supporters who gathered outside the 
court building at the start of the trial in February 2020. He repeatedly refused 
to talk to reporters about the high-profile case.

The judge presiding over the trial has held few hearings on the case over the 
past year due to the frequent absence of defendants and their lawyers.

Sarkisian, who ruled the country from 2008-2018, remains the chairman of the 
Republican Party of Armenia (HHK). HHK representatives have said he was indicted 
in December 2019 in retaliation for his public criticism of Prime Minister Nikol 
Pashinian. Law-enforcement officials and Pashinian’s political allies have 
denied that.

Pashinian has repeatedly implicated Sarkisian, his family and political 
entourage in corruption both before and after coming to power in 2018.



Prosecutors Seek To Criminalize Defamation Of Armenian Officials

        • Artak Khulian

Armenia -- Riot police guard the entrance to the Office of the 
Prosecutor-General during an anti-government protest in Yerevan, January 28, 
2021.

In a move condemned by press freedom groups, Armenian prosecutors have drafted 
legislation that would make defamation of government, law-enforcement and other 
state officials a crime punishable by up to two years in prison.

All forms of defamation were decriminalized in Armenia in 2010 during the rule 
of former President Serzh Sarkisian. The move was recommended by the Council of 
Europe.

A bill circulated by the Office of the Prosecutor-General and posted on a 
government website on Wednesday says that slander and insults directed at state 
officials performing their duties have become commonplace and must be 
criminalized. It says that individuals making slanderous claims through mass 
media or other public channels must face up to two years’ imprisonment and heavy 
fines.

Armenia’s leading media organizations expressed serious concern over the bill on 
Thursday, saying that it could be used by the authorities as a “tool” against 
legitimate criticism. In a joint statement, they described it as a “logical 
continuation” of recent legislative measures aimed at restricting press freedom 
in the country.

The statement pointed to the Armenian parliament’s decision last week to approve 
a fivefold increase in maximum legal fines set for defamation as well as 
pro-government lawmakers’ separate proposal to make it harder for journalists to 
use anonymous sources.

“We are expressing our disappointment with the fact that the authorities formed 
as a result of the 2018 revolution are planning unacceptable restrictions on the 
freedom of expression,” stated the 11 organizations.

“We do not want at all to defend slanderers and offenders,” they said. “But we 
find it necessary to remind that representatives of the authorities, officials 
and public figures must show utmost tolerance towards any criticism.”

The prosecutors’ initiative has been effectively endorsed by the Armenian 
Ministry of Justice. But it is not yet clear whether Prime Minister Nikol 
Pashinian’s government will back the proposed criminalization of defamation.

Some parliamentarians affiliated with Pashinian’s My Step bloc said last week 
that they would hail such a measure.

Daniel Ioannisian of the Union of Informed Citizens also criticized the 
prosecutors’ bill on Thursday, saying that it could result in media censorship.

“You will definitely find no European or democratic country that makes it a 
crime to insult or slander authorities but not [ordinary] citizens,” Ioannisian 
told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.

“True, there are countries, including democratic ones, where defamation is a 
criminal offense … But there is no [democratic] country where insulting 
authorities is deemed a crime but insulting citizens is not,” he said.

Ioannisian said the authorities should tackle instead the spread of false 
information by anonymous or fake social media accounts.


Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
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