Author: Toneyan Mark

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Nikol Pashinyan’s latest visit to Moscow caught the attention of even those who usually steer clear of South Caucasus politics. The Armenian prime minister openly trolled Vladimir Putin on democracy, pointedly noting that in Armenia «there are no participants in the political process serving time in places not so remote,» and that the country’s social networks are «100 percent free.» He dropped all this just as Russia was blocking Telegram and seriously weighing tougher controls on VPN services.

Clips from the exchange instantly spawned memes and Instagram Reels parodies. But behind the funny videos it’s easy to miss the main point. In this meeting the Kremlin for the first time spelled out its demands to Yerevan directly, not through propagandists. The key ones: allow Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan — who is currently under house arrest — to take part in the June elections, and for Armenia to drop its pro-Western course. Refusal would mean higher gas prices and other economic headaches for Yerevan.

In theory Putin could start using those levers right now to tilt the parliamentary vote. But assuming he definitely will would be a mistake. The Kremlin has been talking about «the end of Pashinyan» since late 2020, yet every time Moscow has backed away from a direct confrontation.

Help Samvel

Pashinyan’s trip to Moscow had only one real purpose: to clarify relations with Putin on the eve of the elections set for June 7. At least that’s the clear takeaway from the public part of the meeting. The conversation between the two leaders ran a surprisingly long 20 minutes for a protocol event — when it could easily have been limited to the usual greetings and a couple of standard remarks about «our relations developing dynamically, trade growing, though of course there are still many issues that need discussing.» Everything else normally happens off-camera.

If they let the cameras roll for longer, there was a reason. It felt like those infamous Trump-Zelensky talks where the entire back-and-forth — including the joke about the missing suit — played out live. The emotional temperature was higher there, but Putin’s dialogue with Pashinyan clearly stepped outside normal diplomatic bounds.

From his very first sentence Putin set the tone for a tough conversation: «We see that domestic political processes in Armenia are heating up, and elections are coming soon.» He immediately made clear what mattered to him: «that these flare-ups do not harm our relations between Russia and Armenia in any way.» And he was equally direct about why they might flare up. «We have a great many friends in Armenia — a great many, we know that. Many Armenians live in the Russian Federation,» Putin added, somewhat pointlessly, since Armenia does not allow overseas voting. «And there are many political forces that are pro-Russian. Of course, I will tell you quite frankly — our dialogue is such that we always speak honestly and directly. We would very much like all these political parties and politicians to be able to take part in this domestic political process during the elections. Some of them, I know, are in places of detention, even though they hold Russian passports. That is your decision, we do not interfere, but we would like them all to be able, at the very least, to participate in this domestic political work.»

He was, of course, talking about Samvel Karapetyan — a businessman with a fortune of over $ 3 billion who ranks 44th on the Russian Forbes list. He holds dual Armenian-Russian citizenship and, according to some reports, Cypriot citizenship as well. Under Armenia’s current constitution, anyone who has held a foreign passport in the past four years cannot become prime minister or a member of parliament. Even if Karapetyan formally keeps only his Armenian passport by election day, as his team promises, it changes nothing. Besides, he has barely lived in Armenia, having focused mainly on his Russian business interests in Moscow.

Yet Karapetyan’s team (while he remains under arrest, his nephew Narek, first vice-president of the Tashir Group, acts as the main public face) promises that if they win they will immediately rewrite the constitution to remove these restrictions. According to leaks, the party has already figured out how to bypass the rule requiring the prime-ministerial candidate to meet the criteria: formally the candidate will be Narek Karapetyan, who satisfies them. Everyone understands, however, that the real candidate is the billionaire himself.

Technically, the required constitutional change can be made without a referendum if there is a parliamentary majority. The catch is that a brand-new party is unlikely to win one.

There are also issues with the party name the businessman created from jail. It was originally called «Strong Armenia.» After merging with two smaller forces, they expanded it to «Strong Armenia with Samvel Karapetyan.» The ruling Civil Contract party saw this as a gift and quickly passed a law banning personal names in party titles. Karapetyan’s lawyers will probably still find a workaround — by amending the charter documents, for example.

Assessing the real support for «Strong Armenia» is difficult for now. According to a poll by the American International Republican Institute (IRI), only 6 percent named Samvel Karapetyan as their most trusted politician and another 4 percent as their second choice. Nikol Pashinyan scored 18 percent (first choice) and 2 percent (second). Other candidates did even worse: former president Robert Kocharyan came third with 3 percent and 2 percent respectively.

When asked who they would vote for next Sunday, 24 percent said the ruling Civil Contract, 9 percent «Strong Armenia,» and only 3 percent the «Armenia» bloc led by Kocharyan. Similar numbers came from an April poll by the Armenian company MPG: 24.3 percent for Pashinyan, 13.4 percent for «Strong Armenia,» and 7.9 percent for «Prosperous Armenia» (the pocket party of oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, who is building a Jesus statue taller than the one in Brazil and uses politics to protect his business).

So only two or three forces are likely to clear the parliamentary threshold (4 percent for a single party, 8 percent for a two-party bloc, 10 percent for three or more). Surprises are possible, though, because of the «multiplier» effect — the proportional redistribution of votes from parties that fail to pass the threshold to the winners.

The absolute confidence in victory that Narek Karapetyan loudly proclaims looks like bravado. Still, the new force will most likely win some seats in parliament. Pashinyan, for his part, is likely to keep his majority thanks to low turnout: his 24 percent represents roughly half of those who are actually expected to show up and vote. According to the IRI poll, 48 percent of respondents «trust no one» and will probably simply stay home.

After Pashinyan’s Moscow visit many are asking whether such a result would satisfy Putin, or whether he is counting on Armenia coming fully under the control of a «pro-Russian party.» There are reasons for concern. Almost in passing, Putin reminded his guest that «gas prices in Europe are exceeding $ 600 per thousand cubic meters, while Russia sells gas to Armenia for $ 177.5.» He added that «being in a customs union with the European Union and with EurAsEC [he persistently used the old name for the EAEU that was current before 2015 — author’s note] is impossible… by definition.»

That issue, however, is entirely academic right now. Armenia has not even applied to join the EU and is certainly not a candidate. Even in the most optimistic scenario, membership is at least 15−20 years away. What the EU itself, the EAEU, or Vladimir Putin will look like by then is impossible to predict.

Offended to the Max

Both Russian propaganda outlets and Armenian opposition media are convinced: the Kremlin has given Pashinyan a «black mark,» after which his days are numbered. Even Andrei Kolesnikov — the «chronicler of Putin» at Kommersant, whose reports are often scanned for hidden signals — ended his piece with: «It was an outstanding conversation. And, quite possibly, the beginning of the end for one of the participants.»

There is certainly enough evidence for that conclusion. In addition to Putin’s words came a harsh statement from Dmitry Medvedev («It is time to abandon the tolerant attitude toward our neighbors joining the European military-economic union») and Maria Zakharova, commenting on the visit, called Russia-Armenia ties «part of historical nature itself.» On top of that, Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of research programs at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), made a surprise trip to Yerevan. In an interview with journalist Aze Babayan he spoke in the language of the 2010s, talking about the «deterrence effect» Russia supposedly provides against Azerbaijan and Turkey, and promising that if Azerbaijan attacks Armenia, Moscow would not merely «provide assistance» but would itself enter the war. Suslov made it crystal clear: if Pashinyan breaks ties with Moscow, «aggression will be inevitable.» It looked like classic intimidation from someone close to the Russian authorities.

But even more significant was the lengthy interview Vice-Premier Alexei Overchuk gave to TASS. Overchuk is the key Russian official handling economic relations with both Yerevan and Baku and is deeply involved in all the details, including the «unblocking of communications» (restoring rail links) between the countries after 2020. That process has now been taken over by the Trump administration through the TRIPP project («Trump Route»).

The vice-premier also criticized Armenia’s westward drift, but from his own economic vantage point. Not long ago Pashinyan raised the possibility of transferring the concession on Armenian railways from Russian Railways (RZhD) to some «friendly» country — Kazakhstan, Qatar, or the UAE. The reason: Russian involvement means Yerevan «loses competitive advantage.» It’s true that once the line to Turkey is restored, a train from anywhere in the European Union could reach Yerevan via Bulgaria. But how would potential partners feel about having to deal with a Russian state corporation on Armenian territory?

Moscow flatly rejected the idea. Pashinyan’s own bluntness played a role here: just a couple of months earlier he had asked Moscow to help restore sections of track on the border with Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan and Turkey, only to make it clear afterward that Moscow would not be allowed to enjoy the fruits of that work. «If the leadership of Armenia raises the question of the undesirability of Russian business presence, then the question of reciprocity also arises,» Overchuk said.

Moscow is clearly also offended by Yerevan’s choice of the «Trump Route» (TRIPP). In Overchuk’s words one could clearly hear the familiar Kremlin narrative of «you’ll be sorry you didn’t choose us, but it will be too late.» He put it this way: «Had Armenia remained in the format of the Trilateral Working Group co-chaired by the deputy prime ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia, construction of this railway would already be nearing completion, and it would remain entirely the property of the country whose territory it crosses.»

Incidentally, because of the war in Iran, the prospects for the American project in the South Caucasus are genuinely under threat. As Joshua Kuchera wrote in Foreign Policy, representatives of the American company that were supposed to inspect the route section postponed their visit precisely because of the situation around Iran. Not to mention that the whole project ultimately depends on Trump’s enthusiasm — something even Nikol Pashinyan has acknowledged is currently lacking.

This is not the first time waves of offended statements directed at Pashinyan have poured out of Moscow. But so far no one has given a clear answer to the question: what exactly is Moscow going to do? Simply raise the price of gas? Few believed that before — because in that case the Kremlin would finally lose whatever scraps of support it still has in Armenia. Even the most convinced advocate of Putin and «Russia’s outpost in the Caucasus» would not thank them for that. Besides, the scenario in which Armenia begins buying gas from Azerbaijan — first via Georgia (as already happens with grain and petrol) and later directly, after building a few dozen kilometers of pipeline — no longer looks like fantasy.

Banning the products of a single cognac factory will have little effect, no matter how much state media hypes it. And the Kremlin itself, it seems, does not believe that some influence agents modeled on Moldova’s «Shor network» (a structure of paid influencers and local agitators created by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor) could seriously sway the election results. At most, such «activists» can stand with placards outside the Armenian embassy in Moscow and hold small events for the diaspora. But unlike the Moldovan diaspora, the Armenian one does not vote in elections. They failed to remove Maia Sandu that way, even though her support in Moldova is also not very high. Narek Karapetyan was asked directly whether he planned to organize transport for Russian Armenians to Yerevan to vote; he made it clear he was not prepared to do so.

Lucky Like Pashinyan

Although the «failed» and «shameful» visit to Moscow has been discussed for two weeks now, it can also be viewed from another angle. The trip to Putin was not a «summoning to the carpet» but an initiative of the Armenian prime minister himself. Even his opponents do not dispute this, and the Russian channel Tsargrad went so far as to state: «Pashinyan’s main goal in the talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin was to show potential voters that he knows how to speak with Moscow as an equal.» Of course, Putin also tried to demonstrate that Moscow can dictate its will in a calm and confident tone. But the very fact that Pashinyan came to him of his own accord substantially changes the picture.

The Armenian prime minister had every reason to call the visit «very successful.» As prominent Yerevan political scientist Alexander Iskandaryan noted, any undecided voter — regardless of their views — can see in these talks exactly what they want to see. An anti-Russian viewer will enjoy how cleverly Pashinyan argued with Putin. Someone who believes contact with Moscow must be preserved at all costs (if only for pragmatic reasons) will be reassured: the visit itself proves that the contact exists. What’s more, Pashinyan once again publicly called Russia a friendly country.

There is no doubt that Russia will be mentioned frequently in Armenia over the coming months. The agenda will still include the transfer of the railways (Pashinyan only promised not to negotiate «behind Russia’s back»), relations with Azerbaijan («maybe it would still be better with Russia?»), the future of the CSTO (which Pashinyan has firmly decided not to rejoin), and much else. Solovyov’s shows will continue to invent elaborate insults for Pashinyan, and Armenian parliament speaker Alen Simonyan will keep trading barbs with Russian officials from afar.

None of this cancels out the «inertial» scenario: on 8 June Pashinyan will declare victory for his party, and Putin will calmly congratulate him. There will be plenty of abuse on propaganda airwaves, but despite all Pashinyan’s weaknesses, the Kremlin simply does not have the strength for any other scenario. Serious interference was believable until New Year; now there is neither the time nor suitable candidates capable of winning even 15−20 percent of real support.

Moreover, any attempt by the Kremlin to apply pressure could actually work in Pashinyan’s favor, further consolidating the electorate that is angry with Moscow for its non-intervention in 2022 (when Azerbaijan carried out an offensive on the border) and in 2023 (when Karabakh finally came under Baku’s control). At the meeting Putin tried to explain both episodes. He even called Karabakh «the most sensitive issue.» But that is no longer entirely true. The return of the region is now a radical agenda, while even Karapetyan’s party acknowledges that such a scenario is impossible and is instead focusing on providing decent housing for refugees. Pashinyan himself has taken to wearing a lapel pin showing the map of Armenia without Karabakh — and he wore it to the Kremlin. This demonstrative gesture is, of course, not to everyone’s liking. Putin’s talk about Karabakh impresses few either: when it was really needed, Moscow simply stayed silent.

But Putin has nothing else to say. By publicly treating Nikol Pashinyan like a schoolboy in the principal’s office, the Kremlin is at least preserving what remains of Russian-Armenian relations. If Putin suddenly started praising Pashinyan, his stock among Armenian opposition figures would collapse, while among «Nikolakan» supporters of the government it would hardly rise. If he declared Pashinyan an outright enemy, relations with Armenia would sink to the level of Moldova: formally they exist, de facto they almost don’t. Supporting Karapetyan therefore looks like the safe option: his party is certain to get some result (provided it is even allowed to run). At the same time, the very nomination of the Russian billionaire as leader of the opposition most likely happened by accident — without any direct instruction from the Kremlin. Had Pashinyan not arrested him for an interview defending the Armenian Apostolic Church, Karapetyan would most likely have simply gone back to Moscow and continued minding his own business.

And even if, hypothetically, Moscow managed to bring some pro-Russian force to power in Armenia, it would be unable to offer it serious protection from Azerbaijan. Baku would force those «pro-Russian politicians» to follow its line just as easily.