Author: Toneyan Mark

Amid the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, India is considering sending more military assistance to Armenia, its vital ally in the Caucasus, reports the Economic Times. This comes after India successfully delivered the first batch of weapons to Armenia over the past year.

The article reported that India intends to send additional supplies some of which could consist of military hardware meant to strengthen Armenia’s deterrent might. The development came to light in the backdrop of serious tensions between Armenia and the Islamic country Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey and Pakistan.

A top Armenian official recently was in Delhi to hold negotiations about the same, as per sources with knowledge of the situation. They asserted that India has emerged as a reliable source of weapons which is in line with their demand.

However, specifics of the new shipments are undisclosed at this time and analysts in Armenia who want to remain anonymous stated that the cargo might comprise tools that could act as a deterrent amid the hostile environment with Azerbaijan.

India’s previous consignment to Armenia included Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, rockets, and ammunition. The weapons were reportedly delivered through Iran, a country with historical ties to Armenia. Iran, which has historical ties to Armenia had reportedly facilitated the delivery. The supplies had prompted protests from Azerbaijan.

India, Iran and Armenia established a trilateral earlier this year to explore a transit corridor. The three nations underlined the potential for strengthening cultural and people-to-people ties as well as trilateral collaboration in several areas during a meeting in Yerevan in April. They further spoke about economic initiatives and regional communication channels. The decision was made to “continue consultations” in the format at that point. The usage of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) as a regional connectivity network was addressed as well at the summit.

Armenia has been acquiring Pinaka systems mostly because of Azerbaijan’s drone utilisation, as the system’s “shoot and scoot” functionality allows it to avoid counter-battery fire. It is also an excellent armament system for the country due to its affordability and ease of application. Due to their familiarity with the Russian-made GRAD system, the Armenian army could quickly become proficient with the technique. 

The head of Armenia’s parliamentary committee on defence and security affairs, Andranik Kocharyan recently declared without mentioning India that the new arsenal supplied to the country is now being tested by their military, with “very satisfactory” results.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ethnic and territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians until 2023.

The small nation of Armenia is nestled between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The Azeris share Turkish culture and religion since they are ethnic Turks. The Ottoman Empire colonized the predominantly Christian Armenians for a very long period. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia were the three Soviet republics that split apart from Armenia after the Soviet Union annexed the country in the 1920s.

Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence in the 1990s with the fall of the Soviet Union. However, a small area that was home to ethnic Armenians continued to be a part of Azerbaijan. The name of this area is Nagorno-Karabakh. In the 1990s, tensions rose, leading this region to announce independence with Armenia’s assistance. The impasse lasted for over thirty years until Azerbaijan unilaterally breached the truce in 2020, backed by Turkey.

The dispute saw a significant escalation after this. Six weeks of intense combat were reported to have claimed thousands of lives.

Azerbaijan took over large swaths of land, and by the time both sides agreed to sign a peace deal negotiated by Russia in November 2020, it had grabbed all of the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh controlled by Armenia since 1994. The terms of the deal obliged Armenian troops to leave these territories and they have since been limited to a smaller part of the region.

The violence was momentarily stopped by the arrival of Russian soldiers, however, tensions had been building for months between the two nations.

In September this year, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia once again escalated as the Turkey-backed Azerbaijani forces launched a military offensive in the region. The onslaught that lasted for 24 hours claimed the lives of as many as 10 innocent civilians and left several injured.

The following day, a cease-fire deal mediated by Russia was struck. The agreement stated that the military forces of Karabakh would be entirely disarmed and abolished.

On September 20, the prime minister stated that Armenia was not a party to the deal, accusing Baku, the capital city of Azerbaijan of attempting to draw Armenia into a confrontation. 

Amidst all this, over 1,20,000 ethnic Armenians living in the region started fleeing Muslim-majority Azerbaijan fearing persecution and ethnic cleansing by the Azeri authorities. 

https://www.opindia.com/2023/10/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-india-considers-sending-second-batch-of-weapons-to-armenia/

On September 19th, Azerbaijan launched an attack on the Armenian-controlled territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The offensive ended within 24 hours, resulting in the capitulation of the breakaway republic, marking the end of Nagorno-Karabakh’s history as a de facto independent state (it will officially cease to exist at the end of this year). A mass exodus towards Armenia has begun for around 120,000 people. How is Armenia reacting to the events in Nagorno-Karabakh? What are the country’s future prospects? We discussed these questions in Yerevan with Arshaluys Mghdesyan, who is political commentator for the Armenian newspaper CivilNet Online TV.

MARTINA NAPOLITANO: How is the current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh being perceived in Yerevan and Armenia in comparison to the war and defeat in 2020? From an external perspective, there seems to be a prevailing sense of a climate of resignation, which emerged following the first hours of the Azerbaijani offensive on September 19th. Is this perception correct?

ARSHALUYS MGHDESYAN: It’s a hard question. I have the impression that we did not fully understand what happened in 2020, what kind of defeat it was, what Azerbaijan’s real goals were and with what methods Baku wanted to achieve them.

We seemingly regarded the defeat and the post-war status quo as something stable. We thought that the Russian military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh would be long term.

The political decisions were made with these assumptions, based on the condition of post-war Armenia, [specifically] the army, being in poor condition, as well as the internal political crisis and the 2021 elections. For at least six months after the war, Armenia went through an internal crisis. Then the difficult reform of the army and the war in Ukraine followed, and this changed the status quo.

We found ourselves in an ever-shifting environment that we thought would be stable, but we failed or didn’t have time to adapt. And this was the result.

Is there a sense of disappointment with Russia in Armenia?

In Armenia there is a sense of disappointment, a profound disappointment. But there were also unrealistic expectations. Already during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict there were signs that Russia never spoke out about the consequences of a possible attack on Armenia’s borders, which would have constituted an unacceptable violation.

It should have been recognised that the region was changing and Russia could act in its own interests. Therefore, yes, there is disappointment.

Can the European Union and the United States influence the situation?

We Armenians are always looking for a magic wand that can help us in times of need. But the safety of those who are sinking is first and foremost the responsibility of those who are sinking. There will be no saviours.

In this sense, we can say that the great powers act like deities. They may offer some kind of diplomatic assistance, but I have strong doubts whether they will take drastic measures against Azerbaijan or decide to resolutely support Armenia.

We failed to achieve what we wanted with Russia and we will not succeed with the United States or the European Union.

Here’s a recent example: US Congress Representative Samantha Power, who is now in Yerevan, previously stated that the United States would not tolerate another war against Nagorno-Karabakh. However, we saw that they easily tolerated it. They declare that a reaction is necessary, but they do not mention what exactly this reaction should be.

The fate of the world is not decided here, it is decided in Ukraine. That’s why there is such a severe conflict with Russia there. What happens here, fortunately or unfortunately, is not considered important.

So, we will not receive security guarantees from Europe.

The Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been discussed three times at the UN Security Council, yet there has not been a single statement from the member states regarding possible sanctions.

In Armenia, are there concerns that the conflict could escalate to involve the south of the country?

I believe that this is the most pressing issue right now. Attacking Armenia’s internationally recognised territories would be more complex. But there are many states in the world whose recognition hasn’t helped, from Syria to Ukraine.

Turkey and Azerbaijan will find all possible means to raise the issue concerning the road passing through Syunik province (which they refer to as the Zangezur corridor). They will try to force Yerevan’s hand through diplomatic channels or military actions, such as exercises and other types of manoeuvres near the border.

The Armenian province of Syunik, on the border with Iran, divides Azerbaijan from its exclave of Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan and Turkey have been pushing for the opening of an extraterritorial transport corridor through Armenia for some time. This corridor was also mentioned in the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 war.

We will observe the situation. Now it is difficult to say what will happen, but the possibility that they resolve the issue militarily cannot be excluded.

Iran and western countries could help us avoid such a scenario. On this issue, Tehran and the West have similar positions. The corridor is needed militarily and politically, first and foremost, for Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The road and, in particular, an extraterritorial corridor would be useful also to Russia. Since the 2020 peace agreement stipulated that this route of communication would be patrolled by Russian border guards, this would allow Moscow to maintain its presence in the region.

Iran fears losing its border with Armenia and consequently being surrounded by unfriendly countries. Last year, Iran opened a consulate in Kapan, southern Armenia, and the country’s authorities have repeatedly stated that Armenia’s security coincides with Iran’s security.

However, we should be cautious. Azerbaijan and Turkey could offer Iran something to change its stance.

Moving on to the internal political situation in Armenia, will Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan remain in power?

Yes, for now. In this period, many of the preconceptions we had before the 2020 war are disappearing. We used to think that if an Armenian leader had lost Nagorno-Karabakh or some other territory they would not have remained in power.

Despite the military defeat in 2020, Pashinyan not only remained in power, but he was also democratically re-elected in 2021. Even though now we have lost Nagorno-Karabakh, the government has not fallen.

This shows that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh is not as influential in domestic politics as it was in the 1990s, when it was a sacred, untouchable issue, which decided the fate of those in power.

This is no longer the case. The perception of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has changed in Armenian society.

People think it’s a closed matter, that it was just part of a propaganda narrative.

Armenians are reflecting on the fact that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been used to justify corruption in Armenia. There were discussions like, “Okay, we can have bad roads because we spend money to defend Nagorno-Karabakh.” People accepted poor living conditions and tolerated sending their children to do military service in Nagorno-Karabakh, while politicians lived in luxury.

All this lasted a long time. Dissatisfaction grew and was silenced with propaganda discourse. The first sign of discontent was the war of 2016, when Armenians realised that not everything was going well. That something was rotten in the state of Denmark. Many doubts arose about the army, that it was not well supplied despite all the sacrifices.

Fast forward to 2020. After the defeat, the Armenian authorities began to say that they would support Nagorno-Karabakh, but not at the cost of sacrifices and debts.

Well, in this way the topic has lost its relevance in the eyes of Armenian society and these are the results. Even if many opposition figures have not yet understood this.

Anecdotally, while traveling around Yerevan I had the chance to speak to many people with relatives in Nagorno-Karabakh. Statistically, do most Armenians have personal contacts in Artsakh? How important is Nagorno-Karabakh for the average Armenian citizen?

It is undoubtedly important. Post-Soviet Armenia was conceived around the topic of Nagorno-Karabakh, and there are really many people with relatives in the region. But the sacralisation of Nagorno-Karabakh had the consequence of making it an almost untouchable subject. A normal discussion about the region was not possible. It was the exclusive competence of the [political] elite. And those elites strengthened their power in every way, using the very theme of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Nonetheless, getting into conflict on this issue now is madness. I understand those who say that Nagorno-Karabakh had to be defended. But the government acted with the understanding that any intervention could potentially provide Baku with a justification to attack Armenia.

There are several small protests in Yerevan. Are the opposition forces united?

Two dynamics can be observed. On the one hand, there are protests from the parliamentary opposition, who want Pashinyan to resign. On the other, there are the nationalists, who are few and marginal but very loud.

Arshaluys Mghdesyan is political commentator for the Armenian newspaper CivilNet Online TV.