KURDISTAN – THE QUEST FOR STATEHOOD
By Nimrod Raphaeli*
Middle East Media Research Institute, DC
Inquiry and Analysis Series – No. 298
October 25, 2006 No.298
This Kurdish people was created as Kurdish by Allah …The Arab
people is part of the Arab nation and the Kurdish people is part of
the Kurdish nation …
Jalal Talabani[1]
Introduction
The Kurds are prone to repeating the mantra that they are the largest
nation in the Middle East without a state, though not for lack of
trying, fighting, and sacrificing. After decades of struggle, the
Iraqi Kurds appear to be finally in a position to live in peace and
prosperity within the safe boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan, whether
it is a de facto state, a de jure state, or just simply a broadly
autonomous "federated region" within the greater federation of Iraq.
In the words of MEMRI’s Baghdad analysts, the Kurds are "the luckiest
horse likely to collect the prizes of the American war to bring
down the Saddam regime," and it is among the Kurdish people that the
Americans are most likely to find true friends and allies.
The rest of the Iraqi provinces or governorates, mired in terrorism
and sectarian violence, envy Kurdistan. It is a magnet for Iraqis
seeking work or seeking a safe environment. It is also a model for the
Iraqi Shi’a in the central and southern parts of Iraq who are striving
against heavy odds to create similar federated entities for themselves.
The Kurds have put in place all the ingredients of a modern state –
reasonably well-defined borders, common language and culture, a modern
army subject to command and control, a flag, an elected parliament,
a government, diplomatic/consular representations by and in Kurdistan,
international airports, a bustling economy, and, above all, national
identity and a strong sense of accomplishment. But, for now, sovereign
Kurdistan is not a reality, and the cause of Kurdish self-determination
has many opponents.
Historical Background
The Kurds were conquered by the Arabs in the seventh century and have
since lived under the rule of others, including the Ottoman Empire
from the 13th century to the early part of the 20th century. With
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, the victorious powers
negotiated, with Turkey, the Treaty of Sevres, which was signed on
August 10, 1920. Under Article 62 of the Treaty, the entire Kurdish
population, including the parts now residing in Turkey, Iraq, Iran,
and Syria, was to be granted political autonomy. Article 63 stipulated
that "The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the
decisions… mentioned in article 62 within three months…"
[2]
The post-imperial Turkish government under Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk)
rejected the Treaty of Sevres because of provisions it found
unacceptable. A new round of negotiations started, culminating in the
Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923. Turkey was no longer obligated
to grant the Kurds autonomy. The treaty divided the Kurdish region
among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and it has remained divided since.
The Kurds of Iraq have had their share of troubles and disappointments
with the various governments of Iraq since the monarchy was established
in 1922 with the help of the British government. These troubles reached
their zenith under the Saddam regime which used chemical weapons and
mass deportations to suppress Kurdish national aspirations. In 1991,
encouraged by the United States, the Kurds, like the Shi’a in southern
Iraq, rose up against the Saddam regime, only to be crushed by it
when the United States left both the Kurds and the Shi’a to their own
devices. Then, with public pressure mounting in favor of the Kurds,
the U.S. and Britain established a no-fly zone for Iraqi planes over
Iraqi Kurdistan. This was a turning point in the history of modern
Iraqi Kurdistan.
The no-fly zone was followed in 1996 with 13 percent of oil revenues
earmarked for the "Northern Provinces" [i.e., Kurdistan] from the
proceeds of the Oil for Food Program. This turned Kurdistan into
an increasingly prosperous part of Iraq, even while the rest of the
country was descending into poverty.
The progress that was made in Iraqi Kurdistan did not go unnoticed
in the rest of Saddam-controlled Iraq, thanks to an uncommonly vivid
and detailed report on the situation of Kurdistan that was published
in the former Iraqi daily Babil, owned by Saddam’s son Uday. In the
report from Kurdistan, Babil’s reporter made these observations:
This is supposedly an Iraqi land, but no one utters the name ‘Iraq’…
Here they use cellular phones called kurdistell, they watch a Kurdish
TV… Its people argue that they enjoy freedom unknown to neighboring
countries. Unbelievable changes have taken place here. Imagine:
Most of the children born after 1991 do not speak Arabic… The
surrounding neighboring countries of Syria, Turkey, and Iran do not
wish to see [Kurdistan] as a model for their minorities, even though
they represent 23 million people, the largest group without a state
in the Middle East." [3]
The fall of Saddam signaled the end of oppression of the Kurds and
lifted their spirits. But the Kurds soon discovered that most of the
Iraqi new political leaders, who only a short while earlier, while
serving in the opposition, had promised to support Kurdish national
aspirations, were now beginning to renege on old promises. The tone
had changed. Iraqi nationalism had quickly dominated the political
discourse in Iraq, and the Arab-Kurdish alliance had begun to fray.
Kirkuk, Iraqi leaders argued, was to remain an Iraqi city; the
whole issue of federalism, which had been one of the cornerstones
of the new constitution promulgated on December 15, 2005, was seen
as a Kurdish ploy that needed to be brought under the demands of
multiple revisions. Kurdish hopes for national reconciliation and for
a full Iraqi recognition of their unique status as a federated region
within a unified Iraq were frustrated, and there was even a sense
of betrayal. Soon, voices began to be heard calling for secession
from Iraq and the establishment of a sovereign Kurdistan. Thus,
taking advantage of the current turmoil and uncertainty in Iraq,
the Kurds have moved forward in cementing the foundations of their
federated status – a fait accompli that will be next to impossible
for any future centrally oriented Iraqi government to undo.
Baghdad and Erbil – Violence vs. Construction
More than a decade after the visit of Babil’s reporter to Kurdistan
(endnote 3), an Iraqi-born reporter from the London daily Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat described the dramatic contrast between Baghdad and Erbil,
the capital of Kurdistan, as he had viewed both from an airplane
window. When he approached Baghdad, his birthplace, it looked desolate,
overwhelmed by garbage accumulating everywhere, and covered by a
dusty sky often mixed with the smoke of gunpowder.
Three weeks later, as he flew from Baghdad to Erbil, he was struck by
the sight of cranes around the Erbil International Airport engaged
in the construction of "a forest of residential and commercial
buildings." At the airport, a big sign welcomes the passengers in
three languages: Kurdish, Arabic, and English. The airport itself is
undergoing a major expansion to facilitate the landing of the largest
aircrafts, both civilian and military. Not far from the airport
there is an area surrounded by a colorful fence, where 1200 villas
are being built at prices ranging from $150,000 to $700,000 per unit.
A significant indicator of the economic situation in the two cities is
that while unemployment is about 60 percent in Baghdad, in Kurdistan
there is a shortage of labor. Not surprising there is a flow of Iraqi
professionals and workers from the central and southern provinces in
Iraq into Kurdistan, seeking employment opportunities and personal
safety. [4]
Massive construction is also going on in Suleimaniya, where just
one of the construction companies from the United Arab Emirates and
Kuwait is investing up to $60 million to construct a shopping mall,
a four-star hotel, and five high-rise commercial buildings. [5]
TheUnified Kurdistan Government
For almost 30 years, Kurdistan was run by two parallel governments,
one headquartered in Sulaymaniya under the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) headed by Jalal Talabani and the other headquartered
in Erbil under the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Mas’oud
Barzani. The relationships between the two governments and their
leaders were often hostile, resulting in a military conflict in the
mid-1970s that was brought to an end by the Clinton administration.
In January 2006 the two governments agreed to unify, and on May 7 the
111-member National Kurdistan Council (Parliament) voted unanimously
in favor of a unified government made up of 27 ministries and 40
ministers, with the two major political parties KDP and PUK each
controlling 11 ministries. The five remaining ministries were assigned
to smaller political parties. Four ministries – Finance, Peshmerga,
Justice, and Interior, will continue to operate separately in each
of the two previous regional administrations, but they are to be
unified within a year. This arrangement has left the impression that
the unification of the two administrations remains somewhat tentative.
Under the unification agreement, the president of the region and the
prime minister will be from the KDP, while their deputies and the
speaker of parliament will be from the PUK. This agreement will remain
in force until new elections are held at the end of 2007. The ceremony
for installing the new government was witnessed by representatives
from the central government, including the vice president Adel Abd
al-Mahdi and diplomats from many countries, including the U.S, the
U.K., Iran, and Syria. Noticeably absent was a diplomat from Turkey.
The oath of office taken by the regional prime minister and
the ministers is almost completely separatist, both in word and
intention. It reads: "I swear by God the Almighty that I will loyally
defend the unity of the people and the land of Iraqi Kurdistan, that
I will respect the law and I will serve the interest of the people."
[6] The oath of office offers no loyalty to Iraq or its constitution.
In his speech welcoming the creation of Kurdish Regional Government,
Barzani made two significant comments: First, he asked that the
government make serious efforts to restore to Kurdistan, by "legal and
constitutional means," Kurdish territories that were taken away from
it; and second, he extended a hand of friendship and cooperation to all
neighboring countries while emphasizing: "The style of threats has gone
for good. Henceforth, we shall not accept threats from anywhere." [7]
The vote of confidence by the Kurdish parliament for the new Kurdish
government coincided with the election of Jalal Talabani as president
of Iraqi for a second term. It is significant to note that while most
of the Iraqi press refers to him as "President of Iraq," the Kurdish
media refers to him as "The President of the Federal Republic of Iraq"
[ra’is jumhuriyat al-iraq al-fidirali]. It is a message the Kurds
never tire of pressing upon the Iraqi political public.
Symbols of Autonomy
Apart from regional elections for parliament and the appointment
of a regional government almost entirely independent from Baghdad,
there are other symbols and other measures that the KRG has taken to
underscore its autonomy from the dysfunctional government in Baghdad.
Some stand as a reminder to the Iraqi political establishment that the
Kurds will not hesitate to go it alone if some of their fundamental
demands, such as the inclusion of Kirkuk into Kurdistan, are not met,
or if the central government in Baghdad tries to assert its authority
over the internal affairs of KRG. It is a delicate balance that the
Kurds are striving to maintain, at least for now – on the one hand,
expressing the intention to remain as part of Iraq, and, on the other
hand, seeking to run their lives and their regional government almost
entirely independently from the central government in Baghdad. This
balance is so delicate that any number of external shocks, whether
political or economic, could make it go out of kilter.
The Kurdish Flag
National flags are symbols of a nation’s identity, history, culture
and geography. Iraq was caught by surprise when, in September 2006,
Mas’oud Barzani, the president of the Kurdish region, issued a
directive that all the government agencies under the KRG should lower
the Iraqi national flag in favor of the Kurdish flag. But for Kurds,
the current Iraqi flag with Saddam Hussein’s handwritten words "Allah
Akbar" is a symbol of atrocities committed against them by the Saddam
regime, and the Kurdish leadership has vowed never to live under its
shadow again.
For Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq and a Kurdish national, the
issue of the flag represented the dilemma between affaire d’etat and
personal emotion. For Talabani no less than any other Kurdish leader,
the Iraqi flag symbolizes many of the evils perpetrated against the
Kurds by the regime of Saddam Hussein. But, as he told an interviewer:
"This is the flag of Iraq until it is replaced. It is true that it
is the flag of the ancien regime but it is the flag of Iraq, and in
my capacity as the President of Iraq, it is inevitable that I serve
under it." [8] When the flag crisis broke out following Barzani’s
directive, Talabani never wavered in his support for the Iraqi flag
being raised in Kurdistan and everywhere else in Iraq.
Talabani even withheld any public criticism of the Barzani’s
decision. Always diplomatic, he attributed Barzani’s decision to what
he characterized as "a constitutional void" and pledged himself to
respect any Iraqi flag sanctioned by parliament. Other Iraqis would
argue that Barzani’s directive about the flag must be viewed as
yet another challenge by the Kurds to get Iraq accustomed to their
ultimate destiny.
Expanding Diplomatic Contacts
The Iraqi constitution permits each of the 18 provinces of the country
to send a representative to each of the Iraqi diplomatic missions
abroad. The Kurds have opted to establish their own representative
offices in a number of countries.
At the same time, there is a clamoring from countries to open
consulates in the Kurdish region, and the permission to do so is sought
not from the Iraqi central government in Baghdad but from the Kurdistan
regional government in Erbil. The countries that have either opened or
plan to open such consulates are the United States, the Czech Republic,
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates,
and Iran (two consulates). It has also been announced that United
Nations will open in Erbil its largest office in the Middle East. [9]
In that connection, the UNDP representative arrived in Erbil in May
2006 and was received by the coordinator for the UN in the province
of Kurdistan. [10] The relatively high degree of security and the
assurance that they can operate with a large measure of safety in
Kurdistan is the biggest incentive for foreign governments to open
their consulates there. But the push to locate consulates there
is also a reflection of the economic and strategic significance of
Kurdistan in the context of both Iraq and the Middle East.
The visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Kurdistan in
early October for discussion with the Kurdistan regional government
is another indication that while, at least for now, Kurdistan remains
politically part of Iraq, it is nevertheless an entity to be dealt with
outside the formal diplomatic channels with the central government.
In November 2005, Amr Moussa, the secretary-general of the Arab
League, visited Kurdistan. The President of KRG, Mas’oud Barzani,
visited the U.S. and was received by President Bush. He has also
traveled to China and to a number of European countries where he was
received in a manner befitting a head of state.
American Air Bases
In his interview with TheWashington Post, [11] President Jalal Talabani
called on the United States to build two air bases in Kurdistan to
protect it from foreign incursion. This is perhaps another example of
Kurdistan’s determination to be treated as a separate entity from Iraq.
Arabic Language Reduced to Third Place
In presenting his government program the Prime Minister of KRG
indicated his government’s support for teaching the Turkmen, Chaldean,
Assyrian, Armenian and Arabic languages. The Arabic language was
mentioned last. He then proceeded to say that the KRG will adopt
the instruction of the English language throughout Iraqi Kurdistan
"in all stages and for all ages." In short, Kurdish and English
will be the two leading languages, while Arabic, like the languages
of other minorities, will be an elective subject. It is no secret
that a whole new Kurdish generation, including many who studied at
Kurdish universities, has little or no proficiency in Arabic. That
situation raises a serious question about their future integration
into a federated Iraq.
Oil Exploration
One of the key issues pending between the Kurdistan Regional Government
and the central government in Baghdad is that pertaining to the
exploration of natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas
in Kurdistani territory.
The Iraqi constitution, which was approved in a referendum in
December 2005, is ambiguous on this issue. Under Article 111, "oil
and gas are the property of the Iraqi people in all regions and
governorates." However, the following article distinguishes between
existing and future oil and gas fields. Article 112 assigns the
central government the responsibility for "managing the oil and gas"
extracted from existing fields together with the producing regions,
provided the revenues are equitably distributed in accordance with the
size of population, and while taking into consideration those regions
that were unfairly deprived by the Saddam regime. The draft Kurdish
constitution has interpreted Article 112 to mean that all mineral
and water resources will also fall under the jurisdiction of the KRG,
subject to the approval of the Kurdish parliament. [12]
When the Iraqi oil minister Hussein Shahristani questioned the
KRG’s right to sign exploration agreements with foreign companies,
the Prime Minister of KRG, Nechirwan Barzani, basically told the oil
minister to mind his own business. He then warned that if Baghdad
continues to meddle in Kurdish autonomous affairs, Kurdistan may
opt to consider seceding from Iraq. In a subsequent interview with
the Financial Times the Prime Minister complained that the central
government was not transferring to KRG its share of oil revenues.
[13] In a testimony before a Congressional Committee, Qubad Talabany,
the KRG’s representative to the U.S., said Iraqi Kurds have little
confidence that "an Iraqi government in Baghdad, including one
with Kurdish ministers, will safeguard their fair share of national
resources." [14] At the same time, President Talabani himself told
the Iraqi press that any agreement relating to the exploration of
oil or natural gas must be approved by the Ministry of Oil, which
is in the process of preparing a new law that would regulate such
agreements. [15] As noted earlier, President Talabani often finds
himself in the unenviable position of having to act as president of all
Iraqis without sacrificing the fundamental interests of his own people.
Signing of Oil Exploration Agreements
The Kurdish regional government signed in 2005 an exploration agreement
with the small Norwegian company DNO to search for oil in the Kurdish
region. The first location selected for exploration was approximately
12 miles east of the city of Zacho on the Turkish-Kurdish border. DNO
has announced the discovery of approximately 100 million barrels of
light crude. Encouraged by the initial results, the Norwegian company
will expand its exploration activities in the area. [16]
A politically more significant agreement is with the Turkish-Canadian
company General Energy, whose first drilling resulted in the production
of 5000 barrels/day. The company is committed to drill two additional
wells with a production capacity of 20,000 b/d. [17]
A Canadian company, Western Oil Sand, has also started exploration
in four different areas in Sulaymaniya. The initial topographical
survey indicates the existence of "huge quantities" of oil. [18]
Other agreements are being negotiated. [19]
Problems Ahead
Despite the Kurds’ many accomplishments and their determination
to forge ahead toward independence at some time in the future, the
path which lays ahead remains pregnant with difficulties, including
determining the future of Kirkuk, establishing proper governance,
and weighing the implications of seceding from Iraq.
The Issue of Kirkuk
The Kurds maintain that the city of Kirkuk is the heart of Kurdistan
and should be integrated into the Kurdish region, which currently
comprises the three governorates of Dahouk, Erbil, and Suleimaniya.
It is Kirkuk, not Erbil, the Kurds would insist, that is the real
capital of Kurdistan. In fact, the city has two large minorities,
Arabs and Turkmen, but the Kurds maintain that the roots of Kirkuk
are geographically Kurdistani, even if the city is not exclusively
Kurdish in terms of population structure. The Kurds are so determined
to include Kirkuk in their region that they have proceeded to declare
the city as their own in their draft constitution and to include it
in the administrative map of the region.
The Kurds also have territorial claims on other districts or cities
which are geographically outside the three Kurdish governorates
but have a majority Kurdish population. The Kurdish official map,
currently in use in Kurdistan, includes the districts of Aqra,
Sheikhan, Sinjar, Telaafar, Telkaif (mainly Christian whose population
prefers integration into Kurdistan) and Qaraqosh (part of the city
of Mosul) in addition to some districts in the Governorates of Dyala
and Wassat. When asked about the borders of their region, the Kurds
respond, "Wherever the camel stops is the border of Kurdistan." [20]
The Kurds have stated forcefully and often that they have absolutely
no desire of reaching any compromise on the future of Kirkuk other
than including it in the Kurdish region. [21]
Issues of Governance
While signs of prosperity are palpable across Kurdistan there are
also signs of corruption, nepotism and, generally, poor governance.
Also, like in the rest of Iraq, there are shortages of electricity and
gasoline, which are causing a lot of hardship to large segments of the
Kurdish population. [22] The shortage of electricity is mitigated by
the use of electric generators, which seem to be common in many homes.
Further, there is the issue of poverty. Despite rapid economic growth
generated by local and foreign investments, many families still
live below the poverty line. A reporter of the London daily al-Hayat
underscored the vast differences in the standards of living in Erbil,
the capital of RGK. Local residents compared the differences in income
and quality of life between two quarters in Erbil, the rich quarter
of Azadi and the poor quarter of Bihar, as a difference between the
earth and the sky. [23]
The Kurdish Position in Case of Civil War
One of the intriguing questions is what the Kurds would do in the
event of a civil war breaking out in Iraq and engulfing the Shi’ite
and Sunni communities. The Kurds will do their utmost to stay out of
such a conflagration, as they have been doing so far. The Kurds would
gain nothing by siding with either of the two sectarian groups and,
in fact, there is much for them to gain by watching the conflict from
behind their defensive walls. A full-fledged civil war may impel the
Kurds to separate themselves from the rest of the Iraq by declaring
their independence. [24] This was, in fact, the tenor of a statement
made by Barzani as early as November 2005, and echoed since repeatedly
by other Kurdish officials.
The Kurds have also threatened to secede should the central government
in Baghdad be taken over by an Islamist party. In the words of the
First Lady of Iraq, Hiro Talabani: "I am a Kurd to the marrow but I
would not want to live in a fundamentalist Kurdish state for a single
day." Another leading Kurdish politician who served as a prime minister
in Suleimaniya, Kusrat Rusol, has also threatened to secede should
an Islamist political party take over the central government. [25]
The Threat of Secession
The threat of secession from Iraq in the case of civil war should
not be taken too lightly. The threat may be intended to be a warning
to the two other sectarian communities – the Shi’a and the Sunnis –
to avoid civil war as it would be calamitous for the entire Iraqi
people, the Kurds included.
Virulent Reactions to Kurdish Aspirations
The most virulent reaction to Kurdish aspirations was by the Iraqi
Republican Bloc, a Sunni group which is opposed to a federalized
Iraq. It referred to "decisions and laws" frequently issued by forces
seeking through "malicious conspiratorial intentions" to harm the
unity of the Iraqi people. These forces "cannot exist without crises
and they lack the most basic requirement for proper leadership." The
statement both challenges the provisions of the Kurdish constitution
which identify parts of Iraq’s territory as properly belonging to
Kurdistan, and threatens that such inclusion will not occur even
"if seas of blood are to flow." This statement was published in the
pro-Saddam daily al-Quds al-Arabi, and it is hardly surprising that
it has not been published in the Iraqi mainstream newspapers. [26]
Conclusion
The Iraqi liberal daily al-Zaman points out that it was difficult to
claim that the Kurds are going ahead with the creation of a state,
but neither can one claim with certainty that they are not going to
do so. For 13 years, they have built the foundations of their state,
but it has been a silent state. The ultimate question will be the
reaction of the Arab countries to the creation of a non-Arab state
in their midst. [27]
The aspiration for an ultimately independent and sovereign Kurdish
state runs into the harsh reality that such a state will be surrounded
by hostile countries in every direction. Turkey poses the biggest
threat to such an entity, particularly if the Kurds succeed in
incorporating Kirkuk into their region. With its prospects for
admission into the European Union increasingly dimming, Turkey will
be increasingly less restrained to use force to frustrate Kurdish
sovereignty. At a minimum, Turkey could close its borders with
Kurdistan and prevent the movement of people and goods across the
border. In the absence of access to ports and overflight rights, an
independent Kurdistan will be far worse than an autonomous Kurdish
region that enjoys so much freedom and so few constraints.
Kurdistan also faces internal problems. It must convert the slogans of
democracy and political competitiveness into reality by establishing
the foundations of proper governance and policies.
Finally, the Kurdish people must demonstrate genuine unity, after
years of intra-Kurdish disagreement and even bloody clashes. The
two historic leaders of modern Kurdistan, Jalal Talabani and Mas’oud
Barazani, have agreed to unify their separate administrations, but it
is not certain that they have buried the hatchet. The two men must
convince not only the outside world but also their own people that
henceforth they will march hand in hand to achieve whatever they
determine to be in the best interest of the Kurdish people.
*Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli is Senior Analyst of MEMRI’s Middle East Economic
Studies Program.
—————————————- —————————————-
[1] Interview with President Jalal Talabani on al-Arabiya TV, PUK
Media, August 30, 2005.
[2] The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. 11, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, New York 1924.
[3] Babil (Iraq), October 16, 2002.
[4] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), June 16, 2006.
[5] Al-Qabas (Kuwait) February 11, 2006.
[6] Al-Hayat (London), May 12, 2006.
[7] Al-Mada (Iraq), May 8, 2006.
[8] PUK Media, August 30, 2005.
[9] Al-Mada (Iraq), December 7, 2005.
[10] Al-Taakhi (Iraq), May 27, 2006.
[11] The Washington Post, September 25, 2006.
[12] , September 29, 2006.
[13] The Financial Times (London), October 23, 2006.
[14] KRG Third Occasional Paper, September 28, 2006.
[15] Al-Zaman (Iraq), October 1, 2006.
[16] Al-Zaman (Iraq), June 13, 2006.
[17] Al-Hayat (London), September 29, 2006.
[18] Kurdish News Agency, March 2, 2006.
[19] Al-Zaman (Iraq), November 30, 2003.
[20] Al-Ahali weekly (Iraq), April 21, 2005.
[21] For more analysis on the subject please refer
to MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 215, "Kirkuk: Between
Kurdish separatism and Iraqi federalism," March 31, 2005,
ves&Area=ia&ID=IA21505.
[22] On the problem of governance in Iraq, see Bilal Wahab,
"Iraqi Kurdistan: Time to get serious about governance,"
ations/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1878&prog=zgp& amp;proj=zme.znpp#iraqikurdistan.
[23] Al-Hayat (London), July 4, 2006.
[24] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), November 7, 2005.
[25] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 10, 2005.
[26] Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), October 1, 2006.
[27] Al-Zaman (Iraq), September 18, 2006.
ives&Area=ia&ID=IA29806