Below 19 National Football Team Of Armenia Leaves For Cyprus On Octo

BELOW 19 NATIONAL FOOTBALL TEAM OF ARMENIA LEAVES FOR CYPRUS ON OCTOBER 21

Noyan Tapan
Oct 23 2006

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 23, NOYAN TAPAN. The below 19 years old national
football team of Armenia headed by coach Armen Gyulbudaghian,
left for Cyprus on October 21 where the group tournament of the
qualification stage of the below 19 Europe Championship will take
place from October 27 to November 2. As Noyan Tapan was informed
by the Press Secretariate of the Football Federation of Armenia,
Joan (Ian) Porterfield, the coach of the national team of Armenia,
and Samvel Petrosian, the coach of the below 21 national team also
left for the Cyprus. The national teams of Hungary, Cyprus and
Azerbaijan are also involved in the seventh group, in which Armenia
is involved. The national team of Armenia will hold the first meeting
with the national team of Azerbaijan. It will take place on October 27,
in the Antonis Papadopoulos stadium of Larnaca. The Hungary-Cyprus
meeting will take place on the same day in the Ammochostos-Amberia
stadium of Larnaca. The national team of Armenia will hold the second
meeting on October 29. The Cyprus-Armenia meeting will take place in
the Tasos Marcou city stadium of Paralimni, and the teams of Hungary
and Azerbaijan will compete in the Dasaki Achnas stadium of the city
of Famagusta. The last meetings of the group tournament will take
place on November 1. Armenia will compete with Hungary in the Antonis
Papadopoulos stadium, and Azerbaijan will compete with Cyprus in the
G.S.Z. stadium. To recap, the below 19 national team of Armenia had
a control meeting on October 20 with the below 17 national team of
Armenia. The meeting finished with a big, 5:0, victory of the below
19 team.

Calming The Caucasus

CALMING THE CAUCASUS
The Monitor’s View

Christian Science Monitor, MA
Oct 23 2006

Georgia, a tiny democratic outpost on Russia’s southern flank, is
packing a big message. The two nations are locked in a high-stakes
political and economic standoff – one that reveals the limits of US
and European influence on former Soviet turf.

The crisis began earlier this month when Georgia, known for its 2003
"Rose Revolution" and pro-Western President Mikhail Saakashvili,
arrested four alleged Russian spies. The suspects were eventually
released to Russia, but Moscow has responded with uncalled-for
harshness: cutting off transportation and postal ties with the former
Soviet state, deporting many Georgians living in Russia, and shutting
down their businesses there.

The West might not pay much heed except that an escalation of tensions
could have serious consequences – for Western access to a Caspian oil
pipeline that runs through Georgia, for expanding Russian influence
in its "near abroad," and for possible violence in the volatile
Caucasus region.

Behind the standoff lies Georgia’s desire to join NATO in 2008 and to
bring back two small separatist regions that broke away in bloody wars
in the post-Soviet early 1990s. Russian peacekeepers, serving under
a UN mandate, are in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It’s no secret that
Moscow backs their drive for independence and would like them in its
sphere. Nor does it want NATO’s borders stretching across the Black
Sea to Russia’s back door.

The fear here is that any number of wrong moves – by Russian President
Vladimir Putin or by Mr. Saakashvili – could trigger violence that
would inflame the well-armed Caucasus region, and spark a series of
ethnic secessions from countries on Russia’s border.

Complicating all of this is the Western push for independence for
Kosovo, the former Yugoslav province claimed by Russian ally Serbia.

Mr. Putin sees that as justification for independence for Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Unsaid, but implied, would be independence for a host
of other areas Russia wants back, or more tightly under its control:
parts of Ukraine and Moldova, for instance, the long- disputed region
of Nagorno-Karabakh, and parts of central Asia.

Unless the US and Europe try seriously to address Russia’s real fears
about NATO encroachment, they may not – in the long run – be able to
prevent Russian maneuvering to buttress its periphery. Putin knows
he has the upper hand in the region. Much of the world might object
to his strong-arm, antidemocratic tactics, but he’s got most Russians
solidly behind him, and his country is flush with energy profits.

Politically, the West needs him to help solve the big-ticket crises
of Iran and North Korea. And, economically, Western Europe depends
on Russian oil and gas.

But in the shortterm, the West can help defuse Georgian-Russian
tensions by pointing to the dangers of escalation and a potential
war over Georgia’s breakaways. Over the weekend, the US secretary
of State called for "cooler heads to prevail." Saakashvili, who
needlessly provoked the crisis, has wisely renounced any military or
quick action to solve the separatist problem. Moscow would do well
to find a face-saving way to back down.

Seeing Through The Snow

SEEING THROUGH THE SNOW

Al-Ahram Weekly, Egypt
Oct 19-25 2006

Azade Seyhan* examines the achievements of Orhan Pamuk, winner of
this year’s Nobel Prize for Literature

Yashar Kemal, one of the most prolific names in modern Turkish
literature, had been a perpetual contender for the Nobel Prize for
Literature. Kemal had taken the Turkish novel beyond Istanbul’s
metropolitan centre, interwoven its texture with Anatolian ballads,
legends, songs and colours and developed a poetic prose of epic
grandeur. Yet the coveted prize eluded him. After a lot of speculation
on part of the Turkish literati and press it was Orhan Pamuk who
finally became the first Turkish Nobel laureate. Pamuk is also the
first writer to be recognised from a predominantly Muslim country
since 1988, when Egypt’s Naguib Mahfouz, who died on 30 August, 2006,
was awarded the Noble Prize by the Swedish Academy for his richly
nuanced work that lent Arabic narrative a revolutionary energy.

In recent years, Pamuk’s name had begun to circulate in the rumour
mill as a sure winner. He had garnered major international prizes and
had become a celebrity on the European literary circuit. Furthermore,
Pamuk, buoyed by fame and riches (and certainly by a good dose of
conviction), stood up to what is known as the "derin devlet" (literally
the "deep state"), the powerful cadre of high-ranking officials and
members of the military who see themselves as guardians of the secular
state, making public statements that were deemed highly offensive
to "Turkishness". In an interview in 2005 in the Swiss daily Tages
Anzeiger, Pamuk was quoted as saying that thousands of Kurds and a
million Armenians were killed in Turkish territories and he was the
only one to openly talk about it. Pamuk ended up facing charges of
insulting the state; the "affair Pamuk" became a huge cause celèbre,
and the charges were eventually dropped on a technicality. The
high profile incident cast a shadow on Turkey’s hopes to join the
European Union.

In its citation, the Swedish Academy commended the Istanbul-born
Pamuk as a writer who "in the quest for the melancholic soul of his
native city has discovered new symbols for the clash and interlacing
of cultures". While critics have questioned the timing and political
bias of the Swedish Academy’s choice, the Academy head Horace Engdahl
has stated that political issues did not affect the decision.

Ironically, very little of Pamuk’s work is explicitly or even covertly
political. His novels defy categorisation, and their complexity is
not reducible to the endlessly repeated comments about "the clash of
civilizations" that have appeared in the media since the announcement
of the award. There is no doubt, however, that Istanbul’s amalgam
of geographies, histories and cultures holds great fascination for
Pamuk and has imprinted its signature on his works.

Born in 1952 in Istanbul to a wealthy upper-class family, Pamuk
has rarely left his hometown for long, except for a stint at the
International Writing Program at the University of Iowa between 1985
and ’88. He graduated from the American High School, Robert Kolej
of Istanbul, studied architecture for a while but ultimately chose
to devote himself to writing full time. His first novel, Cevdet Bey
ve Ogullari ( Cevdet Bey and His Sons ; 1982), a multigenerational
novel of an Istanbul family, was an instant literary success in Turkey.

With the translation of The White Castle (1985) into English, French,
and German and the translations into major languages of his subsequent
novels — The Black Book (1990), The New Life (1994), My Name is Red
(1998), Snow (2002), and the memoir Istanbul: Memories and the City
(2003) — Pamuk became an internationally recognised name.

Pamuk’s political sensibilities are couched in philosophical terms
and estranged from "real" life settings. He often displaces events and
concepts by situating them in a distant past and brings the critical
vision that historical distance sanctions to bear on the present
moment. Engdahl also cited Pamuk’s ability to expand the purview of
the novel through his intimacy with Western and Eastern cultures,
adding that he had, in some ways, stolen the novel from Westerners
and transformed it into something never seen before.

Indeed, Pamuk’s novels are informed by modernist and postmodernist
literary strategies, such as framing stories in a chain of other
stories, a metafictional stance where the narration reflects on its own
construction, and the incorporation of other aesthetic forms and texts.

The question of cultural identity threads through all of Pamuk’s work,
and he tests its claims through the registers of language, memory
and representation. In The White Castle, which presents a slice of
Ottoman life in 17th-century Istanbul, Pamuk relates the story of
a Venetian sailor captured by the Turks and sold into slavery to a
Pasha who presents him as a gift to a Hodja. The relationship between
these two men, who look like identical twins, becomes a story of the
fragility and shifting nature of identity, as the two appropriate
each other’s memories and exchange places.

The question of heritage and its claim on identity assumes the form
of a cultural sea change in My Name is Red, a treatise on the lost art
of Ottoman miniature painting that becomes a portrait of how different
forms of representing — divine vs human; truthful or real vs stylised
— signify the struggle for cultural hegemony. Pamuk’s "postmodern"
signature under this novel bears the fusions and revisions of the
binaries present-past, word-image and life- fiction.

In The Black Book, the reader is treated to a mini history of
Ottoman Islamic culture through a circuitous trip in Istanbul’s
labyrinthine spaces. What ultimately separates Pamuk’s work from the
many modernist/postmodernist novels that address questions of identity,
representation and memory is its easy merger of two different reserves
of cultural capital. Pamuk uses the techniques and thematics of the
modern novel in the text, texture and guise of a culturally specific
Ottoman Turkish life and history.

Kar ( Snow ), a postmodernist allegory of the sociocultural imbroglio
in which contemporary Turkish society is caught up, is Pamuk’s first
self- consciously political novel and arguably his most conceptually
sophisticated work. This is the novel that Western readers and critics
welcomed as a source of insight into the alarming confrontations
between the West and the Islamic world and between political cultures
and ethnic communities within and without nation-states. Although
Pamuk had started writing the novel before the extremist arm of
political Islam struck the United States in the form of hijacked
commercial airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center, with the
release of the novel in English translation he became the unofficial
interpreter of Islam for the American public.

In 2005 the German Book Trade chose to award its prestigious Peace
Prize (Der Friedenpreis des deutschen Buchhandels) to Pamuk, honouring
him as an author committed to a concept of culture based on knowledge
and respect for others, writing from a space where Europe and Islamic
Turkey can coexist. Yashar Kemal was the first Turkish writer to be
honoured with the same prize.

Ironically, many secular Turkish intellectuals are irritated by Pamuk’s
oppositional stance from his very privileged position to what he sees
as an intolerant secularist state and its Jacobin advocates.

In Snow, however, Pamuk gives no credence to those who see him as a
champion of modern Islam or who condemn him as an agent provocateur
against the Kemalist reforms of the Republic. In fact, Pamuk marshals
his impressive erudition and literary skill to craft a historically
informed and aesthetically astute commentary on the fortunes of a land
entangled in the thorny ramifications of its past and the pressures
of conforming to the dictates of modernity. Like most of Pamuk’s
previous novels, Snow is a metafiction, a text that reflects on the
act of (re)constructing a story from fragments of other stories,
evidentiary documents, eyewitness accounts, tapes, videos, notebooks
and other traces of memory. At the level of thematics and symbolism,
Snow becomes a fictional vehicle in pursuit of a people’s identity in
the complex web of history and modernity and an allegorical account
of a fateful search — for one’s self, for a sense of belonging or
community and for love.

The story takes place in the small provincial city of Kars. This is
Pamuk’s first novel in which the setting has moved away from Istanbul,
in this case to the Northern province on the Russian border. The
protagonist Ka is a 42-year-old secular writer from Istanbul who
has just returned from a 12-year political exile in Germany. Upon
his return to Turkey he goes to Kars on a temporary assignment to
report on the upcoming municipal elections and a wave of mysterious
suicides among young women. These women, forced into marriages that
they did not want, or else terrorised by fathers and husbands, kill
themselves in spates. Islamists, however, claim women kill themselves
because they cannot wear headscarves to school.

Pamuk’s narrator, who in the end turns out to be Pamuk’s double,
does not take sides and neither censures nor censors. Nevertheless,
in Snow, the real culprit that reveals itself in the undertone and
the subtext of the text is the state.

When Ka accepts the assignment to report from Kars he also has a
private agenda: to see Ipek, his university classmate, for whom he
still holds a torch. He has learned that Ipek is separated from her
husband Muhtar, also a former acquaintance. Muhtar is running for
mayor. This election is one of the many threads in the narrative that
forms part of the "Islamist-Secularist" debate. Ipek leaves Muhtar, a
secularist turned Islamist, because he wants her to cover herself and
become the dutiful Muslim wife. As a visiting journalist, Ka has the
opportunity to listen to the divergent and contentious views of many
citizens of this historical border town, a place desolate and broken,
replete with memories of glory and atrocity, with remnants of Armenian
and Russian occupation and the early remnants of the nation’s efforts
at Westernisation. The seemingly harmonious co-existence of multiple
cultures, languages, religions and ethnicities in the Ottoman state
is now transformed, as Ka experiences firsthand, into irreducible
differences whose terms are no longer negotiable, as conflicting
groups proliferate (secular Turks, Islamist Turks, Kurd nationalists,
Marxist Kurds, Islamist Kurds) and move to ever more distant poles.

Ka tries to understand each viewpoint and the reasons that drive
people to acts of self-destruction and violence and enters into
lengthy conversations with young Islamists. Most of these young
people bear no resemblance to stereotypical images of young Muslim
fanatics. Blue, a charismatic and handsome Islamist, is a walking
paradox in that he identifies with terrorist Islam though he has never
killed a soul. He shares some of Pamuk’s publicly stated views but
takes them to an extreme where they buckle under the weight of their
illogic. The reflective and poetic Ka confronts more questions at
every turn; his tolerance and compassion paralyse him in his search
for answers. He tries to negotiate between the Islamists and the
government officials. Ka’s self-guilt as a middle class citizen who
saw in Islam the dope of the duped and who missed his chance as a
young man to understand his people leads him to flirt with the notion
that Islam is the answer, the memory that has to be captured and
pressed into the service of a nation’s salvation. In the end, after
a bloody military coup staged in the form of a play, Ka is forced to
return to Germany without Ipek, only to be killed, execution-style,
presumably by Islamists, who suspect him of betrayal. His only sin
was trying to understand it all.

The resonance of Pamuk’s books with the burning political and cultural
issues of the day should not detract from the literary achievement
of his work. Pamuk understands how political forces and oppression
control human lives but also believes that individuals have the
capacity to understand their fate and to imagine in the midst of an
abject present the possibility of a different future.

* The writer is Fairbank Professor in the humanities and professor
of German and comparative literature at Bryn Mawr College. The author
of Representation and Its Discontents: The Critical Legacy of German
Romanticism (1992 ) and Writing Outside the Nation ( 2001 ) , she has
just completed a book on the modern Turkish novel entitled Tales of
Crossed Destinies .

–Boundary_(ID_ZkY94iwx0JQmCEeIIKGixw)–

Nairobi: Tycoon Saves Armenians’ Goods From Auction

TYCOON SAVES ARMENIANS’ GOODS FROM AUCTION
Story By Patrick Nzioka

Daily Nation, Kenya
Oct 23 2006

A single telephone call was all it took to save household goods
belonging to the Armenian brothers from the auctioneer’s hammer.

A local tycoon paid Sh450,000 and an additional Sh100,000 as costs
in a matter of minutes to save the goods that were to be auctioned
off to pay rent for the house they lived in at Runda estate.

The two brothers were deported in June after they allegedly caused
a security breach at the city’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport.

Prospective buyers who had gathered at the Pangani Auction Centre yard
on Saturday went home disappointed because they could not lay their
hands on the posh sofa sets, beds, fridges, mattresses, carpets,
tables, crates with bottles and ceramic tiles, advertised for sale
to recover rent arrears.

The owner of the house, Mr Sammy Musyoki, had sued Brotherlink
International Ltd, a company associated with the two men who claim to
be brothers – Artur Margaryan and Artur Sargsyan – to recover the rent.

Mr Joab Apopo, a lawyer for Businessman Raju Sanghani arrived at the
yard just before the auction started.

He called Mr Sanghani on his mobile phone to brief him on the
situation.

Mr Apopo was instructed to negotiate with the lawyer representing
the landlord to stop the auction on condition that he would be given
the money.

If that failed, he was told to bid for the entire lot at Sh450,000.

The money would be paid once the bid was accepted.

The auction had been delayed after another lawyer representing Ms
Shirfana Alarakiya who lived in the Runda home with the brothers,
negotiated with Mr Musyoki’s lawyer, Mr Richard Mutiso, on how to
pay the money.

Mr Mutiso rejected her offer of a Sh200,000 down payment, but left
with Mr Apopo for Westlands after agreeing to negotiate.

Mr Sanghani appeared before the Kiruki Commission that investigated
the activities of the two men. He said he had invited them to Kenya
believing they were investors.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Many Immigrants Chose Maine A Century Ago

MANY IMMIGRANTS CHOSE MAINE A CENTURY AGO
By Wayne Reilly

Bangor Daily News, MAINE
Oct 23 2006

In September 1906, a young girl named Mantoria George disappeared
near her home at 192 Hancock St. in Bangor. Her father, Maron George,
a dry goods and peddlers supply dealer, spent a week checking reports
his daughter had been seen in South Brewer and Old Town. A neighbor
girl claimed to have seen the 13-year-old on the railroad tracks by
the lumber docks with two men, one of whom had offered her a dress
if she would go away with him.

The George family was part of the nation’s rapidly growing population
of immigrants. Seventeen percent of Bangor’s population was
foreign-born, according to the 1910 census, while another 23 percent
had at least one foreign-born parent. Nearly half were English-speaking
Canadians. But if you walked through downtown Bangor, you were apt
to see a colorful array of Russians, Italians, Turks, Armenians,
Scandinavians, French-Canadians, Germans and other groups speaking
an exotic mix of tongues. Six Chinese laundries were listed in the
city directory.

In an era when theories of ethnic superiority were popular, there
were desirable and undesirable immigrants. The newspapers were not
shy about expressing the prevailing stereotypes. Not surprisingly,
the good immigrants were the ones who acted most like native Mainers.

Maron George, a member of Bangor’s "Syrian colony," was one of the
respected immigrants. He had "lived in Bangor for 14 years and is
a good citizen. When he came from his native country, he had very
little, but by dint of saving the small sums which he earned he
gradually became more comfortably off and was able eventually to
buy his store. He is known and trusted in Bangor, and is one of the
influential men in the Syrian colony in this city," wrote a Bangor
Daily Commercial reporter on Sept. 24, nearly a week after Mantoria’s
disappearance.

The Bangor Daily News didn’t hesitate about identifying some of
the undesirable immigrants in an intemperate editorial titled "The
Persistent Peddler." Peddlers were a plague across the landscape,
bothering farmers, selling "mainly cheap and trashy" items. "The
sum total of service which they perform for mankind is very slight,"
sniffed the editorial writer on Aug. 24, 1905.

"Nine out of ten are not Americans. One half of them have no more than
a smattering of the English language. The men have no intention of
becoming citizens," complained the writer. Mostly, he was referring to
"Arabians" and Armenians. These two groups were "grasping" and often
dishonest. On the other hand, Jewish peddlers, of which there were
also many, were "honorable" and kept their word, no matter how poor;
they were "square" and "responsible for their acts," although some were
"oversharp in driving bargains." Many had already become citizens.

This tirade provoked a response from an "Arabian" businessman who
had begun his career in America as a peddler and was now "a popular
and successful merchant in a busy Down East town." He wrote, "As a
matter of fact the average peddler of Armenian or Arabian descent
possesses as high ideals of right and wrong as does the average man
or woman of any other race."

Nearly a year later, on July 13, 1906, the Bangor Daily Commercial
endorsed Scandinavian immigrants. Hundreds of Swedes had settled
farms in several communities in Aroostook County several decades
before, and many Swedes, Norwegians, Finns and Danes had settled in
other parts of the state since then. "No class of immigrants in this
country rank higher in intelligence, industry, thrift, public spirit
and in all the elements of good citizenship than those who come from
the Scandinavian peninsula," according to the editorial.

It was the Italians, however, who provoked the greatest muddle of
responses. Worshiped for their willingness to do hard, dirty work,
ridiculed for their habits and appearance and condemned for their
tendency to strike or riot if working and living conditions were not
to their liking, their presence was a godsend to many communities. It
was the Italian work forces recruited in New York and Boston that
built many of the state’s railroads, paper mills, water systems and
other major projects during this period.

A story in the Commercial on Aug. 6, 1906, however, warned that
Italians were growing scarce. The Irish labor pool had dried up long
ago. So had the Danes and Norwegians. "Neither love nor money will
hire the Yankees to do the work," the writer lamented. One Augusta
contractor "believes that ultimately we will have to rely upon the
Chinese and import large numbers for this work."

And what became of Mantoria George, the Syrian girl mentioned at
the top of this column? She was found in South Brewer a week after
her disappearance. She said she had run off with a girl named McCrea
who had $5 that they shared. They had stayed with some Italian men
one night and then alone in some fields under the open sky and in a
small shed, buying food with the money.

Mr. and Mrs. George wanted nothing more to do with Mantoria. They
signed papers turning her over to the state industrial school for
girls in Hallowell. Mantoria had run off before and lived with some
Italians all night and she had been known to steal, said her father.

"Mr. George says that under his religion when a girl leaves home
under such circumstances, she may not be taken back again, but must
be sent … to some orphanage to remain until she attains a certain
age," reported the Commercial on Sept. 25. Whatever Maron George’s
religion might have been, he was acting like an American. Wild boys
and girls could be institutionalized for running away in America. No
one seemed to question Mantoria’s fate.

UCLA: Azerbaijan Deserves U.S. Public Attention

AZERBAIJAN DESERVES U.S. PUBLIC ATTENTION
By Jennifer Mishory – Daily Bruin Reporter
[email protected]
Derek Liu/Daily Bruin

The UCLA Daily Bruin, CA
Oct 23 2006

UC Irvine doctorate student Javid Huseynov spoke Saturday at a
conference for Azerbaijani youth.

When I decided that the first Azerbaijani-American Youth Conference
would be an interesting column topic, it was with the assumption that
most readers, like me, would struggle to spell its name and locate
it on a map.

Azerbaijan, a secular Muslim country located between Iran and
Russia, is a former Soviet satellite with a history of conflict with
neighboring Armenia. The population is ethnically Azeri; there are
also about 20-30 million Azeris living in Iran, while the population
of Azerbaijan itself is only 8 million.

Seemingly unknown to the multitude of students streaming in to the
dining halls below, the conference drew about 50 attendees, most of
them Azeri, and took place in Covel Commons on Saturday.

The conference was put on by the Azerbaijani American Council of
California.

Javid Huseynov, a doctorate student at UC Irvine, said the purpose
of the event was to strengthen ties between Azeri communities from
a variety of countries now residing in the United States. There are
400,000 Azeris in the United States, with over 100,000 of those living
in California, he said.

With Russia trying to strengthen its hold on the region and
American-Iranian relations becoming more tense everyday, our relations
with their neighbor, Azerbaijan, will be important. It is a chance
to secure friendship and promote democratic values in a country that
has both ties to a large population of Iran and huge oil reserves.

The Azeri population in Iran has nationalistic tendencies, and recently
they have staged protests due to the economic situation in the region,
said journalist Abolfazl Bahadori.

Bahadori is a graphic designer who works part-time for Radio Liberty,
a U.S.-sponsored radio station based in Prague that broadcasts to
Azerbaijan. He reports specifically about the Azeri population in Iran.

There are no U.S.-backed radio stations broadcasting to Iran in
anything but Persian, perhaps missing an entire population that we
could be communicating with, he said.

With Azerbaijan’s key location and economic growth, I wondered why
there was not more interest in the conference outside of the Azeri
community. The only non-Azeris that I met were two Turkish USC students
hoping to demonstrate Turkish solidarity with Azerbaijan.

With few oil-rich democracies and fewer Muslim democracies, the U.S.

should show greater interest, and look to promote Azerbaijan’s
transition from Soviet satellite to a democratic nation.

International monitors of the 2005 election of President Ilham Aliyev
found the elections to be tainted by fraud.

Huseynov said because Azerbaijan only gained its independence fifteen
years ago, they are becoming democratic "in an evolutionary way."

Because of their membership in the Council of Europe and other ties
with the west, "it is inevitable that they fall under European norms"
and become increasingly democratic, he said.

The U.S. already has strong economic ties with Azerbaijan. Their
newest oil pipeline spans 1100 miles and is a U.S.-backed project,
said Deputy Counsel General Elman Abdullayev.

For the U.S., Azerbaijan represents an opportunity to encourage
democracy in a primarily Muslim and oil-rich nation, a chance that
the U.S. must not let slip away.

For the average UCLA student, the Azerbaijani conference represents
the multitude of opportunities that exist right under our noses,
or in this case, right above our dining halls.

Toronto: Community pride a key in Ward 41

COMMUNITY PRIDE A KEY IN WARD 41
Nicholas Keung – Staff Reporter

Toronto Star, Canada
Oct 23 2006

Rooming house, parking violations seen as vital issues
Half of residents in Canada less than 15 years

Residents of Ward 41, Scarborough-Rouge River, are tired of uncut
lawns, garbage-strewn sidewalks and out-of-control street parking.

They point to a concern that has plagued the community for years:
the growing number of illegal rooming houses.

"The lawns are poorly maintained. There are so many cars on the
driveways and people just leave their junk on the sidewalks even
when it’s not on a collection day," complained Valerie Plunkett,
a retired TV production assistant who has lived in the ward for 17
years and heads the 1,600-household Rosewood Taxpayers Association.

"And you don’t see any bylaw enforcement because we are so short of
bylaw-enforcement officers."

Bounded by Steeles Ave., Highway 401, Markham and McCowan Rds. and the
CNR tracks to the west, Scarborough-Rouge has both a huge immigrant
community – nearly half the residents have been in Canada less than
15 years – and a higher median income and homeowner rate than Toronto
as a whole. More than half the residents are of Chinese heritage.

It’s no coincidence the three front-runners in a 10-person race for
the vacant council seat – long-time civil servant Hratch Aynedjian,
grassroots activist Chin Lee and former Etobicoke politician David
Robertson – tout community pride and ownership as key platform
points.Scarborough-Rouge, formerly held by Bas Balkissoon, is destined
to see one of the tightest races in its history on Nov. 13.

"It’s a wide open field," noted Tom Chang, who has lived in the
Brimley Forest neighbourhood more than two decades. "With that many
candidates, the votes are going to split. Whoever manages to get 10
votes plus one is going to win."

Media-savvy Aynedjian, 42, born in Lebanon of Armenian heritage,
has 16 years experience as a political assistant at city hall and
Queen’s Park. He said he’d prioritize the city budget to focus on
hardcore services such as maintaining infrastructure rather than
"soft" services like shelters. Tackling illegal rooming houses is a
top priority for him.

"Every other street in the ward has an illegal rooming house. The
problem is we’ve never had bylaws regulating it across the amalgamated
city."

A Scarborough resident since 1979, he has drawn fire from opponents
for living outside Ward 41. He has promised to relocate if elected.

"That’s a big issue," said long-time resident Clement Edwards.

"If someone is coming from outside, he or she may not know or even
care about the community."

Lee, 53, who came here as a Malaysian in 1971, believes his grassroots
involvement with the local police liaison committee and other community
groups will serve him well.

"When I first moved into the ward 17 years ago, it was much cleaner,
better-kept. But the community seems to be falling apart, and we need
to work hard to build a more stable, strong and vibrant community,"
said Lee, who ran (unsuccessfully) for a Scarborough council seat in
1994 to keep the incumbent from being acclaimed.

"Some of the people living in rooming houses are newcomers. They don’t
know anything about property standards and bylaws. It’s not just about
enforcement. We need to do a better job in educating our newcomers."

Robertson, 44, an Etobicoke councillor from 1978 to 1991, said he’s
upset with deteriorating recreation programs and would like to boost
immigrant-settlement services in the ward.

"We need to introduce a new property standards committee to strengthen
the city bylaws and enhance our neighbourhoods," said Robertson,
who teaches English as a second language and ran unsuccessfully for
the NDP in Scarborough-Agincourt in the federal election.

While Lee and Aynedjian, both from the Liberal party, have pledged to
roll back the 9 per cent council pay hike awarded this year, Robertson
said he would donate the raise (minus inflation) to community groups.

Also running are Jose Baking, John Ching, Min Lee, Malcolm Mansfield,
Thadsha Navamanikkam, Scott Shi and Sonny Yeung.

ANKARA: France And Armenian Issue: Turkey Should Remain Calm

FRANCE AND ARMENIAN ISSUE: TURKEY SHOULD REMAIN CALM
Prof. Dr. Beril Dedeoglu

Zaman, Turkey
Oct 23 2006

If the bill in France that makes it a crime to deny the so-called
Armenian genocide passes in the Senate and is approved by the
president, it will become an effective law.

Although it is probable that it won’t pass, the Senate and the
president won’t approve it, the heart of the matter doesn’t change.

In fact, perhaps the law’s waiting before the Senate, which is known
to be comprised of intelligent men who aren’t worried about elections,
and a president who doesn’t show much of a tendency to go beyond the
demands of society, can spark further serious tensions.

The probability of the law passing can become more important than
the law itself. In this state it can be used more consciously as a
vehicle for imposing action, and from Turkey’s perspective it will
serve as Democles’ sword.

First, we shouldn’t make the mistake of asking France questions as
long as the bill doesn’t become law.

The opposition Socialist Party is the architect of the bill and is
responsible for it. It is as meaningless to criticize all French
citizens for this bill as it is to leave all Turkish citizens under
genocide suspicion.

There is benefit in discussing the probabilities of what is happening
in France. It can be claimed that the bill is a tactic that will
cause Turkey to break off from the EU negotiations process. Perhaps
there are members of parliament from both the party in power and
the opposition who would approve such an understanding. In fact,
if the law leads to ending Turkey’s EU negotiations, there may be
others who would be very happy about it.

However, the tactic to drive Turkey away from the table can only
succeed if Turkey actually chooses to do this. In other words,
this points to a process tied to Turkey, not France. Actually, this
strengthens the hands of those in Turkey who, seeing it as their duty,
defend abandoning developments on the EU road and support efforts
for democratization. However, it is difficult to say that French
representatives had planned this. If France wants to drive Turkey
away from the European Union, it is already doing it with the Cyprus
problem. Besides, France will have several more opportunities to push
Turkey away during the negotiation process.

For the Votes of 400,000 Citizens

Another possibility that can be considered is barring the way of
any improvements in Turkish-Armenian relations. It can be said that
as long as Armenia’s isolation continues in the region and tensions
with Russia are increased, France remains Armenia’s only hope for
political breakthrough and France will protect Armenia because it is
its only avenue for activity in the Caucasus. The biggest weakness
of this possibility lies under the question of whom the tensions
between these countries harm the most. Just as preventing Armenia
from opening to the world will increase its political and economic
weakness, it will bring the problem of taking on more responsibility
before the Armenian Diaspora in France (it can’t be claimed that
there are serious contributions to the root country). In addition,
this kind of implementation that points to Armenia would nurture
radical movements that are fed by enemy politics, which, in turn,
support authoritarian structures. In this situation, those who don’t
want to be authoritarian would be negatively affected, rather than
authoritarians. This process would not benefit Armenian citizens and
would prevent Turkey from taking any possible steps toward Armenia.

We can assume the kind of results the Armenian Diaspora’s expectations
will yield. Armenians are continuing to organize in many regions of the
world. We know that genocide claims form the basis of the Diaspora’s
ethnic references and that it sometimes becomes more important than
those of the citizens of the country they live in.

While such a claim can sometimes have a positive effect on the status
of the people and a negative one, it also gives them political power.

It helps them to receive direct decisions and obtain the capacity to
influence processes. The Diaspora largely uses the positions they
have gained in the country to meet its expectations. The Armenian
Diaspora in France mainly supports the Socialist Party. Situations
like the Socialist Party being an opposition party, their loss to
an ultra-nationalist party in the last elections, and not being sure
about the vote potential of Segolene Royal, the female candidate they
brought out to oppose Sarkozy who is in the party in power as the
presidential elections approach, have led the party to increasingly
lean toward more aggressive policies.

It’s is unknown if there are still people who are surprised at the
socialist parties coming to the point of acting along the same lines
as the ultra-nationalist parties. However, as a result it is obvious
that the Socialist Party needs the votes of the estimated 400,000
Armenians living in France. In a similar way, the parties in power
need every vote they can get, strengthening the nationalist game.

Consequently, the administration doesn’t verbalize the meaninglessness
of the bill; on the contrary, it is said that if this policy gains
votes. If so, why should it fail? One of the reasons why certain
parties want these votes could be to turn the raison d’etre of the
Armenian Diaspora, which supports it, into law. Moreover, this effort
is a matter of urgency for the Diaspora, because Turkey has opened
a different door to approach the issue.

Turkey has announced that it is ready to "officially" open this issue
for discussion on an international level outside of state players and
has made progress to some extent. It is clear that the beginning of
discussion of the issue on an international basis in the fields of
science, politics or law will lead to the watering down of the claim
that genocide was perpetrated and the posing of the proposition in
many places throughout the world that maybe there was no genocide. In
this situation, there can be a weakening of the raw material within
the genocide claim from which it feeds.

For certain, the law related to the benefits of exploitation, which
was passed previously and is still being discussed, and the law
that counts the denial of genocide as a crime will continue to be
debated in France. It is also evident that even if this type of law
is a result of a political party presenting it to the parliament,
these subjects are not that contrary to general perceptions in France.

There is a broad, wide-spread and deep belief in France that there
was an Armenian genocide. When the Socialist Party puts this on the
agenda, there’s no great uproar. As communication increases among
societies, it’s possible for fixed opinions to change. There are
lessons here for Turkey. Instead of producing policies based on pushing
possibilities for communication among societies and drawing closer
through cooperation, looking for counterattack policies that encourage
introversion hasn’t provided Turkey with any permanent benefits
to date. If Turkey is a country that trusts its theses, documents,
philosophy and, most importantly, its system, it shouldn’t rush to
take harsh actions that can be seen as expressions of helplessness.

Professor Beril Dedeoglu – Galatasaray University Faculty Member

1956 Hungarian Uprising Saw Betrayal, Murder Over `Twelve Days’

1956 HUNGARIAN UPRISING SAW BETRAYAL, MURDER OVER `TWELVE DAYS’
By George Walden

Bloomberg
Oct 23 2006

Oct. 23 (Bloomberg) — It is tempting to make something of the
coincidence between the recent anti-government riots in Hungary and
Victor Sebestyen’s new account of the uprising against the Russians
in 1956, "Twelve Days: How the Hungarians Tried to Topple their Soviet
Masters," but I will resist.

There is no connection between the Hungary of the communist dictator
Matyas Rakosi ("Stalin’s Best Pupil" in his own propaganda posters),
whose vicious regime led to the revolt, and today’s troubles, except
perhaps that Hungarians tend to be a spirited people.

Unlike in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, Hungary had enjoyed a fledgling
democracy before the Soviet takeover in 1948, and as is so often the
case, the West was taken in: "an oasis of culture and liberty" was
the description of Hungary in these years by the British historian
Hugh Seton-Watson.

Perhaps the influence of writers and intellectuals helped make its
secret police, the AVO, the most brutal of Eastern Europe. From 1950
until the death of Stalin in 1953, over 10 percent of the country’s
10 million people were at some point arrested.

Sebestyen, a British journalist of Hungarian parentage, tells
the story of the tragic uprising with the drama it demands. There
are no simple villains, or heroes — there are only the Hungarian
people themselves. Imre Nagy, much admired in the West, emerges as a
complex figure: A genial man who earned public sympathy through his
land-distribution program, he had a record as a tough communist. Nor
did he place himself at the head of the revolt; he was pulled along
in its wake, to the point where he crossed the line by talking about
leaving the Warsaw Pact and holding free elections.

Intervention a Certainty

At that point, Soviet intervention became a certainty.

His replacement, Janos Kadar, began as a Soviet stooge and ended by
earning the grudging respect of many of his people. As a diplomat,
I once met him. His long, lugubrious face seemed marked by the
contradictions and contortions of his career: hard-line communist,
prisoner of the Rakosi regime, sympathizer with the 1956 uprising, then
the betrayer who urged a reluctant Khrushchev to hang his colleague
Nagy, and finally Hungarian leader, under whom hundreds of insurgents
were executed and thousands imprisoned.

Eventually Kadar presided over the gradual relaxation of the regime,
as it settled into the reformist model of "goulash communism" so
despised by Mao Tse-tung, whose spread would prove a key factor in
the great schism in the communist camp.

Khrushchev Vacillated

A large plus for this book is the new availability of official records,
so that we now know about Soviet reactions as the crisis unfolded. Like
Khrushchev himself, his men on the spot — the wily Armenian Anastas
Mikoyan and the Stalinist ideologue Mikhail Suslov — vacillated in
their assessments from day to day, though it did not take long to
decide that Rakosi had to go. And so Mikoyan told him that the Soviet
leadership had decided that he was ill, and needed treatment in Moscow.

All three were initially reluctant to use full-throttle violence,
and when Moscow did, killing 2,500 Hungarians, Mikoyan was violently
against it. The prize for unashamed mendacity and double-crossing
goes to the suave Yuri Andropov, then ambassador in Budapest, later
head of the KGB and briefly Soviet leader.

In retrospect it is surprising how far Khrushchev was prepared to
go in placating the insurgents, but in the end he became afraid he
would go down in history as the man who "lost" Hungary. There was
unrest in Poland and Romania, and Khrushchev was part of a collective
leadership whose diehards, like Vyacheslav Molotov (known as "stony
arse"), were waiting to trip him up.

Equally uncertain how to react was the U.S. President Eisenhower
who nevertheless emerges well. Though consistently skeptical about
Moscow’s intentions, he saw at once that a U.S. intervention, which
might have triggered world war, was out.

Appalling Brutalities

When the book cuts between Washington and Budapest, there is an odd
dissonance between descriptions of the appalling brutalities of the
regime, such as a minister of defense urinating in the mouth of a
tortured prisoner, and passages on U.S. internal politics implying
that anti-communism in the America was unjustified or excessive.

We could also have done with more about the effect of 1956 on the
world communist movement. Certainly it shook the faith of some, but
what is more remarkable is how many went on believing. The historian
Eric Hobsbawm continues, for example, to argue that communism was a
worthwhile experiment, yet he remains respected, in parts of academia
if nowhere else. Perhaps his admirers should read this book.

"Twelve Days: How the Hungarians Tried to Topple their Soviet Masters,"
is published in the U.K. by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and in the U.S. by
Pantheon under the title "Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution" (368 pages; 20 pounds, $26).

(George Walden is a critic for Bloomberg News. The opinions expressed
are his own.)

Turkey And Islamism: The Debate

TURKEY AND ISLAMISM: THE DEBATE

ThreatsWatch.Org
Oct 23 2006

The primary rubbing point between the United States and Turkey right
now is not related to radical Islam. Quite the opposite – it is related
to the Marxist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish terrorist
group which has taken refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet as Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development
Party (known by its Turkish initials, the AKP) continue to dominate
Turkey’s political scene, there are rising concerns on both sides of
the Atlantic about the rise of Islamism in Turkey.

The two sides of this debate were on feature in two recent op-eds
in the Wall Street Journal. The first, Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey, Michael
Rubin, a Middle East scholar, argued that the AKP posed a threat to
Turkish democracy, and was slyly and slowly but steadily eroding the
country’s independent institutions. Rubin argues:

…Over the party’s four-year tenure, Mr. Erdogan has spoken of
democracy, tolerance and liberalism, but waged a slow and steady
assault on the system. He endorsed, for example, the dream of Turkey’s
secular elite to enter the European Union, but only to embrace
reforms diluting the checks and balances of military constitutional
enforcement…

The assault on the secular education system has been subtle but
effective. Traditionally, students had three choices: enroll at
religious academies (so-called Imam Hatips) and enter the clergy;
learn a trade at vocational schools; or matriculate at secular high
schools, attend university and pursue a career. Mr. Erdogan changed
the system: By equating Imam Hatip degrees with high-school degrees,
he enabled Islamist students to enter university and qualify for
government jobs without ever mastering Western fundamentals. He also
sought to bypass checks and balances. After the Higher Education
Board composed of university rectors rejected his demands to make
universities more welcoming of political Islam, the AKP-dominated
parliament proposed to establish 15 new universities. While Mr.

Erdogan told diplomats his goal was to promote education, Turkish
academics say the move would enable him to handpick rectors and swamp
the board with political henchmen…

Such tactics have become commonplace. At Mr. Erdogan’s insistence and
over the objections of many secularists, the AKP passed legislation
to lower the mandatory retirement age of technocrats. This could
mean replacement of nearly 4,000 out of 9,000 judges. Turks are
suspicious that the AKP seeks to curtail judicial independence. In
May 2005, AKP Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc warned that the AKP
might abolish the constitutional court if its judges continued to
hamper its legislation. Mr. Erdogan’s refusal to implement Supreme
Court decisions levied against his government underline his contempt
for rule of law. Last May, in the heat of the AKP’s anti-judiciary
rhetoric, an Islamist lawyer protesting the head scarf ban shouted
"Allahu Akbar," opened fire in the Supreme Court and murdered a
judge. Thousands attended his funeral, chanting pro-secular slogans.

Mr. Erdogan was absent from the ceremony.

There have been other subtle changes. Mr. Erdogan has replaced nearly
every member of the banking regulatory board with officials from the
Islamic banking sector. Accusations of Saudi capital subsidizing AKP
are rampant…

Rubin also takes aim at U.S. diplomacy, noting that U.S. Ambassador
Ross Wilson has publicly taken the side of the AKP against its secular
political opponents, describing domestic criticism of Erdogan’s
Islamist policies as "political cacophony."

Matthew Kaminski, a member of the Journal’s editorial board, took the
opposite point of view (although without criticizing Rubin by name).

Writing in Turkish Tiger: Freedom Thrives Even Under an ‘Islamist’
Government, Kaminski argues:

…The recent troubling news here, from Kurdish terrorism to the rise
of political Islam and anti-Americanism to tensions with Europe, can’t
take away from Turkey’s economic renaissance. New and old industries
powered a 7% expansion in 2005, the fourth consecutive year that growth
approached double digits; this year, it’ll be around 5%. Inflation,
an old Turkish non-delight, is under control. Inside the European
Union’s free-trade area since 1996, Turkey has done especially well
with export-driven manufacturing. More than half of Europe’s television
sets are made here. Investors are taking notice; Citigroup last week
bought 20% of the third-largest bank for $3.1 billion. Though the
economic gap with Europe remains wide, Turks are spending their way
to bourgeois respectability, buying, in the past year, $3.5 billion in
imported cars. Consumer loans are up 120% in that time, housing 300%…

The good times have made for a richer civil society. Since the last
military-led regime in 1980-83, notes author Hugh Pope, 27 private
universities have been founded, mostly courtesy of tycoons like the
Koc and Sabanci families. Sabanci University’s art gallery last year
put on a popular Picasso exhibit, a first in Istanbul; Rodin followed
this summer. Associations and lobby groups are mushrooming; they are
giving voice to competing interests and providing counterweights to
the Islamists in charge, even as opposition parties remain weak.

Turkish democracy has never been stronger…

While Turkey continues "talks" with European governments about
entering the European Union, that prospect is all but dead. The
major governments remain in support, but across Europe the publics
are opposed, and their governments are starting to bend. Recently
the French parliament passed the first reading of a bill that would
make it a crime punishable by prison to deny that the Turks committed
genocide against the Armenians in the First World War. As this is in
fact denied by virtually all Turks, not simply the nationalists, many
very mainstream Turkish public figures would be inviting prosecution
by travel to France if the bill becomes law. While such a law would
serve no practical purpose for France, it would ensure that Turks
know they are not welcome.

No, the real issue is whether or not Turkey will maintain its
democratic institutions, or else make a U-turn toward history. There
is no need to assume a choice between extremes; there is a middle
ground in which Turkey could stay outside the EU, but maintain strong
economic, military and diplomatic ties with the West, and be a force
for peace and a non-threatening current of Islam. Yet that middle
ground cannot be assumed, either.

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