Month: October 2005

TURKISH VIEW ON THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN

Axis News
Oct 4 2005

Can Karpat. AIA Turkish section

Ilham Aliyev (L) and Ahmed Cezer
Turkish expert Hatem Cabbarli, the Armenia Researches Department
Director in the Turkish Centre for International Relations and
Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM) analysed on the pages of Turkish Strateji
Dergisi magazine the situation and the main Azerbaijani political and
geopolitical problems. He is making a stress that most of them are
rooted in the excessive dependence on Russia throughout the first
years of the independence and praises the late Heydar Aliyev. AIA
brings a translation of this article.

After gaining their independence in 1991, the ex-Soviet Union countries
could not make much progress in the name of democracy (except for the
Baltic States), and consequently they are living through a painful
process. One of them is Azerbaijan. After it became independent,
the President at that time, Ayaz Mutallibov preferred to depend
on Russia’s economy and security policy instead of strengthening
the independence of his own country. That choice of Mutallibov
is explained today by political, military and social factors of
that time. However, these reasons do not change the fact that the
inappropriate policy of the first years had a negative effect on
the whole Azerbaijani history. Until 1994, Azerbaijan was a sort of
battlefield of superpowers, among which were Russia and the United
States that wanted to control its rich energy sources.

Mutallibov, who could not any longer stand the pressure coming from
the Azerbaijan People’s Front (APF) and his people, fled to Russia.

Although in 1992 elections the APF came to power, it could not fulfil
public’s expectations either; on the contrary, it sunk under the
geopolitical and geo-economic intrigues of the superpowers. In 1993,
the coup d’etat of the Colonel Suret Huseynov removed the Party from
power. Later, the President of the Nakhchevan Parliament at that time,
Heydar Aliyev came to Baku, and was elected first as the new President
of the Parliament and then the President of Azerbaijan. He managed,
more or less, to restore the order in the country. After he had
signed the oil agreement known as the agreement of the century in
September 1994, he strengthened his power even further. Before the
elections on the 6th of November this year, the political agenda of
Azerbaijan is turning around the discussions whether these elections
will be democratic. These elections are also a question of “to be
or not to be” for the opposition, which could not get to the power
for 13 years. Success or failure will determine the fate of the
Azerbaijani opposition.

Inflation of the Candidates

The Azerbaijani Parliament counts 125 MPs. According to the information
given by the Azerbaijan Central Elections Commission, the delay of
application for candidates expired on the 6th of September.

To participate in the elections, 2237 people (100%) took register
forms, 2149 people (96.13%) gave back those forms filled and 2059 of
them (92.13%) became official candidates. 1031 of those candidates
(46.09%) will participate in the elections independently. 968 of those
independent candidates (46.97%) have already been registered, the rest
was divided up between other political parties and organisations. Some
parties, like Azadliq (115 people), New Policy (101), Azerbaijani
Forces (33), Democratic Azerbaijan (35), Reform (30), Union (9) and
For Azerbaijan (8) will participate in the elections in the framework
of political blocs. More than 2000 candidates appliying for 125 seats
is a sign of democracy. Nevertheless, this fact also proved that some
people, who are not even involved in politics, are willing to have
a seat in the Parliament. Moreover many foreign countries, holdings
and commercial companies support their own candidates, and carry out
lobbying activities. Just to remind, in the parliamentary elections of
2000 only 390 candidates participated, so it is possible to claim that
there is a real inflation of candidates for the upcoming elections on
the November, 6th. And there are some candidates, who plan to withdraw
their candidature just before the elections date in favour of other
powerful candidates, and this also caused that the figure is so high.

The Duel: The Government vs. The Opposition

Although the opposition struggles for power for long 13 years, it
could not cope so far with the political system that was built by the
President Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan. When after Heydar’s his son
Ilham took over the opposition considered that it could easily beat
him, and even prepared some “orange”, “blue”, “red”, Ilham Aliyev. Like
father, like son… “green”, “yellow” revolution scenarios, it could
not estimate correctly the real power of Aliyev regime and political
power, and it despised his political potential, and that is why they
could not be represented in the State administration mechanisms. As a
matter of fact, the opposition is bereft of any political influence
in the country. The reason why is that conflicts and disagreements
in the opposition are more serious than those in the ranks of the
government. Those in the government, despite the serious disagreements,
always manage to find compromises or to postpone their disputes in
order to keep their seats. However, the opposition movements, have
nothing to lose, and they quarrel every now and then.

The opposition parties criticise the government for the policy it
pursues in economy, social affairs and especially in the Karabakh
issue. Nevertheless, they do not care about the negotiations in
progress to solve the Karabakh conflict. In other words, the opposition
parties are so busy with the coming elections that they even forget
to oppose to the government.

The Leaders in Exile

Some political forces, especially the Azerbaijan Democratic Party
struggle in order to bring back their leaders who are in exile. Today
the former President Ayaz Mutallibov lives in Russia, and the former
President of the Parliament Resul Kuliyev in the United States.

Although Mutallibov and Kuliyev have already put in motion the United
States, Russia and the European Union to convince the Azerbaijani
government to permit their return, the Attorney General officially
declared that if these persons try to enter to Azerbaijan, they
will be arrested. Those leaders, who claimed that they struggle
against Aliyev’s regime in order to give the Azerbaijani people their
democratic rights back, and who declared that for this aim they would
not hesitate to give their own lives, now live in exile fearing the
arrest. The opposition, taking the last elections as an example,
claims that the results of the upcoming elections in November will
be fraudulent as well. Emphasising that there were some troubles
during the candidates’ registering process, it declared that it
is not possible to trust the government’s intentions. As to the
government, it confirms that the elections will be democratic, and
tries to make its voice heard in the Azerbaijani public opinion as
well as in the European Council. If we take the declarations of the
government into account, we can expect that these elections will be
more democratic than the previous elections. For sure the government
can hardly face the democratisation pressures coming from the United
States, and the country really needs some reforms. If there are any
frauds in the coming elections, it would start a “Color revolution”
in Azerbaijan. If it happens, the government, which is unwilling to
make the least concession, would lose everything. Another point is
that the statements coming from the United States, the EU, Iran and
Russia about these elections are being accepted by the government
as well as by the opposition as prophecies. Of course, one of the
reasons for this “psychology” is the fact that Azerbaijan had been the
Russia’s colony for the last 300 years (except the period 1918-1920
when a Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan existed). Its 14-years-long
history of independence is not enough for the achievement of full
democratisation. The government and the opposition examine the
reactions of foreign countries and they try to gain their support
rather than to listen to their own people, who will vote for them. The
opposition interprets any statement about the elections coming from
abroad as a pressure imposed on the government. As to the government,
although it tries to behave with prudence, it does not hide its
annoyance with some of those statements. Today the government and the
opposition, which should have focused altogether on the economical,
political and military problems of Azerbaijan, are divided in two
opposite poles and waiting for advice that the United States, the
EU and Russia are supposed to give them. This situation offends the
national honour of the Azerbaijani people. Azerbaijan does not have
to act according to foreign countries’ advice or propositions. In
order to become a country where the democratic values and the human
rights are respected and where the income is equally distributed,
the administration must be the first to apply reforms and the people
must support them. It may be that for some reasons the government
would not start this process or extend it. Then the people themselves
may display their will and present their demands to the government.

Unfortunately, Azerbaijan is far from these national values today.

Some opposition leaders claim that the parliamentary elections would
be accompanied the same demonstrations, which happened after the
presidential elections on the October, 15, 2003 and that the government
would interfere in that case. However, in case that before or after
the elections the government is divided, the opposition, which would
possibly have the support of the people and the democratic countries,
would be highly dangerous as far as the ruling party concerned.

Propaganda Campaigns

First of all, it must be emphasised that during all the elections
before 2005, candidates could not gain anything from pre-election’s
campaign periods because of the lack of professional institutions.

The main reason is that the government determined the list of the
candidates for the Parliament. Consequently, candidates, who had their
seats for granted in any case, had no need for propaganda. As a matter
of fact, in the parliamentary elections in 2000, the list prepared by
the government had leaked out to the press, and 122 of 125 candidates
that appeared on the list had ended sitting in the Parliament. That
is why propaganda techniques and mechanisms are not developed in the
Azerbaijani political scene. The Party in power, the New Azerbaijan
Party declared the names of its candidates at the last minute, and
thus disappointed those, who did not appear on the list. Although
the government tries to present an image of a solid team, it suffers
from serious disagreements in its own ranks. The government will
not only fight against the opposition, but also to keep its own
union during these elections. Three major opposition parties, the
Equality, the Azerbaijan Public Front and the Azerbaijan Democratic
Party agreed to form a single bloc for these elections. However,
the fact that the candidates – independent or dependent on the
blocs – promise to solve economical and social problems grants these
parliamentary elections an atmosphere of municipal elections. As a
matter of fact, the main promises are about the solution of water,
sewer system, electricity, labour, and road problems. And the solution
of Azerbaijan’s economical, political and military problems through
a new legislation is not discussed as much. Besides, discussions on
the reduction of presidential powers and the increase of those of
the Parliament are absolutely out of question.

And Turkey’s Point of View

After Azerbaijan obtained its independence, Turkey had tried to
influence some political events in that country every now and then, but
in vain. The attitudes between Turkey and Azerbaijan depend rather on
personal relations: the famous brother-like relations between Heydar
Aliyev and the Turkish President at that time, Suleyman Demirel. The
Azerbaijani public opinion and foreign observers keep claiming that
so far none of the elections had really reflected the will of the
population. The fact that Turkey sending congratulation messages even
before the publishing results of the presidential elections in 2003
had been announced, changed the attitude of the Azerbaijani people
towards Turkey and lowered their trust towards Ankara. Long before the
November elections, foreign embassies and intelligence services began
to spend thousands of dollars lobbying in favour of those candidates,
who support their interest. However, Turkey is contended to watch the
evolution from a distance, and believes in common values that it failed
to develop for the last fifteen years. If the opposition wins these
elections, the political parties, which obtained neither financial nor
spiritual support from Turkey during those fifteen years, may cool
of relations with Turkey. While the United States, the EU, Russia
and even Iran are explaining their official point of view and making
statements that they hope for democratic elections in Azerbaijan,
the Turkish Embassy officials appear in the local newspapers and TV
channels only on the occasion of official ceremonies. This proves that
Turkey abstains from involvement in the elections process. Turkey
uses just a tiny part of its potential of political manoeuvres
in Azerbaijan. Today, for Turkey, “to be influential or not to be
influential” in Azerbaijan will also determine its future relations
with that country.

ALMOST HALF OF BAKU RESIDENTS FOR MILITARY RESOLUTION OF NK CONFLICT: OKL

ArmInfo News Agency
Oct 4 2005

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 4. ARMINFO. The Baku residents are for military
resolution of the Karabakh conflict, says the survey held by the
Organization for Karabakh Liberation.

The survey was held in two stages – in early Sept and early Oct 2005.

The question was: “How can the Karabakh conflict be resolved?” with
three possible answers: “by war,” “by peace” and “no answer.”

Questioned in Sept were 1,943 people classified into three age
groups. 49% of the youths chose war, 35% peace. The adults preferred
peace over war – 40% and 39%. The elders were much more belicose –
50% for war and only 35% for peace.

By Oct the bellicosity grew to 51% for youths, 49% for adults and 50%
for elders with respective 32%, 34% and 29% advocating peace.

TURKEY WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT EU DEMANDS: ARMENIA’S DEPUTY FM

ArmInfo News Agency
Oct 4 2005

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 4. ARMINFO. Turkey should realize that today is not
early XX but early XXI, says Armenia’s Deputy FM Gegam Garibjanyan
commenting on the delayed start of the talks for Turkey’s membership
in the EU.

It would be good for Armenia to have an EU neighbor but Turkey will
have to accept the EU demands to recognize Cyprus and the Armenian
Genocide and to open its border with Armenia. Turkey will hardly avoid
fulfilling these demands if it wants to be EU member, says Garibjanyan.

To remind, the talks were to start Oct 3 but have been put off because
of Turkey’s refusing to accept the requirements to recognize the
Republic of Cyprus and the Armenian Genocide.

NEW-APPOINTED GREEK AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA HANDS CREDENTIALS COPIES TO ARMENIAN DEPUTY FM

ARKA News Agency
Oct 3 2005

YEREVAN, October 3. /ARKA/. Newly appointed Greek Ambassador to
Armenia Panayota Mavromichali handed credentials copies to Armenian
Deputy Foreign Minister Armen Bayburdyan on Monday, Armenian Foreign
Ministry’s press service said. According to the press release, after
congratulating the Greek diplomat on his appointment, Bayburdyan
pointed out centuries-old historic and cultural ties between the
two countries, which lay favorable ground for cooperation. The Greek
new-appointed Ambassador and Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister discussed
Armenian-Greek relationship prospects and stressed the importance of
trade-economic area development.

Special emphasis was also put on Armenia’s relations with Europe. The
sides paid attention to bilateral relations in international
organizations. M.V. -0–

ARKA News Agency
Oct 3 2005

CIS INTER-PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY’S COMMISSIONS ON ECONOMY, FINANCE, EDUCATION, SCIENCE TO HOLD THEIR SESSIONS ON OCT 4 TO 7 IN YEREVAN

YEREVAN, October 4. /ARKA/. CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly’s
Commissions on Economy and Finance as well as Education and Science
are to hold their sessions on October 4 to 7 in Yerevan. According
to Armenian National Assembly’s press service, Armenian Palliament
Speaker Arthur Baghdasaryan and CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly’s
Secretary Mikhail Krotov are set to speak at the session on
October 5. Education and Science Commission members will meet with
ArmeniN Education Minister Sergo Yeritsyan, and Economy and Finance
Commission representatives will meet Armenian Finance Minister Vardan
Khachatryan. Education Commission meeting with professors at Yerevan
State Linguistic University after Valeri Bryusov is scheduled for
October 6. On the same day, Economic Commission representatives will
tour industrial plants in Armavir province, Armenia. Both commissions’
members will visit Armenian Genocide Memorial to pay floral tribute
to victims of the genocide. M.V. -0–

TURKEY: BACK TO THE FUTURE?

American Thinker, AZ
Oct 14 2005

=4874

[Part 1 appears today; Parts 2 and 3 will appear later this week]

Once again, Turks are storming the heart of Europe. This time, it is
not by the sword, but rather in seeking to join the European Union
(EU). Once inside the gates, they will gain access to the great cities,
wealth, and power of their ancient rivals. Smoothing the way for
incorporation of the former would-be conqueror into borderless Europe
is an errant belief that Ottoman Turkey was a tolerant multi-cultural
civilization. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Recently, security analyst Frank Gaffney wrote a courageous essay,
featured in the Washington Times , urging that Turkey’s bid to join the
EU be rejected. Gaffney highlighted the Islamic Shari’a-based religious
revival under the current Erdogan regime as the keystone to his cogent
argument. Despite Gaffney’s legitimate concerns regarding the current
Erdogan government, he reiterates a common, politically-correct canard
which ignores the direct nexus between Erdogan’s ideology, and the
goals and behaviors of Erdogan’s Ottoman ancestors. It is ahistorical
to speak of “Ottoman tolerance” as distinct from Erdogan’s “Islamism”,
because the Ottoman Empire expanded via three centuries of devastating
jihad campaigns, and the flimsy concept of Ottoman tolerance was,
in reality, Ottoman-imposed dhimmitude, under the Shari’a.

With formal discussions regarding Turkey’s potential EU accession
currently underway, this three part essay will elaborate on several
apposite historical phenomena: Jihad and dhimmitude under the Ottomans,
focusing primarily on Asia Minor and Eastern Europe; the failure
of the so-called Ottoman Tanzimat reforms to abrogate the system of
dhimmitude; and the dissolution of this Shari’a state whose bloody,
convulsive collapse during the first World War included a frank jihad
genocide of the Ottoman dhimmi population, once considered most loyal
to the Empire, i.e., the Armenians. I believe such an analysis is
particularly timely, in light of a December 2004 United Nations
Conference which lionized “Ottoman tolerance” as a role model,
“… to be adapted even today…” [emphasis added], and Gaffney’s
reiteration of this profoundly flawed conception, despite his own
bold opposition to Turkey’s entry into the EU.

Jihad Campaigns of the Seljuks and Ottomans

The historian Michael the Syrian (Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch from
1166 to 1199 C.E.) in his Chronicle reproducing earlier contemporary
sources, made important observations regarding events which occurred
beginning in the third decade of the 11th century. He noted,

“…the commencement of the exodus of the Turks to…Syria and the
coast of Palestine…[Where] They subdued all the countries by cruel
devastation and plunder” [1] Subsequently, “Turks and Arabs were mixing
together like a single people…Such was the rule of the Turks amidst
the Arabs” [2]

Expanding upon this contemporary account, and the vast array of other
primary sources- Arabic, Turkish, Greek, Latin, Serbian, Bulgarian,
and Hungarian. [3] Bat Ye’or concludes, [4]

…the two waves of Muslim expansion, the Arab from the seventh
century, and the Turkish four centuries later- are remarkably
similar…The great Arab and Turkish conquerors used the same military
tactics and the same policies of consolidating Islamic power. This
continuity resulted from the fact that the conquests took place within
the framework of the common ideology of jihad and the administrative
and juridical apparatus of the shari’a- a uniformity that defies time,
since it adapts itself to diverse lands and peoples, being integrated
into the internal coherence of a political theology. In the course
of their military operations, the Turks applied to the conquered
populations the rules of jihad, which had been structured four
centuries earlier by the Arabs and enshrined in Islamic religious law.

The Seljuk and Ottoman jihad campaigns were spearheaded by “Ghazi”
(from the word ghazwa or “razzia”) movements, “Warriors of the Faith”,
brought together under the banner of Islam to fight infidels,
and obtain booty. Wittek [5] and Vryonis [6] have stressed the
significance of this movement, in its Seljuk incarnation, at the most
critical frontier of Islam during the 11th and 12th centuries, i.e.,
eastern Anatolia. Vryonis notes, [7]

When the Arab traveler al-Harawi passed through these border regions
in the second half of the 12th century, he noted the existence of a
shrine on the Byzantine-Turkish borders (near Afyon-Karahisar) which
was reported to be the tomb of the Muslim martyr Abu Muhammd al-Battal,
and at Amorium the tombs of those who fell in the celebrated siege
of the city in 838. These constitute fascinating testimony to the
fact that the ghazi-jihad tradition was closely intertwined into the
nomadic society of Phrygia. Not only was there evidence of a nomadic
invasion but also of an epic society in its heroic age, and it is
from this milieu that the Turkish epics were shaped: the Battalname,
the Danishmendname, and the Dusturname.

Wittek, citing the oldest known Ottoman source, the versified chronicle
of Ahmedi, maintains that the 14th century Ottomans believed they too,

“were a community of Ghazis, of champions of the Mohammedan religion;
a community of the Moslem march- warriors, devoted to the struggle
with the infidels in their neighborhood” [8].

The contemporary Turkish scholar of Ottoman history, Halil Inalcik,
has also emphasized the importance of Muslim religious zeal- expressed
through jihad- as a primary motivation for the conquests of the
Ottoman Turks: [9]

The ideal of gaza, Holy War, was an important factor in the foundation
and development of the Ottoman state. Society in the frontier
principalities conformed to a particular cultural pattern imbued with
the ideal of continuous Holy War and continuous expansion of the Dar
ul Islam-the realms of Islam- until they covered the whole world.

Incited by pious Muslim theologians, these ghazis were at the vanguard
of both the Seljuk and Ottoman jihad conquests. Vacalopoulos highlights
the role of the dervishes during the Ottoman campaigns: [10]

…fanatical dervishes and other devout Muslim leaders…constantly
toiled for the dissemination of Islam. They had done so from the
very beginning of the Ottoman state and had played an important part
in the consolidation and extension of Islam. These dervishes were
particularly active in the uninhabited frontier regions of the east.

Here they settled down with their families, attracted other settlers,
and thus became the virtual founders of whole new villages, whose
inhabitants invariably exhibited the same qualities of deep religious
fervor. From places such as these, the dervishes or their agents would
emerge to take part in new military enterprises for the extension
of the Islamic state. In return, the state granted them land and
privileges under a generous prescription which required only that
the land be cultivated and communications secured.

Brief overviews of the Seljuk and Ottoman jihad campaigns which
ultimately Islamized Asia Minor, have been provided by Vryonis and
Vacalopoulos. First, the schematic, clinical assessment of Vryonis:
[11]

The conquest, or should I say the conquests of Asia Minor were in
operation over a period of four centuries. Thus the Christian societies
of Asia Minor were submitted to extensive periods of intense warfare,
incursions, and destructions which undermined the existence of the
Christian church. In the first century of Turkish conquests and
invasions from the mid-eleventh to the late twelfth century, the
sources reveal that some 63 towns and villages were destroyed. The
inhabitants of other towns and villages were enslaved and taken off
to the Muslim slave markets.

Vacalopoulos describes the conquests in more animated detail: [12]

At the beginning of the eleventh century, the Seljuk Turks forced their
way into Armenia and there crushed the armies of several petty Armenian
states. No fewer than forty thousand souls fled before the organized
pillage of the Seljuk host to the western part of Asia Minor…From
the middle of the eleventh century, and especially after the battle of
Malazgirt [Manzikurt] (1071), the Seljuks spread throughout the whole
Asia Minor peninsula, leaving terror, panic and destruction in their
wake. Byzantine, Turkish and other contemporary sources are unanimous
in their agreement on the extent of havoc wrought and the protracted
anguish of the local population…evidence as we have proves that
the Hellenic population of Asia Minor, whose very vigor had so long
sustained the Empire and might indeed be said to have constituted its
greatest strength, succumbed so rapidly to Turkish pressure that by
the fourteenth century, it was confined to a few limited areas. By
that time, Asia Minor was already being called Turkey…one after
another, bishoprics and metropolitan sees which once throbbed with
Christian vitality became vacant and ecclesiastical buildings fell into
ruins. The metropolitan see of Chalcedon, for example, disappeared
in the fourteenth century, and the sees of Laodicea, Kotyaeon (now
Kutahya) and Synada in the fifteenth…With the extermination of local
populations or their precipitate flight, entire villages, cities, and
sometimes whole provinces fell into decay. There were some fertile
districts like the valley of the Maeander River, once stocked with
thousands of sheep and cattle, which were laid waste and thereafter
ceased to be in any way productive. Other districts were literally
transformed into wildernesses. Impenetrable thickets sprang up in
places where once there had been luxuriant fields and pastures. This
is what happened to the district of Sangarius, for example, which
Michael VIII Palaeologus had known formerly as a prosperous, cultivated
land, but whose utter desolation he afterwards surveyed in utmost
despair…The mountainous region between Nicaea and Nicomedia, opposite
Constantinople, once clustered with castles, cities, and villages,
was depopulated. A few towns escaped total destruction- Laodicea,
Iconium, Bursa (then Prusa), and Sinope, for example- but the extent
of devastation elsewhere was such as to make a profound impression on
visitors for may years to come. The fate of Antioch provides a graphic
illustration of the kind of havoc wrought by the Turkish invaders:
in 1432, only three hundred dwellings could be counted inside its
walls, and its predominantly Turkish or Arab inhabitants subsisted
by raising camels, goats, cattle, and sheep. Other cities in the
southeastern part of Asia Minor fell into similar decay.

The Islamization of Asia Minor was complemented by parallel and
subsequent Ottoman jihad campaigns in the Balkans [13]. As of 1326
C.E., yearly razzias by the emirs of Asia Minor targeted southern
Thrace, southern Macedonia, and the coastal areas of southern Greece.

Around 1360 C.E., the Ottomans, under Suleiman (son of Sultan Orchan),
and later Sultan Murad I (1359-1389), launched bona fide campaigns of
jihad conquest, capturing and occupying a series of cities and towns
in Byzantine and Bulgarian Thrace. Following the battle of Cernomen
(September 26, 1371), the Ottomans penetrated westward, occupying
within 15 years, a large number of towns in western Bulgaria, and
in Macedonia. Ottoman invasions during this period also occurred
in the Peloponnesus, central Greece, Epirus, Thessaly, Albania,
and Montenegro. By 1388 most of northeast Bulgaria was conquered,
and following the battle of Kosovo (1389), Serbia came under Ottoman
suzerainty. Vacalopoulos argues that internecine warring, as well
as social and political upheaval, prevented the Balkan populations-
Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Serbians- from uniting against
the common Ottoman enemy, thus sealing their doom.

Indeed, he observes that, [14]

After the defeat of the Serbs at Cirmen (or Cernomen) near the
Hebrus River in 1371, Serbia, Bulgaria, and the Byzantine Empire
became tributaries of the Ottoman Empire and were obliged to render
assistance in Ottoman campaigns.

Bayezid I (1389-1402) undertook devastating campaigns in Bosnia,
Hungary, and Wallachia, in addition to turning south and again
attacking central Greece and the Peloponnesus. After a hiatus during
their struggle against the Mongol invaders, the Ottomans renewed their
Balkan offensive in 1421. Successful Ottoman campaigns were waged in
the Peloponnesus, Serbia, and Hungary, culminating with the victory
at the second Battle of Kosovo (1448). With the accession to power
of Mehmed II, the Ottomans commenced their definitive conquest of the
Balkan peninsula. Constantinople was captured on May 29, 1453, marking
the end of the Byzantine Empire. By 1460, the Ottomans had completely
vanquished both Serbia and the Peloponnesus. Bosnia and Trebizond fell
in 1463, followed by Albania in 1468. With the conquest of Herzegovina
in 1483, the Ottomans became rulers of the entire Balkan peninsula.

Vacalopoulos, commenting on the initial Ottoman forays into Thrace
during the mid 14th century, and Angelov, who provides an overall
assessment highlighting the later campaigns of Murad II (1421-1451)
and Mehmed II (1451-1481), elucidate the impact of the Ottoman jihad
on the vanquished Balkan populations:

>>From the very beginning of the Turkish onslaught [in Thrace] under
Suleiman [son of Sultan Orchan], the Turks tried to consolidate
their position by the forcible imposition of Islam. If [the Ottoman
historian] Sukrullah is to be believed, those who refused to accept
the Moslem faith were slaughtered and their families enslaved. “Where
there were bells”, writes the same author [i.e., Sukrullah], “Suleiman
broke them up and cast them into fires. Where there were churches he
destroyed them or converted them into mosques. Thus, in place of bells
there were now muezzins. Wherever Christian infidels were still found,
vassalage was imposed on their rulers. At least in public they could
no longer say ‘kyrie eleison’ but rather ‘There is no God but Allah’;
and where once their prayers had been addressed to Christ, they were
now to “Muhammad, the prophet of Allah’.” [15]

…the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula accomplished by the Turks
over the course of about two centuries caused the incalculable ruin
of material goods, countless massacres, the enslavement and exile of
a great part of the population – in a word, a general and protracted
decline of productivity, as was the case with Asia Minor after it
was occupied by the same invaders. This decline in productivity is
all the more striking when one recalls that in the mid-fourteenth
century, as the Ottomans were gaining a foothold on the peninsula,
the States that existed there – Byzantium, Bulgaria and Serbia –
had already reached a rather high level of economic and cultural
development….The campaigns of Mourad II (1421-1451) and especially
those of his successor, Mahomet II (1451-1481) in Serbia, Bosnia,
Albania and in the Byzantine princedom of the Peloponnesus, were of
a particularly devastating character. During the campaign that the
Turks launched in Serbia in 1455-1456, Belgrade, Novo-Bardo and other
towns were to a great extent destroyed. The invasion of the Turks in
Albania during the summer of 1459 caused enormous havoc. According
to the account of it written by Kritobulos, the invaders destroyed
the entire harvest and leveled the fortified towns that they had
captured. The country was afflicted with further devastation in 1466
when the Albanians, after putting up heroic resistance, had to withdraw
into the most inaccessible regions, from which they continued the
struggle. Many cities were likewise ruined during the course of the
campaign led by Mahomet II in 1463 against Bosnia – among them Yaytze,
the capital of the Kingdom of Bosnia…But it was the Peloponnesus
that suffered most from the Turkish invasions. It was invaded in
1446 by the armies of Murad II, which destroyed a great number of
places and took thousands of prisoners. Twelve years later, during
the summer of 1458, the Balkan Peninsula was invaded by an enormous
Turkish army under the command of Mahomet II and his first lieutenant
Mahmoud Pasha. After a siege that lasted four months, Corinth fell
into enemy hands. Its walls were razed, and many places that the
sultan considered useless were destroyed. The work by Kritobulos
contains an account of the Ottoman campaigns, which clearly shows us
the vast destruction caused by the invaders in these regions. Two
years later another Turkish army burst into the Peloponnesus. This
time Gardiki and several other places were ruined. Finally, in 1464,
for the third time, the destructive rage of the invaders was aimed
at the Peloponnesus. That was when the Ottomans battled the Venetians
and leveled the city of Argos to its foundations. [16]

Notes [1] Michael the Syrian, Chronique de Michel Le Syrien, Paris,
1899-1906, Vol. 3 p. 176, French translation by Jean-Baptiste Chabot;
English translation in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity
Under Islam, pp. 170-171.

[2] Michael the Syrian, Chronique, Vol. 3 p. 176; English translation
in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam,
Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1996, p. 55.

[3] See the numerous primary sources cited in each of: Dimitar Angelov,
“Certains Aspects de la Conquete Des Peuples Balkaniques par les Turcs”
Byzantinoslavica, 1956, Vol. 17, pp. 220-275. English translation in,
A.G. Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad, Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2005, pp. 462-517; Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos.

Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period, 1204-1461. New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970.; Speros
Vryonis. The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the
Process of Islamization from the Elevemth through the Fifteenth
Century, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971 (Paperback,
1986).

[4] Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam, p.

55-56.

[5] Paul Wittek. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. London, The Royal
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1938 (reprinted 1966),
p. 18.

[6] Speros Vryonis. “Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor” ,
Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol.29, 1975, p. 49.

[7] Vryonis, “Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor”, p. 49
[8] Paul Wittek. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. London, p. 14.

Wittek (also p. 14) includes this discussion, with a block quote from
Ahmedi’s text, The chapter Ahmedi devotes in his Iskender-name to the
history of the Ottoman sultans, the ancestors of his protector Sulayman
Tshelebi, son of Bayazid I, begins with an introduction in which the
poet solemnly declares his intention of writing a Ghazawat-name,
a book about the holy war of the Ghazis. He poses the question”
“Why have the Ghazis appeared at last?” And he answers: “Because the
best always comes at the end. Just as the definitive prophet Mohammed
came after the others, just as the Koran came down from heaven after
the Torah, the Psalms and the Gospels, so also the Ghazis appeared
in the world at the last, ” those Ghazis the reign of whom is that of
the Ottomans. The poet continues with this question: “Who is a Ghazi?”.

And he explains: “A Ghazi is the instrument of the religion of Allah,
a servant of God who purifies the earth from the filth of polytheism
(remember that Islam regards the Trinity of the Christians as a
polytheism); the Ghazi is the sword of God, he is the protector and
refuge of the believers. If he becomes a martyr in the ways of God,
do not believe that he has died- he lives in beatitude with Allah,
he has eternal life”.

[9] Halil Inalcik. The Ottoman Empire-The Classical Age, 1300-1600,
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973, p. 6.

[10] Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period,
p.66.

[11] Speros Vryonis. “The Experience of Christians under Seljuk and
Ottoman Domination, Eleventh to Sixteenth Century”, in Conversion and
Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic lands, Eighth
to Eighteenth Centuries, edited by Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran
Bikhazi, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990, p.

201 [12] Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine
Period, pp. 61-62.

[13] Angelov, “Certains Aspects de la Conquete Des Peuples Balkaniques
par les Turcs”, pp. 220-275; Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation-
The Byzantine Period, pp. 69-85.

[14] Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period,
p. 77.

[15] Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period,
p. 73.

[16] Angelov, “Certains Aspects de la Conquete Des Peuples Balkaniques
par les Turcs”, pp. 236, 238-239

Dr. Bostom is an Associate Professor of Medicine, and the author of
the forthcoming The Legacy of Jihad, on Prometheus Books (2005).

WILL THEY OR WON’T THEY? THE FUTURE OF TURKEY AND EUROPE.

The National Review
Oct 14 2005

On October 3, Turkish and European Union officials will sit down in
Brussels to begin negotiating Turkey’s accession to the European
Union. The day marks a new chapter in Ankara’s decades-long quest
to join Europe. Turkey first applied for membership in the European
Economic Community in September 1959. It achieved association status
four years later. But the European Community rejected its application
for full membership in December 1989. In 1993, the European Union
member states agreed upon the Copenhagen criteria to define the
prerequisites for membership. Few thought Ankara would pass the bar.

But, to the surprise of many European politicians, their Turkish
counterparts pushed through unprecedented economic and structural
reform to meet the criteria. In August 2002, for example, the
Turkish parliament agreed to abolish the death penalty and permit
Kurdish-language broadcasts. In July 2003, the Turkish parliament
pushed through an additional reform package diluting the political
influence of the military. The August 2004 appointment of Mehmet Yigit
Alpogan to head the National Security Council cemented a fundamental
change in Turkish politics.

Empty Populism…

Still, some European politicians seek to prevent Turkish membership.

Many make populist arguments. Former French President Valery Giscard
d’Estaing, for example, said that including Turkey in the European
Union “would be the end of Europe.” For much the same reason,
European Union foreign ministers entered yesterday into emergency
caucus in Luxembourg to discuss last-minute Austrian objections to the
consideration of full-membership for Turkey. As one Dutch politician
hostile to Turkish membership said to me in May 2005, “The question
of whether Turkey belongs in Europe was settled in 1683 [when the
Hapsburgs repelled the Ottomans at Vienna].” Beneath the thin veneer of
the European-identity argument is a deep-seeded but seldom acknowledged
belief among the European elite that Muslims cannot be fully European.

Rather than confront the question of whether Turkey is European –
and what European identity actually means – many European politicians
have used side issues to undercut Turkey’s membership drive. On
December 15, 2004, for example, the European parliament passed
three amendments calling upon Turkey to acknowledge that the Ottoman
Empire had committed genocide against the Armenian people. The debate
over issues that predate Turkey’s establishment has become one of
original sin. While historians do not dispute the deaths of hundreds
of thousands of Armenians during World War I, the historical record
about the role of the Ottoman Empire’s Young Turks is far murkier
than many European politicians acknowledge.

Some European politicians and both European and American
nongovernmental organizations use human-rights concerns as a stick
with which to beat Turkey. Most often, they argue that Turkey relegates
its ethnic minorities to second-class status.

Actually, it is often the other way around. Kurdish citizens of Turkey
who accept the constitutional and the legal basis of the Turkish state
face little if any discrimination. Kurds have risen to the highest
levels of state. Ismet Inolu, Ataturk’s successor and president from
1938 to 1950, was Kurdish. Likewise, Turgat Ozal, president from 1989
to 1993, was part Kurdish. Hikmet Cetin, foreign minister between 1991
and 1994, was a Kurd. The same opportunities do not exist elsewhere
in the European Union. As Washington Institute analyst Soner Cagaptay
has pointed out, in European Union member Latvia, those who do not
pass Latvian language tests cannot vote and do not receive passports.

European sentiment toward Ankara’s treatment of its Kurdish minority
has been colored by many Europeans’ stance toward the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK). European leftists too often assume that any group to
be legitimate if it claims to be a liberation movement. The PKK does
not represent Turkey’s Kurds, though. Kurds were disproportionately
victims of a PKK terrorist campaign responsible for 30,000 deaths. It
is hard for anyone in Turkey, Kurdish or not, to sympathize with a
group famous for lining up Kurdish elementary-school teachers and
executing them because they worked for the state.

The final populist issue with which some European politicians seek to
derail Turkish membership regards Cyprus. In 1974, Greek-army officers
staged a coup, ousting President Makarios in an attempt to unify Greece
and Cyprus. The Turkish army intervened, effectively dividing island
nation in order to protect its sizeable Turkish minority. Decades
of negotiations and peace talks followed. These culminated in a plan
brokered by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to reunite the island
in a loose federation with minority rights enshrined. In an April
2004 referendum, Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan by a margin of
two-to-one; Greek Cypriots rejected it overwhelmingly. The European
Union’s subsequent decision to recognize the Greek Cypriot leadership
as representative of the island nation and to give the Greek Cypriot
side veto power over Turkish accession rewarded the intransigence
of Greek populists and set back the cause of peace. To demand that
Ankara offer further concession or abandon the Turkish minority would
undercut both peace and justice.

…Obstructs Key Issues Armenians, Kurdish nationalists, and Greek
Cypriots may feel strongly about Turkey. But to shift the goal posts
established in Copenhagen would undercut the European claim to stand
for the supremacy of rule.

The irony of the European populist stance is that for the sake of
crude, anti-Turkish bias, they ignore serious problems which, if
left unaddressed, might undercut not only the health and stability
of Turkey’s democracy, but also that of any future European Union of
which Turkey might be part.

The Justice and Development party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP)
rose to power in November 2002 on a wave of popular dissatisfaction
with economic malaise and corruption scandals within the establishment
parties. While Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has claimed credit
for leading the most recent drive toward Turkish membership in the
European Union, he has undercut the rule of law, separation of powers,
and transparency upon which Turkish democracy was built.

In 2000 and 2001, prior to the AKP’s accession, a currency and
banking crisis nearly caused the Turkish economy’s collapse. The
Turkish Government’s Banking Supervisory and Regulatory Board seized
22 private banks. Many made poor investments with inadequate capital.

Demirbank, for example, bought 90 percent of one issue of government
bonds, and went insolvent as the currency collapsed.

Others like Kent Bank and Pamukbank weathered the storm with minor
hiccups. Nevertheless, in order to prove its seriousness to the
International Monetary Fund, the Turkish government seized the banks.

Mustafa Suzer, chairman of Kent Bank, contested the seizure in Turkey’s
supreme court. He won three successive cases, in December 2003, April
2004, and February 2005. The court ordered the government to return
Suzer’s assets. But Erdogan refused to honor the supreme court’s
ruling. Not only was Suzer closely associated with rival politicians,
but the two had clashed when Erdogan, as mayor of Istanbul, sought
to revise the building permits of a controversial tower already under
construction. Rather than obey the court, Erdogan’s political animus
and vendetta carried the day. He transferred the seized assets to
an Erdogan political ally and retaliated against Suzer with a travel
ban. The case is not isolated.

Turkish concerns which refused to make donations to the AKP now find
themselves targets of criminal investigations or, as in the case of
some local branches of U.S. companies, multimillion-dollar tax levies.

As serious as Erdogan’s abuse of power, has been his attempts to
eviscerate the independence of the judiciary. In 2003, the AKP
proposed lowering the mandatory retirement age of public servants
from 65 to 61. In effect, this means that prior to the next election,
Erdogan can replace 4,000 of the existing 9,000 judges and public
prosecutors. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed the bill, but Erdogan,
who as mayor of Istanbul compared democracy to a streetcar – “You
ride it until you arrive at your destination, then you step off” –
directed his party to override the veto. The law (No. 4827) amounts to
an AKP autogolpe that will impact the Turkish state for years to come.

The retirement controversy is part of a larger pattern of the AKP’s
disdain for judicial checks and balances. In May 2005, frustrated
at the constitutional court’s willingness to veto unconstitutional
legislation, Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, an AKP member,
suggested that the party could use its parliamentary majority to
amend the constitution and abolish the court.

In a democratic system of checks and balances, an independent judiciary
is one check on abuse of power. An independent media is another. Here
too Erdogan’s administration has backpedaled. The Turkish prime
minister has sued a number of political cartoonists. In one case, he
filed a lawsuit against a prominent cartoonist who depicted Erdogan
as a cat entangled in a ball of yarn.

After I raised questions about the influx of Saudi and other “Green
Money” into Turkey, the prime minister’s chief adviser told a Turkish
newspaper that rather than answer any questions raised, he would sue
me. His statement was bluster. Too many Turkish journalists picked up
the story and demanded answers. While he could not and did not act –
Turkish reporters said that his threats were part of an increasing
trend of debate suppression, government opacity, and intimidation.

Turkish media outlets are particularly vulnerable to government
pressure. Many are owned by larger conglomerates. Journalists say
they must self-censor government criticism for fear that Erdogan
may retaliate against other television station and newspaper owners’
non-media companies.

Should Turkey Join the European Union?

Turkey has come a long way. Generations of Turkish politicians spanning
parties and philosophies have worked to tie Turkey to Europe. While
Germany and France seek exemptions from their own financial policy
commitments, Turkish politicians have pushed through much more
substantial structural reforms. The tendency of European politicians to
find any excuse to condemn Turkish policy, even while turning a blind
eye toward similar more egregious actions by European Union members,
reflects poorly on the principles for which Europe claims to stand.

Turkey should join the European Union. It is unfortunate, therefore,
to see the AKP increasingly take actions which undercut the
anti-corruption values upon which it campaigned. Abuse of power is
never acceptable. The rule of law must remain supreme. While Europe
should not treat Turkey unfairly, neither should the AKP. It would
be a historical tragedy if one party’s fumbles undercut the Turkish
dream. It is time for Turkey to move forward.

– Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute is editor of the Middle East Quarterly.

CHARLES AZNAVOUR TO GIVE TWO CONCERTS IN MOSCOW

ArmInfo News Agency
Oct 4 2005

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 4. ARMINFO. The world renowned French singer
and composer Charles Aznavour will give two concerts in Moscow’s
Kremlyovsky Palace Oct 4-5, reports ITAR-TASS. This is part of the
world tour he is making to mark his 80th birthday.

Aznavour was born in Paris to an Armenian family. He is a frequent
guest in Russia. He goes there like his own home and loves Moscow
and the Russians.

Aznavour worked with legendary Edith Piaf, Liza Minnelli and many
other world celebrities. He is the author of over 800 songs and the
first singer in Europe to record a platinum disc. The Time has called
Aznavour the best variety singer of XX. Aznavour is not only composer
and singer he is drama and cinema actor. He starred in over 60 films
by world famous directors. Now he is finishing a book of novels and
will soon publish a photo album about his life.

NKR DM REFUTES AZERI MEDIA REPORTS

ArmInfo News Agency
Oct 4 2005

STEPANAKERT, OCTOBER 4. ARMINFO. The press service of the Defence
Ministry of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic has refuted the report
by the Azeri media that an Azeri soldier was killed by the Armenian
armed forces in Karabakh Oct 3.

The press secretary of the DM Senor Asratyan says that the report
is not true and is mere propaganda. “Now that Azerbaijan is to
conduct parliamentary elections the anti-Karabakh rhetoric is getting
increasingly stronger and is aimed at misleading the international
community.” “Karabakh fully meets its commitments to preserve the
cease-fire regime which cannot be said about Azerbaijan,” says
Asratyan.

TURKEY’S BIG TEST

EUPolitix.com, Belgium
Oct 4 2005

Ankara has waited over 40 years to begin entry talks with the EU,
and as it reaches the start line it will need stamina to overcome the
“rigorous” and uncharted terrain that lies ahead.

Turkey faces at least a decade of progress reports and intensive
negotiations as Brussels insists the outcome all hinges on Ankara’s
cooperation.

“The negotiations will be based on Turkey’s own merits and their
pace will depend on Turkey’s progress” in meeting the EU’s political
criteria, officials have stressed.

Whilst the underlying objective of talks is full membership, their
uniquely “open-ended” nature means no outcome can be guaranteed.

The Copenhagen criteria states that if Ankara fails to meet key
conditions it will be offered a partnership, “fully anchored in the
European structures through the strongest possible bond.”

There is also an emergency brake mechanism to suspend negotiations in
case of “a serious and persistent breach of the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Policy issues in the Turkey talks have been broken down into 35 policy
areas or chapters – more than ever before – and the decisions on each
part will require unanimity.

The chapters cover a wide range of issues from food safety to foreign
policy and from free movement of workers to education and culture.

A troubled timeline

November 9 2005 – The European Commission issues its annual progress
report.

Expect tough talk on Turkey’s denial of Armenian genocide, human
rights progress and the criminal justice system.

Earlier this month, slammed the “deplorable provocation” of Turkish
judges for banning a meeting on the massacre of Armenians.

The commission warned Turkey its decision to ban an academic conference
would be noted in its annual situation report.

“The decision will be reflected in the regular report that the
commission will release on November 9,” a commission spokeswoman said.

“We strongly deplore this decision to stop the Turkish people from
discussing their history.”

January 1 2006 – Austria takes over EU presidency With an overtly
hostile Vienna steering negotiations, Ankara can expect a testing
six months.

Vienna’s insistence on less than full membership for Turkey, lead to
a troubled week of brinkmanship ahead of entry negotiations.

“We need an alternative that would ensure Turkey would remain bonded
as strongly as possible to the EU,” Austrian Chancellor, Wolfgang
Schussel insisted.

Opinion polls show 75 per cent of 15-24 year-olds opposed to Turkish
membership; rising to 82 per cent among people over 55. This is the
highest No rating in the EU.

Historical antagonism towards Turkish Ottoman imperialism combines
with modern day fears of incorporating a Muslim nation.

On current projections Turkey would be the biggest and poorest member
state if it entered the EU in ten years time.

The prospect of losing bargaining power to an impoverished Muslim
state troubles Vienna, (not to mention Paris and Berlin.)

March / April 2006 – Commission likely to end initial screening process
with proposals to begin negotiations in non-controversial areas such
as education and culture.

During 2006 – Cyprus likely to demand Turkey opens its ports to Cypriot
vessels before any specific negotiations on the 35 chapters can begin.

MEPs from across the political spectrum have backed up these demands
in recent weeks – pressing for a tight deadline on customs union – and
an ultimatum to recognise Nicosia by 2006, or the termination of talks.

“During the negotiations, recognition of Cyprus must take place,”
Socialist leader Martin Schultz told MEPs in Strasbourg last week.

“That cannot be at the end of the negotiations. It must take place
immediately, within the first one or two years. If there is no
recognition of Cyprus, the accession negotiations must be broken off.”

2007- 08 – The commission likely to propose the opening of the chapter
on the judiciary and fundamental rights.

Turkey will have to work hard to prove itself in these areas.

EU-harmonization reforms focus on a handful of key areas – Removing
regulations that contribute to impunity for torture, abolition
of the crime of spreading separatist propaganda, lifting of press
restrictions, the end of incommunicado detention and the right to
immediate legal counsel for State Security Court detainees.

Last year Amnesty International found, “Reports of torture and
ill-treatment in police detention and disproportionate use of force
against demonstrators continued to be matters of grave concern,
although the use of some torture methods appeared to diminish.”

2015 or later – If EU membership is offered to Turkey, France is
obliged to hold a referendum on the deal.

In September last year France’s then finance minister, Nicolas Sarkozy
convinced President Chirac to offer a referendum on Turkish entry.

Sarkozy does not disguise his anti-Turkey stance and pitted himself
against the French President to secure a referendum on the issue.

According to recent polls, only 20 per cent of French says Yes to
Turkey joining.

The even more sceptical Austria has also promised a referendum.