THE DAILY TELEGRAPH(LONDON)
June 24, 2004, Thursday

Then there was one

By Malcolm Pein

DESPITE a valiant effort to unsettle his opponent, Nigel Short was
eliminated by Michal Krasenkow in the second round of the Fide
Knockout Championships at Tripoli.

English hopes now rest with Michael Adams, who looked impressive as
he defeated the dangerous Armenian player Karen Asrian with the white
pieces to go through 1.5-0.5. Adams looks to have a great chance as
some of the stronger players from his half of the draw either did not
show or have been eliminated.

The draw for the last 32 is: Top half: Topalov (Bul) – Movsesian
(Svk); Rublevsky (Rus) – Kozul (Cro); Mamedyarov (Aze) – Nisipeanu
(Rom); Kharlov (Rus) – Leitao (Bra); Filippov (Rus) – Grischuk (Rus);
Anastasian (Arm) – Beliavsky (Slo); Ivanchuk (Ukr) – Kasimdzhanov
(Uzb); Almasi (Hun) – Ye (Chn). Bottom half: Aronian (Arm) – Smirnov
(Rus); Bacrot (Fra) – Radjabov (Aze); Dominguez (Cub) – Tkachiev
(Fra); Sakaev (Rus) – Dreev (Rus); Adams (Eng) – Hamdouchi (Mar);
Nakamura (USA) – Lastin (Rus); Zvjaginsev (Rus) – Krasenkow (Pol);
Akopian (Arm) – Moiseenko (Ukr).

The youngest player left in the competition is the American Hikaru
Nakamura, 16, who eliminated Alexey Aleksandrov of Belarus, a tough
competitor in knockout competitions. Nakamura showed some cool nerves
to eliminate Russian GM Sergey Volkov in a first round tie-break
against Alexandrov, who was ground down in a drawn endgame after 71
moves. Needing a draw in the return, Nakamura produced some
fireworks. 7.g4 is favoured by Kasparov, who has used it against the
computer Deep Junior, if 7Nxg4 8.Rg1. 13.a3 does not look in the
spirit of the variation – 13.0-0-0 !?; 17Rhe8 was also possible, the
white king looks vulnerable on e1. If 24.Kf1 Qb5+ 25.Kg2 Nxe3+!!
26.fxe3 Qxb2+ 27.Kf1 Qxa1+ winning the house; if 27.Kh1 Bf3+ and
mate.

A Aleksandrov – H Nakamura

Fide KO Tripoli (2.2)

Semi Slav Shabalov Variation

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 Nc3 Nf6 4 e3 e6 5 Nf3 Nbd7 6 Qc2 Bd6 7 g4 dxc4 8
Bxc4 e5 9 g5 Nd5 10 Ne4 Bb4+ 11 Bd2 Bxd2+ 12 Qxd2 Qe7 13 a3 N7b6 14
Ba2 Bh3 15 Rg1 exd4 16 Qxd4 0-0-0 17 Ng3 f5 18 gxf6 Nxf6 19 Qb4 Qd7
20 Ne5 Qc7 21 Nf7 Nbd5 22 Qh4 Bg4!! 23 Nxd8 Qa5+ 24 b4 Qxa3 25 Kf1
Qd3+ 26 Kg2 Nxe3+! 27 fxe3 Qc2+ 28 Kf1 Qd3+ 29 Kg2 draw

Nakamura
p ) l p 7 o c p p o c p c p m p p p p p n p p – f p p Y n l

A p p p X n

6 p p 6

Aleksandrov

Final position after 29.Kg2

David Howell is performing well at the second Young Stars of the
World tournament in Kirishi, Russia. He has scored 2/5 so far.

The Independent, UK
June 25, 2004

BOOKS: BUGGED BY THE PAST AMID ISTANBUL’S FLIGHTS OF FANCY

by Alev Adil

The Flea Palace
By Elif Shafak
trans Muge Gocek
MARION BOYARS pounds 9.99 (444pp) pounds 9.99 (free p&p) from 0870
079 8897

Elif Shafak is a young Turkish novelist with a prodigious output: she
is only 33, and The Flea Palace is her fourth novel, with a fifth,
written in English, due later this year. Her literary success and
journalism mark her out as a figurehead of a new generation of
writers, who use literature to reconfigure Turkish identity, and its
relationship to the country’s history.

Shafak was born in France and educated in Spain before returning to
Turkey as a young adult. Thus she has a doubled, and marginalised,
Turkish identity. Perhaps this helps enable her to cast a fresh eye
on modern Turkey, and to celebrate the contradictions and
incoherences that its past has bequeathed to the present. She is free
from many of the modernist literary, and political, orthodoxies that
are part of Kemal Ataturk’s cultural legacy.

Like Georges Perec’s Life: a User’s Manual, The Flea Palace is a
novel constructed around the daily routines of the inhabitants of an
apartment building. Bonbon Palace is a microcosm of contemporary
Istanbul: a city of contrasts and contestations, where both
continents and cultures meet. The old and the new; Orthodox
Christianity, secularism and Islam; the rich and the poor; the East
and West; the ancient and the postmodern – all co-exist in an urban
kaleidoscope.

In a chaotic neighbourhood, on the site of two ancient cemeteries,
one Muslim, the other Armenian, the dilapidated, bug-infested
apartment building is home to a cast of colourful characters. Built
by Pavel Antipov, an aristocratic Russian emigre based in Paris,
Bonbon Palace was a gift for his unstable wife Agripina. This
grandiloquent gesture of reparation for the tragedies the Antipovs
endured during their brief stay in Istanbul in the 1920s failed to
restore Agripina’s sanity. But the block becomes home to many
subsequent tragedies, and comedies too – Shafak’s black humour
ensures the two usually go hand-in-hand.

The weave of disparate narratives about the residents – from Madam
Auntie, the eccentric old lady in the penthouse, down to Musa the
ineffectual caretaker in the basement – has a picaresque charm that
blends the quotidian with a touch of magic realism. This spiral of
stories within stories is organised around a central enigma that
haunts all the residents: a mysterious, intensifying stench of
rubbish, and the attendant plagues of insects that infest the
building.

There are some engaging male inhabitants in Bonbon Palace, including
the twin hairdressers whose salon is a social hub, and the drunken
philosophy lecturer pining for his ex-wife. But the most complex
characters in the novel are women. Despite their strength, they
dissipate their energies in fruitless ways.

Hygiene Tijen makes a compulsive bid to expunge her house of all
bacteria. Nadia, the Russian scientist, carves lamps out of potatoes
to stave off her obsession with her unloving Turkish husband’s
infidelity. The young and beautiful Blue Mistress spends her time
waiting for the olive-oil merchant who keeps her. Jewish Ethel, an
outrageous socialite, expresses her greed for love and life by going
on drunken binges. Female obsession and thwarted desire are at the
heart of the decay that haunts the building – although it is male
indiscretion that leads to the tragic denouement.

Alev Adil’s latest collection of poems is Venus Infers’ (NE Publications)
From: Baghdasarian

The Independent
June 25, 2004

BOOKS: AN ACCIDENTAL HERO RETURNS

by Boyd Tonkin

Painted in a strident maroon, with running-boards worthy of a
gangster flick, the 1947 Ford Pilot buzzes down the quiet midsummer
roads of south Norfolk like a hummingbird across a cowslip meadow.
Somehow, Louis de Bernieres’ choice of vehicle fits his persona, and
his fiction. It’s colourful, idiosyncratic, out-of-time, but sturdy
and resilient. We’re on the way back to the rail station nearest to
the slowly renovated former rectory where he lives with his partner,
Cathy, an actress and director, when he mentions an emotional storm
that struck in his late twenties. This turning-point made the young
teacher – heartbroken by a failed affair, stressed-out by his job –
think again about the prospect of a literary career.

Or, rather, he says that in that crucible of crisis, he “remembered
that I wanted to be a writer”. So a novelist’s progress that has
thrilled and delighted armies of readers around the globe comes to
sound like a minor errand recollected on a whim. In the de Bernieres
universe, chance and design, the big picture and the foreground
detail, always intersect, always interact.

At the close of his sixth novel, Birds Without Wings (Secker &
Warburg, pounds 17.99), the Muslim potter Iskander reflects on the
tragic expulsion of his Christian neighbours from the home that they
shared on the south-western coast of Turkey until the early 1920s. He
decides that “everything that happened was made to do so by the great
world”.

De Bernieres, you feel, partakes of that suspicion of the “great
world”. Take next week, which contains a momentous day for him. He’s
due to take a Grade Five flute exam. He already plays the clarinet
and oboe, as well as the classical guitar and (yes, of course) the
mandolin, and gigs with an Oxford-based ensemble: “I only have one
track on which I star, which is five minutes of variations on
Greensleeves’.” In his living room, looking out on secluded lawns, a
piano stands ready for musical visitors to accompany him. “To play
with proper musicians, you’ve got be be good enough,” he says.

Something else of note happens next week. This is, of course, the
release of the most eagerly-awaited novel of the year, a full decade
after Captain Corelli’s Mandolin started to pluck the heartstrings of
millions. And so the “great world” beats a path to his tucked-away
door in Norfolk, while its stocky, laid-back target improves his
flute technique and frets about “the publicity machine”. He laments
that, “The funny thing about being a writer is that people find
hundreds of ways of interrupting you, continuously.”

Such as – turning up for interviews and asking questions that focus
on notions of well-planned structure, rather than the serendipity de
Bernieres prefers. Set between 1900 and 1923, Birds Without Wings
traces through its small-town microcosm the dismemberment of the
decadent but tolerant Ottoman Empire, after “the hell’s broth of
religious and nationalist hatred had been stirred up by a multitude
of village Hitlers”. In contrast, says the author, “the thing about
the Ottomans is that they weren’t prodigiously effective oppressors.
As long as you paid your taxes, you were really quite all right.” The
novel celebrates the day-to-day deals of a mongrel Mediterranean
backwater, in which Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Armenians all
rub along.

To trace the demise of this lazy, multi-cultural idyll, it switches
between voices and tones that embody the ramshackle, easy-going world
that new divisions will destroy. We follow the growing-up of
too-beautiful Philothei and the tragic outcome of her betrothal to
the goatherd Ibrahim; the curious menage of the proud landowner,
Rustem Bey, and his concubine, Leyla; the fate of the saintly imam,
Abdulhamid Hodja; and the friends Abdul and Nicos, aka “Blackbird”
and “Robin”, whose answering bird-whistles lend the book an auditory
sign of the ties that bind these vulnerable “birds without wings”. In
Turkey, children still blow these uncannily convincing whistles, one
of which the author fetches to demonstrate – piercingly – for me.

Yet, when I ask de Bernieres about the novel’s cunning architecture,
with its sly shifts of register and mood, he replies that, “Your
question implies a greater degree of self-consciousness than I have.
I just write whatever occurs to me.” He does reveal that he wrote the
opening of the novel long ago, then the end, then filled the middle:
“The book just grew up organically in a rather strange way.”

In his fiction, as in his craft-filled leisure-time of antique motor-
parts and broken instruments, de Bernieres loves what the French call
bricolage: running repairs, on-the-spot fixes, DIY make-do-and-mend.
The hubris of the grand plan repels him, in politics and art.
Suitably enough, the Greek ethnic expansionism of the early 20th
century went by the name of the “Big Idea” – just the kind of thing
that de Bernieres loathes. “I really hate and despise nationalism,”
he affirms. “What other people regard as liberation movements I
regard as really stupid and unnecessary interruptions of a peaceful
life.” Those thuggish interruptors, again.

It was alien nationalism that cursed the Turkish “ghost town” de
Bernieres discovered on holiday in the mid-1990s: a “beautiful,
melancholy place”, whose desolation planted the seed of his novel.
Birds Without Wings paints this remote paradise of mingled blood and
mutual respect, and shows how the nationalist serpent slid into it.
And, in the background, the career of the greatest nationalist of all
unfolds in snappy, newsreel-like scenes: Mustafa Kemal, victor at
Gallipoli, supplanter of the Sultan and, as “Ataturk”, the father of
modern Turkey. “He has a quality of myth about him I didn’t want to
disrupt,” says de Bernieres.

Before the calamity, make-do-and-mend suits the people of the town
down to their harsh but herb-rich ground. That goes for passion as
well as politics. If the doomed devotion of Ibrahim and Philothei
punctuates the book, its unexpected emotional – and erotic – heart
emerges in the blooming tenderness between the stiff squire Rustem
Bey and Leyla: his Greek mistress, bought from a house of ill repute
in Istanbul. De Bernieres has been thinking “about the variety of
human love – the enormous number of ways one can love, or learn to
love. It struck me as possible that a woman who was bought could
learn to love and respect her buyer, and vice versa.”

In counterpoint to the varieties of love, Birds Without Wings
delivers the hideous violence of mechanised warfare. Its 100-page
centrepiece, in which Karatavuk (“Blackbird”) recounts the terror,
squalor and fitful heroism of the Gallipoli campaign, will have
critics reaching for their War and Peace. In truth, de Bernieres (who
learned his craft from the works of Marquez) is too centrifugal and
carnivalesque a novelist for the Tolstoy comparison. However, he
makes of the carnage a mesmerising patchwork of horror, humour and
humanity. “If I can tell it in someone else’s voice,” says the army
officer’s son, and Sandhurst drop-out, of the savagery that haunts
both this novel and Captain Corelli, “it somehow makes it less like
me being obsessed by it.”

Visiting the battle sites, he found their past darkness made all too
visible. “The bones of the corpses come to the surface,” he recalls.
“I found quantities of bones when I was there. You look on the war
memorials and it says, Their name liveth for evermore.’ And you have
this totally anonymous bone in your hand.”

None of the peoples of that fractured region has ever quite buried
the bones of this grim era. So he did “from time to time have the
sense of playing with fire”, even though the novel depicts harmony as
a social norm. “I’m sure there will be Armenians, Greeks and Turks
who are upset by this book,” he says, merrily. “The aim is to upset
them all equally… I think it’s quite possible I’ll be assassinated
at a reading one day. I don’t think it’ll be by a fanatic, but by a
lunatic.”

He guffaws, as he often does. For de Bernieres, heaven can wait.
Indeed, it transpires that this plan-averse improviser has his next
three or four books mapped out, not to mention the flute, the guitars
(and mandolins), the unrestored rooms – and the 1947 Ford Pilot. You
sense that this cheerful busyness brings its own reward. And this is
just the tranquil Eden that, in his novel, the townspeople lose when
the murderous “great world” arrives on their doorstop. May he (and
we) never live in such interesting times.

Biography

LOUIS DE BERNIERES

Louis de Bernieres was born in 1954 to a family of Huguenot descent.
He went to Bradfield School on an army scholarship. Briefly a
Sandhurst cadet, he dropped out to work in Colombia before studying
philosophy at Manchester University. He later became a teacher. The
War of Don Emmanuel’s Nether Parts (1990) was followed by Senor Vivo
and the Coca Lord and The Troublesome Offspring of Cardinal Guzman.
In 1993, he was named as one of Granta’s Best of Young British
novelists. Captain Corelli’s Mandolin (1994) won the Commonwealth
Writers Prize. In the UK , it has sold more than 2.5 million copies.
In 2002, he published Red Dog, a novel for children set in Australia.
Next week, Birds Without Wings appears from Secker & Warburg. He
lives in south Norfolk with his partner.

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 4, No. 24, 24 June 2004

A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics

************************************************************
HEADLINES:
* PUTIN CASTS HIS VOTE FOR BUSH
* ART TRIAL IN RUSSIA SEEN AS TEST OF FREE EXPRESSION
* RUSSIA’S DEFEATED LIBERALS MULL MERGING WITH PARTY
OF POWER
************************************************************

KREMLIN/WHITE HOUSE

PUTIN CASTS HIS VOTE FOR BUSH

By Robert Coalson

President Vladimir Putin caught Russian, U.S., and European
observers off guard on 18 June when he unexpectedly announced that
Russian intelligence services had repeatedly received information
that former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was planning terrorist
attacks against the United States and U.S. interests abroad. In the
ensuing days, Russian commentators have been energetically dissecting
the context of Putin’s statement and speculating on just what the
KGB veteran might be thinking.
Russian media reports were decidedly skeptical about the
veracity and spontaneity of Putin’s remarks. They noted that
almost as soon as the preliminary report of the U.S. commission
investigating the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks was made
public, an anonymous “Russian intelligence source” told Interfax that
“as early as early 2002 Russian intelligence learned that the Iraqi
special services were planning terrorist attacks on the United States
and on U.S. diplomatic and military facilities abroad.”
“Kommersant-Daily” reported on 21 June that the Interfax report was
issued even before the final commission session had ended.
The statement came just as U.S. President George W. Bush was
facing harsh criticism for launching a military operation against
Hussein largely on the basis of arguments from his administration
that the Iraqi leader posed a terrorist threat to the United States.
Journalists and analysts quickly began describing Putin’s
statement as open support for Bush.
“Kommersant-Daily” and “Vremya novostei” on 21 June both
speculated that this low-level support for Bush failed to produce a
sufficient resonance in the West. Therefore, the newspapers wrote, at
a press conference in Astana, Kazakhstan, the Kremlin arranged to
have a reporter ask Putin a completely off-the-wall question about
the U.S. commission’s report. This gave Putin the opportunity to
repeat — almost word for word — the statement from the anonymous
intelligence source that Interfax had reported the previous day.
“Yes, after the events of 11 September 2001 and before the
beginning of the military operation in Iraq, the Russian special
services repeatedly received information that official organs of the
Hussein regime were preparing terrorist attacks on the territory of
the United States and on military and civilian targets outside its
borders,” Putin said. “This information really was transmitted
through cooperative channels to our American colleagues.”
Although Putin was quick to add that Russia’s opposition
to the military operation in Iraq had not changed, his remarks
clearly marked a shift toward the Bush administration’s
positions. “Does this mean that there is reason to argue that the
United States acted in self-defense?” Putin said. “I don’t know.
That is a separate topic.”
Journalists and analysts quickly began describing Putin’s
statement as open support for Bush. Moscow “is looking pragmatically
at the future — at the presidential elections in the United States.
It seems that the Kremlin has made up its mind and is backing Bush,”
“Vremya novostei” wrote. A sampling of leading Russian analysts
published by politcom.ru on 15 June found both that most of them felt
that Bush will win the 4 November election, and that Iraq will be the
most important issue.
But there was considerable skepticism about the veracity of
Putin’s declaration. The press argued that if the U.S.
administration had had such information in the run-up to the military
operation, it would have used it to convince the UN Security Council
to adopt a resolution authorizing the action. Media reports noted
that neither Bush nor Vice President Dick Cheney mentioned such
Russian reports during their testimony before the 11 September
commission. Analyst Boris Vinogradov, writing in “Novye izvestiya” on
21 June, noted that Putin’s statement put German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac — both of whom
have heretofore enjoyed close personal relations with Putin — in an
“idiotic position,” because Putin implied that Russia did not share
this intelligence with its “allies” in the antiwar coalition.
These doubts and others reinforced the impression that the
statement was clearly intended as political support for Bush. And
although there was no shortage of theories about what might be
motivating Putin to make such a transparent gesture now, none of them
seemed entirely convincing.
“Kommersant-Daily” on 21 June noted that the Kremlin
traditionally “finds it much more convenient” to deal with Republican
U.S. administrations than Democratic ones, which “tend to harp too
much on human rights.” Bush, it noted, did not listen to a group of
U.S. congressmen who recently called on the administration to exclude
Russia from the Group of Eight (G-8) leading industrialized
countries. One of the analysts surveyed earlier by politcom.ru,
Strategic Studies Center Director Andrei Piontokovskii, noted in his
assessment of the U.S. election that Democratic challenger Senator
John Kerry has been rumored to be considering asking Republican
Senator John McCain to be his vice presidential candidate and that
McCain was one of the sponsors of the movement to exclude Russia from
the G-8.
Putin’s comments about Hussein lent added significance to
his many statements in support of Bush at the G-8 summit in the
United States earlier this month. At that time, Putin congratulated
Bush for the turnaround of the U.S. economy and said that the
Democrats “don’t have the moral right to attack George Bush for
Iraq since they themselves did the same thing [in Yugoslavia in
1999].”
“Kommersant-Daily” also attached significance to the fact
that Putin made his statement while meeting with Central Asian
leaders. Part of Putin’s message, the daily commented, was to
demonstrate that Russia is an equal partner with the United States in
the struggle against international terrorism and “to show who is the
most important in the CIS.”
“Nezavisimaya gazeta” on 22 June speculated that Putin might
be giving Bush a hand regarding “Saddam’s terror” in order “to
get Washington’s support against ‘Chechen terror.'” It
added as well that Putin’s support might enable him to bargain
for “a special role” in post-Hussein Iraq. The daily connected
Putin’s statement and his purported desire for Western
understanding regarding Chechnya with an unsubstantiated 20 June
report in the Italian daily “La Repubblica” that some 300 Chechen
fighters have appeared in Iraq to support Iraqi insurgents.
Finally, Kremlin-connected political consultant Stanislav
Belkovskii told APN on the day of Putin’s Astana comments that
Kremlin wants the United States to pressure Qatar to release the two
Russian secret-service agents currently on trial there for the
February assassination of former acting Chechen President Zelimkhan
Yandarbiev. “It is possible that Vladimir Putin’s support of U.S.
President George Bush was a condition for the Americans help in
return in solving the ‘Qatar problem,'” Belkovskii said.
Although analysts were at a loss to come up with a definitive
explanation of Putin’s comments, they were unanimous in viewing
them as an extraordinary and potentially momentous step, possibly as
important as Putin’s fabled telephone call to Bush immediately
following the 11 September 2001 attacks. In the months after those
attacks, Bush repeatedly reminded the world that Putin was the first
global leader to express his solidarity with the United States, and
those months marked the high point of U.S.-Russian relations since
Bush became president.

CIVIL SOCIETY

STATE AND CHURCH. As the trial of the curator of Moscow’s
Sakharov Museum and the organizer of an exhibition on the role of
religion in modern society continues this week (see story below), new
attention has focused on the increasingly prominent role of the
Russian Orthodox Church. However, experts on religion in Russia
suggest that while the church’s public profile was raised during
President Vladimir Putin’s first term, its already limited
political independence is diminishing even further.
On the one hand, the Russian Orthodox Church has managed to
sign a series of agreements with various state organs at the federal
and local levels over the past seven years, gaining new access to
state institutions, such as prisons and military installations.
Orthodox chapels have been opened at train stations and airports. On
the other hand, the church has not secured some key items on its
agenda. For example, a school course on the foundations of Orthodoxy
has not yet been established, although church officials first raised
the issue with the Education Ministry in 1999. The church has also
lost key battles over tax reform and the restitution of church land
and property confiscated by the Soviet regime.
In an overview of how Putin has handled cooperation with the
Patriarchate during his first term, “Vremya novostei” on 4 March
concluded that despite the fact that Putin is himself Russian
Orthodox, he has not personally supported the issues that the church
has been lobbying. The daily argued that Putin has set the right tone
for the rest of government officialdom by observing the
constitutionally established separation of church and state.
Lawrence Uzzell, president of the International Religious
Freedom Watch, takes a slightly different view. He argues that while
the state might not be serving the church’s agenda, the church —
like other civil-society institutions — is in danger of being
co-opted to the service of the state’s agenda. Writing in “First
Things: The Journal of Religion and Public Life” on 4 May, Uzzell
suggested that Putin’s regime is “reviving the old habit of
treating every social institution as if it were an extension of the
state.” He recounts how at the beginning of the year, Old Believer
priests from across the country were summoned to visit the local
headquarters of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in their regions.
FSB officials asked the priests whom they were going to support at a
February council meeting, at which a new head of the Old Believer
sect was to be elected.
Uzzell told RFE/RL that “since the leading metropolitans and
bishops were not willing to criticize [former President] Boris
Yeltsin’s war on Chechnya and other policies even when Yeltsin
was deeply unpopular, it is not likely that they will suddenly begin
to defy a president who is genuinely popular and who has tighter
control of the news media and other key institutions than any Russian
or Soviet leader since the 1980s.” He concludes that the threat to
civil society is all too real — not because the church is swallowing
the state, but vice versa.
This week, “RFE/RL Political Weekly” spoke with Uzzell and
Geraldine Fagan, the Moscow correspondent for the Forum 18 News
Service about the role of the Russian Orthodox Church under Putin.
(Julie A. Corwin)

INTERVIEW

RFE/RL: How has the role of the Russian Orthodox Church
changed under the Putin regime? The church seems to have a higher
public profile now, but is that all there is to it? Or has there been
a deepening of the church-state partnership?
FAGAN: Symbolism aside, not much has been done in favor of
the church on the federal level under Putin — the church is very
unhappy about the new Tax and Land codes, for instance. Although the
security services have been far more active in limiting the activity
of foreign missionaries than under Yeltsin, and there is a passage to
this effect in the national security doctrine, which was one of the
first things Putin signed as acting president in 2000. Strictly
speaking, this [activity] does not concern the role of the church
directly. Also, the federal authorities have been noticeably reticent
in coming out in support of the church’s main demands —
particularly the introduction of a course called the Foundations of
Orthodox Culture in state schools. However, many regional authorities
and some government ministries have continued to form their own close
links with the church — even to a degree that is clearly
anticonstitutional — but it is anyone’s guess whether this is
allowed to take place because (a) Putin actually approves of it but
doesn’t want to show it, (b) he is powerless to stop it, or (c)
he doesn’t particularly care, as it is not that important.
UZZELL: The Moscow Patriarchate actually has less political
clout now than it did in the 1990s. On 4 March, the website for
“Vremya novostei” [] published an excellent
summary by Aleksandr Morozov, who wrote that on a whole series of
issues the advocates of “clericalism” have suffered defeats or have
at least been neutralized. The Foundations of Orthodox Culture course
has not become a mandatory part of the school curriculum. The Culture
and Mass Communications Ministry has won the debate over ownership of
church valuables confiscated by the Soviet state. The Patriarchate
continues to be frustrated in its quest for the quick, massive return
of its pre-Soviet real-estate holdings. And the introduction of
military chaplains in the army is not even on the agenda.
The state’s unwillingness to enact the Moscow
Patriarchate’s agenda has not at all diminished the
Patriarchate’s willingness to serve as the state’s docile,
obedient agent. As far as one can judge from its public statements
and actions, the Patriarchate is content to accept that role — as
are the other mainstream, “traditional” religious organizations. For
example, the nature of Russia’s March 2004 presidential election
was such that calling on citizens to vote — which under other
circumstances might be seen simply as a neutral call for them to do
their civic duty — was in effect an endorsement of Putin. The Moscow
Patriarchate gladly provided that endorsement the week before the
election, with its spokesman Father Vsevolod Chaplin declaring that
“every person must remember about his responsibility for the
country’s destiny, for its choice of a correct historical path to
follow.” Similarly, from Rabbi Berl Lazar — the Putin-favored
claimant to the disputed title of Russia’s chief rabbi — came
the statement that “participation in democratic elections is not only
a man’s right, but first of all the fulfillment of God’s
commandment.” [Both quoted by RIA-Novosti, March 11, 2004.] One
cannot even imagine today’s Moscow Patriarchate challenging Putin
on moral/political issues that the latter really considers important,
such as military atrocities in Chechnya.
RFE/RL: Has the Kremlin found a potential successor for
Patriarch Aleksii II? Or do different parts of the Kremlin support
different parts of the church? Who is Archimandrite Tikhon and what
role does he play in relations between the Kremlin and Patriarchate?
FAGAN: At the moment, the issue of a potential successor for
Patriarch Aleksii is actually less clear than it ever was!
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad has long been the
most influential Russian Orthodox hierarch after the patriarch and
Aleksii’s obvious successor. While Kirill might turn out to be
content with just “being patriarch” if he were to succeed Aleksii,
the Kremlin would probably prefer someone more pliable, as Kirill has
so far proved unpredictable and independent-minded. I am not
convinced that anyone in the Kremlin would be so concerned by this
that they would go to great lengths to interfere though (although
there are currently a few rumors circulating to this effect),
especially as it is uncertain how long Aleksii will remain in place,
and two of the few other serious candidates, Metropolitan Mefodii and
Metropolitan Sergii, recently lost their power bases.
Archimandrite Tikhon is the energetic youngish abbot of a
Moscow monastery that has attracted many novices in the 10 years
since it was refounded. Being less Sovietized than many of the
hierarchs, Tikhon finds a natural rapport with the Russian Orthodox
Church Abroad, and has therefore been prominent in the recent
meetings with them. He was rumored to be Putin’s spiritual father
a couple of years ago, but although they are certainly well
acquainted, I am not aware of anything to substantiate any closer
tie. Tikhon’s major sponsor is the patriotic [Mezhprombank head]
Sergei Pugachev — you may want to draw some political conclusions
from that….
UZZELL: My best guess is that the Kremlin will keep its
options open and will intervene decisively when the time is ripe, in
such a way that Aleksii’s successor will feel himself deeply
beholden to the Kremlin.
I agree with Aleksandr Soldatov, who wrote in “Moskovskie
novosti” on 21 January that, “Father Tikhon is a consistent,
traditional statist who ideally would not be at all opposed if the
sovereign emperor were once again to become head of the Church.” He
has faithfully served the state’s interests by calming hysteria
among Orthodox fringe elements over being assigned tax identification
numbers (INN). Tikhon visited the influential so-called all-Russian
elder Father Ioann Krestyankin of the Pskov-Pechorskii Monastery, who
had been among those calling the INN dangerous to the soul, and
persuaded him to make a statement that the INN was not a threat. A
videotape of that statement was widely distributed in the
ultra-Orthodox subculture.
It was also telling that Tikhon, a mere archimandrite of a
monastery, rather than a high-ranking bishop such as Kirill,
accompanied Putin to New York last year for his crucial meeting with
Metropolitan Lavreof the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. Given the
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad’s long record of criticizing the
Moscow Patriarchate for “Sergianstvo” — excessive servility to the
Soviet regime — it is ironic that Tikhon is an even franker
apologist than Aleksii or Kirill for the Patriarchate’s record
under Stalin. His monastery recently published a book glorifying
Patriarch Sergii’s role during the Stalin years and calling for
his canonization.
RFE/RL: Some analysts seem to believe that Putin has been
careful not to tie himself to church too overtly, do you agree?
FAGAN: Basically, yes. He has been careful not to tie himself
with the hierarchy by appearing at the major functions — Easter and
Christmas at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior — only occasionally.
Doing things like making a pilgrimage to the Solovetskii Monastery
and spending Christmas at an ordinary church in Suzdal — after which
he extolled its “real parish” atmosphere to the patriarch on
television speaks volumes. Putin emphasizes his personal ties with
Orthodoxy as a faith, rather than with the Moscow Patriarchate as a
structure. I also think he projects a slight awkwardness in church
situations, which should appeal to the majority of Russian citizens
who say they are Orthodox, but don’t actually know what it’s
about.
UZZELL: Yes. I think it is interesting that he so often does
his “Orthodox photo-ops” for big holidays such as Christmas and
Easter at places such as provincial monasteries rather than standing
alongside the Patriarch in Moscow. His approach seems calculated to
appeal to the majority of ethnic Russians, who in some vague sense
identify themselves as “Orthodox,” who feel instinctive affection for
and loyalty to the Church, but who want to keep it at a comfortable
distance from their lives.
RFE/RL: Why has Putin tried to mend fences between the
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the Moscow Patriarchate? And why
has he tried to act as peacemaker between the Patriarchate and the
Vatican?
FAGAN: Both are important symbolically. If the Russian
Orthodox Church Abroad joined with the Moscow Patriarchate, it would
suggest that modern Russia has gotten over its Soviet past. If the
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad — which has preserved a deep devotion
to the murdered royal family — openly trusts Putin and acknowledges
his leadership, this enhances his historical legitimacy as ruler. If
a papal visit to Russia ever became possible, it would demonstrate
Russia’s openness to the West, and so increase the West’s
confidence in Russia as a “normal” country, which is also desirable
from the Kremlin’s point of view.
UZZELL: I agree with Mikhail Pozdnyaev, who wrote for “Novye
izvestiya” on 16 December 2003 that “for both the Moscow Patriarchate
and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, and also for the president of
the Russian Federation, the main argument in favor of reunification
is that if our motherland is a super state, it should have a super
church. Just as in the 1970s, the foreign parishes of the Moscow
Patriarchate served as centers of foreign intelligence, so tomorrow
the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad could become an outpost of Russian
geopolitics. Its churches could become something of a fifth column.”
I’m not convinced that Putin is really trying to be a
“peacemaker” with the Vatican. He just wants to look like one. Putin
wants good relations with Western governments for the sake of a broad
range of political and economic goals, and the Vatican is too
important to be ignored. It helps if he can present a civilized face
to the Vatican and to the West in general while leaving faceless
bureaucrats to do the dirty work of denying visas, etc.

TIMELINE: PRESIDENT PUTIN AND THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

11 June 2004: Putin presents Patriarch Aleksii with the
order For Services to the Fatherland, 1st class
23 November 2003: Putin and Aleksii meet with the religious
leaders of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan at the Novo-Ogarevo
presidential residence
5 November 2003: Putin meets with Pope John Paul II at the
Vatican
15 October 2003: Putin meets with Aleksii at the presidential
residence in Novo-Ogarevo.
25 September 2003: Putin meets with leader of Russian
Orthodox Church Abroad Metropolitan Lavre in New York
31 July 2003: Putin attends ceremony marking the 100th
anniversary of the canonization of St. Serafim in Sarov, Nizhnii
Novogorod Oblast
10 May 2003: Putin visits Aleksii at his residence at
Peredelkino
24 January 2003: Putin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma
attend a Russian Orthodox Church Service in Kyiv
22 January 2003: Putin meets with Aleksii and Bulgarian
Orthodox church leader Patriarch Ignatios IV of Antioch and All the
East at the Kremlin
31 December 2002: Aleksii confers upon Putin the highest
church award for laymen — the Order of St. Prince Vladimir,
Equal-to-the-Apostles, for the president’s services to the
Fatherland and in connection with his 50th birthday
29 May 2002: Putin signs into law amendments to the Tax Code
exempting religious organizations from paying taxes on income
received while conducting worship
6 January 2002: Putin makes a short Christmas pilgrimage to
Orthodox holy places, including the Cathedral of the Transfiguration
of the Savior in Pereslavl-Zalesskii, the Cathedral of the Assumption
in Vladimir, and the Chernoostrovkii Convent in Malayaroslavets
8 May 2001: Putin meets in the Kremlin with Aleksii and
Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens and All Greece
11 April 2001: Putin decorates Metropolitan Kirill of
Smolensk and Kaliningrad, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s
Department for External Church Relations, with the Order of Merit
24 November 2000: Putin and Aleksii meet in the Kremlin with
the religious leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan
7 May 2000: Aleksii blesses Putin at the Cathedral of the
Annunciation in the Kremlin immediately after the presidential
inauguration
(Sources: , “National Catholic Reporter,”
“RFE/RL Newsline”)

ART TRIAL IN RUSSIA SEEN AS TEST OF FREE EXPRESSION. The Russian
Constitution states that Russia is a secular country, with no
state-sponsored religion. But many observers point to the
increasingly prominent role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in
public life as evidence that some would like to see this changed.
Now, a trial in Moscow is focusing the spotlight on the issue
of freedom of expression, Russian ethnicity and the role of the state
in religion and cultural matters. The case pits the
Prosecutor-General’s Office against three human rights activists
charged with inciting religious and ethnic hatred for organizing a
modern art exhibition titled “Caution, Religion.”
The exhibition, which was hosted by Moscow’s Andrei
Sakharov Museum and Social Center, featured 42 artworks by 42 artists
— some of them controversial, but all intended to provoke discussion
about the role of religion in modern society, according to the
curators. One work featured Jesus’s face drawn on a Coca-Cola
logo next to the words “This Is My Blood.”
Just four days after the exhibition opened last year, six
vandals destroyed several of the pieces, smearing graffiti on the
museum’s walls that accused museum workers of being “Orthodox
haters.” The museum sued the men, but lost the case when a Moscow
court ruled that their actions were justified because their religious
sensibilities had been offended.
Now, prosecutors have turned the tables by charging Sakharov
Center Director Yurii Samodurov, exhibition organizer Lyudmila
Vasilovskaya, and artist Anna Mikhalchuk under Article 282 of the
Russian Criminal Code. The article outlaws actions that “incite
ethnic, racial, or religious hatred.”
The prosecutor, speaking at the trial’s opening on 15
June, said the exhibition “insulted and humiliated the national
dignity of a great number of believers.” The three could face up to
five years’ imprisonment if convicted.
Democracy groups have expressed outrage over the prosecutor.
The Sakharov Center posted an open letter on the Internet that
recalls the center’s advocacy work for human rights, including
work on cases involving issues of religious freedom.
Samodurov told the court 15 June that the exhibition’s
message has been twisted and misunderstood by its detractors: “The
name of the exhibition, ‘Caution: Religion,’ has two
meanings. It is a call for people to take care of religion, to
respect it and respect believers, and also a warning sign when we are
dealing with religious fundamentalism, whether it be Islamic
fundamentalism or Orthodox fundamentalism. None of the materials
presented contained any other message, so I do not understand why we
are accused of the motives mentioned by the prosecutor.”
Others, such as activist Lev Ponomarev, head of the NGO For
Human Rights, say the trial has only served to confirm the
exhibition’s warning about the dangers of fundamentalism and of
politicizing religion. He noted that prosecutors brought the charges
against the Sakharov Center staffers after receiving thousands of
petitions collected by ultraconservative members of the Orthodox
Church. Their aim, he said, is to turn Russia into an explicitly
Orthodox country, an ambition that contradicts the constitution. That
the state is helping them further this ideology is something he finds
deeply disturbing. “This would be laughable if it weren’t so
sad,” he said. “Radical elements in the church want our state to
become Orthodox, even though our constitution forbids this.”
Defense lawyer Yurii Shmidt says he hopes the judge in the
case will be guided by Russia’s constitution and uphold the
freedom of expression it guarantees, as well as the secular nature of
the Russian state. He cautions against linking Orthodoxy with Russian
ethnicity, as the prosecution has done in the charges it has brought.
“This case concerns fundamental human rights,” Shmidt told RFE/RL. “I
have no doubt that it will turn into a huge mark of shame for Russia
if a guilty verdict is rendered.”
That is not the view of the Russian Orthodox Church
hierarchy. Father Mikhail Dudko of the church’s department for
external relations told RFE/RL that the church is not responsible for
the case, and he rejects accusations by those who see the trial as an
attempt by the Orthodox clergy to score political points. “The trial
of the museum workers has not come at our initiative,” Dudko said.
“It is the initiative of the prosecutor’s office and this cannot
be interpreted as a trial of the church versus the Sakharov Museum.
It is a trial of the state versus the Sakharov Museum.”
Nevertheless, Dudko makes no secret that the church hierarchy
does not object to the trial, having been deeply offended by the
exhibition. A guilty verdict, he implies, might not be a bad thing.
“Of course, [the exhibition] offended us and it offended us deeply,”
Dudko said. “Of course, we believe that something similar must not
occur again. But I repeat that a state that tries to promote harmony
in religious affairs, that tries to ensure that all citizens —
regardless of faith — feel comfortable, must of course take steps to
ensure this happens. In our view, the trial reflects the legal right
of the state to conduct its religious policy and it could well serve
as a lesson to those people who are fostering tensions in the
religious affairs of our country.” (Jeremy Bransten)

PARTIES

RUSSIA’S DEFEATED LIBERALS MULL MERGING WITH PARTY OF POWER. When
members of the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) gather on 26 June for a
party congress just outside Moscow, one likely subject for discussion
is a possible merger with the right wing of the pro-Kremlin Unified
Russia party. Boris Nadezhdin, secretary of the party’s
presidium, raised the issue on 19 June at a meeting of the
party’s Moscow Oblast branch. According to Nadezhdin, Kremlin
political strategists would perhaps support the creation of an
electoral bloc composed of SPS and Unified Russia’s “right wing,”
“Gazeta” reported on 21 June.
Nadezhdin’s statement sparked considerable skepticism
within the SPS. Leonid Gozman, head of the party Creative Council,
told “Nezavisimaya gazeta” on 21 June that such a union is hardly
possible since Unified Russia’s right wing is more virtual than
real. The same day, Gozman told Ekho Moskvy that any union between
“such a monster and our party, which failed to show good results at
the elections,” would in reality be more like a “takeover” than a
marriage of equals. “I am absolutely sure that we will never do
that,” he said. Former party co-leader Boris Nemtsov told Interfax
that Unified Russia has neither a right nor a left wing and can
maintain its popularity only so long as the president’s rating
remains high.
Writing on politcom.ru on 21 June, analyst Georgii Kovalev
reported that Nadezhdin also used the 19 June meeting to launch his
own claim to leadership of the party. Nadezhdin stated at the meeting
that “[former SPS co-leader Anatolii] Chubais is not ready to head
the party and there is no other leader of his stature,” according to
politcom.ru. He added that Nemtsov and former Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov are likely candidates, but if new candidates are desirable,
then he is “ready to participate in the process” himself.
Kovalev predicted that while the leadership issue will
probably not be raised at the congress, the idea of joining the
Unified Russia’s “right flank” will certainly be discussed.
According to Kovalev, Chubais is seen as the party’s informal
leader, and the majority of SPS members do not view Nadezhdin’s
ambitions positively. However, a “soft incorporation of the right
into the structure of the pro-presidential party will definitely be
on the agenda,” in part because SPS represents business interests
that “under current conditions would not find it profitable to be in
conflict with the authorities.”
So far, the response from Unified Russia to Nadezhdin’s
idea has been guardedly positive. In an interview with “Nezavisimaya
gazeta,” Deputy Duma Speaker and Unified Russia Supreme Council
member Vyacheslav Volodin called the idea “sensible.” “It is no
surprise that a section of the center-right in SPS can see a great
deal in common with itself and Unified Russia’s party platform,”
Volodin said. Last month, other members of Unified Russia’s Duma
faction — including Andrei Isaev, Gennadii Gudkov, and Oleg Morozov
— raised the issue of splitting the party into right- and left-wing
factions.
The topic of breaking up the party of power has also been the
subject of a number of articles in the Russian press. “Itogi,” No.
23, reported — citing unidentified Kremlin sources — that the
presidential administration plans to split the party up. According to
the weekly, the idea of creating a right-wing group in the Duma by
drawing some members from United Russia was seriously discussed
immediately after the December elections to compensate for the
absence of the defeated Yabloko and SPS. But party leaders reportedly
decided instead to enjoy their new dominance in the Duma and not
create different factions from their 300-plus members.
However, by the 2007 elections, “Itogi” suggested, “the
semi-disintegration of Unified Russia is dictated by several
reasons.” The main one, according to the weekly, is that by the next
elections, there might simply be no one to compete with the “ruling
party” — which “does not suit the president’s multiparty-system
agenda.” Another reason is that “many deputies elected from
single-mandate districts who have joined United Russia faction do not
feel very comfortable there because they have no real opportunities
to lobby their local interests.”
In an article on politcom.ru on 26 May, analyst Tatyana
Stanovaya suggested that Unified Russia might not be big enough to
house all of the egos and diverging ambitions of its members. She
noted that “in such a large faction that brings together extremely
diverse people, many of whom were previously independent political
figures, the problem of distributing power in such a way that these
political figures acquire fitting status and do not feel
‘downgraded’ is a timely one.” According to Stanovaya, it “is
not even a question of a struggle for power within the faction but of
seeking some kind of unique project for [former members] to head and,
in the context of which, to obtain at least a modicum of autonomy.”
Despite the obvious appeal of forming separate parties from
the point of view of individual Duma deputies, some political
analysts are skeptical that the presidential administration has any
interest in seeing the Unified Russia party or faction split into
smaller units. Sergei Markelov, director of the Mark Communications
political-consulting group, told “Izvestiya” on 27 May that the
presidential administration will not support attempts to break up
Unified Russia.
Dmitrii Orlov, head of the Political and Economic
Communications Agency, agreed. “I’m sure these statements are not
authorized by the leaders of the party,” Orlov told “Izvestiya.”
“Measures aimed at separating platforms were logical up to the
mid-1990s. Now, when power is being consolidated, this is not
necessary. Such attempts can only lead to internal fractures within
Unified Russia.” Along these same lines, “Gazeta” opined on 21 June
that while it is well known that the Kremlin is interested in having
an intellectually sound right-wing group in the Duma, it is less
clear whether it would be “happy to break up the already amorphous
Unified Russia.” “Such a merger would be beneficial for the
right-wing leaders, who would get a chance to occupy some Duma
posts,” the daily noted, “but the prospects for the party [itself]
would be [dim].” (Julie A. Corwin)

COMINGS & GOINGS

SHIFTED: Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov signed on 16 June an order
dismissing Ivan Kamenskii and Anatolii Kotelnikov as deputy atomic
energy ministers and naming them deputy directors of the Federal
Atomic Energy Agency, RosBalt reported on 18 June and “Kommersant-
Daily” on 19 June. Fradkov also dismissed Igor Slyunyaev as first
deputy transportation minister. There are now only two deputy
transportation ministers — Sergei Aristov and Aleksandr Misharin.

POLITICAL CALENDAR

23-25 June: Six-country talks on North Korea’s
nuclear program will be held in Beijing
24 June: The cabinet will examine issue of redistributing
property rights over educational, health-care, and cultural
facilities among the federal, regional, and municipal levels of
government
24 June: Moscow Arbitration Court will hold hearing on the
compulsory liquidation of Sodbiznesbank
24 June: Norilsk Nickel will hold a shareholders meeting in
Moscow
24-25 June: Parliamentary assembly of the Russia-Belarus
Union will hold a session in Brest
25 June: Gazprom will hold a shareholders meeting
26 June: Union of Rightist Forces will hold party congress
27 June: International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General
Muhammad el-Baradei will visit Russia
29 June: Founding meeting of the Association of
Russian-Armenian Economic Cooperation will be held in Moscow
30 June: The Qatari court hearing the case of two Russians
accused of carrying out the assassination of former acting Chechen
President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev is expected to announce its verdict
30 June-2 July: Financial Action Task Force will meet in
Paris
Early July: British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw will visit
Russia
July: Russia and the United States will hold bilateral
negotiations on Russia’s possible entry into the World Trade
Organization
July: Audit Chamber will complete its checks on major oil
companies
1 July: First anniversary of the creation of Federal
Antinarcotics Agency
1-2 July: The fourth annual Volga forum on “Strategies for
Regional Development” will be held in Kirov
2 July: State Duma will consider introducing monetary
compensation for in-kind social benefits in its first reading
2 July: The Audit Chamber will hold a session examining the
results of privatization over the last 10 years
2-4 July: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will visit Seoul
3 July: Communist Party congress will be held to elect new
leadership
3 July: Yabloko will hold its 12th party congress
3 July: The Motherland party headed by Dmitrii Rogozin will
hold a party congress in Moscow
4 July: Vladivostok will hold mayoral election
6 July: Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian will visit
Moscow
6-10 July: International weapons exhibition in Nizhnii Tagil
10 July: State Duma will end its spring session
12 July: Hearing of the case against former Yukos CEO Mikhail
Khodorkovskii and Menatep Chairman Platon Lebedev to resume
21 July: Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot will visit Russia
31 July: State Duma will hold a special session
1 August: Deadline for the Finance Ministry to present its
draft 2005 budget to the government
3 August: State Duma will hold a special session
26 August: Deadline for the government to submit its draft
2005 budget to the State Duma
29 August: Presidential elections will be held in Chechnya
September: St. Petersburg’s Hermitage Museum plans to
open the Hermitage Center, which will exhibit works from the
Hermitage’s collection, in the city of Kazan
15-18 September: The third International Conference of Mayors
of World Cities will be held in Moscow
20 September: The State Duma’s fall session will begin
October: President Putin will visit China
October: International forum of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference will be held in Moscow
25 October: First anniversary of Yukos head Mikhail
Khodorkovskii’s arrest at an airport in Novosibirsk
31 October: Presidential election in Ukraine
November: Gubernatorial election in Pskov Oblast
22 November: President Putin to visit Brazil
December: A draft law on toll roads will be submitted to the
Russian government, according to the Federal Highways Agency’s
Construction Department on 6 April
December: Gubernatorial elections in Bryansk, Kamchatka,
Ulyanovsk, and Ivanovo oblasts
29 December: State Duma’s fall session will come to a
close
March 2005: Gubernatorial election in Saratov Oblast

*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.

The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared by Julie A. Corwin
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
Wednesday.

Direct comments to Julie A. Corwin at [email protected].
For information on reprints, see:

Back issues are online at

Azeris protest in Strasbourg against Armenian leader’s visit

Turan news agency
23 Jun 04

BAKU

Armenian President Robert Kocharyan was met with a protest action
staged today by a group of Azerbaijanis outside the PACE
[Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe] building in
Strasbourg.

The action was organized by the congress of world Azerbaijanis, the
society of cultural relations and a local student organization of
Azerbaijanis.

The pickets chanted “Karabakh” and “Down with Armenian occupation”,
and demanded that the UN resolutions urging Armenia to vacate the
occupied Azerbaijani territories be enforced.

The picket was still under way when the Armenian president opened an
exhibition in the PACE lobby on the Armenian genocide by Ottoman
Turkey. The exhibition, organized by the Armenian side, features photo
materials and correspondence documents of researcher Fridtjof Nansen
who helped some Armenian refugees from Turkey at the beginning of last
century.

Robert Kocharian: Nagorno Karabagh Republic today is an established state

24.06.2004

YEREVAN (YERKIR) – Address by Armenian President Robert Kocharian at
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. President, Members of the Parliamentary Assembly, Ladies and
Gentlemen,

It is an honor and pleasure to address you. Last time I have addressed
the Assembly on a very significant day for Armenia the day of
accession to the Council of Europe.

These were three demanding years of reforms that have touched upon all
the domains of life in our country and necessitated full time
employment of allour efforts.

Today I am here to announce that Armenia has fulfilled the vast
majority of its accession commitments. For the few outstanding ones,
there is a timetable agreed with a deadline fixed at the end of this
year. Still, if asked of the single most vital achievement I would
definitely answer: change in the perceptions in the Armenian society
about own future. The people of Armeniais now more involved in the
everyday life of the country. Formation of the Civil Society is on the
move.

Does this mean Armenia has achieved the desirable level of democratic
freedoms? The obvious answer is NO. Democracy has a long way to go in
any country with high poverty indicators. To assure fully inclusive
participation by the people in the democratic process, it is essential
to achieve at least minimal level of social guarantees. That is
precisely why we have strived to synchronize reforms in economy,
political system, judiciary and the social field.

In essence, Armenia has completed the process of dismantling the
former centralized system of power and economy, which allowed for a
total control over the society.

Armenian economy has undergone radical transformation both in terms of
activity fields and of property forms. The scope and depth of the
reforms allowed for a full scale enactment of market economy.

At present over 85% of Armenia’s GDP is produced in private sector,
over 38% of it in small and medium enterprises. Annual GDP growth has
averaged at I2% for last three consecutive years, regardless of the
blockade implemented bytwo fellow members of this very organization.
That dynamic economic growth has allowed us to develop a long term
Poverty Elimination Strategy.

The first time in Armenia this governmental program was developed in
close cooperation with international financial institutions and also
with wide involvement of the society. That Strategy now guides us in
the political decision making and in choosing our budget priorities.

Fighting corruption is Yet another important step towards effective
democracy. The Government of Armenia watches corruption as a systemic
evil,which cannot be eradicated merely through rhetoric or a couple of
sampler prosecutions.

We concentrate on the systemic change aimed at ruling out the sources
of corruption. That is exactly why we have joined the GRECO group
where we canlearn from the experience of other states on combating
corruption. Through a wide discussion including the OSCE, we have
developed a comprehensive Anti corruption strategy. A few weeks ago I
have established an AntiCorruption Council.

As an urgent measure directed at eradication of corruption in Armenia
I shall prioritize the necessity of deepening the judicial reforms,
improvement in tax and customs administration, and formation of an
effective system of Civil Service. All these are key tools for
implementation of anti corruption policies.

In terms of a broader effort aimed at reducing corruption risks, I
would like to particularly mention the importance of establishing
competitive climate, predictability of governmental action,
simplification of procedures, transparency thereof and public
control. Those are our current priorities aimed at achieving the
sustainability of the reforms and irreversibility of the
democratization process in Armenia.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I know many of you wonder: what was happening in
Armenia last spring? What fostered the activity of the opposition that
surrogated the parliamentary work by revolutionary rallies? You are
right to wonder, since you have been all informed by the monitoring
group Rapporteurs who had visited Armenia only very recently, in
January, that there are significant advancements in fulfillingthe
commitments accepted at the accession. And you know that most of those
deal with advancing democracy.

Expert evaluations of Armenia by international financial institutes
are more than optimistic. Two digit figures of economic growth and
budgetary proficit, by default cannot fuel the revolutionary
atmosphere. Moreover, there are three full years before the next
parliamentary elections.

Therefore, there were no internal prerequisites for increase in
political activity. Accordingly, what has happened? The answer is
easy. The opposition, encouraged by the results of the “rose
revolution” in neighboring Georgia, decided to duplicate it in the
Armenian reality, which, however, had nothing in common with the
Georgian one.

They disregarded the fact that Armenia’s economy, as opposite to
Georgian, undergoes dynamic advancement, the government is efficient,
and the democratic achievements are safeguarded by institutional
structures, including the law enforcement system capable of protecting
the public order.

The history has many times demonstrated that inspiration by foreign
revolutions never results in positive outcomes. Unfortunately,
learning often comes only from own experience. That also happened in
our case. The opposition left the parliament and unfolded street
activity.

They openly declared the goal: to destabilize the situation in the
country, cumulate the maximum possible number of participants in a
street action, surround the building of the Presidency and force me to
resign. Once the opposition witnessed lack of public interest towards
their action plan, they decided to increase the tension, most probably
to attract attention. They blocked the most loaded avenue of the city
of Yerevan.

That resulted in disruption of the traffic, prevented normal
functioning of the National Assembly, of the Administration of the
President and of the Constitutional Court. Four embassies, the
National Academy of Science and one of the biggest schools are located
at the same avenue. The organizers called on the public for
demonstrative disobedience. The police was left with no choice; the
public order was restored quickly, without any significant damage to
the health of the participants.

Necessity of implementation of similar police operations is always
regrettable. Still, authorities have to protect the society from
political extremists. It is particularly important in young
democracies, which still lack the advanced traditions of the political
and legal culture. Even more so when part of the population lives in
poverty and can be easily manipulated by populist rhetoric.

I would like to particularly mention that the parties comprising the
ruling coalition have many times offered cooperation to the
opposition. Unfortunately, those offers were rejected. The opposition
probably thinks that cooperation would undermine the revolutionary
temper of their supporters.

Our country is in the important stage of its advancement, and I am
confident that there are many directions that require non partisan
effort. We have offered the opposition to work together on the most
important issues the Constitutional reform and the new Electoral
Code. The offer is still valid,however the discussions shall be held
in the parliament, not in the street.

Ladies and gentlemen: I would now like to turn to another important
issue: the honoring of obligations by the new members of the Council
of Europe. May I remind you that most of the reforms to be implemented
by a new member are sensitive issues in domestic politics? Often,
implementation of the reforms clashes the inertiaof the public
opinion. In the case of Armenia examples of such issues are the
Constitutional reform, abolition of the death penalty and the new
Electoral legislation.

Active implementation of commitments by the authorities usually
results in increased internal tension and meets active resistance of
the opposition. For example, the parliamentary opposition of Armenia
openly contested the abolition of the death penalty and the new
edition of the Constitution, drafted in close cooperation with the
Venice Commission.

Honoring the obligations is a heavy political load accepted by the
entire country, not only by the authorities. Our application for
accession to the Council of Europe was signed by all the parliamentary
factions. In this Assembly the country is presented by the entire
parliamentary spectrum.

Therefore, the duty of honoring the obligations shall bind the
opposition as much as the government. One ought not purposefully fail
to comply with own obligations for the sole purpose of discrediting
the ruling political authorities in face of the Council of Europe.

I would never talk about all this if “not the recent resolution of the
Parliamentary Assembly on Armenia. I regret that some of our MPs drew
the PACE into that discussion. I am confident that the Council of
Europe is not the best choice for the place to practice the opposition
authority contention. For that purpose there is national parliament:
the main political mise en scene of Armenia.

Mr. Chairman: I would now like to turn to one of the priority interest
issues for Armenia. At the time of accession Armenia undertook to
make steps towards peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabagh
conflict. We have done so because we highly appreciate the necessity
of friendly relations among neighboring states. However, to be able to
effectively secure a long lasting solution, one needs to deeply
understand the essence of the conflict. I would like to outline two
important factors characteristic of the Karabagh conflict.

First of all: Karabagh has never been part of independent
Azerbaijan. At the time of collapse of the Soviet Union two states
were formed: the Azerbaijani Republic on the territory of Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic and Republic of Nagorno Karabagh on the
territory of the Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous Region. Establishment of
both these states has similar legal grounds. The territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan, henceforth, has nothing to do with theRepublic of
Nagorno Karabagh. We are ready to discuss the issue of settling that
conflict in the legal domain.

Second: the war of I992 94 was launched by the aggression of the Azeri
authorities, which attempted to implement ethnic cleansing of the
territoryof Nagorno Karabagh with the purpose of its annexation. The
situation in placetoday is the result of a selfless fight of the
Armenians of Nagorno Karabagh for survival on their own land. It is a
classical example of both the implementation of the right for self
determination and of misusing the “territorial integrity” concept as a
justification for ethnic cleansings.

The people of Karabagh has prevailed in it’s strive for independent
life in an egalitarian society. Independence of Karabagh today has I6
years of history. An entire generation grew up there that can think
of no other status for the country. Nagorno Karabagh Republic today is
an established state, in essence meeting all of the Council of
Europe’s membership criteria. It is the reality which cannot be
ignored. That is exactly why we insist on direct participation of
Nagorrio Karabagh in the negotiations, in which Armenia actively
participates.

The solution shall emerge from the substance of the conflict and not
from the perception of the possible strengthening of Azerbaijan
through future “oil money”.

“Oil money” approach is the formula of confrontation and not of
compromise. Armenia is ready to continue and advance the cease fire
regime. We are ready for serious negotiations on a full scale solution
for the conflict. That is exactly why we have accepted two last
formulas of solution offered by the international mediators, which,
unfortunately, were denied by Azerbaijan.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of advancement of the
regional cooperation in the Southern Caucasus. There is a wide
spectrum for potential cooperation: from synchronization of
legislation to restoring the interconnected transportation systems and
to joint projects in the energy sector. We are confident that regional
cooperation is the right route to the settlement of conflicts.

We have no doubt that South Caucasus as a region of inclusive economic
cooperation will be able to achieve much more than three states of the
region can dream of doing on their own. We believe in peace and
cooperation.

Southern Caucasus has always been sensitive of external
influences. Located at the crossroads of civilizations with vast
potential in resources and numerous transit roots, it has always been
a zone of increased interest. These considerations guided us in
forming our foreign policy of “complimentarity.”

That policy is based on the concept of seeking advantages in softening
the contradictions of the global and regional powers, and not in
deepening the gaps. We are responsible for the regional stability and
our actions shall help to solve problems, instead of creating new
ones. That approach allowed us to develop trustworthy relations with
the United States, the European Union and Iran, and to strengthen the
traditional kinship with Russia.

In this context I would also like to concentrate on the Armenian
Turkish relations, or rather on their absence. Those relations are
shaded by the memories of the past: the Genocide, its consequences and
lack of repentance. Nowadays the situation is worsened by the blockade
of Armenia by Turkey. I would like to outline two principals which in
my view are crucial to finding the way out from this impasse. First
of all: Developing practical ties and deliberations over the inherited
problems shall take place in different dimensions and shall not
influence one the other.

Second: Armenian Turkish relations shall not be conditioned by our
relations with a third country (Azerbaijan). Any precondition
terminates all positive expectations.

Dear Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Concluding, I would like to
assure you that Armenia perceives its future in full scale integration
with the European family. A few days ago the European Union has
decided to include Armenia in its “new neighborhood” initiative. This
will further advance our resolve to satisfy the European criteria, to
be able to contribute and fully benefit from the cooperation between
our states and nations. We walk this road with deep belief and
confidence and we appreciate your efforts to help us in that uneasy
but crucial effort.

Thank you for your attention.

Armenian National Committee of America
888 17th Street NW Suite 904
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 775-1918
Fax: (202) 775-5648
E-mail: [email protected]
Internet:

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 24, 2004
Contact: Elizabeth S. Chouldjian
Tel: (202) 775-1918

ANCA PARTICIPATES IN COALITION CAMPAIGN TO STOP GENOCIDE IN SUDAN

— Takes Part in Congressional Black Caucus/Africa Action Effort
to Secure U.S. Intervention in the Darfur Region

— Calls for Support of Genocide Resolution, H.Res.193/S.Res.164,
Renewing U.S. Commitment to the Genocide Convention

WASHINGTON, DC – The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)
participated in a press conference, yesterday, organized by the
Congressional Black Caucus and Africa Action, voicing its support
for a nationwide, grassroots campaign to secure U.S. intervention
to stop the impending genocide in Sudan.

Congressional Black Caucus members, including Chairman Elijah
Cummings (D-MD), Representatives Donald Payne (D-NJ), Barbara Lee
(D-CA), Diane Watson (D-CA), Maxine Waters (D-CA), Sheila Jackson
Lee (D-TX), and Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-IL) were joined by Democratic
Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO), and Africa
Action Executive Director Salih Booker in calling attention to the
ongoing tragedy in Sudan, which has already claimed tens of
thousands of lives in 2004.

In response to a question by ANCA Government Affairs Director
Abraham Niziblian regarding how individuals can get involved in
stopping the cycle of genocide in Sudan, Rep. Payne cited the
example of he Armenian Genocide, noting that “if we had done
something then [1915], we would not have had the 1930’s genocide
committed by the Nazis.” Salih then stressed the importance of
participating in a petition drive, initiated by Africa Action on
June 15th, calling on Secretary of State Colin Powell to support an
immediate intervention to stop the killing [in Sudan].”
Individuals can participate in the Africa Action petition drive by
visiting:

Over the past several weeks, the ANCA has called attention to the
atrocities in Sudan through a series of letters to Congressional
offices, urging them to take a stand to stop the cycle of genocide
through support of Congressional initiatives regarding Sudan as
well as for the Genocide Resolution (H.Res.193 / S.Res.164), which
reaffirms U.S. commitment to the principles of the Genocide
Convention.

In a June 17th memo to Congressional staff members, Niziblian
stated, “as the descendents of survivors of the Armenian Genocide,
Armenian Americans feel a special obligation to encourage our
government to take the lead in preventing genocides, anywhere
around the world. Please stand up against genocide in Sudan and do
all that you can to ensure we, as a nation, meet our obligations
under the Genocide Convention to prevent and punish all instances
of genocide.” Similarly on June 23rd, Niziblian asked Members of
Congress to “work for the passage of the Genocide Resolution
(H.Res.193 and S.Res.164) to reaffirm our collective commitment to
the aims of the Genocide Convention.”

The Genocide Resolution was introduced in the Senate in June, 2003
by Senators John Ensign (R-NV) and Jon Corzine (D-NJ). Its
companion House measure, H.Res.193, led by Representatives George
Radanovich (R-CA), Adam Schiff (D-CA), and Congressional Armenian
Caucus Co-Chairs Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Joe Knollenberg (R-MI),
was adopted unanimously by the House Judiciary Committee last May
and has 111 cosponsors. The resolution cites the importance of
remembering past crimes against humanity, including the Armenian
Genocide, Holocaust, Cambodian and Rwandan genocides, in an effort
to stop future atrocities. Support for the measure has been
widespread, with a diverse coalition of over 100 ethnic, religious,
civil and human rights organizations calling for its passage,
including American Values, National Organization of Women, Sons of
Italy, NAACP, Union of Orthodox Rabbis, and the National Council of
La Raza.

Africa Action has reported that, “In Darfur, the Sudanese
government is destroying African Muslim communities who have
challenged the authoritarian rule of the government. Government
forces and Arab militias known as the janjaweed have burned and
pillaged thousands of villages, poisoned water systems, and
subjected the population to large-scale rape and other atrocities.”
On May 17th, House Members overwhelmingly adopted H.Con.Res. 403,
condemning the Sudanese Government for its attacks against innocent
civilians in the impoverished Darfur region of western Sudan, by a
margin of 360 to 1. Its companion resolution in the Senate,
S.Con.Res. 99, was adopted unanimously on May 6th. Rep. Payne
announced that he would introduce additional legislation calling on
the “UN Security Council to introduce a resolution authorizing
intervention in Darfur” and “urging the U.S. Administration to
expose those responsible for the genocide.”

PRESS OFFICE
Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern)
630 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Contact: Jake Goshert, Communications Officer
Tel: (212) 686-0710; Fax: (212) 779-3558
E-mail: [email protected]
Website:
June 24, 2004
___________________

Week of June 18 to June 24, 2004
* * *

ASP PARTICIPANTS HEAD TO ARMENIA

Participants in this year’s Armenia Service Program (ASP), organized by
the Armenian Church Youth Organization of America (ACYOA), headed to
Armenia on Tuesday (6/22), after a day of orientation and team-building
exercises at the Diocesan Center in New York City. While in Armenia,
the group of 26 young people from throughout the Diocese will serve as
counselors at a summer camp for needy children, and tour the country,
deepening their understanding of their faith and heritage. For updates
on the group in Armenia, and to learn more about the Armenia Service
Program, click to our website:
;selmonth=6&sel
year04

(Source: Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern), 6/22/04)
* * *

ARMENIAN OF THE YEAR HONORED WITH MEDAL OF FREEDOM

On Wednesday (6/23), President George Bush awarded the “Presidential
Medal of Freedom” to Dr. Vartan Gregorian. The medal is the nation’s
highest civilian award. Dr. Gregorian is the president of the Carnegie
Foundation and past president of Brown University and the New York
Public Library. Earlier this year, Dr. Gregorian was also the recipient
of the Eastern Diocese’s “Armenian of the Year Award,” during the 2004
Diocesan Assembly.

Dr. Gregorian was one of 13 people awarded the presidential medal during
the ceremony at the White House. Also receiving the award were such
luminaries as Pope John Paul II, entertainers Rita Moreno and Doris Day,
the late cosmetics entrepreneur Estee Lauder, golf legend Arnold Palmer,
the long-time editor of Commentary magazine, Norman Podhoretz, and
former Republican Senator from Massachusetts Edward Brooke, who in 1966
became the first African-American senator to be elected by popular vote.

To learn more about Dr. Gregorian, click to our website:

(Source: The New York Sun, 6/24/04)
* * *

CLICK TO OUR CALENDAR OF EVENTS

Today (6/24) from noon to 3 p.m., the St. Vartan Cathedral Avaks group
is hosting a picnic for the public on the Cathedral plaza. You can
learn about this, and many more exciting events around the Diocese, by
clicking to our website’s Calendar of Events:

If your parish is having an event, get it listed for free by e-mailing
the information to [email protected].

(Source: Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern), 6/24/04)
* * *

FIND THE PERFECT GIFTS ONLINE

You can find perfect gifts for any loved one by going to the St. Vartan
Bookstore website, Shopping online is safe,
easy, and quick.

Go to for great gifts for art lovers, young
readers, musicians, historians, cooks, and people proud to be Armenian.
New items are added to the online inventory every week.

For simple, secure, and speedy ordering, click to the St. Vartan
Bookstore today:

(Source: , 6/24/04)
* * *

COME TO THE ARARAT CENTER CONSECRATION, OPEN HOUSE ON SATURDAY, JULY 24

Every Armenian is invited to attend an open house and consecration on
Saturday, July 24, the last day of St. Vartan Camp. The day of free
food, live music, and fun will run from noon to 5 p.m. Archbishop
Barsamian will consecrate the land at 2 p.m. The event is free, and
open to the public.

RSVP by July 10, by e-mailing [email protected] or calling (212)
686-0710 ext. 43.

(Source: Ararat Youth and Conference Center, 6/24/04)
# # #

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PRESS RELEASE
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia
Contact: Information Desk
Tel: (374-1) 52-35-31
Email: [email protected]
Web:

Minister of Foreign Affairs Launches Nansen Exhibit at the Council of Europe

Minister Oskanian inaugurated an exhibition of documents and photographs on
Fritjof Nansen, the Norwegian humanist-explorer, who established the first
High Commission for Refugees, under the League of Nations. The passports
given to Armenian refugees of the Genocide of 1915 bears his name.

The Nansen exhibit was sponsored by the Armenian delegation to the Council
of Europe, on the occasion of Norway’s taking on the presidency of the
Council.

Present at the opening were the Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, Peter Schieder, Norway’s Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik and
President Robert Kocharian.

The text of the Minister’s remarks appears below.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vartan Oskanian
On the Opening of the Nansen Exhibit
At the Council of Europe, Strasbourg
June 23, 2004

Mr. Schwimmer, Mr. Schieder, Mr. Prime Minister, and Mr. President,

Armenians have long been fascinated by and grateful to the Norwegian
Fridtjof Nansen. And not because he could ski 50 miles in a day or because
he explored Greenland and survived the North Pole.

As great as Nansen¹s interest was in adventure and the sciences, following
the first World War, he became deeply engaged in international affairs. And
this bore great significance for Armenia and Armenians. He supported the
Covenant of the League of Nations and advocated the rights of small nations.
He repatriated hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war. He mustered help
for millions in Russia dying of famine.

And, he helped establish and lead the office of High Commission for
refugees. In that capacity, Nansen tried to solve the problem of Greek
refugees and arranged for an exchange of 1.2 million Greeks living on
Turkish soil for about 1/2 a million Turks living in Greece. Nansen invented
the Nansen Passport, a document of identification which was recognized by
dozens of governments and which provided an identity to hundreds of
thousands of refugees, including great numbers of Armenians rendered
homeless by genocide, massacres and deportation, at the turn of the 20th
century.

He helped the stateless and homeless whose causes appeared politically
intractable. He helped the human victims on both sides of political and
military conflicts.

Before the creation of international aid and development programs, he drew
up a political, industrial, financial plan for creating a national home for
Armenians. He did this at the invitation of the League of Nations. And
although the League failed to implement the plan, Armenians and others
interested in justice and equal rights believe he accomplished a great deal
– by putting on the international agenda the rights of peoples to their own
homeland.

This man, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, was a Norwegian from a well
to do family. Perhaps it was because he never had to struggle to assure his
own survival, that he had the time and the wherewithal to take on the
struggles of others.

The same can be said for the country and people of Norway who have been
blessed with natural wealth, and the wisdom to use it wisely. From the work
of the Nobel Committee to that of Transparency International, Norway has
found ways to encourage and reward those who make efforts to truly integrate
human rights and democratic values and good governance in their own
societies. With Norway at the helm of the Council of Europe, we look forward
to working together to follow Fritjof Nansen¹s example: to recognize that
which is good and right in society, and to work to improve those aspects
which are still incomplete.

In Armenia, we are thankful for the work of the Norwegian Refugee Council,
and we recognize that today¹s refugees are more fortunate than those whose
fate Fritjof Nansen tried to affect. Yet, judging by the number of those who
still regard the Nansen passports with pride, we can justifiably say that
Nansen gave documents and a sense of belonging to one generation, but his
legacy to succeeding generations is the recognition of a universal
responsibility to acknowledge each individual¹s right to live not as victims
but as equals, in charge of their own lives and their own destiny.

So we offer this modest exhibition, moved by the commitment of this great
humanist, and are proud that it is presented here, in the halls of the
Council of Europe, an organization which espouses the ideas and principles
around which Fridtjof Nansen lived his life.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenian Assembly of America
122 C Street, NW, Suite 350
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202-393-3434
Fax: 202-638-4904
Email: [email protected]
Web:

PRESS RELEASE
June 24, 2004
CONTACT: Christine Kojoian
E-mail: [email protected]

HOUSE FOREIGN AID COMMITTEE REINSTATES U.S. POLICY ON SECURITY PARITY
Assembly Credits Congressman Knollenberg

Washington, DC – The Armenian Assembly praised members of a key foreign aid
subcommittee today for reinstating U.S. policy to maintain military aid
parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Foreign
Operations bill. The bill, which lawmakers passed by voice vote last night,
foils the Administration’s attempt to provide Azerbaijan a $6 million
increase over Armenia by placing the neighboring countries on equal footing.

“We commend Chairman Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) and his Subcommittee for maintaining
equal security assistance between Armenia and Azerbaijan by explicit policy
and by allocating $5 million in military financing to Armenia and
Azerbaijan,” said Assembly Board of Trustees Chairman Hirair Hovnanian. “We
are especially appreciative of Armenian Caucus Co-Chair Joe Knollenberg
(R-MI), who serves on the committee, for taking the lead to reinstate U.S.
balance and impartiality in dealing with the Karabakh conflict.”

Representative Knollenberg said, “Parity in military assistance to Armenia
and Azerbaijan is absolutely critical to maintaining the careful balance
between the two countries. We cannot settle for anything less. I’m also
pleased we were able to increase military assistance to Armenia from $2
million to $5 million in order to help them modernize their equipment.”

Congress has recently rebuffed attempts by the Administration to tip the
scale in favor of Baku by upholding this long-standing parity policy. The
Administration attempted, during the August congressional recess last year,
to provide an additional $5 million in security assistance to Azerbaijan via
the 15 day congressional notification process. Fortunately, Congress
blocked this request until Armenia received equal treatment.

This April, Armenian Caucus Co-Chair Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ) and Caucus
member John E. Sweeney (R-NY), along with over 40 of their congressional
colleagues, wrote to Chairman Kolbe urging that the subcommittee maintain
symmetry in levels of any military/security assistance for Armenia and
Azerbaijan. In addition, they requested “not less than” $75 million in
economic assistance for Armenia and an additional $5 million in humanitarian
assistance for Nagorno Karabakh in FY 2005. The Assembly strongly supported
this initiative by urging Members to sign on to this letter during its
advocacy portion of its National Conference and via a nationwide Action
Alert.

In a letter dated February 10th of this year and sent to the 131 members of
the Armenian Caucus and 35 Senators, the Assembly said that providing
asymmetrical military assistance to Azerbaijan will not only “have a
potentially destabilizing effect on the South Caucasus,” but also “damage
U.S. credibility as an impartial and leading mediator in the ongoing
sensitive peace negotiations for the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.”

The Subcommittee also approved “not less than” $65 million to Armenia, an
increase of $3 million over the Administration’s FY 2005 budget request. An
additional $5 million in humanitarian assistance for Nagorno Karabakh was
also allocated. The Administration did not propose any assistance for
Karabakh.

The bill will next be considered by the full House Appropriations Committee.
Once the full House and Senate complete action on their version of the bill,
a joint House-Senate Conference Committee will reconcile the differences.

The Armenian Assembly of America is the largest Washington-based nationwide
organization promoting public understanding and awareness of Armenian
issues. It is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt membership organization.

NR#2004-061