Associated Press Worldstream
December 13, 2004 Monday 2:06 PM Eastern Time

French minister: Turkey must come clean with its Ottoman record in
Armenia

ROBERT WIELAARD; Associated Press Writer

BRUSSELS, Belgium

France will insist Turkey acknowledge its record regarding the
killing of Armenians in the early 20th century if it wants to join
the European Union, France’s foreign minister said Monday.

EU leaders holding a summit on Thursday and Friday are to discuss
setting a start date for negotiations for Turkey to join the
25-nation bloc.

“In the course of the accession negotiations, France will ask for a
recognition of the tragedy at the outset of the 20th century,” Michel
Barnier said.

Armenia accuses Turkey of genocide in the killings of up to 1.5
million Armenians as part of a 1915-1923 campaign to force them out
of eastern Turkey. At that time, Armenia was part of the Ottoman
Empire.

Turkey remains extremely sensitive to the issue. It denies the
genocide, says the death count is inflated and that Armenians were
killed or displaced along with others as the Ottoman Empire tried to
quell civil unrest.

Barnier was careful to avoid using the term “genocide,” but said that
“Turkey must reconcile itself with its past.”

Barnier said that “The European (unification) project is built on
reconciliation,” citing Germany and France, two EU members with a
rich history of wars that led to enormous loss of life.

Under EU rules, countries can only join if they are democracies, have
functioning market economies and live in peace with their neighbors.

Armenia and Turkey do not have diplomatic relations at the moment
because of past friction.

They are also at odds over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region within
Azerbaijan that has been under ethnic Armenian control since a war
that ended in 1994 without a political settlement. Azeris and Turks
share close ethnic ties, although recently Turkey has expressed a
willingness to improve relations with Armenia.

French-Turkish ties became strained in 2001, when French parliament’s
recognition of the killings as a genocide sparked a boycott of French
goods and an exclusion of French companies from Turkish defense
contracts.

“TURKISH BORDERS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS SHOULD NOT BE CLOSED”

Armenia Suffers Losses Amounting to $1 Billion

Azg/arm
14 Dec 04

“The Turkish Foreign Policy should keep in line with the policy
conducted by Brussels. This means that the Turkish borders with its
old neighbors shouldn’t be closed,” Vartan Oskanian stated in the
interview to Reuters, emphasizing that in the course of the last 10-15
years Armenia suffered losses amounting to $1 billion, as a result of
the closed borders.

“The membership to the EU should contribute to the formation of a more
open society in Turkey that will open the border-gates with Armenia
and will recognize the Armenian Genocide”, Freedom radio station
quoted Vartan Oskanian as saying.

“Armenia would like the issue of opening the borders be touched upon
at the EU more consequently, loudly, even aggressively, as it is an
important issue for the EU, as well,” Oskanian said, touching upon the
December 17 decisionto begin the negotiations around Turkey’s
membership to the EU.

Oskanian said that the opening of the Armenian-Turkish borders
achieved under the pressure of the EU member countries could
contribute to the development of trade, support the Eastern poor
regions of Turkey and the economic development of Armenia. Reminding
that Armenia together with Georgia and Azerbaijan was included in
“Enlarged Europe. New Neighbors,” program, Oskanian said: “If Turkey
doesn’t want to meet the commitments it undertook and use the created
opportunity, the whole program is not in time, at least for Armenia.”

As for the settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Oskanian said that
he is optimistic in the issue of establishing peace with Azerbaijan in
this complicated period, when Ilham Aliyev came to power after the
death of Heydar Aliyev who led Azerbaijan for many years.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The Calgary Herald (Alberta)
December 12, 2004 Sunday
Final Edition

The ring master: Calgary’s Intergold has built a franchise from
crafting victory bands for pro sports teams

by Grant Robertson, Calgary Herald

Tom Wilson is no stranger to glitzy jewelry. For the past 15 years,
the Detroit Pistons’ chief executive has been the owner of two
championship rings from the team’s back-to-back titles in 1989-90.

He remembers when the Pistons received those rings, they seemed so
big and extravagant. It almost makes him laugh all these years later.

When the team received their 2004 championship rings last month, it
was evident how times have changed. The designs are much more complex
and the jewelry itself is massive.

The latest Pistons bauble — a conglomeration of roughly $20,000 US
worth of gold and diamonds — makes the old ones look like high
school rings, he says.

“It is gargantuan, yes — three times the size. You can’t lift your
arm. It covers two knuckles,” says Wilson, exaggerating only slightly
on the phone from Detroit.

“People are saying this is the greatest championship ring the NBA has
ever produced. I don’t know whether it is or it isn’t, but everyone
thinks it is. And that’s all that matters.”

The man behind the masterpiece is Miran Armutlu, a fifth-generation
Armenian jeweller and the founder of Calgary-based Intergold Ltd., a
small company that has taken the North American sporting scene by
storm in the past three years.

In addition to the Pistons, the company has made the championship
rings for the NHL’s Detroit Red Wings, New Jersey Devils and Tampa
Bay Lightning; Major League Baseball’s Anaheim Angels and Florida
Marlins.

It’s been a long road for the company Armutlu started with his
brother in the early 1980s. But Intergold — the smallest player in a
business dominated by international giants Jostens and Balfour — is
now commanding a good portion of the spotlight.

“Finally, over the last three years I would say, our reputation is
starting to precede us,” says Armutlu, sitting in the boardroom at
Intergold’s manufacturing plant in northeast Calgary.

“We’re finding that when we get in the door, people have heard of
us.”

Sales used to be much more difficult. When Armutlu decided the
company should branch out from designing jewelry, graduation rings
and corporate items into the sports arena, he walked into the offices
of the Saskatchewan Roughriders in 1989 as an unknown.

“I just told them I wanted to do their ring,” Armutlu says of the
meeting with the team’s managers, all of them ex-football players.

“They all stood up, looked down at me and said. ‘you better make us
the nicest championship ring in the world.’ Well, these were big
boys, they could be very persuasive.”

Intergold landed several Canadian Football League contracts after
that, including the 1992 Calgary Stampeders Grey Cup ring, but the
company still lacked a major U.S. deal.

Part of the challenge, says Armutlu, is that pro sports is dominated
by close relationships between teams and manufacturers. Once the New
York Yankees or Chicago Bulls picked a jeweller, they stuck with
them.

In a strange twist, Intergold’s break came when Michael Jordan left
basketball to play minor-league baseball. With the Bulls’ dynasty on
hiatus, the Houston Rockets stepped in to claim back-to-back titles
in ’94 and ’95.

More important, the Rockets were a team without a jeweller.

“We were lucky. The organization didn’t have any old ties, so they
took a chance on us,” he says.

“When the established relationships are there, they are very
difficult to break. Our uphill battle has been to break those
relationships.”

Being a small operation is an initial hurdle for Intergold against
its larger competitors, but agility has also become its biggest
asset.

Where other jewellers produce artist renderings of rings for teams,
Intergold makes a genuine version of each proposal, no matter how
many variations. Whatever rings aren’t used get melted down and
recycled.

“We knew they were the smaller company,” says Wilson of the Pistons’
decision to go with the Calgary firm.

“But they kept telling us, don’t make a decision based on something
that looks good on paper. If you like these five designs, we’ll make
you five rings.

“Other companies were saying, ‘Well, maybe we can do one ring, but
these things are very expensive’ . . . We started to get a feel for
just how badly they wanted the job.”

The samples allowed the wife of Pistons general manager Joe Dumars to
give the rings one final test, which essentially secured the
contract.

“Our guys like the bling-bling, as the saying goes,” Wilson chuckles.
“So she took the rings out into the sun, just to see how much ‘bling’
there was — and there’s a lot.”

On Friday, Armutlu boarded a plane for Florida where he will meet
with Boston Red Sox executives in a bid to design that team’s World
Series ring.

It’s the third time the company has pitched the Red Sox since October
and Armutlu has already produced nine variations of a ring, with the
latest three being rolled out at this meeting.

“We’ll produce on average maybe 15 or 16 variations before we arrive
at the final one with some teams,” Armutlu says.

The hardest part of designing the Red Sox ring so far is getting a
scaled-down depiction of Fenway Park onto the band, which the team
has requested.

His business is half science, half art, says Armutlu. A good
championship ring will tell a story of how the team won.

When Intergold designed the Tampa Bay Lightning’s Stanley Cup ring
this year (admittedly a bittersweet task for the Calgary firm) the
emphasis was on that story.

The ring has 138 diamonds — one for each of the Lightning’s regular
season points and two for every victory in the playoffs. The band
carries the logos of Tampa Bay’s opponents, including the Flames’
symbol and the 4-3 series score.

Etched on the inside of the ring are two mottos used by Lightning
coach John Tortorella during the season: ‘Safe is Death’ and ‘Good is
the Enemy of Great.’

“The goal is to make something that can bring back the feeling of the
moment of victory six, seven, eight years from now,” Armutlu says.

“I was talking to Phil Esposito about his Stanley Cups and he doesn’t
really remember them. Most players don’t remember. They know they
won, but how they got there is forgotten.”

Many companies bid for the championship contracts, but the process is
usually narrowed to three or four players in a hurry, Armutlu says.

“Everyone says they can do a championship ring until they start to
attempt it,” he says. “Jewellers think it’s easy. But once the sample
stage starts, you know right away who can do what.”

Intergold’s most opulent piece so far is the Florida Marlins’ 2003
World Series ring, which boasts nearly 250 diamonds and has the
weight of a baseball when you hold it in your hand.

“That one really pushed us to our limits in terms of design,” Armutlu
says, explaining that the ring involves several themes — from a
full-colour baseball to a three-dimensional diamond rendering of the
team’s fish logo.

Marlins owner Jeffrey Loria has since requested a special version of
the ring that flips open to reveal a watch. It’s something Intergold
hasn’t attempted before.

“He also wants it to play ‘Take me out to the Ballgame’ when it
opens,” says Armutlu. “So we’re figuring out how to do that.”

How the rings look before they are delivered — and how much each one
costs — is a closely guarded secret.

Walking through Intergold’s manufacturing plant, Armutlu offers a
peek at Team Canada’s World Cup of Hockey rings, which are in
mid-production.

“This one will be (Jarome) Iginla’s,” says Armutlu, holding a gold
base with the Hockey Canada logo that has just been forged. “None of
the players have seen these yet.”

All glamour aside, Armutlu says the financial foundation of the
company is rooted in the high school and college ring business as
well as its corporate products.

Up to 50 per cent of graduates in the U.S. buy school jewelry each
year — more than twice the average in Canada — and most of what
Intergold makes goes into that market, he said.

While the big-name sports contracts open doors for Intergold, they
have yet to lure investors. The company went public at $3 a share in
1994 but has seen its stock fall sharply to penny status since then.
Intergold has averaged less than 30 cents on the TSX Venture Exchange
this year.

“We went public at a time when we needed funds to take risks on the
the ideas we thought would work,” Armutlu says. “But if I knew then
what we know now, would we be a public company? Probably not.”

The company used its share offering to finance equipment and
processes that are now used to manufacture the high-end jewelry.

“At a time when no other traditional institution would give us the
dollars to build the machines we wanted to, it was the public vehicle
that did that,” he says. “Several years ago, we once had obstacles,
but we now have tools to break down those obstacles with.”

[email protected]

Deutsche Presse-Agentur
December 13, 2004, Monday
16:21:15 Central European Time

E.U. ministers leave key Turkish entry decisions for leaders

Brussels

European Union foreign ministers Monday failed to settle key details
of Turkey’s drive to join the 25-nation bloc, leaving E.U. leaders at
a summit on Dec. 16 and 17 to decide the date for opening the talks –
and set new conditions for Turkish accession.

The 25 foreign ministers continued to differ on a range of important
issues, including the critical question of whether leaders should
make a reference to a so-called “plan B” of offering Turkey a special
partnership instead of membership.

Germany remains adamant that the goal is to ensure Turkish accession
to the bloc, not forge special ties with Ankara, German Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer told reporters.

“There was no discussion of a privileged partnership with Turkey,”
Fischer said.

Conservative politicians in Germany and France have stepped up
demands that E.U. leaders must offer Ankara a special relationship
rather than full-fledged entry.

But rejecting such a half-measure, Fischer insisted: “Our aim must be
Turkish accession.”

French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier, however, said Paris wanted
the summit statement to include a reference to a fall-back plan.

If negotiations with Turkey failed, E.U. leaders should make clear
that they were ready to preserve “strong links” between Turkey and
the E.U., Barnier said.

Reflecting a more cautious stance on Turkey being adopted by French
President Jacques Chirac, Barnier insisted that an E.U. decision to
open negotiations with Turkey did not guarantee that Ankara would
eventually join the bloc.

“Negotiations will be long, difficult and transparent…there will be
no shortcuts,” he warned.

Negotiations should only open in end-2005, the French Foreign
Minister said, adding that discussions would be subject to constant
monitoring and could be suspended at any time by either side.

France does not want its referendum on the new E.U. constitution set
for next summer to be complicated by public opposition to Turkish
accession. Barnier cautioned that the question of Turkey’s entry was
a source of great anxiety and unease in many parts of France.

The E.U. summit is expected to set additional conditions for Turkey,
including demands that Ankara must recognize the government of
(Greek) Cyprus and accept a permanent cap on labour migration.

Barnier said France would also ask Ankara during the negotiations to
recognise the “tragedy” of the Armenian genocide in the early years
of the last century.

Pointing to the geo-strategic importance of allowing Turkey to join
the E.U., Fischer said this was a guarantee for the modernisation and
“Europeanisation” of the country.

He added that a summit statement on just how and when Turkey must
recognise (Greek) Cyprus was still being worked out by the current
Dutch presidency of the E.U.

In separate comments made in Berlin, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter
Balkenende said Turkey must recognise Cyprus in the run-up to this
week’s E.U. summit.

“Turkey must understand that all member states say relations between
Turkey and Cyprus should change in the future,” said Balkenende,
after talks with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.

The Turkish government has declined to give diplomatic recognition to
Cyprus which joined the E.U. earlier this year. Ankara only
recognizes the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Greek Cyprus is now part of the E.U. while Turkish Cyprus is not.
Balkenende said Turkey should approve a protocol extending its E.U.
customs union to Cyprus.

Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos has said such a move
would be a de facto recognition of Cyprus. The island’s government
could in theory, block the start of accession negotiations with
Ankara given that a E.U. decision must be unanimous.

Meanwhile, an opinion poll published in France’s Le Figaro newspaper,
said two of three French respondents and 55 per cent of Germans were
opposed to Ankara becoming an E.U. member.

On the other hand, people in Italy (49 per cent for, 24 per cent
against), Britain (41 per cent for, 30 per cent against) and
especially Spain (65 per cent for) said they were in favour of
Turkish E.U. membership. dpa si ms

The Hindu, India
December 13, 2004

WHY IN CALCUTTA?

BURIED IN the Armenian Church’s well-kept, well-shaded cemetery on
Armenian Street is the Rev. Harathun Shimavonian, who died in 1824.
Having lived a hundred years, his longevity itself made him a
noteworthy figure. But as his tombstone marked by an open book
attests, he was even more noteworthy for a signal contribution he
made to the Armenian nation, at the time scattered in many parts of
the world – including Madras and Calcutta. That contribution was “the
first Armenian Journal in the World”, Azdarar , which he printed and
published in 1794 in a printing press he established near the church.
The founder-editor of Azdarar could not make a success of the paper,
given the small number of Armenians in and around the city, but he
did, it is believed, print several Armenian classics in Classical
Armenian.

One of Armenia’s best-known sculptors, Levon Tokmajian, is now at
work in Calcutta, which still has an Armenian presence – though much
diminished in numbers – sculpting a 5-foot marble statue of the
Armenian priest who spent most of his life in the Madras church of
the Armenian Orthodoxy.

But the statue is to be raised in January in front of the Armenian
Church on Armenian Street in CALCUTTA. Now, I wonder why that is
being done when the Rev. Harathun Shimavonian’s achievements were in
MADRAS. Do the Armenians in Calcutta consider the tombstone in Madras
memorial enough to a pioneer in the world of printing?

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
December 13, 2004, Monday

WHY WE NEED UKRAINE

SOURCE: Ekspert, No. 46 (446), December 6, 2004, pp. 17-20

by: Pavel Bykov, Olga Vlasova

Russia has an interest in seeing Ukraine become an integral, strong,
democratic state with its own independent policies. This is entirely
self-evident: Russia needs effective partners, not more problem zones
along its borders. Moscow doesn’t need yet another burden around its
neck; it already has enough problems in the CIS and within Russia
itself.

Russia’s authorities are only just starting to restore order in the
administration of Russia’s regions. The situation in the North
Caucasus remains explosive. The problem of the Kaliningrad region’s
future still hasn’t been resolved. Relations with “friendly Belarus”
are fairly tense. The Trans-Caucasus conflicts are frozen, but not
resolved. Moscow accepts the military presence of Washington in
Central Asia as a good thing. These are the realities. So how can
anyone talk of Russia exerting real, direct control over Ukraine, a
nation with 50 million people and considerable problems of its own?

The fewer problems Kiev has, the easier things will be for Moscow.
The stronger Ukraine becomes, the more opportunities there will be
for mutually beneficial cooperation. Russia needs an ally that would
take on part of the responsibility for military and political
stability in our region of the world: a suitable partner for
implementing large-scale international business projects in the CIS,
the Black Sea region, the Balkans, and Europe.

Thus, the break-up of Ukraine would not be to Russia’s advantage.
After all, that scenario would not only deprive us of a potentially
very strong partner, but also create a giant conflict zone along our
borders – one that would make the break-up of Yugoslavia and the
Trans-Dniester war seem minor. It would put all of Russia’s border
cities – from Rostov-on-Don to Bryansk – at risk of finding
themselves on the front line.

There would be another risk if Ukraine split into Western Ukraine and
South-Eastern Ukraine: the risk of a border revision process starting
throughout the post-Soviet states. Following the break-up of the
USSR, Russia had a very narrow escape from finding itself enmeshed in
series of regional wars, similar to those in Yugoslavia. Nothern
Kazakhstan, Eastern Ukraine, the Crimea, the Trans-Dniester region,
ethnic Russians in the Baltic states: there would have been more than
enough pretexts for intervention on the grounds of defending the
interests of Russian minorities. At least as many pretexts as the
Serbs had.

And now, in the event that Ukraine does break up, the general public
in Russia would find it very hard to reject the idea of supporting
the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine in a confrontation with
the West. There is no harm in support, as such, but it contains a
hidden danger: should the West suddenly decide that this is “a matter
of principle,” this could lead to a simultaneous deterioration in
Russia’s relations with the United States and the European Union, and
thus a more hard-line regime in Russia itself. And then it would be
only one small step to a direct confrontation over Kaliningrad
(following the Berlin crisis pattern), and an exacerbated situation
throughout the Baltic region. Control over the Trans-Dniester region
would be part of the plan for supporting South-Eastern Ukraine. The
logic behind developments is such that by starting with Ukraine,
Russia would very soon find itself in a confrontation with NATO
across the entire Western front.

What’s more, even if Ukraine breaks up rapidly and painlessly, it is
by no means certain that part of it would join Russia. Becoming the
president of an independent, industrially-developed country close to
the Black Sea is a far more enviable destiny than that of a
semi-appointed regional leader within Russia. In that event, we would
probably end up with another Belarus on our borders: a country held
back from real integration with Russia by a leader who is hostile to
the West, regardless of mutual attachments between the peoples and
pro-Moscow rhetoric.

In short, “break-up of Ukraine” scenarios don’t promise any benefits
for Moscow.

Neither would Russia stand to gain from the prospect of an
economically weak Ukraine, not self-sufficient, becoming part of the
periphery of the European Union. Practically all of Europe’s
politicians and analysts are now saying that the EU has had nothing
to do with the events in Ukraine. According to them, the West didn’t
favor either presidential candidate, initially; it was only after
Russia’s unseemly role became apparent – its determination to secure
a win for pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich – that the West
started condemning these events and supporting opposition candidate
Viktor Yushchenko. That may be a fair statement for some EU
countries, but not all of them. For example, a number of the EU’s
newest member states were overtly pro-Yushchenko even before they
joined the EU. Above all, this applies to Poland.

Poland has never been known to have any great liking for the
brother-people of Ukraine, though it has attempted to extend its
influence into Ukraine on more than one occasion. Yet now the Poles,
most of whom used to be skeptical about their neighbor-state, are
simply overflowing with inexplicable love for Ukraine. Even the
Ukrainians admit that only Poland’s active support helped draw the
European Parliament’s special attention to the situation in Ukraine
and prompt it to refuse to recognize Yanukovich as the winner.

Poland’s love for the freedom-loving people of Ukraine did not arise
suddenly. Long before Ukraine’s election, Polish politicians were
starting to glance in the direction of their south-eastern neighbor.
The Poles claim that the EU absolutely must declare that EU
membership for Ukraine is a possibility. At the latest East-West
Economic Forum, held in Poland this autumn, President Alexander
Kwasniewski stated openly that Poland considers EU membership for
Ukraine to be its own mission, and will do all it can to achieve that
goal.

Poland’s persistence is by no means altruistic. Poland actually hopes
to resolve many of its own problems by pushing for Ukraine to be
accepted into the European Union. For example, despite Poland’s
recently-acquired EU member status, the development of its economy
has stalled. Compared to Poland, Ukraine seems a far more attractive
prospect for many investors: Ukraine is free of the bureaucratic
obstacles created by endless EU regulations, and it has a skilled
labor force prepared to work for relatively low wages. Ukraine’s
economig growth has been in the double digits this year: and this is
causing bitterness in neighboring Poland, where the economy has been
in stagnation for some years. The Poles would much prefer to see a
“velvet revolution” scenario in which factories stand idle, banks
stop functioning, and investors start seeing the political situation
in Ukraine as extremely unstable.

Poland – a weak state on the periphery of Western Europe, with a
semi-agrarian economy – is striving to move towards the center of
Europe by shifting its own current role as “the periphery” onto its
eastern neighbor. Even the negotiation process for EU membership for
Ukraine actually strengthens Poland: it brings Ukraine within the
jurisdiction of EU regulations, thus making it pointless for
investors to go into Ukraine, since its legal status is
indeterminate. Essentially, Poland gains complete control over the
situation: by becoming the mediator between the EU and Ukraine, it
can directly influence the decision-making process for Ukraine’s most
important political and economic issues.

Ukraine will have to be forced to accept that scenario. By summer
2004, the prevalent attitude in Ukraine was that EU membership is not
worth pursuing. President Leonid Kuchma called on his fellow citizens
to heed the negative experience of integration into the EU among the
states of Eastern Europe, and not to be over-hasty in seeking to
integrate Ukraine into the EU with the status of “younger sister.”

The Ukrainian government was intent on developing relations with
Brussels in the areas where this would be to Ukraine’s advantage,
without making any unnecessary commitments. Ukraine’s business
community was preparing to skim some cream: as soon as the nations of
Eastern Europe joined the EU, consumer prices for essential goods
rose sharply, and people from Eastern Europe flooded into Ukraine to
buy up everthing they could. Ukraine’s border regions started
building new supermarkets, aiming to attract consumers from among the
new citizens of the EU. But now these obvious economic advantages for
Ukraine are suddenly in doubt. Viktor Yushchenko has stated
repeatedly that he is in favor of closer relations with the EU. If
the mandate of Ukraine’s new president is determined by EU support
more than by the Ukrainians themselves, he will have to be more
accommodating.

In any event, we should bear in mind that Ukraine’s economy is
stronger than that of Poland. Potentially, it could be stronger than
the combined economies of all Ukraine’s EU-member neighbors. Poland
will find it very difficult to impose the “economic periphery” role
on Ukraine; this plan could only succeed if it’s possible to disrupt
the trend of establishing Ukraine as an independent power which is
bound to play a key role in the region.

A strong, independent Ukraine would generate a fundamentally
different situation throughout Europe. The cornerstone concept in the
EU’s strategy regarding the countries of the East is that they all
wish to become EU members. So Brussels can pick and choose the
candidates, imposing its own terms on them. The EU has a strategy for
dealing with weak neighbors, but it lacks one for dealing with strong
neighbors. That is precisely why relations between Moscow and
Brussels deteriorated in early 2004: the EU’s strategy designed for a
weak Russia wasn’t working (gradually integrating Russia into the
EU’s sphere of influence, piece by piece, on the EU’s own terms), and
the EU had no other strategy. The same situation applies to Ukraine.
If even the slightest doubts arise about whether it’s really
worthwhile for Ukraine to join the EU, this makes all the
pressure-applying procedures of the Eurobureaucrats pointless. The EU
would no longer be viewed as a desirable “heaven on earth”; rather
than making demands, it woould have to seek attention – and that’s an
entirely different ball-game.

If Ukraine can manage to break out of the relations strategy now
being imposed on it by the EU, this would be to Russia’s advantage.
There has been a lot of mud-slinging directed at Russia by the
Europeans this year, and this is largely due to the EU being at a
loss. Its script, designed for a weak Russia, has been in place for a
long time; the entire colossal bureaucracy of the EU is following it.
The fact that Russia has suddenly started to rise just doesn’t fit
into the EU’s plans – and it’s so very reluctant to change those
convenient plans and concepts. It’s far easier to try to persuade
everyone that Russia remains weak and desperately in need of the EU’s
support – while any attempts by Russia to defend its own interests
are only vestiges of the past or imperialist ambitions.

If Ukraine chooses the path of a strong and independent European
power, this would force the EU to admit that its old strategy no
longer works: not because of any “imperialist ambitions,” but due to
the objective process of development among former Soviet countries.
The interests of Ukraine itself, as well as the interests of Russia,
would be served if events develop along these lines.

Events would develop differently if the revolution wins in Ukraine.
The laws by which revolutions develop are such that the leader who
wins is forced to become a dictator – otherwise he is unable to hold
on to power, and would be replaced by a more radical leader. The most
recent and obvious example of this implacable principle in action is
Georgia’s “revolution of roses,” from which the leaders of the Kiev
demonstrators are copying their plans. Mikhail Saakashvili, the “rose
revolutionary,” is being forced to keep on with revolutionary
policies, relying on direct support of the masses and his own
popularity. Saakashvili’s cult of personality has practically been
established in Georgia already – even though the costs of state
administration are covered solely through donations from abroad, and
the economic situation is deteriorating.

There is one fundamental difference between the “revolution of
roses,” for example, and the revolution of 1968, which many observers
are currently citing. In 1968, the revolution failed to win in any
country; but the ideas and movements that drove it were accepted by
the elites and integrating into the existing order. The participants
in that protest movement called for change, but set themselves the
goal of taking power. That was why the revolution of 1968 succeeded.
But if the students of Paris had actually taken power back then, what
would France be like today? The memory of 1968 probably wouldn’t seem
nearly as romantic.

And this is precisely why it’s important now that the “chestnut
revolution” in Ukraine should not win. It would be acceptable for
some opposition leaders to take up government office. There can and
should be some political reforms, and the interests of the protesters
should be taken into account. But all this should take place solely
on the basis of existing laws, and a system of compromises with the
ruling elites. A total victory for the “orange opposition” – a
victory for the power of the streets – would be a Pyrrhic victory for
Ukraine. If that happens, Ukraine would be a source of instability on
post-Soviet territory for a long time to come. The priorities of any
and all victorious revolutionaries are to radically purge the field
of domestic politics and export the revolution – not to ensure the
necessary conditions for the nation’s economic and social development
(and we are already seeing some disastrous consequences of the
revolution for Ukraine’s economy).

A second success for “velvet revolutions” within the CIS will lead to
further attempts to stir up revolutionary uprisings everywhere:
Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Central Asian nations. To put it
plainly, this would not be about democratization; it would be yet
another phase of regime change in former Soviet countries. There is
probably no need to spell out where this can lead. And Ukraine would
undoubtedly be the center of this revolutionary movement; it has
already become a testing-ground where revolutionaries from all over
the CIS are gathering experience.

Those in the West who have inspired Ukraine’s current revolution –
the likes of Zbigniew Brzezinski – do not conceal that in the event
of success in Ukraine, the main target of the international
revolutionary-democratic movement will be Russia. Brzezinski recently
said: “There is no doubt that if democracy is established in Ukraine,
this will provide great momentum for democratic forces in Russia.”
Indeed, the momentum would be great. The opposition within Russia
would become more radical, inspired by the achievements of its
neighbors. We should also expect a threat to come from the
redistribution of influence among Ukraine’s economic elites; the
finance channels of Ukraine and Russia are intertwined, so a
redistribution in Ukraine would destabilize the situation within
Russia’s elites as well. And there’s another destabilizing factor:
Ukraine could become a refuge for critics of the Kremlin’s policy in
the Caucasus. Not only theoretician critics, but practical critics:
the Russian-Ukrainian border is virtually open (so far), and close to
the Caucasus. And finally, the “loss” of Ukraine – which is precisely
how many interest groups in Russia and abroad would view an
unequivocal win for Yushchenko – may weaken the domestic and foreign
policy positions of President Vladimir Putin. At the very least, he
would be sure to face increased pressure.

It would certainly be foolish to oppose the development of democracy
in Russia. Yet the version of it currently being proposed to us by
our Western partners does seem odd: an “orange” victory at any cost,
with no consideration whatsoever of the opinions and interests of the
other side. Zero tolerance for the opposing point of view: is this
democracy?

The track record of how the current crisis in Ukraine is being
resolved, as well as analogous crises in Serbia and Georgia over
recent years, indicates one important point. The West does not have a
complete collection of the tools required to resolve such situations
to its own advantage. And Russia doesn’t even need to obstruct the
West’s revolution-managers in order to stymie them; all Russia has to
do is refrain from helping them. In one case after another, the
intervention of Russian mediators during the final stages of
conflicts has been the only factor that prevented situations from
getting out of control.

In this regard, it is very instructive to note the outcome of the
latest South Ossetia crisis. Moscow did not permit Saakashvili to
provoke it into using force; but neither did it give in to
Saakashvili’s blackmail – Moscow did not start putting pressure on
South Ossetia to agree to terms that South Ossetia considered
unacceptable. What cooled the fervor of Georgia’s leader was a
principled stand by Moscow: if Georgia wants to regain full control
over South Ossetia, it ought to reach agreement with the South
Ossetians themselves, rather than with Washington or Moscow. This
approach by Moscow proved sufficient.

Moscow has now adopted a similar stance with regard to Ukraine. It is
not in the Kremlin’s power to persuade Ukraine’s political elite or
the Ukrainian people to act in one way or another. Is the West
capable of doing so? The Western media have been full of discussion
about the importance of separating Ukraine from Russia and preventing
Russia from gaining control over Ukraine. Thus, allegedly, Ukraine
will make a conclusive choice in favor of freedom and democracy. We
have no wish to argue with commentators who say so. Ukraine should
indeed choose freedom.

Translated by Pavel Pushkin

ArmenPress
Dec 13 2004

GEORGIAN ARMENIANS REJECT AMALGAMATION

AKHALKALAKI, DECEMBER 13, ARMENPRESS: Ethnic Armenian
non-governmental organizations in Georgia’s southern region of
Samtskhe Javakheti held last Saturday their first conference to
discuss ways out of heavy social, economic and cultural conditions,
experienced by the region’s mostly Armenian population.
Titled as Integration but not Merging the conference organizers
invited representatives of the UN, OSCE, European Commission, foreign
diplomats stationed in Tbilisi, parliament members, representatives
of local and central authorities and from Armenia, but only a
representative of the OSCE office in Tbilisi was present. Also
Armenian members of Georgian parliament elected from the region did
not attend it.
Local Armenians say in principle they are not against closer
integration with the rest of Georgia, but they reject the central
authorities’ integration policy which they say leads to their merging
with ethnic Georgians.
The conference adopted a resolution that outlines ways out of the
deep crisis experienced by the region. It also decided to set up a
task force that will be seeking to design development plans together
with Georgian government officials.

DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER OF ARMENIA, LT. GENERAL MANVEL GRIGORYAN
RE-ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF BOARD OF UNION OF VOLUNTEERS “YERKRAPAH”

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 13. ARMINFO. Deputy Defense Minister of
Armenia. Lieutenant General Manvel Grigoryan is re-elected Chairman of
Board of the Union of Volunteers “Yerkrapah.”

The election took place in the course of the 6th Congress of the
“Yerkrapah” UV. Some 40 people were elected members of the Board,
including Ara Ketikyan and Myasnik Malkhasyan occupied the posts of
Vice Chairmen of the Board.

“YERKRAPAH” MEMBERS SURE THAT FORCES BACKING TERRORIST ACT IN ARMENIAN
PARLIAMENT WILL BE PROSECUTED BY PEOPLE

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 13. ARMINFO. Members of the union of volunteers
“Yerkrapah” (UVY) estimates the terrorist act in the Armenian
parliament on Oct 27, 1999 as a crime against Armenia and irrespective
of a decision on dismissal of the criminal case concerning the
organizers of the terrorist act, the UVY members express confidence
that the forces backing the crime will be brought to the justice of
the people. It is said in the resolution of the 6th congress of UVY.

As it is also said in the resolution the UVY condemns the terrorism as
a means to solve political problems. The UVY, as a fruit of Karabakh
movement, will be consecutive in the reaching fair settlement of the
Karabakh problem on the basis of the right of the people for
self-determination. “UVY members think that the fair resolution of the
Karabakh problem is possible only in the case of conducting balanced,
flexible and reasonable foreign and internal political course”, said
in the resolution.

ARMENIANS HOLD ACTION OF PROTEST NEAR TURKEY’S EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 13. ARMINFO. A group of Armenians held an action of
protest near the embassy of Turkey in Washington recently, where a
reception was held on the occasion of the American-Turkish assembly.

Turkish newspaper Hurriyet informs, the participants of the action
were scanning “the 1915 must not be repeated”, “We are ashamed for
Turkey”, “Turkey must not be permitted into the European
Union”. several turks, taking art in the reception at the embassy,
came to the demonstrators and made return statements. After the
interference of law-enforcement bodies “the duel of slogans” was
stopped.