RUSSIA AND IRAN JOIN HANDS IN THE CASPIAN
By Stephen Blank

Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
The Jamestown Foundation
June 1 2005

Wednesday, June 1, 2005

While Central Asia and the Caucasus have been the recent focus of
world attention due to the popular revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the
massacre in Andijan, Uzbekistan, potentially significant strategic
developments there have been unduly neglected. In late April Russia
evidently proposed the creation of a new defense formation,
specifically a rapid-reaction force in the Caspian. Iran welcomed the
proposal (IRNA, May 3; RIA-Novosti, May 4).

Although not much is known about this proposed force, it appears to
be intended not just to repulse terrorist threats but also to oppose
a foreign, i.e. Western, military presence in the Caspian. While this
new Russo-Iranian gambit is clearly intended to counter Washington
and NATO, it also represents a significant modification of Iran’s
stated policy of opposing the militarization of the Caspian, although
Tehran naturally is trying to obscure this contradiction in its
policy (IRNA, May 3).

Azerbaijan appears to be at the center of this issue. Immediately
after U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld left Baku on April
12-13, there was a noticeable spike in local stories claiming that
Washington was seeking major bases and extensive radar, air, and
air-defense facilities in Azerbaijan from which to attack Iran or
from which sophisticated radars and a tripartite military bloc
including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan could be built.
Azeri-American plans to further develop Operation Caspian Watch,
whose purpose is to help the Azerbaijani navy defend its coastal and
offshore oil platforms that Iran has previously threatened and to
enhance Azerbaijan’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace.
apparently triggered this overwrought reaction (Nezavisimaya gazeta,
April 15, 25; RIA-Novosti, May 4; Trend News Agency [Baku], April
14).

But Moscow’s proposal also occurs in a grander strategic context, not
just of the Ukrainian and Kyrgyz revolutions, and now the Andijan
uprising, but also of NATO’s and America’s enhanced interest in the
Caucasus and Central Asia and Russia’s retreat from Georgian bases.
It is now clear that Moscow will leave those bases, whose strategic
utility is questionable at best, by 2008. Russian President Vladimir
Putin, albeit with considerable bitterness, has acknowledged publicly
that in a situation where the host country insists on withdrawal,
Russia has no option but to bring its troops home. Even so, Putin
publicly voiced his fears that the Russian withdrawal would soon be
followed by American bases in Georgia, notwithstanding Georgian
officials’ long-held position that there would be no foreign bases on
their soil (Komsomolskaya pravda, May 24; Itar-Tass, May 14; Moscow
Times, May 24). Even Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s minister of defense, had
to acknowledge in April that the “temporary deployment of U.S. and
NATO bases on CIS territory in support of the anti-terrorist
operation in Afghanistan is in Russia’s national interests.”

Obviously, in order to counter that unwelcome combination of Western
bases in the CIS and retreating Russian power, Putin and Ivanov
thought they had to come up with a new gambit. Evidently they are
pushing for a second Russian base in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, in the Fergana
valley, the epicenter of unrest in Central Asia, and may relocate
their Georgian forces in Armenia, a prospect that disturbs Baku
(RIA-Novosti, May 26; see EDM, May 24).

Iran also feared that these alleged new bases, which have yet to be
announced, would be used to attack it. Certainly there were reports
to that effect from Baku (Trend News Agency, Baku, April 14). Tehran
has much to be anxious about, because it appeared that Russia was
leaning toward the Europeans in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear
program and it obviously faces tremendous pressure from the EU and
the United States over that program. Tehran cannot afford to alienate
Russia under any circumstances and, as in the past, it has had to
accept the relative primacy of Russian forces in the Caspian. It
certainly does not wish to see that primacy supplanted by NATO or the
United States.

There is also reason to believe that Iran was also animated by its
unhappiness over the prospect of a formal Afghan-American strategic
partnership complete with long-term, albeit not permanent, U.S.
basing capabilities at Bagram in Afghanistan and the retention of the
U.S. and NATO forces there. Reports from Afghanistan indicate a
considerable Iranian influence among those who stirred up the recent
anti-American demonstrations in Afghanistan. They also indicate that
this issue, not reports of desecration of the Koran, was probably the
driving force behind the Iranian and Pakistani agitation that stirred
up the demonstrators (New York Times, May 26).

Pentagon officials queried by Jamestown profess no knowledge of any
such Russo-Iranian security bloc or forthcoming huge base structure
in Azerbaijan and pointedly emphasize that such reports contradict
the global basing plan that was briefed to Moscow in 2004 and found
not to be a threat to it. Thus, while there may be more heat than
light behind the Russo-Iranian proposal, that scheme suggests not
only that the great game in the CIS is heating up, but also that its
military character and the trend towards strategic bipolarity in
those regions are assuming a much sharper and therefore more
dangerous character.

Kokoity Visits Moscow, Speaks of South Ossetia’s Policy

Civil Georgia, Georgia
June 1 2005

Visiting President of breakaway South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity said at
a news conference in Moscow on June 1 that during his current visit
in Russia he plans to discuss issues related with “South Ossetia’s
integration [into the Russian Federation] and economic cooperation,”
with officials there, the Interfax and RIA Novosti news agencies
reported.

At a news conference in Moscow Kokoity spoke about South Ossetia’s
relations with other secessionist regions – Abkhazia, Transdnestria
and Nagorno-Karabakh – and predicted that South Ossetia may become
an internationally recognized state in 2007.

“Western politicians are inclined to recognize [the independence]
of South Ossetia, Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh,” Kokoity said, adding
that after receiving international recognition South Ossetia will
seek to join the Russian Federation’s North Ossetian Republic.

“But some international organizations are categorically against
this [accession into Russia] and are mounting pressure on South
Ossetia. These [international organizations] agree to consider the
recognition[of South Ossetia’s independence], but not in the context
of its membership into the Russian Federation,” Kokoity added.

The South Ossetian leader said that the resignation of Aleksander
Dzasokhov, the President of the Russian Federation’s North Ossetia,
will not have any influence on relations between South and North
Ossetia.

He said that a meeting between the secessionist leaders of South
Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnestria and Nagorno-Karabakh may be held
within a month, but he did not specify the venue of this possible
summit.

“This meeting is of vital importance for our Republics and it will
definitely take place… We want to coordinate our policy and help
each other in strengthening our states; or, as democrats say, to
become free,” Kokoity said.

At the news conference Eduard Kokoity also commented regarding the
recent clash between South Ossetian militias and Georgian police
on May 29, which resulted in the death of four South Ossetian men
and one Georgian policeman by calling this incident a provocation
masterminded by the Georgian side.

Kokoity also spoke about the agreement between Russia and Georgia to
close down Russian bases in Georgia in the course of 2008 and said
that he will welcome this decision only if this withdrawal “fosters
the positions of the two states [Russia and Georgia].”

54.9% OF ARMENIAN CITIZENS HATE AZERBAIJAN

YEREVAN, June 1. /ARKA/. According to the results of an interview
conducted in Armenia as part of the project “Armenia and Azerbaijan at
`neither peace nor war’ crossroads: overcoming stereotypes”, 54.9%
of Armenia’s residents hate Azerbaijan, 51.6% hold it in contempt,
48.8% are indignant at it, 33.6% are indifferent to that country,
and 14% feel sorry for it. Only 7.5% of the respondents said that
Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis cause them to feel fear.

Most of the characteristic features of Azerbaijanis are, according
to the respondents, distinctly negative. According to the interview
results, Azerbaijanis are cunning hypocrites, aggressive, impudent
and lazy, as well as bellicose nationalists. According to 40.8%
of the respondents no forces in Armenia have a positive attitude
to Azerbaijan.

The interview was conducted last October-December, and involved 1,000
citizens of Armenia (500 Yerevan residents and 100 residents from
each of the regions of Ararat, Lori, Tavush, Chambarak, Meghri).

Reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the key to Caucasus stability
18:04

RIA Novosti, Russia
June 1 2005

MOSCOW (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) – Nagorno-Karabakh was the
first ethnic conflict that shook the foundations of the political
power “vertical” of the Soviet Union and became the detonator that
exploded it.

It enriched our active political vocabulary with such terms as
“ethnic cleansing” and “cleansing of the territory.” As a result of
the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Karabakh, about 500,000 Armenians
had to leave Azerbaijan, and about 200,000 Azerbaijanis had to leave
Armenia. Both states (particularly Armenia) have essentially become
homogenous mono-ethnic entities. During the armed clashes over
Karabakh, Azerbaijan lost 13% of its original territory.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not simply the largest regional
conflict to affect the former Soviet Union. First, it became
an example for Georgians, Ossetians, Abkhasians, Moldavians and
residents of the Dnestr region (Russians and Ukrainians). Secondly,
it caused the “karabakhization” of the political life in Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The Karabakh problem became a reference point for both
Caucasus republics. Any event in the political life of both states
is tested by the Karabakh factor.

However, the Karabakh problem is also a problem for Russia. This
thesis is not a tribute to nostalgia for the former Soviet Union
or to imperial ambitions. Russia has the world’s largest Armenian
diaspora. Data recorded as part of the 2002 Russia census, suggest that
1,130,000 Armenians live in Russia, while various expert estimates put
the current figure at about 2 million people. The Armenian migration
to Russia increased largely due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In 2002, the official Azerbaijani population of Russia numbered 621,500
people (the 13th place among ethnic groups in Russia). The Azerbaijanis
reside in 55 Federation members, with the Azeri communities in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volgograd, and the Tver region. The diaspora
is an important economic factor for the development of Azerbaijan
itself. According to R.S. Grinberg, the head of the Institute for
International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy
of Sciences, money transfers alone to Azerbaijan are worth $1.8-2.4
billion.

These Caucasian diasporas are two of the ten largest in Russia,
which means “karabakhization” became a factor in Russian as well.

Russia is a Caucasus power. The territory of its Caucasus subjects
is twice as large as the three independent countries in the Southern
Caucasus put together. In addition, the border, which passes over
mountain ridges, makes the four neighboring countries a system of
“communicating vessels.”

Russia’s role in any future resolution of the conflict should be based
on the potential of the diasporas and the ties between Armenian and
Azerbaijani residents of Russia and their native lands. Initially,
Russia should attempt to establish interaction between the two ethnic
groups, which regard one another cautiously, if not with animosity.

At present, it would be sensible to avoid two problems in the
settlement for the time being, as the sides cannot find acceptable
compromises. Azerbaijan demands the “liberation” of the regions
allegedly occupied by the Armenians and the return of Azerbaijani
refugees. Armenia (Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh) demands a solution
to the problem of the political and legal status of Nagorny Karabakh.
It is obvious that the situation demands compromises, which would at
least point to some progress in the conflict’s resolution.

Russian diplomacy could certainly provide such solutions. “The
liberation” of seven districts occupied by Armenian forces could be
separated from the issue of returning refugees, which the Armenians
regard as a security threat. It would eliminate both the “Armenian
occupation” (a political trauma for Azerbaijan) and the security
threat, which is a complicated issue for Armenia. International
peacekeeping forces (led by Russia) could be deployed in the seven
districts that would become a buffer zone between the conflicting
sides, and the Azerbaijani refugees could receive serious material
compensation from global financial structures for the loss of
property and moral damages. Real progress toward a compromise and
signs of certain positive developments in the process (even if they
are palliative) could evidently be beneficial both for Russia and
for the conflict’s resolution, even though the final solution is a
long way off.

Russia needs Armenia, a traditional ally, and Azerbaijan, which
aside from its geopolitical importance is notable for its public’s
pro-Russian views. Success in the process of reconciliation between
Armenia and Azerbaijan would mean there was no alternative to
Russian-Georgian dialogue. Therefore, the key to stability in the
entire Caucasus region is the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement with
proactive support from Russia, if it demonstrates the political will.

Sergei Markedonov is the head of the ethnic relations department at
the Institute for Political and Military Analysis

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.

Time Magazine Distributes CDs On Turkish-Armenian Relations To Its Subscribers

Turkish Press
June 1 2005

ANKARA (AA) – The Time Magazine, one of the leading news magazines
in the United States, distributed CDs of Turkish documentary about
Turkish-Armenian relations to its 494 thousand subscribers in Europe.

Holding a news conference on Wednesday, Ankara Chamber of Commerce
(ATO) Chairman Sinan Aygun said, “with the sponsorship of ATO, a
documentary film was shot about Turkish-Armenian relations in the
past. CDs of the documentary ‘Blonde Bride’ was distributed by the
Time Magazine to 494 thousand people in Europe.”

“The project’s target is not to reply to allegations of Armenians but
to give appropriate information about both history of Turkish-Armenian
relations and the Armenian issue. We aim to prevent distortion of
historical events,” he said.

Noting that the CDs are prepared in Turkish, Russian, English, German,
French, Spanish and Arabic languages, Aygun added that the CDs also
included information about Istanbul, Turkey and regions in Turkey
and backstage of documentary.

South Ossetia’s independence will be recognized by 2007 – President Kokoity
20:44

RIA Novosti, Russia
June 1 2005

MOSCOW, June 1 (RIA Novosti) – South Ossetia, a self-proclaimed
republic in Georgia, will certainly have its independence recognized,
de facto and de jure, by 2007, South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity
said at a press conference in Moscow today.

“Political experts in the West are yielding to recognize, both
de facto and legally, Kosovo, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh
[Armenian-populated area in Azerbaijan]. Current developments in
South Ossetia show we have a genuine republic taken shape, and real
statehood,” he said.

The president does not rule out South Ossetia joining the Russian
Federation after recognition. It may do so through a merger with
North Ossetia, an autonomy in Russia, which borders on South Ossetia.

“International organizations are in dire opposition to that prospect,
and pressuring South Ossetia, to an extent, by saying its recognition
can come under consideration but not in the context of possible
unification with Russia,” said President Kokoity.

The heads of four unrecognized republics, Abkhazia in Georgia, South
Ossetia, Transdniestria in Moldova, and Nagorny Karabakh, intend
to meet in conference within the month. “This conference will be of
extreme importance to the republics. We want to coordinate action,
and help each other to bolster our statehood. Democrats are putting
it differently saying they want to help each other gain freedom.”

Kokoity does not think it necessary for South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
Transdniestria and Nagorny Karabakh to arrange joint military
exercises. “They may be held, but we don’t think we need them very
much as saber-rattling will take us nowhere.”

The unrecognized republics have said on many occasions that they
are willing to come to each other’s rescue in need, “but we prefer
political dialogue.”

The president arrived in Moscow to discuss “integration prospects and
settle the problems of Russian nationals in South Ossetia,” he said.

People who became Russian citizens within a few preceding years make
a majority of the South Ossetian population. “They are encountering
particular problems, with which I try to solve.”

The president’s current visit to Moscow does not envisage contacts with
Russian leader. “We are tackling economic matters now,” Kokoity said.

This all they do to hegemonize the oil resources, writes Rafeeq A.Naqash

GreaterKashmir.com (press release), India
June 1 2005

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the vast oil deposits
beneath the Caspian Sea have made the regions of Georgia and Azerbaijan
the focus of heated interest. The United States sees the region as an
alternative source of energy, Russia regards it as its own strategic
reserve, other countries – Iran, Turkey, even China – have a stake
in control of the oil, where it goes, and how. They call it “The
Great Game” – a reference to the rivalry between Imperial Russia and
the British Empire over influence in Central Asia at the end of the
19th century. This time the stakes are just as high – control over
the vast deposits of crude oil beneath the Caspian Sea but there are
more players.

The United States (and the West) is taking a keen interest in the
region as an alternative source of energy supply for the next century.

Russia has long regarded the Caspian as its strategic reserve and
Moscow does not take kindly to the prospect of the once-Soviet states
which actually sit on the oil drilling their way to real economic
independence.

Iran is keenly interested both in becoming a player itself and in
keeping the United States from dominating its back yard to the North.

Turkey desperately seeks a sphere of influence of its own after being
effectively locked out of the European Union.

Even China, the new giant Tiger to the East, has indicated interest.

At the center of it all is Caspian Sea, and Azerbaijan is booming. A
London-based think-tank recently estimated there are 68 billion
barrels of crude beneath the Caspian in ‘proven’ reserves. The latest
US. government estimate puts reserves at over 100 billion barrels,
worth approximately $2 trillion at current prices.

Whatever the true value of Caspian oil, the rumor of riches has
attracted an a large number of entrepreneurs including international
oil giants, as well as a host of subcontractors interested in getting
their own piece of the oily action. Azerbaijan is the centre of the
entire effort. The various oil companies have pledged to invest over
$25 billion in Azerbaijan by completion in 2004. There is no question
that Azerbaijan is going to be the wealthiest country in the region
in ten years owing to its oil reservoirs.

But paradox is that the Oil won’t really come on line until 2005 if
everything proceeds according to plan. Nor is it possible to know the
true cost of the pipeline. Because clouds of uncertainty are hovering
over the construction of pipeline. Even the routing of the “early oil,”
a line that goes through Russia — but it also goes through Chechnya,
which is still struggling with Moscow. Another possibility is to go
through Georgia to a new terminal on the Black Sea. The most of all
options goes straight South over Iran to the Persian Gulf.

That is not only the shortest route, but also the most secure –
petroleum is so cheap in Iran there is no temptation to drill into the
line, as is currently the practice in Chechnya (and was in Georgia).

The problem is that US companies could not participate without
violating the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). And there are questions
about continued stability in Azerbaijan itself. Most worrisome is
the ongoing stalemate with Armenia to the west over the disputed
territory of Nagorno Karabakh, where ethnic Armenians have declared
their independence from Azerbaijan.

(The Author is Research Scholar Deptt. CCAS, University of Kashmir)

ATAA Chairman: Allegations About So-called Armenian Genocide Are Not Humanitarian, But Political

Turkish Press
June 1 2005

ANKARA (AA) – Allegations about so-called Armenian genocide were not
humanitarian, on the contrary, they were political, Vural Cengiz,
the chairman of the Assembly of Turkish-American Associations (ATAA),
said on Tuesday.

Holding a news conference after holding talks with the Turkish
government officials, Cengiz said, “we support the latest attitude of
the Turkish government against allegations about so-called genocide.”

“Any attempt to open the border crossing between Turkey and Armenia
will not eliminate those allegations since the Armenian plan is
composed of four stages: terrorism, recognition, compensation and
claims for territory. Armenian diaspora describes Republic of Armenia
as eastern Armenia and eastern part of Turkey as western Armenia,”
he said.

Cengiz added that they were planning to hold demonstrations to express
their reaction against those allegations.

RFE/RL Georgia/Russia: Base Deal Seen As Mutually Acceptable Compromise
Tuesday, 31 May 2005

By Jean-Christophe Peuch

Moscow and Tbilisi yesterday announced an agreement on the closure of
Russia’s two remaining military bases in Georgia by the end of 2008. In
theory at least, the deal puts an end to a dispute that started in
December 1999, when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe demanded that Moscow vacate all four former Soviet military
bases it had been maintaining in that Southern Caucasus country. By
2001, Russia had vacated two bases. But the fate of the two remaining
facilities — in the Black Sea port of Batumi and the predominantly
Armenian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti — had remained in abeyance
for nearly four years, triggering tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi.

Prague, 31 May 2005 (RFE/RL) — Addressing reporters last week on 23
May at the Moscow headquarters of the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” daily
newspaper, Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly indicated he had
abandoned all hope of maintaining military bases in Georgia.

“Is it a good thing, or a bad thing that we’re leaving Georgia? From
the standpoint of our security and strategic interests, [these bases]
do not present any particular interest. This is not my personal
opinion. This is the opinion of the Russian Army General Staff,”
Putin said.

At the same time Putin sounded regretful, saying the upcoming
withdrawal would diminish further Moscow’s influence in the former
Soviet Union.

“Politically speaking is it good, or bad? I believe it is not very
good because it means our military presence is no longer desirable
to our neighbors — and I don’t see anything good in this. Whether
this is a right decision with regard to [our neighbors’] interests,
it’s up to them to decide,” Putin said.

But, the Russian president added pragmatically that Russia’s insistence
in maintaining troops in Georgia would eventually backfire.

“It would be even worse if we tried at all costs to prevent [the
Georgians] from implementing their sovereign rights. That would give
rise to even greater mistrust toward our policies,” Putin said.

In this context, the agreement reached yesterday came as no surprise.

All the more because, when U.S. President George W. Bush was in Tbilisi
earlier this month, he urged his Georgian allies to not antagonize
the Kremlin and continue to negotiate the Russian withdrawal.

Bush’s admonition followed Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s
refusal to attend the Moscow ceremonies that marked the 60th
anniversary of the end of World War II. Saakashvili had cited the
collapse of an earlier round of talks, during which Georgia had
insisted that the two Russian bases be vacated by 1 January 2008,
to justify his decision.

Addressing reporters after he had signed with his visiting Georgian
counterpart a joint declaration reaffirming Moscow’s commitment to
vacate both bases, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov yesterday
said the sides had agreed on a new timeframe that clearly meets some
of Moscow’s requirement.

“The final withdrawal will be completed in the course of the year 2008.
The declaration outlines the [successive] stages of this withdrawal in
utmost detail, be it the withdrawal of heavy weapons, equipment, other
property and military personnel; or the transfer to the Georgian side
of Russian military facilities that are not part of the Akhalkalaki
and Batumi bases,” Lavrov said.

The Russian military seems satisfied with the expanded timeframe,
which roughly meets a demand made earlier this month by Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov.

Colonel Vladimir Kuparadze, the deputy commander of the Russian Group
of Forces in Transcaucasia, yesterday told the ITAR-TASS news agency
would start pulling out military equipment in August.

Konstantin Kosachev, who chairs the foreign affairs committee of the
Russian lower house of parliament, or State Duma, yesterday welcomed
the agreement. In comments made to Russia’s Interfax news agency,
Kosachev said he was satisfied to see that “Georgia has eventually
stopped politicizing the base issue to heed to common sense.”

Georgian political leaders have expressed similar contentment,
describing yesterday’s joint declaration as a “historical” document
that paves the way for a significant breakthrough in bilateral ties.

Anton Surikov is a political expert at the Institute of Globalization
Studies in Moscow. He tells RFE/RL he views yesterday’s deal as
equally beneficial to both sides.

“I do believe this is a sensible compromise that one could equally
describe as a victory for Russia and a personal victory for the
Georgian president. On the one hand, it was obvious that one day or
another we would have to vacate those bases to meet our international
obligations,” Surikov said. “But to do that Russia insisted on
an acceptable timeframe. I think the four years or so we are now
given to vacate the bases are enough. On the other hand, the Georgian
president had made the withdrawal of the Russian bases one of his main
hobbyhorses. He can now get the credit for [yesterday’s] decision.”

Russia initially maintained it would need at least 10 years to vacate
the two bases. But it progressively yielded ground to the Georgian
demands, saying the withdrawal could be completed in just four years.

Surikov believes there is nothing unusual in Russia’s progressively
softening its stance.

“Nothing has changed. This is simply the usual way of negotiating. You
start by placing the bar very high and then you reach a compromise,
a medium-level solution. After all, Georgia too insisted that the
withdrawal should be completed as soon as possible. But it eventually
agreed that the timeframe should be expanded,” Surikov said.

There is one drawback for Russia, however.

The agreement reached yesterday does not refer to Georgia’s earlier
oral pledges to not authorize the deployment of foreign troops after
the Russian withdrawal.

Moscow had previously insisted that the Georgian parliament must
vote a law banning the stationing of troops from a third country on
national soil. But Tbilisi had bluntly dismissed such a possibility.

Surikov says he believes that, in the absence of such guarantees,
the eventual deployment of foreign troops in NATO-hopeful Georgia is
almost a foregone conclusion.

“I have almost no doubts that, with time, Georgia will join NATO and
that we’ll see foreign troops deploy there under one form or another.
[But] I would not dramatize the situation. Foreign troops are
currently using the Baltic states and there is nothing catastrophic
in that. The same thing will happen in Georgia. The only problem is
the psychological impact it will have on Russian citizens. For a very
large number of them, this will be something unpleasant,” Surikov said.

In Georgia too, the follow-up to yesterday’s agreement is likely to
trigger some unhappy reactions.

Russia has long suggested that its two military bases be replaced
with a joint antiterrorist center to train border guards and elite
army units.

Saakashvili’s spokesman Gela Charkviani yesterday said there
was no mention of the future antiterrorist center in the joint
Russian-Georgian declaration. However, Georgian Foreign Minister
Salome Zurabishvili said it was still on the agenda.

Russia’s “Kommersant-Daily” today reported Tbilisi has agreed to
consider Moscow’s demand that its Batumi base should serve as the
nucleus of the future center.

But Georgia’s parliamentary opposition leader Davit Gamkrelidze last
week said he opposed the creation of any joint antiterrorist center,
which he likened to an attempt at “legitimizing” Russia’s military
presence in the country.

AzerTag, Azerbaijan
June 1 2005

REPLACEMENT OF RUSSIAN MILITAYR BASES IN ARMENIA TO CAUSE SERIOUS
CONCREN
[June 01, 2005, 23:07:39]

On 1 June, the United States Senator Charles Hagel held a news
conference at the “Hyatt Regency-Nakhchivan” Hotel.

Noting that he is visiting the country as representative of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Hagel said he is going to
have exchange of opinions on series of questions.

He said President Ilham Aliyev had received the delegation he headed
and they had discussed a range issues related to security, geopolitical
situation, economic development, cooperation in the energy field,
as well as democratic issues. I conveyed gratitude of the American
people to the head of the Azerbaijan state for cooperation in fighting
terrorism and activity in peacemaking process in Afghanistan, Iraq
and Kosovo, he underlined.

Touching upon the opening of the Azerbaijan sector of BTC MEP, the
Senator said he has been one of the supporters of this project. BTC
is an important factor for security, stability, and development
in region. And the United States is proud for participation in the
Project.

Charles Hagel said his country supports peace way resolution to the
Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Highly estimating the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from
Georgia, Mr. Hagel noted that replacement of a part of them in Armenia
would cause serious concern. Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are
independent states. No country should have foreign militarily bases
in its territory. This would cause threat in region, he warned.