SEMINAR ON TURKISH GENOCIDE OF ASSYRIANS TO BE HELD IN STOCKHOLM
Assyrian International News Agency, AINA
Sept 23 2005
A seminar on the World War One Turkish genocide of Assyrians, Armenians
and Greeks will be held in Stockholm on September 24. The following
is a press release of the Assyrian Youth Federation of Sweden, which
is sponsoring the seminar.
The Armenian researcher Ara Sarafian is invited to give a lecture
during the Seyfo Seminar taking place at the University of Stockholm on
September, 24th. For the majority of us he might be yet an unknown
character who will be visiting us. However, Mr. Sarafian has an
impressive academic past with many years of studies behind him. He
is also a frequently hired lecturer on issues concerning Armenian
history. What sets him definitely apart from the rest of the Armenian
researchers is his knowledge of the Assyrian Genocide. In purpose
of presenting him and his ideas in advance to the seminar, he has
answered five questions for us.
Q: Mr. Sarafian, what view do you have on the Assyrians and their
history?
A: My knowledge about Assyrians is bad. I know about the ancient
Assyrians, but not about Assyrians of the current times. Their name is
mentioned in Armenian books, often rapidly, but Assyrians as a nation
remain invisible. Even today, where there is an Assyrian minority
in Armenia, there is no information on their language, culture or
history in the general Armenian society. One exception of which I
remember is William Saroyan, who wrote about Assyrians in one of his
short stories. And that was the first time I thought of Assyrians as
a modern people. I was touched already as early as then, because they
were like us Armenians, however living under worse conditions.
Q: Why are you one of very few, or maybe the only Armenian genocide
researcher, who mentions that a genocide was committed even against
the Assyrians?
A: I mention the genocide on the Assyrians, because I know that even
they were murdered in large numbers during 1915. But I am ashamed about
not knowing more. I am also ashamed that our elders did not tell us
more about the Assyrians. I believe that it has to do with that a lot
of Armenians still hold on to the assumption that the attention given
to the Assyrian and Greek genocide in the Ottoman Turkey minimizes
the Armenian aspect. It is a little like “the holocaust’s uniqueness
theoreticians” that minimizes the aspect of Roma and other groups in
the Nazi occupied Europe.
Q: Do you think that Armenians and Assyrians should cooperate on the
recognition of the genocide or continue to work separately?
A: I think that there is a big space for cooperation, but for
many Armenians the genocide is nothing they work with. It is more
a confession, and that confession seems to include the conviction
that the destruction of the year 1915 was only pointed against the
Armenians. Assyrians, Armenians, Turks and Kurds can all cooperate,
or work parallel with each other in purpose of lifting up history. I
would like to see that the Assyrians, for example, translate a few
main writings concerning the Assyrian genocide into English – today’s
most dominant academic and political language – in purpose of breaking
the ice. By confronting others with such important writings, they will
receive much more support for their cause. And I know there are such
important writings. I would also like to recommend that the Assyrians
build their own libraries, research centres and academics so that
their voice will be well articulated and heard within the academic
world. I know that such steps are already taken and I hope that I
will be able to take part of the knowledge that will be gathered.
Q: When did your interest in the Armenian genocide start and why?
A: I became an historian during the 1980’s, because I wanted to
find out the truth about the Armenians. I was privileged enough to
make that decisions. At that time I lived in Turkey, where I found
some good friends, and came to realize how close Armenians and Turks
stood to each other. After that I went to the USA and the University
of Michigan where I started to study Ottoman-Turkish and Armenian
history, and that led me unavoidably to the question of the genocide.
My real area of interest was about the internal organisation of the
Armenian people in the late Ottoman empire. I am seldom asked to
lecture about that area even though it interests me a lot. Five years
ago I stepped out of the formal Armenian academic establishment in the
USA, because I found that many of the establishment’s characters were
chauvinists. Just because the Armenians had been victims, it does not
mean they can not be chauvinists. Even today many Armenian historians
have the opinion that “history” is not about seeking the truth, it
is a practise that compromises a necessary element of “adjusting”
the truth for ideological and personal purposes. Maybe the excluding
of the Assyrian question has been a part of this adjustment.
Q: Do you think that Turkey will recognize the genocide against
Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks?
A: I think that Turkey will recognize the genocide and other injustices
that Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds and others have suffered
from, mainly because more and more Turks are becoming interested in
those questions and they do not want to carry the burden from that
time on their shoulders, as little as they want to lie about such
questions. I hope that even we act in a way that invites them to go
through this phase. Establishing individual contacts with the Modern
Turkey and working for a democratisation of that country, will help
this development.
Translated from Swedish by Nahrin Akguc
From: Baghdasarian

REPORTERS TACKLE ARMENIAN EATERY
By Lauren Phillips And Kris Turner
The State News, MI
Sept 23 2005
JOSH GRASSO The State News
The House of Kabobs, 1825 E. Michigan Ave., serves Armenian fare,
including Armenian Cheese Bouregh and Kutabi, House Kabob Delight,
foreground, and the Red Bean Bon Apetit, center.
Editor’s note: State News reporters Lauren Phillips and Kris Turner
set out to review an Armenian restaurant, House of Kabobs, 1825 E.
Michigan Ave., in Lansing. The restaurant is owned by two Armenian
families – one of which owned a large restaurant in Moscow. House of
Kabobs has plans to introduce a “student day,” which will be the last
Friday of every month and feature discounts on food and an opportunity
to learn about Armenian culture, co-owner Elmira Govorkyan said.
Blinded by the sunset as we drove down Michigan Avenue, we passed
House of Kabobs on the right, despite its noticeable exterior with
pink accents. The small size of the restaurant, perched on the edge
of a neighborhood in Lansing’s East side, makes the eatery look like
a cozy deli or diner. We finally make it into the small parking lot
and walk inside.
Lauren Phillips: It looks like a deli. I don’t like the fluorescent
lighting, but the wood chairs give it a homemade touch.
Kris Turner: It looks like Valentine’s Day exploded in here. The
bright reds and pinks (on the walls) are slightly nauseating. And
there are knickknacks everywhere.
We sat at a table, covered in trinkets and red cloth. We started with
appetizers, potato piroshki, $3.50, and blinchikee, $3.75.
LP: This soft meat-filled thing is called a “blinchikee.” I like the
little pancake wrap.
KT: Now that’s what I like. It’s in your mouth and all of a sudden
it kind of explodes with flavor. (The meat’s) kind of like Hamburger
Helper.
LP: What’s Hamburger Helper?
KT: You don’t know what Hamburger Helper is?
LP: No …
KT: Do you remember the little glove thing from when we were kids
on TV? It’s like hamburger and you put all this stuff in it and it’s
like a meal. Did you never eat Hamburger Helper in your whole life?
LP: Um, no.
KT: (dead silence, open-mouthed stare.)
LP: This potato piroshki (an order comes with two) is like a soggy
ball of bread, about the size of a potato, stuffed with mashed potatoes
and spices. I kind of like it.
KT: It’s mushy in your mouth and has a weird consistency, but it’s
kind of hard to cut with a knife. I’d say it’s OK in my book.
Turner leans in closer to the remaining potato piroshki.
KT: There’s a hair on it!
LP: (leans in too) No! Oh geez…
Both: Ewwww.
For dinner, Turner had a chicken shish kabob wrap, which has seasoned
and marinated cubes of grilled chicken breast with green peppers,
tomatoes and onions, for $5.75. It comes with a side of marinated
cabbage and a pickle.
KT: My wrap arrived warm, which is always good. It’s sprinkled with
some kind of seasoning – not spicy, a little like Lawry’s salt,
but good.
KT: I can taste tomato and the vegetable. It’s enjoyable, but not
soggy, which is nice. But, it got a little messy, leaking onto
the plate.
LP: The grilled chicken is really good. It is what you would expect
from a wrap from Caf-II-Go, but grilled and marinated.
Tasting Turner’s side of marinated cabbage:
KT: Just say no to cabbage! Ick.
LP: Tasting that cabbage reminds me of the time my dad took me to
his friend’s cow farm.
Phillips gets her meal, a house “Luleh” shish kabob plate, $8.75. The
kabob meat is a grilled mixture of ground lamb and beef. It comes with
two types of rice pilaf with imported basmati rice, tossed green salad,
homemade tomato sauce and homemade Armenian bread.
LP: There’s two sausage-sized meat things on the kabob and a side of
marinated veggies and rice with some kind of seasoning.
LP: How do you eat a kabob, Turner?
KT: Don’t you just pull it off the stick and shove it all in your
mouth?
LP: It’s one of those Popsicle conundrums.
LP: Back to my meat on a stick. It’s sizzling steak and lamb at the
same time… interesting to have the two flavors in your mouth like
that at once. It’s a little tough to chew.
KT: I wasn’t that impressed. It didn’t make me go “wow.”
LP: The rice is really spicy.
KT: It doesn’t bother me, really. My one concern with the rice is,
well, some of the granules are hard.
LP: Yeah. It’s not hot, either.
We pay and on the ride home, reflect on our meals, which notably
didn’t give us indigestion.
LP: So Turner, what’d you think?
KT: Overall, a gross experience. The hair in the food was really a
turn-off. While the food was OK, it lacked a certain something. I
won’t be coming back anytime soon.
LP: Yeah, I’m definitely kind of broke right now, so I wouldn’t be
able to afford driving out here and paying this kind of money. The plus
side, though, is the appeal of the opportunity to learn about another
culture and to taste food from it. I just wish the food was better.

16 ARMENIAN SCHOOLS IN TURKEY OPENS FIRST SEMESTER
Journal of Turkish Weekly
Sept 23 2005
ISTANBUL – The new education period has been started. The minority
schools also opened the education session. There are 16 Armenian
schools with 3219 students and 412 teachers. Many more Armenian
students attend the ‘normal’ schools.
This year about 454 children were registered to the Armenian
kindergartens. 2107 students were registered to the primary and
secondary schools. 658 Armenian students were registered to the
Armenian high schools.
Apart from the normal courses, the Turkish Armenian schools also give
Armenian language and Armenian religion courses to their students.
Patriarch Mesrop II, religious leader of Turkish Armenians, said that
the Armenian language courses and Armenian culture courses in these
schools are crucial to maintain the existence of Armenian minority
in Turkey. The main problem of the Armenian population in Turkey is
voluntary ‘assimilation’. Many Armenians do not attend the Armenian
Church and Armenian schools. Another problem is the mixed marriages.
There are about 100.000 Armenians in Istanbul and they have all
the rights to take education in their own schools. Apart from the
Armenian schools there are Armenian health institutions, sport clubs
and cultural-social organizations. Moreover 3 Armenian newspaper are
published in Istanbul.
Apart from the Turkish Armenians, more than 50. 000 Armenians come
to ýstanbul to work from Armenia.
Armenian Schools in Istanbul and Student Numbers:
Aramyan: 142 students.
Bezciya: 161 students.
Bomonti Mihtaryan: 40 students.
Kalfayan: 101 students.
Dadyan: 411 students.
Esayan: 313 students.
Getronagan: 211 students.
Karagozyan: 175 students.
Levon Vartuhyan: 123 students.
Ferikoy: 237 students.
Pangalti Mihtaryan: 362 students.
Sahakyan: 400 students.
Samatya Anarat Higutyun: 74 students.
Ortakoy Tarkmancats: 143 students.
Tibrevank: 78 students.
Yesilkoy: 248 students.
JTW, with Agos and Bolsohays.
–Boundary_(ID_OxXxRgao7L1brUT4/NSM1w)–

TIME FOR A CHANGE, NOT A REVOLUTION
By Ednan Agayev
The Moscow Times, Russia
Sept 23 2005
All but invisible to the wider world, a crisis is developing within
Azerbaijan that could threaten regional stability and the future
development of Caspian basin oil and gas.
Though largely self-created, by a combination of endemic corruption
and institutional underdevelopment, the emerging calamity is being
greatly aided by opportunistic measures by others, including Russia,
the United States and especially Iran.
In many ways, this is developing into a 21st-century version of the
Great Game — that epochal struggle between the British and Russian
empires, which dominated the lives of all sorts of tiny Eurasian
countries throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th century.
But Azerbaijan is not Afghanistan, which has had the misfortune
of historically always having been someone else’s buffer state or
strategic beachhead.
Azerbaijan is a prize in its own right. It can claim one-fifth of the
oil and gas of the Caspian Basin, one of the world’s last great pools
of hydrocarbon wealth. Led by BP, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline
has just opened, creating a new gateway to world markets for Azeri oil.
With gross national product growth increasing at about 11 percent
annually, this should be the most economically successful of the
former Soviet states. Should be, and in some ways is — but not in
nearly enough ways to make Azerbaijan the happy and stable place it
ought to be.
Instead, it is a place that is starting to come unglued. Run until
recently by an authoritarian, but politically astute, former KGB
general named Heidar Aliyev, Azerbaijan is now run by a fractious
group of his ministers, ruling in the name of Heidar’s son, Ilham.
Ilham Aliyev is an intelligent, quite well-educated man of 44 whose
instincts do not appear to run to strong-arm tactics or dictatorship.
But he is surrounded by ministers and minders for whom there is much
to lose in the event of a regime change. Billions of dollars, in fact.
This is because Azerbaijan, under the elder Aliyev, functioned as
a giant franchising operation, with nearly all aspects of Azeri
national life hived off as vertically integrated businesses. If you
want to pass a university exam, you pay the instructor $50, a large
part of which he pays to his supervisor, who then pays part to his
superior, and so on all the way to the top. To be named police chief
in a medium-sized town costs about $10,000, most of which winds up
with whoever’s signature is required for such an appointment.
This was a relatively stable and predictable situation under Heidar
Aliyev, because he was imaginative enough to control its excesses
and tough enough to be able to do so.
There is room to doubt that Ilham Aliyev has that kind of authority.
He has in fact replaced few of his father’s lieutenants and has
remarkably few allies of his own in government from his own generation
or cohort. Increasingly, he appears to be more dependent on his
father’s aging cronies than they are on him.
Apart from the personalities at the top, the world around them
has changed utterly. Part of the change occurred in the streets of
Tbilisi, in neighboring Georgia, where just a month before Heidar
Aliyev’s death in 2003, the Rose Revolution replaced another former
KGB chieftain’s regime.
Understandably, a lot of people have been sticking colored pins
in their wall maps of the former Soviet Union ever since, trying
to guess in which state the next so-called color revolution might
happen: Tbilisi, Kiev, Bishkek — and now Baku? With parliamentary
elections set for Nov. 6, the Azeri opposition parties are playing up
that trend for all it is worth. But many of the opposition leaders
in Azerbaijan are every bit as corrupt and as much a part of the
old guard as the men they wish to replace. Many were involved in an
ill-fated 1992-93 government, almost universally condemned for chaos,
corruption and incompetence.
But the color revolutions have had an important influence, if not
domestically then externally.
For one thing, they have made it more difficult for Russia, still
the leading power in the region, and the United States, the remaining
world superpower, to collaborate, even when it is practical to do so.
The United States now faces a dilemma in dealing with the former
Soviet states with which it is friendly, including Azerbaijan. For
commercial and geopolitical reasons, Washington would obviously prefer
stability over chaos. But it can also no longer afford to be seen to
be propping up an unreformable kleptocracy.
Meanwhile, Moscow also would prefer stability instead of another
revolution in its own backyard.
For both, there are other complications. Iran, along the southern
Azeri border, is chief among them. There are 20 million to 25 million
ethnic Azeris in Iran, and the dominant religion in both nations is
Shiite Islam. Fundamentalism has started to surface in Azerbaijan’s
border areas, and there are reports that some theological schools
across the country are leaning toward Iranian-style militancy. In an
otherwise secular state, these are disturbing developments.
This must be disturbing Washington too. Rumors abound that it is
looking to redeploy military contingents from Uzbekistan, which has
asked the U.S. Army to vacate a military base there, to Azerbaijan,
including to one site close to the Iranian border.
Rumors also abound that Russia is redeploying troops formerly based
in Georgia to regions of Armenia that border Azerbaijan. Apart from
the historic enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, such movements could redraw the military
map of the entire region.
But is a U.S.-Russian rivalry in the area inevitable? The truth is
that Moscow and Washington have more interests in common than they
have in conflict, particularly with respect to Iran, which is a source
of even bigger worry to Russia than to the United States.
Intriguingly, in recent weeks, some members of the Russian media have
been playing up the disruptive influences in Azerbaijan of Wahhabi
militants. But Wahhabism is used as a catch-all term for all forms
of radical Islam, whether Sunni or Shiite.
There may well be some Wahhabi activists in Azerbaijan, especially
in the north, where Chechen and Dagestani refugees have settled. But
the real fundamentalist threat is overwhelmingly from the south,
from Iran. The Kremlin certainly knows this, but, for complex and
remarkably narrow commercial reasons — the sale of nuclear reactor
technology — it cannot bring itself to say so publicly.
And that, almost literally, is what is keeping Russia and the United
States from collaborating in Azerbaijan. In nearly all other matters
of consequence, their interests in Azerbaijan coincide: stability,
moderate reform, and even curbing corruption — since even Russian
companies like LUKoil must be finding the spiraling cost of graft
hard to manage.
There does not need to be a color revolution in Azerbaijan. There
does need to be fundamental change, bringing new young modernizers
into power and giving the rising middle class its say in the country’s
future.
But with Moscow eyeing the Americans with suspicion, and Washington
unable to rely on the Russians while facing Iran, Azerbaijan appears
headed unstoppably toward a less-than-promising future.
Ednan Agayev, an Azeri-born former senior Russian diplomat and
executive vice president of the Russian-American Business Council,
contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.

AZERBAIJAN: HAS GOVERNMENT TAKEN A TROUBLING EXAMPLE FROM ANDIJON?
By Richard Giragosian
Radio Free Europe, Czech Republic
Sept 23 2005
As campaigning for the 6 November parliamentary elections gets
under way, the Azerbaijani authorities are directing their efforts
toward ensuring that the ruling Yeni Azerbaycan Party, together with
ostensibly independent but loyal candidates, retains control of the new
parliament. While such efforts are not unexpected in light of previous
tainted elections, the Azerbaijani government’s blatant disregard
for the international community’s insistence on electoral fairness
and transparency is surprising. Moreover, this apparent disdain for
world public opinion is at odds with — and signals a retreat from —
initial moves apparently aimed at reversing the country’s record of
election “illegalities.”
In mid-May, President Ilham Aliyev issued a decree warning election
officials and local councils against any voting irregularities. The
decree also tasked local election officials with compiling accurate
and updated voter lists, set forth procedures for uniform exits polls,
and made provision for all candidates to have equal access to state
run media.
Just a few weeks later, however, in late June, the parliament adopted
numerous minor amendments to the election law that failed to include
a number of the most significant recommendations of the Council of
Europe’s Venice Commission. Those changes, which opposition parties,
too, deemed indispensable to ensuring a fair and democratic election,
ranged from greater opposition representation on electoral commissions
to the use of indelible ink to mark voters’ fingers in a bid to
prevent multiple voting.
The Crackdown Begins The passage of half-hearted electoral reforms
was soon eclipsed by much more disturbing events, however. Starting
in early August, the country’s already embattled political opposition
was targeted in a new campaign of intimidation and innuendo. Ruslan
Bashirli, chairman of the opposition youth movement Yeni Fikir (New
Thinking), was arrested, charged with conspiring to overthrow the
government and, for good measure, accused of accepting money from an
unlikely combination of Armenian intelligence officers and American
nongovernmental organizations. The case also implicated Azerbaijan
Popular Front Party (AHCP) Chairman Ali Kerimli by charging that
Bashirli was acting on Kerimli’s behalf.
Perhaps fearful of the Ukrainian example of the potential power of
a youth movement, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested Yeni Fikir
deputy head Said Nuri and another of the organization’s leaders in
September on similar treason charges. Those arrests were followed
by a raid on the offices of the AHCP during which police “seized”
three grenades and an undisclosed amount of explosives in a room used
by the Yeni Fikir movement. Then, on 15 September, a special team of
security officers from the Azerbaijani Border Service and National
Security Ministry arrested Serhiy Yevtushenko — an activist of the
opposition Ukrainian youth movement Pora — at the Baku airport and
interrogated and later expelled him. Yevtushenko had been invited to
Baku by the opposition Azadlyg bloc, of which the AHCP is a member,
to attend a conference on democratization.In mid-May, President Ilham
Aliyev issued a decree warning election officials and local councils
against any voting irregularities.
In a more imaginative move, some recent Azerbaijani media reports
also “reported” that opposition Musavat party Chairman Isa Gambar
recently met with an Armenian intelligence operative to discuss plans
to disrupt the election. The most amusing aspect of that report was
the contention that Gambar was able to meet freely with the Armenian
during a visit to Turkey, not a country known for permitting Armenian
intelligence such freedom of action.
Bold Tactics Such actions on the part of the Azerbaijani government
so close to the election raise several questions as to Baku’s motives
for such outright disregard for international opinion and, even more
confusing, why the Aliyev administration assumes that it has far less
to lose by adopting such confrontational tactics. Such actions also
give grounds for serious concern over the actual conduct of the voting
and the possibility of a repeat of the postelection violence that
erupted in Baku after the flawed presidential ballot of October 2003.
One factor driving the Azerbaijani government’s disregard for
international reaction to its tactics over the past six weeks may be
its inferences from Western — specifically the U.S. — response to
two other developments.
The first test case for Azerbaijan was what Baku perceived to be the
lukewarm Western reaction to the May unrest in Uzbekistan. Not only
did Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s bloody response to the violent
events in the southeastern town of Andijon, his government’s dubious
definition of the events as an uprising by Islamic extremists, and
the repressive handling of the victims and witnesses not result in
international sanctions, most importantly, the Uzbek case was a direct
and blatant challenge to U.S. credibility.
The second key development was Washington’s praise for Egypt’s
presidential election earlier this month. That praise may have been
construed in Baku as signaling that the United States would be content
with even the most modest progress toward greater democracy.The first
test case for Azerbaijan was what Baku perceived to be the lukewarm
Western reaction to the May unrest in Uzbekistan.
Moreover, for a presidential republic like Azerbaijan, which remains
as much a one-family state as a one-party state, the test for its
November parliamentary election will be limited to the conduct,
and not the outcome, of the poll. (By contrast, the role of the
parliament in Azerbaijan is almost cosmetic.) Thus, assuming that
the Azerbaijani authorities are acting in line with a carefully
crafted strategy, they may be assuming they have wide latitude to
ensure a victory for the pro-government majority, albeit allowing
for greater opposition representation than before, perhaps in line
with the prognosis by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
rapporteur Andreas Gross, who calculated that the opposition is capable
of winning at least 25 of the 125 seats. If the Egyptian case is any
indication, such an outcome — which would be a marked improvement
over previous Azerbaijani elections — might induce Washington to
overlook violations in the preelection campaign and deliver an overall
favorable assessment.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

INTERNET. NABAZTAG LE LAPIN MAGIQUE
Le Telegramme, France
18 septembre 2005
Il nous dit ” je t ‘ aime ” , s ‘ illumine de couleurs pour nous donner
la meteo, le trafic ou nous prevenir de l ‘ arrivee d ‘ un e-mail :
avec ses oreilles qui bougent, Nabaztag est un lapin, mais aussi le
premier objet communicant grand
Concu par la societe francaise Violet, co-fondee en 2003 par Olivier
Mevel et Rafi Haladjian, deux precurseurs de l ‘ internet en France,
Nabaztag signifie lapin en armenien.
Haut comme trois pommes, avec sa coque blanche, Nabaztag – qui vient
d ‘ etre mis sur le marche – n ‘ est ni bruyant ni encombrant. Faire
vivre un Nabaztag requiert une prise electrique, une connexion internet
permanente et disposer d ‘ un reseau wi-fi chez soi. De son côte,
le lapin est dote d ‘ une carte wi-fi. Nabaztag a sa vie propre et
peut s ‘ animer meme si l ‘ ordinateur est eteint.
Une fois le Nabaztag connecte, reste a lui donner un nom bien a lui,
une formalite a remplir sur le site Ensuite ”
lapinenchocolat ” (c ‘ est un exemple, mais le nom est deja pris !)
va etre en mesure de rendre un certain nombre de services que l ‘
on selectionnera sur ce meme site.
Creer une communaute
de Nabaztag
Donner l ‘ heure, la qualite de l ‘ air, les principaux indicateurs
boursiers : chacun de ces services est identifie par un code couleur.
Lorsque la meteo est bonne, Nabaztag clignote en jaune. Pour les orages
, c ‘ est une alternance de jaune et de bleu qui donne visuellement l
‘ impression d ‘ un eclair.
Outre son nom, chaque Nabaztag peut etre identifie par une signature
sonore, reconnaissable par nos proches. Il est donc possible de les
interconnecter : une communaute de Nabaztag voit alors le jour.
Chaque lapin sera anime des messages envoyes par les membres de la
communaute. En bougeant les oreilles de son lapin, on peut meme a
distance remuer celles d ‘ un autre Nabaztag, qu ‘ il soit a Paris,
New York, ou a Tokyo.
L ‘ objectif de la societe Violet est le developpement de technologies,
produits et services qui permettent de rendre ” intelligents et
communicants ” des objets aujourd ‘ hui inertes.
95 euros
Il y a deux ans deja , la societe avait concu une lampe sur le meme
principe, mais son prix de 800 euros etait inabordable. Le lapin
coûte 95 euros, presque dix fois moins.
S achant d ‘ ores et deja qu ‘ ils seront bientôt depasses par les
nouveaux usages que les utilisateurs vont trouver a leur Nabaztag
, les deux hommes ont decide d ‘ ouvrir le code pour permettre
aux developpeurs d ‘ apporter leur contribution et creer ainsi de
nouveaux services. En attendant, Violet prepare la version anglaise,
prevue fin octobre.
–Boundary_(ID_V0X2N/Kap7Zoi6vyixB+yg)–

UNE COMMISSION DU CONGRES RECONNAIT LE GENOCIDE ARMENIEN
Le Figaro, France
17 septembre 2005
ETATS-UNIS
La commission des Affaires etrangères de la Chambre des representants
americaine s’est prononcee jeudi en faveur de la reconnaissance du
genocide armenien, en depit de la forte opposition de l’Administration
du president George W. Bush. “Un debat en seance plenière sur
une resolution concernant l’Armenie pourrait nuire aux relations
americano-turques et pourrait saper les progrès accomplis par Ankara et
Erevan alors qu’ils commencent de discrets pourparlers pour traiter
de ce dossier et regarder vers l’avenir”, a fait valoir un haut
responsable du Departement d’Etat.
–Boundary_(ID_P6aUmWnnH8OCaxn9u7enRg)–
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

KUWAITI MPS MEET AZERI LAWMAKERS, GOV. OFFICIALS
Kuwait News Agency, Kuwait
Sept 22 2005
POL-KUWAIT-AZERBAIJAN
BAKU, Sept 22 (KUNA) — A delegation from the Kuwaiti parliament,
led by Humoud Al-Hajri, held talks here Thursday with chairpersons of
the friendship committees at the Azeri on ways of further cementing
bilateral cooperation.
Azeri parliament speaker Murtuz Aliskerov expressed relief over the
level of relations with Kuwait.
He appreciated the Kuwaiti position vis-a-vis the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict with Armenia, as well as its support for the Azeri refugees.
The Kuwaiti delegation, which arrived here last night, held talks
with foreign minister Elmar Mammedyarov and Minister of Economic
Development Farhad Aliyev.
Al-Hajri told KUNA after the meetings the talks were very fruitful
and constructive.
He said they have discussed a host of issues falling under the
political, economic, touristic and cultural cooperation.
The lawmaker said the Azeri officials voiced great desire to further
bolster relations with Kuwait. He added that Aliyev called for
increasing the Kuwait investments in Azerbaijan.

STEVE ANLIAN: HOME-BUYING VOUCHERS FOR STORM VICTIMS
Providence Journal , RI
Sept 23 2005
YEREVAN, Armenia — AS NEW ORLEANS and other Gulf Coast places weather
devastation by hurricane, home owners with enough insurance face real,
gut-wrenching choices: Leave, stay, build, buy, rehab, or rent? Those
with little or no flood insurance — reportedly as many as 60 percent
— will turn to government for help.
As officials figure out how to respond to under- or uninsured home
owners who are eligible for aid, experience abroad, in developing
countries, argues strongly for multi-state housing-purchase vouchers.
These are a logical follow-on to the Senate’s recent stop-gap measure
providing six-month rental vouchers to Katrina victims.
On Dec. 7, 1988, in Armenia, an earthquake measuring 6.9 on
the Richter scale demolished 100,000 housing units and displaced
500,000 people. With help from the United States, other countries,
and multilateral aid agencies, Armenia worked through the tortuous
economic decisions that now face leaders in Washington and the
storm-tossed American states.
Which districts should be condemned? Which redeveloped, and how? For
which local expenses should people be reimbursed? Should displaced
families be granted an unconditional right of return, regardless of
timing and cost? Should tenants get rights comparable to home owners’?
Working through such questions will take time, which many of the
current hurricane victims don’t have. But for those uninsured home
owners willing to accept a housing-purchase voucher now, as final
compensation, the transition could be far simpler. For them, help
could be on the way in weeks, instead of months or years.
A housing-purchase voucher program reflecting lessons from Armenia
and other natural-disaster-stricken countries would not have to be
complicated. Participation would be voluntary. Proceeds from selling
an existing home to a displaced family would go directly from the
funding agency to the contract seller, through banks.
Funds left over when an eligible housing unit was bought for less than
the voucher price could be pocketed by the program participant for
renovation, living expenses, or moving costs. At the other extreme,
extra funds from loans or buyers’ other assets could be mobilized to
buy a house that costs more than the voucher’s value.
Low-income participants might receive a sliding subsidy to house-hunt,
since the city of their choice might be a plane ride away.
To get a feel for how vouchers might work, imagine that your $100,000
house in New Orleans is half paid for and totally wrecked. Depending
on your insurance coverage, you might qualify for a “top-up” voucher,
which pays for the difference between what your new house costs and
what your insurance company provides for your old house. Or you
might get a 100-percent subsidy, if your insurance doesn’t cover
flood damage. You could use the voucher in any one of the designated
receiving zones, or even in New Orleans, if there is adequate supply.
If you have funds of your own to add, you can even apply your voucher
outside the approved network.
On the receiving end, the metropolitan areas deemed eligible to take
vouchers might be those that have already welcomed evacuees or where
the housing market is stable and housing affordable. Local associations
of real-estate agents could help match housing to beneficiaries.
The voucher’s size would be pegged to local market conditions. That
way, evacuees could choose a city from the list where housing prices
are a bit above those in New Orleans or Biloxi. This approach worked
after the Armenian earthquake, when the U.S. Agency for International
Development tried it. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s Section 8 program for low-income renters also follow
this principle.
Cities that signed up for the program would reap benefits, too. More
homes would be occupied and, therefore, the housing stock and
associated service costs would be more efficient. On balance, there
would be more demand for housing, so real-estate values would rise.
If they rose too much, vouchers could be adjusted accordingly.
If housing-voucher programs have a weakness in today’s real-estate
boom, it’s that affordable housing often means a soft economy, and
dislocated home owners need jobs. Adding more job hunters to a city
can intensify employment problems, so in selecting receiving zones,
planners would have to match skills with labor markets, even as social
scientists ponder political and human adjustments.
Yet an influx of new residents to the right place at the right
time could stimulate lagging local economies, as cash from
government-supported programs and other subsidies started to
recirculate. Home-improvement activities would be another stimulus,
though no substitute for a long-term economic-development strategy
for each city.
While we all hope that the Gulf Coast’s hurricane-ravaged hometowns
will rise again, a national housing-purchase voucher program holds
enormous potential for displaced home owners — even during the interim
period of recovery. Families who leave the area now may decide to
return when their communities have stabilized. The recent real-estate
spike in Baton Rouge bodes well for vouchers, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s deep experience with vouchers could be
tapped to quickly devise and carry out a demand-side shelter strategy.
Vouchers alone aren’t enough. But neither is new construction. And
vouchers are both cheaper and faster-working. Let’s ask some of the
tens of thousands of hurricane-displaced Southerners if they would
like to give vouchers a try.
Steve Anlian, an urban planner and international-development expert,
is the (Washington-based) Urban Institute’s senior associate in
Yerevan, Armenia, where he led an international team collaborating
on the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Armenia Earthquake
Zone Recovery Program.

L’OSCE ARRETE SA MISSION D’OBSERVATION AU KARABAKH A LA SUITE D’UN TIR
Agence France Presse
20 septembre 2005 mardi 9:00 PM GMT
EREVAN 19 sept 2005
L’Organisation pour la securite et la cooperation en Europe (OSCE) a
arrete sa mission d’observation du cessez-le-feu au Nagorny Karabakh,
enclave separatiste peuplee d’Armeniens en territoire azerbaïdjanais,
après qu’un tir eut ete entendu mardi.
“Aujourd’hui un tir a ete entendu par les deux groupes de l’OSCE qui
conduisent l’observation des deux côtes de la ligne de feu.
L’observation a ete arretee”, a indique un representant de l’OSCE
dans la region, Olexandre Samarski.
Les observateurs se trouvaient près du village de Karakhanbeïli dans
la region de Fizoulinski.
L’OSCE mene regulièrement des missions d’observation le long de la
ligne de feu entre les positions azeries et celles des separatistes
armeniens depuis qu’un accord de cessez-le-feu a ete signe en 1994.
Un conflit meurtrier avait eclate au debut des annees 1990 a propos
de ce territoire peuple en majorite d’Armeniens et qui a proclame
unilateralement son independance en 1991. L’Azerbaïdjan veut en
reprendre le controle.
–Boundary_(ID_7KQ4wqfAbpvrdU3PVD3m8g)–