INTERSTATE BANK FINANCES CREDIT PROGRAMS OF ABOUT 110 MILLION DOLLARS IN ARMENIA
Noyan Tapan
Nov 04 2006
YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 4, NOYAN TAPAN. The Interstate Bank has implemented
tens of projects in Armenia by providing credits of a total of 110
mln dollars.
Tigran Sargsian, Chairman of the Central Bank of Armenia (CBA),
current Chairman of the Interstate Bank, said this at the press
conference to summarize the results of the Interstate Bank’s sitting
in Yerevan on November 3. Chairman of the RF Central Bank Sergei
Ignatyev and Chairman of Kazakhstan’s National Bank Anvar Saydenov
also participated in the press conference. According to T. Sargsian,
the projects implemented by the Interstate Bank in Armenia are related
to such spheres as energy, chemical industry, Yerevan inner city
transport. The bank’s loans carried 9-12% interest rates. “Armenia is
actively cooperating with the Interstate Bank,” he noted, adding that
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine have also implemented projects with this
bank. He said that issues related to the Interstate Bank’s activities,
credit policy and its cooperation with the Eurasian Development
Bank were on the aganda of the Yerevan sitting of the Interstate
Bank Board. S. Ignatyev did not rule out the possibility of a merger
between the Interstate Bank and the Eurasian Development Bank (wose
founders are Russia and Kazakhstan). In his words, the Interstate Bank
does not have yet a financial opportunity to assist with projects
on formation of new financial infrastructures in CIS countries. The
Interstate Bank was founded in 1993 based on an agreement signed by
the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Moldova,
Russia, Tadjikistan, Turmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The bank’s
authorized capital makes 20 million rubles (about 7.22 mln USD),
with Armenia’s share amounting to 300 thousand rubles (1.8%).
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIA LIKELY TO JOIN EURASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Noyan Tapan
Nov 04 2006
YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 4, NOYAN TAPAN. It is likely that Armenia will join
the Eurasian Development Bank (EDP), Chairman of the Central Bank of
Armenia (CBA) Tigran Sargsian stated this on November 3. According to
him, the issue of joining the EDP will be discussed by the Armenian
government. “We received an official letter of the EDP Chairman, the
Armenian government will discuss this issue and make a decision,”
he said. The Eurasian Development Bank was founded by Kazakhstan
and Russia in early 2006. Its authorized capital makes 1.5 billion
US dollars.

AZG Armenian Daily #211, 04/11/2006
Neighbors
MAMEDYAROV’S CONCOCTION: ARMENIANS OF NAGORNO KARABAKH
ARE CITIZENS OF AZERBAIJAN
Azerbaijan considers the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh
to be its citizens and is interested in future
development of this region which is inseparable part
of the country, Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar
Mamedyarov stated. At a meeting with Francesco
Bascone, Italy’s permanent representative to the OSCE,
Mamedyarov “harped on one string” that Karabakh issue
can be settled only on principle of Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity by granting the Armenians of the
region the highest autonomy.
BY Aghavni Harutyunian

ARMENIAN, AZERBAIJANI DEFENSE MINISTERS NOT DISCUSS ISSUE OF “OCCUPIED” TERRITORIES
Arka News Agency, Armenia
Nov 3 2006
YEREVAN, November 3. /ARKA/. At their meeting on October 20, Armenian
and Azerbaijani Ministers of Defense Serge Sargsyan and Safar Abiyev
did not discuss the issue of Armenia’s vacating the “occupied”
territories, Press Secretary of the RA Minioster of Defense Colonel
Seyran Shahsuvaryan told ARKA.
“Abiev’s statement quoted by Azerbaijani mass media that during his
meeting with Sargsyan on October 20 the first issue raised by the
Azerbaijani Minister concerned the withdrawal of Armenian troops
from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan does not correspond to
the facts,” Shahsuvaryan said.
He said that the Ministers’ meeting at the Armenian-Azerbaijani
border was held on the personal initiative of OSCE Chairman-in-Office
Andrej Kasprzic to promote mutual confidence between the Armenian
and Azerbaijani Defense Offices. Shahsuvaryan said that the Ministers
only discussed issues of maintaining the cease-fire regime and border
control. P.T. -0–

GEORGIA, AZERBAIJAN DEBATE CONTROL OF ANCIENT MONASTERY’S TERRITORY
By Diana Petriashvili and Rovshan Ismayilov 11/03/06
Friday, November 3, 2006
EURASIA INSIGHT EurasiaNet, NY
An unresolved border between Georgia and Azerbaijan has put under
question one of the South Caucasus’s most significant cultural and
religious landmarks, the medieval David-Gareja monastery complex,
located in Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Set in semi-desert some 70 kilometers southeast from Tbilisi along
the Georgian border with Azerbaijan and within Azerbaijan proper,
the complex, which contains a rich collection of cave frescoes, has
been a site for conflict as well as for contemplation, ever since
construction began in the 6th century.
The best-known part of the complex, the Udabno cave monastery,
which contain frescoes dating approximately from the 8th to the 13th
centuries, as well as the monastery headquarters at Lavra, are located
within Georgia. Additional monasteries, some nearly inaccessible and
largely ruined, are also on Georgian territory. Azerbaijan contains
the monastery of Bertubani, which features frescoes of the legendary
12th-13th century Georgian Queen Tamara and her son, Giorgi IV.
But who should control the David-Gareja monastery? When the Soviet
Union defined the borders between the then Soviet republics of
Azerbaijan and Georgia, the monastery complex was split in two. The
border between the two now independent countries has remained
unchanged since 1991. Part of the border passes through the top of
the 813-meter-high Udabno ridge (known in Azerbaijan as Keshishdag),
which harbors cave monasteries on its top and also on the northern
(Georgian-controlled) and southern (Azerbaijani-controlled) slopes.
The monastery complex, which has withstood attacks by Tamerlane and
Shah Abbas alike, holds strategic significance for both Azerbaijan
and Georgia. From the Udabno ridge, both Azerbaijani and Georgian
territory can be easily monitored. “From the military point of view,
this position has importance for both countries,” said Uzeir Jafarov,
an independent Azerbaijani military expert in Baku and a retired
colonel. “Theoretically, in the case of military conflict, the side
which enjoys control over these heights will get a big advantage.”
Border talks, ongoing since 1991, recently reentered the news when
Zviad Dzidziguri, a Georgian member of parliament for the opposition
Conservative Party, and chairman of the Democratic Front faction,
claimed that Azerbaijan had moved its border with Georgia so that one
of the complex’s monasteries, Chichkhituri, was now within Azerbaijani
territory, putting at risk the remaining monasteries under Georgian
control.
The Georgian foreign ministry has denied the report. In an interview
with EurasiaNet, a high-level Azerbaijani State Border Control Service
official, who asked to remain anonymous, also stated that Azerbaijan
had never moved its border. Yet, still, the debate continues.
To hold on to the churches on Georgian territory, Tbilisi has proposed
giving Azerbaijan an as yet publicly unspecified section of Georgian
land near the Azerbaijani border. “All we need to do is to find a
common language with our Azerbaijani colleagues,” Georgian Deputy
Foreign Minister Giorgi Manigaladze, who oversees the State Commission
on Border Delimitation and Demarcation, told reporters in Tbilisi on
October 30.
Azerbaijani officials, however, say that they are unwilling to consider
the exchange.
“There is no room for territorial exchange [with Georgia]. There
are no negotiations over this issue,” Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf
Khalafov, co-chairman of the intergovernmental commission on border
delimitation with Georgia, said at a press briefing in Baku on
November 2. Azerbaijani officials say that in the past three years
Georgia has twice offered sections of Georgian territory in exchange
for recognition of the current border division of the David-Gareja
monastery, but that Baku has rejected the offers both times.
“This territory [Azerbaijan’s part of the monastery] has strategic
importance for Azerbaijan. And we have no intention of giving it
to anybody,” Garib Mammadov, chairman of the Azerbaijani State Land
and Cartography Committee, said in an April 2004 interview with the
Azerbaijani daily newspaper Echo. “This is a strategic overlook. The
whole South Caucasus might be monitored from this overlook very
well. Why should we give it away?”
While officials and experts in Baku maintain that their position will
not change, an official within the Azerbaijani foreign ministry,
who asked to remain anonymous, told EurasiaNet that Azerbaijan “is
open to the implementation of joint projects [with Georgia] for the
restoration of the complex.”
At a joint press conference with Georgian Foreign Minister Gela
Bezhuashvili on October 31 in Baku, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister
Elmar Mamedyarov said that a fresh round of border talks would be
held in Baku in November. Two meetings have been held on the topic
since March 2006, Georgian officials say.
“During the commission’s meeting in November, the demarcation
will concern several areas of a 170-kilometer-long segment of the
border,” the Azerbaijani State Land and Cartography Committee’s
Garib Mammadov, a member of the intergovernmental commission, told
journalists on November 1. “The areas have already been investigated
thoroughly.” Mammadov did not specify which parts of the border
segment will be discussed.
Monks at the monastery say that they see the dispute as the result
of Soviet scheming to undermine relations between Christian Georgians
and Muslim Azerbaijanis.
“As the Soviet border is set on the territory of an important
cultural and religious monument, it is possible that the atheistic
Soviet leadership tried to cause misunderstanding between Georgia
and Azerbaijan someday in the future,” said Father Superior Ilarion.
“Right now, we have the result of this [plan].”
“I hope that Azerbaijan takes in consideration that David-Gareja
monastery is an important spiritual and cultural unit for Georgia,”
he continued. “We hope that Azerbaijan will not claim the territory.”
Monks at David-Gareja claim that they are unable to visit the church
of Bertubani, located two kilometers inside the Azerbaijani border in
the region of Agstafa, and are concerned about its maintenance. “We
are not let in by the border guards,” one of the monks said, adding
that the monastery’s leadership fears that the church’s interior has
been damaged. “All we know about Bertubani is that it is not used as
a church. There are unique frescos [there] that need special care,”
he said.
The Azerbaijani Border Service official states that a simplified
border control regime allows monks, Georgian pilgrims and tourists to
travel to the part of the complex located on Azerbaijani territory
without trouble. One Azerbaijani journalist who visited the area in
the summer of 2006, however, reported that “bureaucratic procedures”
for access could prove troublesome.
Questions, however, remain about the condition of the David-Gareja
monastery complex within Azerbaijan. One Azerbaijani scholar concedes
that the Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture and Tourism does not pay
sufficient attention to the question. “Neither restoration work
nor serious historical research has been held at the Azerbaijani
part of the monastery so far,” said Mekhti Mansurov, a historian at
the Azerbaijani National Academy of Sciences. Azerbaijan added the
monastery’s churches to its list of national historical monuments in
2003, “only after Georgia did so,” he added, in comments published
by the Baku-based newspaper Kaspiy on November 1.
Some Georgian observers note that the thought of the monastery and
its condition brings particular poignancy to the delay in concluding
the border discussions with Azerbaijan. The topic is “painful” for
ordinary Georgians, said Caucasian affairs expert Mamuka Areshidze,
“The problem has been discussed by people for a long time, but the
authorities have been inactive” until opposition MP Dzidziguri’s
statement about Azerbaijan moving its border, Areshidze said. “There
are problems with other borders as well — for example, with Russia —
but that issue is not currently on the agenda.”
Some Azerbaijani historians are strongly against the transfer of any
part of the David Gareja monastery complex to Georgia, arguing that
the monastery is not Georgian, but Caucasian Albanian, a reference
to an ancient people, believed to be Christian, who are thought to
have once inhabited northern Azerbaijan.
In the end, the key may be to proceed with moderation, cautions
one Georgian analyst. “There is nothing special in having undefined
borders,” said Paata Zakareishvili, an independent political analyst
in Tbilisi. “If the issue is studied professionally by both sides’
experts, no political tensions should be expected.”
Editor’s Note: Diana Petriashvili is a freelance reporter based
in Tbilisi. Rovshan Ismayilov is a freelance reporter in Baku.
Alexander Klimchuk is a freelance photojournalist based in Tbilisi.

NKR President declares general pardon
ArmRadio.am
04.11.2006 15:00
November 3 NKR President Arkady Ghukasyan presented a suggestion to
the National Assembly on declaring general pardon on the occasion of
the 15th anniversary of independence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic
and the Constitutional Referendum.

ANC PAC
104 N. Belmont St.
Suite 200B
Glendale, CA 91206
PRESS RELEASE
ANC-PAC Endorses
Congressman Brad Sherman
November 3, 2006
LOS ANGELES, CA – Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA) has been endorsed
by the Armenian National Committee – Political Action Committee
(ANC-PAC), the nation’s largest grassroots Armenian American political
organization. The endorsement announcement was made this week by the
ANC-PAC’s Chairman Leonard Manoukian
Sherman, a Democrat, has been a staunch advocate for his Armenian
American constituents in California’s 27th Congressional District.
His district includes a large portion of the San Fernando Valley,
which is home to over 100,000 Armenian Americans. The Congressman
was elected in 1996 and presently serves on the House International
Relations Committee and is the Ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee
on International Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Human Rights.
“Brad Sherman has earned the respect and vote of his Armenian American
constituents,” commented ANC-PAC s spokesperson Nishan Bostanian. “We
welcome the leadership and energy the Congressman has consistently
brought to creating a stronger U.S. foreign policy with respect
to Armenia. We also applaud his determination to provide excellent
constituent services to members of our community throughout the year,”
Bostanian added.
As a member of the House International Relations Committee, Sherman has
been a staunch supporter of efforts to honestly address the Armenian
Genocide through legislative efforts. He has also consistently fought
to provide U.S. assistance for Armenia and most recently worked to
deliver $5 million in humanitarian aid for the people of Artsakh. On
September 29, 2006 the Congressman co-authored a letter to President
Bush urging him to respect the freedoms of the people of Artsakh.
Earlier this year members of the San Fernando Valley ANC
met with Congressman Sherman to thank him for co-sponsoring
the Crowley-Sherman-Royce Amendment to the Export-Import Bank
Reauthorization Act of 2006. That amendment prohibits the Export-Import
Bank from providing any assistance “to develop or promote any rail
connections or railway-related connections that traverse or connect
Baku, Azerbaijan; Tbilisi, Georgia; and Kars, Turkey, and that
specifically exclude cities in Armenia.”
The ANC-PAC is a non-partisan federally registered political action
committee established to support campaign committees for Members of
Congress who share the values of the Armenian American community.
The ANC-PAC is at the forefront of efforts to ensure that the voice
of the Armenian American community is clearly heard in our nation’s
capital. The ANC-PAC continues a century old tradition of Armenian
Americans engagement on the public policy issues facing national
political leaders, both in the U.S. Congress and the White House.

PRESS RELEASE
National Association for Armenian Studies and Research
395 Concord Avenue
Belmont, MA 02478
Tel.: 617-489-1610
E-mail: [email protected]
Web:
Contact: Marc A. Mamigonian
LECTURE AT NAASR ON ARMENIAN DIASPORAN COMMUNITIES OF NORTH AMERICA
Dr. Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill will give a lecture entitled “The
Armenians in Canada and the U.S.: A Borderless Diaspora” on Thursday,
November 9, at 8:00 p.m., at the National Association for Armenian
Studies and Research (NAASR) Center , 395 Concord Ave., Belmont, MA.
Dr. Kaprielian-Churchill is the author of Like Our Mountains: A
History of Armenians in Canada, published last year by McGill-Queen’s
University Press. This is the first comprehensive history of the
Armenian diaspora in Canada spanning a period of 100 years from the
founding settlements in the late 19th century to the devastating
earthquake in Armenia in 1988. Like Our Mountains examines the
economic, social, religious, political, and cultural life of Armenian
settlers focusing on different cities during different waves of
immigration.
Two Communities Share Deep Ties
She will discuss the history of both the American and the Canadian
Armenian communities that she has examined in such remarkable detail in
this major work of scholarship, which was awarded the Clio prize by the
Canadian Historical Association for the best book on Ontario history
in 2005. The two diasporic communities historically have had close
ties in all aspects of community development and Kaprielian-Churchill
will deal with them each in her lecture.
Having received a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto in 1984,
Kaprielian-Churchill taught at the University of Toronto and at
Ryerson and York Universities before moving to Fresno. In 2001 she
was promoted to full professor. She has published extensively on
immigration and ethnic history, emphasizing issues related to refugee
survival and settlement as well as to family and social networks
of immigrants in Canada. Her writings are rooted in vivid personal
accounts and the quest for retaining identities in times of upheaval
and change.
Admission to the event is free. The NAASR Bookstore will open at
7:30 p.m. The NAASR Center and Headquarters is located opposite the
First Armenian Church and next to the U.S. Post Office. Ample parking
is available around the building and in adjacent areas. The lecture
will begin promptly at 8:00 p.m.
More information about the lecture is available by calling
617-489-1610, faxing 617-484-1759, e-mailing [email protected], or writing
to NAASR, 395 Concord Ave., Belmont, MA 02478.

Constructive dialogue is the only answer to the PKK-Turkey conflict
Kurdish Media, UK
Nov 3 2006
11/3/2006 KurdishMedia.com – By Rauf Naqishbendi
The diplomatic efforts between Washington and Ankara have been
incessant since the beginning of the Iraqi Liberation Campaign,
with the Turks hounding the United States’ officials, pushing three
of their main agendas: muting the Iraqi Kurds’ demand for statehood,
crushing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and of course, as always,
begging for foreign aid and more weapons.
Muting the Iraqi Kurds’ Demand for Statehood
Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the mindset of the Turks
regarding the Kurds has been that if they were to renounce their
heritage, abdicate their culture, abandon their language and proudly
announce themselves Turks, then they could be free, not as Turks but
as moderate second-class citizens. To accomplish this, they engaged
in a campaign of intimidation, cruelty and repression. And they
didn’t stop with the idea of the wholesale conversion of Kurds to
Turks, but claim that freedom would be like a serpent to the Kurds,
their sovereignty poisoning them and the region as a whole. Sadly,
this kind of bigotry has been allowed although it has been pointed
out several times to high ranking US officials in both the White
House and the State Department.
It is imperative that US officials not allow this Turkish
opprobrium; they need to live up to the founding fathers’ principle of
comprehensive human dignity, and not allow themselves to be infatuated
with Turkey knowing its inhumane treatment of people and system
and government. They should not continue to involve themselves in
Turkish crimes against humanity by financing them as they have for
more than half a century. They should tell their Turkish friends
that Kurds are entitled to their sovereignty as much as they are,
the Kurds will become a free nation at last, and they better start
getting used to it. Moreover, they should not allow themselves to
be bullied by vicious elements of the Turkish government that are
attempting to manage our foreign policy. A line needs to be drawn
between friendly relations and bullying, and justice and injustice.
All this should be communicated to the Turkish authorities with great
courage and supplication to humble them into descending from their
high horse.
Crushing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Injustice does not bring fortune, nor is there immunity from it. At
its best, humanity has always fought injustice. In Turkey, the Kurds
have tried every peaceful means to secure their rights, yet their
peaceful struggle has ever been refuted with acts of tyranny by the
Turkish authorities: their leaders have been imprisoned, many have
perished by barbaric torture, and many have fled to the mountains
fearing for their lives. This is why the PKK was born, and this is
why they resorted to an armed struggle. If Turkey had treated the
Kurds with a sense of decency, the PKK would not exist.
Against this backdrop, the State Department ignorantly and unfairly
listed the PKK as a terror organization, ignoring the fact that the
birth of the PKK was merely an effect of the brutality of Turks. The
PKK is by far more peace-loving and civilized than the Turkish
authorities. For proof, consider the fact that just recently for the
fifth time they unilaterally declared a ceasefire, and pleaded for
constructive dialogue.
The response from Turkey was, “No dialogue.”
Turkey is trying to have America fight the PKK who found safe haven
in Kurdistan in Iraq. Turkey has been fighting the PKK for nearly
two decades without apparent success. Now they want America to assume
their failing endeavor and engage in a bloody fight with the PKK. If
America does that, they will alienate their only friend in the Islamic
world, the Kurds, and cause further deterioration of the already
fragile security of Iraq. It’s about time for the Turkish hatred to
relent; words of wisdom are needed from President Bush advising that
peaceful dialogue should not be decapitated by the ignorant desire
for violence. The Turks should be told that their abuse of human
rights was the cause of what they now dread, and that now it’s time
for humility and humanity from Turks – dialogue, not violence.
And of course, as always, begging for foreign aid and more weapons
Every high official the Turks send to the US comes begging for
foreign aid and more weapons. Indeed, Turkey, since America’s rise
as a world superpower after World War II, has been a welfare state
thanks to America’s sponsorship. Without it Turkey’s economy would
have remained as bruised as any third world country’s; the US’s
generosity was rendered unconditionally. On the other hand, consider
how the European Union dealt with Turkey – when Turkey applied for
membership in the EU, they made Turkey’s improved human rights toward
Kurds and other minorities a precondition of their consideration.
That was a right course of action, and brings up the question of why,
for half a century, the US ignored all Turkey’s human rights violations
and let Turks use American monetary and military aid to advance their
brutality against innocent civilians. Doesn’t Washington understand
that assisting these reactionary governments is a conscientious
endorsement to further advance their atrocities against humanity,
and what all this tells the world about America?
Shouldn’t the State Department, in an attempt to enhance America’s
standing regarding the promotion of human rights, deal with Turkey as
the EU has? America should make it clear to the Turkish authorities
that no more American aid is to be used for human atrocities and that
Turkey will not receive any more aid at all unless it improves its
human rights record in a verifiable fashion, just as the EU required.
President Bush should not trivialize constructive dialogue between the
PKK and Turkey. To this end, he should pressure the Turks politically
and economically to straighten out their treatment of minorities’
human rights, and to embark on the formation of a democratic system not
benefiting Turks alone, but rather all citizens of Turkey. Indubitably,
anyone who is familiar with Turkey cannot deny the magnitude of the
suffering that has been inflicted upon Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians
as a result of the misplaced American aid to Turkey. The remedy is
long overdue and the time to right the wrong is now.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Kurdish Media, UK
Nov 3 2006
Possibilities of prosecuting Turkish leaders for crimes against
humanity and war crimes – I
11/3/2006 KurdishMedia.com – By Karim Salih
A critical analysis of the possibilities of prosecuting Turkish
leaders for crimes against humanity and war crimes since the military
coup in 1980 – Part I
“I have the conviction that as long as a nation does the best for its
own interests, and succeeds, the world admires it and thinks it
moral.” [1]
– Talaat Pasha, the architect of the Armenian destruction
(1915-1922), in 1915
Abstract
The 1980 military coup has been considered by many Turkish academics
and human rights groups a turning point in the Turkish history in
terms of both the scale and the extent of brutality of human rights
abuses. The atrocities perpetrated against Kurdish civilians,
according to Turkish and international human rights defenders, have
increased since 1984 under the guise of legitimacy of addressing
security concerns.
I intend to explore and catalogue a possible international case
against Turkish political and military leaders for injuries inflicted
on the Kurdish civilians in Turkey since the 1980 coup. I will discus
the criticisms of partiality and prejudice that arise with arbitrary
decisions to prosecute crimes against international law committed in
some internal armed conflicts but not others of arguably equal
brutality. I will contend that bringing into justice those suspected
of international crimes and establishment of a realistic picture,
based on the historical facts of past deeds are critical
preconditions for achieving an everlasting and just peace, and the
development of democratic society that could advance the cause of
democracy and human rights not only in Turkey but in the whole of
West Asia.
Why this paper?
On November 9, 2005, the suspected bombers of a bookstore in Semdinli
in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast were apprehended on the scene by the
surviving victims and their arms and identity cards that belonged to
Turkish security forces were published by Kurdish activists on the
internet on the same day. Unlike previous similar bombings against
institutions and individuals who asserted their Kurdish identity,
this incident attracted domestic and international attention and
deepened the controversy of who wields the real power in Turkey.
When Turkish authorities in April 2006, in a bid to defuse the
tension between the government and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK),
released the suspected bombers and dismissed the prosecutor who
prosecuted them, former President Suleyman Demirel stated that Turkey
had not changed very much since the 1980 coup, explaining that “There
is the state and there is the deep state … When a small difficulty
occurs, the civilian state steps back and the deep state becomes the
generator (of decisions).”
Until Turkey succeeds in reining in the military and eliminating
torture, the Kurdish population and the other Anatolian minorities
seems are destined to encounter more of the Turkish deep state
institutions than the legitimate state.
I believe that opening up debate over the criminal liability under
international law for forced disappearances, torture and extra
judicial killings, though understandably taboo in Turkey (for a
society structured along authoritarian lines, such a debate raises
fears of potentially destabilizing consequences), it may help the
cause of democracy and human rights that so far countless of
Anatolians have lost their lives on its course.
Introduction
In contrast to the 1974 Greek transition from seven year military
dictatorship to democracy which accompanied criminal prosecutions of
the junta leaders for torture and other crimes, [2] in Turkey the
leaders of the 12 September 1980 not only remained unprosecuted after
three years of direct military rule, but retained influence over the
political administration through the National Security Council (Milli
Guvenlik Kurulu – MGK) which they had entrenched in the 1982
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. [3] Twenty six years on and
the unresolved legacy of the coup is increasingly reported to provoke
vile crimes [4] amid accusations, from impartial bodies, of military
disrespecting the legal order. [5]
This paper will attempt to reach prima facie conclusions on criminal
liability in international law for alleged wrongs committed since
1980 in Turkey as well as to assess the available prosecutorial
options and the possibilities of enforcement.
Following presenting a brief historical overview of the modern
republic of Turkey, ideas and practices of Kemalism, Turkey’s
official ideology since 1923, will be examined with some focus on
international indifference toward the plight of Armenians until 1923
and the Kurds thereafter as well as a particular interest in
military’s role in the politics leading up to the 1980 coup. Starting
with a brief presentation of human rights record during the three
years following the 1980 coup, Part II will review the evidence
documented by independent bodies regarding destruction of villages
and forced displacement, torture, and extra-judicial executions and
forced disappearances respectively emphasising in particular on the
alleged involvement of state. This will be followed by a brief
appraisal of Turkey’s international obligations.
Part III will examine the relevant rules of international law on
crimes against humanity following an assessment of the conceptual
evolution of these crimes and the early failings. Next, the concept
of war crimes in internal armed conflicts will be discussed. The
status of crime of torture as a discrete crime under international
law will be analysed. Part IV will attempt to apply the relevant
provisions of law to a selection of the available evidence in
relation to crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture
respectively. The requirement of the legality principle will be
thoroughly analysed, employing the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence as
well as judgments by national courts when appropriate. Part V will
explore the possible venues for accountability, evaluating the
advantages and disadvantages of each option of a special court in
Turkey, the ICC and an ad hoc international criminal tribunal
respectively.
Finally, Part V will attempt to critically analyse the possibilities
of enforcing international criminal law especially in the case of a
NATO ally like Turkey. This paper will expound a view that pursuing
criminal accountability for serious violations of international law,
though not a panacea, is morally and legally imperative and would
contribute to international peace and security in the long run. It
will be contended that biased selective enforcement of international
criminal law on arbitrary basis questions the generality of the law
which is a prerequisite to its legitimacy.
I. The creation of the Republic of Turkey
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I, the Peace
Treaty of Sèvres was signed in August 1920 which provided for the
dismantling of the Empire and the formation of Armenian [6] and
Kurdish states along a Turkish republic. [7] The modern “Turkey”, led
by Mustafa Kemal (surnamed Ataturk “Father of the Turks” in 1934),
[8] “smashed its way” [9] out of Sèvres and into modern
nation-statehood in 1923 in Anatolia [10] where Greeks, Armenians,
Kurds and Assyrians had coexisted for millennia. [11]
On the way to nationhood, the Turkish nationalists Committee of Union
and Progress (CUP), who ruled from 1913 to the collapse of Empire in
1918, engaged in the destruction of the Armenians in 1915-17 that
resulted in the death of up to one and half million Armenians, almost
half of the population. [12] After the war was ended, the British
High Commissioner, in January 1919, informed the Turkish Foreign
Minister that Great Britain is “resolved to have proper punishment
inflicted on those responsible for the Armenian massacres”. [13]
Ottoman court-martials, in deed, tried a number of persons and found,
in absentia, some Young Turk leaders including Talaat Pasha guilty of
“the organization and execution of the crime of massacre” against the
Armenian population under Articles 45 and 170 of the Ottoman Penal
Code. [14]
Rejecting capitulation of the Ottoman sultan to the Great Britain,
Mustafa Kemal established a counter-government in Ankara in April
1919 and a parliament, named “Grand National Assembly of Turkey
Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi – TBMM” in April 1920. [15] Following
the withdrawal of French troops from Cilicia in May 1922, [16] the
Greek forces were repelled and the city of Smyrna (present-day Izmir)
in September 1922 was captured by Kemal troops. [17] According to
some accounts, 200.000 of its indigenous Greek population and
Armenian “refugees” were massacred and the city was later set alight.
[18]
After his military triumph, Kemal was able to influence the
provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) [19] which
replaced the Sèvres Treaty. [20] The new Treaty not only made no
reference to autonomous Armenia or Kurdistan but contained a
‘Declaration of Amnesty’ for all offences committed between 1 August
1914 and 20 November 1922. [21] The CUP members, including those
convicted for the mass killing of Armenians by the Istanbul
authorities in 1918-1920, had already been granted a general amnesty
by the Ankara government of Mustafa Kemal on 31 March 1923. [22] Many
of the CUP members became ardent Kemalists and some served as
ministers in the modern Republic of Turkey which was officially
proclaimed on 29 October 1923. [23]
Kemalism: changing society in short order
The ideology of Kemalism has been enshrined in 1982 Constitution as
sacrosanct[24] which cannot be amended; [25] even proposals to do so
may constitute a criminal offence. [26] According to Randal, like
Italian fascism, Kemalism was characterised by a pivotal feature of
the urge to transform and modernise what they saw as a “corrupt
society” through the power of the state to enforce, be it violently,
“an exclusive racialism”. [27] To modernise the “corrupt” Ottoman
society, Kemal imposed radical social, legal, and political reforms
that included outlawing the traditional dress code, changing from
Arabic to Latin script and adopting new civil and penal codes based
on European models. [28]
Turkification, expressed by Kemal as “How happy I am to be a Turk”,
[29] was imposed on the whole population, regardless of their ethnic
roots, language, culture, and religious practices. [30] Even until
early 1990s, school children were taught “Universal Turkish History”
and its complement “Sun Language Theory”, according which, all
peoples and world civilisations originated from the Turks, and
Turkish language was the first spoken language in the development of
mankind and is the source of all existing world languages. [31]
The Kurds in Anatolia, who at present account for over half of the
Kurds worldwide and up to a quarter of Turkey’s population, [32]
supported Kemal’s nationalist army in 1919-23 war on promises of
“equality” and “a meaningful autonomy” in the new state. [33] As soon
as the new borders of Turkey were secured in the Treaty of Lausanne,
Kemal began to expel Kurdish members of the government and TBMM. [34]
In March 1924, measures were issued proscribing Kurdish political,
educational and cultural associations, and banning Kurdish language
in a clear breach of Articles 38, 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne. [35]
The wards “Kurd” and “Kurdistan” were banned as the Kurds came to be
called “mountain Turks” and the Kurdish names of over 20,000
settlements were replaced with Turkish names. [36]
The Kemalist leaders tried little to hide the ultra nationalist drive
behind the imposition of Turkification on the Anatolian ethnic
communities. In 1925, the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Pasha
(surnamed “Inonu” in 1934) [37] , publicly stated “[w]e are openly
nationalist… Besides the Turkish majority, none of the other elements
shall have any impact. We shall, at any price, Turkicize those who
live in our country, and destroy those who rise up against the Turks
and Turkdom.” [38] The suppression of resistance to Turkification
culminated in the Dersim massacre of 1937-38, [39] which according to
Bruinessen, “undoubtedly, was massive, indiscriminate, and
excessively brutal”. [40] According to eye-witness accounts many
tribes of Dersim, including those who surrendered, [41] as well as
the population of some villages and bigger settlements were
annihilated. [42] These accounts have, according to Bruinessen, been
confirmed by documents published by the War History Department, which
give a detailed account of the military operations. [43]
Similar to Armenian massacres in 1915-22, this large scale
mass-murder did not go unnoticed in the West. [44] However in both
cases, much like the genocide of the Jews in 1939-45, the West did
not raise a finger in support of the vulnerable groups. If one reason
of western indifference to the atrocities perpetrated by the Turkish
armed forces had been purely political, viz., Turkey was wanted to
serve as a bulwark against Bolshevism; the other may have been what
Leo Kuper called the “sovereign right to commit genocide” within the
national borders. [45] It is not a surprise that the western states
paid admiration and more attention to the secularist nature of the
Kemalist regime rather than its domestic brutal practices.
Militarism and democracy
Twelve years after the death of the “Eternal Leader”, [46] Turkey
held its first open elections which led to the victory of the
opposition Democratic Party. [47] The Turkish army, which
traditionally proclaims itself as “the protector of the State” and
the “custodian of the Ataturk ideology”, [48] overthrew the elected
government of Adnan Menderes in May 1960 and executed him along with
two of his cabinet members in September. [51] The generals, driven by
the statist ideology of Kemalism, brought down another elected
government in 1971. [50]
In the mid 1970s, political violence between the left and right
movements was on the rise. Much of the violence was carried out by
“Grey Wolves” the armed wing of the “Nationalist Action Party (MHP)”,
headed by Alparslan Turkes, a leader of the 1960 coup. Martial law
was imposed on much of the South-east where the left, despite army
support to MHP, was particularly strong. [52]
Justifying intervention on the basis of restoring order and ending
“civil war”, [54] Turkish armed forces led by its commander, General
Kenan Evren, deposed the elected government on 12 September 1980.
[54] The army abrogated the constitution, closed down the parliament
and all political parties, and imposed martial law throughout the
country. [55]
notes
1. Quoted in Dadrian, Vahakn N., The History of the Armenian
Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the
Caucasus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 383.
2. Kritz, Neil J., “Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview of
Developments in the Search for Justice and Reconciliation”, in Alice
H. Henkin (Ed.), The Legacy of Abuse: Confronting the Past and Facing
the Future (Washington DC: Aspen Institute, 2002), pp. 21-46, at 24,
26. For an extensive analysis, see Roehrig, Terence, The Prosecution
of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of
Argentina, Greece, and South Africa (Jefferson, North Carolina:
McFarland and Co., 2002), pp. 1-29, 116-185.
3. The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, available at the
official website of the Turkish parliament, Article 118 (As amended
on 17 October2001), , (last visited 30 August 2006).
4. Turkish Daily News, Editorial, “Kurdish impasse key factor in
rising rate of lynchings”, TDN Ankara, 18 September 2006 (Turkish
Daily News – TDN asserts that “politicians, some of Turkey’s most
renowned academics, civil society representatives…” shared the
assessment that the legacy of the 1980 coup “has much to do” with the
rising scale of lynching and attempted lynching “directed either at
people of Kurdish origin or those who have been outspoken in their
defense of the Kurdish cause”).
5. Turkish Daily News, Editorial, “Kretschmer: Military does not
respect legal order”, TDN Ankara, 23 September 2006 (the EU
representative in Turkey, focusing on the “dominance of the Turkish
military’s role in politics”, blamed the army ad security organs for
“playing their own games, outside the control of the civilian
authorities, disrespecting the legal and institutional order”).
6. The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Turkey (Signed at Sèvres August 10, 1920), Section VI, Articles
88-93, available at , (last visited 12 August 2006).
7. Ibid, Section 111, Articles 63-65.
8. The Surname Law, November 1934; see, Yildiz, K and G Fryer, The
Kurds: Culture and Language Rights (London: KHRP, August 2004), pp.
16-7.
9. Levene, Mark “Creating a Modern ‘Zone of Genocide’: The Impact of
Nation and State-Formation on Eastern Anatolia, 1878-1923”, Holocaust
and Genocide Studies, Volume 12, No.3, 1998, pp 393-433, at 433;
Levene, Mark, “Why Is the Twentieth Century the Century of Genocide”,
Journal of World History, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2000, pp. 305-36, at 336.
10. “Anatolia” is roughly the Asian part of the modern Republic of
Turkey, east of the Sea of Marmara, while the European part of modern
Turkey is part of Eastern Thrace. See Library of Congress, Federal
Research Division, “Country Profile: Turkey”, January 2006, , (last
visited 08 August 2006). The word “Anatolia” will be used when
necessary for its lack of ethnic connotation in lieu of “Turkey” in
this paper,
11. McDowall, David, A Modern History of the Kurds (London and New
York: I.B.Tauris, 1997).
12. Dadrian, 1995, p. 382.
13. The Foreign Office, 371/4174/118377 (folio 253), cited in
Schabas, William, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p. 21.
14. Ibid.
15. McDowall, David, The Kurds, a Nation Denied (London: Minority
Rights Publications, 1992), p. 32.
16. Ibid.
17. Dadrian, 1995, p. 271.
18. Horton, George, The Blight of Asia (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1926).
19. The Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24,
1923, , (last visited 14 September 2006).
20. For an extensive analysis of the Western indifference towards the
suffering Armenians and their cooperation with the nascent Kemalism,
see generally, Bloxham, Donald, The Great Game of Genocide:
Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman
Armenians (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
21. Supra, note 19, Article 140.
22. Hofmann, Tessa, “Annihilation, Impunity, Denial: The Case Study
of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire (1915/16) and Genocide
Research in Comparison”, University of Tokyo, 27 March 2004.
23. Ibid.
24. Article 2 of The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, supra
note 3, proclaims Turkey a “democratic, secular, and social state
governed by the rule of law….loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk”.
25. Article 4, ibid, declares that Article 2 “cannot be amended nor
can its amendment be put forward.”
26. Under the law to protect Ataturk (No. 5816 – 1951).
27. Randal, Johnathan, After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness: My
Encounters with Kurdistan (New York: Westview, 1999), p. 252.
28. McDowall, 1992, pp. 4-5.
29. Randal, 1999, p. 267, p. 258; Kendal, 1980, p. 67.
30. Randal, 1999, p. 267.
31. Kendal, 1980, p. 68, and the list of references; Gerger, Haluk,
“Crisis in Turkey”, Middle East Research Associates (MERA),
Occasional Paper No. 28, December 1997.
32. See, e.g., Michael Gunter, “Why Kurdish Statehood is Unlikely?”
Middle East Policy Vol. XI No 1 Spring 2004. The CIA estimate of
Kurdish percentage in Turkey is 20%; see United States Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Turkey, updated on 7
September, 2006, , (last visited 12 August 2006).
33. Olson, Robert, “Kurds and Turks: Two Documents concerning Kurdish
Autonomy in 1922 and 1923”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol. 15, Winter 1991, pp. 20-31.
34. McDowall 1997, p. 198-200.
35. McDowall 1997, p. 200; for details see Yildiz and Fryer, 2004,
p.23. See Articles 38, 39 of the Lausanne Treaty, supra note 19.
36. McDowall 1997, p. 200; As early as 2005, Turkey changed the
scientific Latin names of certain animals to remove reference to
“Kurdistan” and “Armenia”; see, BBC News, “Turkey renames ‘divisive’
animals”, 8 March 2005.
37. Ismet Inonu became the first Prime Minister of Turkey in November
1923 and, after the death of Kemal Ataturk, became President from
November 1938 to May 1950. After the 1960 military coup he served
again as Prime Minister in November 1961- February 1965.
38. Address to the Turk Ocaklari in Ankara, 21 April 1925. Quoted in
Bruinessen, Martin van, “Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of
the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the chemical war against
the Iraqi Kurds (1988)”, in George J. Andreopoulos (Ed.), Conceptual
and Historical Dimensions of Genocide (University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1994), pp. 141-170, 145, citing Guney Aslan, Uniformali
kasaplar (Butchers in uniform), (Istanbul: Pencere Yayinlari, 1990).
39. Bruinessen, 1994.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid; Kendal, [cf. Nezan], “Kurdistan in Turkey”, in Gerard
Chaliand (Ed.), People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan
(London: Zed Books, 1980), pp. 47-106, p. 67; McDowall, 1997,p. 208;
Dr. Sivan, Kurt millet hareketleri ve Irak’ta Kurdistan ihtilali
[Kurdish national movements and the revolution of Kurdistan in Iraq],
(Stockholm, 1975), quoted in Bruinessen, 1994: (“[w]omen and children
of [the tribes who surrendered] were locked into hayshed and burnt
alive”).
42. M. Nuri Dersimi, Kurdistan tarihinde Dersim [Dersim in the
history of Kurdistan], (Aleppo, 1952). Quoted in Bruinessen, 1994:
(“the inhabitants of Hozat town…men, women and children, were
brought near the military camp outside Hozat and killed by machine
gun”).
43. Bruinessen, 1994.
44. Report from the Pro-Consul in Trebizond to Sir Percy Loraine,
‘Memorandum on military operations in Dersim, 27 September 1938’
(Great Britain, Public Records Office, FO 371/21925, Document
E5961/69/44), quoted in McDowall, 1997, p. 209; and Bruinessen, 1994
(in one paragraph the British report reads: “the military authorities
have used methods similar to those used against the Armenians during
the Great War: thousands of Kurds including women and children were
slain, others, mostly children, were thrown into the Euphrates… It is
now stated that the Kurdish question no longer exists in Turkey”).
45. Leo Kuper, “The Sovereign Territorial State: The Right to
Genocide”, in R.P. Claude and B.H. Weston (Eds.), Human Rights in the
World Community (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1989), pp. 56-64.
46. Ataturk was referred to as “Ebedi Sef” meaning the Eternal
Leader; see, Kendal, 1980, p. 71.
47. Ibid, p. 78.
48. On the role of military in Turkish politics, see, Rouleau, Eric,
“Military with Political Power: Turkey’s Modern Pashas”, Le Monde
Diplomatique, September 2000; Ozcan, Gencer, “The Military and the
Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey”, in Kirisci, Kemal and Barry
Rubin, (Eds.): Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional
Power, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp. 16-20.
49. Kendal, 1980, p. 79.
50. Gerger, 1997
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. See the Preamble to 1982 Constitution, supra note 3, before it
was amended in June 1995: “Following the operation carried out on 12
September 1980 by the Turkish Armed Forces in response to a call from
the Turkish Nation, of which they form an inseparable part, at a time
when the approach of a separatist, destructive and bloody civil war
unprecedented in the Republican era threatened the integrity of the
eternal Turkish Nation and motherland and the existence of the sacred
Turkish State.”, the full online text is available at , (last visited
12 September 2006).
54. United Kingdom Home Office, “Country Report: Turkey”, Country
Information and Policy Unit, October 2003, para. 4.1 [hereinafter UK
HO 2003].
55. Ibid
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