Category: News

DECISION ON NEW BSTDB MEMBERS IN 2005
Tirana, 9 June 2004 (16:55 UTC+2)
Macedonian Press Agency, Greece
June 9 2004
A decision on the accession of one or two new members into the Black
Sea Trade and Development Bank, BSTDB, is expected to be reached
in the first half of 2005, according to statements made to MPA by
Armenia’s deputy Minister of Finance and Economy David Avetissian,
the bank’s new Board of Directors President.
The Armenian official, who was elected to the post in the
bank’s general assembly meeting in Tirana, did not reveal the new
members of the bank. However, well-informed sources mentioned that
Serbia-Montenegro will be the 12th state that will participate in
the bank’s share capital followed by FYROM.
Also, the urgent issue of the capital review will be discussed in the
next BSTDB general assembly meeting in Yerevan, Armenia in June 2005
given the fact that certain member-states have a hard time contributing
their share in the bank’s capital.
In a press conference in the Albanian capital, BSTDB president Mustafa
Gurtin stated that Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia requested to cut down
their participation in the share capital of the bank from 2% to 1%.
Mr. Avetissian clarified to MPA that one of the priorities during his
term until June 2005 will be the financing of regional projects and
activities in the sectors of energy and transportation infrastructure.
The BSTDB general assembly in its 6th annual general assembly meeting
in Tirana also elected the representatives of Moldavia and Russia
as assistant presidents for the period until the 7th annual general
assembly to be held in Yerevan, Armenia on June 5, 2005.

Good Governance and Human Security in the Caspian Region
By Hooshang Amirahmadi, Rutgers University
Source: AIC Insight, American Iranian Council
Payvand, Iran
June 9 2004
Lecture Presented at the Conference on:
Caucus, Caspian and Central Asia: Maritime Dimensions of Security May
14-16, 2004. Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good morning! Let me begin by saying how honored I am to have been
invited to speak at this distinguished gathering of experts on
Caspian security. I want to thank David Griffths of the Center for
Foreign Policy Studies (of Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada) and Amir Mohagheghi of the Cooperative Monitoring
Center (of the Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, USA) for
the invitation and joint sponsorship of this rather timely
conference. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the
Caspian region has taken a back seat to the Middle East, where the
United States has focused its war against terrorism, the former Iraqi
regime, and now the religious and nationalist Iraqi rebels. Yet the
Caspian region and its security are no less important to global
peace, regional stability, and American security.
Equally important is the security of the Caspian region for its own
people, particularly if viewed from a multidimensional perspective,
involving human-social, military-strategic, resource-economic,
marine-environment, geopolitics-boundaries, and emergency-management
security issues. In this lecture, however, I wish to focus my talk on
“good governance and human security in the Caspian region,” covering
the five littoral states: Iran, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. I shall begin with an outline of my
conceptual thinking on the subject and then apply the framework to
the real situation in the countries. Except as otherwise specified,
the statistics I refer to in the lecture are for 2001 and taken from
the Human Development Report 2003 of the United Nation Development
Programs (HUR 2003, UNDP).
For centuries, the Caspian region was the strategic crossroads for
the empires of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Control of its vital land
and water routes, particularly for the spice trade, assured great
power and wealth; it also invited rivalry – “the Great Game.” During
the Cold War, ideological confrontations were added to the
geopolitical allure of the area, causing the region to serve as a
fault line in the East-West struggle. Now that technological changes
have diminished the significance of its trade routes and the Cold War
has ended, the control of the region’s rich hydrocarbon resources has
become the focus of international business and political players —
the region has once again become a pivotal frontier.
However, it is a frontier vastly different from that of the past.
History teaches us that while new frontiers bring significant
dangers, they also generate opportunities for progress. The
disappearance of the Soviet Union prompted regional and outside
players to expand their influence in the region – a game
characterized by gross shortsightedness with respect to the people in
the region and their needs for good governance and human security.
Governance – the way society collectively solves its problems and
meets its needs, and human security – human rights and human capacity
development, are the most critical challenges that the littoral
states must meet in order to advance their societies in the global
community.
Governance and Security Requirements of the New World
Till the end of the Cold War, security was understood in largely
political and military terms as it was defined by the state for the
protection of its national territory and control of its people. As
such, neither human security nor governance were central to the
security debates. Both were submerged under the rubric of national
sovereignty and territorial integrity – the two most sacred defensive
functions of the nation-state in the Cold War era. This political
concept of security was partly influenced by the American experience,
where early theories of international security were developed.
Emergence of a democratic-imperial capitalist America, in parallel
with the emergence of the Soviet Union as another world power of a
“social-imperialist” dictatorial nature, was the key factor.
But the bi-polar, state-centric world, which gave birth to this
concept of security, has largely disappeared: the ambitious tightly
knit USSR has been partially replaced with a loose and largely timid
Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS), and Western Europe has
gained relative political autonomy from the United States in
international relations. Even Japan now has become politically
assertive in global matters. One consequence of this is that a new
world has emerged where the state is no more the only player and
security is no longer only the state’s business. Specifically, in the
current tri-centric world where the state is challenged by
multinational corporations and civil society groups, a new concept of
security is emerging where governance and human security are the key
concepts alongside the old concept of state security.
Prior to World War II, the concept of security was dominated by
liberal ideas, which gave prominence to legal arguments and state
preference, as opposed to capabilities, and tended to view
international relations in optimistic terms. In the post-World War
II, that is in the Cold War environment, realists, and then
neo-realists, took over the security field and placed state power in
the center of their new constructs as a means of regulating an
otherwise anarchic international system. Security then emerged as a
field preoccupied with constraining the power of other sovereign
states and non-state actors through military deterrence and
containment. But pre-emption, a concept central to the current Bush
doctrine, was not allowed. The current United States defense strategy
has gone even beyond pre-emption, in practice becoming a prevention
strategy.
The Vietnam War helped to weaken the realists and increase the
predominance of critical theories in security and international
relations. The road was then opened to new ideas, some of which, like
deconstructionism and post-modernism, begin to question the
ideological basis and assumptions of political security as a means of
state domination. The state was also rejected as the only unit of
world security. It was argued that the Hobbsian view of the
individual as inherently ruthless and self-driven is contrary to
human experience and must thus be rejected. This cultural approach
was complemented by the globalization debate, arguing that it has
empowered the transnational corporations in international relations.
Humanizing the individual, recognizing the corporate players, and
limiting the sovereign privilege of the state meant that the old
state-centric security concepts were no longer valid in the emerging
post-Cold War world.
The international system is now viewed as having three groups of
stakeholders: the state, the multinational corporation, and the
individual. This latter in turn was considered as having a
three-dimensional existence: member of the human race, self, and
citizen (civil society actor as well). Only this last dimension was
recognized by the old state-centric security concept: that state
security also meant in a sense the security of its citizens, who were
considered anarchical and assumed to have contradictory (national)
interests to those of citizens in other states. Here, citizens are
territorially bound within a sovereign entity – the nation-state.
Individual as a member of the human race or as self was considered
irrelevant and in fact anti-security.
Expanding the rights of the individual beyond citizenship rights and
accounting for the corporate players meant that a new approach was
also needed to conceptualize the way societies were governed, namely
a governance model. The old concept held that citizens have governing
rights but have, under democracies, bestowed that right to their
state. In dictatorships, it was held that such rights are usurped by
the state. But as far as security was concerned, the state
represented its respective citizens in both cases, and the
representation was legitimate to the extent that the state did indeed
provide the required strategic security. In other words, the
protective state, democratic or otherwise, had an inalienable
sovereign right to security.
Governance, the way society collectively solves its problems and
meets its needs, requires public participation, decentralization and
partnership among the state, the civil society and the corporate
sector. The key concept of partnership in turn involves or enhances
consultation, cooperation and coordination across functional
(sectoral) and territorial (spatial) units of the nation-state.
Governance is, thus, a more integrated approach to decision-making,
development planning, and societal management. It improves
transparency, accountability and social inclusion, and thus results
in societal cohesiveness. More importantly, the model fits the
tri-centric world of the state, the civil society and the corporate
sector.
The governance model is, thus, only possible under a democratic state
or at the least a state that is prepared to recognize the rights of
its citizens beyond the ordinary citizenship rights to include rights
they are entitled to as individuals and members of the human race.
These rights include human rights as defined in the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and human development as outlined in the
UN Millennium Development Goals. Included in these documents are
political, economic, social, cultural, territorial, institutional,
spiritual, ideological, and informational needs and aspirations. From
this perspective, states are classified as high, medium, and low
human development achievers.
Besides these changes, globalization has also resulted in a number of
significant developments, the most important of which are the
emergence of issues that are both threats and panaceas to the
security concerns of the state, the individual, and the corporation.
These include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, HIV/AIDS, drug
trafficking and addiction, environmental degradation, poverty,
corruption, and heightened trans-border traffic of people and
commodities. For example, the Afghan opium trade is a major security
concern for Iran but a security panacea for Afghan cultivators; and
corruption in Caspian states is a major means of wealth accumulation
but threatens the social fabric of the nations. The emergence of
issues as security factors adds the concern of dealing with non-state
actors, who are often not bound to any particular territory.
Terrorism is, evidently, a case in point.
Globalization, by making peoples and states more interdependent has
increased poverty and income inequality though it had the potential
to reduce them. Globalization has particularly endangered the
security of the smaller developing countries whose governments are
slow to adapt to technological and societal changes, and who have
more difficulty seeing beyond short-term financial interests toward
the long-term health of their peoples. Competing for international
resources can be a dangerous proposition for the poorer states, as
they already are facing tremendous challenges in managing their debts
and fueling sustainable growth. More critically, their relative
poverty in the absence of appropriate governance makes them highly
exploitable by multinational corporations. In addition, competition
among nations to attract foreign investment leads to a lack of
taxation, labor law, and environmental protection.
Another critical feature of the new tri-centric world system is a
built-in tension in its drive for simultaneous stability and chaos, a
development that has followed the emergence of a global civil society
of global actors and constituencies, and thus global accountability
and common vulnerability. In particular, the system is caught between
two diametrically opposing tendencies, one calling for integration
and cooperation and the other creating conditions for disintegration
and conflict. Let us call these influences world-integrating forces
and world-disintegrating forces. Broadly speaking, world-integrating
forces include the corporate sector and technological forces, while
disintegrative forces are comprised of interventionist states and
certain non-state fundamentalist actors such as terrorist
organizations and ethnic separatist movements.
There are many ramifications of the contradictory tendencies for
integration and disintegration; the one I believe is most pivotal for
a new paradigm of global security and coexistence is the diminishing
utility of illegitimate power and offensive force, including
militarism and violence, the so-called “hard power,” in gaining
societal hegemony or maintaining a popularly undesirable status quo.
As the power of offensive force has diminished, particularly when
used unilaterally and preventively, economic force and information
technologies, along with other components of so-called “soft power,”
have become the most effective means of influence and domination.
Indeed, Japan and Germany have grown into powerful international
forces almost entirely because of their economic strength and
information-processing capabilities. In the absence of an expansive
“soft power,” no amount of “hard power” may be exercised to gain
dominance, legitimacy, or democracy.
In the tri-centric world, military power is not the most effective
way of providing security for a country. The United Nations
Development Forum says “the world can never be at peace unless people
have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be
within nations rather than between them—with their origins buried
deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The
search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in
arms.” It will be impossible for a developing nation to make progress
towards such goals as peace, development, environmental protection,
human rights, and democratization without attending first to the
sustainable development of its people’s capacities. The lack of human
security, a universal issue now, is one of the causes of national
discord, and can lead to multinational military conflicts. These
conflicts can be prevented by meeting threats to human security
before they become larger and more violent problems.
With the growing recognition of economics and information
technologies as fields of force, and thus means of security, the
state has come under increasing pressure to show performance in these
areas. This demand is particularly significant in the context of the
increasing rights of individuals and corporations. Significantly,
under the new condition, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are
increasingly forced to accept the legitimate rights of their human
and corporate elements, and become accountable to national and global
societies. Indeed, the state is viewed as legitimate only to the
extent that it is acceptably developmental and democratic. Otherwise,
they are considered failed states; such states are increasingly
barred from claiming sovereignty, a concept that has increasingly
become people-centered.
Experience and Challenges of the Littoral Caspian States
How have the littoral Caspian states fared in the tri-centric world,
and what challenges do they face in security and governance? The
answer to this question must naturally recognize the significant
differences that exist among them in relation to their geography,
population, resources endowment, historic and cultural significance,
and regional and international relations and standing. Iran and the
Russian Federation, for example, have bigger economies and larger
populations, and are far more developed, wealthier, and better placed
strategically than Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Nevertheless, they suffer from common problems and enjoy similar
advantages.
Iran and Russia should have been major regional integrationist forces
given their vast and strategic geographies and populations. In
reality, however, they are only marginally influential in their
region and are often seen as siding with disintegrative forces.
Iran-US conflict and US- Russia competition are key obstacles to the
potentials these countries have to assume a more active and effective
role in various regional matters. For example, Iran and Russia only
play peripheral roles in mediating regional conflicts, such as that
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as they themselves have unresolved
conflicts with some states or ethnic groups at home or in the region.
And, more significantly, the states still need to find a solution to
the problem of the Caspian Sea legal regime.
Iran’s international political challenges include allegations
regarding state terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Both these
allegations are directed at the Iranian state, while terrorism in
most nations is a non-state phenomenon. Russia, on the other hand, is
a nuclear state and likes to view itself as a victim of Chechen
terrorism. Yet, Russia refuses to actively engage itself in the
so-called American war against terrorism, viewing the fighting in
Afghanistan and Iraq as largely rooted in the American desire to
dominate the region. The other Caspian states are largely viewed as
irrelevant to the terrorism and nuclear issues, but also have their
own international challenges. For example, the dispute over
Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia remains a time bomb,
and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan need to settle claims over fields in
the Caspian Sea.
Domestic politics are almost equally problematic in all five Caspian
states. Iran and Russia are authoritarian states that allow dissent
but also repress opposition selectively. They divide the population
into conformists and nonconformists, allowing freedom to the former
while restricting the rights of the latter in significant ways.
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, on the other hands, are
totalitarian states where elections are disallowed or allowed only as
an international public relations ploy. In all these states
candidates for public offices are vetted, overtly or covertly, and
elections are rigged. Kazakhstan is not a signatory to the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1966), while Iran has refused to sign the UN Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment and
Punishment (1984), and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979). Ideological rigidity
and power monopoly continue to remain major obstacles to the
development of a democratic polity in the Caspian states.
Economically, too, the Caspian states do not fare well in the new
world. While relatively wealthy because of oil and gas resources,
their GDP per capita (PPP US$) is below the world average of about
$7,376. More importantly, their per capita GDP has declined in the
last two decades or so, while income inequality has increased as has
regional and sectoral disparities. The littoral states are also only
partially integrated into the global economy through the extractive
oil and gas sector, though Russia has the added advantage of being a
big exporter of armaments. Their share of the total imports of
industrialized countries (including oil) is very low, under 0.5
percent, with the exception of Russia, whose share is comparable to
the major Western European economies. Statistics for their share of
the total exports from the same countries is similarly low. With the
exception of Russia again, some 70 to 80 percent of imports are
consumer goods; only 1 to 2 percent is capital goods.
Foreign investment remains miniscule in Iran, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and the little capital that has been
attracted concentrate in the oil and gas sector. In Iran, for
example, only $400 million in foreign capital has been invested in
non-oil sectors since the revolution. Iran’s manufacturing value
added per capita in 2001 was only $285 (1990 US dollars) compared to
$876 for the developing countries (See IMF 2003 report on Iran’s
economy). Except for Russia, the other Caspian states have no better
position with respect to non-oil foreign investment or the value
added in manufacturing sector. In Azerbaijan, the manufacturing
sector has all but vanished. The fact is that the Caspian states
remain undeveloped and largely isolated from the international
non-oil markets. Of all the Caspian states, only Russia can claim to
be sufficiently engaged and developed.
The Caspian states are decades behind in technological development,
despite the fact that in countries like Iran and Russia, the people
could have created a powerful competitive economy. Russia is again
relatively advanced in technological fields but all the other states
are decades behind in the seven or eight key industries of our age:
electronics, telecommunications, computer hardware and software, new
materials, biotechnology, civil aviation, and genetic engineering.
The high-technology sector makes up 8 percent of Russia’s
manufacturing exports. For Iran the figure is 2 percent and for
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 4 percent and 5 percent respectively.
Russia spends 1 percent of its GDP (Purchasing Power Parity – PPP
$US) on research and development, other littoral states much less.
For Iran the figure stands at 0.1 percent, for Azerbaijan at 0.2
percent, for Kazakhstan at about 0.3 percent, and for Turkmenistan at
close to zero. Compare these figures to the figure for South Korea at
2.7 percent. Figures for internet users are similarly low: for every
1,000 people, 29.3 Russian citizens are internet users, for Iran
15.6, for Kazakhstan 9.3, for Turkmenistan 1.7, and for Azerbaijan
3.7. Compare these figures to the figure for South Korea at 521.1.
The Caspian states continues to mismanage their economies, which have
declined relative to the years immediately preceding the Soviet era
and pre-revolution in Iran. Managers are appointed on ideological and
relational bases, not on the basis of expertise or merit. Corruption
and rent seeking is rampant, and the governments dominate and lead
the economies at the expense of the private sectors, except for a few
well-connected, often corrupt, wealthy businessmen. It will take
years before these states can turn their economies and
information-processing capabilities into fields of force for security
purposes. Yet unless they mange to do so in the foreseeable future,
the Caspian states will increasingly have to resort to military
expenditures and thus further drain themselves of resources for
economic and technological developments. At present, they spent
almost as much on military as on health care or education. The
Caspian states spend between 3.5 and 4.4 percent of their GDP on
education and between 0.6 and 3.6 percent on health care, while
spending between 1 and 4.9 percent on military expenditures.
Socially, too, there are disturbing developments in these countries
when compared to developments globally. Income inequality is widest
in Russia and Iran, where the share of the richest 10 percent is
between 10 to 20 times larger than the share of the bottom 10 percent
poor. In Azerbaijan, where poverty is a more serious problem, almost
10 percent of the population earns less than $2 a day, and the GDP
per capita shrinks 1.3 percent every year. Between 30 to 45 percent
of the people in the littoral states live below the poverty line, and
the female share of the total earned income is between 10 and 15
percent. Women are economically more exploited than men across the
states, and in Iran they are also socially oppressed. The youth
unemployment stands at between 20 to 30 percent, and the annual rate
of “brain drain” ranges between 2 and 5 for every 1000 people, Iran
suffering the most. The young populations, about 60 percent of whom
are below the age of 30, also suffer from the lack of social
recreations. Many are addicted to drugs, particularly in Iran
according to official statistics. Ethnic groups remain restless and
some are plotting with foreign forces for separatist movements. In
Kazakhstan, regional disparity is extreme.
The Caspian states predominantly view their national strength and
defense in military terms, and thus pour a large percentage of their
resources into their military and police sectors. This tendency is
partly imposed on them, as they live in a dangerous neighborhood, but
some officials of the governments actually believe in the use of
offensive force and in the liberating power of violence. While Frantz
Fanon, the Martinican/French revolutionary political thinker, is no
longer widely read, his influence continues: “Violence is a cleansing
force,” he wrote in his The Wretched of the Earth, and it “restores
self-respect.” More specifically, the Caspian states continue to view
their security through the old state-centric lenses. The state
remains dominant and unanswerable to civil society and to private
businesses, and individuals are viewed as mere citizens with rights
determined by the state. The rights of the individual or citizen as
self or as members of the human race are peripheral at best.
Significant governance problems exist in the Caspian states. While
parliaments exist, they are often made null and void by decrees or
institutional mechanisms. Public participation in decision-making,
particularly in strategic areas, is even institutionally absent.
Almost no partnership exists between the state, civil society and the
business firms, and public policies often lead to social exclusion
rather than inclusion. The lack of participation and partnership
means that little cooperation and coordination exists across
functions and territories at almost every administrative level. No
wonder the Caspian states suffer from social incoherence and
political tension. The tragedy of September 11 has indeed exacerbated
the governance problem in the region as the states have often used
the security pretext to further limit freedoms, and abuse the human
rights and human development of their citizens. Political dissidents
are often labeled and dealt with as “terrorists.”
Not a single Caspian state is among the high human development
category of the UN report on Human Development. Of 175 countries
included in the UN ranking of nations with regard to their
achievements in human development, the Human Development Index (HDI)
rank for Russia is 63 and for Iran 106, with other nations in between
these two figures: Kazakhstan 76, Turkmenistan 87, and Azerbaijan 89.
Iran’s situation is particularly problematic as it is the only
Caspian littoral state with a negative GDP per capita (PPP $US) rank
minus HDI rank figure. At –29, Iran is only better than 7 countries
in the 175 countries included. The data is a good indication of state
efficiency in managing its resources. A higher positive figure will
indicate a more efficient bureaucracy, while a lower figure shows
exact the reverse. In terms of human rights, too, the Caspian states
fare badly compared to many in the world, with Iran, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan topping the list in the region with the most negative
records.
There is also some good news. The countries’ political cultures are
changing. Foreign policy is increasingly based on national interest,
away from ideological considerations, and increasingly thicker lines
are drawn between the states and disintegrative forces. It is now
recognized that new nuclear proliferators will not be tolerated, and
that identification with terrorists is dangerous. An increasing
number of the political elite now sees offensive force as
counterproductive, though the states continue to have a hard time
grasping the value of defensive forces such as economics and
technology or human rights and human developments. The role of
government is increasingly being challenged by a growing number of
NGOs and business firms throughout the region, and humanitarian
causes are receiving significant attention. A clear break is
developing between the state and NGOs, and this change demonstrates
the fact that the legitimacy of the state in the region has sharply
declined due to its inefficiency and the lack of transparency and
accountability.
There are positive developments in the economic sphere too. The
states have set up an “oil fund” to better manage their budgets and
allocate resources for future development, and their economies are
growing while their macroeconomic environment is stable. With the
exception of Russia, Caspian littoral states as yet have no
multinational corporations, but the business communities are
increasingly asserting their relative autonomy from the states. This
is particularly true of the small industrial entrepreneurs in the
forefront of the struggle for modernization of the economies. A few
Iranian companies now operate internationally, and an expatriate
counterpart has also emerged in the West. The internationalization of
these companies will help Iran’s economic integration, technology
transfer, capital flow, and foreign partnership. It will take a while
before firms in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan can hope to
achieve international prominence.
There is some good news socially as well. The middle class continues
to remain assertive and demand liberalism and democracy. Compared to
the past, their numbers are large and their quality high in Russia
and Iran. They now have better connections with both the working
people and the modern sections of the upper classes. In other
littoral states, however, they remain less significant but growing as
well. It is particularly important to note the progress that women
are making in private and public domains. Their literacy rate and
economic independence has improved significantly in recent years,
though their relative wellbeing is much lower than that achieved by
men. In Iran, there are many great women artists and poets, powerful
political voices, a Nobel laureate, an Oscar nominee, a best-selling
author, and a beauty queen. Women’s achievements have been even more
notable in the Russian Federation.
Ultimately, the main source of the Caspian states’ wealth today and
tomorrow is their people. Here too there is good news. Their level of
education and professionalism is fast improving, as is their global
reach and awareness. The literacy rate is well over 75 percent in
every state, and, according to the World Bank, 20 percent of the
relevant age group in the Caspian states participates in some form of
tertiary education. There are now millions of university graduates in
these countries, and their size is particularly expanding in science
and technology fields as well as in key social science disciplines.
These achievements notwithstanding, the Caspian states continue to
fail to generate visionary leaders among themselves. Why? In a
nutshell, the problem is rooted in the undeveloped nature of their
polity, and largely in the absence of well-developed political
parties.
To conclude this discussion, let me say that the Caspian littoral
states face a multiple of political, economic, social, cultural,
spatial, institutional and international challenges in order to
develop their countries. Among them, and from a security perspective,
governance and human development need to receive the highest
priority. The key to achieving success in these areas is to
intelligently mobilize and utilize available resources. Given that
these states are oil and gas rich, their attention must particularly
focus on a more transparent and accountable management of the revenue
from these natural resources. They must translate the finite
resources provided by nature into sustainable development, and this
needs to be done as quickly as possible, since for most states in the
Caspian region, oil provides a very short window of opportunity – in
Azerbaijan, e.g., less that 20 years.
It is often the case that a sound fiscal policy, like creation of an
“oil fund,” is viewed as the only proper policy. Yet, transparency,
accountability, a vibrant civil society, and genuine democracy play
an even more important role. It is indeed due to misunderstanding of
this aspect of natural resource management that most, if not all
natural-resources rich countries have less developed societies than
nations lacking significant natural resources: they have greater
poverty, income inequality and regional disparity, higher
international debt and dependency, more dictatorship and human rights
abuses, worse governance and legal procedures, and higher military
and nonproductive expenditures. While oil revenue is an additional
source of income and disruptive of traditional authority, it has also
led to declining per capita income and authoritarianism, raising the
likelihood for domestic conflicts.
To be sure, there is a political dimension to “resource curse.”
Revenues from the natural resources flow to the state, making it
relatively autonomous from the citizens and the private businesses.
They then often pay no taxes, or pay only negligibly, in such rentier
states, and thus these states receive little clamor for
representation from their citizens. The leaders here find no reason
to share power and often refuse to account for the revenues. When
transparency becomes a victim as a free press is suppressed, a host
of negative consequences will follow, including dictatorship and
human rights abuses. The absence of democracy then distorts economic
policy and national priorities. Thus, instead of seeking legitimacy
through the electoral process, the rulers seek it through
inappropriate spending. Rent seeking, corruption, debt accumulation,
and inflation can result, leading to political instability and
conflict, which is how the regime of the former Shah of Iran
collapsed. A recreation of the past then becomes a desirable
alternative and the future fails to come to life.

Armenian president appoints minister of town planning
Mediamax news agency
9 Jun 04
Yerevan, 9 June: Armenian President Robert Kocharyan has signed
a decree appointing Aram Arutyunyan as Minister of Town Planning,
the presidential press service has told Mediamax news agency.
Before his appointment Aram Arutyunyan was an MP of the Armenian
National Assembly and member of the Orinats Yerkir [Law-Governed
Country] faction.
Member of the Orinats Yerkir Party Ara Aramyan resigned his post as
Minister of Town Planning on 9 April this year after the arrest of
his son, Ayk Aramyan.
Ayk Aramyan was arrested in connection with the shoot-out at Yerevan’s
Triumph cafe on 12 March as a result of which five people were
wounded. He was charged under three articles of the Armenian Criminal
Code: attempt on life, illegal possession of weapons and hooliganism.

Armenia unsure about getting visas for Azeri-hosted NATO conference
Public Television of Armenia, Yerevan
8 Jun 04
Armenian servicemen will visit the Azerbaijani embassy in Georgia
where they will be granted entry visas to Baku. The spokesman for
the Armenian Defence Ministry, Seyran Shakhsuvaryan, has said that
NATO representatives have informed the Armenian side about this.
It is strange that information about the visas has been received not
from Azerbaijan, but from Brussels. Shakhsuvaryan also noted that
it is not yet clear whether Armenian officers will be granted visas
or whether they will return from Tbilisi to Yerevan empty-handed,
as has been the case before.

Cork City miss out
Irish Independent
Jun 09, 2004
CORK CITY have missed out on a place in the UEFA Cup following the
FairPlay League draw in Germany last night – Pat Dolan’s side will
contest the Inter TottoCup instead.
Armenian side FC Mika, plus a team from Ukraine yet to be decided as
their league season runs until June 19, were the lucky names drawn
from the hat during half-time at the European Under-21 Championship
final in Bochum.
The other teams in the draw, together with with Cork and Charlton,
were Esbjerg ofDenmark, SK Brann of Norway, German side Freiburg,
FC Lahti of Finland, Spanish sideReal Mallorca, KS Teuta of Albania
and Throttur Reykjavik of Iceland.

USA applying double standards in Karabakh settlement – Azeri pundit
Zerkalo, Baku
9 Jun 04
The head of the Centre for Political Innovations and Technologies,
Mubariz Ahmadoglu, has familiarized reporters with his assessment
of the political situation in the South Caucasus again. This time
a considerable amount of the analytical report is given to the
geopolitical situation in neighbouring Armenia, a country which is
unfriendly to us.
However, according to Ahmadoglu, the Azerbaijani media have
lately abused the coverage of the domestic political situation in
neighbouring countries: “I think that the Azerbaijani public should
pay more attention to the situation in Azerbaijan instead of showing a
‘sporting’ interest in other states,” the pundit said.
[Passage omitted: Armenia losing its positions in the economic and
social spheres]
The pundit believes that the events taking place in Iraq clearly reveal
the following picture: The USA is playing the role of an international
policeman, and this is obvious at least from the fact that Iran and
Turkey are not taking an active part in the Iraq events. In turn,
Armenia, which is a historic ally of Russia, is trying to benefit
from it, involving “Uncle Sam” in the geopolitical situation in the
region. Armenian politicians openly let US political circles know
that they are ready to make various overtures to Washington.
On the other hand, Ahmadoglu believes that the USA is applying dual
political standards not only with regard to the Karabakh problem, but
also with regard to the domestic political situation in Armenia. If the
USA really wishes a fair solution to the Karabakh conflict, it should
provide financial aid to Karabakh via Azerbaijani banks. “Washington is
often talking about a mechanism of trust in the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict settlement, forgetting that transferring investments via
Azerbaijani banks could serve as an additional resource for a peaceful
solution to the problem. The USA’s discrimination against the sides
to the conflict and the application of double standards by the USA
put a brake on the settlement process and create serious obstacles
to the region’s stable economic development,” Ahmadoglu said.

Azeri ministry plans Baku-London satellite link, broadcast upgrade
MPA news agency
9 Jun 04
Baku, 9 June: The Teleradio company of the Azerbaijani Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology will put into operation
a Baku-London international satellite communications link by 15
June 2004.
Measures are being taken to increase the quality of radio and TV
broadcasts, the ministry has told MPA news agency. A 1-kW transmitter
[as received, does not clarify radio or TV] has been installed in
the Ganca TV and radio broadcast centre and a 5-kW transmitter [as
received, does not clarify radio or TV] is to be installed there.
By the end of 2004, radio and TV stations in Ganca and Xanlar District
[northwestern Azerbaijan] will be provided with modern technical
equipment. Similar measures are to be taken in Gadabay, Samkir,
Agstafa and Fuzuli districts [all in western Azerbaijan, along the
frontline in Karabakh and the Armenian border].

Armenian ombudsman warns Georgia against resettling Meskhetian Turks
Noyan Tapan news agency
8 Jun 04
Tbilisi, 8 June: Armenian rights activist Larisa Alaverdyan has said
she understands the concern of the Armenian population of Georgia’s
Samtskhe-Javakheti Region over the possible mass return of Meskhetian
Turks to the region.
Larisa Alaverdyan said in an interview with [Georgian news agency]
Kavkasia-Press that if the Georgian government decides to take in
the Meskhetian Turks who wish to return to Samtskhe-Javakheti, a real
conflict might break out in the region.
Meskhetian Turks were evicted to Central Asia during Stalin’s
repression in the middle of the last century. Their return was a
condition when Georgia was admitted to the Council of Europe.
According to the Armenian ombudsman, the Georgian government should
be maximally careful and wise while taking any specific decisions on
this issue. About 300,000 representatives of this people are living
in CIS countries today. The largest diaspora of Meskhetian Turks –
about 80,000 – lives in Azerbaijan.

Thoroughly modern meze
COOKING
Los Angeles Times
June 9, 2004
By Anya von Bremzen, Special to The Times
ISTANBUL — By 11 p.m., the street theater on Nevizade Street, a narrow
lane lined with outdoor restaurants around Istanbul’s fish market, works
up to a kind of Felliniesque mayhem. Flower sellers push big thorny
roses at passersby’s noses, while a Gypsy quartet cranks background
music for a parade of street peddlers.
Amid this carnival, waiters unload trays of small dishes on tables and
refill glasses with raki, Turkey’s favorite anise-based liquor. Our own
table, at an old Armenian restaurant called Boncuk, is mosaicked with
plates of dips, crisp fish croquettes redolent of allspice and cinnamon,
a chickpea pâté layered with dried currants and pine nuts, and a
majestic /börek/, a pastry oozing a tangy filling of cheese and
/pastirma/, or spiced cured beef.
These are meze, Turkey’s signature little dishes and the Middle East’s
answer to Spanish /tapas/, Venetian /baccari/ or Mexican /antojitos/.
On our own shores, meze offer yet another twist on the small-plates
trend. Entertaining at home? Meze could have been invented for Southern
California, where, much like in Istanbul, they can be languidly savored
al fresco on the patio. Less fussy than hors d’oeuvres, a welcome break
from Italian antipasti, infinitely more varied than hummus and baba
ghanouj, a few meze together make an exciting light feast.
Meze — the name is derived from the Persian word /maza/, or flavor —
seem to flourish in Istanbul as an edible life force: from a plethora of
eggplant preparations to a veritable encyclopedia of dolma, or stuffed
vegetables; from multitudes of /böreks/, savory pastries, to a vast
roster of salads and dips. They can be cold or hot, light or
substantial, as humble as a wedge of salty white cheese or as chichi as
the langoustine salads dished out at the glamorous fish restaurants
along the Bosphorus shores. / /Though most travelers to Turkey encounter
meze at restaurants, they taste even better when prepared at home. “Meze
is all about socializing — nibbling, drinking, laughing,” says Gökçan
Adar, an Istanbul food writer. One breezy night, under a sour cherry
tree in his overgrown garden, he treats us to a 19-dish meze marathon.
Spontaneity is essential
**Typical of modern-day Istanbul, where the cuisine evolves with
lightning speed, his spread is both creative and classic: braised
eggplant topped with a flourish of walnut and sun-dried tomato paste,
langoustines with their roe resting atop lemony wild greens, fritters of
just-picked zucchini flowers on a vibrant red pepper purée. This could
almost be Catalonia — or California. Not to be outdone, my friend Engin
Akin, a food writer and radio host legendary in Istanbul for her swank
soirees, throws a bash on the lawn of her home overlooking the
Bosphorus. Ever willing to experiment, Akin deep-fries paper-thin leaves
of /yufka/ (a phyllo-like dough) and serves the crisps with shavings of
Turkish cured mullet roe similar to /bottarga/. She fashions nifty
bruschetta from the ubiquitous fava bean pâté, topping the toasts with
fried almonds.
Grazing gets more cosmopolitan still when Akin and I move on to Bodrum,
a jet-set resort on the Aegean. Here, at a cocktail party at the
white-washed villa of a shipping tycoon, white-gloved waiters pass such
dainties as miniature French fry “kebabs,” Gruyère /köfte /(meatballs),
and spicy /sucuk /(/soujuk)/ sausage wrapped in phyllo.
In Turkey, meze are intimately linked with the city’s history as a
cosmopolitan port and to drinking establishments called /meyhane/.
What — drinking in a Muslim culture, with its Koranic prohibitions on
alcohol? Well … sure.
Even before Kemal Atatürk secularized Turkey in the 1920s, restrictions
on alcohol were sporadic, a whim of one sultan or another. Selling
alcohol was taboo, though, entrusted to Istanbul’s numerous non-Muslim
minorities: Greeks, Armenians and Jews. It was they who established the
original /meyhane/, raucous dives packed with foreign sailors, where
meze was an excuse for another round of raki. Dating back to early
Ottoman times or even further, /meyhane/ continue to thrive.
To learn more, I rendezvous with Akin and Deniz Gursoy, an author of
books on raki and meze, at Safa, the city’s oldest /meyhane./ With
whirling fans, burnished mirrors and pictures of Atatürk striking
Hollywood poses, the place feels like a souvenir from another era. When
Safa opened some 125 ago, Gursoy explains, meze came free with
consumption, consisting of basics like anchovies, pickled cabbage, a
tiny /börek//leblebi/, or dried chickpeas. Today, the repertoire seems
inexhaustible.
Akin explains that flavors Westerners usually associate with Middle
Eastern cuisines — bulgur, pomegranate molasses, lavish spicing,
hummus, kebabs — are rather new to Istanbul, a consequence of the
enormous influx of immigrants from eastern Turkey.
Other classic meze we sample reflect the city’s historical layers of
cultures. Delicious fried liver nuggets, with wisps of raw onion and a
dusting of sumac, hail from the Balkans. The /plaki/ is Greek, Gursoy
notes, referring to a classic cold preparation in which beans or fish
are simmered in tomato sauce sweetened with onions and cinnamon. Jews
might have contributed /zeytinyagli/, an iconic cold meze of vegetables,
such as artichokes or leeks, braised slowly in water and olive oil with
a little sugar until they melt in the mouth.
And though raki still reigns, these days, younger Turks are just as
likely to sip a locally made Cabernet or a dry Muscat with their meze.
It is actually on Istanbul’s Asian side, at a humble joint called Çiya,
that I discover the city’s most exciting small dishes. Little surprise,
because chef-owner Musa Dageviren hails from Gaziantep, a city near the
Syrian border renowned for Turkey’s finest cuisine.
Each of his dishes vibrates with flavor: A simple tomato and parsley
salad comes alive with a sprinkling of pungent orange-hued powder made
from dried curd cheese. Grape leaves are filled with dried onions,
bulgur and pomegranate syrup. Boiled wheat berries and home-pickled
green tomatoes sport a creamy cloak of dense, tart yogurt.
“Gaziantep doesn’t have a meze tradition per se,” Dageviren explains,
“but small dishes are normally served at kebab houses. At home, cooks
often fashion light cold meals from leftovers.”
Lacking white-gloved waiters or a grandma from Gaziantep, a meze spread
is still easy to improvise. The rich thick Turkish yogurt alone — which
can be replicated in the United States by draining good-quality yogurt
in a cheesecloth-lined sieve — provides a dozen simple ideas. Stir in
some crushed garlic, minced herbs and grated cucumbers and spread it on
pita. Or fold it into shredded beets, sautéed zucchini or the chopped
smoky flesh of an eggplant that has been grilled whole over charcoal
(and why not sprinkle some toasted almond on top?). Alternatively, a
dollop of yogurt can top fried eggplant or zucchini slices.
Bulgur also makes a fine meze, say as a salad tossed with chickpeas,
tomatoes, parsley and mint and drizzled with pomegranate molasses and
olive oil. The mandatory raki accompaniment of feta and honeydew melon
becomes elegant when cut into cubes and threaded on long wooden skewers.
Not to forget olives, pistachios, good, creamy feta and roasted
chickpeas. And unless you have a bottle of raki that’s been burning a
hole in your liquor cabinet, try Greek ouzo, Pernod, a fruity, light red
wine (slightly chilled) or a crisp, delicate white (no oaky Chardonnay,
please).
Still, raki is our drink as Akin and I prepare a meze feast on her boat
for an indolent Aegean voyage. As for the menu, our plan is to test-run
the best meze recipes we’ve collected from parties and restaurants. From
Tugra, the palatial Ottoman restaurant at Istanbul’s Çiragan Palace
hotel, we steal the idea of wrapping /haloumi/ cheese in grape leaves,
grilling them and serving this unusual dolma drizzled with pomegranate
molasses. A hit.
A floating feast
**
**From the shipping tycoon’s party we’ve emerged with a recipe for
/müjver/, crisp zucchini pancakes, which we make cocktail-sized, with
the addition of the nontraditional baking soda — for puffier fritters.
In Akin’s hands, the ubiquitous /köfte/, or meatballs, turn out studded
with nuts and laced with herbs.
Suddenly, Akin confesses that she’s never made /topik/, my favorite
Armenian chickpea pâté filled with caramelized onions, currants and pine
nuts and dusted with cinnamon. A flurry of phone calls to Armenian
matriarchs. Akin nods and scribbles furiously. She got it. Except we are
not shaping it by spreading the chickpea purée on a wet muslin cloth
with a rolling pin, as tradition dictates. A shortcut will do.
The table is finally set on the deck under a vast starry sky. Akin’s
husband, Nuri, proffers a CD with /fasil/, the traditional /meyhane/ music.
“You pour, we drink,” the song blasts. We take the cue. A sip, a nibble,
a gulp — and luckily no one falls in the water. Luckier still, we don’t
have far to go. No need for a /hamal/, a porter who in Ottoman times
would wait by the /meyhane/ doors to deliver the inebriated back to
their families.
*
Topik (layered garbanzo bean pâté )
*Total time: *1½ hours, plus chilling time
*Servings: *Makes 9 squares
2/3cups dried Zante currants
1/4cup mild olive oil
4 cups chopped white onions (medium dice)
1 teaspoon cinnamon, plus more for sprinkling the pâté
3/4 teaspoon ground allspice
1/2 cup toasted pine nuts
3 cups canned garbanzo beans, well drained, liquid
reserved
3 tablespoons tahini paste, room temperature, well stirred
2 tablespoons fresh lemon juice
2 medium-sized yellow-fleshed potatoes, peeled and boiled
Salt
*1. Place the currants *in a medium bowl, add boiling water to a level
one-half inch above the currants and let them stand for 30 minutes.
Drain and reserve the soaking liquid.
*2. In a large skillet, *heat the oil over medium-high heat. Add onions
and cook, stirring, until they begin to soften, about 7 minutes. Reduce
heat to medium-low and continue cooking, stirring occasionally, until
onions are soft and very lightly browned, about 15 to 20 minutes, adding
2 to 3 tablespoons of the currant soaking liquid when onions begin to
look dry.
*3. Add the currants *and another 2 to 3 tablespoons of their soaking
liquid and cook for 5 more minutes, stirring. Stir in the cinnamon and
allspice and cook for 2 more minutes. Remove from heat and let the
mixture cool to room temperature. Stir in the pine nuts.
*4. In a food processor, *purée the garbanzo beans in 2 batches with the
tahini, lemon juice and 4 to 5 tablespoons of the bean liquid until very
smooth. Scrape the mixture into a large bowl.
*5. Mash the potatoes *until smooth with a potato masher or pass through
a ricer. Stir the mashed potatoes into the puréed mixture and mix
thoroughly. Season with salt.
*6. Line an 8-inch square *baking pan with plastic wrap, leaving 4 to 5
inches of overhang on all sides. Wet your hands with cold water and use
them to spread half of the garbanzo mixture evenly on the bottom. Spread
the onion mixture evenly on top; it will be a rather thick layer. With
wet hands, spread the other half of the garbanzo mixture on top of that.
Fold in the overhang to enclose the pâté. Weight the pâté with a small
cast-iron skillet, a plate topped with two 16-ounce cans or something of
similar weight, and refrigerate for 2 to 3 hours.
*7. To serve, *bring the pâté to room temperature, invert it onto a
serving plate and remove the plastic wrap. Sprinkle the top lightly with
cinnamon (you can do this decoratively through a doily). Cut into squares.
*Each serving: *306 calories; 9 grams protein; 41 grams carbohydrates; 7
grams fiber; 14 grams fat; 2 grams saturated fat; 0 cholesterol; 246 mg.
sodium.
*
Herbed zucchini and feta fritters
*Total time: *1 hour, 30 minutes, plus refrigerator time
*Servings: *36 fritters
1 1/2 cups plain yogurt, preferably full-fat organic
1 large garlic clove, crushed through a garlic press
Salt
1 pound zucchini (about 2 large), shredded in a food processor using a
three-eighths-inch hole
4 ounces feta, grated
1/3cup minced dill
1/3cup minced parsley
1/4 cup thinly sliced mint leaves
2/3cup flour
3/4 teaspoon baking powder
2 large eggs, beaten
Mild olive oil for frying
*1. Place yogurt *in a small sieve lined with cheesecloth and set over a
bowl. Drain in the refrigerator for 2 hours or overnight.
*2. Place drained yogurt *in a bowl, stir in garlic and salt to taste
and let mixture stand at room temperature while preparing fritters.
*3. Place shredded zucchini *in a fine sieve and press hard against the
sieve to extract as much liquid as possible. In a large bowl, mix
zucchini, feta, dill, parsley and mint and stir until well combined.
*4. **Sift flour *and baking powder into bowl. Add half of mixture to
the eggs and stir to form a smooth paste. Stir paste into zucchini and
combine thoroughly. Sprinkle in the rest of the flour mixture and stir
in well. Let stand for about 10 minutes. Stir again.
*5. Line a cookie sheet *with paper towels. In a 12-inch skillet, heat 1
inch of oil to 375 degrees, or until a drop of batter sizzles on
contact. Drop 3 (1-tablespoon) portions of batter into oil without
overcrowding and flatten lightly with the back of a spoon. Fry until
deep golden and crusty, about 1 1/2 minutes per side. With a slotted
spoon, transfer fritters to the paper towels to drain and continue to
fry remaining fritters. Serve hot or warm, with the yogurt dip.
*Each fritter: *50 calories; 2 grams protein; 3 grams carbohydrates;
0 fiber; 4 grams fat; 1 gram saturated fat; 16 mg. cholesterol; 52 mg.
sodium.
*
Herbed köfte with tahini sauce
*Total time: *45 minutes plus 1 hour chilling time
*Servings: *42 meatballs
*Note: *Sumac is available at Middle Eastern markets.
*Tahini sauce*
**
**
1/2 cup tahini paste, well stirred
1/2 cup chicken broth
1/4 cup fresh lemon juice
1 teaspoon ground cumin
1 teaspoon mild paprika
*1. Combine *tahini, chicken broth, lemon juice, cumin and paprika,
stirring well.
*Meatballs*
**
**
2 slices white sandwich bread, crusts removed
1/2 pound ground beef
1/2 pound ground lamb
1 medium onion, grated
1 heaping teaspoon salt
1 1/2 teaspoons ground cumin
Large pinch ground allspice
1 teaspoon crushed red pepper
3/4 teaspoon black pepper
3/4 cup minced parsley
1/2 cup finely chopped mint
1 cup toasted walnut pieces
2 tablespoons mild olive oil
1/2 red onion, very thinly sliced
Minced parsley or sumac for garnish
Tahini sauce
*1. Dip the bread *in cold water and squeeze dry against the bottom of a
fine sieve. In a large bowl, mix bread with beef, lamb, onion, salt,
cumin, allspice, red pepper and black pepper. Mix thoroughly, but avoid
overhandling. Refrigerate for 1 hour.
*2. Mix in parsley, *mint and walnuts with your hands and shape mixture
into balls.
*3. Heat 1 tablespoon oil *over medium heat in a large skillet. Add half
the meatballs and sauté until browned and cooked through, about 7
minutes. Regulate heat so meatballs don’t burn, and shake pan vigorously
to turn them. Transfer to paper towels. Wipe skillet and repeat with
remaining oil and meatballs.
*4. Top with onions. *Garnish and serve hot or warm, with tahini sauce.
*Each meatball: *69 calories;
3 grams protein; 2 grams carbohydrates; 0 fiber; 6 grams fat; 1 gram
saturated fat; 7 mg. cholesterol; 78 mg. sodium.
*
Grilled haloumi-stuffed grape leaves with pomegranate sauce
*Total time: *25 minutes
*Servings: *Makes 12 dolmas
*Note: *Haloumi cheese is available at Bristol Farms and at Middle
Eastern markets. Haloumi and grape leaves can both be quite salty; if
your brand of leaves is too briny, soak them longer or blanch in boiling
water for 1 minute.
12 grape leaves preserved in brine
12 (3-inch by one-half-inch) logs haloumi cheese, one-half-inch thick
(queso blanco can be substituted)
2 1/2 tablespoons mild olive oil,
divided
2 tablespoons pomegranate molasses
1 tablespoon water
1/4 teaspoon sugar
*1. Place the grape leaves *in a bowl. Add boiling water to cover and
soak for about 2 minutes. Taste, and if the leaves still taste
assertively briny, soak for few minutes more. Rinse under cold water,
drain and pat dry with paper towels. Heat the grill to medium.
*2. Place a grape leaf *shiny side down on a work surface with the stem
facing you. Trim off the stem. Place a log of haloumi across the bottom
end of the leaf and fold the bottom over it. Fold in the sides and roll
up like a cigar to make a dolma. Make sure there are no tears in the
leaf, or the cheese will ooze out. Continue until you have used all the
grape leaves.
*3. Brush the dolmas lightly *with one-half tablespoon olive oil. Grill
them until they are lightly charred and the cheese is beginning to
soften but is not oozing out, about 1½ minutes per side. Transfer the
dolmas to a plate and let them cool for about 10 minutes.
*4. Meanwhile, whisk *the remaining oil with the pomegranate molasses,
water and sugar.
*5. To serve,* drizzle a white serving plate with the pomegranate
mixture and arrange the dolmas on top, drizzling with some extra sauce
if desired.
*Each dolma: *246 calories; 14 grams protein; 3 grams carbohydrates;
0 fiber; 20 grams fat; 11 grams saturated fat; 50 mg. cholesterol; 418
mg. sodium.
,1,7717227.story?coll=la-home-food

Cyprus Press and Information Office – Turkish Cypriot Press Review
June 9 2004
Degrading statements by the Ambassador of Sweden to Turkey for the
Cypriots and their President who are under the yoke of the brutal
Turkish occupation for 30-years. Reference to Russia and the Arab
countries
Turkish Daily News (08.06.04) publishes an article, which according
to the editor´s note, is a contribution to the paper by the
Ambassador of Sweden, Mr Henrik Liljegren.
The article, under the title “Waiting for the NATO summit” is
insulting for the President and the people of Cyprus who were forced
by the Turkish troops to abandon their homes and properties and are
deprived of all their fundamental human rights by 40,000 heavily
equipped Turkish troops which keep northern Cyprus under their
control.
The article, is as follows:
“President George W. Bush looked noticeably relieved the other day as
he commented on the establishment of an interim government in Iraq at
a press conference. Here was a man who seemed to say to himself, ”
OK, we created a big mess in Iraq, but, by God, now we are getting
out of it and others will have to deal with it.”
“A free Iraq will be a game changer, an agent of change,” said Bush.
These words revealed what the administration probably considered to
be the most important motive for attacking Iraq. The neo-conservative
hawks, who dominated the foreign policy agenda in Washington after
9/11, believed that a successful war against Iraq would create a
“shock and awe” effect in the whole region. It would make the rogue
states stop supporting terrorists and prepare the ground for the
democratization of the authoritarian Arab regimes. “It would change
the game,” as the president said.
Instead, the war and occupation has led to intensified terrorism both
inside and outside of Iraq. In addition, relations between the United
States and its allies have been severely strained and
anti-Americanism has risen to previously unimaginable heights all
over the world. The credibility of U.S. intelligence services has
been badly damaged; with the conflict between the Israelis and the
Palestinians becoming more violent than ever.
This is the bad news; but the good news is that there are signs that
many people in the greater Middle East have recently seen the need
for democratic reform. Moreover, it seems that some regimes have
concluded that it is dangerous to tolerate or aid terrorists or to
attempt to build or sell nuclear weapons. More importantly, Iraq
could, in spite of everything, eventually turn out to be a more
stable place once the transition to a sovereign Iraqi government has
been completed. At least one should not totally exclude such a
scenario in the long-term; the game may change and developments
become more benign than anybody can foresee today.
Right now the best news is that the Bush administration is adjusting
to the realities on the ground in a pragmatic spirit. As Winston
Churchill once said, “The Americans always do the right thing after
they have exhausted all the alternatives.”
The Clinton administration learned the lesson in the Balkans that it
had to be prepared to back up diplomacy with military action. The
Bush administration has learnt the lesson in Iraq that military
action must be backed up by diplomacy. It is now trying to repair
relations with its allies and to involve the United Nations in the
future of Iraq. I think we can safely assume that the United States
will not start a preventive war against another country in the near
future. Last but not least, it seems that the U.S. intelligence
community will undergo a much-needed overhaul.
How the readjusted foreign policy of the Bush administration will
play out in the context of NATO will be interesting to observe at the
NATO summit in Istanbul on June 28-29. Turkey not only has to take
the responsibility for the nightmarish organizational and security
problems of the summit, it must also act diplomatically in advance of
the summit in the hope that NATO comes up with policies for the
region that are beneficial, rather than detrimental, to the security
of Turkey.
In connection with a conference arranged by the Istanbul Policy
Center in the summer of 2002, we were told by a participant, a short
time after 9/11, that planning had begun to move about a third of
U.S. forces in Europe to the Black Sea region and beyond, and that
the Pentagon regarded this area as the “new central front” in the
fight against terrorism. The planning included establishing “forward
operating sites” in what were termed “vulnerable battle ground
states” in Central Asia. It also foresaw helping these states
strengthen their own security against terrorists.
While the United States recently began to consult with its NATO
allies about this plan, the plan was gradually revealed to the
public. Michael R. Gordon, in The New York Times on June 4, wrote of
“the most significant rearrangement of American military around the
world since the beginning of the cold war.” The same article says
that Secretary of State Colin Powell thought it “unlikely that the
Turks would agree to allow the United States to operate freely from
Turkish bases.”
My guess is that Turkey is already discreetly taking creative
diplomatic action in the relevant capitals. The role and intentions
of Russia might be a matter of concern to some at the summit.
President Vladimir Putin, in his recent state of the nation speech,
talked of Russia’s “vital interests.” His new and smooth foreign
minister, Lavrov, in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal
explained that for Russia “the territory of the former USSR is a
sphere of vital interests, prompted by its entire history.” Lavrov
added, “By vital interests we do not mean some kind of right to bring
pressure on our neighbors.”
But if history is any guide, that is exactly what it does mean. As
for the Russian military, it still thinks in terms of the Cold War,
regrets the expansion of NATO and would like to resurrect Russia as a
superpower as soon as possible. When speaking to his domestic
audience, Putin has to take the attitude of the nationalistic forces
within the military and the Duma into account.
One thing is clear: Just like in the good old days of the Cold War,
the United States and Russia are competing for geopolitical
influence, this time in countries in the neighborhood of Russia and,
in some cases, Turkey. Nowadays this competition is tempered by the
fact that the United States and Russia have an overriding common
interest in cooperating with each other in the fight against
terrorism.
Since the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
conference in Istanbul, both NATO and the OSCE have expressed concern
that Russia has failed to fulfill its 1999 commitments to withdraw
forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russian diplomacy would now like
NATO to ratify the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
without demands to fulfill its Istanbul commitments.
By saying that he will not attend the NATO summit, Putin presumably
wants to put pressure on the West to accept Russia’s demands. Turkey
has tried to contribute to stability to the west and south of its
borders, and by its diplomacy regarding Cyprus, and has consequently
received many favorable comments in the international media.
The same cannot be said for the Greek Cypriots. In one of his weekly
electronic letters, Carl Bildt, the former prime minister of Sweden,
writes that Greek nationalistic forces carry the main responsibility
for the failure to solve the issue. Bildt talks of “the almost
hateful rhetoric of the Greek-Orthodox Church and the blatantly
cynical way that the Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos played on
prejudice and fear in order to stop the peace plan. Bildt continues:
“That he belonged to the Greek support troops for Milosevic is hardly
surprising. The methods of agitation are recognizable.” I really hope
that the other leaders of the European Union will distance themselves
from Papadopoulos and treat him with the icy coldness that he
deserves.” Bildt predicts that various measures will be taken to
“ease the restrictions against the Turkish Cypriot part of the
island.”
To the extent that Bildt’s views are representative of views within
the EU, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots should in principle benefit
from the general goodwill that their support for the Annan plan has
generated. Eventually it might lead to some level of recognition of
the Turkish Cypriot state. Outside the EU the only important state
that supports the Greek Cypriots seems to be Russia.
Since the EU does not wish to import border disputes when admitting
new members, it has also encouraged Turkish diplomatic activity
regarding Turkish relations with Armenia. In this context the 2003
Regular Report of the EU Commission mentions grassroots civil society
initiatives with a view to promoting closer cooperation between
Turkey and Armenia.
The other day I was invited to attend a meeting of a select group of
prominent Turkish and Armenian media representatives. Under the
chairmanship of the managing editor of the Turkish Daily News, Yusuf
Kanli, the group discussed how the media in their respective
countries could deal with the sensitive subjects that prevent
reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia, and did so in a
dispassionate and objective manner.
“We are not out to solve any of the outstanding issues, but to
prepare the ground for the dealing of them by politicians, if and
when they choose to do so. We are simply trying to ‘clarify’ the
respective terminologies and help create a better understanding,”
said Mr Kanli, who also explained that the meeting was a follow-up to
a series of meetings sponsored by the American University in
Washington since May 2001.
Such initiatives are important as confidence-building measures could
inspire the Turkish and Armenian governments to make progress in
their diplomatic relations. However, they also require tact and
discretion since Russia casts a long shadow over Armenia, and, it is
not obvious that Russia finds friendship between Armenia and Turkey
desirable. The group that Mr Kanli has brought together is making a
laudable effort in a way that is in the best interests of their
respective nations. Who knows, maybe the NATO summit can bring new
momentum to these efforts by meetings at both the levels of
government and civil society.
The NATO summit will, in fact, bring more clarity to many important
issues of global security that are now shrouded in uncertainty.
Hopefully the run-up to the summit will be an occasion for
exceptionally creative diplomacy. It is sorely needed.”