Category: News

Geology, Oil and Gas Potential, Pipelines, and the Geopolitics of the
Caspian Sea Region

Ocean Development & International Law
35:19-40, 2004

BY PHILIP D. RABINOWITZ, MEHDI Z. YUSIFOV, JESSICA ARNOLDI, EYAL HAKIM
Department of Geology & Geophysics
Texas A & M University
College Station, Texas, USA

EXCERPT

Legal Issues in the Caspian Sea

The exporting of fossil fuels from the Caspian region will require the
development of pipelines that traverse political boundaries. There are
many scenarios for pipeline routes, as discussed above, each having
both political and economic problems. What is discussed below are the
current legal status of the Caspian Sea and the regional conflicts
that pose political risks that must be taken into consideration before
decisions are made. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, treaties
of 1921 and 1940 established an exclusive 10-mile fishing zone for the
Soviet Republics and Iran and referred to the Caspian Sea as the
Soviet-Iranian Sea. However, these treaties did not cover ownership of
seabed boundaries or which state had jurisdiction respecting oil and
gas exploration. In the post-Soviet era, conflicting approaches have
been proposed to dividing the offshore regions among the five
independent countries bordering the Caspian Sea. Some important
agreements have been reached, but there are still a number of
outstanding problems. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) provides that a state may claim a 12-nautical-mile (nm)
territorial sea and a 200 nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The
Caspian Sea is not wide enough to allow for the full extent of 200 nm
EEZs for states on opposing coasts. The threshold legal question is
how the Caspian Sea is to be classified. If the Caspian Sea is
classified as a sea, then UNCLOS is applicable; however, if it is
classified as a lake, then UNCLOS is not applicable and the Caspian
Sea is free of the international rules governing oceans (Oxman,1996;
Sciolino, 1998).

The initial Russian position, addressed to the UN General Assembly in
1994, was that international ocean law, particularly those pertaining
to territorial seas and EEZ, do not apply since the Caspian is a
landlocked body of water without natural links to the worlds’ oceans
(Gouliev, 1997). Their position was that there are no grounds for
unilateral claims to areas of the Caspian and that the entire sea is a
joint venture area (a “condominium” approach). The implications are
that any activity with respect to utilizing the seabed by one country
encroaches upon the interests of all the other bordering countries. In
1996 Russia softened their position by suggesting the establishment of
a 45 nm EEZ for all littoral states with joint ownership beyond the 45
nm limit.

The Azerbaijan position differed considerably from that of the initial
Russian position. Azerbaijan claimed that the Caspian Sea falls within
the jurisdiction of the international Law of the Sea. Using this
approach, a median line is drawn using the shores with the coastal
states having full sovereignty in their respective sectors. In 1997,
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, as between themselves, agreed to an
approach based on the median line principle. Russia and Kazakhstan in
1998, and Russia and Azerbaijan in 2001 also agreed to this approach
to delineate their respective offshore areas. Thus, Russia,
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have agreed to divide the seafloor into
sectors or zones between corresponding neighboring and oppositely
located states.

Turkmenistan agrees to this approach in principle, but not in method,
claiming that application of a median line does not take into account
the peculiarities of the shore line, in particular, the potentially
oil rich Absheron Peninsula that is presently claimed by
Azerbaijan. Iran, however, still disagrees with any division of the
Caspian using median lines. Iran originally favored the “condominium”
approach but later considered dividing the Caspian into five equal
areas with each state having sovereignty over 20% of the seabed
resources and water. Utilizing median lines, Iran’s sector of the
Caspian does not have the potential fossil fuel resources. Iran’s
method of dividing the Caspian gives them not only a larger share of
the Caspian Sea than the median line approach but as well would place
potential oil-rich seafloor regions claimed by Azerbaijan in their
sector (Croissant, 1998; U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2001).

Because of the above disagreements, there are conflicts between
Azerbaijan and Iran. In 1999, Azerbaijan accused Iran of licensing
Royal Dutch Shell to do seismic exploration in an area the Azeri
government claimed was in their sector. In July 2001, the Iranian Oil
Ministry issued a warning to foreign energy firms not to work with the
other four Caspian states in the disputed areas of the Caspian
Sea. The day after the warning was issued, Iranian ships intercepted a
British Petroleum (BP) seismic exploration ship (the Geofizik-3) that
was undertaking exploration in the Araz-Alov-Sarq fields in the South
Caspian Basin. These fields, located ~90 miles southeast of Baku,
Azerbaijan, were licensed by the Azeri government to a BP consortium
and are in a region over which Iran claims sovereignty. This incident
was the first overt military act in the Caspian Sea since the breakup
of the Soviet Union (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002).

According to Dr. Elmar Mamedyarov, Charge d’Affaires, Embassy of
Azerbaijan, the dispute between Iran and Azerbaijan regarding the
legal status of the Caspian is a “component of the tension that has
arisen in the area” (Calabrese, 2001). This tension includes the
Iranian support of Armenia in the conflict over Nagorno-Karakh, a
highly contentious region, and one that pits Armenia and Azerbaijan in
a state of “cold war.”

The U.S. presence and influence in Azerbaijan has also fueled tension
in the region, especially since Iranian companies are excluded from
U.S. energy projects in the Caspian. Conflicts regarding seabed
sovereignty also exist between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Though as
noted earlier Turkmenistan has agreed in principle with Azerbaijan,
Russia, and Kazakhstan respecting use of a median line to divide up
the seabed, exactly where to draw this line has created a major
dispute with Azerbaijan. The Absheron Peninsula of Azerbaijan juts
into the Caspian Sea. Because of this coastline “anomaly,” strict
application of a median line gives Azerbaijan more of the mid-Caspian
than Turkmenistan would agree to cede. Turkmenistan claims the border
should lie on a line drawn using the shores of the two states lying
opposite. This would give Turkmenistan a larger share of the
mid-Caspian, an area where there is significant oil potential (the
Serdar/Kyapaz oil fields). Though considerable rhetoric has arisen
between the two countries, hostilities have thus far been
nonexistent…

Copyright: Taylor & Francis Inc.

Armenian press body condemns attacks on reporters covering opposition rally

Mediamax news agency
6 Apr 04

YEREVAN

The National Press Club of Armenia (NPC) issued a statement today,
condemning attacks on journalists by unidentified people during an
opposition rally in central Yerevan on 5 April.

During the rally, 15 to 20 young people with an athletic build
attacked the filming crews of the Armenian Public TV and the private
TV companies Kentron, HY Noyan Tapan and Shant, and reporters of
Aravot and Aykakan Zhamanak newspapers. They deliberately broke video
and photo cameras that belonged to the abovementioned mass media.

“This odious step is directed against freedom of speech and pursues
one aim – to hamper the reporting of unbiased information about the
developments in Armenia,” the NPC statement read.

The NPC demanded that the Armenian authorities punish the perpetrators
of the attack on the journalists and prevent such incidents in the
future.

The authors of the statement also appealed “to respect their
professional duty” to those journalists who the NPC said “have
distorted facts thus rendering support to the bandits”.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

CIS countries to hold joint air-defence exercise

ITAR-TASS news agency
6 Apr 04

MOSCOW

Over 100 military units and subunits of the CIS countries’ unified
air-defence system will be taking part in command-and-staff training.

ITAR-TASS was told today by the head of the Russian Air Force press
service, Col Aleksandr Drobyshevskiy, that “on Wednesday 7 April there
will be command-and-staff training under the leadership of
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force Army Gen Vladimir
Mikhaylov – the chairman of the coordinating committee of the CIS
countries’ air defence – and involving management bodies and duty
forces of the unified air-defence system of the member states of the
CIS”.

The training will be directed from the central command post of the
Russian Air Force.

“During the training, about 10 different points will be practised,
relating to the improvement of the CIS unified air-defence system,”
Drobyshevskiy said. “More than 100 units and subunits of the air
forces and air-defence forces of the CIS countries and 80 aircraft
will be taking part in the training.”

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan and Russia are taking part in the command-and-staff
training of the CIS unified air-defence system.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenian police arrest 127 opposition members, party leader says

Mediamax news agency
6 Apr 04

YEREVAN

Leader of the National Unity Party Artashes Gegamyan said in Yerevan
today that the Armenian president and the defence minister bore
personal responsibility for the provocation that took place during an
opposition rally in central Yerevan on 5 April.

During the rally, some unidentified people tried to throw eggs at
Artashes Gegamyan. Seeing that journalists were filming this, 15 to 20
young people attacked the filming crews of the Armenian Public TV, the
private TV companies Kentron, Hai TV and Shant, and the reporters of
Aravot and Aykakan Zhamanak newspapers. The video and photo cameras of
the abovementioned media were broken.

Addressing a briefing in Yerevan today, Artashes Gegamyan said that
“the plan of provocations was approved on the previous day at a
meeting with the Armenian president, and only the fact that people
exercised restraint helped prevent disorder”. According to the
opposition politician, the persons who attacked media representatives
during the rally were the “bodyguards of some oligarchs”.

Artashes Gegamyan expressed confidence that the authorities were
preparing for more provocations on 9 April, the day when the National
Unity Party and the Justice bloc will start their actions of protest
in the streets.

At 1019 gmt, Noyan Tapan news agency quoted Gegamyan as saying that
the police arrested 127 members and activists of the National Unity
Party on 4-5 April.

Armenian servicemen desert their units in Karabakh

Ayna, Baku
6 Apr 04

By Casur Mammadov

Starting from this year, the number of deserters among Armenian
soldiers stationed in Nagornyy Karabakh and other occupied Azerbaijani
districts has reached yet unseen figures.

According to Armenian sources, over the last two months a total of 94
Armenian servicemen have deserted regiments stationed in Nagornyy
Karabakh. This brings the number of deserters from the “Karabakh army”
to a total of 5,000 people since 1994. The sources say that a
significant portion of the deserters – 1,400 people – have fled to
Iran.

According to another report available to us, the stand-off between the
Nagornyy Karabakh and the Armenian troops stationed in the occupied
Azerbaijani territories has become extremely intense. The report says
that this confrontation is particularly fierce on the
Armenian-occupied part of Azerbaijan’s Fuzuli District. For instance,
a recent exchange of fire registered in this area between two brigades
claimed the lives of several Armenian servicemen. Karabakh Armenians
put the blame for the incident on the Armenian military command.

Passage omitted: minor details

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Azeri MPs concerned at possible opening of Turkish-Armenian border

ANS TV, Baku
6 Apr 04

Today’s session of the Azerbaijani parliament discussed the
probability of opening the Turkish-Armenian border.

MPs said they should support Turkey which had come under the West’s
pressure. Baku should invite the Turkish speaker to Baku. The
parliament should appeal to the international public, the European
Union and the Council of Europe over the issue.

Azerbaijani Speaker Murtuz Alasgarov said that the opening of the
border would deal a blow to Turkish-Azerbaijani relations.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Agency sees rapprochement between Armenia, NATO

Mediamax news agency, Yerevan
5 Apr 04

Armenia might one day bid for NATO membership, Armenian news agency
Mediamax has reported. The alliance’s presence in the Caucasus is only
a matter of time, and Armenia does not want to be sidelined, the
agency said. But Yerevan cannot ignore Russia’s interests in the
region, like did Georgia, thus spoiling relations with Moscow. On the
other hand, Russia does not have a clear-cut position on NATO
expansion, which gives Armenia an opportunity to get closer to NATO
“without much noise”, the agency said. The following is an excerpt
from the report in English by Mediamax headlined “Armenia sent NATO a
message” and subheaded “Armenia ready for the alliance’s ‘arrival’ in
the South Caucasus”; subheadings inserted editorially:

Last week, seven new members joined NATO, and the Armenian parliament
ratified the multilateral PfP Status of Forces Agreement (PfP
SOFA). This coincidence can be considered as symbolic, especially if
we take into account that both Yerevan and Brussels approach the
ratification of the agreement as something more than a simple
formality.

At first sight, there is nothing special in the ratification of the
PfP SOFA by the Armenian parliament. Armenia’s neighbours in the South
Caucasus joined this agreement several years ago – Georgia in 1995
(ratified in 1997) and Azerbaijan in 1998 (ratified in 2000).

However, if we take into consideration the specific character of
Armenia-NATO relations, there will be no doubt that making the
decision to join the PfP SOFA, Yerevan decided to send a definite
message to NATO, which can be interpreted as follows – Armenia is not
categorical any more about prospects of beginning a new stage in
relations with NATO as published , the result of which might one day
become a claim to join the alliance.

Summing up the results of 2003, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan
Oskanyan said in early January that “Armenia’s political dialogue with
NATO and our participation in the Partnership for Peace programme are
gradually acquiring a more purposeful and coordinated character”. But
in our opinion, Oskanyan’s most important statement was this one:
“Building armed forces compatible with the allies, Armenia will
contribute to the peacekeeping operations carried out by NATO.” The
representative of the Yerevan government for the first time stated
that Armenia would build armed forces compatible with NATO, and this
statement cannot be considered as accidental.

There is another nuance too: having ratified the agreement, Yerevan
deprived of a powerful trump card its neighbours, and Azerbaijan in
the first place, who had been trying to convince the alliance that
Armenia was not capable of pursuing an independent foreign policy and
acted “looking back” at Russia.

Another symbolic coincidence is that at the time when the Armenian
parliament ratified the PfP SOFA, the Russian State Duma adopted a
statement “In connection with NATO expansion”, which said that “NATO’s
military doctrine continues to take on an offensive character”.

Passage omitted: quote from Russian parliamentary newspaper

NATO values relations with Armenia

NATO’s reaction to the ratification of the agreement was also
noteworthy. Ariane Quentier, press officer at the NATO Press and
Media Service, said in a telephone interview with Mediamax that “we
welcome every step aimed at developing relations with Armenia and view
the ratification of the PfP SOFA in this context”.

Moreover, Ariane Quentier expressed satisfaction with the fact that
“the tragic Budapest incident” did not affect Armenia’s readiness to
develop relations with the alliance.

On 19 February, 26-year-old Lt Gurgen Margaryan of the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Armenia, who was attending the NATO Partnership for
Peace Programme’s English language training course in Budapest, was
brutally murdered while he was asleep. He was axed by an Azerbaijani
military officer attending the same course.

Passage omitted: reaction by the NATO secretary-general

The fact that the alliance representative herself mentioned the
Budapest incident speaks for itself. It testifies to the fact that
NATO values its relations with Armenia and that the alliance did not
want the Budapest incident to retard the intensive pace of
cooperation.

We must not overlook the fact that the demarche of Azerbaijan which
did not allow Armenian officers to Baku to take part in the planning
conference of the Cooperative Best Effort 2004 military exercises came
as an unpleasant surprise to NATO. The statement made in Yerevan last
week by Director of Plans and Policy, Headquarters US European
Command, Maj-Gen Jeffrey B. Kohler was more than unambiguous.

“The US government made it clear to Azerbaijan that we fully support
the participation of Armenian servicemen in the Cooperative Best
Effort 2004 exercises. When NATO is the organizer of exercises within
the PfP framework, they must be open to all the partners,” Jeffrey
Kohler said.

Most likely, a sober calculation is behind Armenia’s new policy with
regard to the alliance – the statements made recently by US and NATO
representatives testify to the fact that the alliance’s firm presence
in the Caucasus is just a matter of time, and Armenia does not want to
be sidelined.

Passage omitted: quotes from statements of different officials at
different times; quote from Armenian president’s statement two years
ago

Armenia – “bridge” between Russia and NATO

The main factor affecting the pace and character of Armenia’s
integration into NATO has been the position of the Russian leadership,
which Yerevan cannot and does not want to ignore. The main reason for
the aggravation of Georgian-Russian relations in the last years was
not “Moscow’s imperial ambitions” but the policy of the Georgian
leadership that demonstratively ignored Russia’s interests in the
Caucasus. It is obvious that Armenia will never follow this path.

On the other hand, if we trace the statements by Russian leaders on
prospects of relations with NATO made after Russian President Vladimir
Putin came to power in 2000, it becomes obvious that the Russian
leadership does not have a clear-cut position on this issue. It could
seem that this makes the situation more complicated for Armenia. On
the other hand, this gives Armenia an opportunity to think over real
steps to get closer to NATO and the alliance’s standards without much
noise and public statements. These efforts will not be in vain in any
case.

Armenia, as well as Russia and NATO, understand that if it was not for
close Armenian-Russian military and political relations, which have
been and continue to be an objective necessity for Yerevan, Armenia
would have become the first country in the South Caucasus to declare
its desire to become a full member of the alliance. Moreover, there is
every reason to assume that the alliance, in turn, would have given
Armenia “the go-ahead” much earlier than to Georgia and Azerbaijan
because of a number of reasons.

However, this must not be spoken about with regret. The modern world
is changing rapidly and there can arise a situation when Armenia’s
role as a “bridge” between Russia and NATO in the Caucasus will be
extremely important to both Moscow and Brussels.

Chechen rebel site says Russia’s Krasnodar gripped by “Cossack-mania”

Chechenpress web site, Tbilisi
5 Apr 04

A rebel Chechen web site has accused Cossacks in Russia’s Krasnodar of
“tyranny” and “constant wars” against ethnic minorities. Chechenpress
said that to protect themselves “against the tyranny”, representatives
of ethnic minorities are “ingratiating themselves among the Cossacks
and joining their ranks”. It added that “the regeneration of the
Cossacks’ militant psychology” was also encouraged by local
officials. The following is the text of report by Chechenpress news
agency web site entitled A “Cossack shop”; subheadings have been
inserted editorially:

There is a “Cossack shop” on Suvorov Ulitsa Street in
Krasnodar. Anyone can enter wearing ordinary European clothes and come
out in a colourful Cossack costume. In the summer this could be a silk
Cherkess coat, a beshmet quilted coat or a hood, and in winter, into
the bargain, there would also be a burka felt coat , papakha fur cap
and boots. Here, you can adorn your outfit with a sabre, dagger and
lash, and also shoulder-boards with virtually all the Cossack military
decorations. And none of the assistants will ask if you are a Cossack
or a member of any sect. Here, the laws of the market economy hold
sway – money means trade.

Any weekend you will come across gentlemen who are fitted out in these
shops and who swan about with their lashes on Krasnaya Ulitsa Street ,
which is the main street in Krasnodar. The Cossacks of the Northwest
Caucasus (Krasnodar Territory and the Republic of Adygeya) call this
town their capital. They consider it their duty to impose order on all
the populated areas, using their own, special methods. “I was struck
three times with a lash because I left my passport at home,” said the
Krasnodar tradesman, Artur Z-yan. A 30-year old refugee from Abkhazia,
Georgiy Benia, told me this: “In Sochi, three Cossacks shouted at me,
calling me a ‘black'”. I told them it was they who were blacks. They
abused me and in broad daylight started beating me with lashes and
their feet. Only one passer-by – a woman – stopped and shouted at
them to stop. I ended up in hospital for three weeks and soon left
Sochi.” A history teacher from Maykop, Aslanbey Skhalakho, told me:
“Cossacks dressed in Cherkess coats are not looked upon with favour by
Adygeys, Cherkess, Kabardinos, Balkaris or other indigenous peoples of
the North West Caucasus. The Cossacks used to have their own form of
dress, which had nothing in common with the Cherkess.

In 1861, the Russian Emperor Alexander II ordered the Cossacks to wear
such coats as a military uniform, but we, the indigenous peoples, were
forbidden to wear them. Czarism not only subjugated, but “stripped”
the indigenous peoples. We still fill resentment over this even now.”
“But we are even more annoyed by the fact that the Cossacks here, in
the Caucasus, call all the Caucasus people “foreigners” Russian
“inorodtsy” , and consider only themselves to be the indigenous
population. This is a blatant incitement to inter-ethnic discord,” he
said.

Cossack-mania

In the opinion of the Krasnodar writer, Valeriy Kuznetsov, the Kuban
area has been gripped by Cossack-mania. Representatives of ethnic
minorities are ingratiating themselves among the Cossacks and joining
their ranks. This is their way of protecting themselves against the
tyranny of the Cossacks. A tale by this writer called “The faculty of
stupidity” creates the stereotypes of a “Jew turned Cossack” and an
“Armenian turned Cossack”, and so on. “In official documents,” says
the psychologist, Sergey Kiryanov, “the Cossacks are described as a
socio-ethnic community. They are distinguished from the Slav peoples
in precisely this respect – a way of life which is subordinate to
military demands, an ability to rapidly organize the defence of their
homes, a constant readiness to attack and persecute the enemy, and the
habits and skills of life on the move.” “It was precisely these
qualities of the Cossacks which Russian Empress Yekaterina II
Catherine the Great learnt when, in a Proclamation of 30 June 1792,
she bestowed upon them the Taman peninsula and the right bank of the
Kuban river.

Regeneration of Cossacks’ “militant” psychology

Having settled here, the Cossacks waged constant wars against the
Adygeys, the Cherkess and other aboriginal tribes of the North West
Caucasus. During the years of Soviet power, the Cossacks were
subjected to repression. Their aggressive war-like mentality suffered
considerably, but over the past 15 years it has been increasing in a
geometrical progression.”

Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin gave the Cossacks back their
rights. This served as a signal for the regeneration of the Cossacks’
militant psychology. It was no accident that the Cossacks took an
active part in all the inter-ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet
space, and even in the Balkans. The Kuban Cossacks were particularly
active in neighbouring Abkhazia, fighting on the Abkhaz side. The
governor of Krasnodar Territory, Aleksandr Tkachenko, is still giving
all kinds of moral and material support to the Abkhazian. The Cossacks
are forming the opinion that Abkhazia is virtually already a part of
Krasnodar Territory, and not Georgia. I have frequently heard this
opinion among the Cossacks: “The empire will still exist while it
continues to fight and to develop.”

Cossack patrols

Highly disciplined militarised structures, built on a social basis and
headed by atamans, have been created in all the Cossack villages,
settlements and towns. The so-called Cossack patrols, ostensibly to
help the police, which are carried out in residential areas, are a
blatant form of interethnic confrontation. In the markets, railway
stations, telephone booths and other areas where people congregate,
the Cossacks detain and search mainly “people of Caucasus
nationality”. If there is the slightest resistance these documentation
checks end in a flogging. Whereas over the past 7-8 years these
so-called Cossack patrols have been largely a substitute for the
police, the tactics have now changed somewhat.

The ataman of Cossack troops, Gen Gromov, ordered his subordinates
“not to Cossackize”. Asked by a journalist of the Mayak Kubani Beacon
of the Kuban radio station what he meant by this, the general replied:
“This means not being distracted by petty things, not showing off, and
always being at combat readiness.” The writer of these lines explained
in a conversation with rank-and-file Cossacks that the day was not far
off when they will have to “drive the blacks – the so-called
foreigners -from the Kuban”.

Refugees

In the same interview, Gen Gromov said plainly, and without a trace of
diplomacy, that the “Cossacks have nowhere to tread on Kuban land”. As
a result of interethnic clashes in the Fergana valley of Uzbekistan,
Baku, Sumgait, Karabakh, Abkhazia, Tskhinvali and other places of
post-Soviet space, there has been a flood of refugees into Krasnodar
Territory, although this number is tiny compared with the territory’s
population of nearly six million. There are only 30,000 Armenians
registered here. There are the same number of Meskhetian Turks from
Fergana, as well as about 10,000 Georgian refugees, and even less
representatives of other ethnic groups.

It would be a gross exaggeration to claim that there was an abundance
of “foreigners” in the territory. “Armenian merchants appeared in the
Kuban long before the Cossacks,” Armenak S., a teacher, says, “but now
we are treated as aliens. One of my people wanted to buy a patch of
land in the Dubinok area of Krasnodar, but the local Cossacks held a
protest rally and forced the local authorities to abolish the act of
buying and selling. “We are outlawed,” says an activist of the
Meskhetian Turk community, Dursun Z. “We are not registered in the
towns or the villages, we have no rights and they can extradite us at
any time.” If one bears in mind that the Russian Federation is
considered to be the legal successor of the USSR, then the situation
cannot be considered normal. But Cossack Gen Gromov is proud of the
fact that the Kuban Cossacks have managed to “uphold their rights” not
to permit the registration of the Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar
Territory.

“The Don Cossacks in Rostov Region,” the general says, “made a mistake
when they allowed the authorities to register the Meskhetian Turks on
their territory, but we have managed to avoid this.” It might appear
that the general was overstepping his role, but that is the absolute
truth. The Kuban Cossack army in the territory virtually duplicates
the power-wielding bodies, and in the majority of cases, when it is a
matter of inter-ethnic relations and migration processes, it acts much
more brutally than them. It could be said that in these instances the
Cossacks run the law-enforcement and administrative bodies. “This
do-as-you-please attitude to the Cossacks was created when the
well-known nationalist and anti-Semitist Nikolay Kondratenko was
governor of the territory,” says the writer, Sergey S. “The Cossacks
still refer to him as “batka”, in other words, ataman.”

Governor Tkachev

The present governor of the Territory, Aleksandr Tkachev, is his
pupil. His convictions are the same as his predecessor. He also openly
helps the Abkhaz separatists and indulges in Cossack nationalistic
behaviour. I learnt from confidential sources that Tkachev allocated
from the budget a multi-million sum (in roubles) to the semi-legal
Cossack “Volchya sotnya” “Hundred wolves” unit. Its main task, as in
Czarist times, is to suppress the “foreigners”. The unit uses this
money for what amounts to a terrorist-saboteur training programme. “I
am often able to visit all the republics and territories of the
Caucasus,” said Alt T., a scientist from Maykop, “and I have never
seen such chauvinism and nationalism as in Krasnodar
Territory. Thinking about this, I came to the conclusion that this is
a syndrome of fear.

The Cossacks are evidently afraid of the retribution of the Caucasian
peoples whom they have been destroying for three centuries. I can find
no other explanation.” On Krasnaya Ulitsa, in the very centre of
Krasnodar, next to the “Zimnyy Sad” Winter Garden Cafe, hangs a sign
in indelible paint: “Churka, clear off home, today I am a snake!”
“‘Churka’, in the local street jargon, means ‘non-Russian’. One can
see the following signs on walls and fences, too: “Death to the
peasants!”, “Death to the foreigners!”.

On Kommunarov Ulitsa there is another sign on a concrete wall: “Rus,
arise! The enemy is in our land.” As to who the enemy is, there is no
need to explain, one feels. To complete the picture there are the
regular gatherings of members of the local branch of the all-Russian
chauvinistic party “Russian National Unity”. They gather at the
“Zimnyy Sad” Cafe and hand out leaflets and brochures with
anti-Semitic and nationalist content to the passers-by. The pet
subject of their discussions is substituting the republic and
autonomous regions with guberniyas provinces run by governors . It has
to be said that Putin is systematically implementing this task, having
already abolished two autonomies in Russia.

Eduard Sergiyenko, for Chechenpress. 05.04.04

Azeri reporters protest in Turkey’s Igdir against opening of Armenian border

ANS TV, Baku
6 Apr 04

Presenter A group of Azerbaijani journalists are in Turkey now to
protest against the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border . A special
correspondent of ANS, Qanira Pasayeva, is on the line. Hello, Qanira.

Correspondent, over phone Hello, Leyla.

Presenter Qanira, how did Igdir’s population meet you?

Correspondent They met us much better than we had expected. They can
watch Azerbaijani TV channels, including ANS. They had learnt about
the campaign from other TV channels and newspapers. They met us at the
entrance to Igdir. Many correspondents from local TV channels and
newspapers were among them. They supported us in this action and were
wearing T-shirts with slogans on them – Turks must support Turks and
No to opening Armenian borders – and chanted these slogans together
with us.

We went to the Turkish-Armenian border some time ago and Azerbaijani
journalists staged there a protest action by blocking the road. They
also aired slogans urging an end to the European and US pressure on
Turkey, which demand that it open its borders with Armenia, and
expressed confidence that Turks would support Turks and that Turkey
would not open borders with Armenia.

The Igdir population, who gathered nearby, voiced the slogans together
with us. Even very old people were among them. They were wearing these
T-shirts and stood near the border together with us. People in Igdir
said that they did not want the borders to open although they might
get some income from trade with Armenia . Because they will not agree
to any trade relations with Armenia until Azerbaijanis are in trouble
and their lands are under occupation.

Presenter Qanira, where are you now? What other meetings are you going
to have?

Correspondent We are going to visit a memorial to Ataturk. We have
been informed that many people have already gathered there on this
occasion in support of our action. Even the municipal head of Igdir is
in the crowd there and he has said that he will wear a T-shirt like
ours and air our slogans.

Presenter Thank you, Qanira.

Armenian paper says authorities in search for “stabilizing factor”

Aravot, Yerevan
6 Apr 04

Text of unattributed report by Armenian newspaper Aravot on 6 April
headlined “Stabilizing factors”

The only thing that is “stable” in our country is the authorities’
arsenal of propaganda cliches. For 12 years there have been two
counter-arguments to any activation of the opposition: a) such
activation is advantageous to Azerbaijan and increases chances to
resume hostilities; b) activation could threaten stability and hinder
investment, economic development, etc.

The first argument can hardly stand up to criticism. There were
moments in the history of independent Armenia when even during the war
the opposition (including Dashnaktsutyun which is “a supporter of
stability”) was fighting against the authorities in a more aggressive
way, but in spite of that, success was registered on the
battlefield. Undoubtedly, today there is a danger of war, but it has
nothing to do with the mass demonstrations being held in Armenia.

One may agree with the second argument. Reasons and effects have
simply been confused there. The situation is really unstable and
tense, but there is one reason for this: unfortunately, in 2003
President Robert Kocharyan was not re-elected to the post of
president. (By the way, he was not elected in 1998 either, but the
results of those elections were in some sense corrected by the
parliamentary elections, in which voters really voted for the Unity
bloc, trusting [late Armenian Speaker] Karen Demirchyan’s legend. The
parliamentary elections of 2003 corrected nothing, as the rating of
the coalition parties was as low as the president’s.)

So, the situation is tense because Robert Kocharyan was not elected,
and it will remain tense irrespective of the opposition’s
activation. This is the diagnosis of the present situation.

What are the ways to relieve tension?

1. The president tenders his resignation, though this is ruled out.

2. A revolution takes place, which is impossible.

3. A palace revolution takes place, as was the case in 1998. This is a
theoretically possible option, but preconditions for it have not yet
been noticed.

4. The National Assembly is dissolved and new “more pleasant for the
people” parliamentary elections are held, as for instance, [leader of
the Christian Democratic Union] Khosrov Arutyunyan suggests. This is
also a possible option but it will hardly be carried out.

So, we may suppose that the status quo will be preserved by means of
arrests and “police” violence. It cannot be ruled out that some
“cosmetic” changes will be simultaneously made. For example, a new
prime minister and government may be appointed. In 1997, Robert
Kocharyan was invited from Karabakh to Yerevan as “a stabilizing
factor”. But first, experience shows that this kind of “stabilizing
factors” very quickly turn into “power changing factors”, and second,
we have not so far noticed a new Robert Kocharyan.