For several days, there have been protest actions in Azerbaijan, which are mainly related to educational changes by the authorities of that country, as a result of which pro-religious schoolgirls do not have the opportunity to enter schools with headscarves. Since this event is not only important in itself and goes beyond the scope of purely intra-Azerbaijani developments, but has also become the cause of various (and mostly incorrect or incomplete) interpretations (up to claims about the start of the Islamic revolution in Azerbaijan), then I will present the main points that you need to know about what is happening.
◾ The reason for the protest actions is the educational change, which imposes a new uniform on students studying in state schools. In other words, Muslim children who wear headscarves have no more opportunity, without violating their religious rule (and wearing headscarves is defined by the Koran), to receive school education. A similar restriction was introduced for teachers as well (this is less talked about, but it is an equally important issue). This is the scene recorded in the footage spread on social networks and international media.
◾ The relevant decision of the government is based on on a legislative amendment passed in July and entered into force at the end of September, but the restrictions actually began to be applied this week. Azerbaijani state propaganda presents the decision as a social project to eliminate rich-poor differences, but everyone understands that the purpose of the law is to continue to control the country’s religious community through additional restrictions. Now let’s understand why this is so important for the government and society.
◾ Azerbaijan is a secular state, where the vast majority of the population is Muslim. Moreover, the majority of them profess Shiism (about 60%), while others profess Sunniism (according to available data, the number of Sunnis has increased significantly in recent years under Turkish influence). The ruling regime of Azerbaijan conducts a unique religious policy, which is based on the perception of Islam as a threat on the one hand, and as a tool and opportunity on the other. The Aliyev family is well aware that the Azerbaijani society is not ethnically homogeneous (there are not only Turks, like the Kurdish Aliyevs themselves), and that the religious component is important for the Azerbaijani meta-ethnic identity (in other words, Iranian-speaking Talish and Turk live together in one state, because they perceive themselves as the same Shia). And religion is necessary to ensure that delicate unity and social solidarity. Islam is also useful for obtaining foreign policy partners, support, and other pragmatic interests.
◾ At the same time, Islam is the main threat to the Azerbaijani ruling power and state stability. The Islamists are subject to external influence (first of all, by neighboring Shia-davan Iran and Sunni-davan Turkey), which makes the latter a tool against the ruling regime inside Azerbaijan. At the same time, a significant part of Azerbaijanis do not believe in the prevailing state ideology (“Azerbaijanism” or “Heydarism”) in any way, nor do they believe in other defined universal goals. Therefore, in the course of social crises, which are incessant in Azerbaijan, due primarily to the economic situation, it is religion that becomes the main source of public mobilization and salvation, and religious figures become natural leaders. This has been shown many times. Spontaneous demonstrations on various occasions are a vivid evidence of this. Therefore, religion is not only about ritual, but also has the significance of a real social ideology in Azerbaijan, therefore, religious restrictions are perceived more acutely by the society than could be expected.
◾ For this very reason, the authorities of Azerbaijan try to keep the religious field under strict control (this is called secularism), on the one hand defining permissible manifestations of religion, and on the other hand, making religion as much as possible a cultural rather than a socio-political phenomenon (a special term was invented for this, “traditional Islam”).
In the past, the authorities of Azerbaijan have tried to limit the headscarves, but they had to take a step back after large-scale protests (on the scale of Azerbaijan). The current demonstrations have received a wide response thanks to social media support, but it is wrong to talk about the unprecedented.
◾ Since Azerbaijan continues to enter the zone of Turkish cultural influence (including against the will of the Aliyevs), this step of the Azerbaijani authorities has received a wide and negative reaction in various socio-political circles of Turkey, causing some tension between the parties. However, in no case can one think that this can cause a significant problem in Azerbaijan-Turkey relations. These two countries are so interconnected from the point of view of geography, state thinking and vitality that they are truly “one nation, two states” from a strategic point of view. Even more so today, when the key to the long-term stability of both is continuous integration and the formation of a unified Turkic zone in the Caucasus. Therefore, disagreements arising at the tactical level cannot harm strategic opportunities. Claims to the contrary are naive.
◾ However, these protests suggest something else. The social crisis in Azerbaijan not only did not disappear, but also deepened in 2020. after the victory. If in the past, state propaganda under the slogan “Let’s take Karabakh, live well” created some opportunities to ease public tension, today “Karabakh exists”, but the average Azerbaijani, who also made a sacrifice, has not only well-being, but also a perspective of it. Therefore, the problems multiply, the complaint doubles.
◾ Aliyev will certainly succeed in suppressing this wave of protests (for this he has created a fairly effective repressive system for years), perhaps by taking some steps back. But it is important to record that these demonstrations will not remain without consequences. It can be asserted with great confidence that Aliyev’s regime will try to mitigate the public dissatisfaction by directing it to a new foreign goal and to a permanent foreign enemy. This means that both the spread of the artificial “Western Azerbaijan” anti-Armenian thesis and the creation of mechanisms for its practical application will be strengthened. Yes, you understood correctly, I mean that there can be no question of peace.
Turkic scholar Varuzhan Geghamyan
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