October 15, 2026
On October 14, Nikol Pashinyan received the delegation led by Oleg Belozyorov, the general director of “Russian Railways” OJSC and the chairman of the management board. After the meeting, Belozyorov told “Sputnik Armenia” that the issue of preserving the concession of Russian railways was not raised.
After the cabinet session, Pashinyan first announced in a conversation with journalists that they do not have any problem with the Russian concession, the problem is the competitiveness of our railway, and that the Russian partners have assured that they will solve this issue, a working group has been formed for this purpose. Then he continued.
“If the Russian Federation says: I am bringing, I am putting 3 billion dollars, it means that it has no fear that the countries or entities we mentioned will not come and bypass the railway. It means that he is sure that they will come and go, and those money will be bought back. This will solve the concrete test of the debate.”
According to Pashinyan, even today European countries use the Russian railway.
“We say: very well, if there is that conviction and we are mistaken, you bring the investment,” he emphasized.
Referring to the issue of enclaves/exclaves, Pashinyan expressed new ideas regarding Artsvashen, stating:
“At the moment there is no agreement either, but I feel that there is an understanding. And, yes, we are talking about Kyarki, Barkhudarli, Sofulu, Askipara and Arsvashen. I suggest that I say something, not to perceive it as de jure. The idea is that in case of border demarcation, there is no enclave or exclave on both sides of the border. It is a technical question. I think that there should be an Artsvashen village in Armenia, it is not that we should close the Artsvashen settlement. But it could be, for example, there is an area between Artsvashen and Armenia, which is the territory of Azerbaijan, one of the ideas could be that the village of Artsvashen moves, moving a little to the right, a little to the left, but we don’t close the village.”
Details in the video
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The Armenian-Russian negotiations on the railway concession are coming to a conclusion
October 15, 2026
The issue of managing the railway network of Armenia continues to be one of the most sensitive issues on the agenda of relations between Yerevan and Moscow.
The visit of Oleg Belozyorov, CEO of “Russian Railways” to Yerevan and the results of the meeting with Nikol Pashinyan show that the parties are still far from a final agreement on the future of concession management.
At the same time, the decision to create a joint working group proves that the issue is not limited to the general discussion of bilateral relations. negotiations are ongoing.
There was no question of maintaining the concession of “South Caucasus Railway” CJSC. Oleg Belozyorov, CEO of “Russian Railways” JSC, chairman of the management board, said this in a conversation with Sputnik Armenia.
And according to the press release of “Russian Railways” OJSC, “Russian Railways” is open to a dialogue with the Armenian government and a joint assessment of the effectiveness of the concession contract. “Russia and Armenia have agreed to create a working group to assess the potential of transit communications using Armenia’s railway network.
“Russian Railways” intends to strictly observe the terms of the concession agreement of the Armenian Railways,” the message says.
According to the announcement of the RA Government, at the Nikol Pashinyan-Oleg Belozyorov meeting, Pashinyan emphasized that taking into account the possibilities of unblocking the regional transport infrastructures, the goal of the RA Government is to make the railways of Armenia competitive, to integrate them into the neighboring states and the international railway network.
“In this regard, the interlocutors discussed the opportunities created in the context of regional processes and the steps aimed at making the railways of Armenia competitive, as well as integrated into international transport routes. Thoughts were exchanged on the reconstruction projects of the Gyumri-Akhurik-Turkey border and Yeraskh-Nakhijevan railways and the opportunities created as a result of them.
Reference was made to the works carried out during the concession management of the “South Caucasian Railways” company in the direction of infrastructure development, management efficiency, existing problems and the possibilities of their solution.
An agreement was reached to create a joint working group in order to discuss the formulated problems in a short period of time, to find possible solutions and to specify further steps,” the message says.
According to the RA government, the core of the disagreement between Yerevan and Moscow is not so much the ownership of the railway as the issue of its management and competitiveness in regional conditions. The railway infrastructure of Armenia belongs to Armenia, but under the concession agreement signed in 2008, it was handed over to the management of the “South Caucasian Railway” company, which is a subsidiary of “Russian Railways”. The term of the contract is 30 years with the possibility of extension.
However, the RA authorities currently consider the Russian concession problematic and non-competitive, so they put forward the idea of transferring the right to manage the concession to a third country as a possible compromise. Pashinyan also suggests discussing the possibility of transferring the concession rights to a country that would be acceptable to both sides.
A possible alternative manager should not only be an economic operator, but also a tool for balancing Armenia’s relations with the West, Russia and regional partners. At the same time, the transfer of the concession to a third country is not an agreed decision, and political arrangements are necessary for its implementation.
Belozyorov’s statements show that the Russian side is trying to keep the existing agreement in the center of the negotiations, without promising concessions in the transfer of the concession.
The fact that the head of “Russian Railways” emphasizes the readiness to strictly fulfill contractual obligations is an important political message. Moscow considers the issue within the framework of the current legal agreement, while Yerevan wants to evaluate its effectiveness, taking into account regional and international realities.
In August, the Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the idea of transferring the concession, presenting it as a possible consequence of external pressure on Armenia. However, the difference in the positions of the two sides is not only about the efficiency of railway management, they are currently trying to change the entire logic of Armenian-Russian relations.
The results of the meeting so far do not prove that Yerevan has achieved its main goal of changing the Russian governance model. The creation of a joint working group allows the parties to continue the dialogue, explore the potential of transit communications and discuss possible solutions to the problems already formulated. However, in the official reports, there is no agreement on the transfer of the concession rights to a third country, on revising the current contract or on setting the terms of its termination.
Moreover, Belozyorov’s statement about not making the issue of maintaining the concession a subject of discussion and the Russian side’s emphasis on the fulfillment of contractual obligations allow us to conclude that Moscow is not yet ready to publicly accept the main solution proposed by Yerevan. Here is the main contradiction of the visit. the parties have agreed to discuss the railway problems, but have not yet agreed on the principle of solving them.
Against this background, the upcoming meeting between Pashinyan and Putin in Moscow takes on special significance. In September, Pashinyan announced that they had agreed to meet with the Russian president in the near future and discuss various issues of bilateral relations, including the issue of railway management. Belozyorov’s visit can be considered as a preparatory stage of that political dialogue, during which an attempt is made to clarify the scope of disagreements and the limits of a possible compromise.
Until a political decision is made in Moscow, or the parties do not announce a concrete agreement, the conclusion is that Armenia has not yet managed to change the Russian governance model, and Russia continues to maintain its position in Armenia’s railway network.
A key question in the upcoming negotiations will be whether the parties will be able to combine the maintenance of contractual obligations with the new transit agendas.
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The scientists’ letter, Nikol Pashinyan’s ignorance and Sargis Armenian’s resignation. C:
October 15, 2026
Today, during the regular session of the Government, Minister of Education and Science, Zhanna Andreasyan announced that additional funding of 2.35 billion drams will be provided to science.
Nikol Pashinyan mentioned that “if he is not mistaken”, after 2018 the funding of science has been doubled, to which the minister said that it has been increased by 2.8 times.
“After 2018, the funding of science has almost tripled, I don’t remember any discussion about it in RA. Do you understand, the funding of science has been cut and, let’s say, nothing about it in the press, nothing in social networks, in the squares. But suddenly there is 726 drams less in any project, letter-letter, interview, statement, speech, demonstration, protest, etc. We have the impression that we are under the gun, someone has held this weapon against us and said: you know what, increase the funding of science. And we, don’t shoot, we will add, in that situation we have increased the funding of science, as soon as the person holding the weapon turned his eye away, we have reduced the funding of science to zero.
This is a phenomenon of going crazy in RA in general. I will not pay any attention to those letters until the authors of all those letters tell at the same pace what has happened in the field of science in recent years. I’m saying it directly, I know I’m saying it rudely and there will be a backlash, but don’t write me letters. Those people who did not write a line during the tripling of this funding, I will ignore all those letters, although these days I receive dozens of letters on this topic. I don’t read your letters, dear letter writers, I don’t notice your letters, I look at the topic and immediately delete it, so be aware.” mentioned Nikol Pashinyan.
Let us remind you that recently 240 scientists signed an open letter regarding the 2027 science budget and addressed the open letter to Nikol Pashinyan, Ruben Rubinyan, members of the Government, and members of the National Assembly.
“In the coming years, public funding for research and development must increase significantly and consistently to reach 0.75% of GDP by 2030 and create a basis for the continued development of the sector. If growth is limited to around 5% in 2027, instead of the required minimum of 35%, the required growth in subsequent years should be much steeper, around 50% per year.
The experience of 2026 also deepens our concern. At least 7 billion drams intended for scientific research programs and scientific equipment with the additional budget supplement have not been allocated to date,” the scientists’ statement stated. in the letter.
168.am followed the traces of this letter, revealed several remarkable facts, which was the reason for the open letter and concerns of the scientists, as well as for the resignation of the former chairman of the Higher Education and Science Committee, Sargis Armenian.
According to our source, the funding, which the Government has not yet transferred, has led to a number of problems in the sector.
“It was planned that they should buy equipment to equip the institutes, but they did not give the money. It’s clear, isn’t it, that if they haven’t given the money for the equipment, then this means that they won’t be able to do anything. There were plans, the tenders were announced in advance, applications were made through those tenders, the tenders were summarized, but they were not officially published because there is no money to give. This is a shame because it is a big scandal. There are people from abroad who, according to that program, were supposed to come to Armenia to work, they applied, they passed the competition, they won, but there is no money to give them. This also led to Sargis Armenian’s resignation.” on 168.am conveyed our source.
According to him, one of the problems was last year, when the funding was not increased, but they said that they would give additional money, but they did not. They didn’t give it this year either, but they promised that they would. The science committee also held competitions, assuming that they would give the money, but since they did not, Sargis Armenian was forced to resign. For example, an Armenian-Italian joint project was supposed to be announced in September, which was agreed with the Italian side, with the Italian Gitcom, but it was never done because the Government did not give the money.
“This is already a scandal with the Italian Gitcom. There are many such complications.
For the 2027 budget, the State Science Committee submitted an application of 39 billion drams in order to be able to implement all current programs. In addition, money had to be allocated to solve a number of issues related to the Academic City. First of all, they have not yet given money related to the Academic City, although they have not yet allocated land there. In fact, the Academic City “suffered” so to speak, well, it is a big deal, but they didn’t give real money for it. The academic city should work according to the plan in 2030, the technological cluster, how will they do it?
But all this aside, the worst thing is that before the elections held in June this year, the Government took and adopted a strategy according to which until 2030 science funding should be 1 percent of the GDP, of which 0.25 percent should be taken by the private sector and 0.75 percent by the Government. The government has accepted this strategy and actively promoted it during the elections. And that amount, 0.75 percent, is currently 0.3 percent, in order to become 0.75 percent, enormous increases must be made every year,” emphasized our interlocutor.
Continuing, he said that this year, the government did not even give the 39 billion drams they wanted, but instead gave 31.5 billion drams. As a result of all this, many programs that were planned will no longer be carried out. Here, he singled out the so-called leading research project, where the 50 strongest groups of scientists of the country were working. If this is not done, it means that 50 scientific groups in Armenia will be deprived of funding, which is nonsense.
“The 2027 budget did not provide for everything that was so loudly announced on the eve of the elections, accepted, boasted everywhere, but as a result, nothing was given,” emphasized our interlocutor.
It should be noted that yesterday, October 14 of 168.am in a conversation with the Government and the Ministry of Education and Culture, responding to our questions regarding the scientists’ letter, what will be the reaction of the departments, in particular, Nikol Pashinyan’s press spokesperson Melanya Harutyunyan said:
“I have reported to the Prime Minister about the open letter, I will inform you about the further process. At the moment, I have no information about the problem, we are aware of the scientists’ open letter.”
Hovhannes Yukinyan, the spokesman of the Minister of CGMS and said:
“We will address this topic tomorrow.”
Our interlocutor answered the question: in what format will they address it, will they meet with scientists or will a press conference be held?
“We will understand, we will say, probably after tomorrow’s session of the Government.”
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Iran is trying to restrain dangerous geopolitical projects for Armenia. n:
October 15, 2026
What dilemma are the USA and Israel facing regarding Iran? on the one hand, the goal of limiting the nuclear program and weakening Iran’s military potential, on the other hand, the risks of the resumption of military operations, the possibility of a large-scale regional war and its economic and security consequences.
On these and other regional issues 168.amhas talked With Iran expert, political analyst Aram Shahnazaryan.
– The main dilemma facing the US and Israel is how to limit Iran’s strategic capabilities without the conflict turning into a protracted and uncontrollable regional war. In the calculations of Washington and Tel Aviv, the weakening of nuclear infrastructure, missile capabilities and military potential should reduce Iran’s deterrence capabilities.
But the military strikes of 2025-2026 showed that the destruction of infrastructure does not in itself eliminate technological knowledge, strategic intent, or mutual perceptions of the security threat. Furthermore, uncertainty about the current state of Iran’s nuclear program, with limited IAEA inspection control, makes it difficult to assess the long-term effectiveness of strikes.
From Israel’s point of view, the problem is primarily to prevent a long-term strategic threat, so Tel Aviv may be interested in resuming hostilities before Iran fully recovers its capabilities. The US calculation is more multi-layered. Washington must consider not only the security of Israel, but also the defense of American forces, the stability of regional partners, global energy markets, and domestic political consequences. According to publications on October 13, the possibility of a new military operation was considered in recent discussions between Trump and Netanyahu, but there is no unified position in Washington on its advisability.
From the Iranian strategic point of view, the logic of containment is key here. Tehran also views the development of nuclear technologies as a matter of sovereignty and technological independence, and missile potential as an important component of security in the face of external military pressure.
Therefore, the new strikes can damage Iran’s capabilities, and at the same time make the belief in Tehran irreversible that concessions do not guarantee security, and contribute to the formation of a much tougher position.
Therefore, the main problem for both countries is not just military strikes, but their political success. Military escalation could trigger retaliation against Israel, US forces and strategic infrastructure in the region, further disrupt energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, threaten safe navigation in the Indian Ocean and Bab El-Mandeb Strait, and create a serious global economic crisis.
The ongoing deadlock in mediated negotiations between Iran and the US shows that the parties have not yet found a mutually acceptable security framework that would allow for combining the limitation of nuclear risks, Iran’s security concerns, and the cessation of hostilities.
In this sense, the real dilemma between Washington and Tel Aviv is: is it possible to turn military operations into a stable political outcome, or will new strikes simply turn into a protracted and uncontrolled war with an unpredictable outcome?
– Let’s deviate a little from the topic. Can Iran prevent the realignment of forces in the south of Armenia, or is it already losing that opportunity, and if Iran cannot prevent the Turkish-Azerbaijani plans in Syunik, so to speak, what is the value of Tehran’s support for Armenia? In other words, is Iran today a real pillar of security for Armenia or just a diplomatic partner?
– For Iran, the issue of Syunik is not only a matter of the inviolability of Armenia’s territorial integrity, but also a matter of preserving its own geopolitical position and security atmosphere. Iran continues to oppose not the opening of transportation links in the region as such, but the creation of an extraterritorial corridor that would limit Armenia’s sovereignty or change the geopolitical balance of the region.
From this point of view, Iran’s position has not undergone any change. In September 2026, Ambassador Shirgholami stated that Tehran may not object to the TRIPP project if Armenia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are preserved and there is no American military or security presence on the territory of Armenia.
However, it should be taken into account that Iran can increase the political and security price of such programs, but it does not have the ability to prevent all possible scenarios on its own. Iran’s influence now largely depends on how well it will be able to monitor the implementation of the agreements and prevent their unacceptable interpretations. And what is the value of Iranian support for Armenia today? I think the answer is unequivocal. it has a real strategic importance, and above all, as a restraining political factor.
Iran’s principled approach creates an additional limitation for the actions of Azerbaijan and Turkey. In addition, the development of economic, energy and transport ties with Iran can reduce Armenia’s vulnerability. However, this coincidence of interests should not be equated with a military guarantee. Tehran has not assumed an unconditional obligation to defend Armenia’s territorial integrity with military force.
Therefore, Iran still cannot act as a full pillar of Armenia’s security. It is a strategic neighbor whose interests can restrain dangerous geopolitical projects for Armenia, but this influence is conditional and depends on Iran’s own capabilities and regional calculations, as well as the desire of the current authorities of Armenia.
– What will the South Caucasus and Armenia get with the weakening of Iran? In other words, in the conditions of the weakening of Iran’s position, who is reshaping the balance of power in the South Caucasus: Turkey, Azerbaijan, the USA, or Russia, and what place does Armenia have in those reshuffles?
– As a result of the possible weakening of Iran’s positions, the South Caucasus will definitely suffer. It will create a risk of power imbalance, which is theoretically fraught with unpredictable consequences.
Today, the balance of power in the South Caucasus is reshaped not by one state, but by the competition of actors pursuing different goals. Iran is trying to maintain its presence and influence. Turkey is expanding its ties with Azerbaijan and seeks to strengthen land communication with Central Asia. Azerbaijan is trying to turn its military advantage into political and economic supremacy.
Russia, with limited opportunities as a result of the Ukrainian war, has lost part of its former monopoly position, and the US is trying to fill the gap with diplomatic engagement and transport projects. The TRIPP initiative is a key example of this new competition.
There is a serious danger here for Armenia. If the Turkish-Azerbaijani military-political supremacy deepens as a result of the possible weakening of Iran’s position in the region, Armenia may definitely find itself in a very vulnerable situation, being strategically isolated. As a result of the weakening of Iran’s positions, in the conditions of the changing balance of power, Armenia will face the danger of losing its own subjectivity in regional developments, as a result of which the future of the region will be shaped around Armenia, without Armenia’s decisive participation.
– What? What issues are Tehran and Baku trying to solve at the moment, to what extent is it related to Armenia’s interests? By the way, there are visible and invisible problems in Azerbaijan-Turkey relations, to what extent or which ones coincide with the existing problems in Iran-Azerbaijan relations?:
– Tehran-Baku relations today should be considered not just in terms of bilateral differences, but in terms of influence in the South Caucasus, control of communication channels and the formation of a new regional security system. The main contradiction between Iran and Azerbaijan is that both countries strive to expand their strategic capabilities, and against this background, they imagine the desired balance of forces in the region in different ways.
At the moment, one of the urgent issues between Tehran and Baku is the issue of mutual security guarantees and prevention of military escalation. A key concern for Iran is Azerbaijan’s deepened strategic cooperation with Israel and the risk that Azerbaijani territory could be used against Iran. Baku, for its part, strives to preserve its security independence without getting involved in an open conflict with Iran.
The second key issue is transportation and geopolitical competition. Opening the roads connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan is not just an economic issue for Tehran. it is related to the strategic importance of Iran’s border with Armenia, its transit role in the region and the growing influence of Turkey. The development of TRIPP can reduce Azerbaijan’s dependence on routes passing through Iranian territory, while Tehran is interested in communications that will not reduce Iran’s strategic capabilities.
Various strategic calculations are operating under the visible fraternal rhetoric in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations. Ankara wants to strengthen ties with Central Asia, expand its economic and transport presence in the South Caucasus, and Baku seeks to turn itself into an independent regional center, maintaining close relations with Turkey, Israel, Russia and other actors.
Possible disagreements should not be exaggerated or presented as open cracks. rather, they are about leverage, competition for transit routes, and how far to go in confronting Iran. Turkey may support Azerbaijan’s regional goals, but it is not necessarily interested in a full-scale war with Iran.
The main problem for Armenia is that all contradictions between Tehran-Baku and Ankara-Baku relations cannot automatically turn into Armenian interests. It is important for Armenia to understand under what conditions this competition can serve its own interests and when it can lead to new pressures and isolation.
– Such a question arose. We always say that in the constitution of Azerbaijan there are territorial claims against RA, so to speak, is there such a claim related to Iran, visible or invisible? And is the “constitutional demand” for 60 percent of the RA territory, which includes a number of RA marzes, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Ararat, Armavir, Gegharkunik, Tavush, Lori, Shirak are consequently “related” to Iran.
– In the Constitution of Azerbaijan, there are no known provisions establishing direct territorial claims against Iran, but there is a different kind of pan-Azerbaijani and irredentist political discourse in the direction of Iran.
The problem is mainly related to the so-called “Southern Azerbaijan” concept, by which some Azeri nationalist circles present the territories of the northwest of Iran as part of the historically unified Azerbaijani territory. Such ideas are often accompanied by ideas of “reunification of the north and the south”, which is perceived in Tehran as a challenge to clear separatism and the territorial integrity of Iran.
The issue of the claim regarding 60 percent of the territory of Armenia is related to Iran not by the identity of the territorial claim, but by geopolitical consequences. According to the interpretation of the “historical” maps presented in Azerbaijan, that territorial claim includes Syunik and Vayots Dzor as a whole, as well as parts of Ararat, Armavir, Gegharkunik, Tavush, Lori and Shirak marzes. The importance of Syunik is particularly great, because it is here that Armenia’s direct land connection with Iran is located.
If the policy of territorial claims or the idea of an extraterritorial corridor leads to a practical limitation of Armenia’s sovereignty or a change in the operational significance of the Armenian-Iranian border, it will directly contradict Tehran’s strategic interests. However, this circumstance does not mean that Azerbaijan’s historical-territorial arguments against Armenia automatically extend to Iran as well.
From Iran’s point of view, the main danger is not that Baku has the same territorial demands towards Iran, but that the realignment of geopolitical forces in the south of Armenia can sharply limit Iran’s geopolitical opportunities. Therefore, for Iran, maintaining the territorial integrity of Armenia and the Armenian-Iranian border is not only a matter of Armenian-Iranian friendship, but also an important component of its own strategic security.
– Aliyev is looking for mines in Nakhichevan and wants to get involved in it also to the United Arab Emirates Investment Company. Can this program concern Iran, and is its significance only economic, or can it also have strategic consequences, taking into account the geographical position of Nakhichevan and the balance of forces in the region?
– From the Iranian strategic point of view, the project to study the mineral resources of Nakhichevan can have not only economic, but also long-term geopolitical significance.
The core of Iran’s possible concern is the geographical location of Nakhichevan. it borders Iran, Armenia and Turkey, and in the context of transport rearrangements around Syunik, the growth of economic and infrastructural importance of Nakhichevan can change the communication and strategic balance of the region.
It is also noteworthy that the agreement was signed with the participation of Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan, National Security Advisor of the UAE, Deputy Ruler of Abu Dhabi, as part of the broader cooperation between the two countries, which also includes critical raw materials, digital infrastructure, energy and investments. From the Iranian point of view, this is a reason to carefully monitor the long-term consequences of the UAE’s economic presence, especially since the investment project could theoretically have a military or intelligence purpose.
Therefore, the direct significance of the project is economic, and the strategic consequences are possible and conditioned by further developments. If the exploration activities lead to the discovery of large reserves, the creation of mining production and the expansion of transport infrastructure, the UAE can acquire long-term economic interests in the area immediately adjacent to the borders of Armenia and Iran. For Iran, it will not be foreign investment per se, but the possibility that the economic presence will be intertwined with communication or security projects that will limit Tehran’s influence in the South Caucasus. Tehran has reasons to follow this project, especially in the background of close military-political relations between Azerbaijan-Israel and UAE-Israel.
What dilemma are the USA and Israel facing regarding Iran? on the one hand, the goal of limiting the nuclear program and weakening Iran’s military potential, on the other hand, the risks of the resumption of military operations, the possibility of a large-scale regional war and its economic and security consequences.
On these and other regional issues 168.amhas talked With Iran expert, political analyst Aram Shahnazaryan.
– The main dilemma facing the US and Israel is how to limit Iran’s strategic capabilities without the conflict turning into a protracted and uncontrollable regional war. In the calculations of Washington and Tel Aviv, the weakening of nuclear infrastructure, missile capabilities and military potential should reduce Iran’s deterrence capabilities.
But the military strikes of 2025-2026 showed that the destruction of infrastructure does not in itself eliminate technological knowledge, strategic intent, or mutual perceptions of the security threat. Furthermore, uncertainty about the current state of Iran’s nuclear program, with limited IAEA inspection control, makes it difficult to assess the long-term effectiveness of strikes.
From Israel’s point of view, the problem is primarily to prevent a long-term strategic threat, so Tel Aviv may be interested in resuming hostilities before Iran fully recovers its capabilities. The US calculation is more multi-layered. Washington must consider not only the security of Israel, but also the defense of American forces, the stability of regional partners, global energy markets, and domestic political consequences. According to publications on October 13, the possibility of a new military operation was considered in recent discussions between Trump and Netanyahu, but there is no unified position in Washington on its advisability.
From the Iranian strategic point of view, the logic of containment is key here. Tehran also views the development of nuclear technologies as a matter of sovereignty and technological independence, and missile potential as an important component of security in the face of external military pressure.
Therefore, the new strikes can damage Iran’s capabilities, and at the same time make the belief in Tehran irreversible that concessions do not guarantee security, and contribute to the formation of a much tougher position.
Therefore, the main problem for both countries is not just military strikes, but their political success. Military escalation could trigger retaliation against Israel, US forces and strategic infrastructure in the region, further disrupt energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, threaten safe navigation in the Indian Ocean and Bab El-Mandeb Strait, and create a serious global economic crisis.
The ongoing deadlock in mediated negotiations between Iran and the US shows that the parties have not yet found a mutually acceptable security framework that would allow for combining the limitation of nuclear risks, Iran’s security concerns, and the cessation of hostilities.
In this sense, the real dilemma between Washington and Tel Aviv is: is it possible to turn military operations into a stable political outcome, or will new strikes simply turn into a protracted and uncontrolled war with an unpredictable outcome?
– Let’s deviate a little from the topic. Can Iran prevent the realignment of forces in the south of Armenia, or is it already losing that opportunity, and if Iran cannot prevent the Turkish-Azerbaijani plans in Syunik, so to speak, what is the value of Tehran’s support for Armenia? In other words, is Iran today a real pillar of security for Armenia or just a diplomatic partner?
– For Iran, the issue of Syunik is not only a matter of the inviolability of Armenia’s territorial integrity, but also a matter of preserving its own geopolitical position and security atmosphere. Iran continues to oppose not the opening of transportation links in the region as such, but the creation of an extraterritorial corridor that would limit Armenia’s sovereignty or change the geopolitical balance of the region.
From this point of view, Iran’s position has not undergone any change. In September 2026, Ambassador Shirgholami stated that Tehran may not object to the TRIPP project if Armenia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are preserved and there is no American military or security presence on the territory of Armenia.
However, it should be taken into account that Iran can increase the political and security price of such programs, but it does not have the ability to prevent all possible scenarios on its own. Iran’s influence now largely depends on how well it will be able to monitor the implementation of the agreements and prevent their unacceptable interpretations. And what is the value of Iranian support for Armenia today? I think the answer is unequivocal. it has a real strategic importance, and above all, as a restraining political factor.
Iran’s principled approach creates an additional limitation for the actions of Azerbaijan and Turkey. In addition, the development of economic, energy and transport ties with Iran can reduce Armenia’s vulnerability. However, this coincidence of interests should not be equated with a military guarantee. Tehran has not assumed an unconditional obligation to defend Armenia’s territorial integrity with military force.
Therefore, Iran still cannot act as a full pillar of Armenia’s security. It is a strategic neighbor whose interests can restrain dangerous geopolitical projects for Armenia, but this influence is conditional and depends on Iran’s own capabilities and regional calculations, as well as the desire of the current authorities of Armenia.
– What will the South Caucasus and Armenia get with the weakening of Iran? In other words, in the conditions of the weakening of Iran’s position, who is reshaping the balance of power in the South Caucasus: Turkey, Azerbaijan, the USA, or Russia, and what place does Armenia have in those reshuffles?
– As a result of the possible weakening of Iran’s positions, the South Caucasus will definitely suffer. It will create a risk of power imbalance, which is theoretically fraught with unpredictable consequences.
Today, the balance of power in the South Caucasus is reshaped not by one state, but by the competition of actors pursuing different goals. Iran is trying to maintain its presence and influence. Turkey is expanding its ties with Azerbaijan and seeks to strengthen land communication with Central Asia. Azerbaijan is trying to turn its military advantage into political and economic supremacy.
Russia, with limited opportunities as a result of the Ukrainian war, has lost part of its former monopoly position, and the US is trying to fill the gap with diplomatic engagement and transport projects. The TRIPP initiative is a key example of this new competition.
There is a serious danger here for Armenia. If the Turkish-Azerbaijani military-political supremacy deepens as a result of the possible weakening of Iran’s position in the region, Armenia may definitely find itself in a very vulnerable situation, being strategically isolated. As a result of the weakening of Iran’s positions, in the conditions of the changing balance of power, Armenia will face the danger of losing its own subjectivity in regional developments, as a result of which the future of the region will be shaped around Armenia, without Armenia’s decisive participation.
– What? What issues are Tehran and Baku trying to solve at the moment, to what extent is it related to Armenia’s interests? By the way, there are visible and invisible problems in Azerbaijan-Turkey relations, to what extent or which ones coincide with the existing problems in Iran-Azerbaijan relations?:
– Tehran-Baku relations today should be considered not just in terms of bilateral differences, but in terms of influence in the South Caucasus, control of communication channels and the formation of a new regional security system. The main contradiction between Iran and Azerbaijan is that both countries strive to expand their strategic capabilities, and against this background, they imagine the desired balance of forces in the region in different ways.
At the moment, one of the urgent issues between Tehran and Baku is the issue of mutual security guarantees and prevention of military escalation. A key concern for Iran is Azerbaijan’s deepened strategic cooperation with Israel and the risk that Azerbaijani territory could be used against Iran. Baku, for its part, strives to preserve its security independence without getting involved in an open conflict with Iran.
The second key issue is transportation and geopolitical competition. Opening the roads connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan is not just an economic issue for Tehran. it is related to the strategic importance of Iran’s border with Armenia, its transit role in the region and the growing influence of Turkey. The development of TRIPP can reduce Azerbaijan’s dependence on routes passing through Iranian territory, while Tehran is interested in communications that will not reduce Iran’s strategic capabilities.
Various strategic calculations are operating under the visible fraternal rhetoric in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations. Ankara wants to strengthen ties with Central Asia, expand its economic and transport presence in the South Caucasus, and Baku seeks to turn itself into an independent regional center, maintaining close relations with Turkey, Israel, Russia and other actors.
Possible disagreements should not be exaggerated or presented as open cracks. rather, they are about leverage, competition for transit routes, and how far to go in confronting Iran. Turkey may support Azerbaijan’s regional goals, but it is not necessarily interested in a full-scale war with Iran.
The main problem for Armenia is that all contradictions between Tehran-Baku and Ankara-Baku relations cannot automatically turn into Armenian interests. It is important for Armenia to understand under what conditions this competition can serve its own interests and when it can lead to new pressures and isolation.
– Such a question arose. We always say that in the constitution of Azerbaijan there are territorial claims against RA, so to speak, is there such a claim related to Iran, visible or invisible? And is the “constitutional demand” for 60 percent of the RA territory, which includes a number of RA marzes, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Ararat, Armavir, Gegharkunik, Tavush, Lori, Shirak are consequently “related” to Iran.
– In the Constitution of Azerbaijan, there are no known provisions establishing direct territorial claims against Iran, but there is a different kind of pan-Azerbaijani and irredentist political discourse in the direction of Iran.
The problem is mainly related to the so-called “Southern Azerbaijan” concept, by which some Azeri nationalist circles present the territories of the northwest of Iran as part of the historically unified Azerbaijani territory. Such ideas are often accompanied by ideas of “reunification of the north and the south”, which is perceived in Tehran as a challenge to clear separatism and the territorial integrity of Iran.
The issue of the claim regarding 60 percent of the territory of Armenia is related to Iran not by the identity of the territorial claim, but by geopolitical consequences. According to the interpretation of the “historical” maps presented in Azerbaijan, that territorial claim includes Syunik and Vayots Dzor as a whole, as well as parts of Ararat, Armavir, Gegharkunik, Tavush, Lori and Shirak marzes. The importance of Syunik is particularly great, because it is here that Armenia’s direct land connection with Iran is located.
If the policy of territorial claims or the idea of an extraterritorial corridor leads to a practical limitation of Armenia’s sovereignty or a change in the operational significance of the Armenian-Iranian border, it will directly contradict Tehran’s strategic interests. However, this circumstance does not mean that Azerbaijan’s historical-territorial arguments against Armenia automatically extend to Iran as well.
From Iran’s point of view, the main danger is not that Baku has the same territorial demands towards Iran, but that the realignment of geopolitical forces in the south of Armenia can sharply limit Iran’s geopolitical opportunities. Therefore, for Iran, maintaining the territorial integrity of Armenia and the Armenian-Iranian border is not only a matter of Armenian-Iranian friendship, but also an important component of its own strategic security.
– Aliyev is looking for mines in Nakhichevan and wants to get involved in it also to the United Arab Emirates Investment Company. Can this program concern Iran, and is its significance only economic, or can it also have strategic consequences, taking into account the geographical position of Nakhichevan and the balance of forces in the region?
– From the Iranian strategic point of view, the project to study the mineral resources of Nakhichevan can have not only economic, but also long-term geopolitical significance.
The core of Iran’s possible concern is the geographical location of Nakhichevan. it borders Iran, Armenia and Turkey, and in the context of transport rearrangements around Syunik, the growth of economic and infrastructural importance of Nakhichevan can change the communication and strategic balance of the region.
It is also noteworthy that the agreement was signed with the participation of Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan, National Security Advisor of the UAE, Deputy Ruler of Abu Dhabi, as part of the broader cooperation between the two countries, which also includes critical raw materials, digital infrastructure, energy and investments. From the Iranian point of view, this is a reason to carefully monitor the long-term consequences of the UAE’s economic presence, especially since the investment project could theoretically have a military or intelligence purpose.
Therefore, the direct significance of the project is economic, and the strategic consequences are possible and conditioned by further developments. If the exploration activities lead to the discovery of large reserves, the creation of mining production and the expansion of transport infrastructure, the UAE can acquire long-term economic interests in the area immediately adjacent to the borders of Armenia and Iran. For Iran, it will not be foreign investment per se, but the possibility that the economic presence will be intertwined with communication or security projects that will limit Tehran’s influence in the South Caucasus. Tehran has reasons to follow this project, especially in the background of close military-political relations between Azerbaijan-Israel and UAE-Israel.
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Are the interests of Ankara and Baku in conflict with the settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations?
October 15, 2026
“One nation, two states” is not a license to interfere in internal affairs and foreign relations. Little brother’s advice to big brother’ in the article we referred to the Baku-Ankara emotional dispute against the background of the ban on wearing hijab in Azerbaijani schools, but during which real episodes of disagreements are brought forward in the foreign political context.
For example, as we mentioned in our article, Azerbaijan once again reminded Turkey that based on its own state interests, it will maintain diplomatic and strategic relations with Israel, although it supports the settlement of the Palestinian issue.
Moreover, Baku reminded Ankara that he consistently supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, provides assistance to it, including military, but at the same time does not break diplomatic relations with Russia the relationship and: maintains broad commercial and economic ties with it.
Later, Farhad Mammadov, a political scientist close to Aliyev, on Facebook note: did, where he alludes to the fact that the alliance of Azerbaijan and Turkey is passing another examination, and singled out three episodes.
■ The issue of relations between Azerbaijan and Israel is raised in Turkey.
■ In Turkey, they raise the issue of the rules for wearing school uniforms in Azerbaijan or the ban on wearing hijab.
■ The issue of Turkey-Armenia relations is being raised in Azerbaijan.
“Many people in Turkey asked the question: why does Turkey coordinate its policy towards Armenia with Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan does not coordinate its policy towards Israel with Turkey?” Everything is very simple. Armenia has “occupied” the territories of Azerbaijan (quotation marks: M.P.), and Israel has not occupied anything from the territories of Turkey. Azerbaijan plays a role in the process of normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel. In addition, the trade between Turkey and Israel continues normally, – the Azerbaijani political scientist wrote and went further, stating – during the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a foreign policy determined by ideology was formed in Turkey, so to speak, and this is not new for Baku. All this time, Azerbaijan is trying to place relations within the framework of pragmatism, not neglecting the emotional component.
Alliance with Azerbaijan is Turkey’s success story in the region. Azerbaijan supports it with its organizational, financial, energy and all available resources, both in the region and far beyond its borders.”
At the same time, the Azerbaijani day.az, a supporter of the government’s discourse and theses, “One thing with words, another with deeds. How far is Turkish diplomacy ready to go? article: published, where it is clearly stated that the main question for Azerbaijan is what place Ankara allocates to the interests of its closest ally when building relations with Yerevan.
In the article, they recalled the last telephone conversation between Ararat Mirzoyan and Hakan Fida, after which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia announced that the process of opening the Armenian-Turkish border has matured, “it is possible that we will wake up tomorrow morning and see the following headline in the news: “Armenia-Turkey border is open”. In other words, according to Mirzoyan, the Armenian-Turkish border may be opened before a new envoy is appointed.
“For Baku, the information background formed around the rapprochement is important. Presenting Azerbaijan as an obstacle to regional peace can weaken the support of Turkish society towards that country.
The formation of such an impression contributes to the promotion of the idea that Ankara should take less into account the interests of its ally in order to develop relations with Yerevan. The price of this political line is measured by confidence. The leadership of Turkey has emphasized the special nature of relations with Azerbaijan for years, and these statements have created quite certain expectations. “Baku has the right to evaluate Ankara’s actions in the context of its own promises,” the day.az article states.
The same the claims minval.az also did its “Ghost of Zurich. The reason for the conflict between Azerbaijan and Turkey” in the analysis.
“Hakan Fidan publicly announced on June 8 that the regulation of relations with Armenia is carried out in close coordination with Azerbaijan. He expressed a similar position during his visit to Baku in September. However, serious disagreements are hidden behind the official statements about the agreed policy.
And this is where we should remember the popular “football diplomacy” and the negotiations that took place in Zurich, Switzerland in 2008-2010,” the media wrote, referring to its sources, stating that the Turkish Foreign Ministry is dissatisfied with the excessive dependence of the negotiation process on Azerbaijan’s position and demands a “stop”, and that this line is being personally promoted by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
Can it be assumed that Turkey understands that the final peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia will not be signed in the near future, no matter how much Nikol Pashinyan insists that all efforts should be focused on it? But the same Pashinyan announced today that he has set himself the task of signing and ratifying the peace agreement by 2031.
And Aliyev, in turn, noted that although they have been living in peace with Armenia for more than a year, that “peace is still fragile, it must be protected and strengthened.”
Let’s remind that one of the main conditions for Baku to sign the peace treaty is the removal of the Declaration of Independence from the RA constitution, which Pashinyan’s government has problems with its implementation, and the border adjustment process has not yet been completed, and not only that.
In other words, Turkey has reasons to hurry…
By the way, Hakan Fidan is in Baku, and the Azerbaijani side can ask him the questions that concern him and dispel his doubts.
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Clouds are gathering over Benjamin Netanyahu’s head, but he hopes to “be
October 15, 2026
The favorite of the race, as always, is Benjamin Netanyahu, but not at all unconditionally.
The prime minister who heads “Likud” is harassed by other parties: “Yashar”, “Yes Atid”, “Benet”, “Israel Beitenu”. In addition, A significant part of the country’s population is tired of the “irreplaceable”, especially since its administration has gone through almost continuous wars and crises. to the landscape. According to many forecasts, no movement will gather the 61 votes needed to form a majority in the parliament. However, the situation can completely change.
… On the eve of another anniversary of the tragedy of October 7, 2023, state flags were lowered in Israel. On Jerusalem’s Mount Herzl and elsewhere in the country, citizens mourned the dead and shuddered to hear heart-wrenching accounts of the horrific day when Hamas militants invaded the Jewish state and began a massacre that left 1,200 dead and more than 250 hostages.
Mourning ceremonies were also held on the day of the tragedy, and it was remembered with pain in the following days as well. Probably, the black mourning will become the background against which the expression of will of the citizens of the republic will take place. Yohan Plesner, a former member of the Knesset, president of the Israel Democracy Institute, stated that the October tragedy “casts a long shadow over the upcoming elections in Israel.” He reminded that until now, no independent and authoritative report has been drawn up about what happened, and the most important task of the new government will be to eliminate that gap.
And before that? Israelis, with their characteristic passion, continue to argue about who is the main culprit of the tragedy. And they point to Netanyahu more and more often.
If at first it was considered that the attack of the militants was sudden and some miscalculations were made by the intelligence, now it is directly stated that the Prime Minister was aware of the plans of Hamas, but did not make decisive conclusions. More and more facts testify to this. One of them presented Haaretz the newspaper. “A few days before the attack by Hamas, the President of the UAE, Muhammad bin Zayed Al Nahyan, warned Netanyahu about the threat. But he either didn’t believe, or he didn’t imagine the extent of the coming calamity, confidently declaring that Israel is ready for any development of events.”
Moreover, the Prime Minister did not inform his supporters about the content of the conversation with the UAE leader. The heads of intelligence and the military were also not aware of the situation. But now Netanyahu denies everything and is suing Haaretz.
He did not initiate legal proceedings with another American newspaper, The Wall Street Journal, although that newspaper reported on a similar warning to Netanyahu by the head of Egypt’s general intelligence, Abbas Kamil. He had ignored them too. However new revelations can finally discredit the politician. But at the same time, many remind that he is known for his ingenuity and ability to deftly escape from the most complex traps.
And if that fails, Netanyahu may face a path to the abyss. he will be deprived of immunity, court cases related to corruption will be resumed against him, which do not bode well for him. Besides, his many enemies will certainly want to get revenge on him.
But this is a sad future that Netanyahu does not want to face. Of course, he has a plan that he would like to implement if he realizes that the elections promise him destruction.
The prime minister has already stated several times that the enemies are going to attack Israel. Later, a well-known incident took place with Flydubai flight FZ 1073, which the Israeli authorities described as an attempt of “jihadi terrorism”. The Omani co-pilot was preparing to direct the plane with passengers to the terminal building of Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. It could provoke a new big war in the Middle East. Fortunately, the terrible plan did not materialize. But if it succeeded, the elections threatening Netanyahu would be annulled. It sounds sacrilegious, but it would be to his advantage…
Now the Prime Minister spoke about the danger from Hamas. According to Netanyahu, he has information that the radical organization is planning to repeat the massacre of October 7, 2023 by attacking Israel in order to disrupt the elections.
If that happens, everyone will remember Netanyahu’s warning. He will come out of his skin to show himself as a hero in the battle against the enemy. Well, the elections will turn from an urgent event into an absolutely irrelevant procedure. Again in favor of Netanyahu…
But for now the clouds hang over his head. And Uri Geller, the world-famous magician and psychologist, has undertaken the task of dispelling them. A few months ago, he announced that he shared his phenomenal abilities with Donald Trump and Netanyahu. However, so far there is no evidence that the magician’s clients have started working miracles in politics. Rather, the opposite.
However, Geller is not worried about that. In an interview with Israeli TV channel 14, he played his usual role as a soothsayer and announced Netanyahu’s imminent victory in the elections.
“Bibi is a genius, and not because he is my friend. He is my friend. He’s more of a wizard than I am.’ The psychic described Netanyahu as “strong”, “courageous”, “devoted” to his work and admitted that he felt a special, almost magical aura around him. And he even called him the “Israeli Churchill” for his enormous success. Only it is not known where he got them from. Geller listed Netanyahu’s merits, which are also legendary in many ways, and exonerated him on all matters of state, including the events of October 7; “Nevertheless, the entire responsibility for the disaster, for some reason, is on Bibi.”
It is difficult to say how the magician’s magic will affect the voters, but it is unlikely that he alone will be able to pull Netanyahu out of the “swamp” of many accusations. But others can help him, in particular, competitors. This will happen if they fail to form a coalition capable of overthrowing Likud.
The reason is simple. not only Netanyahu, but also other Israeli politicians are treated with prejudice by the voters. They will have to solve a paradoxical dilemma: to find the best among the worst.
By the way, Netanyahu’s rivals must first solve the main problem: enter the Knesset. But it will not be easy to do. many Israelis may not want to exchange Netanyahu’s “biz” with the “soap” of his rivals. After all, regardless of the outcome of the elections, the new government will painfully search for a way out of the long “tunnel” of problems.
VALERIE BRUT
fondsk.ru
Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan
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Նիկոլի տերերը մարդաբոյ են ուզում՝ Հայաստանը սարքեն Ուկրաինա. Նաիրա ԶոհրաբյանՆ
Հոկտեմբեր 15, 2026
168TV-ի «Զառան հարց ունի» հաղորդաշարի հյուրը ԱԺ նախկին պատգամավոր, հանրային ու քաղաքական գործիչ Նաիրա Զոհրաբյանն է։
Մանրամասները՝ տեսանյութում
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168: «Ալիևն ուզում է պատմության մեջ մտնել՝ որպես հաղթող նախագահ, ոչ թե՝ Թուրք
Հոկտեմբեր 15, 2026
Ադրբեջանի դպրոցներում հիջաբ կրելու սահմանափակումները հանելուց հետո, Թուրքիա-Ադրբեջան հարաբերություններում նկատվում է լարվածություն։
Երկու երկրներից փոխադարձաբար տարբեր հայտարարություններ են հնչում, երեկ նույնիսկ Ադրբեջանը Թուրքիային ու Իրանին մեղադրել է իր դեմ տեղեկատվական պատերազմ տանելու մեջ։
Ադրբեջանի Մեդիայի և հեռարձակման խորհուրդը հայտարարություն է տարածել, որում նշում է, թե վերջին օրերին բացահայտորեն նկատվում է արտասահմանյան երկրներում գործող հասարակական ակտիվիստների, քաղաքական գործիչների և նույնիսկ պաշտոնատար անձանց ակտիվ մասնակցությունն Ադրբեջանի դեմ ուղղված նպատակային տեղեկատվական արշավներին։
«Մենք Իրանի և Թուրքիայի կողմից նպատակային տեղեկատվական հարձակումների ակտիվացումը, հատկապես՝ X, Telegram և TikTok հարթակների միջոցով, գնահատում ենք որպես տեղեկատվական անվտանգության պաշտպանության, միջպետական հարաբերություններում փոխադարձ հարգանքի և ապատեղեկատվության դեմ պայքարում միջազգային համագործակցության սկզբունքներին անհամատեղելի երևույթ և վճռականորեն դատապարտում ենք այն։ Ադրբեջանի վերաբերյալ անհիմն և կողմնակալ նյութերի, ադրբեջանական պետության և ժողովրդի հասցեին սպառնալիքների, վախեցնելու փորձերի ու վիրավորանքների տարածումն այդ երկրների լրատվական դաշտում և սոցիալական ցանցերում սովորական երևույթի վերածվելը, ինչպես նաև այդ կապակցությամբ իշխանությունների կողմից որևէ միջոց չձեռնարկելը մեր հասարակության մեջ անհանգստություն և լուրջ դժգոհություն են առաջացնում»,- նշել է Մեդիայի և հեռարձակման խորհուրդը։
Ադրբեջանում հիջաբ կրել-չկրելու հարցն ինչո՞ւ սրեց թուրք-ադրբեջանական հարաբերությունները, խորքում իրականում ի՞նչ խնդիր կա թաքնված։
ԳԱԱ Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի նախկին տնօրեն, ակադեմիկոս, թուրքագետ Ռուբեն Սաֆրաստյանը պատասխանելով այս հարցերին, նշեց, որ Ալիևը փորձում է Ադրբեջանի դիրքերն այս աշխարհում վերաձևակերպել և ինչպես հայտարարել է՝ Ադրբեջանը դարձնել միջին պետություն։
«Սա նշանակում է, որ Ադրբեջանը Հարավային Կովկասում ձգտում է նրան, որ Հայաստանն ու Վրաստանը միջին պետություն չեն, այլ փոքր, նրանց նկատմամբ ունենա գերակայություն։ Այսինքն՝ մեր տարածաշրջանում այս երեք պետությունների մեջ Ադրբեջանը լինի գերակա։ Թուրքիան էլ իր հերթին՝ ինչպես գիտենք, Արցախի վերջին պատերազմից հետո, Հարավային Կովկասում սեփական դիրքերն աշխարհաքաղաքական առումով ուժեղացրել է Ռուսաստանի դիրքերի թուլացման հետևանքով։ Եվ այս ամենն աշխարհաքաղաքական հարթության վրա ստեղծում է դիրքորոշումների տարբերություն։ Այսինքն՝ Ադրբեջանն ուզում է տարածաշրջանում իր դիրքերն ավելի ցցուն դարձնել, իսկ Թուրքիան, որն իր դիրքերն ուժեղացրել է՝ հավանության չի արժանացնում»,- 168.am–ի հետ զրույցում նշեց Ռուբեն Սաֆրաստյանը։
Նրա կարծիքով՝ Ալիևը փորձում է ադրբեջանցիներից ստեղծել, որպես հաղթող ժողովուրդ, որ միայնակ ինքն է հասել հաղթանակի վերջին պատերազմում։ Թեպետ բոլորի համար էլ հասկանալի է, թե այդ պատերազմում որքան մեծ է եղել Թուրքիայի դերը։ Նաև բոլորն են հիշում, թե Արցախի պատերազմից հետո ինչպես էին Ադրբեջանում բոլորը գովաբանում Թուրքիային, որ օգնության ձեռք է մեկնել, և այլն։
Հիմա Ալիևն այս ամենը մոռացության է տալիս և փորձում է ադրբեջանցիների ինքնության վրա ազդել՝ կերտել որպես հաղթող ժողովուրդ։
«Այստեղ մեկ հանգամանք էլ կա, որն արդեն Ալիևի անձնականն է, կարծում եմ՝ Ալիևը պատմության մեջ ուզում է մտնել՝ որպես հաղթող նախագահ, ոչ թե Թուրքիայի օգնությամբ հաղթած ղեկավար։
Իհարկե, այս ամենը Թուրքիային դուր չի գալիս, և դա միանգամայն հասկանալի է։ Լավ գիտենք՝ Իսրայելի դերը կա, որ Թուրքիան Իսրայելի հետ առերևույթ լարված հարաբերություն ունի, գիտենք՝ նաև առևտրային ու տնտեսական հարաբերություններ կան Իսրայելի հետ։ Ամեն դեպքում Իսրայելը Թուրքիայի համար հանդես է գալիս շատ ցցուն թշնամի պետություն։ Ադրբեջանն այդ երկրի հետ սերտ հարաբերություններ ունի, սա ևս Թուրքիային դուր չի գալիս, և սրան ավելացավ հիջաբի խնդիրը։
Ըստ իս, սա Ադրբեջանի ղեկավարի մտավախությունն է արտահայտում»,- հավելեց մեր զրուցակիցը։
Ռուբեն Սաֆրաստյանի դիտարկմամբ՝ այսօր ադրբեջանական էլիտան կենտրոնացած է Ալիևի շուրջ, նրանք հիմնականում ձևավորվել են խորհրդային շրջանում, իսկ այդ շրջանում Ադրբեջանն ուժեղ աթեիստական պետություն էր, իսկ իսլամը հետապնդվում էր։
Թեպետ վերջին շրջանում տեսանելի է, որ Ալիևն ու իր մերձավորները փորձում են տպավորություն ստեղծել, որ իրապես հավատացյալ մահմեդականներ են, բայց իրականում լուրջ չեն վերաբերվում Իսլամին։
«Այս պայմաններում, երբ Ադրբեջանը փորձում է իր դերը մի քիչ ընդլայնել, որը հավանության չի արժանանում Թուրքիայի կողմից։ Իրանի գործոնն այստեղ ևս պետք է հաշվի առնենք, որ Ադրբեջանում մտավախություն կա, որ Իրանը կարող է իսլամական այս զգացմունքները, որոնք կան, Ադրբեջանում օգտագործել։ Դրա համար փորձում են ճնշել հիջաբի հարցը, որն էլ առաջացնում է դժգոհություններ։ Գիտենք, որ Էրդողանի ընտրազանգվածը հիմնականում իսլամամետ զանգվածն է, մյուս կողմից՝ նրա կուսակցությունն է իսլամամետ»,- շեշտեց Ռուբեն Սաֆրաստյանը։
Նա հիշեցրեց, որ Հեյդար Ալիևի նախագահության ժամանակ ևս լարվածություններ կային Թուրքիայի և Ադրբեջանի միջև։ Երբ Հեյդար Ալիևը եկել էր իշխանության, Թուրքիայում դա դժկամությամբ էին ընդունել, քանի որ Հեյդարի անունը կապվում էր ադրբեջանական ԿԳԲ-ի հետ՝ երկար տարիներ դրա ղեկավարն էր եղել, իսկ այդ կառույցի երկար տարիների գաղտնի աշխատանքը կապված է եղել Թուրքիայի ու Իրանի հետ։ Այսինքն՝ Թուրքիան վստահությամբ նրան չի ընդունել։ Հետո, տարիներ անց Հեյդար Ալիևի մոտ մտավախություն էր առաջացել, որ այն սպաները, որոնք գտնվում էին Ադրբեջանում և դասավանդում են ադրբեջանական ռազմական հաստատություններում, կարող էին իր դեմ գործել։ Դրա համար էլ վերջնագիր էր ներկայացրել, որ այդ թուրք սպաները մի քանի օրում լքեն Ադրբեջանը։
«Նկատի ունեմ, որ այդ երկու երկրներում նման լարվածություն եղել է, պարզապես այսօր ԶԼՄ-ի դերը շատ է մեծացել, այդ ամենը ավելի ցայտուն է դարձել ու լայն շրջանակներին է հասու դառնում։
Հատկանշական է, որ այս հակերային հարձակումների, որոնք եղել են ադրբեջանական կայքերի վրա, պատասխանատվությունը ստանձնել են պրո իրանական հակերական խմբավորումները»,- ասաց Ռուբեն Սաֆրաստյանը։
Հարցին՝ թուրք-ադրբեջանական հարաբերությունների լարված իրավիճակը հայկական կողմն ինչպե՞ս կարող է օգտագործել ի շահ իրեն, Ռուբեն Սաֆրաստյանը պատասխանեց՝ այս ամենը 90-ականներից հայկական կողմին հետաքրքրել է։
«Այն ժամանակ ես աշխատում է նախագահականում, ռազմավարական վերլուծությունների վարչության պետի տեղակալն էի։ Այդ ժամանակվանից սա հետաքրքրել է մեզ, որ հնարավո՞ր է նման իրավիճակն օգտագործել, թե՞ ոչ։ Չեմ կարծում, որ այս իրավիճակը կարող է ավելի սրվել, իրականում սա փոքր բան է։ Թուրք-ադրբեջանական դաշինքը շատ խորն է, և երկուսն էլ շահագրգռված են, որ այս դաշինքը պահպանվի։ Պարզ է, որ նրանք չեն գնա այնպիսի քայլերի, որ վտանգեն այդ դաշինքը։ Հատկապես, որ տեսնում ենք՝ Թուրքիայի կողմից որոշակի հայտարարություններ են հնչում, որ այս ամենին պետք է վերջ տալ, և այլն»,- ընդգծեց Ռուբեն Սաֆրաստյանը։
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RFE/RL – Pashinian Confirms Change Of Stance On Russian Control Of Armenian Ra
- RFE/RL’s Armenian Service
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian on Thursday confirmed that he is no longer demanding an end to Russia’s long-term management of Armenia’s railway network.
He also downplayed Yerevan’s tensions with Moscow which have risen further in recent months.
The chief executive of the Russian Railways (RZhD) monopolu, Oleg Belozerov, indicated a change of Pashinian’s position on the issue after meeting with him in Yerevan on Wednesday. Belozerov said they did not discuss terminating the Armenian government’s 30-year management contract signed with RZhD in 2008.
“In my opening remarks [at the meeting with Belozerov,] I stated that we have no problem with the Russian concession [over the network,]” Pashinian told reporters. “Rather, our concern is that our railway must be competitive. Our analyses aimed at achieving this goal indicate that a rational approach would be to alter the concession management framework — specifically, by delegating it to third countries.”
“However, if our Russian partners say they know how to resolve this issue, they can propose solutions,” he said. “As a result of yesterday’s discussion, I said: ‘Very well, let us form a working group that will provide, within a three-month timeframe, answers as to how Armenia’s railways can become competitive.’”
Pashinian said in February that the Armenian railways should be run by another, non-Russian company because their current status discourages Turkey and Azerbaijan from using a much larger section of Armenian territory for transit purposes. Moscow has repeatedly rejected Pashinian’s demands since then. The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed in August that they are part of the West’s efforts to drive Russia out of the South Caucasus.
“Our expectation now is that Russia, with our consent, sells the concession rights to a third party,” Pashinian insisted on September 19.
Russian-Armenian relations have deteriorated further in recent months, with Moscow pressuring Yerevan to quickly choose between seeking to join the European Union and remaining part of a Russian-led economic union. Pashinian and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to hold crunch talks on the issue later this year.
Moscow has threatened to sharply raise the price of Russian natural gas supplied to Armenia and impose other economic sanctions if Pashinian’s government continues to reorient the South Caucasus country towards the West. It already banned imports of Armenian agricultural products in May and June.
In what some observers view as an attempt to placate the Kremlin, Pashinian indicated on October 1 his readiness to accept a Russian proposal to build a new nuclear plant in Armenia. He said Yerevan is no longer interested in the kind of nuclear energy technology that has been offered to it by the United States. Pashinian’s apparent U-turn on the railway issue will be seen as another concession to the Russians.
The Armenian premier claimed on Thursday that Russian-Armenian relations have been and will remain “good.”
“Even if there are issues on the diplomatic or other agendas, it doesn’t mean we stop speaking to each other or take offense at one another,” he said.
The deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, lambasted Pashinian’s pro-Western foreign policy and warned of Armenia’s “transformation into a new Ukraine” as recently as on October 3.
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UN Chief Cautious Over Release Of Armenian Prisoners In Azerbaijan
- RFE/RL’s Armenian Service
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for the quick implementation of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace deal when he commented on Azerbaijan’s refusal to free Armenian prisoners during a visit to Yerevan on Thursday.
Guterres arrived in the Armenian capital to attend the COP17 Biodiversity Conference that began later in the day. He was asked about the plight of the 19 prisoners at a news conference held ahead of the global UN forum.
“I am a strong supporter of the peace agreement,” he replied. “I hope all the provisions set out in it will be implemented and that implementation will accelerate. I hope for more rapid progress so that we conclude the peace agreement and settle those outstanding issues.”
“We call on all parties to implement all provisions of the peace agreement as quickly as possible, which naturally also includes detained persons,” Guterres said, commenting on a lack of UN pressure on Baku.
When asked by News.am after the news conference whether the UN could take concrete steps to try to secure the prisoners’ release, he only said: “It’s a matter of great interest to us.”
Guterres appeared to refer to the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty that was finalized in August 2025 during a summit hosted by U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House. Neither the treaty nor a separate declaration signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian commits Baku to freeing the Armenian captives.
They include eight former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh who were captured right after Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive that restored Baku’s full control over the region and forced its population to flee to Armenia. Five of them were sentenced to life imprisonment and the three others received 20-year jail terms in February at the end of what Armenian lawyers and human rights activists see as sham trials.
The Armenian government is regularly accused by its domestic critics of doing little for the prisoners’ release. Pashinian and other Armenian officials deny the accusations.
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