Iran is trying to restrain dangerous geopolitical projects for Armenia. n:

What dilemma are the USA and Israel facing regarding Iran? on the one hand, the goal of limiting the nuclear program and weakening Iran’s military potential, on the other hand, the risks of the resumption of military operations, the possibility of a large-scale regional war and its economic and security consequences.

On these and other regional issues 168.amhas talked With Iran expert, political analyst Aram Shahnazaryan.

– The main dilemma facing the US and Israel is how to limit Iran’s strategic capabilities without the conflict turning into a protracted and uncontrollable regional war. In the calculations of Washington and Tel Aviv, the weakening of nuclear infrastructure, missile capabilities and military potential should reduce Iran’s deterrence capabilities.

But the military strikes of 2025-2026 showed that the destruction of infrastructure does not in itself eliminate technological knowledge, strategic intent, or mutual perceptions of the security threat. Furthermore, uncertainty about the current state of Iran’s nuclear program, with limited IAEA inspection control, makes it difficult to assess the long-term effectiveness of strikes.

From Israel’s point of view, the problem is primarily to prevent a long-term strategic threat, so Tel Aviv may be interested in resuming hostilities before Iran fully recovers its capabilities. The US calculation is more multi-layered. Washington must consider not only the security of Israel, but also the defense of American forces, the stability of regional partners, global energy markets, and domestic political consequences. According to publications on October 13, the possibility of a new military operation was considered in recent discussions between Trump and Netanyahu, but there is no unified position in Washington on its advisability.

From the Iranian strategic point of view, the logic of containment is key here. Tehran also views the development of nuclear technologies as a matter of sovereignty and technological independence, and missile potential as an important component of security in the face of external military pressure.

Therefore, the new strikes can damage Iran’s capabilities, and at the same time make the belief in Tehran irreversible that concessions do not guarantee security, and contribute to the formation of a much tougher position.

Therefore, the main problem for both countries is not just military strikes, but their political success. Military escalation could trigger retaliation against Israel, US forces and strategic infrastructure in the region, further disrupt energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, threaten safe navigation in the Indian Ocean and Bab El-Mandeb Strait, and create a serious global economic crisis.

The ongoing deadlock in mediated negotiations between Iran and the US shows that the parties have not yet found a mutually acceptable security framework that would allow for combining the limitation of nuclear risks, Iran’s security concerns, and the cessation of hostilities.

In this sense, the real dilemma between Washington and Tel Aviv is: is it possible to turn military operations into a stable political outcome, or will new strikes simply turn into a protracted and uncontrolled war with an unpredictable outcome?

– Let’s deviate a little from the topic. Can Iran prevent the realignment of forces in the south of Armenia, or is it already losing that opportunity, and if Iran cannot prevent the Turkish-Azerbaijani plans in Syunik, so to speak, what is the value of Tehran’s support for Armenia? In other words, is Iran today a real pillar of security for Armenia or just a diplomatic partner?

– For Iran, the issue of Syunik is not only a matter of the inviolability of Armenia’s territorial integrity, but also a matter of preserving its own geopolitical position and security atmosphere. Iran continues to oppose not the opening of transportation links in the region as such, but the creation of an extraterritorial corridor that would limit Armenia’s sovereignty or change the geopolitical balance of the region.

From this point of view, Iran’s position has not undergone any change. In September 2026, Ambassador Shirgholami stated that Tehran may not object to the TRIPP project if Armenia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are preserved and there is no American military or security presence on the territory of Armenia.

However, it should be taken into account that Iran can increase the political and security price of such programs, but it does not have the ability to prevent all possible scenarios on its own. Iran’s influence now largely depends on how well it will be able to monitor the implementation of the agreements and prevent their unacceptable interpretations. And what is the value of Iranian support for Armenia today? I think the answer is unequivocal. it has a real strategic importance, and above all, as a restraining political factor.

Iran’s principled approach creates an additional limitation for the actions of Azerbaijan and Turkey. In addition, the development of economic, energy and transport ties with Iran can reduce Armenia’s vulnerability. However, this coincidence of interests should not be equated with a military guarantee. Tehran has not assumed an unconditional obligation to defend Armenia’s territorial integrity with military force.

Therefore, Iran still cannot act as a full pillar of Armenia’s security. It is a strategic neighbor whose interests can restrain dangerous geopolitical projects for Armenia, but this influence is conditional and depends on Iran’s own capabilities and regional calculations, as well as the desire of the current authorities of Armenia.

– What will the South Caucasus and Armenia get with the weakening of Iran? In other words, in the conditions of the weakening of Iran’s position, who is reshaping the balance of power in the South Caucasus: Turkey, Azerbaijan, the USA, or Russia, and what place does Armenia have in those reshuffles?

– As a result of the possible weakening of Iran’s positions, the South Caucasus will definitely suffer. It will create a risk of power imbalance, which is theoretically fraught with unpredictable consequences.

Today, the balance of power in the South Caucasus is reshaped not by one state, but by the competition of actors pursuing different goals. Iran is trying to maintain its presence and influence. Turkey is expanding its ties with Azerbaijan and seeks to strengthen land communication with Central Asia. Azerbaijan is trying to turn its military advantage into political and economic supremacy.

Russia, with limited opportunities as a result of the Ukrainian war, has lost part of its former monopoly position, and the US is trying to fill the gap with diplomatic engagement and transport projects. The TRIPP initiative is a key example of this new competition.

There is a serious danger here for Armenia. If the Turkish-Azerbaijani military-political supremacy deepens as a result of the possible weakening of Iran’s position in the region, Armenia may definitely find itself in a very vulnerable situation, being strategically isolated. As a result of the weakening of Iran’s positions, in the conditions of the changing balance of power, Armenia will face the danger of losing its own subjectivity in regional developments, as a result of which the future of the region will be shaped around Armenia, without Armenia’s decisive participation.

– What? What issues are Tehran and Baku trying to solve at the moment, to what extent is it related to Armenia’s interests? By the way, there are visible and invisible problems in Azerbaijan-Turkey relations, to what extent or which ones coincide with the existing problems in Iran-Azerbaijan relations?:

– Tehran-Baku relations today should be considered not just in terms of bilateral differences, but in terms of influence in the South Caucasus, control of communication channels and the formation of a new regional security system. The main contradiction between Iran and Azerbaijan is that both countries strive to expand their strategic capabilities, and against this background, they imagine the desired balance of forces in the region in different ways.

At the moment, one of the urgent issues between Tehran and Baku is the issue of mutual security guarantees and prevention of military escalation. A key concern for Iran is Azerbaijan’s deepened strategic cooperation with Israel and the risk that Azerbaijani territory could be used against Iran. Baku, for its part, strives to preserve its security independence without getting involved in an open conflict with Iran.

The second key issue is transportation and geopolitical competition. Opening the roads connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan is not just an economic issue for Tehran. it is related to the strategic importance of Iran’s border with Armenia, its transit role in the region and the growing influence of Turkey. The development of TRIPP can reduce Azerbaijan’s dependence on routes passing through Iranian territory, while Tehran is interested in communications that will not reduce Iran’s strategic capabilities.

Various strategic calculations are operating under the visible fraternal rhetoric in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations. Ankara wants to strengthen ties with Central Asia, expand its economic and transport presence in the South Caucasus, and Baku seeks to turn itself into an independent regional center, maintaining close relations with Turkey, Israel, Russia and other actors.

Possible disagreements should not be exaggerated or presented as open cracks. rather, they are about leverage, competition for transit routes, and how far to go in confronting Iran. Turkey may support Azerbaijan’s regional goals, but it is not necessarily interested in a full-scale war with Iran.

The main problem for Armenia is that all contradictions between Tehran-Baku and Ankara-Baku relations cannot automatically turn into Armenian interests. It is important for Armenia to understand under what conditions this competition can serve its own interests and when it can lead to new pressures and isolation.

– Such a question arose. We always say that in the constitution of Azerbaijan there are territorial claims against RA, so to speak, is there such a claim related to Iran, visible or invisible? And is the “constitutional demand” for 60 percent of the RA territory, which includes a number of RA marzes, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Ararat, Armavir, Gegharkunik, Tavush, Lori, Shirak are consequently “related” to Iran.

– In the Constitution of Azerbaijan, there are no known provisions establishing direct territorial claims against Iran, but there is a different kind of pan-Azerbaijani and irredentist political discourse in the direction of Iran.

The problem is mainly related to the so-called “Southern Azerbaijan” concept, by which some Azeri nationalist circles present the territories of the northwest of Iran as part of the historically unified Azerbaijani territory. Such ideas are often accompanied by ideas of “reunification of the north and the south”, which is perceived in Tehran as a challenge to clear separatism and the territorial integrity of Iran.

The issue of the claim regarding 60 percent of the territory of Armenia is related to Iran not by the identity of the territorial claim, but by geopolitical consequences. According to the interpretation of the “historical” maps presented in Azerbaijan, that territorial claim includes Syunik and Vayots Dzor as a whole, as well as parts of Ararat, Armavir, Gegharkunik, Tavush, Lori and Shirak marzes. The importance of Syunik is particularly great, because it is here that Armenia’s direct land connection with Iran is located.

If the policy of territorial claims or the idea of ​​an extraterritorial corridor leads to a practical limitation of Armenia’s sovereignty or a change in the operational significance of the Armenian-Iranian border, it will directly contradict Tehran’s strategic interests. However, this circumstance does not mean that Azerbaijan’s historical-territorial arguments against Armenia automatically extend to Iran as well.

From Iran’s point of view, the main danger is not that Baku has the same territorial demands towards Iran, but that the realignment of geopolitical forces in the south of Armenia can sharply limit Iran’s geopolitical opportunities. Therefore, for Iran, maintaining the territorial integrity of Armenia and the Armenian-Iranian border is not only a matter of Armenian-Iranian friendship, but also an important component of its own strategic security.

– Aliyev is looking for mines in Nakhichevan and wants to get involved in it also to the United Arab Emirates Investment Company. Can this program concern Iran, and is its significance only economic, or can it also have strategic consequences, taking into account the geographical position of Nakhichevan and the balance of forces in the region?

– From the Iranian strategic point of view, the project to study the mineral resources of Nakhichevan can have not only economic, but also long-term geopolitical significance.

The core of Iran’s possible concern is the geographical location of Nakhichevan. it borders Iran, Armenia and Turkey, and in the context of transport rearrangements around Syunik, the growth of economic and infrastructural importance of Nakhichevan can change the communication and strategic balance of the region.

It is also noteworthy that the agreement was signed with the participation of Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan, National Security Advisor of the UAE, Deputy Ruler of Abu Dhabi, as part of the broader cooperation between the two countries, which also includes critical raw materials, digital infrastructure, energy and investments. From the Iranian point of view, this is a reason to carefully monitor the long-term consequences of the UAE’s economic presence, especially since the investment project could theoretically have a military or intelligence purpose.

Therefore, the direct significance of the project is economic, and the strategic consequences are possible and conditioned by further developments. If the exploration activities lead to the discovery of large reserves, the creation of mining production and the expansion of transport infrastructure, the UAE can acquire long-term economic interests in the area immediately adjacent to the borders of Armenia and Iran. For Iran, it will not be foreign investment per se, but the possibility that the economic presence will be intertwined with communication or security projects that will limit Tehran’s influence in the South Caucasus. Tehran has reasons to follow this project, especially in the background of close military-political relations between Azerbaijan-Israel and UAE-Israel.