Armenian FM, envoy to attend Antalya Diplomacy Forum: FM Çavuşoğlu

Toys Matrix
Jan 27 2022

Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and its special envoy Ruben Rubinyan will attend the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced Thursday.

Armenia wants to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey without any preconditions, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said on Monday, indicating that the country might attend the Antalya Diplomacy Forum.

Speaking at a press conference, he said: “Our special representatives have met. If the process continues like this, it is highly possible that Armenia will participate in the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. It would be irrational to miss a chance to continue meetings.”

The Antalya Diplomacy Forum will be held on March 11-14 in Antalya province, under the motto “Recoding Diplomacy” and will be attended by several heads of states, ministers, academicians and members of the press.

The gathering, where the most important regional and global issues on the world’s agenda will be discussed in a solution-oriented platform, will provide leaders, politicians, prominent academics, thinkers, opinion leaders, diplomats and business people an opportunity to discuss international issues from a diplomatic perspective.

After a 1 1/2 hour meeting recently in Moscow, the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministries published the same statement hailing the talks and agreeing to “continue negotiations without preconditions.” Turkey aims for the next meeting to be held either in Turkey or Armenia, sources said.

Can Armenia-Turkey ties improve in the shadow of the Armenian genocide?

India – Jan 27 2022


By Aditi Bhaduri

New Delhi, Jan 27: The recent talks between Armenia and Turkey in Moscow, while surprising, were not totally unexpected. This had been a long time in the offing. The two – it would not be out of place to call them civilisational foes – had long ago met to start a diplomatic dialogue – in fact back in 2010. 

However, nothing came out of it. Armenia has now appointed a lawmaker from the ruling Civil Contract party, Ruben Rubinyan as special envoy to work on the normalisation of ties with Turkey, while Ankara has appointed former ambassador to the United States Serdar Kilic for the same. They met in Moscow on January 14.

Now, after the end of the war for Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan has wrested decisively from Armenia's control, it is expected that Turkey and Armenia would begin normalisation of relations. Currently, the two countries do not have any diplomatic relations. The reason goes back to the last millennium where 1.5 million Armenians were slaughtered by Ottomans, often thought to be the modern world's first genocide. The ghost of that slaughter lives in the collective consciousness of Armenians the world over. While major powers, including the USA and Russia, have recognised the genocide, Turkey has refused to do so, fearing threats of reparations if it was to do so.

The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict remained a reason for Turkey to not engage diplomatically with Armenia. Turkey opposed Armenia's control over the enclave Nagorno-Karabakh, which in Ankara's view was territory of Azerbaijan, a fellow Turkic nation. In 1993, it sealed the border with Armenia, depriving the small landlocked country a transit route through Turkish territory.

When war once again broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, most Armenians believed they were fighting the Turks rather than the Azeris. Turkish technology, Turkish arms, Turkish military counsellors won the war for Azerbaijan. After the swashbuckling speeches and promises of victory by Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinian, the defeat was not merely a military or economic or territorial loss for the Armenians; it was a huge psychological setback for them. Riots broke out on the street and there were many calls for Pashinian to resign. To put it mildly, he is not in a strong position today.

With the end of the war, with Azeri control over most of the contested territory, and with Russian and Turkish joint peace keeping operations, the equation has changed. Economically backward Armenia has the proverbial carrot dangling before it: normalising relations with Turkey will open up a host of connectivity and therefore economic opportunities for it. On the other hand, having a corridor to Azerbaijan through Armenia – the Zangezur Corridor – would greatly aid both Azerbaijan and Turkey. It would especially benefit Turkey's outreach to both Azerbaijan, Caspian Sea, and the Turkic countries of Central Asia. That would also open up land connectivity for Turkey to South Asia – to Afghanistan where Turkey is keen to play a major role and of course to its ally Pakistan, with major implications for India. Undoubtedly, opening up the corridor would benefit Azerbaijan and Turkey far more.

Will Armenia be willing to do so?

As such, Armenia may have nothing to lose but much to gain by it. But going by the mood of the people, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh after two long decades to Azerbaijan because of Turkish intervention, the incomplete rehabilitation and resettlement of its displaced residents, it seems a tough call. Capping all this is the fact that the negotiations have been entered into by the government that lost the war and the deeply unpopular prime minister.

For one, Armenians do not want any preconditions attached to the talks.

However, one of the preconditions laid down by Turkey is for Armenia to give up its support for international recognition for the Armenian Genocide; yet another is that Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan; and open up the Zangezur Corridor.

The Armenian Genocide remains a deeply emotional issue for Armenians everywhere and a greatly unifying factor, as also a marker of the Armenian identity. While the Republic of Armenia may some day in the future give up this support, to do so right now would add salt to injury. Moreover, there is huge pressure exerted by the Armenians in the diaspora, many of whom have had victims amongst their families.

Secondly, suffering defeat in war to arch-rival Azerbaijan after more than two decades is bad enough. And recognising Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan eliminates any further opportunity to work out some kind of mechanism for joint control of the Zangezur corridor to Turkey and arch-rival Azerbaijan would be double humiliation. To that end, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan is on record saying that, "The issue of the corridor is a red line for us, everyone is aware of it: Azerbaijan and all the countries that have anything with Armenians are aware of it."

Finally, Turkey's announcement that it would be coordinating the matter with Azerbaijan is another red flag to the Armenians. Therefore, while Armenia-Turkey normalisation of ties is neither unexpected nor impossible, it will probably remain improbable in the near future. At least not till passions on both Armenian and Azeri sides have cooled down and till the government of the day is perceived to be more mindful of Armenian sovereignty and security interests.

(The content is being carried under an arrangement with indianarrative.com)

–indianarrative

Can Armenia-Turkey ties improve in the shadow of the Armenian genocide?

Turkey announces its readiness to host meeting in the Minsk format

  News.am  
Armenia – Jan 27 2022

Turkey is ready to host the meeting of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the Minsk format, Ankara is ready to provide support, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said.

“As for the negotiations in the Minsk format, we said that if we receive a request about whether we can host, we will gladly accept. Due to the fact that some parties have problems with Belarus. All sides of the format, when they decide, are ready to accept and provide any support. There will be no problems,” Cavusoglu said at a press conference.

Earlier, a source in the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that the Turkish side plans to organize negotiations on the Minsk agreements in Istanbul with the participation of "the same players as before: Russia, Ukraine, representatives from Donbass and the OSCE," RIA Novosti reports.


Will 2022 Be The Year Of The Caucasus Peace Dividend? – Azeri OpEd

Jan 27 2022

By Ilham Nagiyev*

With all the trouble in the world today it is easy – as many have – to overlook the significance of the peace talks between President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia which began in Brussels in December last year. Yet to do so is to miss a potentially critical and defining moment in the post-soviet history of the Caucasus – as well as overlook a source of economic opportunity for Europe.

Since a 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in late 2020, there has been an uneasy ceasefire between the two countries – but little else. The meeting of December, hosted by European Council president Charles Michel, was the first and most promising step since the conflict towards future certainty and permanent peace.

At the talks progress was made on border demarcation, more cooperation on the exchange of maps of landmines laid by Armenia for prisoners arrested by Azerbaijan. But perhaps even more importantly for the future than these first steps forward, initial agreement was reached on “Zangezur” – a transport corridor that will run from the Caspian Sea in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west – transgressing both Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Turkish territory. 

This project offers crucial diversification for all three countries. 

For Turkey, with its policy of regional engagement, it offers a way to expand beyond diplomatic initiatives. 

For Armenia, whose economy was stunted for decades by political and economic isolation from its neighbours, a transport route offers much-needed income. 

For Azerbaijan, as a nation built on oil and gas exports in an increasingly decarbonising world, it offers a route to increase the speed of economic diversification away from fossil fuels.  

For all three nations along with Georgia, Russia and Iran, the other countries that straddle the Caucasus, there may be longer-term the potential for co-operation over a replacement for Metsamor – the Chernobyl-design nuclear power station that provides most of Armenia’s electricity while posing a threat through dilapidation and mismanagement to the lives and livelihoods of an entire region. 

And this also offers opportunity for western nations, particularly Britain and those in Europe. There are contracts to be gained not merely on the transport corridor – but on the vast reconstruction needed of Karabakh, occupied by Armenia from 1994 but won back during the 2020 conflict – and to where close to one million Azerbaijanis displaced in the 90s seek to return. 

Already the UK, as the world leader in mine and ordinance clearance, has provided government funding for demining programmes. Private British companies that specialise in clearance are part of the Azerbaijani national effort which by the end of 2021 had cleaned some 21,000 hectares of land contaminated with 53,000 landmines. Another British company has, in concert with the authorities, produced the masterplan for the reconstruction of the entire region. 

While foreign investment is arriving, is it obvious that with more certainty through a potential future peace deal, and overseas interest would multiply. 

But let us not get ahead of ourselves. A future of prosperity across the region depends on the continuing success of peace talks only just begun last month in Brussels. 

While it can be guaranteed those talks will be difficult, we can hardly second-guess the length of time it will take to complete them. What we do know, however, is that there are other examples of the peace dividend to focus on – starting within the most obvious which emerged through peace in Europe some 70 years ago. 

There were, of course, very different circumstances to that pan-Europeanizing effort – and no one is suggesting anything as expansive as political and economic union is the direction of travel, or even desirable in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

But what is clear is that prosperity between countries with land borders is built on peace and the determination to avoid war. Once that is secured, with borders at last designated and finalised, economic cooperation – across those borders – can sustainably develop. How that progresses, and the trade in which goods and services, and what is transported – whether manufactured products on trucks and trains or oil and gas and electricity through pipelines and cables – depends on what those two countries offer to exchange with the other because they lack them themselves. 

That is for the future – but perhaps not one that is too distant. For now, we must watch and wait how peace talks progress, with the anticipation that 2022 is the year when the Caucasus puts war behind it and learns to love economics. 

*The author is an Azerbaijani economist, author, IT entrepreneur, co-founder and the Chairman of the Board of security company GESCO OJSC


Red Cross on Karabakh conflict consequences: Winter deepens agony of families of missing people

  News.am  
Armenia – Jan 27 2022

 In marshy fields and mountain slopes, in hard-to-reach areas, in overgrown with bushes, littered with mines and unexploded ordnance, dozens of men and women have been searching for and raising the remains of fallen soldiers for more than a year, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) writes about the consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

About 300 people are still missing as a result of the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020. Since the ceasefire agreement was signed in November 2020, the remains of more than 1,700 people have been found and the process of identifying them and returning them to their families has begun.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, together with Russian peacekeepers, has conducted about 360 searches for human remains, supporting local rescue teams in their work.

"Nothing can bring their loved ones back but giving these hundreds of families a chance to know what happened is incredibly important. Conditions are always extremely dangerous because the terrain is littered with mines and unexploded ordnances, and on top of that, in winter visibility drops to almost zero," said Christopher Poole, who leads ICRC's regional specialists in landmines, explosive remnants of war, stockpiles and small arms.

"In order to retrieve these remains, recovery teams must face mortal danger. It is not just about treating the dead with dignity, but also doing it safely. Our teams support local specialists as they do this," Poole said.

Restoration work is often put on hold for a variety of reasons, including winter conditions. These operations are part of the ICRC's longstanding work as a neutral intermediary in the region since 1992.

The ICRC's forensic experts also assist mortuaries in the region by providing cold storage, equipment and advice to groups undertaking the difficult task of identification.

"Retrieving human remains, identifying the victims and returning them to their families is complex and takes time. There is always a lot of pressure on forensic practitioners from authorities and families to work as quickly as possible, but there is no margin for error," said Jane Taylor, ICRC's regional forensics manager for Europe and Central Asia.

In addition to the hundreds of people missing in the November 2020 escalation, more than 4,500 people went missing as a result of the 1990s conflict.

"People going missing and families not knowing what happened to them is one of the most agonizing and often overlooked scars left by conflict. Thousands of families across Europe today are living with this pain. Besides those affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there are hundreds of people missing in Ukraine after almost eight years of conflict, for example, and more than 10,000 people missing in the Balkans," said Martin Schüepp, ICRC's regional director for Europe and Central Asia.

Russia MFA: Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation will prevent border incidents

  News.am  
Armenia – Jan 27 2022

Russia continues to work closely with its partners to implement the trilateral statement by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia—and which envisions also the establishment of a bilateral commission on delimitation and further demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, with Moscow's advisory support. This was announced by Alexey Zaitsev,  Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department.

"We are confident that the formation of the commission and the start of the [Armenian-Azerbaijani border] delimitation process will contribute to the prevention of border incidents and, in general, will have an important contribution to the normalization of relations between Yerevan and Baku. We plan to establish profile connections. The media will be properly informed about the results," Zaitsev added.

Armenia and Turkey: Rapprochement 3.0?

Valdai Discussion Club
Jan 27 2022


Given the post-war realities and the pressure coming from different capitals, the Armenian authorities must slow down, take into account the institutional realities and capabilities within Armenia, and correctly analyse the primary and secondary layers of the statements coming from Turkey, writes Dr. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, Program Chair of Political Science and International Affairs program, American University of Armenia.

The defeat in the 45-day war of 2020 has challenged the foundations of Armenia’s security architecture. The trilateral ceasefire statement of November 9, 2020, followed by months of unnerving domestic turmoil, professed a guaranteed demise for Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his government. However, the snap parliamentary elections on June 20 helped him emerge from what many had considered an unpreventable “political Armageddon”. Winning the elections, however, did not protect him from the need to face pressing issues like negotiating for the return of prisoners of war (POWs) from Azerbaijan, border security problems, rebuilding the tarnished army, starting the demarcation and delimitation of the border with Azerbaijan, restarting the negotiations on the status and security of Nagorno Karabakh, and containing Azerbaijan’s tough posturing vis-a-vis Armenia’s borders.

No less pertinent is the question of Armenia’s relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan’s pivotal ally in its recent war against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and has kept the border closed since 1991. Months after the 2020 war, Pashinyan stated that Armenia is ready to embrace an era of peace in the South Caucasus region. For months, there was no visible progress as Armenia received mixed reactions from Turkey, complete with a set of preconditions and demands. However, weeks ago, both countries appointed envoys who would work on the normalisation of relations. What is going on between Armenia and Turkey? Are they embarking on another process of rapprochement? What are the chances for it to succeed this time, considering the previous failed cases of rapprochement in 1992-93 and 2008-09?

Contrary to the constructive interpretations that Armenia’s government has recently advanced, Turkey's position on its relations with Armenia has not changed since 1991. On the surface, Turkey ascertains the following condition: “in the absence of any improvement in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, any progress to be achieved within the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process alone would remain insufficient and would not be lasting or sustainable”, implying that the pro-Azerbaijani resolution of the Karabakh conflict is the only precondition for normalisation. Armenia, meanwhile, has viewed the normalisation of interstate relations with Turkey from the perspective of the logic established in the early 1990s: a) relations should be normalised without any preconditions; b) the Karabakh conflict, involving Azerbaijan and Armenia, should be decoupled from the Armenian-Turkish relations.

For Turkey, the Karabakh issue was, indeed, the most discussed and voiced precondition over the decades, however, it remains only one of the preconditions. The shadow of history looms large over relation between the two nations. First and foremost, Turkey continues to view the normalisation of relations with Armenia from the point of view of unsettled historical-political legacies, followed by Turkey’s long-term interests in the Caucasus and geopolitical objectives. Hence, the Karabakh conflict lags behind several fundamental issues in the Armenian-Turkish and Armenia-Turkey relations that I have raised over the last 15 years and summarised in the recent academic article. 

Over the last decades, using various platforms and opportunities, Ankara has raised several preconditions for Armenia to comply with, which included but were not limited to the following:

  • the Republic of Armenia and Diaspora should halt the worldwide campaign to recognise the Genocide and renounce any claims to land and property compensations and reparations from Turkey;

  • Turkey periodically insists on Armenia acknowledging the existing border with Turkey according to the 1921 Kars treaty;

  • Armenia should recognise Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and, thereby, close the Karabakh chapter;

  • Turkey periodically entertains — sometime through Azerbaijan (Aliyev demanded that Armenia adopt a new constitution) — the idea that Armenia should revise its Declaration of Independence adopted in 1990 (and Constitution of 1995), as the document indicates that the Armenian Genocide was committed in Western Armenia, which is the present-day eastern region of Turkey;

  • Turkey occasionally demands the closing down of Armenia’s Metsamor Nuclear Power Station, which is located a few kilometers from the Armenian-Turkish border.

  • Turkey has recently started to reintroduce another precondition which it failed to achieve a century ago: establishing a corridor between the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, an exclave of Azerbaijan, and mainland Azerbaijan through Armenia’s sovereign territory in the Syunik province in the south.

In essence, Armenia and Turkey continue to speak in different languages because the gap that has widened over the decades cannot be closed under the influence of suppositious claims about regional peace and stability. It is not accidental that Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan speaks about the gradual normalisation of relations, while Pashinyan is in a hurry to escape Armenia’s regional isolation as soon as possible. Turkey’s president insists on a lack of trust towards Armenia’s government and needs for the depoliticisation of history, while the Armenian prime minister speaks of Armenia becoming a crossroads in connecting the east to the west and the north to the south. Given the post-war realities and the pressure coming from different capitals, the Armenian authorities must slow down, take into account the institutional realities and capabilities within Armenia, and correctly analyse the primary and secondary layers of the statements coming from Turkey. Yerevan should learn from the achievements and slips of the last 30 years. Taking into account Turkey’s assertive ambitions in the South Caucasus and its plan to promote its 2020 “3+3” initiative, which was a slightly revised version of its own the 2008 Caucasus Stability Platform, it is unpromising to talk to Turkey with the expectation of becoming a co-author of peace in the region. Turkey has been blockading Armenia for 30 years and hindering its development without bearing any responsibility for its wrongdoings. Pashinyan, in turn, has crossed the point of no return in his policy of advancing “an era of peaceful development in the region”.  There are all the indications that he is eager to open the borders at nearly any cost. Turkey has spoken and will continue to talk to Armenia in the language of preconditions, as long as Armenia demonstrates haste in breaking the deadlock. Even if the parties make a breakthrough and establish diplomatic relations, Turkey’s policy of advancing preconditions will not cease, making it a difficult partner to work with. The aforementioned explicit and implicit preconditions will remain in Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. Those preconditions are too complex and firmly intertwined to untangle them with ease. In one form or another, they will feature in the future relations. To counteract, Armenia should advance the formula “normalisation first, reconciliation afterwards” and never repeat the mistakes of the Zurich protocols, which aimed at launching the two processes simultaneously.

There are serious doubts as to whether Armenia’s ruling party has sufficient resources to initiate parallel processes with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and many voices in the opposition and expert community question the wisdom of Pashinyan’s agenda. According to them, Armenia’s PM fails to grasp that the sporadic movements aimed at simultaneously embracing the agenda of peace with Azerbaijan and normalising interstate relations with Turkey without facing the political ramifications of the recent war and clarifying the questions of status and security of Nagorno-Karabakh are erroneous and risky. The fact of the matter is that the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh and the joint Russian-Turkish Monitoring Centre do not have an international mandate and the prospects of peace remain fragile and elusive. Another pertinent question is whether, in addition to political ambitions and will, the Armenian government has sufficient professional-bureaucratic support — including from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs — support advancing the process and withstand internal and external pressures? The question remains whether Pashinyan has pragmatically considered the anticipated gains versus the price Armenia will pay for embarking on this policy avenue. Does he clearly understand how his government will communicate Armenia’s grievances and accounts to the Turkish political elite and people? These questions beg for honest and open answers and this is where asking for advice and support will do no harm.

Russia’s stance on the Armenian-Turkish question is instrumental. Even though Moscow supports the Armenian-Turkish normalisation efforts and has made several statements and taken tangible steps, its assertions about a peaceful era in the region sound premature. With time, Moscow, slowly yet with tacit resistance, has shared various areas of strategic importance with Turkey. Turkey’s watchful posturing in the Caucasus and its control over certain economic, business, culture, infrastructure, and security sectors is slowly expanding and seems irreversible. How candid is Russia in supporting yet another display of Turkey’s expansion in the region if Turkey agrees to normalise relations with Armenia and open the border? The agenda of Russian-Turkish bilateral relations has become too diverse, yet the formula that both embrace – cooperation through competition or “frenmity” – continues to defy their complex relations in different parts of Eurasia and Africa. Armenia and the South Caucasus are no exceptions. Russia’s pre-conceived red lines in the post-Soviet space are becoming more and more blurry in the face of Turkey’s creeping geopolitical expansion. How long Russia can continue to counterbalance Turkey’s encroachment in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, and elsewhere remains a principal question among both politicians and policy experts.

The European Union, on the other hand, is a yet another primary stakeholder in the process of normalising relations between Armenia and Turkey. Brussels will be able to restore its tarnished reputation in Armenia in the face of its underperformance during the 45-day war and its aftermath, as well as the tolerance it has showed towards the forms of transgression of Pashinyan’s government since 2018. Washington, too, is in a position to extend its support to Yerevan, should the normalisation process go forward. The American government has constantly advocated for the normalisation of bilateral relations and the opening of the border. Secretary Blinken has also reaffirmed the US stance; however, Armenia’s government needs lasting support to overcome existing and potential challenges when talking to Turkey.

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

We support contacts of Yerevan and Ankara within so-called ‘3+3’ and others possible in Antalya. Klaar

  News.am  
Armenia – Jan 27 2022

The EU fully supports normalisation of relations and opening of communications between Armenia and Turkey as an important objective to ensure lasting peace in the region, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar told NEWS.am about what are EU’s expectations from the Armenia-Turkey negotiations.

“We also support the upcoming resumption of flights between Yerevan and Istanbul and other high-level contacts between Armenian and Turkish officials, such as the contacts within the so-called ‘3+3’ platform and other possible contacts in the framework of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum,” Klaar stressed.

EUSR informed NEWS.am that during the last visit to Yerevan on January 21, 2022, with Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly / Special Representative Ruben Rubinyan he “had a very interesting exchange of views on these issues”.

“It seems to me that his (Ruben Rubinyan – ed.) first meeting with his Turkish counterpart held in Moscow on December 14, 2021 was commended by both sides. The EU welcomes this effort and is ready to contribute to any further positive development in this direction, provided the sides show corresponding interest.

As stated by several Armenian officials recently, including at the level of Prime Minister Pashinyan, we expect this process to bring stability and prosperity to the peoples in the region and we hope to see additional concrete steps in this direction in the near future. It is my hope that it will result in agreements for the long-awaited establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of the Turkish-Armenian border,” stressed Klaar.


Stockholm Center for Freedom: Armenian cultural heritage faces destruction in Turkey

  News.am  
Armenia – Jan 27 2022

Minorities and refugees in Turkey continued to suffer from rights violations, hate speech, and attacks throughout last year, according to the 2021 report of the Stockholm Center for Freedom—which is an advocacy organization.

As per this report, Armenian cultural heritage in Turkey faced destruction in the year past.

Accordingly, an “Armenian church dating to 1603 in the western province of Kütahya that was on the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s preservation list was demolished in January after it was acquired by a private party.” 

As per this report, in March “an old Armenian cemetery was destroyed during construction in Ankara’s Ulus district as part of gentrification project, and human remains were found at the site.”

Also, an “old Armenian cemetery in Turkey’s eastern province of Van was destroyed by bulldozers in August and bones were scattered across the field, sparking outrage among the Armenian community and opposition politicians.”

In addition, an “Armenian Protestant church in Diyarbakır province was leased to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism for a period of 10 years to serve as a public library.”

Furthermore, the “Surp Yerrortutyun (Holy Trinity) Armenian church in central Turkey’s Akşehir district will serve as the ‘World’s Masters of Humor Art House’ as part of a project to found a ‘humor village’ in the hometown of famous 13th century Turkish satirist Nasreddin Hoca.”

And, separately, a “far-right independent member of the Turkish Parliament threatened Turkish-Armenian lawmaker Garo Paylan with facing the same fate as his ancestors amid debates over the recognition of the mass killings of Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman Empire as genocide by the US administration.”

Minority and Refugee Rights in Turkey: 2021 in Review

Jan 26 2022

Minorities and refugees in Turkey continued to suffer from rights violations, hate speech and attacks throughout the year. President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his key ally, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahçeli, continued to use a divisive ultranationalist rhetoric throughout the year especially against the Kurds, contributing to the rise of hate crimes.

The government has made little effort to address the religious freedom issues including granting minority religious communities’ legal personality and permission to hold board member elections; recognizing Alevi houses of worship (cemevleri); and reopening the Theological School of Halki, a Patriarchate of the Eastern Orthodox Church seminary.

Turkey is home to a total of 4,038,857 refugees from around the world, according to the latest figures provided by Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu. Attitudes about refugees fleeing the long conflict in Syria have gradually hardened in the country, where they used to be welcomed with open arms, sympathy and compassion, as the number of newcomers has swelled over the past decade.

Anti-immigrant sentiment reached a boiling point, fueled by Turkey’s economic woes. With unemployment high and the price of food and housing skyrocketing, many Turks turned their frustration toward the refugees in the country, particularly the 3.7 million who fled the civil war in Syria.

The prospect of a new influx of refugees following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan served to reinforce the unreceptive public mood. Videos purporting to show young Afghan men being smuggled into Turkey from Iran caused public outrage and led to calls for the government to safeguard the country’s borders.

Here is some of the most important news from 2021 in the field of minority and refugee rights:

Kurds continued to face discrimination and hate speech

Seven members of a Kurdish family were killed in July in central Turkey by armed assailants who tried to burn their house down in what rights activists said was a racist attack. More..

In August armed groups set up checkpoints in different parts of Antalya province amid rumors that wildfires ravaging the region were started by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). A group of people reportedly stopped a car and beat a man apparently because he was Kurdish. More..

A Kurdish family from northern Iraq’s Erbil province was attacked in an apparent hate crime while they were visiting Turkey’s southern Mersin province in May. More..

In July a group of seasonal workers were attacked in Afyon province and a Kurdish family was attacked in Konya. More..

Restrictions on use of the Kurdish language

Kurdish was not included among the six languages that are supported by KADES, a smartphone app designed by the Turkish National Police for use by women to ask for help in cases of domestic violence. More..

Disapproval of the use of Kurdish was high on the agenda in August, with a popular TV host criticizing her guest for speaking Kurdish on live television and a prison administration investigating several prisoners for singing in Kurdish. More..

Kurdish singer Mem Ararat said in a statement in December that a concert of his that was scheduled to take place at Ankara’s Neşet Ertaş Culture Center was cancelled by the authorities because it included Kurdish songs. More..

The pressure on Kurds in Turkey to not speak their own language is a reflection of a general intolerance towards the Kurdish population, said Birca Belek Language and Culture Association Co-chair Mirza Roni. More..

Government vehicles hit 57 pedestrians in 4 years, killing 16 and injuring 41

A total of 16 pedestrians, including nine children and a disabled person, have died after being hit by government vehicles since 2018. The killing of civilians by armored vehicles is common in Turkey’s Southeast, where there is a heavy military presence due to ongoing clashes between the Turkish military and the outlawed PKK. More..

In November a police officer was given a reduced sentence of four years, five months and 10 days for the death of Şahin Öner, 18, after he hit him with an armored vehicle, due to “good conduct” displayed during the hearings, despite the fact that the defendant never appeared in court. More..

Kurdish inmate who claimed prison guards beat and sexually harassed her found dead in her cell

Garibe Gezer, an inmate who alleged that she was beaten and sexually harassed by prison guards in Kocaeli’s Kandıra Prison, was found dead in her cell in December. More..

 

 

Gendarmerie commander responsible for burning down Kurdish village, killing 9, Turkish court said

Bülent Karaoğlu, a former gendarmerie officer, was responsible for the burning down of the southeastern Turkish village of Altınova (Vartinis) in 1993, which caused the death of nine people, including seven children, the first chamber of Turkey’s Supreme Court of Appeals said in May. More..

Former Turkish minister was planning attack on Alevi house of worship, mob boss claimed

A Turkish crime boss who had been making scandalous allegations about the relationship between state actors and the mafia claimed in June that former Turkish interior minister and police chief Mehmet Ağar was planning an attack on a cemevi, an Alevi house of worship. More..

US religious freedom commission said situation of Turkey’s Alevi community getting worse under Erdoğan leadership

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) pointed out that discrimination against the Alevi community in Turkey was rampant and pervasive and that the situation under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was only getting worse, in a message issued in July on the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the Sivas Massacre. More..

Alevi houses marked with red paint sparked fear among residents

A number of Alevi residences were marked with red paint in Turkey’s northwestern Yalova province, bringing back memories of violence against the community in the past after their houses were similarly marked. More..

 

In possible sign of official discrimination, villages were identified as Alevi on Turkish Health Ministry map

The Turkish Ministry of Health was allegedly using a map of northern Tokat province on which Alevi villages appeared to be clearly marked, a patient’s relative revealed, leading to the fear of official discrimination against Alevi patients. More..

Armenian cultural heritage faced destruction

An Armenian church dating to 1603 in the western province of Kütahya that was on the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s preservation list was demolished in January after it was acquired by a private party. More..

In March an old Armenian cemetery was destroyed during construction in Ankara’s Ulus district as part of gentrification project, and human remains were found at the site. More..

An old Armenian cemetery in Turkey’s eastern province of Van was destroyed by bulldozers in August and bones were scattered across the field, sparking outrage among the Armenian community and opposition politicians. More..

An Armenian Protestant church in Diyarbakır province was leased to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism for a period of 10 years to serve as a public library. More..

The Surp Yerrortutyun (Holy Trinity) Armenian church in central Turkey’s Akşehir district will serve as the “World’s Masters of Humor Art House” as part of a project to found a “humor village” in the hometown of famous 13th century Turkish satirist Nasreddin Hoca. More..

Far-right MP attacked Armenian lawmaker, threatening genocide

A far-right independent member of the Turkish Parliament threatened Turkish-Armenian lawmaker Garo Paylan with facing the same fate as his ancestors amid debates over the recognition of the mass killings of Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman Empire as genocide by the US administration. More..

US religious freedom commission recommended placing Turkey on special watch list for severe violations

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended that the State Department place Turkey on its special watch list based on the Turkish government’s perpetration or toleration of severe violations of religious freedom, in its annual report released in April. More..

Pro-gov’t daily targeted Turkish journalist in antisemitic attack

The pro-government Takvim daily in March launched an antisemitic attack against Karel Valansi, a Turkish journalist and foreign policy analyst, in a report critical of İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. The report, headlined “[İmamoğlu] shows animosity to a Turk but great politeness to a Jew,” said İmamoğlu “showed too much respect to a Jewish journalist working in Turkey.” More..

Last traces of Ankara’s Jews in peril

The Jewish heritage of Turkey’s capital city of Ankara, which dates back to the 2nd century BC, was faced with destruction as the abandoned homes of the city’s Jews, who at one point numbered around 5,000, were identified as a site for urban renewal. More..

Assyrian, Chaldean associations called on Turkish authorities to investigate disappearance of villagers

Chaldean and Assyrian associations in Europe, the United States, Australia and Iraq sent a joint letter to Turkey’s justice and interior ministers in February demanding a thorough investigation into the disappearance of Chaldean villager Hurmüz Diril and the murder of his wife Şimoni Diril. More..

Assyrian priest given jail sentence on terror charges

A Turkish court in April handed down a 25-month prison sentence to an Assyrian priest in southeastern Turkey on charges of aiding the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). More..

Roma conscript died under suspicious circumstances following hate speech by his commander

Caner Sarmaşık, 20, a conscript who was being targeted for being Roma, allegedly died by suicide while on guard duty on April 29. According to his family Sarmaşık told them during a phone call a week before his death that he was being targeted with hate speech by his commander for being Roma. More..

Turkish university cancelled World Greek Language Day events due to xenophobic pushback

The faculty of languages, history and geography of Turkey’s Ankara University in February announced that it had canceled plans to mark World Greek Language Day on February 9 after being targeted by pro-government newspapers and receiving condemnation and pushback on social media. More..

Syrian refugees continued to suffer from hate speech, discrimination and attacks

In August a group of locals attacked houses, workplaces and cars owned by Syrians in Ankara’s Altındağ district, chanting anti-Syrian slogans. More..

Three Syrian men were killed in an alleged hate crime in Turkey’s İzmir province in November.  A Turk poured gasoline over the Syrians while they were asleep and set them on fire. The man later admitted to having committed the hate crime. More..

A Syrian refugee family living in Turkey’s Gaziantep province was attacked in their home on March 28 in an apparent hate crime. More..

A Somali restaurant in Ankara’s central Kızılay district was attacked in April following anti-migrant reporting by the Sözcü daily. More..

A large number of Syrian residents of İzmir’s Cumhuriyet neighborhood left their homes after tensions increased following the alleged murder of 17-year-old Batuhan Barlak by a 20-year-old Syrian refugee in September. More..

Refugees in Turkey’s northwestern city of Bolu said they have been confronted with more hate crimes since the city council approved a discriminatory proposal imposing exorbitant fees on foreigners to access public services in the city. More..

A group of streetcleaners assaulted a Syrian man who was collecting trash in Antalya province, crushing his motorcycle and setting it on fire. More..

A refugee who had been living in İstanbul with her children for four months was beaten up and threatened by neighbors and insulted at the police station. More..

Eleven Syrian refugees who were detained in October after sharing videos on social media showing them eating bananas in an effort to condemn racism and discrimination in Turkey faced deportation. More..

In a landmark decision in December, a Turkish court handed down a prison sentence of 25 years to a police officer who shot a young Syrian refugee to death in 2020. More..

Prosecutor declined to pursue case against gendarmes who allegedly threw refugees into Evros River

The Edirne Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office in December declined to pursue a case against gendarmes who allegedly threw refugees into a river after they were pushed back by Greece, without taking the testimony of all the witnesses and the accused. More..

Human Rights Watch accused Turkish soldiers of beating and pushing Afghan asylum seekers back to Iran

Turkish authorities are summarily pushing Afghan asylum seekers crossing into the country from Iran back to Iran, denying them the right to seek asylum, in violation of international law, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in an October statement. More..

Turkish far-right group beat Afghan man and shared video on social media

A new Turkish far-right group in December shared a video on social media showing one of their members beating an Afghan refugee in an apparent hate crime. More..

 

2 refugees severely beaten by security officers in Turkish repatriation center

Two refugees, one Syrian and the other Palestinian, were severely beaten by security officers at a repatriation center in Turkey’s western İzmir province on May 11. More..

Hate speech against refugees increased on Turkish social media as a new wave of Afghan migrants arrived

Hate speech against refugees on Turkish social media increased in July, with a new wave of refugee arrivals in Turkey starting as the Taliban increased the territory it controlled in Afghanistan amid a US troop withdrawal. More..

Turkey was ranked 48th among 49 countries on LGBT rights in rainbow index

Turkey was ranked 48th among 49 countries as regards the human rights of LGBT people, according to the 2021 Rainbow Europe Map published by the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA)-Europe. More..

Targeted by Erdoğan, Turkey’s LGBT community faced ‘tsunami of hate’

Turkey’s President Erdoğan in February unleashed a torrent of attacks against what he called “the LGBT youth,” which came as sudden student protests began to rattle his 18-year rule. Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu reported the arrest of “four LGBT freaks” over the display, condemning the “degenerates” in Twitter posts that got flagged for “hateful conduct”. More..

3 transexual women attacked in one week as violence against LGBT+ community increased in Turkey

The LGBT+ community in Turkey witnessed multiple acts of violence against its members in March with at least three transexual women suffering injuries or death. More..