Month: March 2023

Education: Armenia’s Path to Stronger Economic Growth

Jhanna Virabian

Published

 15 hours ago 

on

 

By

 Ivailo Izvorski

Better education and a stronger innovation drive are crucial for achieving higher rates of economic growth and prosperity in any country. Countries that prioritize improvements in education – from the pre-primary to the university level – and innovation are better positioned to adapt to economic change and help raise the living standards for their people.

Education equips individuals with the knowledge and skills necessary to contribute to the economy, with the ability to learn – and unlearn – continuously. Innovation involves the creation of new products, processes, and services that expand the capacity of enterprises and economies. In fact, the most innovative countries tend to be the most successful economically.

Take the case of Estonia. In 1993, Estonia’s GDP per capita was a modest about $6,480. In comparison, Japan’s was $24,000. Fast forward 30 years. Estonia’s GDP per capita was equal to that of Japan in 2022, at nearly $43,000. Estonia now boasts the highest PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) scores in math, science and reading in Europe. A similar ‘miracle’ happened in Korea, a country that moved from developing country status to an advanced economy in just one generation. How can countries replicate Estonia’s or Korea’s success and achieve faster economic growth and standards of living that are like to those of high-income countries?

Through education and innovation.

Here in Armenia, education has been a priority since the country’s independence in 1991. The government has made efforts to increase the number of schools, provide free education for primary and secondary schools, and promote STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education. As a result, Armenia has a high literacy rate of over 99% and over 60% of adults have completed at least secondary education.

Yet, the education system is not producing the needed outcomes. Children born in Armenia today will be only 58% as productive during their lives as they could have been if they had received quality health and education services available. Armenian children are expected to complete 11.3 years of schooling. This decreases to 8 years if the quality of education is factored in. Pre-primary school and secondary school enrollment is low compared to peer countries in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). It is the quality of education that is the most pressing concern. Armenia’s TIMSS mathematics score – a standardized test for children in grade 4 – is one of the lowest in the region. The quality of tertiary education is below the ECA average: it is nearly 30% lower than Georgia, and half as low as the new EU member states. These outcomes are not surprising, given that public spending on education is just under 2.7% of GDP in Armenia, which is half that of the EU.

The World Bank is helping Armenia improve its education system, including through the Education Improvement Project, which is enhancing the conditions for learning across educational levels by extending preschool coverage, providing laboratory equipment, informing curriculum revisions, and improving the relevance and quality of higher education institutions. The many outcomes of the project include new preschools in rural communities, training of preschool teachers, and grants to higher education institutions through the Competitive Innovation Fund. Under the EU4Innovation Trust Fund, the World Bank is also helping improve the quality of STEM education. By September this year, Armenia will have a fully revised STEM curriculum for middle and high schools (grades 5 to 12), improved learning materials, school-based STEM laboratories and as well as enhanced student-centered instructional methodologies/teaching methods.

Education is essential but alone is not sufficient to drive economic growth. How knowledge is applied by firms, researchers and workers through innovation is critical. In Armenia, there is a disconnect between education, research, and the link to entrepreneurs and markets. For example, academic research in Armenia is dominated by the National Academy of Sciences which comprises more than 30 separate research institutes. None of these institutes are formally integrated with any teaching university in the country. There is also a proliferation of universities in Armenia, with 26 public (state) and 33 private universities; many of the latter, in name only. In Denmark, a country with almost twice the population, there are only eight state-recognized and funded universities offering research-based education.

Consolidating the universities in Armenia, merging them with the research institutes, and focusing government attention on accreditation could help address some of these challenges. It is also essential to reform the university admission process to incentivize talented high schoolers to apply. The government could also support the commercialization of research. In many advanced economies, universities are prodigious producers of knowledge and basic research output, and the private sector, the user of this research, is very vibrant. Without practical application, research may have little impact on the country’s growth potential.

Extensive work by the World Bank shows that human capital is at the core of efforts to strengthen innovation and technology adoption. In Armenia, as in many other countries, human capital is one of the main binding constraints to growth.

While the government has taken significant steps and has initiated important reforms to promote both education and innovation, more is needed to realize their potential. By making a greater investment in education and innovation, Armenia can build a knowledge-based economy that can help the country deliver a development miracle and elevate standards of living to those of high-income countries. The dialogue at the recent panel discussion on “Growth, Education, and Innovation” could help policymakers in their efforts to transform education and innovation in Armenia.

This op-ed was originally published in Banks.am via World Bank

Recognition of Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek Genocides Gains Momentum in Australia

David Nargizian
https://neoskosmos.com
Posted 2023-03-28 08:01 GMT

Momentum is building for Australian parliamentary recognition of the indigenous Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek genocides ahead of the annual commemorations of the three catastrophes.

Associate Professor Dr Melanie O'Brien, president of International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) participated in the Joint Justice Initiative (JJI) Advocacy Week held at the Commonwealth Parliament.

The commemorations of the three genocides serve as a reminder of the mass atrocities committed against indigenous Hellenic, Assyrian and Armenian communities by the Ottoman and Republican Turkish authorities in the early 20th Century.

Approximately 1.5 million Armenians, 750,000 Assyrians, and 350,000 to 500,000 Greeks (including Pontic Greeks) were killed during the genocides committed by the Ottoman Empire between 1914 and 1923.

Dr O'Brien, a global historical authority on genocide studies spoke to parliamentarians about the atrocities.

"We are delighted Dr O'Brien was our inaugural guest for the JJI Advocacy Week this year," said Michael Kolokossian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of Australia (ANC-AU).

Dr O'Brien talked to parliamentarians about her book From Discrimination to Death: Genocide Process Through a Human Rights Lens.

Dr O'Brien has worked closely with Australian Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek organisations and was a keynote speaker at the 2018 National Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide, including the commemoration for the centenary of the holocaust of Smyrna in Sydney, in September 2022.

"Being part of this Joint Justice Initiative delegation is an important way that I can represent the International Association of Genocide Scholars."

"Our members conduct scholarly work with the goal of preventing and punishing genocide and aim for our work to influence policy and lawmakers," said Dr O'Brien.

"It is crucial that Australia recognise the genocide of the indigenous Armenian, Assyrian and Hellenic populations of the Ottoman Empire by the Ottoman and Republican governments."

"It is important to acknowledge the reality of the crimes committed against the victims, survivors and their descendants — some of whom are Australian citizens — and to contribute to the prevention of future genocides." O'Brien said.

Peter Stefanidis the president of the Federation of Pontian Associations of Australia said that a key factor in the success of JJI's Advocacy Week was the involvement of youth leaders.

"Combining our resources on the key issue of genocide recognition continues to expand as the Hellenic, Armenian and Assyrian communities of Australia together develop the leadership skills of the next generation."

The inaugural JJI Advocacy Week was held before Armenian Australians commemorate the 108th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide and as Azerbaijan's blockade of the Republic of Artsakh nears 100 days.

Formed in March 2020, the JJI is a joint advocacy effort aimed at achieving parliamentary recognition of the genocides of the Armenians, Assyrians and Hellenes from Australian Commonwealth, state and territory parliaments.

Russia irritated by Armenia’s intentions to recognise ICC jurisdiction, which wants to arrest Putin

Karapet Navasardian

Russia considers Armenia's intention to join the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) unacceptable and warns Yerevan about the consequences of such a step.

Source: Russian propaganda outlets TASS and RIA Novosti, with reference to the identical comment "of a source in the Russian Foreign Ministry"

Quote: "Moscow considers Yerevan's plans to join the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court against the backdrop of the recent illegal and legally void and null ICC warrants against the Russian leadership absolutely unacceptable," the source said.

Details: The agency source added that Armenia was warned about the "extremely negative" consequences of their possible steps for bilateral relations with Moscow.

Background: Last week, Armenia's Constitutional Court declared that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is in line with the country's basic law, paving the way for its ratification.

Armenia's Constitutional Court announced its decision a week after the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin, finding him guilty of the illegal deportation of thousands of children from Ukraine.

The warrant issuance means that Putin could be arrested if he travels to any member state of the International Criminal Court.

Russia ‘criticises’ Armenia’s International Criminal Court ratification

Tatoyan Vazgen
 

ByAni Avetisyan

Russia’s Foreign Ministry finds Armenia’s intent to ratify the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) ‘inadmissible’, Russian state news agency TASS reports.

TASS cited an unnamed source from the ministry as saying that Yerevan’s intent to ratify the Rome Statute could have ‘extremely negative consequences’.

Armenia’s Constitutional Court greenlit the ratification process on Friday, a week after the ICC issued arrest warrants for President Putin and Russian Children’s Rights Comissioner Maria Lvova-Belova for the deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia. 

‘Moscow considers Yerevan’s plans to officially join the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court absolutely unacceptable against the backdrop of the recent illegal and legally void “warrants” of the International Criminal Court against the Russian leadership’, TASS quoted the source as saying.

Armenia signed the treaty in 1998, but in 2004, the Constitutional Court deemed that it contradicted the country’s constitution.

While the constitution has since been amended several times, members of the opposition have claimed that the articles the Rome Statute appeared to be incompatible with have not fundamentally changed.

Armenia began discussions over the Rome Statute in late December 2022 with the intent of taking Azerbaijan to the ICC over the two-day war in September and several other clashes.

Following the fighting in September, several videos surfaced online appearing to show Azerbaijani soldiers summarily executing Armenian captives. Other footage showed the mutilation of an Armenian soldier by Azerbaijani troops.

[Read more:  Azerbaijan ‘investigating’ new POW execution footage]

The ICC has the power to investigate allegations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of agression.

Azerbaijan has not signed the Rome Statute, while Russia signed the agreement in 2000 but never ratified it, withdrawing its signature in 2016.

In order to ratify the statute, the Armenian government must appeal to parliament within three months of the Constitutional Court’s decision. 

Parliamentary Speaker Alen Simonyan expressed support for the ratification, saying Armenia ‘needs to join the treaty […] to bring the leader of a country that has launched a war against us before the Hague tribunal’. 

While not directly answering a question about whether Putin would be arrested if he visited Armenia, Simonyan said he could not imagine other countries arresting Putin.

‘Let’s ratify it, let’s finish it. The Russian president will come, and then we’ll see’, he said.


Russia Warns Armenia Against Siding With ICC After Putin Arrest Warrant: ‘Serious Consequences’

Kanayan Tamar


By Craig Peters

Russia is warning Armenia that there would be “serious consequences” if the latter were to follow through on plans to become a member state of the International Criminal Court. 

The state-run RIA news agency cited a source in the Russian Foreign Ministry as saying that Armenia’s ICC plans as “unacceptable.” 

Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a meeting on the social and economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol via a videoconference at the Moscow’s Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, Friday, March 17, 2023. (Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

It said Russia had warned Armenia’s government there would be “extremely negative consequences” between their two nations if it were to become a state party to the Rome Statue – a move that would need to be ratified by the Armenian parliament after approval by the constitutional court. 

“Moscow considers official Yerevan’s plans to accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to be absolutely unacceptable against the background of the recent illegal null and void warrants of the ICC against the Russian leadership,” the Russian Foreign Ministry source reportedly said. 

PUTIN ALLY SAYS RUSSIA HAS ‘WEAPONS CAPABLE OF DESTROYING ANY ADVERSARY, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES’

Armenia has been a traditional ally of Russia. The two nations have a mutual defense pact and Russia maintains troops and a military base in Armenia. 

But relations have soured in recent months. Yerevan accuses Moscow of failing to uphold a 2020 ceasefire treaty it helped broker between Armenia and Azerbaijan to end a war over Nagorno-Karabakh – an Armenian-populated region of Azerbaijan. 

The ICC said earlier this month it had issued an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes, accusing him of personal responsibility for the abductions of children from Ukraine. The Kremlin condemned the move as a meaningless and outrageously partisan decision. 

It was the first time the global court had issued a warrant against a leader of one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. 

The Associated Press contributed to this report. 


Iran Not Opposed to Deployment of EU Monitoring Mission Along Armenian-Azerbaijani Border

Maral Chavushian

05:27 PM Age: 16 hours

(Source: The Moscow TImes)

The Iranian ambassador to Armenia, Abbas Badakhshan Zohouri, announced on the sidelines of the “Armenia-Iran Relations in Context of Common Interests” forum, which was held on February 10, that “Iran does not oppose the deployment of a civilian EU [European Union] monitoring mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border” (PanArmenian.net, February 10). Although the Iranian ambassador did not directly mention Azerbaijan, the Zangezur Corridor, nor the possible blockage of the common border between Iran and Armenia, nevertheless, he stipulated, “Armenia and Iran are and will be neighbors. Of course, we see some ruse, they speak about so-called corridors and some actions, but Iran and Armenia will not allow the creation of such a corridor” (Massis Post, February 9).

Tehran’s position on the EU mission is important for a number of reasons. First, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and throughout the past three decades, traditionally, Iran has opposed the intervention of extra-regional forces, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, EU and United States, in the regional conflicts of the South Caucasus. For example, former Iranian ambassador to Armenia, Seyed Ali Saghaeyan, at a news conference in Yerevan on June 23, 2010, mentioned that “Iran is strongly opposed to US involvement in a multinational peacekeeping force that would presumably be deployed around Nagorno-Karabakh after the signing of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace accord” (Azatutyun.com, June 23, 2010).

In fact, Iran has traditionally supported a regional approach to developments in the South Caucasus, including efforts to find a solution to the Karabakh stand-off between Armenia and Azerbaijan. For this reason, Iran did not oppose the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces to the Karabakh region after the Second Karabakh War in 2020, nor to Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. In this regard, Iran supports the “3+3” regional cooperation format, which includes Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan plus Russia, Turkey and Iran. The format could serve as a new postwar regional integration platform (see EDM, June 16, 2021), as “over the past three decades, various initiatives for regional cooperation in the South Caucasus have been proposed, but none proved successful or long-lasting because each failed to include all of the wider region’s key members.” Thus, against this backdrop, especially in supporting the 3+3 regional cooperation format, Iran’s lack of opposition to the deployment of the EU monitoring mission represents a newfound approach.

Second, while Iran has not opposed the EU mission, Azerbaijan and Russia have voiced their opposition to it. In this regard, on January 10, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described the mission as a “fraud” (Media Max, January 24). For Russia’s part, during a press briefing on October 11, 2022, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova proclaimed, “We see this as yet another attempt by the EU to interfere by any means in the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan to oust our country’s mediation efforts” (Armenian Weekly, October 12, 2022). While the difference in positions between Tehran and Baku was not surprising, it was rather unexpected that the Russian view diverged from that of Iran as the two sides have traditionally agreed on how to approach the South Caucasus.

Third, Tehran’s position on the EU mission is largely the result of Iranian uneasiness concerning threats to its common border with Armenia. Overall, Tehran is not opposed to the implementation of the “ninth clause of the 2020 Karabakh ceasefire agreement,” but it strongly opposes the “change of international borders” in the South Caucasus, as well as “the blocking of the Iranian-Armenian border” (see EDM, October 14, 2022). Therefore, the Iranian government hopes to prevent the realization of these threats near Iran’s northwestern borders through the auspices of the EU monitoring mission.

Importantly, Iran has basically only been able to rely on Armenia in supporting these concerns over the past two years; Russia has not had the expected position regarding the security and border concerns of Iran and Armenia, especially in relation to the Zangezur Corridor. In fact, the Kremlin has demonstrated that it seemingly does not share Iran’s perception that the blocking of its common border with Armenia represents a serious security threat. For this reason, Moscow, unlike Tehran and Yerevan, not only does not object to Baku’s desired corridor but also believes that this corridor should be implemented to remove blockages in communication and transit routes (JAM-news, November 28, 2022).

In this regard, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mikhail Bocharnikov, who believes the necessary plans are in place for the development of the Zangezur Corridor, argued, “I do not see any unsolvable differences on this issue” (Hetq, February 9). In Iran, the view is prevalent that, despite the common interests of Iran and Russia in maintaining the balance of power in the South Caucasus, Russia’s transit, commercial and banking needs vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Turkey following the re-invasion of Ukraine have made Moscow more flexible in its relations with Baku and Ankara.

As the conflict zones between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the Karabakh region and Syunik province, are in the southern part of the region, Iran is in a “very vulnerable situation” as compared to Georgia, Turkey and Russia. As a result, Iran “strongly opposes” another war between Armenia and Azerbaijan because it would directly threaten Iranian security and border conditions (Regioncenter.info, February 12). However, despite the direct consequences of both Karabakh wars on Iran’s northwestern border, unlike Ankara and Moscow, Tehran does not have a representative at the joint Russian-Turkish center for monitoring the ceasefire regime in Karabakh.

In these circumstances, Iran’s positive position regarding the EU monitoring mission could be a sign of Tehran’s dissatisfaction with the positions of Moscow and Baku—in spite of the fact that “Iran has always balked at the injection of more foreign actors in its backyard.” In truth, the EU mission could provide a balancing force that is “in line with Iran’s interests,” even when relations between Brussels and Tehran are at an “all-time low” (Al-Monitor, January 31).

However, it is extremely unlikely that Iran’s positive stance on the EU mission will be taken to the step of agreeing to the possible deployment of foreign military forces near Iran’s borders. In fact, this will likely remain in place as Tehran’s “red line” in the South Caucasus. Instead, it seems that, within the atmosphere of close relations between Tehran and Moscow, especially since the start of the war in Ukraine, Iran will prefer to convince Russia to accompany and pay more attention to Iran’s security concerns, as well as to prevent a change in the balance of power in the region to the detriment of both Moscow and Tehran.

https://jamestown.org/program/iran-not-opposed-to-deployment-of-eu-monitoring-mission-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border/

Sports: GdS: Milan interested in Armenian forward drawing Kvaratskhelia comparisons

Ara Felekian
 
Sempre Milas
Italy –
GdS: Milan interested in Armenian forward drawing Kvaratskhelia comparisons

AC Milan are interested in FC Krasnodar forward Eduard Spertsyan who is drawing comparisons with Kvara Kvaratskhelia, a report claims.

According to a report from La Gazzetta dello Sport, Spertsyan is the big hope of the Armenian national team while he has also been impressing with Krasnodar too having amassed 11 goals and 10 assists in 27 games this season.

He is like Kvara in role as he currently plays in a 4-2-3-1 as the attacking midfielder behind the striker but also operates wide on the left in a 4-3-3. He is quick, loves dribbling, is able to assist and his left foot is almost as good as his favoured right.

There are clubs in Spain who seem keen on landing the 22-year-old, but Marseille are interested and sources in Russia have said that Milan are also following him and have offered €8m despite the fact there is currently an asking price of €12m that seems destined to rise.

New film focuses on love – not war – in Nagorno-Karabakh

Emil Lazarian


The Dream of Karabakh, about a woman’s attachment to her village, is rooted in personal memories that cannot be moved, unlike borders

Lucia De La Torre
, 11.28am

Ifirst met Shushan in February 2021. The mother of five was living in Landjazat village, near Armenia’s barbed-wire border with Turkey. The house, which belonged to some of Shushan’s acquaintances who worked in Russia, had become her family’s temporary home after they were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh as the Second Karabakh War raged.

On the morning of 27 September 2020, Shushan and her family woke to the sound of explosions. In the days that followed, at least 3,700 Armenian and Karabakh soldiers, and nearly 200 civilians were killed in an offensive by Azerbaijani troops to take back territory in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Fighting ceased on 10 November 2020, when an agreement was signed by Armenia’s prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. As a consequence, Nagorno-Karabakh lost 70% of the territory that its de-facto administration had controlled since 1994, displacing nearly 70,000 Armenians.

This is the second mass displacement in the territory in a little over two decades. Disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it has seen years of war. By 1994, Armenian forces had taken full control of Nagorno-Karabakh, and full or partial control of seven other Azerbaijani regions bordering the territory. Though all of these areas were still internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, more than half a million Azerbaijani civilians were forcibly displaced from their homes.

I got in touch with Shushan after I started researching the story of her village. Before the 2020 war, Charektar village had 48 families or roughly 270 residents. Charektar de jure lies in the Shahumyan province of the breakaway Republic of Artsakh or the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, but de facto it is in Azerbaijan’s Kalbajar district. I became interested in Charektar’s story because it had practically been burned to the ground even though no fighting took place there during the 2020 war.

As Armenia’s prime minister Pashinyan announced the Moscow-brokered ceasefire on 10 November and people stormed parliament in protest, Charektar’s residents were told their village was part of the territories to be transferred to Azerbaijan. Many people had already fled the region for Armenia and news of the impending transfer reportedly caused those who remained in Charektar and the neighbouring villages to set fire to their homes, which was widely covered by many Western media outlets.

But then, a few days later, the residents of Charektar were told their village would remain under Armenian control, just a few hundred metres away from military checkpoints and the newly-drawn border with Azerbaijan. The lack of reliable information and clear messaging from the authorities meant that Charektar’s residents had tragically set fire to their own village.

When I met Shushan, I expected her to be grieving the loss of her home. But it quickly became clear that was not all and she was grieving a double loss. Shushan had lost her husband in a car accident six months before the autumn 2020 conflict.

Shushan had met her late husband in the mid-2000s in Dadivank, a village in the foothills of a mediaeval monastery in Nagorno-Karabakh.. They fell in love, quickly decided to get married and when Shushan’s parents opposed the relationship, they eloped. Eventually, the couple moved to Charektar, where they slowly built a house with their own hands. Their new home had a panoramic view of the valley, a yard where Shushan would drink coffee with her neighbours , and an ivy-covered gazebo where the couple would relax after work.

Shushan’s eyes lit up as she told me about the life she had shared with her husband, one that was profoundly tied to their house and the village. It was then that I realised her story wasn’t about war but love. To her, the war was tragic most of all because it took away the place where memories of her husband resided – the house they had built together and shared.

That’s how my film, The Dream of Karabakh, materialised. I followed Shushan over the course of three months, as she tried to adapt to her new life as a refugee in Armenia. Four of her children were living with her, while the eldest remained in Stepanakert, capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, studying to become a doctor.

In the months we spent together, Shushan reminisced a lot, as she grappled with her grief and life in a foreign place. In the film we see her greatly moved and almost in tears while making her husband’s favourite dish for the first time since he passed away. She also complains about the herbs needed to make the dish. Native to Nagorno-Karabakh, they were so much better back home than in Armenia.

Shushan’s relatives and neighbours, who had also fled Charektar and are now scattered across Armenia, share the feeling of being uprooted. As her younger sister eloquently explains in the film: “This place is fine, but it’s not our home”.

But when Shushan floats the idea of returning to Charektar, the others quickly shut her down. “When you open the door, the Azerbaijanis are going to be 300 metres away,” says her sister. “How are you going to live like that?” Shushan doesn’t say anything in reply.

It has now been more than a 100 days since the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, including Shushan and her family, have lived under a blockade

Then comes a turning point with Shushan revealing that her husband often appears in her dreams and asks her to come back home, to the house they built together. He promises her that they’d be safe there, he would protect them. Eventually, the dreams push Shushan to make the decision to return.

In April 2021, Shushan made the perilous journey back to Charektar. What would have normally taken a few hours via the northern road that connected Armenia’s Gegharkunik region and Kalbajar district, turned into nearly a whole day of travel. From southern Armenia, she was able to reach Nagorno-Karabakh via the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Eventually, Shushan did make it back home.

I, on the other hand, was not able to reach Charektar. By early 2021, foreign passport holders were denied access to Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia. Twice, I was turned away by Russian peacekeepers at the Lachin corridor, despite having a press pass and visa. This meant I could not travel with Shushan back to her village. However, I worked with Armenian filmmaker Greta Harutunyan to film Shushan’s return.

In her footage, we see Shushan going home to an eerily quiet Charektar, except for the occasional column of Russian peacekeepers that drives through to the makeshift border checkpoint manned by Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers. The school that Shushan’s children attended was burned down. Most of the houses have been burned and looted, including Shushan’s.

I will never forget the scene in which Shushan stands in her garden looking down the hillat the destruction. She says: “It’s going to be very difficult to live here without him. But this is the village he loved.”

It was Shushan’s courage and her decision, moved by love, to challenge her family and return to the village that inspired this film.

I have often found myself wondering if I were simplifying the situation or even rendering it banal by framing The Dream of Karabakh as a love story. But in fact, it was my initial assumption that the war was the centre of Shushan’s story that was an oversimplification. Shushan’s story challenges narratives of belonging as merely rooted in nationalism. Her attachment to Charektar is rooted in personal memories that cannot be moved, unlike borders.

Unfortunately, since April 2021, when Shushan and her children moved back to Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation has progressively worsened. Fighting often erupts along the border. In March 2022, during a very cold period of late winter, the roughly 100,000 residents of Karabakh were left without natural gas, hot water or food. The price of everyday goods in supermarkets is higher and there is a shortage of bread and sugar. The electricity is switched off frequently.

I got in touch with Shushan in the spring of 2022, and she said that she hadn’t had electricity for days, inflation was high and life had become very difficult.

The situation only worsened towards the end of 2022. The Lachin corridor has been blocked since mid-December by Azerbaijani eco-activists seemingly backed by their government. On 25 March, Azerbaijani forces cut access to a dirt road that had been used to bypass the blockade, claiming that it had been used to smuggle weapons – a claim that the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh denied.

It has now been more than a 100 days since the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, including Shushan and her family, have lived under a blockade. There are shortages of food, fuel and medicine. Amnesty International has said the blockade is disproportionately affecting women and children. There are rumours that conflict will soon erupt again. And in the meantime, Shushan and her family, as well as hundreds of other Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, are deprived of their rights, in the midst of a worsening humanitarian crisis they cannot escape. Shushan’s dream of Karabakh seems more unattainable than ever.

Even so, it is Shushan's courage and resilience in returning to Nagorno-Karabakh that this film seeks to honour. The Dream of Karabakh is a story about love and belonging, powerful forces that drive Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh but which are often silenced by war narratives.

Film participants' full names have not been included to protect their identities.

https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/new-film-dream-of-karabakh-is-about-love-not-war/

Mount Davidson 90-year-old time capsule to be unveiled

Raffi Khondkarian
  • Megan Rose Dickey

San Francisco community leaders plan to dig up a 90-year-old time capsule buried near the base of Mount Davidson's towering cross this weekend.

What's happening: The Council of Armenian Americans of Northern California plans to unveil a time capsule that a Boy Scout troop buried at the cross in 1933 to commemorate the inaugural Easter sunrise service on April 1, 1923.

  • The time capsule is expected to hold old editions of the Bible, water from the Jordan River, city and telephone directories from 1933, and issues of the leading newspapers of the time.

Why it matters: The cross atop Mount Davidson has a long, complicated history in San Francisco involving legal battles and ballot measures.

  • Despite threats to its existence, the cross has served as a community-gathering place since the Great Depression, including for Easter services and to commemorate the 1915 Armenian genocide.

Flashback: Between 1923 and 1934, the cross evolved from a 40-foot wooden structure to the 103-foot-high concrete structure with reinforced steel you see today.

  • The first cross was built for the 1923 ceremony, which attracted about 5,000 attendees, Friends of Mount Davidson Conservancy co-founder Jacqueline Proctor told Axios.
  • In 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt pressed a button in D.C. that lit the permanent cross atop Mount Davidson for the first time. More than 50,000 people attended that event.

What they're saying: Proctor noted that the concrete version of the cross was built in the middle of the Great Depression, when "people were feeling pretty hopeless."

  • "But they came together to be together and to find hope."

Of note: In 1992, the American Civil Liberties Union, along with other plaintiffs, sued the city, arguing it was illegal to have a religious symbol on public property.

  • The city lost the suit and was required to either remove or sell the cross.

  • In 1997, the Council of Armenian Americans of Northern California became the legal owner of the cross, following a voter-approved measure allowing the sale.

Between the lines: San Francisco became a refuge for Armenians who were able to escape the genocide nearly a century ago, Roxanne Makasdjian, the executive director of The Genocide Education Project, told Axios.

  • Armenians in San Francisco wanted to become custodians of the cross as a thank you to the city for providing the Armenian community with a haven, Makasdjian explained.

What's next: The time capsule unveiling is planned for Saturday from 11am-12:30pm. It will be followed by the placement of a new time capsule, featuring an iPhone, an Armenian Bible, a face mask, issues of the San Francisco Chronicle, and more.

  • One hundred years from now, the council hopes someone will unearth the new capsule.

https://www.axios.com/local/san-francisco/2023/03/27/mount-davidson-time-capsule-easter-sunrise-commemoration

Iran ready to take part in another three-plus-three meeting, says ambassador to Russia

Hovik Karapetian
 TASS 
Russia –
Earlier, Sergey Lavrov said that the country’s Foreign Ministry was working on convening the second three-plus-three meeting

MOSCOW, March 27. /TASS/. Tehran supports the three-plus-three platform for the South Caucasus and is ready to take part in its second meeting, which is being organized by the Russian Foreign Ministry, Iranian Ambassador to Moscow Kazem Jalali told TASS on Monday.

"Iran has always supported this mechanism," he said, when asked if Tehran planned to participate in the meeting once it eventually took place.

Russia’s top diplomat, Sergey Lavrov, said earlier that the country’s Foreign Ministry was working on convening the second three-plus-three meeting.

The six-party platform for cooperation on resolving the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and unblocking economic and transport links in the South Caucasus was initiated by President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey. Russia and Iran welcomed the idea, while Georgia said that it had no plans to join the initiative, but proposed trilateral talks to Azerbaijan and Armenia. On December 10, 2021, Moscow hosted the first meeting of the regional consultative platform, which involved deputy foreign ministers.