A CRUCIAL ELECTION IN GEORGIA
September 11, 2012
Georgia Elections Georgia’s parliamentary election on October 1 will be
its most important since the disputed polls of 2003 which led to the
Rose Revolution and the subsequent election of Mikheil Saakashvili as
president. The governing party, the United National Movement (UNM),
is seeking to win a majority for a third time. The emergence of the
Georgian Dream coalition led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili poses
the most credible challenge yet to the elite that has governed Georgia
for more than eight years.
The election is also being watched closely abroad where it is being
seen as a test of how Georgia can manage a competitive election
process. Speaking on a visit to the country in June 2012, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told President Saakashvili,
“the single best thing Georgia can do to advance your security,
your prosperity, your democracy, your international reputation, is
to hold free and fair elections that result in a fully democratic
transition.” Both the government and opposition are also engaged
in a parallel contest for approval in Western capitals, helped by
well-known PR firms.
Interactive Map [GeorgiaMap_emailgraphic.jpg] The Georgian parliament
has relatively modest powers, but this is also a shadow leadership
election. In 2013, when Saakashvili ends his second and final term as
Georgia’s president, a new constitution adopted in 2010 immediately
takes effect. This transfers most of the executive powers currently
held by the president to a newly powerful prime minister, who will
form the government. The prime minister will be chosen by parliament,
which thus hands important powers to whichever political force obtains
a majority in parliament in the October 1 elections.
A new president, to be elected in a separate election in 2013, will
remain head of state but have more ceremonial powers and the role of
constitutional arbiter.
Thomas de Waal
Senior Associate Russia and Eurasia Program
Until recently there was much speculation that Saakashvili himself
would seek the prime ministerial job and thus try to remain the most
powerful person in Georgia-speculation Saakashvili fuelled by refusing
to rule the option out. However, the plan apparently launched by the
governing elite sets out a different scenario. On June 30, veteran
interior minister Ivane (commonly known as Vano) Merabishvili, long
regarded as the second-most powerful man in Georgia after Saakashvili,
was appointed prime minister. Since then the UNM has formally nominated
Merabishvili to be its candidate for prime minister in 2013.
The economy is by far the most important issue for Georgian voters.
In a recent survey, respondents listed jobs, affordable health care,
poverty and pensions as being four of their top five priorities, along
with territorial integrity. To address these concerns, Merabishvili
has unveiled an ambitious four-year program, with an emphasis on
social spending that departs from the Georgian government’s more
laissez-faire liberal economic policies of recent years.
The new course is clearly a response to the rise of the opposition
Georgian Dream coalition led by the country’s richest man, Bidzina
Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili turned the political scene upside down in
October 2011, when he declared he was entering politics with the aim
of winning the parliamentary elections and becoming prime minister.
Unlike previous opposition contenders, Ivanishvili had two attributes
that made him hard for the governing elite to contend with: money
and power.
Most polls still put the United National Movement in the lead,
but the Georgian Dream coalition is attracting significant support,
especially amongst those parts of society which have felt alienated
by Saakashvili’s policies. These include the unemployed and the
professional classes in Tbilisi among others. The main tenor of
Ivanishvili’s campaign is a greater emphasis on social fairness,
with promises to provide greater government support for agriculture,
job-creation and healthcare.
The two main contenders in the election are broad coalitions,
rather than homogeneous parties. Without the high-profile leaders,
Saakashvili and Ivanishvili, at their head there is arguably little
that holds them together. Like most post-Soviet governing parties,
the United National Movement commands loyalty for both ideological and
bureaucratic reasons. Georgian Dream is a diverse group of six parties
which range from economically liberal and pro-Western to nationalist.
Much of the political debate has focused on the conduct of the
campaign itself. Ivanishvili and his supporters have complained that
that their activists are harassed and that to reach out to voters
they are battling an unfair media environment and restrictive rules
on campaign financing. This has led to key members of Ivanishvili’s
team saying that “the election is already stolen.”
Government supporters respond that it is normal to have mechanisms to
restrain a man whose wealth is equivalent to around half of Georgia’s
GDP and hint that Ivanishvili is acting with the support of forces
“outside Georgia,” in other words Russia.
Georgian politics is always a highly emotional affair but this campaign
is proving especially heated. The main adversaries use extreme language
about one another, leading one group of foreign observers to comment
on a “growing political polarization in the country and a dearth of
civil discourse among political leaders.”
There is also a sharp divide between the capital Tbilisi, which leans
more towards the opposition, and the provinces, especially the southern
regions of Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, which have large ethnic Armenian
and Azerbaijani populations respectively. In the 2008 parliamentary
elections the extremes were represented by Ninotsminda district,
where some precincts recorded 100 percent support for the governing
party (and one precinct more than 100 percent), Tbilisi district of
Vake, which voted heavily for the opposition (and where ironically,
Saakashvili launched his political career in 1999, by winning the
parliamentary seat.)
Our map illustrates this polarization between the capital and the
countryside. If the election is close or contested, this issue could
become even more divisive.
The outcome of the election is hard to predict. Opinion polls
consistently give the advantage to the ruling party, but have given
fluctuating information, from which both government and opposition
can take encouragement.
An independent poll commissioned by the National Democratic Institute
in August gave the UNM a clear lead, with 37 percent of the vote
against 12 percent for Georgian Dream. However, it also recorded a
drop in support of more than 10 points for the UNM since February,
and showed 43 percent of voters responding either as “Don’t Know”
or as “Refuse to Answer,” an increase of 10 points since February.
If many voters are indeed undecided, or not volunteering an opinion,
this suggests that there is still much to play for before October 1.
Parties and Players
United National Movement Founded by Georgia’s President, Mikheil
Saakashvili in 2001. The current governing party won 119 of the 150
seats in the last election in 2008. Current speaker of parliament
David Bakradze heads the party list for the 2012 election. The UNM
campaign trumpets the economic successes of the past eight years
but also offers a more populist program than previously, pledging
investment in road-building, tourist and hydro-electric power and
promising Georgian families vouchers worth 1,000 GEL (around $600).
The UNM’s foreign policy program has a strong emphasis on Euro-Atlantic
integration and explicitly names the United States as the “main
strategic partner of Georgia.”
Georgian Dream A coalition of six opposition parties formed by
Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili and named after a song by
Ivanishvili’s rapper son, Bera. Its constituent parties are: Georgian
Dream-Democratic Georgia (Ivanishvili’s own party); The Republican
Party, a veteran liberal party; the pro-Western Free Democrats,
led by Irakli Alasania; The National Forum, a populist party with a
regional focus; the Conservative Party, led by nationalist politician
Zviad Dzidziguri; and the pro-industry party, Industry Saves Georgia.
Georgian Dream is building its campaign on a strong rejection of
rule by Mikheil Saakashvili and promising a change of course on four
domestic issues: jobs, education, healthcare, and agriculture.
Separately, Ivanishvili has also committed Georgia to a pro-Western and
pro-NATO foreign policy, but has pledged a more pragmatic relationship
with Russia in which he will “abandon saber-rattling.”
Christian Democrat Party A center-right party led by Giorgi Targamadze,
which forms the main opposition group in the current parliament but
risks being squeezed after the emergence of Georgian Dream. The party
calls for a greater role for the Georgian Orthodox Church in public
life. The party, along with New Rights, has been accused of being a
“loyal opposition” to the government.
New Rights Party Led by David Gamkrelidze, a veteran of all Georgian
political campaigns since 2003, it orients itself as a right-of-center
party and is well known for advocating the creation of a constitutional
monarchy in Georgia.
Labor Party Populist left-wing party led by firebrand politician
Shalva Natelashvili. Won six seats in the 2008 election and will aim
to repeat this performance. Natelashvili has promised free gas and
electricity for voters and also accused the current government of
being under the paid influence of George Soros.
Mikheil Saakashvili President of Georgia since 2004, swept to power
by the peaceful 2003 Rose Revolution. A lawyer, educated in Kiev,
Strasbourg and New York, who made his name as an anti-corruption
campaigner. Saakashvili is both widely credited for having made
transformational reforms and blamed for provoking war with Russia
in 2008. Saakashvili’s second and final term as president expires
in 2013, when he will still be only 45 years old. There is much
speculation about what Georgia’s highest-profile politician will do
next and whether he will seek a new political position, perhaps that
of speaker of parliament.
Vano Merabishvili The current prime minister, whose appointment on
June 30 confirmed him as the most powerful political figure in Georgia
alongside the president. He was previously the interior minister
and country’s chief policeman for eight years and is associated with
building up a powerful police force, and a highly successful “zero
tolerance” policy against both petty and serious crime. He was also
the man who twice (in November 2007 and May 2011) coordinated the
dispersal of opposition demonstrations on the streets of Tbilisi and
was criticized for his handling of the brutal murder of a young bank
clerk Sandro Girgvliani.
Bachana (known as Bacho) Akhalaia A figure of growing influence at
the age of only 31, now in the powerful position of interior minister,
having served previously as defense minister. A controversial figure
associated with a successful campaign against organized crime but
also with a poor record on human rights. His brother Data is now
deputy defense minister. The rise of the Akhalaia brothers is seen
as a triumph for the “strongmen” (siloviki in Russian parlance)
in Georgian politics.
David Bakradze The current speaker of the Georgian Parliament heads
the UNM’s party list for the upcoming elections. He has also served as
foreign minister and minister for conflict resolution and is discussed
as a potential candidate for president from the UNM.
Bidzina Ivanishvili Georgia’s richest man had almost no public profile
until he made a dramatic entry into opposition politics in October
2011. Ivanishvili comes from the village of Chorvila in central
Georgia, made a fortune in Russia, chiefly through the bank Rossiisky
Kredit and is now estimated by Forbes to be worth $6.4 billion.
He returned to Georgia in 2001 and spent millions on philanthropic
projects, many of them in partnership with the government. He is also
a prominent art-collector. Ivanishvili says he hopes to become prime
minister-but insists he would leave office after two years.
Irakli Alasania Served as Georgian envoy for the conflict in Abkhazia
until 2006, when he was transferred to become Georgia’s ambassador
to the United Nations. He broke with Saakashvili in 2009 and founded
a pro-Western opposition party, the Free Democrats. Still aged only
39 and well-known in the West, he may be Georgian Dream’s candidate
for president in 2013.
David Usupashvili Leader of the Republican Party, first founded as
a dissident group in 1978, now a liberal opposition party. Married
to fellow Republican Party politician Tinatin Khidasheli. Both are
running for single-mandate seats in the October 1 election.
Giorgi Targamadze Leader of the Christian Democrat Party. Much higher
personal approval rating than that of his party. Previously worked
for two controversial Georgian politicians, Aslan Abashidze and Badri
Patarkatsishvili. If the election produces a divided parliament,
Targamadze and his party may have an important “swing vote.”
Patriarch Ilia II Now aged 79, has been head of the Georgian Orthodox
Church since 1977. The most trusted person in Georgian society by a
wide margin, with a 92 percent approval rating in a recent survey.
The patriarch rarely intervenes directly in politics, although he
expresses support for conservative religious values and improved
relations with Russia. He may be called upon to play a mediating role
if there is continuing political confrontation after the election.
The Electoral Process
In the parliamentary election of May 2008 the governing party won
119 out of the 150 seats in parliament, including 71 out of 75 of
the single-mandate constituency seats.
[Piechart_votes-01-01-01.jpg]
Since then, the electoral map has changed a little. There are now
73-two fewer-single-mandate seats, which will be won by the candidate
who beats all others and wins more than 30 percent of the vote. The
remaining 77 seats will be distributed proportionally to parties
which receive at least five percent of the vote.
The new electoral code has attracted various concerns. Opposition
parties had called for there to be a smaller number of single-mandate
seats on the grounds that the government has the advantage in these
contests and can therefore win a parliamentary majority even without
a majority of the vote. In 2008 the governing party won 59 percent
of the vote but 79 percent of the seats.
[Piechart_seats-02-02-02.jpg]
International organizations, such as the Venice Commission, expressed
concern about the great variation in the size of constituencies,
which range from the mountainous district of Kazbegi (5,779 voters)
to the city of Kutaisi (163,654 voters, 28 times more than in Kazbegi.)
Another major controversy has been campaign financing. Under new
legislation passed at the end of 2011, evidently to prevent Ivanishvili
spending his own money on his campaign, a cap was placed on the amount
individuals could donate to political parties of 60,000 GEL ($36,000).
Since then Ivanishvili has been hit with several heavy fines for
alleged violating party-funding rules. In July Ivanishvili paid the
government a fine of more than 80 million GEL (more than $48 million),
saying that he insisted the money be spent on the relief of flood
victims in eastern Georgia.
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s three-man pre-election observation
mission drew attention to this issue, saying that “the fines levied
are disproportionate and apparently being applied in a selective
manner mainly targeting one political subject.”
The United National Movement has also been fined a much smaller sum
for receiving an illegal donation.
Media Situation
The media landscape and the situation with television in particular
is probably the most controversial part of political life in Georgia,
and it has a major bearing on the election campaign.
According to a recent study by Transparency International, more than
80 percent of Georgia’s population use television as their prime
source of news. Two private pro-government channels, Rustavi-2 and
Imedi, dominate viewing and are estimated to be watched for 60 out
of every 100 minutes the average Georgian viewer spends in front of
a television set.
The two channels are by far the wealthiest outlets in Georgia and
receive the vast majority of advertising revenue from one advertising
company, General Media, which has a monopoly of the market.
A third national channel, the state broadcaster Channel 1, is
perceived as being more neutral in its news coverage, but it is also
more sympathetic to the government. Two more pro-opposition channels
Kavkasia and TV9, affiliated to opposition leader Bidzina Ivanishvili,
have more limited coverage. Maestro, which is generally more critical
of the government but more balanced, has a high audience in Tbilisi
but less so in the rest of the country.
Since it was launched in May, the pro-Ivanishvili channel and TV9
cable operator Global TV, owned largely by Ivanishvili’s brother, has
complained of a government campaign to confiscate their equipment and
limit TV9’s capacity to broadcast. The co-owner of TV9, Alex Ronzhes,
a U.S. citizen, was detained for five hours at Tbilisi airport in
June. Global TV attempted to hand out thousands of its satellite
dishes for free but they were impounded for alleged violation of
electoral laws.
In response to international criticism, the Georgian parliament
passed legislation entitled “Must Carry” on June 29, obliging cable
providers to carry all television news channels for the duration of
the election. The initiative has been widely welcomed, although it
will apply to fewer than 200,000 households.
Another row erupted with the confiscation of around 10,000 satellite
dishes which the popular channel Maestro was intending to distribute
in the regions of Georgia. Maestro strongly denied that it had any
political affiliations and the actions provoked strong protests from
journalists and non-governmental organizations complaining that the
government was suppressing free speech.
Disputes
Both Saakashvili and Ivanishvili have been confidently predicting
victory in the October election.
Saakashvili has said that the UNM will win “very decisively” and
said of his opponents, “they are not preparing for elections; they
are preparing for post-election developments.”
Ivanishvili said that the “best-case scenario” would be if his bloc
won three-quarters of the seats in parliament and that they would
win 40 percent of votes only if they made “catastrophic mistakes.”
This raises the specter that, in case of a UNM victory, the opposition
will dispute the outcome of the election after October 1.
This makes it all the more important for the election to be judged
to be fair.
The government set up an Inter-Agency Task Force to consider any
complaints about violations of the electoral legislation. The task
force has intervened in several cases to reverse political motivated
dismissals of officials. However, as it is headed by chief government
strategist, Giga Bokeria, secretary of the National Security Council,
it cannot be said to be independent.
The main opposition party, Georgian Dream, rejected an initiative by
the governing party, the UNM, to sign a code of conduct which would
commit all parties to accepting the election as legitimate if it is
deemed fair by international observers.
Georgian Dream said it was subscribing to an earlier seventeen-point
rule of conduct devised by a group of NGOs and media organizations.
There will be a large number of observers, both foreign and Georgian,
monitoring the election. The OSCE has deployed a small long-term
observer mission and plans to send 350 short-term observers to monitor
polling day itself.
However, international observers are not likely to deliver a clear-cut
verdict. The OSCE report on the last presidential election in 2008,
for example, contained both praise and criticism. It noted that “while
the election was in essence consistent with most OSCE and Council of
Europe commitments and standards for democratic elections, it also
revealed significant challenges which need to be addressed urgently.”
All this means that is unlikely that the heated political temperature
in Georgia will cool once the results are announced.
Comments (1)
TiflisBound September 13, 2012 10:01 AM
There are two issues I want raise about the upcoming Georgian election
that were not covered in Tom de Waal’s otherwise thorough overview. The
first is that of the Georgian citizen diaspora and its role in the
upcoming election. It is thought that up to a quarter of all Georgian
citizens are living abroad. This is one of the highest percentages
of citizen diaspora of any country anywhere. Few register and vote,
however, due to extremely restrictive registration requirements
instituted recently (curiously, in the middle of the campaign
cycle). The most restrictive, and quite malicious, is the requirement
that Georgians prove to Georgian authorities (not the host country
authorities) that they are living legally in their host countries. In
fact, the Georgian Ambassador to France was quoted as saying that
Georgians living abroad illegally will not be allowed to vote in this
[October 2012] election. For some reason, and by unknown authority,
the Georgian authorities have taken it upon themselves to police the
immigration status of its citizens living abroad. More disturbingly,
the Georgian authorities have linked the immigration status of its
citizens to the exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed right
of suffrage.
And, in another recent decision that really serves to disenfranchise
even more of its citizens, the Georgian government will not open any
polling stations in the vast territory of the Russian Federation even
though most Georgian citizens who will be abroad during the election
are living and working in Russia.
Fair and representative elections assume free and unfettered
access to the ballot box for all citizens. The approach the Georgian
government has taken toward its citizen diaspora’s participation in
the upcoming election – especially considering the diaspora’s sheer
size and percentage of the citizenry – calls into question their real
commitment to managing the kind of election that Secretary Clinton
has urged them to conduct.