Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
Aug 27 2004
Russian bear calls on gray wolf
By K Gajendra Singh
The two-day state visit to Ankara starting next Thursday by Russian
President Vladimir Putin, three decades after the last visit by the
Soviet Union’s president Nikolay Podgorny in 1973, underlines the
reshuffling of strategic perceptions by major players in the region.
This comes after Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan’s recent
visit to Tehran, which capped warming relations between Turkey and
Iran and their efforts to put aside deep-rooted historical and
ideological differences, because of developments in the region.
Clearly, Turkey is moving away from its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) ally the United States, and its good regional
friend, Israel.
Even the 1973 Podgorny visit, when the author was first posted at
Ankara, was Turkey’s show of anger at Washington’s warnings that it
not use US arms in its dispute over Cyprus with Greece, also a NATO
member. Of course that was at the peak of the Cold War, and that
visit was an expression of frustration.
But now we are in the post-Cold War era after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US-led invasion
of Iraq and the deteriorating security situation and daily bloodbath
there. March last year was a watershed when the Turkish parliament
rejected a government motion (with a two-thirds majority ) to allow
troops of its ally the US to open a second front against Iraq from
Turkish soil.
Perhaps for the first time in history after centuries, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia no longer shared a
border. But the strategic interests of Turkey and Russia still
overlap in “near abroads” – in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where
some degree of geopolitical competition is inevitable.
As one expert put it, “Turkish-Russian interactions highlight how the
relationship between key regional powers in the post-Cold War context
can be characterized by significant cooperation and conflict at the
same time.” In the short term, the security problems appear to be
manageable, but they will always remain a major long-term concern.
For the time being, the magnitude of Turkish-Russian trade (based on
large-scale energy imports to Turkey ) and the need for co-existence
at the political level, works against more competitive policies.
Growth of bilateral economic relations
Perhaps the most positive development in Russian-Turkish relations in
recent years has been the 15-20% annual growth in trade. Bilateral
trade, which was just US$200 million 15 years ago, is expected to
reach $8 billion this year. In 2003, Turkey exported $1.3 billion
worth of goods to Russia, while its imports were $5.4 billion. Until
the early 1990s, trade was balanced. Russia is now second only to
Germany as Turkey’s main trading partner. The Turkish Vestel company
has invested $15 million and started production of television sets in
Russia. Koc and Enka Group’s Ramstore has opened more
supermarket-chain stores, which now total 20 in Russia. Turks are
also very active in the construction business.
While Turkish entrepreneurs and traders are active in Russia, Russian
entrepreneurs are also involved in the privatization of Turkish
companies, specifically Tatneft, which won a tender for Turkey’s
largest petrochemical company, and Europe’s fourth-largest. In
February, Tatneft, Russia’s sixth-biggest oil producer, won final
approval from the Turkish government to buy a majority stake in state
oil refiner Tupras for $1.3 billion.
Russia also wants to sell arms to Turkey. In the mid-1990s, Turkey
became the first NATO country to buy arms, rifles, helicopters etc
from Russia, for use against Kurdish rebels, as Western nations
refused to sell them. The number of Russian tourists to Turkey is
also on the rise. In 2003, some 1.2 million Russians visited Turkey.
This number is expected to rise to 1.7 million by the end of 2004.
The “Blue Stream” natural-gas pipeline forms the basis of higher
trade and closer economic relations, increasing Turkish reliance on
Russia. In 1986, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia (for 25
years) for 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas. A similar agreement
was signed in 1998 for 8 billion cubic meters of “Turusgaz”. Moscow
wants to extend the pipeline to Israel. In 2003, the problems of
supply of Russian natural gas through the Blue Stream were resolved
during the visit of Erdogan to Russia, as the leader of his Justice
and Development Party (AK Party). Russia’s Gazprom company agreed to
a lower gas price and the amount of natural gas to be purchased by
Turkey.
Russian project for oil pipeline via Turkey
Now Russia is keen on a Trans-Thracian pipeline, which would allow
its oil to reach the Mediterranean from the Black Sea without passing
through the congested Bosporus. Oil traffic through the strait has
risen by 30% to about 2.8 million barrels per day in the past two
years, mainly from the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. This figure
will increase as exports to the Black Sea via the Caspian pipeline
from Kazakhstan are set to grow to 67 million tons per year.
Increasing traffic through the strait has been a bone of contention
between Russia and Turkey for many years. The Trans-Thracian
pipeline, from Turkey’s western Black Sea coast, 193 kilometers south
to Ibrikbaba on Turkey’s Aegean coast, would ease the bottleneck in
the strait. The proposed pipeline could transport about 60 million
tons per year directly to the Mediterranean. The Turkish government
supports the idea, but does not want to finance it. London-based
Center for Global Energy Studies analyst Julian Lee told the Moscow
Times recently: “Turkey doesn’t want to fall into the trap which
Ukraine did with the Odessa-Brody project, of building a pipeline
nobody wants to use. The [Turkish] government would rather see an
international consortium take the project forward.”
The Trans-Thracian pipeline proposal is to overcome restrictions
imposed by Turkey on the passage of tankers carrying Russian and
Kazakhstan oil to the world markets through the Bosporus. In 2003,
more than 8,000 ships sailed through the strait, compared with 4,000
in 1996, and carried some 150 million tonnes of cargo. About 15
million people live along the shores of the Bosporus. And there have
been some blazing accidents.
However, apart from environmental and safety concerns for the
inhabitants of the region, the Turkish authorities want to force oil
companies and the governments of the Caspian region to use the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), which is now being built. Oil
from Azerbaijan is hardly enough to fill the requirements of the new
line, whose chief backer is the United States. The shift from tankers
would fulfill the political and economic objectives of the pipeline.
There is also the problem of an extra 9 million tons of oil per year
that could flow through from Ukraine’s Druzhba pipeline to the Black
Sea. So Turkey remains advantageously placed for transfer of energy
from the Caspian basin to the Mediterranean.
Turkey is also looking for Russian support on the Northern Cyprus
question during Putin’s visit. Russia, a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council, is seen as a sympathizer of Orthodox
Greek Cypriots, who overwhelmingly voted against a UN plan in April
for reunification of the island. Greek Cypriots oppose efforts at the
UN and the European Union to end the international isolation of
Turkish Cypriots. Turkey did note that Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov met with Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali
Talat on the sidelines of the mid-June foreign ministers’ meeting of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Istanbul.
Relations with the Russian Federation
There was a flurry of visits between Russia and Turkey soon after the
collapse of the USSR. These included the visit of foreign minister
Hikmet Cetin to Moscow on January 20-22, 1992, and a reciprocal visit
to Ankara by foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev the next month. During
prime minister Suleyman Demirel’s official visit to Moscow on May
25-26, 1992, the “Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the
Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation” was signed, replacing
an earlier but similar treaty bearing the same title. This treaty
established the legal basis of relations between the two countries
and also confirmed their willingness to improve this relationship.
Russian president Boris Yeltsin was in Istanbul on June 25, 1992, for
the first summit meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC). Cetin paid another official visit to Moscow on March 1, 1993,
while prime minister Tansu Ciller made an official visit on September
8-9, 1993. During that visit, a joint transportation committee and a
working group in the fields of telecommunications, industry and
transfer of high technology were established.
Russian first deputy prime minister Oleg Soskovets paid an official
visit to Ankara on July 15-20, 1994, and signed two protocols on
bilateral economic relations and debt rescheduling related to Turkish
Eximbank loans extended during the Soviet period. Ciller, visiting
Moscow on May 9, 1995, for the ceremony to commemorate the 50th
anniversary of the end of World War II, held official talks with
Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Chernomyrdin’s visit to Ankara on December 15-16, 1997, was the first
of a Russian premier since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Premier
Bulent Ecevit was in Moscow on November 4-6, 1999, during which a
joint declaration on cooperation in the “struggle against terrorism,
agreements on the abolition of visas for diplomatic passports,
cooperation in the veterinary field and a protocol on cooperation in
the field of information” was signed. A protocol on a joint economic
commission provided the framework for bilateral economic cooperation.
During Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s visit on October
23-25, 2000, when he was accompanied by the ministers of energy,
public property and industry, and science and technology as well as
other high-ranking officials, agreements including the formation of a
joint committee on cooperation in the defense industry were signed.
During foreign minister Igor Ivanov’s visit to Ankara on June 7-8,
2001, a cultural exchange program for 2001-03 was signed. Ivanov and
his counterpart also held consultations on possible areas of
cooperation in Eurasia.
In early 2004, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul visited Moscow after a
gap of eight years. The two sides discussed accusations of harboring
hostile and terrorist groups, such as Chechen and other groups, by
Turkey and Kurdish groups by Russia. The Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) , a Marxist Kurdish rebel group, had support from the USSR and
its proxy, Syria, but Syria was forced to shut down its operations in
1999.
But Chechen-led violence in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia and
terrorist acts in Istanbul have brought realism to the two nations’
view on international terrorism. This is a major problem worrying
Moscow and Ankara. But any agreement after Gul’s visit remained
unknown. Many Chechen leaders, including Akhmed Zakayev, a
representative of the so-called president of Ichkeria, Aslan
Maskhadov, once lived in Turkey. Russians complain that while the
activities of the followers of the pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic Nurcular
organization are banned in Turkey, they carry out a wide variety of
intelligence-related tasks in Russia.
At a press conference, Gul responded that Moscow had supplied Turkey
with “a list of Turkish citizens involved in terrorist activity” and
that it would be thoroughly studied. He agreed that some of the
fighters killed in Chechnya might be Turkish citizens and declared,
“Terrorist acts have occurred in Istanbul, and their perpetrators
also hold Turkish passports.” As for funds collected for humanitarian
purposes in Chechnya, they are handled by the Turkish Red Crescent,
he added. Gul said Turkey had demanded that Russia declare the PKK,
now called Kong La, a terrorist group. “The Russians had promised to
study the question,” the minister said.
Contacts at the military level have also been established after the
signing of a framework agreement on “cooperation in the military
field and agreement on cooperation of training of military personnel”
in January 2002 during the visit of General Anatoly Kvashnin, chief
of staff of the Russian Federation, to Ankara. Turkish chief of staff
General Huseyin Kivrikoglu returned the visit in June 2002. The first
meeting of the joint military-technical cooperation commission was
held in September 2002 in Ankara and a second meeting in November
2003 in Moscow.
Relations have also been established at the level of the parliaments.
During the visit of the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly (TGNA), Mustafa Kalemli, to Moscow on July 14-18, 1996, a
“protocol on cooperation between the TGNA and the Federal Assembly of
the Russian Federation” was signed.
Competition in Central Asia
Muslim tribes around the Black and Caspian seas and the mountainous
Caucasian region that separates Russia and the Middle East and
Anatolia migrated to the Ottoman Empire and are now spread all over
the region and beyond, and have long-established roots. The region
has complex linkages and relationships between the people of Turkey
and the people of the Caucasian region, which were established when
the empire was shrinking. Contacts between citizens of the Turkish
Republic and the republics of Central Asia are also abiding.
But after World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the
creation of the Turkish Republic in Anatolia by Kemal Ataturk,
contacts with Muslim people of not only Central Asia but the
Caucasian region ceased almost altogether. A pan-Turkic leader, Col
Turkesh, told this writer that he met Turks from Central Asia for the
first time in New Delhi, when invited by Indira Gandhi to meet
delegations from the USSR. Even relations with Arabs were limited,
who, according to the Turks, had revolted against the Sultan Caliph.
Ataturk jettisoned the Arab and Ottoman religious heritage and
Islamic and Central Asian baggage. He turned Turks around to look at
the West and become Westernized, modern and secular citizens to reach
the level of contemporary European civilization.
The sudden collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s historical
enemy, pleased Turks no end. It opened the floodgates of exchanges
and relations between the Turks of Anatolia and the Turkic peoples of
Central Asia and the Caucasus. There were delegations galore, with
the two “lost peoples” hugging each other, with many Central Asian
leaders bending down to touch the soil of Turkey with their foreheads
on first arrival. The Iranians and the Russians had cut off exchanges
and relations between the Ottomans and their ethnic kin in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, known as Turkestan.
The author remembers the romantic vision sold to former communist
states by Western leadership and media that with democracy and
capitalism, prosperity was around the corner. Soon the reality
dawned, how Western leadership trifled with the ex-communist
leadership, making them reliant on Western capitalism and
institutions. Billions of dollars were transferred from Russia to
Western banks and institutions under the charade of globalization.
Many Central Asian leaders to whom power fell like manna from heaven
in 1991 were confused and rudderless. They were cautious and wanted
good relations with all. The United States encouraged Turkey’s
efforts as it was afraid that Russia would try to wrest back control
of its “near abroad”, which it tried in many ways, but the horse had
already bolted from the stable.
Fears that Iran would export its version of fanatic Islam and support
anti-US regimes in Central Asia also proved far-fetched. After a
debilitating eight-year-long war with Iraq in the 1980s, in which
Iran lost a million young people, there was little energy or money
left to spread the message of Shi’ite revolution.
Except for the Azeris and some other pockets, most people in Central
Asia are Sunni Muslims, closer to the more mystic Sufi way of life.
They have a very high level of education and a lifestyle of drinking
and good living. With deep-grained nomadic habits, they could not
easily be led to Islamic fundamentalism. It was the ill-conceived US,
Saudi and Pakistani policies that brought Wahhabi Islam to Central
Asia. It was further aggravated by former communists, now rulers,
using the fear of Islamic fundamentalism to crush all forms of
opposition to their dictatorial rule, based on clan and regional
linkages only.
Except for the Caspian basin, because of its energy resources, and in
Kyrgyzstan, the US leadership soon lost interest (except after
September 11, 2001). The Caspian basin has between 100 billion and
200 billion barrels of oil. The US courted Kyrgyz President Askar
Akayev, touting him as a democrat, and helped his country join the
World Trade Organization in 1998. The reason was to have a friendly
regime with freedom to base personnel and sensing equipment to
monitor China, next door. Akayev has proved no different than leaders
of other Central Asian republics in terms of his record on democracy,
though.
The early 1990s were an opportune moment for Turkey, which under the
dynamic leadership of Turgut Ozal had successfully undergone a decade
of economic reforms, opening its economy to the West, especially
Europe. The country had many trained managers and experts who,
because of ethnic, linguistic and religious similarity, became
advisers and even ministers in the new Turkic republics in Central
Asia (CARs). Both at state level and in the private sector, Turkey
made large investments in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The Turkish
government provided loans amounting to $750 million to Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Turkish private
investment runs into billions of dollars. Turks have established
successful industries and run hotels and textile and other
businesses.
Turkey also arranged to train 10,000 students and teachers from the
new republics. Turkish as spoken in Turkey has been purified by
excluding many Arabic and Persian words. Many European words,
especially from French, have been added. The Azeri language is quite
similar to Turkish, as well as the Turkmen language. The languages
spoken by Uzbeks, by Kyrgyz and in Kazakhstan are somewhat different.
Originally, Soviet Russians prescribed Latin script for the Central
Asian languages, but when Ataturk changed to Latin script from
Arabic, the Russians changed to Cyrillic. Many Turks have opened
schools in Central Asia, too. Turkey also started beaming Avrasia TV
programs to Central Asia, but with uneven results.
The initiative to bring the new Central Asian Turkic countries
together was taken by Ozal, but unfortunately he died in 1993. But
Turkey’s efforts to create an area of influence in Central Asia were
opposed by the newly independent leadership. A loose organization of
Turkic states exists without having achieved much. The Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) was reorganized, with the CARs joining in to
create the new Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). To soothe the
Russians, a Black Sea organization was also created, but it remains
equally ineffective. Many Turkish leaders complained in the mid-1990s
that the Central Asian governments did not repay Turkish loans, while
they paid back Western ones. The author was told that the new CARs’
leadership would like to establish authoritarian political regimes
and try to follow the capitalist system of East Asia. They have
certainly succeeded rather well in the first objective.
Problems in the Caucasus
The Russians might have plotted the borders of the Soviet republics
in such a way that there are territorial disputes among almost all
neighboring states that became independent after the collapse of the
USSR, eg between Armenia and Azerbaijan, between Ossetias in Russia
and Georgia, and among Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks in the Ferghana
Valley, to name only a few. But Russia, too, was caught in the sudden
denouement. This writer recalls the Russian ambassador in Baku, the
capital of Azerbaijan, forced to operate his mission from a suite of
rooms in a rundown Intourist hotel, while the US, United Kingdom and
even Israel occupied prime property.
To avoid loss of control in the Muslim North Caucasus, ie Chechnya
and Dagestan, which would result in the disintegration of the Russian
Federation itself, Russian objectives remain that it maintain
military bases and influence in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
deploy Russian troops to guard the external frontiers of the three
Trans-Caucasian states, use exclusive Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS – ie Russian) peacekeeping troops in the region and
station more Russian tanks and armored vehicles in the North
Caucasus, even though this violates the terms of regional treaties.
Russia also wants Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to route
their oil and gas exports via Russia. It is thus clear that Russian
and Turkish interests (or rather of the US as well) are bound to
clash in the Caucasus.
Therefore, soon after the collapse of the USSR, nationalist Russian
politicians, ex-communist cadres, ambitious Russian generals, local
mafia, Turkish groups and international oil executives all entered
the fray to play their part for personal or national gains on the
Caucasian chessboard.
Ten million inhabitants of Turkey come from families that originate
in the North Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus, which were once parts
of the Ottoman Empire. It is estimated that there are 25,000 Turkish
citizens of Chechen decent alone. About 50 official Caucasian
solidarity associations are active in Turkey. These groups invariably
pressure the Turkish government to oppose Russian involvement in the
Trans-Caucasus and against Russian military operations in Chechnya.
Even Turkey was put in an embarrassing situation when the late
Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev accused a Turkish group in 1995
of trying to overthrow him with the help of his opponents in Baku.
Turkey remains wary of Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia
as a potential threat. Ankara would also like CIS peacekeeping forces
in the South Caucasus to be replaced by international forces, since
these peacekeeping troops are mostly Russian.
At the same time, Russia is also unhappy with Turkish military and
security officials’ cooperation with their counterparts in Georgia
and Azerbaijan. In January 2002 in Ankara, Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey concluded a tripartite agreement on regional security. Moscow
is especially unhappy with Turkish assistance in modernizing the
Marneuli Air Base near Tbilisi in Georgia. In October 2002, a Turkish
military delegation attended the formal opening of the United
Military Academy in Tbilisi, set up and co-staffed by the Turkish
armed forces. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Georgian
Lieutenant-General David Tevzadze stressed that instructions would
comply with NATO standards.
Zeyno Baran, director of the Caucasus Project at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, pointed out recently, “In the
past, Georgia had asked the Russians for help against the Ottomans,
but today Georgia receives military, economic and political
assistance from Turkey.” Turkey has become Georgia’s main trading
partner, with a flourishing border trade. There has been talk of
improving railway connection between the two countries, but no
concrete steps have been taken. But as long as Georgia has problems
with Russia, it will need Turkey and the US. Apart from strategic
reasons, Turkey also needs Georgia for its Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline.
It appears that everyone is coming to Georgia’s aid. “For example,
the boots of our soldiers are from Turkey, and their uniforms, worth
9 million euros [$10.8 million], are from Italy. The UK, Romania,
Bulgaria, Israel and the US also help. We do not conceal this,” said
a Georgian press report. The Georgian army will be equipped with
Israeli-made Tavors instead of the classic Kalashnikov (AK-47).
But the US remains the main actor and has successfully replaced an
aging Eduard Shevardnadze with a more pliable Georgian leader. The
skirmishes, or the Great Game, despite the US being embroiled in
Iraq, go on.
K Gajendra Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served as ambassador
to Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that, he served
terms as ambassador to Jordan, Romania and Senegal. He is currently
chairman of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies. E-mail
[email protected].