New French OSCE Minsk Group co-chair appointed

Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
Dec 22 2004

Bernard Fassier has been appointed as the new French co-chair of the
OSCE Minsk Group. He is due to visit the region on January 25.

During the visit, a special mission of the OSCE, jointly with the
MG co-chairs, is expected to visit Upper Garabagh and other occupied
regions of Azerbaijan to look into the illegal settlement of Armenians
there.

Fassier worked as ambassador of France in Georgia in 1990s. Before
his new appointment, he acted as Deputy High Representative of the
European Union mission in Sarajevo.

Fassier attended the recent meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian
foreign ministers in Sofia, along with the OSCE MG co-chairs.
The previous French co-chair Henry Jacolin was expected to give up
the position this summer, but his term was later extended.*

IFEX MEMBERS HIGHLIGHT FREE EXPRESSION CONCERNS AMIDST EU TALKS

IFEX, Canada
Dec 22 2004

As Turkey took one step closer toward membership in the European
Union (EU) with the agreement last week to begin formal accession
talks, IFEX members focused attention on the need to continue
pressing the Turkish government on its free expression record.

The Writers in Prison Committee (WiPC) of International PEN and the
International Publishers Association (IPA) released a set of
recommendations for bringing Turkey’s new Penal Code in line with
European free expression standards.

The groups say the Code, adopted on 27 September 2004, contains
several provisions that discourage debate on sensitive topics,
including Cyprus and the Armenian genocide. They say the EU must
“take action now to eliminate all remaining obstacles to freedom of
expression under Turkish law.”

Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans frontières, RSF) is also
calling for the new Penal Code to be amended. Under Article 305 of
the Code, opinions and statements about Cyprus or Armenia could be
considered “threats against fundamental national interests,” a
provision the European Parliament has said is incompatible with the
1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. The Code also contains a provision (Article 127) under
which the crime of insult can be punishable by up to three years in
prison.

RSF says that while Turkey has made genuine progress in reforming its
laws, the climate continues to remain harsh for journalists who are
outspoken. Turkish courts impose prison sentences and exorbitant
fines that encourage self-censorship, while
television and radio stations remain subject to “brazen censorship,”
the organisation notes.

The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), a regional affiliate of
the International Federation of Journalists, has expressed concerns
that journalists in Turkey do not enjoy the right to collectively
organise within unions. The group warns that a proposed Trade Unions
Law could “deprive journalists of their right to organise
independently in defence of their specific rights.”

Despite these concerns, Human Rights Watch says the EU accession
process has helped bring about significant human rights improvements
in Turkey and strengthened the efforts of reform advocates. The EU’s
decision to start formal accession talks with
Turkey follows an October 2004 evaluation by the European Commission,
which concluded that “Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political
criteria” to begin negotiations.

–Boundary_(ID_n9dV75fuVGb372nIeZUf/w)–

Armenian kin face another setback
By Nancy Lofholm, Denver Post Staff Writer

Denver Post, CO
Dec 22 2004

The government has appealed a ruling that made the eldest daughter
a legal U.S. resident.

Immigration officials have thrown up one more roadblock for an Armenian
family that has been fighting for six years to become legal residents
of the United States.

An attorney for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division
of the Department of Homeland Security has appealed the recent
immigration-court ruling that granted legal status for the eldest
daughter of the Sargsyan family, Nvart Idinyan.

The appeal claims that Idinyan engaged in marriage fraud when she
wed American Vaughn Huckfeldt in her homeland in 1995.

The Sargsyans deny that and blame Huckfeldt for causing all their
immigration woes. They allege he was engaged in human trafficking and
falsely promised to secure visas for Armenians after taking thousands
of dollars from them.

He brought the Sargsyan family to the United States in 1999 after,
they say, Armenians who had been duped out of money for visas by
Huckfeldt were threatening and harassing the Sargsyans.

“My personal belief is that Vaughn Huckfeldt conned them (immigration
officials) as much as he conned Nvart. He is a master con man,”
said Jeff Joseph, the Denver immigration lawyer who is handling the
Sargsyans’ case.

Huckfeldt is reportedly living in Germany and could not be reached for
comment. He faces a warrant for his arrest in the United States, where
he has not paid child support for the son he and Idinyan had in 1996.

Joseph said Huckfeldt alleged after Idinyan filed for divorce in
1999 that she had married him for a green card. Those allegations
were dismissed following a hearing before an immigration judge in
Denver in 2000.

The appeal affects the immigration cases of other members of the
Sargsyan family.

Idinyan remarried, and her current husband has adopted her two minor
brothers. If Idinyan’s legal status had not been challenged, it would
have given her brothers, Gevorg, 20, and Hayk, 17, more legal standing.

Gevorg, Hayk, their father, Ruben, and sister, Meri, recently spent
five weeks in an immigration detention center awaiting deportation.
The matriarch of the family, Susan Idinyan, was not jailed because
her case is being heard separately.

Luisa Aquino, a spokeswoman for Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
said her agency has the right to appeal any decision made by an
immigration judge.

Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Dec 22 2004

EU-Turkey Membership Deal, Subject to De Facto Recognition of Greek
Cyprus

Theme: This report examines the historic agreement taken by European
Union leaders at their 16-17 December summit in Brussels to begin
accession talks with Turkey after 41 years in Europe’s ante-room. The
process will begin on 3 October, 2005 provided Turkey has by then
tacitly recognised Cyprus, which joined the EU in May. Turkey invaded
the island in 1974 and it has been divided since then. Both the
previous Popular Party government (1996-2004) and the current
Socialist administration have been among the most active supporters
of Turkey’s membership.
Summary: EU leaders endorsed the European Commission’s momentous
recommendation on 6 October to open accession talks with Turkey (see
). But they added a
condition which threatened to end the marriage before the two sides
got to the altar. The negotiations almost broke down as a result of
the demand that Ankara formally recognise Cyprus. The situation is
surreal because Turkey is set to join a club one of whose members it
does not formally recognise. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime
Minister, rejected the EU’s first proposal and threatened to abandon
the summit, apparently backed by the chief of the Turkish armed
forces.
Erdogan’s brinkmanship paid off. A compromise was reached under which
Turkey agreed to extend its customs union (as of 1996) to include
Cyprus before October. This allowed Erdogan to save face at home,
particularly among the powerful military, by maintaining that Turkey
was not formally recognising Cyprus but making a gesture of goodwill
tantamount to recognition (see box below).
Other EU entry terms included open-ended talks, no guarantee of full
membership if conditions are not met and the possibility of some
safeguards remaining over the migration of workers from Turkey.
The protracted process for membership during which Turkey has to
harmonise its laws with EU legislation will last at least 10 years
and could be compounded by Austrian and French pledges to hold
referendums on Turkish entry at some point in the future. Every EU
country has the right to veto the accession of a new member. A 1972
poll in France saw two-thirds of voters backing the UK’s accession to
the EU.
As a large (with a population of more than 70 million), poor (with a
per capita income of 27% of the EU-25) and Muslim country, Turkey’s
membership is in a special category of its own with far-reaching
implications for the country and for the Union as a whole.

-The Cyprus Issue:Cyprus is one of the world’s longest unresolved
disputes. In July 1974 the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, a
Greek Cypriot, was deposed in a coup backed by Greece’s military
junta. Turkey, fearing that its traditional enemy would annexe the
island, responded by invading it and enforcing a partition between
the north and south of the island. In 1983 the Turkish-held area
declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is
recognised only by Turkey.

Turkey won sympathy in March 2004 from the international community
because Turkish-Cypriots in the northern part endorsed the UN drafted
reunification plan with a 65% majority while more than three-quarters
of Greek-Cypriots in the south, already granted EU membership,
rejected it. As a result, and to the immense frustration of the UN
and the EU over the historic missed opportunity, only the southern
part joined the EU on May 1 as both sides had to approve the
reunification plan.

Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, in a volte face, bent over backwards for
a power-sharing deal and also opened the border for the first time in
30 years.

But Greek-Cypriots stubbornly resisted any change. Tassos
Papadopoulos, the island’s president, threatened in October, ahead of
the Brussels summit, to veto Turkey’s EU entry if Turkey did not
reduce its 36,000 soldiers in the northern part, allow
Cypriot-registered vessels to dock at Turkish ports and end its veto
of the island’s bid to join international bodies such as the OECD and
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Greek
Cypriot government scuppered the European Commission’s bid in October
to end the economic isolation of northern Cyprus by allowing
Turkish-Cypriots to trade freely with the world. The Greek Cypriot
‘No’ infuriated the European Commission, which wanted to bring the
Turkish community into the economic mainstream.

Erdogan was justifiably angry at Cyprus’ tactics, but was not in a
position to turn his back on the issue as Cyprus might then have
exercised its right to veto Turkey’s EU entry which needed the
approval of all 25 EU countries. Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and
Jacques Chirac brokered a way out of the impasse. Diplomatic
recognition is the trump card which Ankara has yet to play in its
push to find a permanent solution to the anomalous situation. Turkey
is still pressing for the UN plan to be implemented but another
formula may have to be found.-

Analysis: By postponing the start of accession talks until October,
despite the decision taken at the December 2002 Copenhagen summit to
open them “without delay” once the European Council gave the green
light, the EU bowed to a French demand. President Jacques Chirac, a
strong supporter of Turkey despite fierce opposition within his UMP
party, had called for the talks to start after his country’s
referendum on the new European Constitution (expected before the end
of June), fearing the ‘no’ campaign could harness public opposition
to Turkish membership of the EU. ‘If there is a link between Turkey
and the constitution, we will lose the referendum’, said Michel
Barnier, French foreign minister.
The constitution has to be approved by all 25 EU countries in
referendums or parliamentary votes. Spain will be the first EU
country to hold a referendum on 20 February. The prospects for a
French ‘yes’ now look greater, particularly as 59% of Socialist Party
members who voted in an internal ballot backed the treaty, giving a
big boost to the European debate.
The EU’s decision to open the door to Turkey was taken against a
backdrop of rising hostility to Turkey’s membership in some countries
including Spain. In the latest Elcano barometer carried out with CIS,
only 44% of those surveyed were in favour of Turkey’s membership,
compared with 56% in May. According to the latest Eurobarometer
opinion poll, 53% of EU citizens are in favour of further
enlargement, but support falls to just over one third in France and
Germany. Only 39% of those polled in France and 36% in Germany said
they wanted the EU-25 to be expanded. At 28%, support was at its
lowest in Austria. The go-ahead for Turkey, however, was preceded by
a vote in the European Parliament in favour of accession talks (407
to 262 with 29 abstentions).
Erdogan laid down several red lines, particularly on not extending
diplomatic recognition to Cyprus. His political opponents have long
been accused him of being soft on the issue and criticised him after
the summit for paying too high a price for membership talks.
According to the Turkish press, Erdogan told Jan Peter Balkenende,
the Dutch prime minister and current holder of the EU’s presidency,
in an angry exchange during the summit: ‘You are choosing 600,000
Greek Cypriots over 70 million Turks. I have nothing to reproach them
for, but I cannot justify this to my people’. The other red lines
were:
– Negotiations must have Turkey’s complete membership as the final
aim.
– The decision to start talks must not be conditional on later
decisions by EU leaders.
– There should be no special conditions imposed permanently on
Turkey.
The other contentious country issue –Armenia– did not raise its head,
but will have to be dealt with at some point if only because a
country cannot join the EU if it does not have ‘normal’ relations
with all its neighbours. The border with Armenia has been closed
since 1993 due to the Karabag conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia
and other issues including historic tensions arising from the 1915-16
massacre (or ‘genocide’) by Turkey of Armenians. Michel Barnier, the
French foreign minister, spoke to his country’s gallery before the
summit when he urged Turkey to recognise the ‘genocide’. Turkey does
not recognise that it was ‘genocide’ and would like an independent
commission of historians to examine all the archives and pronounce on
the issue.
Erdogan could claim a substantial but not a complete victory, still
sufficient, however, to justify being named European of the Year at
the European Voice awards shortly before the summit. Erdogan was also
nominated as non-European Union citizen of the year. The government
pulled out the stops as much as it could before the summit in order
to impress the EU. For example, it opened up its national security
council, the secretive institution long regarded as Turkey’s main
decision-making body. The council briefed diplomats and the media on
its operations in an unprecedented display of transparency.
The idea of offering a second-class ‘privileged partnership’ for
Turkey, as opposed to the prospect of full membership, demanded by
opponents in the run-up to the summit, particularly Germany’s
opposition Christian Democrats, did not see the light of day. Erdogan
made it very clear that it was all or nothing. EU leaders agreed a
form of words which stressed that the aim of Turkey’s accession talks
would be full membership, but if that was not possible the country
‘must be anchored in European structures’. This wording is more
ambiguous than a reference to ‘privileged partnership’. However, a
key phrase about establishing ‘permanent safeguards’ on allowing
Turkish workers to settle anywhere in the EU was kept in the text.
The decision to open accession talks followed the recommendation of
the European Commission. The main points of its report justifying the
start of talks were:
– Conclusion: ‘Turkey has achieved significant legislative progress
in many areas… Important progress was made on implementation of
political reforms, but these need to be further consolidated and
broadened’.
– Political reforms: ‘Political reforms, in line with the priorities
in the Accession Partnership, have been introduced by… a series of
constitutional and legislative changes adopted over a period of three
years (2001-2004)’.
– Economic reforms: ‘Economic stability and predictability have been
substantially improved since the 2001 economic crisis. Previously
high inflation has come down to historic lows, political interference
reduced and the institutional and regulatory framework has been
brought closer to international standards’.
– Military reforms: ‘The government has increasingly asserted its
control over the military. Although the process of aligning
civil-military relations with EU practice is underway, the armed
forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of
informal channels’.
– Judicial reforms: ‘The independence and efficiency of the judiciary
were strengthened’.
– Human rights: ‘Concerning… the respect of human rights and the
exercise of fundamental freedoms, Turkey has acceded to most relevant
international and European conventions’.
– Torture: ‘The authorities have adopted a zero tolerance policy
towards torture and a number of perpetrators have been punished.
Torture is no longer systematic, but numerous cases of ill-treatment,
including torture, still continue to occur and further efforts will
be required to eradicate such practices’.
– Women’s rights: ‘The situation of women is still unsatisfactory;
discrimination and violence against women, including “honour
killings”, remain a major problem’.
– Children’s rights: ‘Children’s rights were strengthened, but child
labour remains an issue of serious concern’.
– Minority rights: ‘The OSCE [Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe] High Commissioner on National Minorities
could play a valuable role in assisting Turkey to move towards full
compliance with modern international standards on the treatment of
minorities, including the Kurds’.
– Freedom of religion: ‘Although freedom of religious belief is
guaranteed by the constitution… non-Muslim religious communities
continue to experience problems’.
– Freedom of the press: ‘Notable progress has been made, (but)…
journalists, writers and publishers continue to be sentenced for
reasons that contravene the standards of the European Court of Human
Rights’.
Between this report and the summit the debate on Turkey among
opponents and supporters became very intense. The greatest
controversy was caused by Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the former French
president and president of the European Convention, who once again
took up the cudgels against Turkey. It was Giscard who said in 2002
that Turkey was ‘not a European country’ and its membership would
spell ‘the end of Europe’ and he followed this up less than a month
before the Brussels summit by saying that the proposed new European
Constitution (whose drafting he presided over) was ‘not designed to
accommodate a power the size of Turkey’.(1) ‘Accession by Turkey,
whenever it took place, would make the country the major
decision-maker in the European Union, and would change the nature of
the European project’.
Giscard’s remarks provoked many comments, including a letter
published in the Financial Times by Ana de Palacio, a former Spanish
Foreign Minister and a member of the Praesidium of the European
Convention. She criticised Giscard for failing ‘to bring much reason
to the debate over Turkey’ and suggested that he might have had in
mind the problems that the double-majority issue would cause for
Turkey when he wrote it into the new constitution.
Under a key provision of the new constitution (which has to be
approved by all countries in referendums or parliamentary votes),
known as double-majority voting, Turkey would automatically be
accorded a strong position in EU decision-making. Under the
constitution all decisions that do not need to be made unanimously
–many matters, especially foreign policy and taxation, still do– must
be backed by at least 65% of the EU’s population and 55% of member
states. Put another way, any country would need support from 35% of
the EU population and 45% of member states to block a proposal it did
not like. Turkey’s population (80 million in 2015, the earliest date
when it would join the EU assuming all goes well, roughly the same as
Germany’s) gives it considerable power, but even if it is the most
populous country it would not be able to block any decisions alone;
it would need the populations of at least two other big countries to
meet the required 35% mark.
In another letter in the FT, Stephen Wall, Tony Blair’s former EU
adviser, took Giscard to task for saying in his article that all
Turkey was offered in its 1963 associate member agreement with the
European Community was membership of the Common Market. This was
incorrect, he said, and cited the text of the agreement: ‘As soon as
the operation of the agreement has advanced far enough to justify
envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out
of the treaty establishing the Community, the contracting parties
shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the
Community’. Giscard conveniently forgot this.
EU membership is of huge importance for the economy for three main
reasons. First, it will make the Customs Union (as of 1996)
irreversible because as long as Turkey remains outside the EU bloc,
it can be reversed by either party. Far from wiping out some Turkish
businesses, as they feared at the onset, the Customs Union has been
very good for Turkish exports and companies have stood their ground
in the face of increased imports. For example, exports of automotive
components have risen from US$155 million in 1995 to around US$5
billion. Secondly, the risk premium on public debt will fall (this
has already started), both easing the pressure on public finances and
improving the performance of the economy. Thirdly, inflows of foreign
direct investment will probably surge from their current very low
levels, leading to higher growth rates and lower unemployment.
Turkey’s stock of investment is lower today than it was in the 1980s;
annual inflows have rarely reached more than US$1 billion (Spain and
Ireland both attracted over US$25 billion in 2003). The Istanbul
Stock Exchange hit a record high the day the EU made its
announcement.
Some analysts ambitiously forecast that Turkey’s per capita income
could increase over the next 10 years from around €4,000 to €14,000
in purchasing power parity terms, spurred by the country’s clearer
horizon.
The Turkish economy has been something of a star in the last year
after recovering from its 2001 crisis. The economy is by far the
fastest growing in Europe and the inflation rate has fallen to single
figures for the first time since 1972. The IMF recognised Turkey’s
progress two days before the start of the Brussels EU summit when it
announced a new three-year US$10 billion stand-by agreement which,
according to Rodrigo Rato, the IMF’s managing director, ‘should allow
Turkey to exit from further IMF financial support’.
As a result of finally getting inflation under control, on 1 January
Turkey will remove six noughts from the face value of the lira: one
unit of the local currency will then be worth what one million are
now (€0.53), welcome news for tourists and foreign investors who have
to mentally wrestle with strings of zeros and carry wads of notes.
Yet the economy remains vulnerable. Turkey has massive debts
including US$23 billion owed to the IMF and billions borrowed via the
international bond markets. At around 80% of GDP, Turkey’s gross debt
is double that of the new EU member status. Turkey’s debts have
largely arisen from its efforts to push through banking reform after
a run on the banks in 2001 caused the country’s devastating
recession.
Spain, with its experience of having spent eight years negotiating
its much easier EU membership (between 1978 and 1986), worked behind
the scenes to encourage Turkish politicians to keep their cool in the
face of those countries, like Cyprus, using the summit as an open
agenda to settle old scores and stay focused on the overriding goal
of membership.
Spain could well be a useful model for Turkey when the talks start.
The same fears about impoverished workers flooding the European
labour market existed about Spain 20 years ago as are now being made
about Turkey. An often overlooked point in the debate about a
possible surge in Turkish immigrants to the EU is that, like Spain,
Turkey will itself become a magnet for immigrants when it is a full
EU member. Just as no one in Spain could have predicted 20 years ago
that today there would be an estimated more than one million North
Africans in Spain, so too it is quite likely that a richer Turkey
will attract workers from Iran, Iraq, Syria and other poorer
countries with whom it shares a border.
Conclusion: Turkey has achieved impressive reforms on all fronts
since it was declared an EU candidate in 1999. The long and uncertain
process that now opens will be more wrenching.

Notes:
(1)See his article ‘A better European bridge to Turkey’ (Financial
Times, 24 November, 2004).

–Boundary_(ID_W5hHqaZhyB3GKQeA+ZdtMw)–

And on the Farm He Had Caviar (E-I-E-I-O)
By FLORENCE FABRICANT

New York Times
Dec 22 2004

Published: December 22, 2004

IT is time to add new players to the usual caviar vocabulary of beluga,
osetra and sevruga: transmontanus and baerii.

Farm-raised caviar is becoming a better option than the shrinking and
restricted wild harvest, and the sturgeons of choice are Acipenser
transmontanus and Acipenser baerii. These terms are showing up on
caviar tins.

The quality of farm-raised caviar has improved dramatically, and the
amount that is available keeps increasing. It is being produced in
California, France, Italy and Uruguay, and experiments are also under
way in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Germany and Armenia.

Cultivated caviar is a response to decreasing supplies of Caspian
Sea caviar. The quotas for the 2004 catch have been sharply reduced
to protect the fish. That and the weak American dollar are driving
the already exorbitant price of wild caviar even higher, starting at
about $60 an ounce compared with $30 and up for farm-raised.

Armen Petrossian, the chairman of the caviar company that bears his
name, said: “Today about 25 tons of caviar are farm-raised, compared
with about 180 tons of wild. In five years I would estimate we’ll
see 150 tons of farm-raised on the world market.”

Petrossian now sells transmontanus caviar, which is also called
white sturgeon, from Stolt Sea Farm in California. It is $40 to
$45 an ounce in two grades: royal, which I found to have an earthy,
osetralike flavor, and imperial, which has a delicacy like beluga.
Stolt Sea Farm’s caviar is also marketed under the brand name Sterling
and is available at Zabar’s for $65 for two ounces.

Browne Trading in Portland, Me., is selling transmontanus from Italy
at about $50 an ounce. The texture of the dark grains is impeccable,
with a flavor that has sweetness and hints of black truffle. This
caviar is also available at Balducci’s stores.

(Exact price comparisons are difficult to make because some places
sell caviar by the gram and others sell it by the ounce. The price
usually drops for larger amounts.)

Tsar Nicoulai, another California company, is producing good, buttery
transmontanus, which it sells for $53 to $63 an ounce, depending on
the grade. Williams-Sonoma has it, too, for $65 an ounce (in two-ounce
tins) for select, the higher grade.

A type of Siberian sturgeon, Acipenser baerii, is being cultivated
in Uruguay. At Eli’s Manhattan, it is $37 an ounce. This baerii has
a smallish, sevrugalike grain and darkness, but is exceptionally
clean tasting, with delightful nutty overtones. Paramount Caviar in
Long Island City, Queens, also carries the Uruguayan caviar at $45
an ounce, but is now sold out and awaiting a shipment.

Acipenser baerii has been cultivated in the Bordeaux region of
France for about five years. D’Artagnan’s house brand is from Caviar
d’Aquitaine, owned by Pierre Bergé, a former partner in Yves Saint
Laurent. It is just under $60 an ounce. This caviar is dark gray
with a clean, fresh salinity. Petrossian sells French baerii from a
different company for around $60 an ounce; it has a small grain and
a softer texture than the company’s cheaper transmontanus. The flavor
is not quite as bright.

At prices like these for cultivated caviar, you might consider wild
Caspian Sea caviar after all, unless political or environmental issues
are factors. But it is best to buy only from Iran or Azerbaijan.

Earlier this year it seemed doubtful that any Caspian Sea caviar from
the 2004 catch would be approved for sale. In October wild caviar was
finally given the green light by the international organization that
regulates the trade, and by the federal Fish and Wildlife Service.

Fine Azerbaijan osetra from the 2004 catch is around $60 an ounce.
Delicious, classic Iranian osetra, which meets extremely high
standards, starts at around $75 an ounce most places, more for caviar
labeled golden or imperial.

As for beluga, which once dominated American caviar sales, little
is available, because of restrictions placed on the catch. Also, no
fresh caviar is coming in from Russia. This season the best beluga
is from Romania, on the Black Sea, for at least $85 an ounce.

“Prices are now as high as I have ever seen them,” Mr. Petrossian
said. “They may come down a bit after the holidays. But we are trying
to get our customers to experiment with different caviars. You can’t
just sell beluga anymore.”

Whether caviar is purchased from shops, mail-order catalogs or online,
the jar or tin should be labeled as to type of caviar and country of
origin. Those that say only “Caspian Sea” are best avoided because
they could be from an older harvest.

And if you want to indulge in caviar in a restaurant but shudder to
think of the price, there is a bring-your-own policy until Jan. 1
at Le Périgord, 405 East 52nd Street. The accouterments are on the
house. Georges Briguet, the owner, is also serving Iranian osetra at
cost, $130 for two ounces, for what may be the only caviar bargain
around.

–Boundary_(ID_ZnS3ahAlzGpwONCVc2D3YA)–

Zenit News Agency, Italy
Dec 22 2004

Christian Martyrs: Witnesses for the World

Says Secretary of Congregation for Sainthood Causes

VATICAN CITY, DEC. 21, 2004 (Zenit.org).- Because of the values
they incarnated, Christian martyrs are the patrimony of the whole of
humanity, not only of the Church, says a Vatican official.

Archbishop Edward Nowak, secretary of the Congregation for Sainthood
Causes, made that point during an address at the inauguration of
the new academic year of the “Studium” of the Vatican dicastery,
held at the Patristic Institute Augustinianum.

The “Studium” was established 20 years ago in response to the need to
form people specialized in carrying forward a cause of canonization,
from the first phases. Until last year, the studies were carried out
by more than 1,600 people.

The text of the monsignor’s introduction, with the title in Italian
“The Church Is Again the Church of Martyrs,” was issued earlier this
month by L’Osservatore Romano.

“The century that has just ended was presented as a time of very many
martyrs. Some historians say that, in the 20th century, Christianity
experienced the greatest persecution of its history,” the prelate
noted.

According to John Paul II, “at the end of the second millennium,
the Church is again the Church of martyrs, the persecutions against
believers, priests, religious and laity have produced a great sowing
of martyrs in different parts of the world.”

Martyrdom always has formed a part of the life of the Church,
Archbishop Nowak said. He mentioned for example the persecution of
the Armenian people, the Spanish and Mexican martyrs, and the victims
of the Nazi and Communist eras, as well as the present time.

“The martyrs are, in the first place, an inestimable and precious
value in itself for the Church herself,” he said. “In the second
place, they are bearers of a great message. Their martyrdom is above
all the testimony of faith and of the Church.

“In particular, the martyr is a witness who has undertaken the
following of Christ, to the giving up of his life, in order to witness
to the truth of the Gospel.”

The Vatican official said that martyrdom is “the scandal, the absurd,
the paradox of Christianity. From a martyr who was killed, other
faithful were born, hundreds, thousands. There is no reasonable
explanation. Perhaps there is one, namely the person of Christ, his
defeat on the cross, which generated Christianity, and millions and
millions of Christians in all ages.”

The secretary of the Congregation for Sainthood Causes added that
“the martyrs are also a great patrimony of humanity. These persons,
in civil language, are the heroes of society.”

“They incarnate values of civility, fidelity, solidarity, primacy
of conscience, primacy of being over having, heroism unto death,
forgiveness, and help,” he added. “Because of this, they are the most
beautiful and true pages of history. Not only those of the Church
but also of humanity.”
From: Baghdasarian

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12/21/2004
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1) No Other Document on Karabagh Is As Pro-Azeri As Atkinson’s Report
2) Minsk Group to Inspect Mountainous Karabagh Territories
3) Sheikh Sultan Inaugurates Armenian Cultural Show

1) No Other Document on Karabagh Is As Pro-Azeri As Atkinson’s Report

By Tatoul Hakobian

(AZG)–The former Russian co-chair of OSCE Minsk Group Vladimir Kazimirov,
dissatisfied with the Parliamentary of Council of Europe’s (PACE) latest
report
on the Mountainous Karabagh conflict, wrote a letter to PACE rapporteur David
Atkinson, who authored the report. 
Kazimirov, who chaired Russia’s mediating mission in Karabagh, particularly
blasted the pro-Azerbaijan nature of the report. “The most important
international documents on Mountainous Karabagh always maintained balance in
order to make it easy for the sides to compromise. None of them has ever been
as single-mindedly pro-Azeri as yours,” Kazimirov wrote.
Having visited the Karabagh conflict zone 47 times, Kazimirov, considered an
expert on the conflict, says both Atkinson’s report, as well as his
predecessor’s Terry Davis’s, neglect the history of the confrontation, the
1992-1994 war, and the conflict regulation process.
“Many issues of the conflict resulted from actions on both sides; yet your
approach pins the entire blame on the Armenian side. I am not trying to
justify
the Armenians; I only say that we need to be impartial in assessing the
actions
of both sides. Moreover, it was Azerbaijan that wanted to settle the Karabagh
issue by means of force–that rejected all steps to ease the tension,” he
writes.
Kazimirov stresses that Mountainous Karabagh, both in the UN formulas and OSCE
documents, was either directly or indirectly recognized as a side to the
conflict: “Only your formula overlooks this issue and recognizes only Armenia
and Azerbaijan as sides–thus playing into Baku’s hands.” He recalls that the
OSCE Budapest summit also mentions “three sides” to the conflict.
He criticizes the report’s emphasis on the importance of Karabagh’s Azeri
community. “Azerbaijan is a side to conflict–not the Azeri population in
Mountainous Karabagh. There is no difference of viewpoints between
Azerbaijan’s
and Karabagh’s Azeri population,” he stresses. “Could it be that it is
appropriate to use the terms, ‘London’s British community,’ ‘Baku’s Azeri
community,’ or ‘Moscow’s Russian community’?”
Both the Davis and Atkinson reports, Kazimirov writes, refer to the four UN
resolutions on the Karabagh conflict, accenting only demands for the
withdrawal
of Armenian Armed forces. Kazimirov stresses, however, that even having lost
control over their territories, Azerbaijan’s leadership persisted in their
attempts to solve the conflict by force. Already having all the four
resolutions of the UN Security Council, Baku directly ignored the chances of
putting an end to hostilities three times.
“Azerbaijan agreed on ceasefire under the threat of all-out defeat and loss of
power–not to implement the UN Security Council’s resolutions. The Armenians
also had many problems, but they turned to be more flexible and constructive,”
Kazimirov reminds.
The Russian diplomat concedes that the Armenians did not withdraw forces from
the occupied territories, as stipulated by the UN formula, “But, in fact,
Azerbaijan has not implemented any of the demands put forth by the UN either,
and continue to this day to do nothing. Moreover, they demand that Turkey
maintains its blockade of Armenia, threatens–time after time–to resume the
war, and encourages anti-Armenian hysteria in Azerbaijan–but there is no word
about this [in Atkinson’s report].”
Toward the end of his letter, Kazimirov reminds Atkinson that Armenia has full
control over five regions and partial over two–not eight as Atkinson
contends.
He also notes that Azerbaijan also occupies Armenian territories such as
Artsvashen.
Kazimirov ends the letter with hope that a distinguished organization, such as
PACE, will be able to demonstrate a balanced approach in the Karabagh
conflict.

2) Minsk Group to Inspect Mountainous Karabagh Territories

BAKU (Armenpress)–A Minsk Group fact-finding mission to Mountainous Karabagh
in late January will seek to find out whether Armenians inhabit the “occupied
territories,” according to the Minsk Group’s Russian co-chairman Yuri
Merzlyakov.
Azerbaijan’s “525” daily reported that all three Minsk Group co-chairmen will
participate, along with representatives from Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and
Finland–all OSCE Minsk Group participating countries.
The Russian co-chairman revealed that the co-chairmen will most likely visit
Yerevan and Baku at the beginning of January to clarify the details of their
visit to Karabagh.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group is
headed by the Co-chairmanship consisting of France, the Russian Federation,
and
the United States, and includes participating countries Belarus, Germany,
Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, as well as Armenia
and Azerbaijan.

3) Sheikh Sultan Inaugurates Armenian Cultural Show

SHARJAH (Sharjah-Welcome.Com)–Supreme Council Member and Ruler of Sharjah His
Highness Dr. Sheikh Sultan Bin Mohammed Al Qassimi, inaugurated on Sunday the
Armenian cultural exhibition at the art district.
The art exhibition, which showcases more than 60 paintings and various other
Armenian artworks, is in celebration of Sharjah’s Armenian Cultural Week.
Armenian Minister of Culture and Youth Affairs Hovik Hoveyan is visiting the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the occasion. During his visit, a memorandum of
understanding between Sharjah and Armenia was signed to consolidate cultural
relations between the two countries and exchange expertise among Armenian and
UAE artists.
The formal inauguration was attended by various officials, among them Chairman
of Sharjah Department of Culture and Information Sheikh Essam bin Saqr Al
Qasimi, Armenia’s Ambassador to the UAE Dr. Arshak Poladyan, and
Director-General of the Department of Culture and Information Abullah bin
Mohammed bin Owais.
Dr. Poladyan told Khaleej Times that through the initiative of Armenian
Cultural Week, Sharjah residents will be able to gain more knowledge about
Armenian culture, art, and folklore.
Commending Dr. Sheikh Sultan’s proposal, Poladyan said, “Dr. Sheikh Sultan
showed great dedication in organizing and highlighting the Armenian cultural
days in Sharjah–a very well known cultural hub. Armenian Cultural Week will
strengthen the cultural ties between the UAE and Armenia and exchange various
creative ideas between the artists.”
Dr. Sheikh Sultan expressed his appreciation of Armenian art while viewing the
exhibition area, where a number of Armenian paintings and carpets are
displayed.
      According to the signed memorandum, the upcoming Sharjah Cultural Days
2005 will be held in Armenia.

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Saakashvili’s campaign against corruption
By Molly Corso for PINR (22/12/04)

ISN, Switzerland
Dec 22 2004

Once the Georgian government starts interfering with the status quo
of people’s daily lives, President Saakashvili’s popularity might
drop and the public could quickly lose taste for strong reforms.

Corruption has plagued Georgia – as well as its neighbors Armenia and
Azerbaijan – for generations. While it was a problem even during the
Soviet regime, ever since the former republics gained their
independence in the early 1990s, the degree of corruption has
crippled economic development and stifled attempts at reform. The new
government in Georgia, which won power on a reformist platform, is
widely viewed in the country as Georgia’s last chance to defeat the
spread of corruption and create a stable economy and law-abiding
society. Before the peaceful revolution of November 2003, Georgian
President Eduard Shevardnadze had been unsuccessful in curbing the
rapid growth of corruption throughout Georgian society and the
political process. Corruption in Georgia under the leadership of
Shevardnadze was so widespread it affected life on nearly every
level. Despite very strong laws against corruption, little was done
to enforce them. Blatant vote rigging and fraud led to his
government’s demise last fall, shortly replaced by younger
politicians on a reform platform. Even as Georgians rejoiced Mikhail
Saakashvili’s victory, activists stated that the new government would
have to prove it was better at fighting corruption than the former
president, otherwise Saakashvili would share his fate. Corruption
among the Georgian authorities is so widespread that it consistently
affects foreign investments. Investors originally saw Georgia as a
land of opportunity as the country is strategically located between
Europe and Asia. Plans for new oil and gas pipelines created an
economic boom for Azerbaijan in the early 1990s and observers fully
expected Georgia to receive part of that wealth. But corrupt
officials, coupled with unclear laws and tax policies, continue to
frustrate investors. The foreign investment community was further
antagonized by high-level kidnappings and threats for ransom and
bribes. The American electricity provider, AES, which took over
electricity distribution in Georgia in the late 1990s, was repeatedly
taken to court and threatened. In August of 2002, the company’s CFO,
Nika Lominadze, was murdered. Other high profile cases include the
kidnapping of the Welsh banker Peter Shaw in July 2002. Although no
ransom was reportedly paid, Shaw escaped his captors after four
months of imprisonment. While the Georgian government ascertained
Shaw escaped due to a special military operation, speculation
continued after Shaw’s release that members of the government were
involved in the kidnapping business.

A turn of the tide

While the 2003 parliament election might have started like business
as usual, protestors and politicians quickly assembled in front of
the parliament to protest the voting results. After weeks of
protests, Shevardnadze resigned on 23 November. Mikhail Saakashvili,
a former justice minister in Shevardnadze’s government from
2000-2001, was voted into office 4 January 2004 with 96 per cent of
the vote. Originally seen as Shevardnadze’s groomed pupil,
Saakashvili left his position as the justice minister, citing that he
believed it was “immoral” to remain a part of the corrupt government.
He became one of the loudest voices of the opposition in the years
leading up to his election, and one of the country’s most popular
politicians. He was a visible face during the protests and led the
charge into parliament the day before Shevardnadze resigned.
Saakashvili started out his presidency with strong words. “We need to
introduce in the parliament very drastic anti-corruption legislation
that would give vast powers to a new elite, small, honest
investigative unit that would really tackle high-level corruption,”
he said in January 2004. During his inauguration speech, he pressed,
“We must root out corruption. As far as I am concerned, every corrupt
official is a traitor who betrays the national interest.” Many hoped
the difference would be Saakashvili’s young age, 36, and the Western
influence brought through his education in the US. With a high
popularity rating – and no real opposition – Saakashvili was free to
implement any reforms or laws he felt fit. Many supporters were
alarmed when one of his first acts, in addition to the high profile
arrests of infamous businessmen like Gia Jokhtaberidze,
Shevardnadze’s son-in-law, included constitutional amendments to
consolidate his power. While the overall response to reforms from the
business sector has been positive, Badri Patarkatsishvili, who is the
president of the Georgian Federation of Businessmen, has repeatedly
stated that businessmen in Georgia should feel secure and know that
their rights will be honored. In an interview with the BBC in January
2003, Saakashvili stated that one of his top priorities for Georgia
was creating a stable and safe climate for investors. As early as
February, the new government was warned by the Visiting Council of
Europe Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer that the country’s fight
against corruption should not abuse the law. Critics of the new
government also began citing media intimidation and accusing the
government of arresting political enemies without adhering to the due
process required by law. Although criticism of the new government
continued, culminating in an open letter to the president by
prominent civil leaders in Georgia, the new president has not backed
down from his system of arrests and has not made any open efforts to
compromise with the growing opposition. The open letter, published
widely in Georgia, spoke of a growing concern that Saakashvili was
actively squashing public debate with nationalist rhetoric, as well
as failing to come to terms with his power in a “post-revolution”
society. Nevertheless, during his first year in office, Saakashvili
has made progress encouraging foreign investment in his country.
Georgia was included in the EU’s New Neighborhood Initiative and
received one billion dollars in pledges to help finance reforms.

Neighboring states concerned over the Georgian example

Neighboring countries throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia are
threatened by Saakashvili’s November rise to power and his rhetoric
against corruption. A 25 November 2003 emergency meeting of foreign
ministers from the Commonwealth of Independent States in Kiev
highlighted the fear of neighboring governments that Georgia’s new
crusader against corruption would also adversely affect the status
quo in their countries. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, opposition
parties celebrated the resignation of Shevardnadze. Although both
Azeri President Ilham Aliev and Armenian President Robert Kocharian
were not openly supportive of Saakashvili in November, the overriding
element in their relationship revolves around commerce and trade.
Both presidents have conducted high profile trips to Georgia in the
past year, and Saakashvili has warmly welcomed them both as
“brothers”. Georgian election observers, however, were not welcome in
Ukraine. Despite the chilly official reception, Georgians traveled to
Kiev and participated in the protests following the November run-off
election. The Georgian Foreign Ministry issued statements on November
28 supporting the call for a Ukrainian revote. Georgian Prime
Minister Zurab Zhvania also supported the protestors, wishing Ukraine
a “victory of justice and democracy”. Georgia’s relationship with
Russia was strained during Shevardnadze’s presidency. Despite a
positive beginning, that relationship has rapidly deteriorated under
Saakashvili. During the protests calling for Shevardnadze’s
resignation, it was widely feared in the country that Russia would
strongly back Shevardnadze. However, after some initial support, then
Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov flew to Tbilisi on 22 November
to help ease tensions, and he has been given credit for helping the
country avoid violence. Warm relations between the countries
continued through the summer, highlighted when a large group of
potential Russian investors came to Tbilisi in May to discuss joint
business projects between the countries. During the convention,
Russian businessmen repeatedly emphasized the need for a stable, safe
investment climate and tax reforms. Talk of business investment was
overshadowed by the growing violence in South Ossetia, however, and
Russian involvement in Abkhazia. Currently, the administration in
Georgia is dealing with Moscow’s accusations of anti-Russian
militants hiding in the country, near the border between Chechnya and
Georgia, and the likelihood that Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border patrols will not continue after
the mandate expires later this month. Furthermore, an ongoing point
of contention between the two governments is the existence of two
Russian army bases that still exist within Georgian territory. The
Russians use the bases to potentially influence Georgian affairs,
explaining why Tbilisi wants them removed. No real progress has been
made on this issue. Georgia’s relationship with the US has improved
under Saakashvili. Although accusations of heavy-handed policies have
grown against the current administration, the US has been a steadfast
supporter of Saakashvili and his reforms. In light of the current
reforms taking place in the military, the US government has pledged
over US$15 million to help modernize the Georgian army and
Saakashvili has already sent over 150 soldiers to Iraq. Georgian
soldiers are involved in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan as
well, and Saakashvili has promised that over Georgian 800 soldiers
will eventually be dispatched. While Western powers initially faced a
quandary supporting the overthrow of an elected president, once the
degree of civil outrage toward the election became obvious, the US
issued a strong rebuke against Shevardnadze and his handling of the
election.

Rhetoric and reason

President Saakashvili has had some success fighting corruption
through tax reform and large scale arrests that include politicians
from the former regime and powerful businessmen. His peaceful
acquisition of the semi-autonomous Adjarian republic has given the
central government a great opportunity to reform invasive corruption
throughout the republic, especially in tax collection. The new tax
code, scheduled to begin February 2005, should help the government
receive lost revenue as well as prove to potential investors that the
new regime is serious about reform. Criticism of Saakashvili’s
policies is not unfounded. By refusing to follow due process, his
program of arrests could backfire by turning the accused into victims
in the eyes of the public. To date, the arrests have largely been
centered on high profile politicians and business leaders. In order
to fully eradicate corruption, citizens and low-level civil servants
involved in bribery and the black market will also need to be
arrested. Once the government starts interfering with the status quo
of people’s daily lives, Saakashvili’s popularity might drop and the
public could quickly lose taste for strong reforms. While he has
hired supporters of democracy into his government, he has distanced
himself from civil leaders outside of his government. Prominent civil
leaders in Georgia are giving Saakashvili some leeway as he gains
experience in office. However, his success will depend on his ability
to compromise heady rhetoric with reasonable public policy to lead
his country through difficult and painful reforms.

This article originally appeared in Power and Interest News
Report, PINR, at (). All comments should be directed
to [email protected].

EU, NATO TREAT FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS AS NEXT PHASE IN EXPANDING THEIR INFLUENCE

RIA Novosti, Russia
Dec 22 2004

MOSCOW, December 22 (RIA Novosti) – The European Union and NATO
are treating the former Soviet republics as the next phase in the
efforts to expand their influence, Konstantin Kosachev, the head of
the international committee of the State Duma, the lower house of
parliament, told reporters on Wednesday.

Mr. Kosachev said the EU and NATO “are beginning to divide the CIS
states into more preferable and closer partners in the integration
process and less preferable ones.”

Mr. Kosachev said Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were among the former.
Belarus and five Central Asian states are not prepared to take part in
the integration processes, according to the MP. Mr. Kosachev believes
Azerbaijan and Armenia are somewhere in between the two groups.

Mr. Kosachev believes the situation is unfavorable for Russia. “The
West used to stake on democratic changes in Russia as the means of
implementing joint projects, whereas today its motto is: ‘if we did
not succeed in democratizing Russia, let us demonize it.'”

Mr. Kosachev said the European Parliament and the OSCE had subjected
Russia to constructive criticism recently, as well as accused it of
the “sins” other countries could afford.

While working to turn Russia into some rogue state, the EU and NATO
are getting Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia more energetically involved
in the integration processes.

“This shows that the EU and Russia have failed to implement their
major project of creating a common European space with no dividing
lines,” said Mr. Kosachev.

French Prime Minister Raffarin uses ‘Genocide’ Term

Zaman, Turkey
Dec 22 2004

French Prime Minister Jean Pierre Raffarin has followed the lead of
his Foreign Minister, Michel Barnier, in using the expression
“Armenian Genocide” publicly.

At a session organized at the French Parliament to discuss the
opening of membership negotiations between the European Union (EU)
and Turkey, Raffarin disclosed that they have prepared a law on
“Armenian Genocide” at the parliament and that the Armenian and
Kurdish issues will be raised with Turkey. Raffarin pointed out that
Turkey’s EU perspective was assigned in 1963 and that no French
administrations have considered Turkey’s EU membership as a subject
worth discussing since then. He emphasized that nothing can keep
Turkey out of Europe once Turkey fulfills all the requirements and it
will become an EU member.

12.22.2004
Ali Ihsan Aydin