California Courier Online, March 3, 2005

California Courier Online, March 3, 2005

1 – Commentary
US Ambassador Asked to Clarify
Comments on Genocide & Karabagh
By Harut Sassounian
California Courier Publisher
2 – The Astor Broadcast Group Grows
With One Leg in the Inland Empire
3 – Melkonian to Speak in Fresno on
New Book About Brother Monte
4 – Weekly Show Connects Youth
To the Entertainment World
5 – Letters to the Editor
6 – Singapore Armenian Church
Will Mark 170th Anniversary
7 – Bone Marrow Drive to Help
Save L.A.’s Arlene Titizian
8 – CSUN Presents March 8 Literary Evening
With Three Armenian American Authors
9 – UAF Reaches $400 Million Mark
In Relief Supplies to Armenia
*************************************************************************
1 – Commentary
US Ambassador Asked to Clarify
Comments on Genocide & Karabagh

By Harut Sassounian,
Publisher, The California Courier

The U.S. Ambassador to Armenia issued “a clarification” on Monday regarding
the statements he had made on the Armenian Genocide and Karabagh during his
meetings two weeks ago with the Armenian American community.
Given the euphemisms used by successive U.S. administrations to sidestep
the use of the term “Armenian Genocide,” it was refreshing for Armenian
Americans to hear a U.S. official who properly and repeatedly referred to
the Armenian Genocide, as genocide.
Amb. Evans made his candid remarks during private as well as public
meetings with the community in various U.S. cities. He was reported to have
said during a public gathering at the University of California at Berkeley,
“I will today call it the Armenian Genocide.” Stating that he had studied
extensively the facts of the Genocide, the U.S. Ambassador Said, “I
informed myself in depth about it. I think we, the US government, owe you,
our fellow citizens, a more frank and honest way of discussing this
problem. Today, as someone who has studied it… there’s no doubt in my mind
what happened…. I think it is unbecoming of us, as Americans, to play word
games here. I believe in calling things by their name.” He did point out,
however, that the official policy of the U.S. government on this issue had
still not changed. Calling the Armenian Genocide “the first genocide of the
20th century,” he said, “I pledge to you, we are going to do a better job
at addressing this issue.” Amb. Evans also disclosed that he had consulted
with a legal advisor at the State Department who had confirmed that the
events of 1915 were “genocide by definition.”
In response to a question on Karabagh, Amb. Evans was quoted as saying:
“everybody realizes that Karabagh can’t be given back to Azerbaijan. That
would be a disastrous step.”
In my opinion, Amb. Evans did not say anything new or earth-shattering.
Back in 1981, someone in a much higher position than a mere ambassador, the
President of the United States — Ronald Reagan — issued a presidential
proclamation in which he specifically referred to “the genocide of the
Armenians.” The U.S. House of Representatives twice (in 1975 and 1984)
adopted resolutions commemorating the Armenian Genocide. Based on these
precedents, the Ambassador’s remarks should not have been controversial at
all.
The Ambassador’s comments on Karabagh were also factual and sensible. He is
absolutely correct that Armenians would never willingly give Karabagh back
to Azerbaijan. They spilled their blood to liberate that precious piece of
historic Armenian territory. After such a sacrifice, no Armenian official
would ever think of returning Karabagh’s Armenian population to the cruel
and tyrannical rule of Azerbaijan.
In the clarification issued by the U.S. Embassy in Armenia on Monday, Amb.
Evans alluded to “misunderstandings” that may have arisen as a result of
his earlier comments. He said he used the term “genocide” in his “personal
capacity,” which he now found to be “inappropriate.” Copying the words used
by Pres. George W. Bush in his annual April 24 statement, Amb. Evans
described the Armenian genocide as a “tragedy,” “horrific events,” and “the
forced killing and exile of Armenians in 1915.”
Amb. Evans said that his “comments on the status of Nagorno Karabagh may
have also created misunderstanding on U.S. policy. The U.S. government
supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and holds that the future
status of Nagorno Karabagh is a matter of negotiation between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.”
Even though there has been recently a lot of bad blood between Turkey and
the United States, their discord apparently has not reached a level that
would force Bush administration officials to reconsider their complicity in
Turkey’s shameful denial of the Armenian Genocide. The ideological bias of
a small but powerful clique of neo-conservative Turkophiles in Washington
holds such a sway over U.S. foreign policy that when Turkish and
Azerbaijani officials complained about Amb. Evans, they found a receptive
audience.
Nevertheless, I believe that this whole controversy has its beneficial
aspects for the Armenian Cause. The Turks, the Azeris and their surrogates
in Washington had to spend some of their valuable political capital to get
this “clarification” issued. They cannot go to the same well too many
times, before the cost becomes too prohibitive for them. While Turkey’s
clout in Washington is waning, the Armenians have just started implementing
their yearlong activities worldwide to commemorate the 90th anniversary of
the Armenian Genocide.
Thanks to the Turkish and Azeri over-reactions and the media coverage of
this controversy, the Armenian Genocide has become once again an important
topic of discussion in various capitals, including Ankara and Washington.
It is only a matter of time before Turkish and U.S. officials give up their
untenable denials of the Armenian Genocide. The only remaining question is
would they do it willingly and with dignity or would they have to be
dragged into admitting the inevitable, losing all respect in the process!

**************************************************************************
2 – The Astor Broadcast Group Grows
With One Leg in the Inland Empire
Inland Empire Business Journal (California)
By Joe Lyons
The history of the Astor Broadcast Group is the history of Art Astor. He
was born into an Armenian immigrant family. After a tour in the Army Air
Corps (earning him the Air Medal with four clusters) he took a
communications degree from USC in 1949 on the G.I. Bill.
His loyalty to the school remains apparent as he wears the cardinal and
gold colors at least once a week and carries the football and basketball
broadcasts on KSPA, his Ontario station. But that’s getting ahead of the
story.
Degree in hand, he started in TV as what he describes as `the Armenian Dick
Clark,’ but that was 50 years ago. Among other positions, he headed the
sales department at Los Angeles station KHJ during the great `Boss Radio’
days of the early sixties.
By the late seventies, he was in a partnership which owned KIK-FM, a
country station out of Orange County. By 1982, he had bought out his
partners and, with the purchase of an AM/FM operation in the Bay Area, he
became the proud owner of the Astor Broadcast Group.
In 1999, Hank Stickney, owner of the Quakes, sold his Rancho Cucamonga
radio station, known as The Muscle, to the Astor group. The calls became
KMXN with the name AM 1510 applied to it to let people know where it is.
The name has stuck, but the call letters are now KSPA.
The signal remains the same. The official city of license is still Ontario,
but the studios are still down in Orange County. Oddly enough, those
studios are also the site of an incredible collection knows as Astor
Classics.
It seems that back in the seventies, Astor fell in love with a 1967 Jaguar
4.2 sedan. That car became the start of a remarkable collection. Nearly 200
`rolling sculpture’ are now the heart of an amazing fleet – from a 1925
Dodge Bros. car to one of the largest private collections of Packards in
the area.
Each car is as original as possible and all are drivable. In fact they all
get out on the road sooner or later. Many famous names are attached to
these cars including Orson Welles, Cary Grant, Admiral Nimitz and even
Howard Hughes.
Soon the Astor Group will be opening a multipurpose event center which will
put the entire collection on proper display as a special attraction for
groups looking to hold their functions in a most unusual atmosphere.
In this age of corporate broadcasting, where programming people in New York
issue memos every day on what to air to people like us 3,000 miles away,
the Astor Broadcast Group remains one of the last of the independent
entrepreneurships in our area.
At nearly 80, Art Astor can still be found in one of his offices every day.
Of course which office he can be found in depends on whether he’s working
on plans for the event center, getting ready for a major car show,
developing the international syndication of the Wolfman Jack shows or
planning new ideas for Ontario’s AM 1510.
Last year the Anaheim Chamber of Commerce presented Art Astor with a
lifetime achievement award. They may have been premature.
***************************************************************************
3 – Melkonian to Speak in Fresno on
New Book About Brother Monter
FRESNO – Author Markar Melkonian will present his new book, “My Brother’s
Road: An American’s Fateful Journey to Armenia” at 7:30 p.m., on March 15
in the Industrial Technology Building, Room 101 (corner of Barstow and
Campus Drive) on the Fresno State campus.
The lecture is part of the Armenian Studies Program Spring 2005 Lecture
Series and is co-sponsored by the Armenian Students Organization.
My Brother’s Road is the story of Markar’s brother, Monte Melkonian, a
third-generation California boy, who grew up to become a promising
archaeologist, a witness to revolution in Iran, a militiaman in the streets
of Beirut, a guerrilla in southern Lebanon, a prison strike leader in
France, and a commander of 4,000 fighters in the Karabagh war. The son of
native Californians and a Little League Baseball player, yet he embodied
the agony and the folly of the final years of the Cold War and the dashed
dreams of the post-Soviet era. Monte did not just witness the convulsions
of those years; he endured them and he helped bring them on.
The product of eight years of research and writing, the book draws from
hundreds of interviews and thousands of unpublished documents in four
languages on three continents. But My Brother’s Road is not just the story
of a long, amazing journey and a short life: It is also a story of
discovery, written by Monte’s brother, his comrade and sometimes-critic.
For a while, the brothers shared the dangers and hopes of the road.
Markar Melkonian is a teacher, writer and veteran solidarity worker. He
holds several graduate degrees, including a Ph.D. in philosophy from the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Melkonian’s books include Marxism: A
Post-Cold War Primer (Westview Press, 1996) and Richard Rorty’s Politics:
Liberalism at the End of the American Century (Humanities Press, 1999).
Melkonian is a founder and a director of The Monte Melkonian Fund, Inc., a
nonprofit organization that assists the neediest of the needy in Armenia
().
Relaxed parking will be available in Lots Q, K, and L after 7:00 PM the
night of the lecture. For more information on the presentation, contact the
Armenian Studies Program at 278-2669.
**************************************************************************
4 – Weekly Show Connects Youth
To the Entertainment World
GLENDALE – Although still considered a fledgling show, World Entertainment
Connections is proving to be the Glendale and Burbank areas’ premiere local
source for the latest entertainment news, red carpet premieres, movie
reviews, and top American and international music videos.
This show is doing what no other show has done in the local area: bridging
the new generation of Armenians with American pop culture. And, they’re
doing it every week.
This fresh new take on the entertainment scene not only maintains strong
roots with the established Armenian community, but it is exploding with
colorful pop-culture vitality. W.E. Connections delivers to their young
audiences a unique fusion of the international music scene and the American
entertainment industry. The show covers entertainment from red carpet
Q&A’s with Academy Award winning director James Cameron (Titanic), to
exclusive one-on-one interviews with international sensations like
Armenian/Persian singer Andy, to spotlights on up-and-coming bands from the
local area, to Oscar viewing parties packed with Hollywood celebrities.
Hosted by Jill Simonian (a former Miss Hollywood and Miss California
Pageant finalist), the show also features young local Armenian talent from
Southern California, including Michelle Mack delivering entertainment news,
and Arin Mikailian with his ‘sometimes-too-honest’ movie reviews. Most
importantly, it showcases the heartfelt vision of producer Vahik ‘Vic’
Pirhamzei (Richmond Media Entertainment) of Glendale.
“You’d be surprised how many people watch… and they keep watching after
they see it,” says Judith Ghougassian, former production coordinator. “It’s
a lot of fun and I think that people like to see Armenians putting
something like this together for the young Armenian-American generation.”
Nearly 200,000 households in the Southern California area can catch this
show: Sundays at 9 p.m. in Glendale/Burbank on Charter Media cable Channel
26, and Mondays at 9pm in Sunland/Tujunga on Comcast cable Channel 27.
**************************************************************************
5 – Letters to the Editor
Dear Sir:
I read with great interest your editorial “American Jewish Group to Lobby
for Turkey’s EU Membership [California Courier, Feb. 3]. I believe you
should have mentioned the Jewish organizations that demand not only
Turkey’s but also the world’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
Additionally, I respectfully ask that you include the Jewish Defense League
on that list.
My late husband, Irv Rubin, who was the international chairman of the
Jewish Defense League, always observed April 24 in solidarity with the
Armenian people. During our marriage of 22 years that ended with his 2002
untimely death, I heard Irv say countless times, “if the world had taken
notice of what the Turks did to the Armenian people, the Holocaust would
not have happened.”
If I can be so forward as to give advice, I would say to the American
Armenian community: People will not remember the Armenian Genocide unless
Armenians make them remember. Just as the Jewish community raised great
amounts of money in order to erect buildings and monuments so the world
would never forget, the Armenian community has a responsibility to
commemorate their tragedy in the same way. As the philosopher George
Santayana so beautifully stated, “Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it.”
Shelley Rubin
Administrative Director
Jewish Defense League
Los Angeles, Calif.
**************************************************************************
6 – Singapore Armenian Church
Will Mark 170th Anniversary
SINGAPORE – The Trustees of the Armenian Church of St. Gregory the
Illuminator, built in 1835 in Singapore, and the Armenian residents of
Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong, have decided to celebrate the 170th
anniversary of the church with a schedule of Armenian cultural, social and
religious events at the site.
Catholicos Karekin II, Archbishop Aghan Baliozian Primate of Australia, New
Zealand and South East Asia, have indicated their intention to participate
at the activities, which this year also commemorates the 90th anniversary
of the Genocide.
Giving early notice to provide everyone sufficient time to book their dates
and travel plans to Singapore to help celebrate and commemorate this
historic occasion. Organizers ask the potential visitors to remember if
all of the Armenian living in Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Guangzhou,
(China) and Malaysia were able to participate, they would hardly number 70
to 80.
“We appeal to all Armenians who may be able to attend to make the effort
and give us your support,” organizers observed.
The planned dates are November 11 12 and 13, with a possibility of a
pre-event on Thursday, Nov. 10.
An Event Committee has just been appointed and will prepare an event
program over the next three months. Committee members and other details
will be announced soon.
**************************************************************************
7 – Bone Marrow Drive to Help
Save L.A.’s Arlene Titizian
CHATSWORTH, CA — Arlene Titizian, 56, has recently been diagnosed with a
rare disease, Myelofibrosis, a proliferation of fibroblastic cells in bone
marrow, causing anemia and sometimes enlargement of the spleen and liver.
The only treatment for survival is a bone marrow transplant.
Doctors have told the family that the best chances of finding the correct
match are from those of Armenian descent.
Two bone marrow drives have been set up in the greater Los Angeles area to
help find a match for Titizian. On March 6 from 1to 5 p.m., volunteers
can donate at the Ararat Home (15105 Mission Hills Road, Mission Hills) or
April 3 from 12:30 pm – 5:30 pm at the United Armenian Congregations
Church (3480 Cahuenga Blvd. West., Los Angeles). The donor drives are
sponsored by the Armenian Bone Marrow Registry Program and the City of
Hope, respectively.
There is no cost to be included on the Armenian Bone Marrow Registry.
Arlene Titizian is the wife of George Titizian for 37 years and mother of
Sonia Mikaelian, Martin and Armen Titizian. She is the proud grandmother
of three grandchildren, Nicholas, Kristopher and Alexa
Mikaelian.
**************************************************************************
8 – CSUN Presents March 8 Literary Evening
With Three Armenian American Authors
NORTHRIDGE, CA – The Armenian Students Association (ASA) at the California
State University, Northridge (CSUN), in cooperation with the Armenian
Studies Program (ASP) on campus, has organized a literary evening, March 8
at 8 p.m,. at the University’s Grand Salon, as part of the ASP’s 20th
Anniversary celebration.
The evening will feature three talented Armenian American writers and their
recent publications.
Rising stars on the literary scene, the three authors will present their
books. Aris Janigian will provide his perspective on the Bloodvine,
Micheline Aharonian Marcom will analyze her The Daydreaming Boy, and Markar
Melkonian will lead the audience along My Brother’s Road. These books will
be available for sale.
The Armenian Students Association of CSUN, representing over 3,000 students
of Armenian descent at the University (10% of the total student
population), is a very active body organizing 10-15 activities annually
pertaining to Armenian culture and relevant issues.
The ASP offers 14 undergraduate courses on Armenian language, literature,
culture, etc., as well as a Minor, a Concentration, and a Certificate in
Armenian. The Program also has a Memorandum of Understanding with Yerevan
State University that promotes collaboration in various academic
activities.
For further information regarding the literary evening, the ASA, and/or the
ASP, contact Program Director Prof. Hermine Mahseredjian at (818) 677-7228
or [email protected]; Prof. Vahram Shemmassian at (818) 677-3456 or
[email protected]; or
***************************************************************************
*************************
9 – UAF Reaches $400 Million Mark
In Relief Supplies to Armenia
GLENDALE – The United Armenian Fund’s 132nd airlift arrived in Yerevan on
February 27, delivering $3.2 million of humanitarian assistance.
The UAF itself collected $2.6 million of medicines and medical supplies for
this flight, most of which were donated by the Catholic Medical Mission
Board ($2.4 million) and AmeriCares ($196,000).
Other organizations which contributed goods for this airlift were: Medical
Outreach for Armenians ($170,000); Nork Marash Medical Center ($101,000);
Armenian General Benevolent Union ($80,000); Armenian Eye Care Project
($31,000); Harut Chantikian of New Jersey ($26,000); Dr. Stephen Kashian of
Illinois ($23,000); and Fund for Armenian Relief ($22,000).
Also contributing to this airlift were: Innotech Projects Inc. ($19,000);
American University of Armenia ($17,000); Glendale Ghapan Sister City
Association ($17,000); Howard Karagheusian Commemorative Corp. ($16,000);
Bay Area Friends of Armenia ($11,000); and Armenian Gospel Mission
($11,000).
Since its inception in 1989, the UAF has sent $400 million of humanitarian
assistance to Armenia on board 132 airlifts and 1,153 sea containers.
The UAF is the collective effort of the Armenian Assembly of America, the
Armenian General Benevolent Union, the Armenian Missionary Association of
America, the Armenian Relief Society, the Diocese of the Armenian Church of
America, the Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church of America and the
Lincy Foundation.
For more information, contact the UAF office at 1101 North Pacific Avenue,
Suite 301, Glendale, CA 91202 or call (818) 241-8900.
***************************************************************************
The California Courier On-Line is a service provided by the California
Courier. Subscriptions or changes of address should not be transmitted
through this service. Information in that regard should be telephoned
to (818) 409-0949; faxed to: (818) 409-9207, or e-mailed to:
[email protected]. Letters to the editor concerning issues
addressed in the Courier may be e-mailed, provided it is signed by
the author. Phone and/or E-mail address is also required to verify
authorship.

–Boundary_(ID_sgskLEyqr9cAW43erwSUvA)–

http://www.melkonian.org
www.csunasa.org.

CSO, guest conductor showcase the soul of Vienna

CSO, guest conductor showcase the soul of Vienna

Review

The Denver Post (Denver, Colorado)
Sunday, February 27, 2005

By Sabine Kortals, Denver Post Staff Writer

Among fans of Peter Oundjian, count me in.

Friday night, the Colorado Symphony Orchestra’s principal guest
conductor took the stage at Boettcher Concert Hall in his second of
three programs this season.

His elegant and amiable manner obviously appeals to CSO musicians and
audiences alike, and his refined and magnetic musicianship lent itself
well to a program of works showcasing the musical soul of Vienna.

No matter that Oundjian had only an abridged version of the orchestra
to work with; the maestro uncovered both the fact and flair of
Beethoven’s Symphony No. 2 – an overall sunny musical journey with
hints of pathos.

Oundjian’s perfect tempo and intrinsic artistry conveyed the score
as a satisfying story that sparred triumph and grace against ominous
threats.

Less successful, however, were the largely cosmetic pieces on the
program, featuring three CSO principal players.

In part due to the hall’s muffling acoustics, YuMi Hwang-Williams’
performance of Franz Schubert’s “Konzertstück” in D Major for Violin
and Orchestra was entirely forgettable.

But the violinist wholly redeemed herself in a set of four charming
Fritz Kreisler musical vignettes. From “Caprice Viennois” and
“Tambourin Chinois” to the delightfully sentimental “Liebesleid” and
“Liebesfreud” pairing, soloist and conductor delivered on every sheen
and shade of the lightweight favorites.

Her tone warm and translucent, Hwang-Williams rendered the buoyant
rhythms and rubatos of Kreisler unfettered, as if reading a clutch
of favorite poems.

Pamela Endsley – CSO principal flutist since 1972 – and the wonderfully
talented Courtney Hershey Bress opened with Mozart’s Concerto for
Flute and Harp in C Major.

The CSO Masterworks concert repeats at 2:30 p.m. today.

,1413,36~28704~2734870,00.html

–Boundary_(ID_AZb1kriYvh8XvBZ+rKZh4g)–

http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0

Israel and the occupied territories: Country Reports on Human Rights

U.S. Department of State
Israel and the occupied territories: Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices – 2004
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 28, 2005

(The Report on the occupied territories is appended at the end of this
Report.)
Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy. “Basic laws” enumerate
fundamental rights. The 120-member Knesset has the power to dissolve the
Government and mandate elections. The current Knesset and Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon were elected democratically in 2003. (An annex to this report
covers human rights in the occupied territories. This report deals only with
the situation in Israel itself.) The judiciary is independent and often
ruled against the Executive, even in security cases.
During the year, a total of 76 Israeli civilians and four foreigners were
killed as a result of Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel and the
occupied territories, and 41 members of the Israeli Defense Forces were
killed in clashes with Palestinian militants. During the same period, more
than 800 Palestinians were killed during Israeli military operations in the
occupied territories.
Internal security is the responsibility of the Israel Security Agency (ISA
or Shin Bet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister. The
National Police, which includes the Border Police and the Immigration
Police, are under the Minister of Internal Security and the Minister of
Interior respectively. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are under the
authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The IDF includes a significant
portion of the adult population on active duty or reserve status. The
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset oversees the IDF and
the ISA. Security forces were under effective government control. Some
members of the security forces committed serious abuses.
The country’s population is approximately 6.8 million, including 5.2 million
Jews, 1.3 million Arabs, and some 290,000 other minorities. It has an
advanced industrial, market economy with a relatively high standard of
living. Twenty one percent of the population lived below the poverty line in
2003. Unemployment was approximately 11 percent, and was higher among the
Arab population. Foreign workers, both legal and illegal, constituted about
7 percent of the labor force.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens;
however, there were problems in some areas. Some members of the security
forces abused Palestinian detainees. Conditions in some detention and
interrogation facilities remained poor. During the year, the Government
detained on security grounds but without charge thousands of persons in
Israel. (Most were from the occupied territories and their situation is
covered in the annex.) The Government did little to reduce institutional,
legal, and societal discrimination against the country’s Arab citizens. The
Government did not recognize marriages performed by non-Orthodox rabbis,
compelling many citizens to travel abroad to marry. The Government
interfered with individual privacy in some instances.
Discrimination and societal violence against women persisted, although the
Government continued to address these problems. Trafficking in and abuse of
women and foreign workers continued to be problems. Discrimination against
persons with disabilities persisted.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
There were no reports of politically motivated killings by the Government or
its agents during the year.
Twelve Israeli-Arab and one Palestinian protestors were killed by police
during October 2000 demonstrations (see Section 2. b.). The Orr Commission
of Inquiry (COI) was established to investigate those killings. It
recommended a number of measures, including criminal prosecutions. The
Cabinet adopted those recommendations in June. At year’s end, the Justice
Ministry had not completed its investigations. In October, the Justice
Minister appointed Assistant Commander Benzi Sau, one of the officers being
investigated, to the position of Border Police staff commander. The Legal
Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (Adalah), an Israeli-Arab advocacy
group, charged that this was a promotion. The Orr Commission specifically
recommended that Sau not be promoted due to his involvement in the killings.
During the year, terrorist organizations such as the Islamic Resistance
Movement (Hamas), Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), committed numerous
acts of terrorism in Israel as well as in the occupied territories.
According to the Government, there was a 45 percent reduction in the number
of Israelis killed in such attacks during the year due to the construction
of a security barrier (see annex) and effective terrorist interdiction.
Seventy-six Israeli civilians and 4 foreign nationals were killed, and over
394 were injured in terrorist attacks during the year. Forty-one Israeli
security forces were killed and 195 injured. There were 13 suicide attacks
during the year that resulted in 53 Israeli and 2 Palestinian deaths. In
addition, eight suicide bombers killed only themselves. In contrast, 26
suicide attacks in 2003 caused 144 deaths.
In July 2003, the Border Police killed Morassi Jibali, an Israeli-Arab.
Police claimed the car in which he was a passenger had failed to stop upon
order, and that he had been mistaken for a terrorist. The driver claimed
that he had tried to avoid the roadblock because he was driving without a
license. According to Mossawa Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens of Israel
(Mossawa), witnesses reported that the police did not warn the driver before
firing and that police later prohibited medical personnel from treating
Jibali. At year’s end, the Ministry of Justice division for investigating
police officers continued to investigate the incident.
In July 2003, police killed unarmed Bedouin, Nasser Abu al Qia’an, in his
car at a junction. Police claimed he had tried to run them over but at least
one witness disputed the police account, reporting that spikes in the road
prevented any movement of the car. In September, the Ministry of Justice
filed an indictment against the police officer, who was subsequently tried
and found not guilty on the grounds of self-defense.
In September 2003, residents of an Arab community, Kafr Qassem, clashed with
police searching for illegal immigrants. The police wounded one Israeli Arab
when, according to police reports, village residents began to throw stones.
According to Mossawa, at year’s end, the police had either not investigated
or had closed all cases against the police involved.
On January 29, a suicide bomber blew up a Jerusalem bus killing 11 Israelis
and injuring 50. Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Hamas claimed responsibility.
On August 31, twin suicide bombs exploded on buses in Be’er Sheva, killing
16 persons and injuring over 100. Hamas claimed responsibility.
On November 1, a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv killed 3 Israelis and wounded
30. The PFLP claimed responsibility. According to official Israeli data, the
number of rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli targets increased over
the year. Palestinian terrorists routinely fired rockets into Sderot, a town
that borders the Gaza Strip. Qassam rocket attacks on June 28, and again on
September 29, killed four residents of Sderot.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances during the
year.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Laws, judicial decisions, and administrative regulations prohibit torture
and abuse; however, during the year, credible NGOs filed numerous complaints
with the Government alleging that security forces tortured and abused
Palestinian detainees. (The law regarding torture and allegations of torture
of Palestinians by Israeli security officials is discussed in the annex to
this report.)
The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) stated that no ISA
officials had been tried on torture charges during the past 3 years.
In June, the Physicians for Human Rights in Israel (PHR) petitioned the
Supreme Court to end what it termed the Israel Prison System’s (IPS)
“systematic abuse of prisoners” in the Sharon Prison. In July, the court
decided to close the case after prisoner complaints ended with the
appointment of a new prison warden. At year’s end, PHR continued to
investigate the complaints and had received relevant files from the police.
A special bureau in the Ministry of Justice reviews complaints against
police officers and may impose disciplinary charges or issue indictments
against officers. During the year, several judges criticized this bureau for
launching faulty investigations against police officers who were later
acquitted.
In January, two police officers were convicted of raping a foreign worker
after they confiscated her work permit; each received a 2-year prison
sentence.
In May, an official secretly recorded a senior immigration police officer
stating that immigration police used excessive force when detaining foreign
workers. The senior officer confirmed his statement to the media, but its
accuracy was disputed by the Immigration Police spokesperson. At year’s end,
a Knesset Committee on Foreign Workers continued to investigate this matter.
The law provides detainees the right to live in conditions that do not harm
their health or dignity. Conditions in IPS facilities, which house common
law criminals and convicted security prisoners, and in IDF military
incarceration camps, which hold convicted security prisoners, generally met
international standards. The ICRC has access to these facilities. However,
police detention and interrogation facilities for Palestinian were
overcrowded and had austere, provisional conditions. In June 2003, the
Supreme Court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting prisoners from being
forced to sleep on the floor and mandated that every prisoner be provided a
bed. Subsequently, the Minister of Internal Security stated that all persons
held in the IPS would receive a bed, daily outdoor exercise, telephone and
visitation rights, and less crowded facilities. In May, however, the IPS
deputy warden told a Knesset committee that approximately 500 prisoners in
the IPS, both security and criminal, slept nightly on prison floors because
of a lack of beds.
Conditions at the Russian Compound interrogation center in Jerusalem
remained harsh. According to a PHR report released in November 2003,
prisoners in the Russian Compound holding cells were routinely handcuffed
with their hands behind their backs to their feet, sometimes for hours. The
PHR report also stated that medical examinations given to arriving prisoners
were used to determine if the prisoner could withstand “the application of
violent approaches to those jailed.” A reputable international organization
with access to this facility also reported during the year that it is
investigating the use of Israeli doctors in this capacity.
Women and children in prison were held separately from the adult male
population. Citizens 18 years and older and Palestinians 16 and older were
treated as adults. The ICRC reported that, as of the end of December, the
Government held 498 minor Palestinians, with the youngest being 13 years
old. Defense for Children International and Save the Children charged that
minors were being “physically and mentally abused,” denied access to their
families and legal representation during interrogation, and held in
overcrowded and unsanitary conditions.
The ICRC regularly monitored IPS facilities, as well as IDF camps and
detention facilities. Pursuant to a 1979 ICRC-Israel agreement, the ICRC
does not have access to interrogation facilities but can meet with detainees
under interrogation in designated areas of those facilities. NGOs generally
were not permitted to monitor any incarceration facilities, including within
the IPS, but could send lawyers and representatives to meet with prisoners
in those facilities. According to PHR, the Israeli Bar Association and
public defenders were permitted to inspect IPS facilities.
In December, in response to a petition to compel the Government to release
information on a secret IDF detention facility, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Government should not use secret interrogation facilities. The court
gave the Government 60 days to respond to its undisclosed suggestions
related to the secret facility.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government
generally observed these prohibitions. (Palestinian security detainees fell
under the jurisdiction of military law even if they were detained in Israel
(see annex). When arrested, the accused is considered innocent until proven
guilty, has the right to habeas corpus, to remain silent, to be represented
by an attorney, to contact his family without delay, and to a fair trial. A
bail system exists and decisions denying bail are subject to appeal. A
citizen may be held without charge for 24 hours before he must be brought
before a judge (48 hours for administrative detainees). If the detainee is
suspected of committing a “security offense,” the police and the courts can
delay notification of counsel for up to 31 days. The Government may withhold
evidence from defense lawyers on security grounds. In March, the Public
Defender’s Office charged that the police sometimes failed to apprise
detainees of their rights under law and did not always provide detainees
with legal counsel when required. The Public Defender’s Office estimated
that, as a result, approximately 500 persons were deprived of their rights
to due process.
Foreign nationals detained for suspected violations of immigration law are
afforded an immigration hearing within 4 days of detention, but do not have
the right to legal representation. According to the local advocacy
organization Hotline for Migrant Workers, appropriate interpreters were not
always present at the hearings. Hotline received complaints from Israeli
attorneys of being denied access to their foreign clients. According to
Hotline, foreign detainees were rarely released pending judicial
determination of their status. If the country of origin of the detainee had
no representation in the country, detention could last for months, pending
receipt of travel documents. During the year, there were credible
allegations that the police knowingly detained and deported legal foreign
workers to meet deportation quotas.
Pursuant to the 1979 Emergency Powers Law, the Ministry of Defense may order
persons detained without charge or trial for up to 6 months in
administrative detention, renewable indefinitely subject to district court
review. Such detainees have the right to legal representation, but the court
may rely on confidential information to which the defendant and his or her
lawyer are not privy. Administrative detainees have the right to appeal
their cases to the Supreme Court.
In September, Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz ordered the 4-month
administrative detention of Israeli citizen Tali Fahima based on
confidential evidence that she was involved in terrorist activity. Fahima’s
appeal to the Supreme Court was denied in November. In December, she was
released due to insufficient evidence, but was rearrested shortly thereafter
when police presented additional evidence. Fahima remained in administrative
detainee until later in December, when the Tel Aviv Magistrate’s Court
indicted her on criminal charges, which included assisting the enemy during
wartime and passing information to the enemy. At year’s end, she was
detained pending trial.
In the past, human rights groups have alleged abuse of preventative or
administrative detention orders in cases in which the accused did not pose a
clear danger to society.
In 2000, the High Court ruled that detaining Lebanese captives indefinitely
as “bargaining chips” violated the administrative detention law. In 2002,
the Knesset passed the Illegal Combatant Law allowing the IDF to detain
persons who are suspected of “taking part in hostile activity against
Israel, directly or indirectly” or who “belong to a force engaged in hostile
activity against the State of Israel.”
In January, the GOI released Mustafa Dirani, head of the security for the
Amal militia; Sheikh Obeid, a Lebanese cleric; and some 25 other Lebanese
prisoners held as enemy combatants in return for the release of Elchanan
Tanenbaum, a kidnapped Israeli held by the Hizballah terrorist group in
Lebanon, and the remains of three IDF soldiers kidnapped to Lebanon in 2000.
The Government also released 400 Palestinian prisoners and another 9 foreign
prisoners in addition to the Lebanese. In October 2003, the Tel Aviv
District Court disclosed that a Lebanese citizen, imprisoned in the country
for 5 years but eligible for release, had been detained under administrative
detention for the past year because the IDF decreed him an illegal
combatant. He was released and repatriated in December.
According to a reputable international organization, at year’s end one
Lebanese national remained in Israeli detention.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the Government generally
respected this provision in practice.
The Judicial Branch is organized into three levels: Magistrate Courts; six
District Courts; and the Supreme or High Court. District Courts prosecute
felonies, and Magistrate Courts prosecute misdemeanors. There are military,
religious, labor relations, and administrative courts, with the High Court
of Justice as the ultimate judicial authority. The High Court is both a
court of first instance and an appellate court (when it sits as the Supreme
Court). All courts in the judicial system, including the High Court of
Justice, thus have appellate courts of jurisdiction. Religious courts,
representing the main recognized religious groups, have jurisdiction over
matters of personal status for their adherents (see Section 2.c.).
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent judiciary
generally enforced this right. The country’s criminal justice system is
adversarial, and professional judges rather than juries decide cases.
Nonsecurity trials are public except in cases in which the interests of the
parties are determined to be best served by privacy. Security or military
trials are open to independent observers upon request and at the discretion
of the court, but they are not open to the general public. The law provides
for the right to a hearing with legal representation, and authorities
generally observed this right in practice. In cases of serious
felonies–subject to penalties of 10 years or more–indigent defendants
receive mandatory legal representation. Indigent defendants facing lesser
sentences are provided with representation on a discretionary basis. Counsel
represented approximately 70 percent of defendants.
The 1970 regulations governing military trials are the same as evidentiary
rules in criminal cases. Convictions may not be based solely on confessions;
however, according to PCATI, in practice, some security prisoners have been
sentenced on the basis of the coerced confessions made by both themselves
and others. Counsel may assist the accused, and a judge may assign counsel
to those defendants when the judge deems it necessary. Indigent detainees
are not provided with free legal representation for military trials. Charges
are made available to the defendant and the public in Hebrew, and the court
can order that they be translated into Arabic if necessary. Sentencing
procedures in military courts were consistent with those in criminal courts.
Defendants in military trials have the right to appeal through the Military
High Court. Defendants in military trials also can petition the civilian
High Court of Justice (sitting as a court of first instance) in cases in
which they believe there are procedural or evidentiary irregularities.
According to a 2003 Haifa University study, a tendency existed to impose
heavier prison terms to Arab citizens than to Jewish citizens. Human rights
advocates claimed that Arab citizens were more likely to be convicted of
murder and to have been denied bail.
In May, three Israeli Arabs were released after having been detained for 10
months in prison when the police arrested new suspects for the July 2003
murder of IDF corporal Oleg Shaigat. One of those released publicly stated
that his confession was coerced. According to the Government, it will
conduct an official examination of this case.
Human rights NGOs charged that the former mayor of the Arab city of Umm
al-Fahm, Sheikh Raed Salah, who was arrested in May 2003 for allegedly
funneling money to terrorist organizations, has been unfairly denied bail
despite his status and community ties. At year’s end, his case was still
pending.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The law generally protected privacy of the individual and the home. In
criminal cases, the law permits wiretapping under court order; in security
cases, the Ministry of Defense must issue the order. Under emergency
regulations, authorities may open and destroy mail based on security
considerations.
In May, the High Court banned the unsupervised electronic flow to public
bodies and banks of data on private citizens maintained by the Government’s
Population Registry.
Separate religious court systems adjudicate personal status matters such as
marriage and divorce for the Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze
communities. Jews can only marry in Orthodox Jewish services. Jews and
members of other religious communities who wish to have a civil marriage,
Jews who wish to marry according to Reform or Conservative Judaism, those
not recognized as being Jewish, and those marrying someone from another
faith, must marry abroad in order to gain government recognition of their
unions. While civil marriages are available in nearby Cyprus and are
recognized by the Government, this requirement presents a hardship. In July,
the Knesset extended for 6 months the 2003 law that prohibits citizens’
Palestinian spouses from the occupied territories from residing in the
country (see Section 5).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government
generally respected these rights in practice. The law prohibits hate speech
and incitement to violence, and the 1948 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
makes it illegal for persons to express support for illegal or terrorist
organizations. In previous years, the Government has prosecuted persons for
allegedly speaking or writing on behalf of terrorist groups; however, there
were no such incidents during the year.
On May 25, the ISA detained for 2 days British journalist Peter Hounam
following his meeting with nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu, who was
released in April after serving 18 years in prison (see Section 2.d.). The
terms of Vanunu’s release prohibited him from meeting with the foreign press
unless approved by the Government. On November 11, police re-arrested Vanunu
for meeting foreign media in violation of the terms of his release and
confiscated his computer. Vanunu acknowledged the violation, and was
released after 12 hours. Vanunu’s computer had not been returned by year’s
end.
In June, Arab Knesset Members Ahmed Tibi and Taleb el-Sana were censured by
the Knesset Ethics Committee for harshly criticizing IDF operations in Gaza.
The Committee banned Tibi and el-Sana from attending Knesset sessions for 1
and 2 days, respectively.
In September, the Supreme Court upheld its original ruling overturning the
Film Council’s ban on the screening of the film, “Jenin, Jenin,” which
depicts fighting in the West Bank refugee camp in Jenin during April 2002.
In its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that a ban on the film was an
undue infringement on freedom of expression.
Arab Knesset Member Azmi Bishara was indicted (after the Knesset lifted his
immunity) for making statements allegedly supportive of Hizballah during
2000 visits to Syria (a country still in a state of war with Israel) and to
the Israeli-Arab city of Umm al-Fahm. In November, the Supreme Court held a
hearing on a petition filed by Adalah to dismiss the charges. At year’s end,
the case was still pending.
As a general rule, Israeli media covered the occupied territories, except
for combat zones where access was restricted. In general, journalists
continued to claim that the Government placed limitations on their freedom
of movement within the occupied territories. The Government claimed such
restrictions were necessary for the security of the journalists.
There were several allegations from foreign media that the IDF fired upon
journalists (see annex).
In August, the Supreme Court ruled that the Government Press Office could
not apply a blanket refusal to issue press credentials to facilitate access
to official events to Palestinians from the occupied territories. The Court
reasoned that such a blanket policy did not properly balance freedom of the
press and national security.
All newspapers are privately owned and managed. According to the Journalism
Ordinance dating from the British Mandate, anyone wishing to publish a
newspaper must apply for a license from the locality. The ordinance also
allows the Minister of Interior, under certain conditions, to close a
newspaper. In November, the High Court heard a petition filed by the
Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) challenging the ordinance; at
year’s end, the court had not reached a decision.
The country has 12 daily newspapers, 90 weekly newspapers, more than 250
periodical publications, and a number of Internet news sites.
The quasi-independent Israel Broadcast Authority controls television Channel
1 and Kol Israel (Voice of Israel) radio, both major sources of news and
information. The Second Television and Radio Authority, a public body,
supervises the two privately owned commercial television channels and 14
privately owned radio stations. There are three cable and one satellite
television companies that carry international networks and shows
specifically produced for the domestic audience.
The law authorizes the Government to censor any material reported from the
country or the occupied territories that it regards as sensitive on national
security grounds. A censorship agreement between the Government and media
representatives provides for military censorship only in cases involving
issues that are nearly certain to harm the country’s defense interests.
Media organizations may appeal the censor’s decision to the High Court of
Justice, and they are not subject to closure by the military censor for
censorship violations. The military censor cannot appeal a court judgment.
Foreign journalists were required to sign an agreement upon receiving their
press cards in which they agreed to submit sensitive articles and
photographs to the military censor. In practice, they rarely complied;
however, the censor reviewed such material after the fact. News printed or
broadcast abroad may be reported without censorship. During the year, there
were instances of newspapers being fined for violating censorship
regulations.
The Government generally respected academic freedom; however, ISA approval
was needed for appointments of teachers and administrators in Arab schools.
In August, members of a Knesset committee reviewing the status of the Arab
education system criticized this practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The law provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the Government
generally respected these rights in practice. ACRI reported that the police
confiscated posters from both right and left wing demonstrations during the
year, including posters referring to Prime Minister Sharon as a “dictator.”
The law provides for the right of association, and the Government generally
respected this provision in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
The law provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally
respected this right. The Basic Law and Declaration of Independence
recognize the country as a “Jewish and democratic state,” establishing
Judaism as the country’s dominant religion. Civil rights NGOs have
accurately charged the Government with the discriminatory allocation of
state resources favoring Orthodox Jewish institutions.
Religious communities are conferred recognition under the law, enabling them
to exercise legal authority over their members in personal status matters,
such as marriage and divorce. These communities included the Eastern
Orthodox Church, several Catholic orders, Maronites, and Jews. Three
additional communities have been recognized–the Druze, the Evangelical
Episcopal Church, and the Baha’i. Several religious communities are not
recognized, including Protestant groups. Unrecognized communities may
practice their religion freely and maintain communal institutions, but are
ineligible to receive government funding for religious services.
The fact that there was no recognized Muslim community is a vestige of the
Ottoman period, during which time Islam was the dominant religion, and did
not affect the rights of Muslims to practice their faith. Legislation
enacted in 1961 afforded the Muslim courts exclusive jurisdiction to rule in
matters of personal status concerning Muslims. Secular courts have primacy
over questions of inheritance, but parties, by mutual agreement, may bring
cases to religious courts. Muslims, since 2001, also have the right to bring
matters such as alimony and property division associated with divorce cases
to civil courts in family-status matters.
Under the Law of Return, the Government grants citizenship and residence
rights to Jewish immigrants and their immediate family members. In May, the
High Court held that non-Jews who immigrate to the country and then convert
according to Orthodox requirements are eligible to become citizens pursuant
to the Law of Return. The court let stand the State’s practice of not
recognizing conversions to Judaism performed in the country by non-Orthodox
rabbis.
In December, ACRI released a report charging that the Ministry of Interior’s
Population Authority sought to prevent non-Jews–particularly spouses of
Israeli citizens–from obtaining residential status.
Many citizens objected to exclusive Orthodox control over religious aspects
of their personal lives. Approximately 300,000 citizens who immigrated under
the Law of Return are not considered Jewish by the Orthodox Rabbinate. These
immigrants cannot be married, divorced, or buried within the country. A 1996
law requiring the Government to establish civil cemeteries has not been
implemented adequately. Non-Jews and Jews who wish to marry in Reform,
Conservative, or secular ceremonies must do so abroad.
Non-Orthodox Jews faced greater difficulties than Orthodox Jews in adopting
children. In December, on petition of the Israeli Religious Action Center
(IRAC), the High Court of Justice ordered the Government to justify the
Adoption Service of the Ministry of Social Affairs’ practice of placing
non-Jewish children only in Orthodox Jewish homes.
According to IRAC, the budget for Jewish religious services, institutions,
and schools for the year was approximately $450 million (1.9 billion New
Israeli shekels (NIS)), and virtually none of this went to non-Orthodox
institutions. Also according to IRAC, the budget for the non-Jewish
population was approximately $9 million (40 million NIS)–2 percent of the
budget for 18 percent of the population.
Muslim groups complained that the Government does not equitably fund the
construction and upkeep of Muslim holy sites in comparison to Jewish
Orthodox sites. It charged that the Government was reluctant to refurbish
mosques in areas where there is no longer a Muslim population and has
allowed mosques to be used for nonreligious purposes. The 1967 Protection of
Holy Sites Law protects all holy sites, but the Government has only issued
implementing regulations for Jewish sites. In November, Adalah petitioned
the Supreme Court to compel the Government to issue regulations to protect
Muslim sites, charging the Government’s failure to implement regulations had
resulted in desecration and the conversion of some into commercial
establishments, including bars.
Since 2000, the Government no longer requires Israeli Muslims to obtain
permission from the Interior Ministry to travel to Saudi Arabia on the Hajj.
During 2003, the Government refused to grant residence visas to
approximately 130 Catholic clergy assigned by the Vatican to the country and
the occupied territories. According to representatives of Christian
institutions, the process of visa issuance for religious workers
significantly improved during the year. The Interior Ministry’s Christian
Department reported it had approved most of the 3,000 applications made by
clergy during the year.
During the year, there were reports that airport immigration deported
non-Jews with mutilated passports, whereas Jews with damaged travel
documents were allowed entry.
Missionaries were allowed to proselytize, although the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints voluntarily refrained from doing so under an
agreement with the Government. There were incidents of societal religious
intolerance. In October, a yeshiva student spat at the Armenian archbishop
of Jerusalem. The student was arrested and ordered to remain away from the
Old City for 75 days. He also made a formal apology. There were incidents
where ultra-Orthodox Jews threw rocks at motorists to protest their driving
on the Sabbath.
In January, the Government recognized the duly elected Greek Orthodox
Patriarch, Eirinaios I; however, a legal challenge delayed implementation
until March. Eirinaios I was elected in 2001, but had been unable to
conclude financial or legal arrangements on behalf of the Patriarchate.
However, he had been free to travel to the West Bank and Syria, where he is
also the ecclesiastical authority.
For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International Religious Freedom
Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
Repatriation
The law provides for these rights and the Government generally respected
them in practice for citizens. (Restrictions on movement within the occupied
territories, between the territories and Israel, and the construction of a
security barrier are discussed in the annex.)
Citizens generally were free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they
had no outstanding military obligations and were not restricted by
administrative order. Pursuant to the 1945 State of Emergency Regulations,
the Government may bar citizens from leaving the country based on security
considerations. In April, the Government released Mordechai Vanunu after he
served 18 years in prison for revealing details of the country’s nuclear
program to a British newspaper, the Sunday Times. Upon release, the
Government prohibited Vanunu from going within 500 meters of airports and
overland border crossings, and from entering any foreign diplomatic offices.
Citing security concerns, the Minister of Interior barred Vanunu from
leaving the country for 12 months. On December 24, Vanunu was detained at a
checkpoint when he attempted to travel to Bethlehem for midnight mass; he
was released the next day (see Section 2. a.)
Citing confidential security reasons, in 2002, the Government imposed and
renewed 6-month bans on foreign travel for Sheik Raed Salah, leader of the
Northern Branch of Israel’s Islamic Movement. In May 2003, Sheikh Salah was
arrested for allegedly providing funds to terrorist groups. His trial was
ongoing during the year.
Citizens, including dual nationals, are required to enter and leave the
country using their Israeli passports only. In addition, no citizen or
passport holder is permitted to travel to countries officially at war with
Israel without special permission from the Government.
Advocacy groups challenged the 2003 temporary Citizenship and Entry into
Israel Law, which bars Palestinians from the occupied territories from
acquiring residence or citizenship rights through marriage to Israelis or to
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. These groups claimed that the law has a
disproportionate adverse effect on the country’s Arab citizens and residents
(see Section 5).
In 2002, the police confiscated the passport of Archimandrite Attallah
Hanna, a citizen and a priest with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, for
allegedly visiting Lebanon without permission and for making public
statements hostile toward Israel while there. The case against Hanna was
closed in January after Hanna signed a declaration renouncing terrorism. At
year’s end, Hanna claimed that he had not received a response to his
application for a passport.
The law prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government generally
respected this prohibition in practice.
The Government provides refugees all the protections under the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol and has
established a system whereby persons can apply for refugee status.
Palestinians were considered under the protection of the U.N. Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and therefore not eligible for refugee
status in the country.
The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting Jewish
refugees. The Government also provided temporary protection to individuals
who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol.
The Government provided temporary humanitarian protection to persons from
“conflict countries,” including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Some individuals present on tourist or work visas, or illegally, filed
petitions with the local UNHCR representative seeking refugee status. The
UNHCR referred eligible refugee applicants to the National Status Granting
Body (NSGB), a committee consisting of representatives of the Justice,
Foreign, and Interior Ministries. The NSGB issued recommendations, with the
Ministry of Interior making final adjudication on refugee status. The Tel
Aviv University Refugee Rights Clinic charged that the NSGB’s procedures
were not transparent, that it did not publish data, and that applicants who
were denied status by the NSGB often were not given a reason for the denial.
The Government did not return those denied refugee status to their home
countries against their will. According to the Tel Aviv University Clinic,
some of those denied refugee status could remain in detention facilities for
months. In the case of asylum seekers from countries with which Israel was
at war, the Government attempted to find a third country to accept them. The
Government provided asylum seekers with temporary work permits, but it did
not provide them with social benefits. If a person was granted refugee
status, it was government policy to grant renewable temporary visas.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change
Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic,
free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage for adult
citizens. National elections were held in January 2003, when the Likud Party
led by Ariel Sharon again won a plurality of Knesset seats, and Sharon was
asked to form a Government of which he became Prime Minister. The country is
a parliamentary democracy with an active multiparty system in which
political views are wide ranging. Relatively small parties, including those
whose primary support was among Israeli Arabs, regularly win seats in the
Knesset. Elections are by secret ballot.
In March, the State Comptroller discovered the names of 2,298 citizens age
110 or over in the voter registry, and determined that ballots had been cast
in the names of some of these individuals. The Comptroller recommended that
the Ministry of Interior investigate the registry’s data to prevent fraud.
The Basic Law prohibits the candidacy of any party or individual who denies
the Jewish character and democratic existence of the State of Israel,
incites racism, or supports in action or speech the armed struggle of enemy
states or terror organizations. Prior to the 2003 election, there were
efforts to disqualify Arab candidates under the provisions of this law;
however, they were overturned by the Supreme Court.
In June, the Attorney General exonerated Prime Minister Sharon of
allegations that he accepted bribes while serving as foreign minister in
1999. The Attorney General continued to review the Prime Minister’s
connections to the so-called “Cyril Kern Affair,” in which he was alleged to
have engaged in questionable financial dealings to refund illegal campaign
contributions.
On July 11, the Prime Minister dismissed Minister of Infrastructure and
Knesset Member Josef Paritzky from his cabinet seat after Channel 1
Television broadcast a tape of Paritzky allegedly plotting with a private
detective to defame a party rival.
In September, Knesset Member Tzachi Hanegbi was suspended from his post as
Minister of Public Security, pending a criminal investigation into
allegations he made inappropriate political appointments while serving as
environment minister from 2001-03. At year’s end, there had been no further
developments.
There was an increasing public perception of corruption in the executive and
legislative branches.
A 2000 law affords the public access to government information, and citizens
could petition for such access. According to the Association for Civil
Rights in Israel, the Government does not effectively implement its freedom
of information act; consequently, information was not always easy to obtain.
There were 18 women in the 120-member Knesset, and women chaired 6 of the
Knesset’s 21 committees, including the Committee on the Status of Women.
There were 3 women in the Cabinet and 6 women on the 14-member High Court of
Justice. There were 11 Arabs, including 2 Druze, in the 120-member Knesset;
most of these 11 represented parties that derived their support largely or
entirely from the Arab community. In March, for the first time since the
establishment of the State, an Arab was appointed as a permanent justice to
the High Court of Justice. No Muslim or Druze citizens served on the court.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Following a visit in November 2003, the World Organization Against Torture
and the International Federation for Human Rights concluded in a study that
human rights groups were able to perform a full range of investigative and
protective activities in the country “without major difficulties.”
In November 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a new liaison
unit to develop and maintain relations with international and domestic NGOs,
assist domestic NGOs to participate in U.N. and other international fora,
and to facilitate international NGOs’ visits to the country.
During the year, the Ministry of Interior, operating under a 2002 order,
barred entry to all foreign nationals affiliated with certain Palestinian
human rights NGOs and solidarity organizations. In July, immigration police
detained a U.S. citizen for over a month at Ben Gurion Airport on security
grounds before a district court ruled that she could enter. The U.S. citizen
was affiliated with the International Solidarity Movement, a Palestinian
advocacy NGO.
In February, the Ministry of Interior sustained the appeal of Adalah against
the decision of the Office of the Registrar of Associations to investigate
its activities. The registrar had contended that Adalah exceeded its mandate
by associating with a political party and mismanaging its finances.
NGOs must register with the Government by submitting an application and
paying approximately $20 (85 NIS). They operate under the laws for nonprofit
organizations. If its application is approved after investigation, the NGO
receives a license to operate and must register with the tax office to
receive tax-exempt status. Registered NGOs are eligible to receive state
funding. Some Israeli-Arab NGOs have complained in the past of difficulties
in both registering and receiving state funding.
(See annex regarding NGOs in the occupied territories.)
Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, race,
political beliefs, or age. Local human rights groups believed that often
these laws were not enforced, either due to institutionalized discrimination
or lack of resources.
Women
The Equality of Women Law provides for equal rights for women in the
workplace, the military, education, health, housing, and social welfare, and
entitles women to protection from violence, sexual harassment, sexual
exploitation, and trafficking; however, violence against women was a
problem. According to an annual government report released in March,
approximately 140,000 women–almost 12 percent of the country’s adult women
population–reported that they suffered from spousal abuse in 2003. The
Ministry of Welfare and several Knesset committees, including the Domestic
Violence Committee, have taken steps to address this problem. A wide variety
of women’s organizations and hotlines provided services to abused women. One
organization reported that it handled approximately 1,300 hotline calls
regarding domestic violence in 2003 with calls from women double those from
men.
Rape is illegal; NGOs considered the incidence of rape a matter of concern.
In 2001, the Government enacted the Prevention of Stalking Law and amended
the Prevention of Family Violence Law to require a number of public and
private sector professional personnel to inform suspected victims of their
right to turn to the police, welfare service, or Centers for the Prevention
of Domestic Violence for assistance. There were no accurate statistics
regarding the extent of sexual harassment in the workplace, although there
was a dramatic increase in the number of complaints following the enactment
of the 1998 law prohibiting sexual harassment. According to a government
report issued in July, the 65 cases of sexual harassment recorded in 2003 in
the public sector resulted in 12 employees facing internal disciplinary
action (warnings) and 2 male employees being forced to resign. Currently, 13
public employees accused of harassment face trial.
According to IDF data, 358 soldiers complained of sexual harassment during
the year, an increase of 3 percent from 2003. Male soldiers made 14 of the
complaints.
In 2003, a women’s organization reported three cases of Arab women killed by
male relatives in “honor” cases, and that a Bedouin women’s organization
suspected 10 cases of women disappearing in the Negev to involve honor
killings. There was no accurate estimate of the number of family honor cases
as families often attempted to cover up the cause of such deaths.
Prostitution is not illegal; however, the operation of brothels and
organized sex enterprises is outlawed.
The law provides for class action suits and requires employers to provide
equal pay for equal work, including benefits and allowances; however,
women’s rights advocates claimed that significant wage gaps remained.
According to figures published in March by the Central Bureau of Statistics,
men’s wages in 2002 were 23 percent higher than women’s earnings. Women make
up 56 percent of the bottom echelon of wage earners, but they are only 34
percent of the top echelon.
Religious courts adjudicate personal status law. Jewish and Muslim women are
subject to restrictive interpretations of their rights in both systems.
Jewish women are not allowed to initiate divorce proceedings without their
husbands’ consent. Consequently, there were estimated to be thousands of
so-called “agunot” who may not remarry or have legitimate children because
their husbands either disappeared or refused to grant divorces. Rabbinical
tribunals may sanction husbands who refuse to divorce wives. A foreign man
was jailed for over 2 years because he refused to grant his wife a writ of
divorce. Some Islamic law courts in the country have held that a Muslim
woman may not request a divorce, but that a woman may be forced to consent
if a divorce is granted to the husband.
Children
Government spending on children was proportionally lower in predominantly
Arab areas than in Jewish areas. In December 2003, the Child Welfare Council
of Israel published a report that children in the country were growing
poorer, and increasingly falling victim to violence, sexual exploitation,
and drug and alcohol addiction. In November, the National Insurance
Institute’s (NIS) annual report on poverty showed that approximately 680,000
children, or 30 percent of the total child population, lived below the
poverty line in 2003. However, some economists disputed the NIS’ definition
of poverty as overly broad. In October the Eli child protection organization
reported to a Knesset committee that in 2003 it addressed 3,599 child abuse
cases, as compared to 699 in 2000. The group attributed the increase in part
to a new law requiring reporting of such abuse. The group claimed that child
abuse cases in the country increased five-fold after 2000.
On February 9, Elem, an NGO that aids troubled youth, estimated that there
were more than 1,000 women under the age of 18 who work as prostitutes.
Education is compulsory until the child reaches the 10th grade.
The Government operated two school systems: One for secular Jews and Arabs,
and one for Orthodox Jews. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish schools, while not a part
of the public system, also received government funding. In December, the
National Task Force for the Advancement of Education in Israel (the Dovrat
Committee) issued a report including recommendations that would affect
ultra-Orthodox schools. Ultra-Orthodox political parties, such as the United
Torah Judaism, opposed interference by the Government in its school system.
Most Jewish children attended schools where the language of instruction was
Hebrew and the curriculum included Jewish history. Most Israeli-Arab
children chose schools where the language of instruction was Arabic and the
curriculum had less of a Jewish focus. Israeli-Arab advocacy groups charged
that Arab children received an education inferior to that of Jewish children
in the secular system.
According to the Government’s February 2002 report to the U.N., government
investment per Arab pupil was approximately 60 percent of investment per
Jewish pupil.
High school graduation rates for Arabs were significantly lower than for
Jews. According to an Israeli-Arab advocacy group, the percentage of Jews
beginning university studies was 21.5 percent compared with 11.5 percent of
those defined as “members of other religions,” mostly Arabs. Preschool
attendance for Bedouin children was the lowest in the country, and the
dropout rate for Bedouin high school students was the highest. Arab members
of the Knesset have criticized the lower academic achievements of Arab
students and stated that this was an indication of discrimination in the
system.
The Government has legislated against sexual, physical, and psychological
abuse of children and has mandated comprehensive reporting requirements. The
sharp increase in reported cases of child abuse in recent years, activists
believed, was due to increased awareness rather than a growing pattern of
abuse. There were five shelters for children at risk of abuse.
Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual
exploitation; however, trafficking of women for prostitution remained a
serious problem. Trafficking in foreign labor has also been a problem. The
penal code stipulates that it is a criminal offense, punishable by between 4
and 20 years imprisonment, to coerce a person to engage in prostitution and
makes it a crime to induce a woman to leave the country to “practice
prostitution abroad.”
The operation of brothels and “organized sex enterprises” is outlawed, as
are many of the abuses committed by traffickers and procurers, such as
assault, rape, abduction, and false imprisonment; however, brothels operated
in several major cities. The law guarantees foreign laborers legal status,
decent working conditions, health insurance, and a written employment
contract; however, some foreign laborers entered the country under
conditions that constituted trafficking. Numerous reports documented foreign
laborers living in harsh conditions, subjected to debt bondage, and
restricted in their movements.
Organized crime groups trafficked women primarily from the former Soviet
Union, sometimes luring these women by offers of service jobs. Foreign
laborers came mainly from Southeast Asia, East Asia, Africa, Turkey, Eastern
Europe (Romania), and South and Central America. Some women were sold to
brothels, forced to live in harsh conditions, subjected to beatings and
rape, and reportedly forced to work off transportation costs and other
“debts” through sexual servitude. In September, police arrested 40 suspected
members of a Russian-Israeli prostitute smuggling ring which, according to a
major media report, the police believed had brought hundreds of women into
the country over the past decade. According to local NGOs, several hundred
women are trafficked into the country annually, but the number decreased
from previous years because of increased airport security.
During the year, the Government strengthened its laws for fighting
trafficking and established a new border police unit to combat smuggling of
persons and drugs across the border with Egypt. A 2003 law provides minimum
sentencing requirements for convicted sex traffickers. During the year, the
Government filed 89 indictments for trafficking. Also, the police conducted
50 criminal investigations of trafficking and 516 involving related
offenses. During the year, the police arrested 103 persons for trafficking,
69 of whom were denied bail. The prosecution division of the Ministry of
Trade and Labor filed 309 criminal indictments against employers and
manpower firms for violations of labor laws concerned with employment of
foreign workers. The Government received 88 judgments against violators
during the year, for a combined sum in criminal fines of approximately $3
million (13.5 million NIS).
The Government investigated allegations that individual police officers
engaged in misconduct, including taking bribes or tipping off brothels of
raids, but these instances of corruption were not widespread.
In February, the Government opened a new, 50-person-capacity shelter for
trafficking victims. As of the end of the year, it was almost filled to
capacity, and NGOs claimed that additional shelters were needed. The
Government continued to provide some victims with lodging in police-funded
hostels, minimal financial assistance, and access to medical care.
Trafficking victims who are willing to assist in prosecuting traffickers,
are not prosecuted or fined for illegal entry or for the possession of
fraudulent documents, and receive visas and permits. According to the
Government, during the year, 108 trafficking victims chose to testify,
compared to 81 victims in 2003. In August 2003, the State Attorney’s office,
the police, and the Knesset urged the courts to speed up the process of
taking testimony from trafficking victims; the law stipulates that testimony
must be taken within 2 months of the indictment of suspected traffickers,
but some victims have waited as long as 18 months.
In comparison with previous years, the Government increased its campaign to
combat trafficking, and cooperated with local NGOs to launch an information
campaign in countries of origin. With assistance of NGOs, the Government
distributed brochures through its embassies in such source countries as
Moldova and Uzbekistan, warning potential victims of the threat.
Persons with Disabilities
The Government provided a range of benefits, including income maintenance,
housing subsidies, and transportation support for persons with disabilities,
who constituted approximately 2.4 percent of the population. Existing
antidiscrimination laws do not prohibit discrimination based on disability,
and persons with disabilities continued to encounter difficulties in areas
such as employment and housing. A law requiring access to public buildings
for persons with disabilities was not widely enforced and accessibility of
public transportation was not legally mandated. A 2002 survey of buildings
by the Commissioner for Equality for the Disabled indicated that most
building owners have ignored access laws for persons with disabilities. The
commissioner also accused the Government of not adequately providing for the
employment needs of the persons with disabilities, despite legal
requirements to do so. In December 2003, the Attorney General told the
Knesset committee that laws protecting and assisting persons with
disabilities were not being implemented due mainly to a lack of funding.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Orr Commission of Inquiry’s report (see Section 1.a.) stated that the
“Government handling of the Arab sector has been primarily neglectful and
discriminatory,” that the Government “did not show sufficient sensitivity to
the needs of the Arab population, and did not take enough action to allocate
state resources in an equal manner.” As a result, “serious distress
prevailed in the Arab sector in various areas. Evidence of distress included
poverty, unemployment, a shortage of land, serious problems in the education
system, and substantially defective infrastructure.”
In June, the Government adopted the proposals of a special ministerial
committee on implementing the Orr Commission’s recommendations, including
the establishment of a government body to promote the Arab sector, the
creation of a volunteer, national civilian service program for Arab youth,
and the creation of a day of national tolerance. At year’s end, the
Government had not implemented these proposals.
In December, the Knesset established a new subcommittee charged with
monitoring the needs of the Israeli-Arab sector and advocating necessary
alterations in the budget. The subcommittee is to be chaired by an
Israeli-Arab Knesset member.
In November, the Israeli-Arab advocacy NGO Sikkuy’s annual report stated
that 45 percent of Arab families were poor, in contrast to 15 percent of
Jewish families, and that the rate of infant mortality in the Arab sector
was 8 out of 1,000 births–twice that of the Jewish population. According to
Human Rights Watch, during the year, the Government provided 1 teacher for
every 16 Jewish primary school children compared to 1 teacher for every 19.7
Arab children.
According to a report by Mossawa, racist violence against Arab citizens has
increased, and the Government has not done enough to prevent this problem.
The annual report cited 17 acts of violence by Jewish citizens against Arab
citizens. In October, police arrested two 15-year-old boys for allegedly
assaulting and harassing Arabs several months earlier. The two youths
reportedly have admitted to the allegations against them. Advocacy groups
charged government officials with making racist statements. In December,
Knesset member Yehiel Hazan likened Arabs to “worms” in a speech in the
Knesset on a terrorist attack. The Attorney General declined to open
investigations into incitement by several public figures, including Hazan.
In June, the Jerusalem District Court filed six indictments against fans of
a local soccer team for shouting “death to the Arabs” at the local stadium.
In May, then-Transportation Minister Avigdor Lieberman publicly advocated
the transfer of Israeli-Arab communities to the occupied territories. A
Haifa University poll released in June revealed that over 63 percent of Jews
believed that the Government should encourage Israeli Arabs to emigrate.
Approximately 93 percent of land in the country was public domain, including
that owned by the state and some 12.5 percent owned by the Jewish National
Fund (JNF). All public land by law may only be leased, not sold. The JNF’s
statutes prohibit the sale or lease of land to non-Jews. In October, civil
rights groups petitioned the High Court of Justice claiming that a bid
announcement by the Israel Land Administration (ILA) involving JNF land was
discriminatory in that it banned Arabs from bidding. The ILA halted
marketing JNF land in the North and the Galilee. In December, Adalah
petitioned the High Court to annul definitively the ILA policy. At year’s
end, there had been no court action.
The Jewish community of Katzir had refused to provide an Israeli-Arab
family, the Ka’adans, with title to a plot of land. In 2000, the High Court
of Justice ruled that the Government cannot discriminate against Israeli
Arabs in the distribution of State resources, and that the ILA must provide
the Ka’adans with the plot they wanted to buy. According to ACRI, the
Ka’adans will be able to sign a lease upon payment of a development fee to
the local municipality.
Israeli-Arab advocacy organizations have challenged the Government’s policy
of demolishing illegal buildings in the Arab sector, and claimed that the
Government was more restrictive in issuing building permits in Arab
communities than in Jewish communities, thereby not accommodating natural
growth. In February, security forces demolished several homes allegedly
built without authorization in the Arab village of Beineh (see Section
1.c.). The Orr Commission found that “suitable planning should be carried
out [in the Arab sector] as soon as possible to prevent illegal
construction… ” A ministerial committee, created to advise the Government
on implementing the Orr Commission recommendations, called on the ILA to
complete master plans for Arab towns, some half of which currently lack such
plans. In towns without plans, and in 46 unrecognized Bedouin villages,
building permits are not legally available. Israeli-Arab advocacy
organizations have challenged the Government’s plan to demolish more illegal
buildings in areas in which it is not possible to obtain building permits.
In June, the Supreme Court ruled that omitting Arab towns from specific
government social and economic plans is discriminatory. This judgment builds
on previous assessments of disadvantages suffered by Arab Israelis.
Israeli-Arab organizations have challenged as discriminatory the 1996
“Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel,” which listed as priority
goals increasing the Galilee’s Jewish population and blocking the
territorial contiguity of Arab towns. Objections were presented at a hearing
in March 2003, but there was no response from the National Council for
Building and Planning. The plan had not been implemented at year’s end.
On February 25, security forces demolished several homes in the Arab village
of Beineh, claiming that the houses were built illegally. Adalah filed a
complaint in April with the Ministry of Justice charging that security
forces assaulted residents of Beineh in their homes and caused widespread
property damage during the demolitions. At year’s end, the Justice Ministry
was still investigating the incident.
Israeli Arabs were underrepresented in the student bodies and faculties of
most universities and in higher professional and business ranks. The Bureau
of Statistics noted that the median number of school years for the Jewish
population is 3 years more than for the Arab population. Well educated Arabs
often were unable to find jobs commensurate with their level of education.
According to Sikkuy, Arab citizens held approximately 60 to 70 of the
country’s 5,000 university faculty positions. A small number of Israeli
Arabs have risen to responsible positions in the civil service, generally in
the Arab departments of government ministries. In September 2003, the
Government approved an affirmative action plan to promote the hiring of
Israeli Arabs in the civil service. However, according to Civil Service
Commission data, only 5.05 percent of civil servants are Arab or Druze and
only 193 of the 4,531 civil servants hired in 2003 were non-Jewish.
In January, in order to implement a 2000 law requiring that minorities be
granted “appropriate representation” in the civil service and on the boards
of government corporations, Prime Minister Sharon mandated that every
state-run company’s corporate board must have at least one Arab member by
August. In June, the media reported that the number of Arabs sitting on the
boards of state corporations actually had declined. According to data from
the Government Companies Authority, Arabs were only 36 out of the 544 board
members of state-run companies.
Israeli Arabs continued to complain of discriminatory treatment at the
airport. In February, Ben Gurion Airport security officials singled out the
editor of an Arab weekly, Lutfi Mashour, from his Jewish colleagues for
additional security checks before he could join the press entourage, whose
individual members President Moshe Katsav had invited to accompany him to
Paris. Mashour refused to subject himself to the checks, and security
officials prevented him from accompanying the President.
Israeli Arabs were not required to perform mandatory military service and,
in practice, only a small percentage of Israeli Arabs served in the
military. Those who did not serve in the army had less access than other
citizens to social and economic benefits for which military service was a
prerequisite or an advantage, such as housing, new-household subsidies, and
employment, especially government or security-related industrial employment.
Regarding the latter, for security reasons, Israeli Arabs generally were
restricted from working in companies with defense contracts or in
security-related fields. In December, the Ivri Committee on National Service
issued official recommendations to the Government that Israel Arabs not be
compelled to perform national or “civic” service, but be afforded an
opportunity to perform such service.
The Israeli Druze and Circassian communities were subject to the military
draft, and the overwhelming majority accepted service willingly. Some
Bedouin and other Arab citizens who were not subject to the draft served
voluntarily.
The Bedouin sector was the weakest of all the population groups in the
country. The COI report called for “special attention” to the living
conditions of the Bedouin community. Approximately 140,000 Bedouin live in
the Negev; half in 7 state-planned communities, and the rest in 46
unrecognized settlements. The recognized Bedouin villages received basic
services, but remained among the poorest communities in the country.
According to a media report, some “60 percent of the community’s babies are
not inoculated, the school dropout rate is exceedingly high, and 31 percent
of school-age children in unrecognized settlements are illiterate.”
According to PHR, the unrecognized villages were not connected to national
infrastructure and lacked basic services.
In March, the Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction to prevent the ILA
from spraying herbicide on Bedouin crops in unrecognized villages. Adalah
alleged that the herbicide has caused adverse health effects; the ILA
claimed that the crops were planted illegally on state-owned land.
During the year, the Government began to implement a plan to relocate
Bedouin living in unrecognized villages to seven new townships. Nearly
two-thirds of the plan’s $225 million (1 billion NIS) allocation is
earmarked for “environmental law enforcement in the Negev,” which included
resources for crop-spraying and home demolitions.
Government planners noted that funds to complete the seven new townships
were far from sufficient, and that the average Bedouin family did not have
adequate funds to purchase a home there. Clashes between authorities and
residents of unrecognized villages have escalated over the past year,
resulting in one Bedouin resident of the village of Atir killed during a
clash with a government home-demolition unit.
In July, the Government extended for 6 months the 2003 Citizenship and Entry
into Israel Law, which bars Palestinians from the occupied territories from
acquiring residence or citizenship rights through marriage to Israelis.
Several civil rights groups petitioned the High Court arguing that the law
has a disproportionate effect on the country’s Arab citizens. The ISA
recommended the law based on its allegation that in some 20 cases
Palestinian spouses of Arab citizens were involved in terrorist activity.
Advocacy groups stated that approximately 16,000 residency applications have
been affected. In August, the Attorney General informed the court that the
Government may amend the law in February 2005 to widen exceptions to the
ban. In December, the court ruled that it would wait to review these
amendments before ruling on the legality of the law.
Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination
In June, bystanders verbally harassed participants in a gay pride parade in
Jerusalem. At the same time, a photograph and the telephone number of a
homosexual Jerusalem city council member was plastered on that city’s
billboards along with accusations that he would bring disaster to Jerusalem.
Anonymous callers threatened to bomb the parade; however, there was no
violence.
In 2003, the Association of Gay Men, Lesbians, Bisexuals, and Transgendered
in Israel complained of several incidents in which police allegedly engaged
in verbal and physical harassment of homosexuals in a Tel Aviv public park.
Representatives of that organization subsequently met with the police to
discuss ways to improve relations, and the police appointed contact persons
in all police districts who serve as liaisons to the homosexual community.
No similar complaints were reported during the year.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Citizen workers may join and establish labor organizations freely. Most
unions belong to Histadrut (the General Federation of Labor in Israel) or to
a much smaller rival federation, the Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit (National
Federation of Labor). These organizations are independent of the Government.
Histadrut members elect national and local officers and officials of its
affiliated women’s organization, Na’amat, from lists of those already in the
union. Plant or enterprise committee members are elected individually.
Approximately 650,000 workers were members of Histadrut during the year, and
much of the non-Histadrut work force was covered by Histadrut’s collective
bargaining agreements.
Nonresident workers, including Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, were not able to join Israeli trade unions or organize their own
unions in Israel. Nonresident workers in the organized sector were entitled
to the protection of Histadrut work contracts and grievance procedures. They
may join, vote for, and be elected to shop-level workers’ committees if
their numbers in individual establishments exceed a minimum threshold.
Palestinian participation in such committees was minimal.
Labor laws apply to Palestinians holding East Jerusalem identity cards and
to the Syrian Druze living on the Golan Heights.
Unions were free to affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Citizen workers exercised their legal rights to organize and bargain
collectively. The law specifically prohibits antiunion discrimination. No
antiunion discrimination was reported.
Nonresident workers could not organize their own unions or engage in
collective bargaining, but they were entitled to be represented by the
bargaining agent and protected by collective bargaining agreements. The
country’s immigration officials estimated there were approximately 200,000
foreign workers in the country. They did not pay union dues, but were
required to pay an agency fee in lieu of dues, which entitled them to union
protection by Histadrut’s collective bargaining agreements. The Ministry of
Labor has the authority to extend collective bargaining agreements to
nonunionized workplaces in the same industrial sector. The Ministry of Labor
also oversaw personal contracts in the unorganized sectors of the economy.
The right to strike was exercised regularly. Unions must provide 15 days’
notice prior to a strike. The law protected strike leaders–even those
organizing illegal strikes. If essential public services are affected, the
Government may appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders while the
parties continue negotiations. Worker dismissals and the terms of severance
arrangements often were the central issues of dispute. During the year,
there were several major strikes of municipal workers. For example, on
September 21, Histadrut called a nationwide strike over unpaid public sector
wages to some 20,000 local government workers, reportedly involving 400,000
workers. Agreement was reached whereby the Government would pay grants to
the local authorities in accordance with a recovery plan. During July, the
port workers conducted strikes over a period of weeks to protest the
Government’s intentions to implement port reforms. In July, the country’s
Manufacturers Association reported that the strikes had caused approximately
$400 million (2 billion NIS) in economic damages.
There are no export processing zones. In December, the country signed an
agreement with Egypt to establish a “Qualified Industrial Zone” (QIZ), which
creates duty-exempt zones to facilitate joint manufacturing between Israel
and Egypt for exports to the United States. Egyptian labor laws apply since
the factories are located in Egypt. A comparable QIZ was established with
Jordan in 1998.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and
there were no reports that such practices occurred for citizens or
nonresident Palestinians working in Israel; however, civil rights groups
charged that unscrupulous employers often took advantage of illegal workers’
lack of status to hold them in conditions that amount to involuntary
servitude (see Section 6.e.).
Women were trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Section 5,
Trafficking).
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
Children at least 15 years old, who have completed their education up to
grade 10, may be employed as apprentices only, according to the
Apprenticeship Law. Children who are 14 years old may be employed during
official school holidays in light work that will not harm their health.
Working hours of those 16 to 18 years of age are restricted to ensure time
for rest and education. The Government enforced these restrictions in
practice.
No reliable data existed regarding illegal child workers, although it is
believed they exist to a small degree, primarily in urban, light industry.
Previously, there were reports of illegal child labor in the country’s
undocumented Palestinian population; however, with the greatly reduced
Palestinian workforce, such reports could no longer be confirmed.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage was calculated periodically and adjusted for cost of living
increases. During the year, the minimum wage was approximately 47.8 percent
of the average wage. At year’s end, the minimum wage was approximately $900
(3,335 NIS) per month. During the year, the minimum wage often was
supplemented by special allowances for citizens and was considered by the
Government to be sufficient to provide a citizen worker and family with a
decent standard of living. Some union officials and social commentators
disputed that. Union officials expressed concern over enforcement,
particularly with respect to employers of illegal nonresident workers.
By law, the maximum hours of work at regular pay are 42.5 hours a week, 8
hours a day, and 7 hours in night work on the day before the weekly rest.
That rest period must be at least 36 consecutive hours and include the
Sabbath for Jews and a choice of Friday, Saturday, or Sunday for non-Jews.
Employers must receive a government permit to hire Palestinian workers from
the occupied territories, and, to do so, must make a case that no citizen is
available for the job. All Palestinians from the occupied territories
working legally in Israel were employed on a daily basis and, unless they
were employed on shift work, were not authorized to spend the night in
Israel. Palestinians without valid work permits were subject to arrest.
Palestinian employees, whose Israeli employers recruited them through the
Ministry of Labor, received their wages and benefits through that ministry.
Palestinian workers were not eligible for all National Insurance Institute
(NII) benefits although the ministry deducted a union fee and required
contributions to the NII. Palestinians, paid through the Labor Ministry,
continued to be entitled to maternity leave and were insured for injuries
suffered while working in the country and for any wages lost by bankruptcy
of a worker’s employer. They did not, however, receive unemployment
insurance, general disability payments, or low-income supplements.
Palestinians, who were not employed through the Labor Ministry, were paid
directly by their Israeli employers.
Since 1993, the Government has agreed to transfer the NII fees collected
from Palestinian workers to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was to
assume responsibility for all the pensions and social benefits of
Palestinians working in Israel. According to the Government, these funds
were unfrozen and transferred to the PA at the beginning of 2003, when
mechanisms for transferring the funds and mechanisms for providing these
services in the PA controlled territories were established.
Following the outbreak of violence in 2000, the Government implemented a
closure policy on the occupied territories, which prevented nearly all
Palestinians from getting to their places of employment in Israel (see
Section 2.d.). As of midyear, the Government issued approximately 15,000
work permits for Palestinian day laborers, of which approximately 12,500
were used by Palestinians to cross into Israel.
Along with union representatives, the Labor Inspection Service enforced
labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace, although resource
constraints, such as insufficient staffing, affected overall enforcement.
Legislation protects the employment rights of safety delegates elected or
appointed by the workers. In cooperation with management, these delegates
were responsible for safety and health in the workplace.
Workers did not have the legal right to remove themselves from dangerous
work situations without jeopardy to continued employment. However,
collective bargaining agreements provided some workers with recourse through
the work site labor committee. Any worker may challenge unsafe work
practices through government oversight and legal agencies. Continuing NGO
and police reports charged that illegal workers often lived in situations
amounting to involuntary servitude, due primarily to their tenuous legal
status and lack of recourse. NGOs noted cases in which the police injured
foreign workers during arrest. In July, the immigration police reportedly
raided a factory on Kibbutz Ramat Hakovesh and found eight allegedly
illegally employed Thai workers living in harsh conditions.
Public debate continued regarding the role in the workplace and society of
non-Palestinian foreign workers, whom the Government estimated as
approximately 189,000 at the end of 2003. According to the Government, most
of these workers entered the country illegally or overstayed their visas,
with illegal migrant workers reaching 104,000. The Government estimated
that, during the year, approximately 45,000 illegal migrant workers left the
country, with approximately 19,000 deported and the rest departing
voluntarily. Currently, the Government estimated that approximately 60,000
to 70,000 workers employed illegally still resided in the country. The
majority of such workers came from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia and
worked in the construction and agricultural sectors, and as domestic help.
During the year, the Government sought to restrict the entry and stay of new
and resident workers.
The law does not permit foreign workers to obtain citizenship or permanent
residence status unless they are Jewish.
In May, the Minister of Interior halted the deportation of any illegal
foreign workers’ children, age 10 and above and who were born and raised in
the country, until a ministerial panel formulated a policy for naturalizing
children in these circumstances. During the year, the Government allowed
over 2,300 foreign laborers to change employers.
NGOs alleged that foreign workers were being lured to the country with the
promise of jobs that did not exist. Some foreign workers reportedly paid up
to $10,000 (45,000 NIS) to employment agencies to obtain work permits.
According to NGOs, in a significant number of cases workers were dismissed
shortly after arriving. Allegedly, the manpower companies worked with
deportation authorities to deport the newly arrived workers, who were then
replaced by others, earning the companies more fees. NGOs argued that most
workers expected to work for some time in the country to recoup their
initial payments; those dismissed often sought illegal employment and some
committed suicide.
Illegal foreign workers facing deportation were brought before a special
court, and workers may contest the deportation orders. Many workers lacked
fluency in Hebrew, which hindered the process. In March, in response to
judicial criticism about the protracted detention of foreign workers, the
Attorney General directed that detained foreign workers must be brought
before the court within 4 days of arrest, and not the 2 weeks stipulated by
law. NGOs existed to aid workers facing deportation, and there have been
cases in which the worker’s status was reinstated. The court also provided a
forum where workers subject to deportation orders can lodge claims for
unpaid wages or other benefits to which they are entitled by law. Workers
were often deported before they could lodge such claims. NGOs noted cases in
which the police injured foreign workers during arrest. In some cases, these
NGOs claimed, the workers were injured so seriously that they were not
ultimately detained, due to the potential cost of care for their injuries
and police fears of possible investigation of police misconduct. In 2003, at
least one foreign worker killed himself while in detention; however, there
were no such cases during the year.
In 2002, the editor of the foreign worker newspaper Manila-Tel Aviv Times
was deported shortly after giving interviews to other publications on the
subject of foreign worker rights under the law; foreign worker advocates
claimed the deportation was politically motivated. During 2003, another
reporter from the publication was deported after advising foreign workers in
an article on strategies for avoiding detention and deportation. Human
rights groups claimed that since foreign worker residency permits were tied
to specific employment, even legal foreign workers had little leverage to
influence their work conditions. However, there were no comparable
deportation actions during the year, and the newspaper continued to operate.
The Occupied Territories (Including Areas Subject to the Jurisdiction of the
Palestinian Authority)
Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem
during the 1967 War. Pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the
September 1995 Interim Agreement, Israel transferred most responsibilities
for civil government in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the
newly created Palestinian Authority (PA). The 1995 Interim Agreement divided
the territories into three types of areas denoting different levels of
Palestinian Authority and Israeli occupation control. Since Palestinian
extremist groups resumed the use of violence in 2000, Israeli forces have
resumed control of a number of the PA areas, citing the PA’s failure to
abide by its security responsibilities.
The body of law governing Palestinians in the occupied territories derives
from Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, and Egyptian law, and Israeli
military orders. Laws and regulations promulgated by the PA also are in
force. Israeli settlers were subject to Israeli law.
The Palestinian Authority now has a democratically elected President and
Legislative Council, which elects a Prime Minister and Cabinet. Following
the death of PA Chairman Yasir Arafat on November 11, an election for PA
president was scheduled for January 9, 2005. Seven candidates competed in a
vigorous election campaign throughout the occupied territories. Municipal
elections were held in selected West Bank localities on December 23–the
first since 1976. Future rounds of municipal elections were scheduled for
2005. New Palestinian Legislative Council elections were scheduled for July
17, 2005.
Israel exercised occupation authority through the Israeli Ministry of
Defense’s Office of Coordination and Liaison (MATAK).
Violence associated with the Intifada has claimed the lives of 3,517
Palestinians, according to the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), 1,051
Israelis, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, and
52 foreign nationals, according to B’tselem, an Israeli human rights
organization that monitors the occupied territories. During the year, over
800 Palestinians were killed during Israeli military operations in the
occupied territories, a total of 76 Israeli civilians and 4 foreigners were
killed in terrorist attacks in both Israel and the occupied territories, and
41 members of the Israeli Defense Forces were killed in clashes with
Palestinian militants.
The Palestinian security forces included the National Security Forces (NSF),
the Preventive Security Organization (PSO), the General Intelligence
Service, or Mukhabarat, the Presidential Security Force, and the Coastal
Police. Other quasi-military security organizations, such as the Military
Intelligence Organization, also exercised de facto law enforcement powers.
Palestinian police were normally responsible for security and law
enforcement for Palestinians and other non Israelis in PA-controlled areas
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinian security forces were under the
authority of the PA. Members of the PA security forces committed numerous,
serious abuses.
Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consisted of the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the
Israeli National Police (INP), and the Border Police, an operational arm of
the Israel National Police that is under IDF command when operating in the
occupied territories. Israeli military courts tried Palestinians accused of
security offenses. Israeli security forces were under effective government
control. Members of the Israeli security forces committed numerous, serious
abuses.
The population of the Gaza Strip was approximately 1.4 million, of the West
Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) approximately 2.4 million, and of East
Jerusalem approximately 414,518, including 177,333 Israelis. The economy of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip is small, underdeveloped, and highly dependent
on Israel and international assistance. The continuing conflict, including
Israeli curfews and closures, severely affected the economy.
The PA’s overall human rights record remained poor, and it continued to
commit numerous, serious abuses. There were credible reports that PA
officers engaged in torture, prisoner abuse, and arbitrary and prolonged
detention. Conditions for prisoners were poor. PA security forces infringed
privacy and freedom of speech and press. The PA did not take available
measures to prevent attacks by terrorist groups either within the occupied
territories or within Israel. Impunity was a serious problem. Domestic abuse
of women persisted. Societal discrimination against women and persons with
disabilities and child labor remained problems.
There were reports that Israeli security forces used excessive force, abused
and tortured detainees. Conditions in permanent prisons met international
standards, but temporary facilities were austere and overcrowded. Many
Israeli security personnel were prosecuted for committing abuses, but
international and Israeli human rights groups complained of lack of
disciplinary action in a large number of cases.
The Israeli Government continued construction of a security barrier along
parts of the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice line) and in the West Bank. The
PA alleged that the routing of the barrier resulted in the taking of land,
isolating residents from hospitals, schools, social services, and
agricultural property. Israel asserts that it has sought to build the
barrier on public lands where possible, and where private land was used,
provided opportunities for compensation. Palestinians filed a number of
cases with the Israeli Supreme Court challenging the routing of the barrier.
In June, the Court ruled that a section of the barrier must be rerouted;
determining that the injury caused by the routing of the barrier did not
stand in proper proportion to the security benefits; various portions of the
barrier route were rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice
issued an advisory opinion, concluding that “The construction of the wall
built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem. and its associated regime, are
contrary to international law.”
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
Killings by Palestinian and Israeli security forces and by Israel settlers
and Palestinian militant groups remained a serious problem.
‘Imran Abu Hamdiyah, a 17-year-old Palestinian, was found dead in Hebron in
December 2002. In April 2003, four Israeli Border Police officers were
arrested on charges that they had beaten Hamdiyah and then dumped him from
their moving vehicle, causing fatal injuries. At year’s end, a trial begun
in 2003 was reportedly still ongoing.
Three U.S. security personnel in a diplomatic convoy were killed in an
attack in October 2003. At year’s end, there had been no progress by the PA’s
investigative team, and the case remains unsolved.
On May 2, Palestinians belonging to the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the
Islamic Jihad shot and killed Tali Hatuel, an Israeli settler and her four
daughters in the Gaza Strip when their car spun off the road after a
shooting. An Israeli traveling in a separate car and two IDF soldiers were
injured before the gunmen were killed.
On August 2, grenades were thrown into a room holding suspected Palestinian
collaborators in the Gaza Central Prison. Two Palestinian prisoners were
killed, and six others were injured. Palestinian security officials arrested
two policemen, who allegedly had carried out the attack on behalf of Hamas.
At year’s end, no further legal action had been taken against the two police
officers.
On September 20, gunmen belonging to the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades shot and
killed Rami Yaghmour near Ramallah, alleging that Yaghmour had collaborated
with Israel. The PA security services arrested two persons who were
subsequently released.
On September 27, an Israeli settler, Yehoshua Elitzur, shot and killed
Palestinian taxi-driver Sa’al Jabara near Nablus. According to witnesses,
Elitzur shot Jabara at close range after he had slowed his car to ask
whether Elitzur needed assistance. On October 25, Elitzur was indicted in
Tel Aviv District Court.
On October 1, according to a Palestinian human rights group, 10 unknown
individuals in military uniforms entered the central prison in Nablus and
killed 2 prisoners.
On October 7, gunmen belonging to al-Aqsa entered a hospital in Ramallah,
kidnapped a Palestinian accused of collaboration, shot him, and left his
body on the street.
On October 11, an assailant believed to be an Israeli settler shot and
seriously wounded Palestinian farmer Hani Shadeh, 26, after Shadeh engaged
in an argument with settlers. Local Palestinians said that settlers had cut
down approximately 1,000 olive trees in an effort to drive Palestinians from
their farmland.
On October 27, an Israeli settler shot and killed 18-year-old Salman Yussuf
Safadi near the settlement of Yizhar. The settler initially claimed that
Safadi attempted to enter his home, but later said that the Palestinian was
not in his home when he shot him. Settlers placed spikes in the road that
prevented an ambulance from reaching Safadi before he died. The Israeli
police opened an investigation into both the shooting and the obstruction of
the ambulance; however, at year’s end, there were no public results.
On December 27, a Palestinian male was found dead outside Ramallah. Al-Aqsa
claimed responsibility for killing the suspected collaborator.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances during the
year.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Article 13 of the PA Basic Law prohibits the use of torture or force against
detainees; however, international human rights groups stated that the use of
torture was widespread and not restricted to those persons detained on
security charges.
Torture by PA security forces reportedly was widespread. Documentation of
abuses was very limited, due partly to the hesitancy of alleged victims to
file or make public claims of torture or abuse against PA authorities.
Palestinian security officers have no formal guidelines regarding the proper
conduct of interrogations; most convictions were based largely on
confessions
Israeli law, as interpreted by a 1999 High Court of Justice decision,
prohibited torture and several interrogation techniques, such as violent
shaking, holding and tying of prisoner in painful positions, shackling,
sleep deprivation, covering the prisoner’s head with a sack, playing loud
music, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures, but allowed “moderate
physical pressure” against detainees considered to possess information about
an imminent attack. However, CATI and the Physicians for Human Rights in
Israel (PHR) reported that techniques prohibited by the law were used
against Palestinian detainees during interrogation and that security forces
often beat Palestinians during arrest and transport. Israeli law prohibits
the admission of forced confessions, but most convictions in security cases
were based on confessions made before legal representation was available to
defendants.
(A detainee may not have contact with a lawyer until after interrogation, a
process that may last weeks. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) is notified of arrests 12 days after they take place, and the ICRC is
allowed to visit detainees 14 days after their arrest.) Detainees sometimes
stated in court that their confessions were coerced, but there were no
instances when judges excluded such confessions.
In January, at the Huwwara checkpoint, an IDF sergeant handcuffed and beat a
Palestinian man in front of his family. The man was then removed to a hut
and further beaten. The incident was taped by an IDF video team. The
sergeant was convicted by a military judicial panel in September, sentenced
to 6 months in jail, and demoted to the rank of private; he also admitted
beating at least 8 other Palestinians and smashing windshields of 10
taxicabs from mid-January until the end of February.
On May 23, a PA prison guard at a facility in Jericho severely beat a
prisoner with a metal ruler, according to a witness. The witness also saw
several other guards and nonuniformed individuals taking part.
On May 24, another witness in the same facility observed a prisoner being
beaten with a nightstick. The prison governor claimed that the prisoner had
provoked the initial beating by taunting the guards, but he refused to
explain the presence of other guards and plainclothes individuals during the
beating.
The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) reported that on July
6, a Palestinian inmate at the Gilboa Prison poured a hot substance on an
Israeli prison official. In response, prison officials allegedly forced the
cellblock inmates to kneel with their hands tied behind their backs and beat
them, resulting in numerous injuries. At of year’s end, PCATI had not
received a response from the prison authorities regarding this incident.
On September 26, the Israeli Justice Ministry filed indictments against five
Border Policemen accused of severely abusing two Palestinians detained for
lacking the necessary permits in Abu Dis earlier in September. According to
the indictment, the border policemen forced the two Palestinians into a
building and beat one with rifles, boots, and fists before forcing him to
jump out of a second floor window. The border policemen allegedly burned the
second Palestinian with a cigarette and forced him to drink urine. The
policemen then allegedly threw the Palestinian’s papers into a puddle of
urine and ordered him to pick up his papers with his mouth and tongue. They
then threw him out the same second story window. At year’s end, further
legal action remained pending.
In February 2003, Israeli authorities arrested Daoud Dirawi, a Palestinian
lawyer, for being in Jerusalem without proper identification. Dirawi told
his lawyer that soldiers beat him severely on the way to the Asyun military
prison in the Negev. In March 2003, Israel sentenced Dirawi to 6 months of
administrative detention. He was released in August.
Israeli soldiers on patrol in June 2003 allegedly attacked 20 Palestinian
youths, who were trying to cross a dirt road near a military checkpoint
north of Jerusalem. The soldiers allegedly beat the youths with their rifles
and threw several of them in a sewage ditch before leaving the scene.
In June 2003, Israeli Border Police in Tulkarm took the identity card of
shepherd Nazih Salah ‘Awad Damiri, 24, and forced him to mime sexual
intercourse with his donkey.
In November 2003, IDF soldiers at the Huwwara checkpoint outside Nablus
demanded that two Palestinians stop and clean the checkpoint. When the men
refused, the soldiers handcuffed, blindfolded, and detained them for several
hours. When B’tselem investigated the incident, the soldiers admitted to the
action and claimed their superiors had ordered them to do it. B’tselem has
requested an official investigation of the incident; however, at year’s end,
there was no response to their request.
PA prison conditions were poor. Facilities were old, dilapidated, and
neglected. Most prison facilities were destroyed during the Intifada, and
prisoners were kept informally in houses or other buildings. There were
separate facilities to hold juvenile prisoners. Prison facilities were
poorly protected and subject to intrusions by outsiders. The PA generally
permitted the ICRC access to detainees and allowed regular inspections of
prison conditions; however, the PA denied access to some detainees for 14
days following their arrests. The PA permitted independent monitoring of its
prisons, although human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, and
lawyers reported difficulties arranging visits or gaining access to specific
detainees. Human rights organizations stated that their ability to visit PA
prisons and detention centers varied depending on which security
organization controlled the facility. Human rights monitors stated that
prison authorities did not consistently permit them to have access to PA
detention facilities and that they rarely were permitted to see inmates
while they were under interrogation.
The conditions of Israeli permanent prison facilities generally met
international standards. The standards were less likely to be met in
provisional detention centers, because prison facilities refused to take new
inmates when their maximum capacity was reached. The detention and
interrogation facilities for Palestinian detainees, including the four
interrogation centers (Shikma, Kishon, Petah Tikva, and the Jerusalem
Internment Center) were austere, overcrowded, provisional facilities. Israel
held at least 121 Palestinian prisoners in some form of solitary
confinement. Israel permitted independent monitoring of prison conditions by
the ICRC and other groups, although human rights groups reported delays and
difficulties in gaining access to specific detainees. Male family members
between 16 and 40 years of age, and any family members with security
records, usually were barred from visiting relatives in Israeli facilities.
According to the ICRC, between January and May, 3,517 detainees in Israel,
Gaza, and the West Bank had visits from family members.
The NGO, Palestinian Prisoners Club, had approximately 820 medical cases in
Israeli prisons. During the year, approximately 57 cases required urgent
medical attention. Following the August 18 hunger strike, Israeli
authorities provided increased medical attention; however, prisoners
continued to claim that it was inadequate. Several private doctors were
authorized to visit prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The 2001 PA Criminal Procedures Law allows police to hold detainees without
charges for 24 hours. Court approval is necessary for detention without
charges for a maximum of 45 days. A trial must start within 6 months of
arrest or the detainee must be released. In practice, however, many
Palestinians were held in detention without charge for months.
PA security forces detained persons without informing judicial authorities,
and often ignored laws that protect the rights of detainees and court
decisions calling for the release of alleged security criminals. At year’s
end, Palestinian sources estimated that between 250 and 300 suspected
collaborators were held in PA prisons. Alleged collaborators often were held
without presentation of evidence to a court and were denied access to
lawyers, their families, or doctors.
Under applicable occupation orders, Israeli security personnel may arrest
without warrant or hold for questioning a person suspected of having
committed or to be likely to commit a security related offense. Israeli
Military Order 1507 permits the Israeli army to detain persons for 10 days,
during which detainees are barred from seeing a lawyer or appearing before
court. Administrative detention orders could be issued for up to 6-month
periods and could be renewed indefinitely by judges. No detainee has ever
successfully appealed a detention order. Israeli military Order 1369
provides for a 7 year prison term for anyone who does not respond to a
special summons in security cases. Suspects are entitled to an attorney, but
this can be deferred during the interrogation phase, which sometimes lasts
up to 90 days. Israeli authorities stated that they attempted to post
notification of arrests within 48 hours, but senior officers may delay
notification for up to 12 days. Additionally, a military commander may
appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an unlimited
period, and many families reported serious problems in learning of the
status and whereabouts of prisoners. Evidence used at hearings for
administrative detentions in security cases was often unavailable to the
detainee or his attorneys due to security classification.
The Israeli Government maintained that it held no political prisoners, but
Palestinians claimed that administrative detainees were political prisoners.
At year’s end, Israel held approximately 8,300 Palestinian security
prisoners (up from 5,900 in 2003), of which at least 960 were in
administrative detention.
During the year, Israel did not conduct mass detentions in the West Bank as
had been the case in the past; arrest operations were geared more toward
specific persons. Israeli authorities intermittently issued special
summonses for those suspected of involvement in or knowledge of security
offenses.
Palestinians transferred to prison facilities in Israel had difficulty
obtaining legal representation because only Israeli citizens or Palestinian
lawyers with Jerusalem identification cards were permitted to visit them.
However, during the year, procedures were revised to permit more lawyers to
have access to the prisons. Israeli authorities in some instances scheduled
appointments, but they subsequently moved the clients to another prison to
delay lawyer client meetings for as long as 90 days.
The Government of Israel frequently failed to notify foreign consular
officials in a timely manner when their citizens were detained.
In contrast to past practice, during the year, Israel did not forcibly
transfer Palestinians from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. On August 27,
Israel allowed Kifah Ajouri, a Fatah activist who was forcibly transferred
to Gaza in 2002, to return to his home in Nablus. Mahmud Suleiman Sa’id
al-Sa’di al-Saffouri was transferred to Gaza from Jenin in May 2003 and was
required to remain in the Gaza Strip.
Amnesty International (AI) noted that Muhammad Hassan Mustafa al-Najjar was
administratively detained for the fourth consecutive time on May 20.
Subsequently, AI reported that al-Najjar was released on June 20.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The PA court system is based on legal codes that predate the 1967 Israeli
occupation and Israeli military orders. A High Judicial Council (HJC)
maintained authority over most court operations. State security courts were
formally abolished in 2003. Military courts, established in 1995, have
jurisdiction over police and security force personnel as well as crimes by
civilians against security forces. The PA courts were inefficient, lacked
staff and resources, and often did not ensure fair and expeditious trials.
These problems predated PA jurisdiction, and were aggravated by lack of PA
attention thereafter. The PA executive and security services frequently
failed to carry out court decisions and otherwise inhibited judicial
independence.
The ongoing violence adversely affected the PA administration of justice.
Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 damaged the Court of First Instance and
Conciliation in Ramallah and the PA’s main forensic lab. Many police
stations and incarceration facilities were damaged or destroyed. Travel
restrictions, curfews, and closures significantly impeded the administration
of justice.
Israeli law provides for an independent judiciary, and the Government
generally respected this in practice. Palestinians accused of security
offenses usually were tried in military courts. Security offenses are
comprehensively defined and may include charges as varied as rock throwing
or membership in outlawed terrorist organizations, such as Hamas or the
PFLP. Military prosecutors brought charges. Serious charges were tried
before three-judge panels; lesser offenses were tried before one judge. The
Israeli military courts rarely acquitted Palestinians of security offenses,
but sentences in some cases were reduced on appeal.
Israeli military trials followed evidentiary rules that were the same as
those in regular criminal cases. Convictions may not be based solely on
confessions, although, in practice, some security prisoners were convicted
on the basis of alleged coerced confessions of themselves and others. The
prosecution must justify closing the proceedings to the public in security
cases. The accused is entitled to counsel, and a judge may assign counsel.
Charges are made available to the defendant and the public in Hebrew, and
the court may order that the charges be translated into Arabic, if
necessary. Defendants had the right to appeal through the Military High
Court or to the Civilian High Court of Justice in certain instances. The
court may hear secret evidence in security cases that is not available to
the defendant or his attorney. However, a conviction may not be based solely
on such evidence.
Trials sometimes were delayed for very extended periods, because Israeli
security force witnesses did not appear, the defendant was not brought to
court, files were lost, or attorneys were delayed by travel restrictions
(see Section 2.d.). Palestinian legal advocates alleged that these delays
were designed to pressure defendants to settle their cases.
On May 20, a Tel Aviv District Court convicted West Bank Fatah leader and
Palestinian Legislative Council member, Marwan Barghuti, on three charges of
murder and one charge of attempted murder involving terror attacks that
resulted in the deaths of five Israelis. Barghuti was arrested in April 2002
and initially was barred from seeing an attorney; however, he was allowed to
retain and dismiss legal counsel during the course of his trial. The trial
began in September 2002 and proceeded sporadically for more than 2 years.
Barghuti rejected the Israeli court’s jurisdiction, did not mount a legal
defense, and did not appeal the five consecutive life sentences he received.
In May 2003, the PA High Court of Justice ordered the release of Taysir Abu
Meghasib and Mehdi Abu Seif from detention for lack of evidence on charges
of collaborating with Israel. At year’s end, it appeared that they had not
been released.
On October 16, a PA civil court in the Gaza Strip sentenced a Palestinian to
death by hanging after finding him guilty of collaborating with Israel;
however, by year’s end, there had been no execution. Another three
Palestinians convicted of the same charges received prison terms.
On November 28, an Israeli military court delayed PLC member Husam Khader’s
trial until March 6, 2005. Khader was arrested in March 2003 for alleged
involvement in Intifada-related violence, but his trial since has been
delayed repeatedly.
Crowded facilities, poor arrangements for scheduling and holding attorney
client consultations, and confessions prepared in Hebrew hindered legal
defense efforts.
Israeli settlers were tried under Israeli law in the nearest Israeli
district court. Civilian judges presided, and the standards of due process
and admissibility of evidence were governed by the laws of Israel, not
military orders. Settlers rarely were prosecuted for crimes against
Palestinians and, in the rare instances in which they were convicted,
regularly received lighter punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli
courts (see Section 1.a.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The PA required the Attorney General to issue warrants for entry and
searches of private property; however, Palestinian security services
frequently ignored these requirements. Police searched homes without the
consent of their owners. In some cases, police forcibly entered premises.
Under occupation orders, an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or
above could authorize entry of private homes and institutions without a
warrant, based upon military necessity. On some occasions IDF personnel beat
occupants and destroyed or looted property. Authorities stated that these
were punishable violations of military regulations, and compensation was
due.
Israeli security forces demolished and sealed the homes (owned or rented) of
Palestinians suspected of terrorism or the relatives of such suspects,
without judicial review (see Section 1.g.). During the year, according to
B’tselem, Israeli forces demolished 181 housing units in the occupied
territories (compared with 219 in 2003) as punishment for terror activity
and deterrence against future attacks.
On February 26, the IDF blew up the apartment of ‘Itaf Abu Sha’ira in the
al-Aida refugee camp near Bethlehem. Abu Sha’ira said that an IDF officer on
the scene told her that the demolition was punishment for her husband
Hassan’s June 2001 killing of an IDF soldier. The IDF gave Abu Sha’ira and
her family 10 minutes to remove items from her apartment prior to its
destruction; the explosion also damaged other apartments in the building.
On April 4, the IDF blew up the home of Fakhri ‘Aarda from the Tulkarm
refugee camp after one of his sons killed an Israeli and injured another in
a northern West Bank settlement on April 3.
Israel demolished many homes between the Rafah refugee camp and the border
with Egypt, claiming that the houses concealed tunnels used for weapons
smuggling or provided cover for attacks against Israeli soldiers. Between
May 17 and 24, the IDF undertook “Operation Rainbow” to secure the
neighborhoods along the Philadelphi road that divides the Gaza Strip from
Egypt and eliminate “terrorists and wanted operatives.” UNWRA and U.N.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), judged that this
operation destroyed 298 buildings, leaving 3,794 individuals homeless. Since
2000, approximately 1,500 buildings in Rafah have been demolished by the
IDF, making more than 15,000 Palestinians homeless.
The IDF destroyed numerous citrus, olive, and date groves, and irrigation
systems, stating that Palestinians had been shooting from those areas. The
IDF also cleared and took control of land held by private Palestinians for
construction of the separation barrier. B’tselem estimated that at least
6,900 acres of land has been taken for construction of the separation
barrier. According to OCHA, the separation barrier was approximately 123
miles long and was projected to be more than 372 miles long.
Human rights monitors reported that the IDF provided greater protection to
Palestinian farmers than they did in the past. Still, Palestinians
complained that the IDF measures gave insufficient time to complete the
harvest, and that they were limited in their own ability to protect their
property by curfews and travel restrictions.
On November 17, approximately 70 Israeli settlers from the West Bank
settlement of Itamar attacked Palestinian olive harvesters; Israeli security
forces attempted to prevent disruption of the harvest.
Between December 9 and 12, according to the daily Ha’aretz, Zufim settlers
uprooted more than 217 olive and citrus trees at Jayyus.
Israeli authorities generally did not prosecute settlers for acts of
violence against Palestinians, and settlers rarely served prison sentences
if convicted of a crime against a Palestinian. However, in August 2003,
Israel arrested nine settlers for plotting an attack on a Palestinian school
in East Jerusalem. Ultimately, during 2003, two were sentenced to 15-year
terms, and one was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. The remaining six
were released from custody for lack of evidence.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal and
External Conflicts
Palestinian members of Fatah, HAMAS, and PFLP attacked and killed civilians
in Israel, Israeli settlers, foreign nationals, and soldiers. They used
weapons designed to inflict casualties on noncombatants, such as suicide
bombs, and fired area weapons such as rockets and mortars at their targets
without regard for noncombatants. In addition, they often fired at Israeli
security forces from civilian population areas, increasing the risk that
Israeli return fire would harm noncombatants. The PA did not take sufficient
steps to prevent terrorist attacks, enforce a ban on militant groups, or
prevent such groups from seeking shelter in civilian areas. By year’s end,
some PA officials made statements questioning the utility of violence.
During the presidential campaign, PA presidential candidate Abbas called the
armed Intifada counterproductive to Palestinian interests.
According to the PA Ministry of Health, the Palestine Red Crescent Society,
and B’tselem, at least 800 Palestinians were killed during the course of
Israeli military and police operations during the year. The PA Ministry of
Health estimated that approximately half of those killed were noncombatants.
B’tselem reported a figure of 452 innocent Palestinians killed this year.
The IDF stated that the majority of Palestinians killed were armed fighters
or persons engaged in planning or carrying out violence against Israeli
civilian and military targets. According to the PRCS, IDF operations
resulted in injuries to approximately 4,000 Palestinians.
The IDF conducted numerous military incursions into Palestinian population
centers, in response to Palestinian mortar and antitank fire. These actions
often resulted in civilian casualties. Israeli forces fired tank shells,
heavy machine-gun rounds, and rockets from aircraft at targets in
residential and business neighborhoods where Palestinian gunfire was
believed to have originated. Palestinians often used civilian homes to fire
upon Israeli forces and booby-trapped civilian homes and apartment
buildings. In response to these actions, the IDF usually raided, and often
leveled, these buildings.
During an IDF incursion into two refugee camps in the northern Gaza Strip on
March 7, Israeli forces killed 10 Palestinian militants and 4 civilians,
including 3 children, during fighting throughout the day.
On May 17, Israel launched “Operation Rainbow” in Rafah in the Gaza Strip.
According to the IDF, the operation was designed to destroy tunnels used for
smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Over 40 Palestinians were
killed during the operation, including civilians. (See Section 1.f.
regarding housing destroyed in this operation.) Human Rights Watch (HRW)
also reported that the IDF actions destroyed over 50 percent of Rafah’s
roads and elements of its water, sewage, and electrical systems.
On May 18 in Rafah, two Palestinian children, 16-year-old Asma al-Mughayr
and her 13-year-old brother, were shot in the head on the roof-terrace of
their home while performing household chores. AI concluded that IDF snipers
killed both; Israeli army officials suggested that they were killed by an
explosive device set by Palestinians. At year’s end, there was no
information on any further official investigation.
On July 6, IDF forces killed Dr. Khaled Salah, a Palestinian engineering
professor at al-Najah University, and his teen-age son during a raid on
their apartment building. IDF soldiers were seeking Palestinian militants in
the building and, in the exchange of gunfire, also killed Salah and his son.
On September 7, a girl sitting in a U.N.-flagged school was struck in the
head by gunfire from an Israeli position in Gaza. At year’s end, an IDF
investigation was ongoing into the circumstances of the shooting.
On September 19 in Nablus, during an exchange of gunfire between the IDF and
militants, an 11-year-old Palestinian girl was shot and killed while
standing in the doorway of her house. Palestinians claimed the IDF killed
the girl, but the IDF stated that a preliminary investigation found that no
IDF gunfire had been directed at the girl.
On September 28, the IDF launched “Operation Days of Penitence” into the
northern Gaza Strip in response to continued Qassam rocket fire into Israel
that killed two Israeli children in the town of Sderot. The IDF attacked
targets in Bayt Hanun and Jabaliyah refugee camp using tanks and helicopters
during the 17-day operation. Human rights groups claimed that IDF security
forces killed as many as 130 Palestinians and wounded over 430 during the
operation, although the U.N. put the number of those killed at 107.
According to B’tselem, among the Palestinians killed were approximately 50
civilians, including at least 26 Palestinians under the age of 18. The IDF
estimated that 19 civilians were killed.
On October 5, IDF soldiers shot and killed Imam al-Hams, a 13-year-old
Palestinian schoolgirl, as she approached an IDF outpost in the southern
Gaza Strip. The girl approached the outpost carrying a bag that troops
suspected contained explosives, but which later turned out to contain only
schoolbooks. After the girl had been shot from a distance, the IDF company
commander repeatedly fired his automatic weapon into her at close range. On
November 22, after investigation including statements by soldiers under his
command, an IDF military court indicted the company commander on two counts
of illegal use of weapons, obstructing justice, unbecoming behavior, and
improper use of authority. At year’s end, the court martial remained
ongoing.
On October 7, IDF tank fire killed two boys 12 and 15 years of age while
they were standing near their school.
On October 8, a 10-year-old Palestinian girl was shot and killed by IDF
gunfire in Bayt Hanun in the northern Gaza Strip as she stood on the street
in front of her house.
On October 12, Israeli military forces shot and killed an 11-year-old,
Ghadir Mokheimer, as she stood outside her school in Khan Yunis refugee camp
in Gaza. The IDF claimed that they returned fire after coming under rocket
attack from militants using the school as cover.
On October 4, the IDF severely damaged the Gaza City wastewater treatment
plant resulting in $200,000 (872,000 NIS) worth of damage to the
USAID-funded parts of the plant. An investigation is being conducted into
the incident; however, the IDF stated that the plant was not intentionally
targeted. According to USAID, the total repair and replacement costs for
damage during the year to USAID-funded projects are estimated at $450,000
(1.93 million NIS).
On November 5, Israeli media reported that an IDF tank round killed two
Palestinian children, ages 8 and 10 years old, when tank fire hit their home
in the al-Qarrara district of Khan Yunis.
On November 6, a 13-year-old Palestinian boy was shot and killed by IDF
forces in Jenin. The IDF said the boy had thrown a firebomb at IDF soldiers.
On November 18, IDF tank fire killed three Egyptian policemen at the border
near Rafah. Reportedly, the IDF believed the police were Palestinians
attempting to plant explosives. Subsequently, the Government apologized for
the killings.
IDF soldiers reportedly fired without warning on trespassers in or near
restricted areas.
On September 28, Israeli forces killed a mentally ill Palestinian man when
he climbed a fence near an army outpost in Jenin. On another occasion in the
Gaza Strip, Palestinian youths were killed when they approached the security
fence. Soldiers said the boys were providing intelligence to militants;
Palestinians maintained that the boys were hunting birds.
During the year, according to Palestinian security and media reports, the
IDF targeted for killing at least 25 Palestinians suspected of involvement
in terrorism. IDF forces killed at least 18 bystanders–4 of whom were
civilians and many of the remaining were affiliated with terrorist
organizations and injured a number of others.
On March 22, rockets from Israeli helicopters killed Sheikh Ahmad Yassin,
the founder of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), as he was leaving a
mosque in the Gaza Strip. Two bodyguards and one of Yassin’s sons-in-law
also died in the attack, along with eight worshippers from the mosque.
Fifteen bystanders were injured.
On April 17, rockets from Israeli helicopters killed ‘Abd al-Azziz
al-Rantisi, a co-founder of Hamas and Yassin’s replacement as its leader.
Rantisi’s bodyguards were killed during the attack. Eighteen other persons
were wounded.
On October 21, Israeli aircraft fired two missiles at a car killing Adnan
al-Ghoul, a senior Hamas commander, and his assistant. Eight bystanders also
were slightly wounded.
Israeli security personnel operating checkpoints killed a number of
Palestinians.
There were no developments in the investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the July 2003 death of 3-year-old Palestinian Mahmud Jawadat
Sharif Kabaha, who was shot while sitting in his parents’ car at the Barta’a
checkpoint west of Jenin (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
During the year, Israeli forces delayed the movement of, and occasionally
fired upon, medical personnel and ambulances. Israel has presented video
evidence of armed Palestinians running from a building and entering an
ambulance and of an ambulance crew that picked up an injured Palestinian,
retrieved his weapon, and put it inside the ambulance before driving away.
The U.N. maintained that the ambulance crews acted under duress. The Israeli
Government acknowledged that an accusation that an ambulance crew had
transported a Qassam rocket was in error.
On January 11, according to PRCS allegations, Israeli soldiers manning a
checkpoint in the West Bank beat an ambulance driver and medic as they
transferred patients from Nablus to Ramallah hospital.
On June 13, according to PRCS, an ambulance attempted to evacuate protesters
injured during an antiseparation barrier demonstration. Israeli security
personnel allegedly fired gunshots and tear gas at the ambulance.
The IDF abuse of Palestinians or their vehicles at checkpoints continued,
but at a more reduced level than during 2002-03. Qahira Muhsen, age 41, from
the village of al-Funduq, alleged that four Israeli Border Police in the
vicinity of the Jajuliya checkpoint punched, kicked, and cursed him.
In April, a young Palestinian woman from Bethlehem told Machsom Watch, an
Israeli women’s rights organization, that she witnessed IDF soldiers at the
“Container” checkpoint, southeast of Jerusalem, hit her father with
truncheons as he sat in his car as well as abusing other drivers.
Palestinians frequently threw stones, Molotov cocktails, and on occasion
fired live ammunition at Israeli security forces. Israeli security forces on
various occasions responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and live fire,
including tank fire.
On May 19, at least 10 Palestinians were killed and more than 50 wounded
when tank shells exploded near demonstrators in the Rafah refugee camp. IDF
officials claimed that the tank had fired warning shots, and denied firing
into the crowd. The IDF claimed that gunmen were in the crowd. This claim
was disputed by Palestinians, and there was no evidence to substantiate the
IDF charge. The IDF released a statement that expressed deep sorrow and
regret over the loss of civilian lives.
On November 15, according to witnesses, Israeli border police entered Saint
Vincent’s Monastery in Bethany and seriously wounded an unarmed 15-year-old
boy when his group, holding a mourning demonstration for Arafat, did not
disperse as police requested.
Israeli forces used Palestinians as “human shields” in violation of
applicable Israeli law. In 2002, the Israeli High Court of Justice granted
an injunction against the use of Palestinians as “shields” for Israeli
forces. The IDF admitted violations of existing procedures and reiterated
that IDF forces “are absolutely forbidden to use civilians of any kind as a
means of ‘living shield’ against gunfire or attack by the Palestinian side,
or as ‘hostages.'” However, IDF soldiers were permitted to seek consensual
assistance of civilians in operations. Human rights groups asserted that
Palestinians who consented often did so out of fear even if they were not
coerced. Such Palestinians face the risk of being branded as collaborators.
On January 12, IDF soldiers used Ahamd Assaf to enter and search homes in
the Tulkarm refugee camp and fired gunshots into the homes as Assaf searched
them. Another Tulkarm refugee camp resident, Ahmad Ganem, claimed that
Israeli soldiers made him search homes in the camp.
In April, Adalah, an Israeli-Arab human rights organization, asked the
Israeli High Court to issue an injunction against the IDF seeking the
assistance of Palestinians, without exception. On September 5, the President
of the Court urged the IDF to forego use of the procedure, citing the Fourth
Geneva Convention. The High Court announced that it would give its decision
at a later date.
According to B’tselem, there have been 90 Military Police investigations
since September 2000 relating to Palestinians killed and injured during the
Intifada, resulting in the filing of 29 indictments. B’tselem reported that
one soldier was convicted for causing the death of a Palestinian.
B’tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) petitioned
the High Court in September 2003 to open military investigations into all
cases where IDF soldiers killed Palestinians who had not engaged in
hostilities. At year’s end, the High Court had not ruled on the petition.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The PA restricted freedom of speech and freedom of the press. During the
year, the PA limited free expression, particularly regarding human rights
and alleged security issues. PA security services banned publications or
broadcasts and periodically harassed or detained members of the media.
Palestinian commentators and human rights groups stated that, as a result,
journalists practiced self-censorship. In addition, armed extremist groups
attacked journalists.
There were three Palestinian dailies and several Palestinian weekly
newspapers. There also were several monthly magazines and three tabloids.
The PA operated two television stations and one radio station. There were
approximately 30 independently owned television stations and approximately 9
radio stations. According to an October study published by the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics, approximately 33 percent of Palestinians in
the occupied territories had access to the Internet.
The Israeli occupation authorities limited speech. In East Jerusalem, the
display of Palestinian political symbols, such as flags, national colors,
and graffiti, was prohibited and punishable by fines or imprisonment, as
were public expressions of anti-Israeli sentiment and of support for Islamic
extremist groups. Israeli authorities censored press coverage of the
Intifada and reviewed Arabic publications for material related to public
order and security issues. Closures and curfews limited the ability of
Palestinian journalists to do their jobs.
On January 8, journalist Saifeddin Shahin was beaten by five armed men after
his car was stopped. The attackers claimed to be from the Fatah movement and
threatened reprisals if he continued to write about Fatah. PA police
arrested one of the attackers; however, at year’s end, there had been no
further legal action.
On March 22, Mohammad Abu Halima, a correspondent for the al-Najah
University-affiliated radio station, was killed by IDF gunfire as he
reported on clashes in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus, according to the
Committee to Protect Journalists. An IDF spokesperson said that Abu Halima
had opened fire. At year’s end, there was no report of any Israeli
investigation of the circumstances of the killing.
During the year, Israeli gunfire killed a journalist, and at least 11 other
journalists sustained injuries during clashes between IDF soldiers and
Palestinians in the occupied territories. Israeli soldiers beat journalists
on several occasions, detained others, and confiscated their press cards.
On September 27, Riad Ali, a Cable News Network journalist, was abducted by
a group of armed Palestinian men. Ali, an Israeli citizen from the Druze
community, was released 36 hours after his abduction. There were no claims
of responsibility for the kidnapping.
In March 2003, PA police in Gaza City shut the Palestinian newspaper,
al-Risalah, a weekly publication of the Islamic National Salvation Party
(Khalas). The paper returned to publication during the year.
On April 2, Ammar Awad was covering clashes between Israeli police and
Palestinian demonstrators in Jerusalem. The policemen destroyed the
journalist’s cameras.
On April 24, an IDF soldier shot journalist Ali Samoudi in the nose as he
was covering an Israeli army incursion into Jenin. Samoudi, who was wearing
a “press” sign, alleged that the soldier intentionally fired at him.
James Miller was killed by the IDF in May 2003 while filming a documentary
in Gaza City. After repeated requests from his family and from foreign
diplomatic representatives, the IDF Military Attorney General (MAG) ordered
an investigation into the incident. At year’s end, the NGO B’tselem had no
information regarding the status of the investigation.
In April 2003, an IDF soldier killed Nazeeh Darwaza while he was filming a
wounded child during an IDF incursion in Nablus. On June 16, B’tselem was
informed that the MAG was investigating the case. At year’s end, there was
no further information.
On December 27, Israeli police detained PA presidential candidate Mustafa
Barghuti for several hours after he attempted to campaign in Jerusalem.
Barghuti lacked a permit to enter Jerusalem (see Sections 2.d. and 3).
The PA had authority over all levels of education. During the year, the PA
did not interfere with education, but academic institutions were adversely
affected by the violence.
On November 27, Yaser al-Madhoun, a Palestinian professor at al-Azhar
University in Gaza City, was killed when a remote control bomb exploded in
his office; another Palestinian was injured. At year’s end, PA police
continued the investigation.
Israeli closures, curfews and the separation barrier restricted access to
Palestinian academic institutions. In some instances, Israeli authorities
shut universities entirely. Israeli shelling and gunfire during military
operations damaged a number of schools and, in some cases, killed
schoolchildren (see Section 1.g.).
In 2003, Israeli authorities closed the Hebron University and the Hebron
Polytechnic School, which served 5,000 students. The schools reopened during
the year.
According to UNICEF, years of conflict damaged 300 schools and, in 2003, 580
schools were periodically forced to close.
The PA Ministry of Education claimed that, since 2001, the IDF had converted
three schools in Hebron into military barracks.
Physical damage to schools and universities was calculated at more than $10
million (43 million NIS).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The PA imposed some formal limits on freedom of assembly; however, while it
required permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large cultural events,
these permits rarely were denied. In Gaza, police approval was required for
political meetings at specific meeting halls and for buses to transport
passengers to attend political meetings. The PA prohibited calls for
violence, displays of arms, and racist slogans, although these provisions
were rarely enforced. The PA placed some limits on freedom of association;
however, charitable, community, professional, and self-help organizations
were able to operate.
Israeli military orders banned public gatherings of 10 or more persons
without a permit; however, Palestinians were able to ignore this order
without punishment.
Israeli security forces used force against Palestinians involved in
demonstrations (see Section 1.c.). The Israeli and Palestinian authorities
disputed whether Palestinians attacked security forces during such
demonstrations. In 2001, the IDF authorized the use of gunfire in some
rock-throwing situations.
On February 26, Israeli security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and
live ammunition, reportedly after demonstrators began throwing stones at
Israeli forces during an antiseparation barrier demonstration Biddu village.
Two persons were killed and approximately 70 persons sustained injuries.
Orient House, the preeminent Palestinian political institution in Jerusalem,
was shut by Israeli forces in 2001 and remained closed throughout the year.
In 2002-03, Israel closed the Arab Graduates Club, frequented by Fatah
activists, the Multi-Sectoral Review Project, the Land Research Center, the
East Jerusalem offices of the Federation of Palestinian Chambers of
Commerce, and the Jerusalem Cultural Association and the Union of Sports
Clubs. Israeli authorities claimed that these institutions were operating
under PA supervision in violation of signed agreements. At year’s end, these
organizations remained closed.
c. Freedom of Religion
The PA has no law that specifically protects religious freedom, but
religious freedom was respected in practice. Islam is the official religion
of the PA. Religion must be declared on identification papers, and personal
status legal matters must be handled in ecclesiastical courts. The PA’s
Ministry of Waqf and Religious Affairs paid for the construction and
maintenance of mosques and the salaries of imams. Christian clergymen and
charitable organizations received limited financial support. The PA did not
provide financial support to any Jewish institutions or holy sites in the
occupied territories; these areas were generally under Israeli control.
During the year, there were no reports of violence against or vandalism of
Jewish institutions in the occupied territories.
The PA required that religion be taught in PA schools. The PA provided
separate religious instruction for Muslim and Christian students.
Media frequently published and broadcast material about the occupation that
included anti-Semitic content. The rhetoric used by Palestinian terrorist
groups included expressions of anti-Semitism. Muslim religious leaders and
the PA television station engaged in expressions of anti-Semitism. On the
positive side, in a December 3 sermon broadcast on PA Television, preacher
Muhammad Jammal Abu Hunud called for the development of a modern Islamic
discourse, to recognize the “other,” to treat him with tolerance, and to
avoid extremism and violence.
Israeli authorities generally respected religious freedom and permitted all
faiths to operate schools and institutions. However, internal and external
closures prevented tens of thousands of Palestinians from reaching their
places of worship in Jerusalem and the West Bank, including during religious
holidays. Citing security reasons, Israel prevented most male Muslim
worshippers under the age of 45 from attending Friday prayers inside the
Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, the third holiest site in Islam and the
holiest site in Judaism. Most West Bank residents and virtually all Gaza
residents were restricted from entering Jerusalem during Ramadan.
In August 2003, Israeli police began escorting tourists to the Haram
al-Sharif/Temple Mount to reassert the right of non-Muslims to visit the
shrine.
For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International Religious Freedom
Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
The PA generally did not restrict freedom of movement. The Israeli
occupation authorities, citing military necessity, often tightly restricted
the movement of Palestinians in response to changing security conditions.
During periods of unrest (in the aftermath of terrorist attacks or during
military exercises), travel between some or all towns within the territories
was prohibited. Such “internal closures” were supplemented, during periods
of potential unrest and during major Israeli and Muslim holidays, by
“comprehensive, external closures,” which precluded Palestinians from
leaving the territories. During the year, there were no extended blanket
closures, although several Gaza crossing points were simultaneously closed
for extended periods, completely closing off the Gaza Strip. Since 1993,
Palestinians were able to enter East Jerusalem only with a travel permit
issued by Israeli authorities. The Israeli authorities also imposed curfews
in some areas, which confined Palestinians to their homes for all but a few
hours per week. During the year, there were fewer curfews than in 2003.
The PA issued passports for Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza.
Because there are no commercial flights from the territories, travelers must
depart via land crossings into Israel, Jordan or Egypt. Even prior to the
Intifada, it was difficult for Palestinians to obtain permits to visit
Israel. While transit passes for travelers using Ben Gurion airport exist,
they are not widely available. Vehicles originating in the territories are
often not permitted entry into Israel or Jerusalem. Palestinians were
prohibited from using the Sheikh Hussein or Arava crossings. As a result,
most Palestinians traveling abroad could exit and enter only via the Allenby
Bridge or Rafah crossing points.
Between April 16 and September 18, the IDF prevented Palestinian males
between the ages of 16 and 35 from exiting Gaza through the Rafah terminal.
On July 18 the terminal was closed completely, leaving approximately 2,500
Palestinians on the Egyptian side for more than 2 weeks. The IDF was
searching for a tunnel in the vicinity, but failed to locate it. On December
12, a terrorist attack extensively damaged the terminal and killed five
Israeli soldiers. At year’s end, the terminal remained closed.
Palestinians with Jerusalem identification cards, issued by the Israeli
Government, needed special documents to travel abroad. Upon request, the
Jordanian Government also issued travel documents to Palestinians in the
West Bank and East Jerusalem. Palestinians who wish to travel to Jordan must
leave their Israeli identification documents with Israeli authorities at the
Allenby Bridge. Bridge-crossing permits to Jordan were available at post
offices without a screening process.
The external and internal closures contributed to increased unemployment and
poverty in the occupied territories. Approximately 146,000 West Bank and
Gaza workers, representing roughly 25 percent of the Palestinian work force,
depended on day jobs in Israel, Israeli settlements, and Jerusalem. The
closures impeded Palestinians from reaching jobs or markets in the occupied
territories and disrupted internal and external trade. The unemployment rate
was estimated at 31 percent at year’s end. The economic dependency ratio
(total population divided by employed persons) increased during the year.
The percentage of employees whose monthly wages fell below the poverty line
increased from 43.5 percent in the third quarter 2000 to 56.8 percent at
year’s end.
For the approximately 200,000 Palestinians who lived in rural villages
without the full range of urban services–such as medical care, education,
or potable water-the closures were a particular hardship.
Apart from closures, delays at checkpoints and roadblocks affected all
aspects of life, particularly emergency health care. According to OCHA, in
the West Bank there were 61 fully manned checkpoints, 6 occasionally manned
checkpoints, 374 earthen mounds blocking roads, 102 cement roadblocks, 48
road gates, and 51 gates along the separation barrier. The Israeli
authorities’ figures show 47 checkpoints and 130 roadblocks in the West Bank
as of December. (OCHA and Israeli Government statistics are based on
different methodology.) Although ambulance response times improved during
the year as the Israeli authorities provided additional permits, many
problems remained, including difficulties for ambulances attempting to reach
villages in remote areas of the West Bank.
In January, villagers from Jayyus were unable to exit the village to tend
fields or graze sheep.
On March 10, the IDF delayed a car containing an ill 10-month-old for 3
hours at a roadblock near Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip. The baby died.
On April 30, Mohammad Dagaghmah, a shepherd from Hebron who claimed to have
a valid permit, was not permitted to pass a checkpoint for 2 days, although
his sheep were allowed to pass.
According to B’tselem, on June 15, taxi driver Fuad al-Jaiyusi reported that
IDF soldiers refused to let him and four other drivers cross the Jit
checkpoint, contending that al-Jaiyusi did not have the proper permit, and
impounded his vehicle for 4 days.
On July 10, Israeli soldiers delayed at the Allenby Bridge gates for
approximately 2 hours a PRCS ambulance carrying a cancer patient in critical
condition to a local Palestinian hospital. During a search of the ambulance
by Israeli security personnel, the patient’s condition deteriorated, but
PRCS medics were not permitted to intervene. The patient was dead on
arrival.
On July 20, Abdel Latif Emlaitat died of a heart attack at a roadblock near
the village of Bayt Furik. According to his family, Emlaitat suffered severe
chest pain and was trying to reach the hospital in Nablus. Israeli soldiers
stopped the car when it attempted to leave the village for approximately 2
hours.
On December 23, at the Erez Crossing into Israel from Gaza city, only 5 of
25 medical cases that had permits to enter were allowed to cross into
Israel. Those unable to enter were directed to leave and reapply to enter on
another day.
The Israeli Government continued construction of a security barrier along
parts of the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice line) and in the West Bank. The
PA alleged that the routing of the barrier resulted in the taking of land,
isolating residents from hospitals, schools, social services, and
agricultural property. Israel asserts that it has sought to build the
barrier on public lands where possible, and where private land was used,
provided opportunities for compensation. Palestinians filed a number of
cases with the Israeli Supreme Court challenging the routing of the barrier.
In June, the Court ruled that a section of the barrier must be rerouted;
determining that the injury caused by the routing of the barrier did not
stand in proper proportion to the security benefits; various portions of the
barrier route were rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice
issued an advisory opinion, concluding that “The construction of the wall
built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem. and its associated regime, are
contrary to international law.”
At the end of the year, the barrier divided approximately 157,800 acres with
a population of 93,200 from the rest of the West Bank. According to OCHA,
Palestinians have been impeded from reaching their land to harvest crops and
graze animals. Residents’ access to schools, medical care and other services
was also impeded. In October 2003, Israeli military orders required
Palestinians residing in “seam zones” between the separation barrier and the
Green Line (approximately 5,000 of the 93,200 mentioned above) to obtain
residency permits to remain in these areas.
Israel offered East Jerusalem residents citizenship following Israel’s
occupation of Jerusalem in 1967. Most have chosen not to accept Israeli
citizenship, but instead have sought a residence permit or Jerusalem
identification card. Under the 1952 Law of Permanent Residency, such
residents risk loss of status if their ties with Jerusalem lapse, although
human rights groups report that such revocations have been infrequent. On
July 8, an Israeli ministerial committee reportedly adopted an unpublished
resolution calling for the application of the 1950 Absentee Property Law to
East Jerusalem; however, the resolution does not appear to have been acted
upon or implemented by year’s end.
Residency restrictions affected family reunification. Palestinians who were
abroad during the 1967 War, or who subsequently lost their residence
permits, were not permitted to reside permanently with their families in the
occupied territories. Foreign-born spouses and children of Palestinian
residents experienced difficulty in obtaining residency. Palestinian spouses
of Jerusalem residents must obtain a permit to reside there. Palestinians
reported delays of several years or more before spouses were granted
residency permits. The Government of Israel occasionally issued
limited-duration permits, but renewing the permits could take up to 8
months, which resulted in many Palestinians falling out of status.
Palestinians also reported extensive delays in registering newborn children
with Israeli authorities.
Neither the Israeli Government nor the PA used forced exile or forcibly
deported anyone from the occupied territories during the year.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change
Their Government
Following the death of PA Chairman Yasir Arafat on November 11, an election
for PA president was scheduled for January 9, 2005. Seven candidates
competed in a vigorous election campaign throughout the occupied
territories. The Government of Israel and the PA agreed to follow the 1996
parameters for voting in East Jerusalem.
On December 23, the PA held municipal elections in 26 West Bank localities
for the first time since 1976. Further elections were scheduled for Gaza on
January 27, 2005, and for other municipalities in the spring and summer of
2005. Domestic and international election observers found the December 23
elections met democratic standards, while noting several technical and
procedural problems.
The 88-member Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and Chairman of the
Executive Authority were elected in 1996 in a process that international
observers concluded generally met democratic standards, despite some
irregularities.
On September 27, the Palestinian cabinet adopted a 1-year reform action
plan, approved by the council, that was designed to create a more equal
balance of power between the executive and the council and more
accountability and transparency in governance.
In September and October, the independent Central Elections Commission
conducted voter registration. The registration process went smoothly except
in East Jerusalem, where Israeli police closed registration centers, and in
some parts of Gaza, where IDF operations disrupted the process. The register
was used in the December 23 municipal elections and will be used in
elections scheduled for 2005. Following the closure of registration centers
in East Jerusalem, very few Palestinian residents of the city attempted to
register elsewhere, though they were eligible to do so.
While Palestinians with residency permits were eligible to vote in Jerusalem
municipal elections, most did not recognize the jurisdiction of the Israeli
municipality of Jerusalem and did not participate. There were no Palestinian
residents of Jerusalem on the city council.
There was a widespread public perception of corruption within the PA,
notably within the security forces. There were calls for reform from many
social and political elements, especially during the summer.
The law requires official PA institutions to “facilitate” the acquisition of
requested documents or information to any Palestinian; however, the law does
not require any PA agency to provide such information. Many Palestinians
cited the law when seeking to acquire information from the PA; however, no
cases have come before the PA courts. NGOs were seeking to amend the law to
make it mandatory to provide information to Palestinians.
During the year, there were 5 women on the 88-member Council, and 2 women
served in Ministerial-level positions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Local Palestinian human rights groups and several international
organizations monitored the PA’s human rights practices. By the end of 2003,
the PA had issued registration certificates for 150 of the approximately 350
new and existing NGOs that submitted applications under the 2000 NGO law.
During the year, an additional 74 such certificates were granted; others
still were being processed at year’s end.
PA officials usually met with NGO representatives. Public criticism from
these groups has been somewhat less forthcoming since the outbreak of the
Intifada, with several NGOs voluntarily deciding to defer criticism of the
PA’s human rights performance. Observers noted that documentation of abuses
was very limited.
On March 2, Khalil al-Zaban, a journalist and advisor to PA Chairman Arafat
on human rights and the media, was shot and killed in Gaza City. Al-Zaban
headed the PA’s government-appointed NGO Council and published its monthly
newsletter. Al-Zaban was noted both for open criticism of Islamic militancy
and aggressive attacks on those critical of the PA, particularly on human
rights. At year’s end, neither the perpetrators nor their motives had been
identified.
Some PA security organizations, including the General Intelligence Service
in the West Bank and the police, appointed officials to act as liaisons with
human rights groups. These officers met with human rights organizations and
members of the diplomatic community to discuss human rights cases.
The ICRC and human rights groups, such as the Palestinian Independent
Commission for Citizens’ Rights and the Mandela Institute, regularly visited
PA prisons and detention centers. During the year, some groups reported that
they occasionally encountered delays in obtaining access to detainees in
Palestinian prisons. PA officials reportedly were less responsive to queries
regarding the PA’s policies toward and treatment of collaborators than to
queries on other detainees (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
Israeli, Palestinian, and international humanitarian and human rights NGOs
monitored the Israeli Government’s practices in the occupied territories.
The Israeli Government permitted human rights groups to publish and hold
press conferences, and provided the ICRC and other groups with access to
detainees (see Section 1.c.). Some of these organizations were critical of
the Israeli Government’s practices and cooperation. In many cases, human
rights groups refused to apply to Israeli authorities for special travel
permits in order to protest Israel’s regulation of their activities. During
the year, human rights groups reported that Israeli closures impeded and, at
times, completely prevented their work.
On January 13, Thomas Hurndall, 22, a British activist with the
International Solidarity Movement, died as a result of injuries sustained in
April 2003 when an IDF soldier shot him as he attempted to move Palestinian
children to safety during clashes in Rafah. At year’s end, the court-martial
of the IDF soldier charged with manslaughter was still pending.
In May 2003, Israel began requiring foreigners entering the Gaza Strip to
sign a waiver providing that “the Government of the State of Israel and its
organs cannot be held responsible for death, injury and/or damage/loss of
property which may be incurred as a result of military activity.”
In May 2003, then-Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom said,
“Most human rights offices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip provide shelter
for Palestinian terrorists.”
In September, a settler confronted two members of the Temporary
International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), an NGO that monitored relations
between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, Palestinian civilians, and
settlers in the city, and attempted to run over one of the TIPH staff. IDF
soldiers refused to intervene, allegedly told the TIPH members to leave, and
blamed them for the incident.
On September 29, unidentified assailants suspected of belonging to the Maon
settlement in the South Hebron Hills attacked and robbed two U.S. citizen
members of the Christian Peacemakers Teams (CPT) as they escorted
Palestinian children to school. One sustained internal injuries, including a
punctured lung, and the other a broken arm. Settler officials denied any
knowledge of the attack. At year’s end, the assailants had not been
apprehended.
On October 9, members of the CPT, AI, and an Italian NGO (“Operation Dove”)
were escorting Palestinian children from the village of Tuwani to a school
in the village of Tabban southeast of Hebron. As they were walking by the
settlement of Maon, settlers wearing masks and shouting obscenities in
Hebrew attacked the escorts with baseball bats, seriously injuring an
Italian volunteer. At year’s end, the assailants had not been apprehended.
The U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and other groups reported continued
delays in transporting goods to Palestinian refugees in the occupied
territories. During Operation Days of Penitence in September and October,
the IDF restricted entrance into the Gaza Strip, preventing humanitarian
agencies such as UNRWA from delivering food and providing assistance.
In October, UNRWA claimed that 24 of its staffers were detained by the IDF
and that it was not notified. An Israeli official stated the number detained
was not 24, but said that other UNRWA staff members were under indictment.
Physicians for Human Rights, which offered weekly “mobile clinics” in
Palestinian villages, has been denied access to Gaza for 3 years and has
only limited access to the West Bank.
On March 16, 2003, an Israeli bulldozer clearing land in Rafah in the Gaza
Strip crushed and killed Rachel Corrie, 23, a U.S. citizen peace activist.
Corrie was standing in front of the bulldozer and was wearing a reflective
vest. Eyewitness demonstrators stated that they believe the driver knew
Corrie was in front of the bulldozer as he proceeded forward. IDF
investigations concluded that the operator was not negligent. U.S. officials
who have seen the IDF report found inconsistencies among the statements of
the people involved in the accident and other witnesses. The Corrie family
believes that the investigation was not thorough, credible, and transparent
and continued to pursue the case. In conjunction with the report of the IDF
Judge Advocate General, the IDF implemented two remedial procedures for
improved safety: The presence of more senior officers to oversee such
operations and the designation of closed military zones with orders
forbidding the presence of civilians in areas when IDF military operations
are concluded.
On April 7, 2003, gunfire from an undetermined source struck 24-year-old
U.S. citizen Brian Avery in Jenin. The IDF denied responsibility for the
incident. Avery, an activist with the International Solidarity Movement, was
walking outside during curfew in the city when an IDF armored personnel
carrier approached him. Avery was shot in the face and required considerable
surgery and extended hospitalization. In December, a lawyer petitioned the
Supreme Court to require Israel military authorities to investigate his
shooting. According to B’tselem, the IDF had reportedly conducted an
internal investigation and concluded that it was impossible to determine
whether Avery was hit by IDF or Palestinian gunfire. At year’s end, the
Israeli High Court had not delivered its decision in the case.
On December 26, 2003, Israeli security forces fired at demonstrators
attempting to penetrate the separation barrier built near the town of
Qalqilya. The gunfire wounded a 25-year-old U.S. citizen and seriously
wounded Israeli citizen Gil Na’amati in both legs. The IDF internal inquiry
concluded that the soldiers involved had not violated the open-fire
regulations. On November 27, the Military Attorney General (MAG) decided
that no criminal charges would be brought. However, the MAG recommended a
reprimand for the regional brigade commander and further recommended that
the commander of the Engineers Corps unit that was involved, his second in
command, and two other soldiers be brought to a disciplinary hearing.
At year’s end, the Government of Israel continued to withhold information
regarding the documents and property taken during the 2001 seizure of Orient
House (see Section 2.b.).
Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
PA law does not explicitly prohibit domestic violence, but assault and
battery are crimes. There were reports indicating that Palestinian domestic
violence increased since 2000.
So-called honor crimes occurred infrequently, according to human rights
groups. Public discussion of the issue gained greater attention due to a
significant effort by Palestinian women’s groups. The crimes almost
exclusively involved alleged sexual interactions of female family members
with men who were not their husbands. Women’s shelters were not accepted
culturally. There was no reliable data on the incidence of violence against
women.
Rape is illegal, but spousal rape is not.
Palestinian women endured social prejudice and repression. Some girls,
especially in rural areas, did not finish mandatory schooling because
prospective husbands did not approve. Education and cultural restrictions
occasionally prevented women from attending college. Muslim and Christian
women who married outside of their faith often were disowned and sometimes
harassed. Local officials sometimes advised such women to leave their
communities to protect themselves.
Before 2000, a growing number of women worked outside the home, where they
often encountered discrimination and, occasionally, sexual harassment. There
were no special laws on women’s rights in the workplace. Women were
underrepresented in most aspects of professional life, although a small
group of women were prominent in politics, medicine, law, teaching, and
NGOs.
For Muslims, personal status law is derived from Shari’a (Islamic law).
Ecclesiastical courts rule on personal status issues for Christians. Shari’a
pertaining to women is part of the Jordanian Status Law of 1976, which
includes inheritance and marriage laws. Women in most cases are not entitled
to inheritance. Men may take more than one wife, although few did so. Women
may make “stipulations” in the marriage contract to protect them in the
event of divorce and on questions of child custody; however, only an
estimated 1 percent of women took advantage of this provision.
Ecclesiastical courts also often favored men over women in divorce and child
custody cases.
Children
The PA provides for compulsory education through the ninth grade. However,
girls who married before the ninth grade left at the behest of husbands and,
in rural areas and refugee camps, boys left school to help support their
families.
Internal closures, checkpoints, and the separation barrier significantly
impeded the ability of both students and teachers to reach educational
facilities (see Sections 2.a. and 2.d.).
In areas under curfew, all classes were cancelled. UNRWA reported that more
than 35,000 teacher workdays were lost in the 2002-03 academic year.
Enrollment of students from Gaza at Birzeit University in the West Bank
declined from 370 in 2000 to 39 at year’s end.
Education and health care professionals judged that the violence produced
lack of focus, nightmares, incontinence, and other behavioral problems.
UNRWA reported that elementary school exam pass rates in Arabic,
mathematics, and science declined dramatically between 2000-01 and 2003-04.
OCHA reported that during the past 3 years, Palestinian universities lost
approximately $4.85 million (20.8 million NIS) worth of infrastructure.
During the year, university dropout rates increased by 7 percent, in part,
because families were unable to pay the fees.
The PA Ministry of Health provided for children’s immunizations. The PA
insurance program provided basic medical care for children, for a small
monthly fee. The latest available figures showed a slight improvement in
nutrition levels from 2003. In 2003, 3.4 percent of Palestinian children
suffered from acute malnutrition and 10.7 percent suffered from chronic
malnutrition. The prevalence of anemia varied between the West Bank (17.4
percent) and the Gaza Strip (31.2 percent).
Child abuse was not a widespread problem. The law does not explicitly
prohibit child abuse, but does sanction parents who failed to protect
children from abuse. PA courts may protect children in “difficult
situations,” including cases of neglect or abuse. The Ministry of Social
Affairs may ask a court to intervene to place a child in an official
protective institution or with an alternate family.
The law provides that no one under 14 can work. Those between 15 and 18 can
be employed under limited conditions (see Section 6.d.). There was no
juvenile court system, but certain judges specialized in juvenile cases.
Palestinians in East Jerusalem received municipal services inferior to those
available in other parts of Jerusalem. In 2001, the Israeli High Court
ordered the construction of new infant care clinics in East Jerusalem. The
Association for Civil Rights in Israel stated that six centers now existed
in East Jerusalem and the surrounding areas and that there was sufficient
coverage for the local East Jerusalem population. East Jerusalem schools
remained under-funded and overcrowded, and many students were denied
enrollment due to lack of space. In 2001, the Israeli High Court ordered the
municipality to build 245 new classrooms within the next 4 years, but, at
year’s end, only 2 new classrooms were finished and 28 were under
construction
International and domestic NGOs, including UNICEF, Save the Children, and
Defense for Children International, promoted educational, medical, and
cultural services for children, and other groups specialized in the needs of
children with disabilities.
Palestinian terrorist groups used minors to conduct attacks or as human
shields. On January 11, a 17-year-old high school student from Nablus blew
himself up near an army post at Jinsafut; no IDF solders were hurt. On
November 1, a 16-year-old Palestinian bomber blew himself up in a Tel Aviv
marketplace, killing three Israeli civilians.
Trafficking in Persons
Palestinian law does not prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there
were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, or within the
occupied territories.
Persons with Disabilities
Accessibility to public facilities was not mandated in the occupied
territories. Palestinians with disabilities were discriminated against in
most spheres, including education, employment, transportation, and access to
public facilities. There were approximately 130,000 Palestinians with
disabilities prior to the outbreak of the current Intifada. The Health,
Development, Information, and Policy Institute estimated that one-tenth of
the approximately 28,000 Palestinians injured in the Intifada will have
permanent disabilities.
Some institutions cared for persons with disabilities; however, their
efforts consistently were underfunded.
Care for Palestinians with physical and mental disabilities remained a
problem. Cultural stigmas coupled with inadequate funding produced poor
quality care. The PA depended on NGOs to care for physical disabilities, and
offered substandard care for mental disabilities. In February, the Ministry
of Health, with input from the World Health Organization, released a
national strategy for mental health services that called for increased
efforts to care for mental health patients and to reintegrate them into the
community.
Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination
There were no laws that discriminated against homosexuals, and there were no
reports of specific incidents of abuse because of sexual orientation.
However, cultural traditions and religious publications reject
homosexuality, and Palestinians alleged that the public and PA security
officers subjected them to harassment, abuse, and sometimes arrest because
of their sexual orientation.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Labor Law 7 went into effect in 2001, but calls for 48 bylaws. Nine have
been approved by the Ministers Council and published; 9 were approved but
have not yet been published; and 30 remain incomplete. Workers may establish
unions without government authorization. There were 19 trade unions
registered with the Ministry of Labor.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has paid to disseminate an
explanation of labor laws prepared by the Department of Law at Birzeit
University.
Workers in Jerusalem are free to establish unions, but may not join West
Bank federations; however, this restriction was not enforced. Workers,
holding Jerusalem identity cards, may belong simultaneously to West Bank
unions and the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
Palestinians who worked in Israel or Jerusalem prior to 2000 were partial
members of Histadrut and had 1 percent of their wages withheld. Partial
membership entitled them to limited benefits, including compensation for
on-the-job injuries, maternity leave, and employer bankruptcy. Histadrut and
West Bank union officials negotiated an agreement to transfer half of this
fee to the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU), which
claimed it was owed $6.5 million (28 million NIS).
Article 66 of the labor law provides for the right to strike. Prospective
strikers must send a written warning 2 weeks in advance to the other party
and the Ministry of Labor notifying them of the basis for the strike. (For
strikes affecting public utilities, the period is 4 weeks.) In practice,
strikers had little protection from retribution. Unions that seek to strike
must accept arbitration by the Ministry of Labor and are subject to
disciplinary action if they do not accept the result.
The PGFTU participated in some programs of the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions, but was not a member. The PGFTU became an ICFTU
affiliate in 2002.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
A majority of workers in the occupied territories were self employed or
unpaid family helpers. Approximately 35 percent had wage jobs. Most were
employed by UNRWA and the PA. Articles 60 to 65 of the labor law stated that
conflicts should be resolved by a mediator from the ministry. If the
ministry cannot resolve the dispute, it can be referred to a special
committee, and, eventually to a special court. Accordingly, in practice the
right to strike remained questionable.
There are no export processing zones in the occupied territories, although
the Gaza Industrial Estate previously enjoyed free trade access to foreign
markets.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
PA law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor; however,
there were no reports that such practices occurred.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
The minimum employment age is 15, and there are special conditions for
employment between 15 and 18. For minors, working at night, hard labor, and
travel outside their area of domicile were prohibited. However, many
children under 15 worked in family farms and shops, or as street vendors,
and in small manufacturing enterprises, such as shoe and textile factories.
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics’ Labor Force
Survey Report, July-September 2003, 1.7 percent of children 10 to 14 years
of age worked in 2003. The PA had only 40 labor inspectors for an estimated
65,000 enterprises. The ILO and UNICEF worked with the PA to develop
capacity. During the year, the ILO began to implement its International
Program for the Elimination of Child Labor, conducted a survey, and hired a
specialist to conduct a technical assessment.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There was no minimum wage. Prior to 2000, the average wage for full-time
workers provided a decent standard of living. The standard of living dropped
significantly over the last 4 years.
The normal workweek was 45 to 48 hours. There was no effective enforcement
of maximum workweek laws.
The PA Ministry of Labor was responsible for enforcing safety standards,
and, while its ability was limited, it carried out some inspections. The
ministry stated that new factories and workplaces met international health
and safety standards, but that older ones did not. Palestinians who worked
in Israel were required to contribute to the National Insurance Institute
and received limited benefits.

College to offer trip to Armenia

Glendale News Press
27 Feb 2005

College to offer trip to Armenia
Glendale Community College students will travel to Armenia this summer as
part of a study-abroad program.
By Darleene Barrientos, News-Press and Leader
NORTHEAST GLENDALE — Glendale Community College students are preparing for
a summer trip to Armenia, the first study abroad program offered at the
school.
College trustees are expected to approve the travel arrangements for the
Armenia trip and another study abroad trip to Italy during its meeting
Monday.

“The kind of trip we’re doing is a formal academic program combined with a
lot of excursions and on-site lectures,” trip coordinator Levon Marashlian
said. “A lot of the lectures are not in lecture halls but at museums,
monuments and churches all over the country.”
While several universities throughout the nation have traveled to Armenia
for different programs, Marashlian said this will be the first time it has
been done as part of a formal study abroad program. It will be the first
time a trip to Armenia will be offered to students at a two-year
institution, he said
The college has taken trips to Czech Republic, Spain, Italy and France and
selected Armenia and Italy because they are rich culturally, religiously and
architecturally, Trustee Ara Najarian said.
“[The trip to] Armenia may have a special attraction for students of
Armenian heritage,” Najarian said. “It may be their opportunity to go in an
environment that’s both fun and educational. Many first-generation
[Armenian] students have never had the opportunity to go.
“We felt it was time, and there was enough interest for students to go to
Armenia,” Najarian continued. “We wanted to pick a location where we will
have a good response and good enrollment. Without the proper enrollment, we
would have to drop or cancel or postpone.”
About 21 students are scheduled to go on the trip to Armenia, which will be
from June 21 to July 21. Marashlian hopes the maximum of 30 students will
sign up for the trip.
Student Ani Daniyelian, 20, of Glendale, is excited to visit the country she
left when she was 4, and she plans to visit at least a few relatives while
she is there.
“I want to see what it looks like,” Daniyelian said. “When you’re hearing
about it, you just want to see it for yourself. I want to see Karabakh — I
want to see where so many people lost their lives to liberate the Armenian
territory.”
She would have liked to visit Armenia with her parents, but she feels she
might learn more without them.
“It’s better with students,” she said. “If you go with your parents, its
going to be more of family get-together. As part of a student group, you are
with people your age and you experience it with students who haven’t seen
the country. It’s a better way of learning about it.”

Commemoration of Sumgait pogroms in Stepanakert

AZG Armenian Daily #036, 01/03/2005

Karabakh diary
17TH ANNIVERSARY OF SUMGAIT POGROMS COMMEMORATED IN STEPANAKERT
A human string headed for the Monument to Sumgait Victims in Stepanakert
from early morning to lay wreaths and flowers. Archbishop Pargev
Martirosian, head of Artsakh diocese of the Armenian Church, served a
liturgy commemorating the victims of Sumgait.
The President of NKR Arkady Ghukasian, chairman of the National Assembly
Oleg Yesayan, PM Anushavan Danielian and members of the government and
parliament visited the monument to pay their tribute and lay wreaths.
Being asked to comment on Khojalu events and Azerbaijan’s strivings to liken
two events, President Arkady Ghukasian said: “I feel pain that a country
where Sumgait tragedy took place speaks of Khojalu. Especially in this case
when the facts of Sumgait massacres are well-known to everyone”. The
president reminded that the Karabakh side opened a corridor for the
civilians in Khojalu and said that they were killed nearby Aghdam and by the
Azeris. He cited the words of former Azerbaijani president Ayaz Mutalibov
noting that this confession leaves no room for doubt that Azerbaijan’s
People’s Front killed people of Khojalu trying to compromise authorities of
the day in order to come to power.
Ghukasian also noted that Azerbaijan’s yearning to turn Khojalu events into
political weapon will do no good for the mutual trust of the sides in the
negotiation process.
A concert by the Artsakh’s State Chamber Orchestra closed the day.
By Kim Gabrielian in Stepanakert

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenian Insurance Settlement

PRESS RELEASE

ARMENIAN INSURANCE SETTLEMENT FUND BOARD

Post Office Box 5053
Portland, OR 97208-5053
U.S.A.
1-866-422-0124
_www.ArmenianInsuranceSettlement.com_
(http://www.ArmenianIn suranceSsettlement.com)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE — March 1, 2005
DEADLINE NEARS FOR ARMENIAN INSURANCE
SETTLEMENT FUND CLAIMS

Paul Krekorian, a member of the Armenian Insurance Settlement Fund
Board, announced that March 16 is the absolute deadline to submit
a claim for payment under the class action settlement in Marootian
v. New York Life Insurance Co.

The Marootian case was a class action suit filed in United States
District Court by the heirs of Armenians who had purchased life
insurance from New York Life in the Ottoman Empire between 1875 and
1915. The heirs contend that upon the deaths of the policyholders,
many of whom were murdered by Turks during the Armenian Genocide, New
York Life did not pay the benefits on these policies. Last year, New
York Life agreed to settle the class action suit by paying a total
of $20 million, including up to $11 million for the heirs of the
policyholders and at least $3 million for specified Armenian charities.

“The beneficiaries of these policies have waited 90 years
for justice,” said Settlement Fund Board member Krekorian,
an attorney who also serves as Vice President of the Board of
Education of Burbank, California. “It would be a great tragedy if
their efforts were frustrated now because they missed a simple
deadline and waived their legitimate legal rights,” Krekorian
said. The heirs of policyholders may be considered for a share
of benefits under this settlement only if they submit a Notice
of Claim form by March 16. The form may be obtained by calling
the toll free information line at 1-866-422-0124 or visiting the
settlement fund website at _www.armenianinsurancesettlement.com_
() . Claims may come
from anywhere in the world, and it is not necessary that complete
documentation be included with the Notice of Claim form. After the
Settlement Fund Board receives the Notice of Claim form, the claimant
will be informed about other steps that are required in the process.

The settlement fund website includes a partial list of New York Life
policyholders from the relevant era, and those who believe they may be
heirs can search for their ancestors on this list. However, it is not
necessary that their ancestor appear on the list in order to submit
a claim. A claim might still be approved if the heir has some other
evidence that their ancestor was a policyholder and payment was not
made, even if the ancestor does not appear on the list.

The Settlement Fund Board is an independent panel of three Armenian
community leaders appointed by California State Insurance Commissioner
John Garamendi. The Settlement Fund Board is not affiliated in
any way with the lawyers who handled the class action suit, and
the Board members were not involved in negotiating the terms of the
settlement. The Settlement Fund Board is an entirely independent panel
that will evaluate all of the claims of individual heirs and award the
funds to those who meet the qualifications of the agreement. The three
members of the Board are Paul Krekorian; attorney and law professor
Berj Boyajian; and physician and health care activist Viken Manjikian.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, $3 million has already
been distributed in equal shares to the AGBU, the Armenian Relief
Society, the Armenian Education Foundation, the Armenian Missionary
Association, the Armenian Catholic Church, both the Eastern and
Western Dioceses of the Armenian Church of North America, and both
the Eastern and Western Prelacies of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

http://www.armenianinsurancesettlement.com/

Family races for cure to deadly disease

Family races for cure to deadly disease

News 14 Carolina (Charlotte, NC)
2/28/2005

By: Martie Salt, News 14 Carolina

On the field, famed Notre Dame coach Ara Parseghian
was a winner. But there was one fight he couldn’t win
— three of his four grandchildren were diagnosed with
a deadly disease.

One of those children, Marcia, has a fatal disease
that will kill her. She knows because it killed her
older brother and her little sister.

Not knowing how to deal with their daughter’s looming
death, Mike and Cindy Parseghian created a foundation
to help other families dealing with similar
situations.

“We were hoping it would have a big impact on our
children’s lives,” Cindy said about the organization.

Niemann-Pick Type C disease usually affects children
of school age by interfering with their ability to
metabolize cholesterol.

The Parseghians know that time has run out to save
Marcia from the genetic disease Niemann-Pick Type C,
which is also known as NPC. It has destroyed her
ability to metabolize cholesterol, robbed her of her
ability to walk, talk and even move her eyes.

NPC is fatal — a diagnosis Cindy first heard for her
son Michael.

“He just couldn’t quite keep up with the other kids on
the playground,” she said.

After a year of tests, doctors finally found out what
was wrong.

“All of a sudden … we have not just Michael that is
seriously ill, but we have the potential for having
the two girls (who are sick),” Cindy said.

All three tested positive for NPC.

“We screamed, we yelled,” Cindy said. “I’m not
embarrassed to say that I cursed God.”

Then Cindy and Mike turned their anger into something
positive and started a foundation. Although research
did not help their children, the gene that causes it
has been discovered. Now the race is on for a cure.

“You see this one little toddler, of 1 year old, that
we know has the disease, yet is not showing signs, and
I have a real strong belief that we can make an impact
on that child’s life,” she said.

She and her husband say they pray other children will
be saved because of their work and the resulting
research.

Ara Parseghian Medical Research Foundation, a
volunteer, nonprofit corporation, funds research
projects that will lead to a treatment and cure for
Niemann-Pick Type C disease.

Web Journalist: Megan Butler

On the Net: Ara Parseghian Medical Research Foundation

–Boundary_(ID_fYTR87cL11yb2iT8/0aSog)–

http://www.parseghian.org/
http://www.news14charlotte.com/content/top_stories/default.asp?ArID=87785

“Turkey Should Recognize Sevres Treaty Together With Armenian Genoci

â~@~XTURKEY SHOULD RECOGNIZE SEVRES TREATY TOGETHER WITH ARMENIAN
GENOCIDEâ~@~Y

Azg/arm 01 March 05

The first sitting of the EU-Turkey Interparliamentary Committee was
held in Strasbourg on February 23. The representatives of the European
Committee and the CE were present at the sitting. According to Anatolu
agency, Jacques Toubot, French parliamentarian, demanded to include
in the agenda the issue of “the Armenian Genocide that was proved
real.” He reminded the participants of the decision of the European
Parliament to recognize the Armenian Genocide and emphasized that
“Turkey should recognize the Armenian Genocide to become the member
of the EU.”

Shjukru Eleqdag, member of Democratic-Republican party at the Turkish
parliament, member of the interparliamentary committee, who was
the chairman of the sitting declined the suggestion of the French
parliamentarian, explaining that the issue of the genocide will be
discussed during the sitting of the next day that will be dedicated
to Turkeyâ~@~Ys relations with its neighboring countries.

The French parliamentarian responded the refusal with anger. Marios
Matsakis, parliamentarian from Cyprus, took the floor and stated:
“Turkey carried out a genocide against the Armenians, the Greeks
and the Kurds.” Eleqdag strictly criticized Matsakis and called his
approach “rough, full of hatred and behavior unbecoming of the EU.”

During the February 24 sitting, the participants touched upon
the position undertaken by Turkey towards Armenia, Greece and
Cyprus. Jacques Toubot took floor again. Repeating his speech of the
previous day, the French parliamentarian demanded that Turkey should
recognize the Armenian Genocide and the Treaty of Sevres, too. The
February 25 issue of Zaman reported. Vaqid, another Turkish newspaper,
wrote the same day: “The atmosphere got tougher when Toubot boldly
demanded to recognize the Treaty of Sevres from Turkey.”

In order to decline the French parliamentarianâ~@~Ys demand to
recognize the Armenian Genocide, Eleqdag said that Toubotâ~@~Ys
statements were groundless, adding that the issue should be studied
by the historians and not by the political figures. Afterwards, he
suggested to establish with the assistance of UNESCO a Committee for
Studying the Issue of the Armenian Genocide, including Turkish and
Armenian specialists in that. The demand to recognize the Treaty
of Sevres was declined by Oghuz Demirlap, Turkeyâ~@~Ys Permanent
Representative to the EU, saying that “such demands are unacceptable.”

By Hakob Chakrian

–Boundary_(ID_4eLGsZaJB2UD+HEl9zT3nQ)–

Turkey: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004

U.S. Department of State
Turkey: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 28, 2005

Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty parliamentary system
and a president with limited powers elected by the single-chamber
parliament, the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In the 2002 parliamentary
elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the majority of seats
and formed a one party government. In March 2003, AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip
Erdogan was named Prime Minister. The State and Government remain separate,
and sometimes conflicting, concepts. The State, including the presidency and
bureaucracy, is seen as the embodiment of the core principles of the
republic, while the elected Government is more closely tied to the popular
will. The military exercised indirect influence over government policy and
actions in the belief that it was the constitutional protector of the State.
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the
judiciary was sometimes subject to outside influences.
The Turkish National Police (TNP), under Interior Ministry control, has
primary responsibility for security in urban areas, while the Jandarma,
paramilitary forces under joint Interior Ministry and military control,
carries out this function in the countryside. The Government maintained a
heavy security presence in parts of the southeast. A civil defense force
known as the village guards was less professional and disciplined than other
security forces and was concentrated in the southeast. Civilian and military
authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces.
Some members of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
The country has a market economy and a population of approximately 67.8
million. Industry and services are dominant sectors of the economy; the
agricultural sector also remains important. During the year, the real gross
domestic product was expected to grow by over 10 percent and consumer prices
were expected to rise by less than 12 percent. Approximately 9.3 percent of
the workforce was unemployed. There were major disparities in income,
particularly between the relatively developed west and the much less
developed east.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens;
although there were significant improvements in a number of areas, serious
problems remained. Security forces reportedly killed 18 persons during the
year; torture, beatings, and other abuses by security forces remained
widespread. Conditions in most prisons remained poor. Security forces
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, although the number of such
incidents declined. Lengthy trials remained a problem. Convictions of
security officials accused of torture remained rare, and courts generally
issued light sentences when they did convict. In politically sensitive
cases, the judiciary continued to reflect a legal structure that favors
State interests over individual rights. The State and Government continued
to limit freedom of speech and press; harassment of journalists and others
for controversial speech remained a serious problem. At times, the
Government restricted freedom of assembly and association. Police beat,
abused, detained, and harassed some demonstrators. The Government maintained
some restrictions on religious minorities and on some forms of religious
expression. At times, the Government restricted freedom of movement. The
Government restricted the activities of some political parties and leaders,
and sought to close the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP). The
Government continued to harass, indict, and imprison human rights monitors,
journalists, and lawyers for the views they expressed in public. Violence
against women remained a serious problem, and discrimination against women
persisted. Trafficking in persons, particularly women, remained a problem.
Child labor was a widespread problem.
The Government carried out extensive legal reforms during the year aimed at
meeting the requirements for European Union (EU) membership. In September,
Parliament adopted a new Penal Code and, in May, approved a package of
constitutional amendments. Elements of the new Penal Code included:
Sentences for torture convictions were increased; “honor killings”–the
killing by immediate family members of women suspected of being
unchaste–were defined as aggravated homicides; the statutes of limitations
for all crimes were lengthened; and actions aimed at preventing free
religious expression were defined as a crime punishable by 1 to 3 years’ in
prison. Constitutional amendments included: International agreements were
given precedence over national law; military and defense expenditures were
placed under Audit Court review; the State was assigned responsibility for
ensuring gender equality; and the military lost its authority to name
members of government boards overseeing higher education and broadcasting.
Legislative amendments abolished the State Security Courts (SSCs); however,
they created comparable high penal courts that picked up the caseload of the
former SSCs.
The Government implemented a number of reforms adopted in 2003 and 2002.
While security forces applied torture and ill-treatment widely, particularly
in the southeast, the overall use of torture appeared to decrease during the
year. Police and local authorities demonstrated more tolerance for
controversial speech and were more flexible in handling nonviolent
demonstrations. Kurdish language courses and news and cultural broadcasts
began during the year, under tight restrictions.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1
Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
There were no known political killings; however, there were credible reports
that security forces committed a number of unlawful killings. Police,
Jandarma, and soldiers killed a number of persons, particularly in the
southeast and east, for allegedly failing to obey stop warnings. The Human
Rights Foundation (HRF) estimated that there were 18 killings by security
forces between January and September, including shootings by village guards
and border patrols. For example, in August, security forces in Van Province
shot and killed Senol Kizil after he allegedly failed to heed a stop
warning. In November, Jandarma officers shot and killed Fevzi Can in Hakkari
Province, also alleging that he failed to heed a stop warning. One officer
was arrested in the case and was awaiting trial at year’s end. HRF estimated
there were 43 killings by security forces in 2003.
The courts investigated most alleged unlawful killings by security forces;
however, the number of arrests and prosecutions in such cases remained low
compared with the number of incidents, and convictions remained rare (see
Section 1.d.).
In May, Adana police shot and killed Siar Perincek after he allegedly
ignored a stop warning and shot at police. However, three human rights
organizations–HRF, the Human Rights Association (HRA), and Mazlum-Der–and
the Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions conducted a joint
investigation and concluded that the evidence indicated police shot Perincek
at close range while he was lying on the ground unarmed. The organizations
also stated that police apparently tortured two men who were detained in the
incident. Prosecutors charged one police officer with manslaughter and two
others with torture; their trials began in October and were ongoing at
year’s end.
In November, Mardin police shot and killed Ahmet Kaymaz and his 12-year-old
son in front of their home in Kiziltepe. Security officials alleged that
Kaymaz and his son were planning a terrorist attack and had fired on police;
however, a number of witnesses reportedly denied those claims. HRA
representatives investigated the incident and stated that the victims had
been shot at close range and there was no evidence they had exchanged fire
with police. A parliamentary subcommittee also concluded there was no
evidence that the victims had fired at police. Prosecutors opened a case
against four police officers involved in the incident. Legal proceedings
continued at year’s end.
According to the HRF and press reports, four trials in cases of past alleged
killings by security officials ended during the year, resulting in nine
acquittals and no convictions. Civilian judges transferred cases against six
soldiers to military courts.
Court proceedings continued in the trial of 10 village guards arrested in
connection with the 2002 killing of 3 internally displaced persons (IDPs)
returning to their homes in Ugrak village. One defendant remained in
detention during the trial while the others were released pending a verdict.
In November, the High Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of a police
officer charged with the 1999 death in detention of trade unionist Suleyman
Yeter and sentenced the officer, Mehmet Yutar, to 4 years and 2 months in
prison. According to the law under which convicts serve a portion of their
sentences, Yutar would spend 1 year and 8 months in prison. A second officer
charged in connection with the death, Ahmet Okuducu, failed to attend the
trial; the court issued a warrant for his arrest. In November, an Istanbul
court closed a separate trial of four police officers charged with torturing
Yeter (see Section 1.c.).
In April, a prosecutor in Mus Province opened a case against seven village
guards in connection with the 1994 killing of Ramazan Oznarci. The case
continued at year’s end.
According to the Government, seven persons died while in police or Jandarma
custody during the year: Four deaths were recorded as suicides, two as heart
attacks, and one was under investigation at year’s end to determine the
cause of death.
According to the HRF, landmines and unattended explosives killed 31
civilians and injured 78 during the year. Both security forces and the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)–a terrorist organization that in 2003 changed
its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and later
to the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KHK, or Kongra-Gel)–used landmines; it
was not possible to verify which side was responsible for the mines involved
in the incidents.
The Government, as well as the PKK/KADEK/KHK, continued to commit human
rights abuses against noncombatants in the southeast. According to the
military, 18 civilians, 62 members of the security forces, and 79 terrorists
died between January 1 and October 7 as a result of armed clashes.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
The Government continued to investigate and explain some reported
disappearances. The Ministry of Interior operated the Bureau for the
Investigation of Missing Persons, which was open 24 hours a day. According
to the Government, 14 persons were reported missing during the year due to
suspected terrorist activities and 4 missing persons were located alive.
There were no new developments in the 2002 disappearance of Coskun Dogan.
In March, a Diyarbakir SSC determined that there was insufficient evidence
to prosecute 47 soldiers for their alleged involvement in the 2001
disappearance of Serdar Tanis and Ebubekir Deniz.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, members of the security
forces continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons regularly,
particularly in the southeast. Security forces most commonly tortured
leftists and Kurdish rights activists.
According to the HRF, there were 918 credible cases of torture and
mistreatment reported at its 5 national treatment centers during the year.
Human rights advocates claimed that hundreds of detainees were tortured
during the year in the southeast, where the problem was particularly
serious, but that only a small percentage of detainees reported torture and
ill-treatment because they feared retaliation or believed that complaining
was futile.
During the year, senior HRF and HRA officials stated that there had not been
a significant change in the frequency of torture over previous years.
However, officials at a number of HRA branch offices, including in the
southeast, said they had observed a decline in the practice. A number of
attorneys in the southeast and other regions also reported that torture and
ill-treatment had become significantly less common. Observers reported that
police demonstrated greater restraint in their treatment of detainees and
protestors during the year due to legal reforms and government directives.
In June, Mehmet Nurettin Basci and Mehmet Gazi Aydin claimed Adana police
tortured them while they were being held in detention. Basci said police
administered electric shocks to his testicles and squeezed them, and hung
him by his arms. Aydin said police hung him by his arms. Prosecutors charged
three police officers in the case, which continued at year’s end. In July, a
14-year-old claimed that Izmir police officers repeatedly kicked him, struck
him with a truncheon, threw him down a staircase, and then released him
without charges. In October, an attorney for Sezai Karakus filed a complaint
with prosecutors alleging that Istanbul police tortured Karakus during 4
days of detention between late September and early October. Karakus claimed
police squeezed his testicles, struck his head against the wall, beat him
repeatedly, and forced him to sign a confession. Authorities did not file
charges in the case. Karakus committed suicide in prison in November. In
November, several persons detained by police during a raid of the Yeniden
Ozlem publishing house in Istanbul filed a complaint alleging that police
tortured them. They claimed police repeatedly struck them with pistol butts
and kicked them.
In January, an Istanbul prosecutor opened a case against police officers Ali
Senoz and Yilmaz Savas for allegedly torturing two juveniles in November
2003. The police were charged with hanging the juveniles by their arms,
squeezing their testicles, and spraying them with cold water and forcing
them to stand in front of an air conditioner. The trial continued at year’s
end.
There were no developments in the alleged rape and torture of DEHAP official
Gulbahar Gunduz in 2003.
In July, a Burdur court convicted three Jandarma officers for torturing 17
farmers in 2000; it sentenced 1 officer to 6 years in prison and the other 2
officers each to 2 years in prison. The court acquitted four co-defendants.
The case was under appeal at year’s end.
Proceedings continued in the 5-year-old Iskenderun trial of four police
officers – Murat Cikar, Halil Ozkan, Aysun Yuksel, and Gurkan Ilhan – on
charges of torturing and raping two teenage girls in detention in 1999. The
trial had experienced repeated delays related to the handling of forensic
evidence. In March, the court rejected a request by prosecuting attorneys to
bring charges against the chairman of the Forensic Medicine Institute for
not submitting evidence in a timely manner. The defendants remained on duty
and were promoted during the trial; one of the alleged victims was released
from prison in November, while the other remained in prison at year’s end on
charges of membership in an illegal organization.
In November, an Istanbul court closed the trial of four police officers
charged with torture because the statute of limitations on the charges had
expired. The defendants were accused of torturing trade unionist Suleyman
Yeter and 13 other detainees in 1999.
Human rights observers said that, because of reduced detention periods,
security officials mainly used torture methods that did not leave physical
traces, including repeated slapping, exposure to cold, stripping and
blindfolding, food and sleep deprivation, threats to detainees or family
members, dripping water on the head, squeezing of the testicles, and mock
executions. They reported a continued reduction, compared with past years,
in the use of methods such as electric shocks, high-pressure cold water
hoses, beatings on the soles of the feet (falaka) and genitalia, hanging by
the arms, and burns.
The HRA reported that women detainees were sometimes subject to rape,
including vaginal and anal rape with truncheons, and sexual harassment.
Female detainees sometimes faced sexual humiliation and, less frequently,
more severe forms of sexual torture. After being forced to strip in front of
male officers, female detainees were sometimes touched, insulted, and
threatened with rape.
Human rights attorneys and physicians who treated victims said torture
generally occurred during police or Jandarma detention before detainees
appeared in court. Because arresting officers were responsible for
interrogating suspects, they sometimes used torture to obtain a confession
that would justify the arrest.
Treatment of those arrested for ordinary crimes reportedly differed from
treatment of those arrested for political crimes. Observers said that
security officials sometimes tortured political detainees to intimidate them
and send a warning to others with similar political views.
Government-employed doctors administered all medical examinations of
detainees. Examinations occurred once during detention and a second time
before either arraignment or release; however, the examinations generally
were brief and informal. According to the Society of Forensic Medicine
Specialists, only approximately 300 of 80,000 doctors in the country were
forensic specialists, and most detainees were examined by general
practitioners and specialists not qualified to detect signs of torture.
There were forensic medical centers in 27 of 81 provinces. Some former
detainees asserted that doctors did not conduct proper examinations and that
authorities denied their requests for a second examination.
A Justice Ministry regulation requires doctor-patient privacy during the
examination of suspects, except where the doctor requests police presence
for security reasons. Under a legal amendment adopted in January, a suspect
cannot request the presence of police; international and domestic human
rights observers had argued that police could intimidate suspects into
requesting their presence. However, the Society of Forensic Medicine
Specialists reported that security officials often remained in the room
despite objections, although this occurred less often than in past years.
According to the Medical Association and human rights observers, the
presence of a security officer could lead physicians to refrain from
examining detainees, perform cursory examinations and not report findings,
or to report physical findings but not draw reasonable medical inferences
that torture occurred.
In June, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT)
published a report on its September 2003 inspection of prisons and detention
facilities in the country. The report noted that a majority of former
detainees interviewed by the CPT said law enforcement officials had been
present during their medical examinations. However, some medical staff told
CPT representatives that police had become more cooperative when asked to
leave the room during examinations.
Authorities opened an investigation against Dr. Ilker Mese for “insulting
soldiers” and “failing to examine a prisoner in the presence of soldiers”
after he asked soldiers to leave the room while he was examining a prisoner
at the Tekirdag State Hospital in December 2003. Dr. Mese was also
transferred to another medical facility.
The law mandates heavy prison sentences and fines for medical personnel who
falsify reports to hide torture, those who knowingly use such reports, and
those who coerce doctors into making them. The law provides the highest
penalties for doctors who falsify reports for money. In practice, there were
few prosecutions for violation of these laws. The Medical Association may
fine and suspend for up to 6 months the license of any doctor who falsifies
a report. However, Association officials said they were unable to enforce
these sanctions in many cases because most doctors worked at least partly
for the Government, which protected them.
The CPT’s June report stated that, due to recent reforms, the legislative
and regulatory framework necessary for combating torture and ill-treatment
had been established. The Committee’s report stated that the challenge
facing the Government involved implementing the reforms and “transforming
mentalities” among law enforcement and judicial officials.
The CPT found clear evidence that local and regional authorities were
attempting to comply with the Government’s stated zero tolerance policy on
torture. The Committee’s report concluded that there had been a sharp
decline over previous years in the use of the more severe forms of torture.
At the same time, the CPT reported that it continued to find credible claims
of recent torture and ill-treatment.
In September, Parliament adopted a new Penal Code that provides increased
punishment for torture (see Section 1.d.).
During the year, courts tried and convicted members of the security forces
for torture and abusive treatment (see Section 1.d.).
Police harassed, beat, and abused demonstrators (see Section 2.b.).
The Government continued to organize, arm, and pay a civil defense force of
approximately 58,000, mostly in the southeast region. This force, known as
the village guards, was reputed to be the least disciplined of the security
forces and continued to be accused repeatedly of drug trafficking, rape,
corruption, theft, and other human rights abuses. Inadequate oversight and
compensation contributed to this problem, and in some cases Jandarma
allegedly protected village guards from prosecution. In addition to the
village guards, Jandarma and police special teams were viewed as those most
responsible for abuses.
Conditions in most prisons remained poor, although the Government made
significant improvements in the system, and the country’s best prisons
maintained high standards. Underfunding, overcrowding, and insufficient
staff training remained common problems. The HRF reported that the
Government provided insufficient funds for prison food, resulting in
poor-quality meals; food sold at prison shops was too expensive for most
inmates, and there was a lack of potable water in some prisons. According to
the Medical Association, there were insufficient doctors, and psychologists
were only available at some of the largest prisons. Some inmates claimed
they were denied appropriate medical treatment for serious illness.
According to the HRF, six people died during the year in hunger strikes
protesting F-type (small cell) prisons. The Government reported that, since
2000, the President pardoned 189 inmates on hunger strike. As of September,
six hunger strikers remained in prison, according to the HRF.
In March, an Istanbul court ruled that authorities had used disproportionate
force during the “Return to Life” prison operation in 2000, during which 12
prisoners were killed and 77 wounded. The court ordered $32,750 (44 billion
lira) in compensation for each victim.
At any given time, at least one-quarter of those in prison were awaiting
trial or the outcome of a trial. Men and women were held separately; most
female prisoners were held in the women’s section of a prison. Despite the
existence of separate juvenile facilities, at times juveniles and adults
were held in adjacent wards with mutual access. According to the Government,
detainees and convicts were held either in separate facilities or in
separate sections of the same facility. However, some observers reported
that detainees and convicts were sometimes held together.
The Government permitted prison visits by representatives of some
international organizations, such as the CPT; however, domestic
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) did not have access to prisons. The CPT
visited in March, and conducted ongoing consultations with the Government.
Requests by the CPT to visit prisons were routinely granted.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government
did not always observe these prohibitions in practice. During the year,
police routinely detained demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). Police detained
dozens of members of the legal pro-Kurdish party DEHAP on several occasions
(see Section 3). Police continued to detain and harass members of human
rights organizations and monitors (see Section 4). The Government continued
to detain persons, particularly in the southeastern province of Batman, on
suspicion of links to Hizballah.
The Turkish National Police (TNP), under Interior Ministry control, are
responsible for security in large urban areas. The Jandarma, paramilitary
forces under joint Interior Ministry and military control, are responsible
for policing rural areas. The Jandarma are also responsible for specific
border sectors where smuggling is common; however, the military has overall
responsibility for border control. There were allegations of police
corruption.
In September, Parliament adopted a new Penal Code that provides increased
punishment for torture. Under the new law, the sentence for most torture
convictions is 3 to 12 years in prison. Previously, the maximum penalty was
8 years per victim, and most persons sentenced to jail terms received 2
years. The new Code also establishes higher penalties, including life
imprisonment, for aggravated torture, and prison terms of up to 3 years for
police who fail to report torture. The new Penal Code increases the maximum
statute of limitations for torture cases and other felonies from 15 years to
30 years and allows for the statute to be suspended in certain
circumstances. The law requires that trials, including appeals, be completed
before the statute of limitations expires; otherwise, the trial ends without
a verdict. The extension of the statute of limitations was expected to make
it difficult for defendants in torture cases to avoid a verdict by delaying
court proceedings.
During the year, prosecutors opened trials against 2,395 security personnel
on torture or ill-treatment charges. Through September, courts reached final
verdicts in 625 torture and ill-treatment cases begun in previous years,
convicting 345 defendants and acquitting 1,094. Seven security officers
received short suspensions from duty during the year for ill-treatment.
Courts investigated many allegations of ill-treatment and torture by
security forces; however, they rarely convicted or punished offenders. When
courts did convict offenders, punishment generally was minimal; monetary
fines did not keep pace with the rate of inflation, and sentences were
sometimes suspended. The rarity of convictions and generally light sentences
in torture cases contradicted the Government’s official policy of zero
tolerance for torture. Authorities typically also allowed officers accused
of abuse to remain on duty and, in some cases, promoted them during their
trial, which often took years.
Administrative and bureaucratic barriers impeded prosecutions and
contributed to the low number of torture convictions. Under the law, courts
could not convict unless a defendant attended at least one trial session.
Police defendants sometimes failed to attend hearings in order to avoid
conviction; prosecuting attorneys claimed courts failed to make serious
attempts to locate such defendants, even in cases where the defendants
received salary or pension checks at their home address.
In separate decisions in March and September, an Ankara court convicted five
police defendants in the 1991 Birtan Altinbas death-in-detention case and
sentenced them each to 4 years and 5 months in prison. The court acquitted
five codefendants. In November, the High Court of Appeals overturned the
verdict on the grounds that the sentences were too lenient, sending the case
back to the lower court.
The TNP and Jandarma were effective and received specialized training in a
number of areas, including human rights and counterterrorism. The armed
forces emphasized human rights in training for officers and noncommissioned
officers. Noncommissioned police officers received 2 years of training.
The Government’s Ten Year Human Rights Education Committee held regional
seminars to educate civil servants and others on human rights problems.
Regional bar associations and the EU held training seminars with police,
judges, and prosecutors across the country, focusing on EU human rights
standards. The Justice and Interior ministries conducted numerous training
programs for law enforcement and security officials, judges, and prosecutors
on recent legal reforms and European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case law.
Except when police apprehend suspects in the commission of a crime, a
prosecutor must issue a detention order for a person to be taken into
custody. The maximum detention period for persons charged with individual
common crimes is 24 hours. Persons charged with collective common crimes can
be held for 48 hours.
The law provides that detainees are entitled to immediate access to an
attorney and to meet and confer with an attorney at any time. In practice,
authorities did not always respect these provisions and most detainees did
not exercise these rights, either because they were unaware of them or
feared antagonizing authorities. Once formally charged by the prosecutor, a
detainee is arraigned by a judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. After
arraignment, the judge may release the accused upon receipt of an
appropriate assurance, such as bail, or order detention if the court
determines that the accused is likely to flee the jurisdiction or destroy
evidence.
Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported uneven implementation
of these regulations, particularly with respect to attorney access.
According to HRA and a number of local bar associations, only approximately
5 percent of detainees consulted with attorneys. HRA claimed police
intimidated detainees who asked for attorneys, sometimes telling them a
court would assume they were guilty if they consulted an attorney during
detention. A number of attorneys stated that, unlike in past years, law
enforcement authorities did not generally interfere with their efforts to
consult with detainees charged with common crimes; however, they said they
continued to face difficulties working with detainees charged with
terrorism.
The CPT reported that, during its September 2003 visit to the southeastern
region, it discovered that only between 3 and 7 percent of recent detainees
in the area had consulted with an attorney. A number of former detainees
told CPT officials they did not know they had the right to consult with an
attorney at no cost if they could not afford to hire one. Several said
police refused their requests for access to an attorney or discouraged them
from consulting an attorney, for example by implying they would have to pay
the attorney. The CPT stated it was skeptical of records indicating that a
high proportion of detainees held in antiterror departments had waived their
right to consult an attorney and concluded that authorities in these
departments were reluctant to allow attorney access.
In June, the General Directorate of Security issued a circular directing law
enforcement authorities to notify detainees of their right to consult with
an attorney and to retain an attorney at no cost if they lack the means to
hire one. The circular warned police that failure to inform detainees of
their rights could render an arrest illegal.
Regulations on detention and arrest procedures require authorities to notify
relatives as soon as possible of an arrest, and authorities generally
observed this requirement.
Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. The Constitution provides
detainees the right to request speedy arraignment and trial; however, judges
have ordered that some suspects be detained indefinitely, at times for
years. Most such cases involved persons accused of violent crimes, but there
were cases of those accused of nonviolent political crimes being held in
custody until the conclusion of their trials.
Detainees could be held for up to 6 months during the preliminary
investigation period. If a case was opened, the pretrial detention period
could be extended for up to 2 years. If the detainee was charged with a
crime carrying a maximum punishment of more than 7 years, a court could
further extend the detention period.
Persons detained for individual crimes under the Antiterror Law have to be
brought before a judge within 48 hours. Persons charged with crimes of a
collective, political, or conspiratorial nature can be detained for an
initial period of up to 4 days at a prosecutor’s discretion and for up to 7
days with a judge’s permission, which was almost always granted.
International humanitarian organizations were allowed access to “political”
detainees, provided the organization obtained permission from the Ministry
of Justice. With the exception of the CPT, which had good access, the
Ministry granted organizations such permission few times.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the
judiciary was sometimes subject to outside influences. There were
allegations of judicial corruption.
In June, the Court of Appeals President’s Council, headed by Court President
Eraslan Ozkaya, rejected a request by prosecutors to investigate eight Court
of Appeals judges for corruption in a bribery-related case. Prosecutors
sought to pursue evidence obtained from wiretaps indicating that the suspect
in a bribery ring investigation had been in contact with the eight judges.
In August, the press reported allegations that organized crime figure
Alaaddin Cakici maintained links to two High Court of Appeals
judges–Eraslan Ozkaya and Court Deputy Secretary General Ercan
Yalcinkaya–as well as to officials of the Turkish National Intelligence
Organization. Cakici allegedly was informed about the status of his case at
the Court of Appeals and used this information to escape the country in May.
Yalcinkaya resigned from the Court of Appeals in October and was reassigned
as public prosecutor for Kazan, Ankara. In October, the Court of Appeals
President’s Council decided not to pursue either a criminal or disciplinary
investigation of Ozkaya. A Justice Ministry investigation of Yalcinkaya
continued at year’s end.
The Constitution prohibits the Government from issuing orders or
recommendations concerning the exercise of judicial power; however, the
Government and the National Security Council (NSC), an advisory body to the
Government composed of civilian government leaders and senior military
officers, periodically issued announcements or directives about threats to
the State, which could be interpreted as general directions to the
judiciary. The seven-member High Council of Judges and Prosecutors,
appointed by the President and chaired by the Minister of Justice, selects
judges and prosecutors for the higher courts and is responsible for
oversight of the lower courts. The High Council, which is located in the
Ministry of Justice and does not have its own budget, was widely criticized
for restricting judicial independence. While the Constitution provides for
security of tenure, the High Council controlled the careers of judges and
prosecutors through appointments, transfers, promotions, reprimands, and
other mechanisms.
The judicial system is composed of general law courts; specialized heavy
penal courts; military courts; the Constitutional Court, the nation’s
highest court; and three other high courts. The High Court of Appeals
(Yargitay) hears appeals for criminal cases; the Council of State (Danistay)
hears appeals of administrative cases or cases between government entities,
and the Audit Court (Sayistay) audits state institutions. Most cases were
prosecuted in the general law courts, which include civil, administrative,
and criminal courts. During the year, Parliament adopted legislation
providing for the establishment of regional appeals courts to relieve the
Yargitay caseload and allow the judiciary to operate more efficiently.
In June, Parliament adopted legislation closing the SSCs, special courts
designed to try crimes against the State. The courts had been widely
criticized for proprosecution bias, and the ECHR had overturned many SSC
convictions over the years on the grounds that the defendants had been
denied a fair trial. However, the legislation established new, specialized
heavy penal courts to take most of the former SSC caseload. Since the new
courts have special powers similar to those of the SSCs, a number of
attorneys and human rights activists asserted that the legislation amounted
to little more than a name change.
The Constitutional Court examined the constitutionality of laws, decrees,
and parliamentary procedural rules and heard cases involving the prohibition
of political parties. If impeached, ministers and prime ministers could be
tried in the Constitutional Court. However, the Court could not consider
“decrees with the force of law” issued under a state of emergency, martial
law, in time of war, or in other situations as authorized by Parliament.
Military courts, with their own appeals system, heard cases involving
military law for members of the armed forces.
The law provides prosecutors far-reaching authority to supervise police
during investigations; however, prosecutors complained that they had few
resources to do so. In December, Parliament adopted legislation establishing
judicial police, who will be assigned to take direction from prosecutors
during investigations; however, the Interior Ministry maintains authority
over judicial police, including their promotions. Prosecutors also were
charged with determining which law had been broken and objectively
presenting facts to the court.
Defense lawyers did not have equal status with prosecutors. In heavy penal
courts, prosecutors sat alongside judges, while defense attorneys sat apart.
In courts with computers, prosecutors were generally provided with computers
and had access to the hearing transcript; defense attorneys were not
provided computer access. Judges and prosecutors lived in the same
government apartment complexes, and some defense attorneys claimed that the
social ties between judges and prosecutors disadvantaged the defense in
court.
Defense attorneys in politically sensitive cases sometimes faced harassment,
although human rights groups and bar associations said this was less common
than in the past. Attorneys could face threats and other harassment,
particularly if they defended clients accused of terrorism or illegal
political activity, pursued torture cases, or sought prompt access to their
clients, which police often viewed as interference.
There is no jury system; a judge or a panel of judges decides all cases. The
Constitution provides for the right to a speedy trial; however, at times
trials lasted for years (see Section 1.d.). Proceedings against security
officials often were delayed because officers did not submit statements
promptly or attend trials. In some cases, such delays extended beyond the
statute of limitations, causing the trial to end without a verdict.
The law prohibits the use of evidence obtained by torture in court; however,
prosecutors sometimes failed to pursue torture allegations, and exclusion of
evidence only occurred after a separate case on the legality of the evidence
was resolved. In practice, a trial based on a confession allegedly coerced
under torture could proceed and even conclude before the court had examined
the merits of the torture allegations.
The law requires bar associations to provide free counsel to indigents who
request it from the court, and bar associations across the country did so in
practice.
The legal system did not discriminate in law or in practice against ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities; however, legal proceedings were
conducted solely in Turkish, with interpreting available sometimes, which
seriously disadvantaged some defendants whose native language was not
Turkish.
In September, Parliament adopted a new Penal Code that reduced sentences for
some crimes and decriminalized some acts that had previously been considered
crimes. As a result, the Government released 3,240 convicts through
November.
There were no developments in the appeal of the 2003 ECHR ruling that jailed
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan did not receive a fair trial during the
proceedings that led to his 1999 conviction.
The HRA estimated that there were approximately 6,000 to 7,000 political
prisoners, including leftists, rightists and Islamists. Of these,
approximately 1,500 were alleged members of Hizballah or other radical
Islamist political organizations. The Government claimed that alleged
political prisoners were in fact charged with being members of, or
assisting, terrorist organizations. According to the Government, there were
4,508 convicts and detainees held on terrorism charges at year’s end.
International humanitarian organizations were allowed access to “political”
prisoners, provided they could obtain permission from the Ministry of
Justice. With the exception of the CPT, which generally had good access,
such organizations were seldom granted permission in practice.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits such actions, and the Government generally
respected these provisions in practice.
The law allows officials to enter a private residence and intercept or
monitor private correspondence with a judicial warrant. If delay might cause
harm to a case, prosecutors could authorize a search without a warrant.
The law permits wiretaps on national security grounds with a written court
order or, in an emergency situation, written permission of a prosecutor, and
the Government generally respected these requirements in practice.
Section 2
Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however,
the Government continued to limit these freedoms in some cases.
The Government, particularly the police and judiciary, limited freedom of
expression through the use of constitutional restrictions and numerous laws,
including articles of the Penal Code prohibiting insults to the Government,
the State, or the institutions and symbols of the Republic. Other laws, such
as those governing the press and elections, also restrict speech. In
September, Parliament adopted legislation prohibiting imams, priests,
rabbis, and other religious leaders from “reproaching or vilifying” the
Government or the laws of the State while performing their duties (see
Section 2.c.). The “reasoning” attached to the Penal Code states that
persons could be found in violation for accepting payment from foreign
sources for the purpose of conducting propaganda in favor of withdrawing
troops from Cyprus or (quoting from the text of the “reasoning”) “saying
that Armenians were subject to a genocide at the end of the First World
War.” The reasoning is not law, but serves as guidance to judges and
prosecutors on how to apply the law.
According to HRA, in the first 9 months of the year, courts tried 416
persons on charges relating to spoken or written expression.
Individuals could not criticize the State or Government publicly without
fear of reprisal, and the Government continued to restrict expression by
individuals sympathetic to some religious, political, and Kurdish
nationalist or cultural viewpoints. Active debates on human rights and
government policies continued, particularly on issues relating to the
country’s EU membership process, the role of the military, Islam, political
Islam, and the question of Turks of Kurdish origin as “minorities”; however,
persons who wrote or spoke out on such topics risked prosecution.
In January, prosecutors opened a case against Vetha Aydin, chairman of the
HRA Siirt branch, for distributing posters featuring slogans in both Turkish
and Kurdish. Aydin was charged with hanging posters without permission and
was later acquitted.
In February, an Ankara prosecutor indicted Fusun Sayek, president of the
Turkish Medical Association, and Metin Bakkalci, Association vice president,
on charges of insulting the Health Minister. The two were charged for public
comments made in response to the Minister’s criticism of a stop-work action
by physicians. According to the indictment, Sayek said the Minister “has a
problem understanding” and Bakkalci said, “Not seeing the greatness of this
action is a kind of pathological case.” In June, a court acquitted the
defendants on criminal charges. Civil charges were also filed against the
Medical Association officials; a civil court acquitted Sayek but fined
Bakkalci, whose appeal of the ruling continued at year’s end.
In May, a prosecutor in Marmaris indicted Mehmet Yurek, editor of the
newspaper Degisim, for insulting former President Evren in an article
published in April.
In June, police detained and released DEHAP official Nedim Bicer for using
the expression “sayin” (“esteemed”) in reference to Abdullah Ocalan during a
May press conference.
In September, an Istanbul prosecutor opened a case against journalist Mehmet
Ali Birand and three attorneys for jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in
connection with an April CNN Turk broadcast during which Birand interviewed
the attorneys. Birand and the attorneys–Irfan Dundar, Mahmut Sakar, and
Dogan Erbas–were charged with aiding the PKK.
During the year, there were indications that some judges in speech-related
cases were conforming their rulings to recent, EU-related legal reforms. In
May, SSCs in Van and Erzurum acquitted DEHAP President Tuncer Bakirhan on
charges of separatism and spreading terrorist propaganda in public speeches.
The courts determined that Bakirhan’s comments did not encourage violence
and were within the realm of legally protected speech. In August, a Van
court acquitted Selahattin Demirtas, president of the HRA Diyarbakir branch,
on charges of making terrorist propaganda, reportedly basing its ruling on
the European Convention on Human Rights.
There were no new developments in the appeal of DEHAP parliamentary
candidate Ruknettin Hakan’s 2003 conviction and 6-month suspended prison
sentence for “making propaganda in a language other than Turkish.”
In January, an Istanbul SSC sentenced Sefika Gurbuz, chairwoman of the
Social Support and Culture Association of Migrants, to 10 months
imprisonment in connection with the organization’s 1999 2001 report on
forced displacement. The court converted the sentence to a fine of $1,430
(1.9 billion lira).
Freedom of the press was restricted; however, the Government took a number
of steps during the year to ease some of the restrictions. In June,
Parliament adopted a law to expand press freedom. The new law replaces
prison sentences with fines for a number of crimes, reduces fines, permits
noncitizens to own periodicals and serve as responsible editors, protects
editors and reporters from being forced to disclose sources, provides
punishment for preventing the distribution of a publication, allows law
enforcement authorities to confiscate a maximum of three copies of a
publication under investigation, generally prohibits courts from converting
fines to prison sentences in press-related cases, and prohibits authorities
from closing publications or preventing their distribution due to violations
of the Press Law.
In May, Parliament amended the Constitution so that it no longer authorizes
law enforcement authorities to seize printing presses or other publishing
equipment.
Independent domestic and foreign periodicals that provided a broad spectrum
of views and opinions, including intense criticism of the Government, were
widely available, and the newspaper business was extremely competitive.
However, news items reflected a proauthority bias.
The Government owned and operated the Turkish Radio and Television
Corporation (TRT). According to the High Board of Radio and Television
(RTUK), there were 226 local, 15 regional, and 16 national officially
registered television stations, and 959 local, 104 regional, and 36 national
radio stations. Other television and radio stations broadcast without an
official license. The wide availability of satellite dishes and cable
television allowed access to foreign broadcasts, including several
Kurdish-language private channels. Most media were privately owned by large
holding companies that had a wide range of outside business interests; the
concentration of media ownership influenced the content of reporting and
limited the scope of debate.
The RTUK monitored broadcasters and sanctioned them if they were not in
compliance with relevant laws. Parliament elected the RTUK Council members,
who were divided between ruling and opposition parties. In July, Parliament
revised the RTUK law to eliminate the NSC-nominated member from the Council,
reducing Council membership from nine to eight. Although nominally
independent, the RTUK was subject to political pressures. The RTUK penalized
private radio and television stations for the use of offensive language,
libel, obscenity, instigating separatist propaganda, or broadcasting
programs in Kurdish. RTUK decisions could be appealed to the Provincial
Administrative Court and then to the Council of State (Danistay). The RTUK
reported that, in the first 9 months of the year, it closed 4 television
stations and 6 radio stations for periods of 30 days each.
In March, the RTUK ordered Ozgur Radio and Serhat Television to cease
broadcasting for 30 days for inciting people to hatred and violence. Ozgur
was sanctioned in connection with an August 2003 broadcast during which
articles from the newspaper Evrensel were read on the air; Serhat was
sanctioned due to a July 2003 program titled “Isildak.” In April, the RTUK
ordered ART Television of Diyarbakir to cease broadcasting for 30 days on
the grounds that an August 2003 broadcast featuring Kurdish music
constituted separatist propaganda. In June, the RTUK banned one broadcast of
the Show TV program “Valley of Wolves” for encouraging violence and inciting
racial hatred. In September, RTUK ordered Gun TV of Diyarbakir to cease
broadcasting for 30 days as punishment for a December 2003 broadcast that
authorities deemeded to be “against the values of Ataturk, against the unity
of the State.” The sanction stemmed from Gun TV’s live broadcast of a
symposium on local administration, human rights, and the media. In October,
the RTUK ordered Imaj Radyo to cease broadcasting for 30 days for playing a
song that it considered incited hatred and violence.
Prosecutors harassed writers, journalists, and political figures by bringing
dozens of cases to court each year under various laws that restrict media
freedom; however, judges dismissed many of these charges. Authorities often
closed periodicals temporarily, issued fines, or confiscated periodicals for
violating speech codes. Despite government restrictions, the media
criticized government leaders and policies daily and adopted an adversarial
role with respect to the Government.
In May, an Ankara court ordered three journalists of the Islamist-oriented
Vakit newspaper–owner Nuri Aykon, editor Harum Aksoy, and writer Mehmet
Dogan–to pay $408,000 (551 billion lira) to 312 generals for insulting
them. The charges stemmed from an article published in August 2003 titled,
“The Country Where a Soldier Who Does Not Deserve to be Sergeant Becomes a
General.” An appeals court upheld the ruling.
In October, a Bursa court convicted Genc Party leader Cem Uzan, sentenced
him to 8 months in prison, and fined him $462 (623 million lira) for
insulting the Government in a 2003 speech in which he called Prime Minister
Erdogan “godless.” The case was under appeal at year’s end.
There were no new developments in the case of Sabri Ejder Ozic, who appealed
his December 2003 conviction for insulting and mocking Parliament in a radio
broadcast.
At year’s end, writer and scholar Fikret Baskaya continued to face charges
involving the 2003 republishing of an article he wrote in 1993.
According to the Government, there were no journalists held on speech
violations during the year; however, at year’s end, there were 43 prisoners
claiming to be journalists who were charged with a variety of crimes.
Authorities sometimes used forms of censorship against periodicals with
pro-Kurdish or leftist content, particularly in the southeast. In January,
Sinan Kutluk claimed police kidnapped him and threatened to kill him as he
was distributing the leftist daily Ozgur Gundem in Adana. In June, a
juvenile said plainclothes police beat him as he was distributing Ozgur
Gundem in Van. Journalists practiced self-censorship.
While there were improvements during the year, the Government maintained
significant restrictions on the use of Kurdish and other minority languages
in radio and television broadcasts. In June, state television and radio
began limited broadcasts in Kurdish and three other minority languages. RTUK
regulations limited the minority-language broadcasts, including news and
cultural programming, to 60 minutes per day, 5 hours per week on radio, and
45 minutes per day, 4 hours per week on television. The regulations also
require that non Turkish radio programs be followed by the same program in
Turkish and that non-Turkish television programs have Turkish subtitles. At
year’s end, local stations were prohibited from broadcasting similar
non-Turkish programs pending the completion of a RTUK viewer-listener
profile.
In October, the Government’s Human Rights Consultation Board issued a
report, which found that legal restrictions on the use of minority languages
violated the country’s commitments under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty to provide
Turkish nationals the right to use any language in the press, commerce,
religion, public meetings, and private life without restriction. A number of
Government officials harshly criticized the report and Ankara prosecutors
opened an investigation against the report’s principal authors. There were
no developments in the investigation at year’s end.
In November, the High Court of Appeals reinstated a case against the
teachers’ union Egitim-Sen on charges stemming from an article in the
union’s statute supporting the rights of individuals to receive education in
their mother tongue; the case continued at year’s end.
While Kurdish-language audio cassettes and publications were available
commercially, local authorities periodically prohibited specific cassettes
or singers, particularly in the southeast. Prosecutors ordered the
confiscation of numerous issues of leftist, Kurdish nationalist, and pro-PKK
periodicals and prohibited several books on a range of topics. Police
frequently raided the offices of such publications.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet; however, the law
authorizes RTUK to monitor Internet speech and to require Internet service
providers to submit advance copies of pages to be posted online. The law
also allows police to search and confiscate materials from Internet cafes to
protect “national security, public order, health, and decency” or to prevent
a crime. Police must obtain authorization from a judge or, in emergencies,
the highest administrative authority before taking such action.
The Government did not overtly restrict academic freedom; however, there was
some self-censorship on sensitive topics.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government
restricted this right in practice. Significant prior notification to
authorities was required for a gathering, and authorities could restrict
meetings to designated sites.
Police beat, abused, detained, or harassed some demonstrators. In April,
Istanbul police reportedly prevented students from marching in Taksim Square
to protest the Higher Education Council. Police allegedly beat students with
truncheons, used tear gas, and detained 48 demonstrators. In July,
Diyarbakir police reportedly prevented a group of women from staging a
demonstration in support of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Police
allegedly beat demonstrators, injuring 6 persons and detaining 38.
In August, the Interior Ministry issued a circular directing governors and
law enforcement authorities to take measures to avoid the use of excessive
force in responding to demonstrations. The circular instructed authorities
to identify the root causes of excessive force, working with NGOs and other
civil institutions as necessary, and to punish law enforcement officials who
engage in the practice.
There were no new developments in the court appeal by police officers of
their postponed prison sentences for beating Veli Kaya during a 2002 protest
against the Higher Education Council.
On March 21, most celebrations of Nevruz, the Kurdish New Year, took place
without incident, according to the HRF; however, the HRF reported that
police beat celebrants at a number of locations. In Agri Province,
authorities refused to allow celebrations because the application featured
the Kurdish spelling “Newruz,” including the letter “w,” which is not found
in Turkish.
In February, an Aliaga court sentenced Alp Ayan, a psychiatrist with the HRF
Izmir Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, to 1½ years in prison for holding
an unauthorized demonstration. The court also sentenced 31 codefendants in
the case and acquitted 34; the ruling was under appeal at year’s end.
The HRF reported that authorities in most cases did not interfere in
celebrations of May Day (May 1); however, police detained a number of
celebrants. Organizers canceled May Day celebrations in Diyarbakir because
the Governor designated a site 12 kilometers from the city center.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, there were
some restrictions on this right in practice.
In March, prosecutors opened a case seeking the closure of the Human Rights
Agenda Association for allegedly failing to make required changes to its
statute. In September, an Izmir court decided to drop the case, determining
that the changes were not necessary.
In April, Istanbul police sealed the headquarters of the Association of
Prisoners’ Relatives under a closure order from the Governor for alleged
violations of the Associations Law.
In May, the Directorate General for Foundations issued a circular stating
that all foundations were required to seek government permission prior to
applying to participate in projects funded by international organizations.
In June, an Ankara court ordered the closure of the National Youth
Foundation for promoting “Arab nationalism.” In December, the High Court of
Appeals upheld the ruling.
In June, the Interior Ministry issued a circular that directed local
authorities to regard public statements by civil society organizations as
constitutionally protected speech. It also instructed law enforcement
officials not to film or photograph meetings and activities of organizations
unless so instructed by the governor’s office.
In August, a Diyarbakir prosecutor opened a case against the local branch of
the Kurdish Writers Association for “receiving a committee from the EU”
without permission from the governor’s office. A court acquitted the
defendants in October.
In November, Parliament adopted a law that reduces limits on the right to
form and join associations by removing restrictions on the establishment of
associations based on race, religion, sect, region, or minority status, and
on student associations. The law also allows associations to cooperate with
foreign organizations and establish branches abroad without prior
permission. The law removes the requirement that associations inform local
authorities of general assembly meetings and prohibits law enforcement
authorities from searching association premises without a court order.
However, the new law maintains the requirement that foreign associations
receive permission from the Interior Ministry, in consultation with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before engaging in activity in the country.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice; however, the Government imposed
some restrictions on Muslim and other religious groups and on Muslim
religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions,
including universities, usually for the stated reason of preserving the
“secular State.”
The Constitution establishes the country as a secular state and provides for
freedom of belief, freedom of worship, and the private dissemination of
religious ideas; however, other constitutional provisions regarding the
integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. The
Constitution prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. The state
bureaucracy has played the role of defending traditional Turkish secularism
throughout the history of the Republic. In some cases, elements of the
bureaucracy have opposed policies of the elected government on the grounds
that they threatened the secular state.
The Government oversees Muslim religious facilities and education through
its Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which reports directly to
the Prime Ministry. The Diyanet has responsibility for regulating the
operation of the country’s 75,000 registered mosques and employing local and
provincial imams, who are civil servants. Some groups, particularly Alevis,
claim that the Diyanet reflects mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs to the
exclusion of other beliefs; however, the Government asserts that the Diyanet
treats equally all who request services.
There are an estimated 7 to 9 million Alevis, including ethnic Turks, Kurds,
and Arabs. In general, Alevis follow a belief system that incorporates
aspects of both Shi’a and Sunni Islam and draws on the traditions of other
religions found in Anatolia as well. Alevis in Central Anatolia base their
beliefs on 12er Shi’ism. Alevi Kurds in the Tunceli area follow the Kurdish
“Cult of Angels,” or Yarsanism. The Government considers Alevism a heterodox
Muslim sect; however, some Turkish Alevis and radical Sunnis maintain that
Alevis are not Muslims.
A separate government agency, the General Directorate for Foundations
(Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu), regulates some activities of non Muslim
religious groups and their affiliated churches, monasteries, synagogues, and
related religious property. There are 161 “minority foundations” recognized
by the Vakiflar, including Greek Orthodox foundations with approximately 70
sites, Armenian Orthodox foundations with approximately 50 sites, and Jewish
foundations with 20 sites, as well as Syrian Christian, Chaldean, Bulgarian
Orthodox, Georgian, and Maronite foundations. The Vakiflar also regulates
Muslim charitable religious foundations, including schools, hospitals, and
orphanages.
Secularists in the military, judiciary, and other branches of the
bureaucracy continued to wage campaigns against what they label as
proponents of Islamic fundamentalism. These groups view religious
fundamentalism–which they do not clearly define, but which they assert is
an attempt to impose the rule of Shari’a law in all civil and criminal
matters–as a threat to the secular State. The NSC categorizes religious
fundamentalism as a threat to public safety.
According to the human rights NGO Mazlum-Der and other groups, some
government ministries have dismissed or barred from promotion civil servants
suspected of antistate or Islamist activities. Reports by Mazlum-Der, the
media, and others indicated that the military regularly dismisses
religiously observant Muslims from military service. Such dismissals were
based on behavior that military officials believed identified these
individuals as Islamic fundamentalists, which they were concerned could
indicate disloyalty to the secular State. According to Mazlum-Der, the
military charged individuals with lack of discipline for activities that
included performing Muslim prayers or being married to women who wore
headscarves. According to the military, officers were sometimes dismissed
for maintaining ties to what the military considered to be Islamic
fundamentalist organizations, despite repeated warnings from superior
officers.
The law prohibits mystical Sufi and other religious-social orders (tarikats)
and lodges (cemaats). The military ranked tarikats among the most harmful
threats to secularism; however, tarikats remained active and widespread and
some prominent political and social leaders associated with tarikats,
cemaats, and other Islamic communities.
The Government did not recognize the ecumenical status of the Greek Orthodox
Patriarch, acknowledging him only as the head of the country’s dwindling
Greek Orthodox community. As a result, the Government has long maintained
that only citizens of the country could be members of the Church’s Holy
Synod and participate in Patriarchal elections. Members of the Greek
Orthodox community said these restrictions threatened the survival of the
Patriarchate in Istanbul, because, with fewer than 2,500 Greek Orthodox left
in the country, the community was becoming too small to maintain the
institution. In March, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I appointed six non
Turkish-citizen metropolitans to the Holy Synod, representing the first time
in the 80-year history of the country that noncitizens had been appointed to
the body. At year’s end, the Government was still conducting a legal
analysis of the unprecedented move.
The law restricts religious services to designated places of worship.
Municipal codes mandate that only the Government can designate a place of
worship; if a religious group has no legal standing in the country, it may
not be eligible for a designated site. Non-Muslim religious services,
particularly for groups that do not own property recognized by the Vakiflar,
often took place on diplomatic property or in private apartments. Police
occasionally prohibited Christians from holding services in private
apartments, and prosecutors sometimes opened cases against Christians for
holding unauthorized gatherings.
In May, a Diyarbakir court acquitted Ahmet Guvener, pastor of the Diyarbakir
Evangelical Church, of multiple charges of operating an illegal church after
the prosecutor told the court that Guvener’s actions no longer constituted a
crime due to international law and recent domestic legal reforms. In
November, a local board charged with protecting cultural and historic sites
approved the church’s application to have its property zoned as a place of
worship, reversing its May ruling against the church. In December 2003, the
Interior Ministry issued a circular directing provincial governors to
facilitate efforts by non-Muslim communities to open places of worship;
however, some local officials continued to impose standards, such as minimum
space requirements, on churches while failing to apply them to mosques.
In March, authorities approved an application by a group of expatriate,
German-speaking Christians to establish a religious/charity association in
Alanya, Antalya Province. In the past, authorities rejected such
applications on the grounds that the law prohibited associations based on
religion. The arrangement authorizes group members to build and maintain a
church, but does not explicitly allow them to worship.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul continued to seek to reopen the
Halki seminary on the island of Heybeli in the Sea of Marmara, which was
closed in 1971 when the State nationalized private institutions of higher
learning. The Ecumenical Patriarchate faced a series of other problems
related to its properties. Under existing restrictions, religious
communities other than Sunni Muslims cannot legally train new clergy in the
country for eventual leadership. Coreligionists from outside the country
have been permitted to assume leadership positions in rare cases, but in
general all religious community leaders, including Patriarchs and Chief
Rabbis, were required to be citizens.
In September, Parliament adopted a law prohibiting imams, priests, rabbis,
or other religious leaders from “reproaching or vilifying” the Government or
the laws of the State while performing their duties. Violations are
punishable by prison terms of 1 month to 1 year, or 3 months to 2 years if
the crime involves inciting others to disobey the law, which was scheduled
to go into effect in April 2005.
While no law explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions,
many prosecutors and police regard proselytizing by non-Muslims and
religious activism with suspicion. Police occasionally prohibited Christians
from handing out religious literature and sometimes arrested proselytizers
for disturbing the peace, insulting Islam, conducting unauthorized
educational courses, or distributing literature that has criminal or
separatist elements. Courts usually dismissed such charges. Proselytizing is
often considered socially unacceptable; Christians performing missionary
work are sometimes beaten and insulted. If proselytizers are foreigners,
they may be deported, but generally they are able to reenter the country.
Police may report students who meet with Christian missionaries to their
families or to university authorities.
Authorities enforced the long-standing prohibition on the wearing of
headscarves at universities and by civil servants in public buildings. Women
who wore headscarves and persons who actively showed support for those who
defied the prohibition were disciplined or lost their jobs in the public
sector. Students who wear head coverings are officially not permitted to
register for classes. Many secular Turkish women accused Islamists of using
advocacy for wearing the headscarf as a political tool and expressed fear
that efforts to remove the headscarf ban would lead to pressure against
women who chose not to wear a head covering. Secular women also maintained
that many women wore headscarves under pressure from men. In June, the ECHR
ruled that Turkish universities have the right to ban Muslim headscarves;
the ruling was under appeal at year’s end.
The law establishes 8 years of compulsory secular education for students.
After completing the 8 years, students may pursue study at imam hatip
(Islamic preacher) high schools. Imam hatip schools are classified as
vocational, and graduates of vocational schools faced an automatic reduction
in their university entrance exam grades if they applied for university
programs outside their field of high school specialization. This reduction
effectively barred imam hatip graduates from enrolling in university
programs other than theology. Most families that enroll their children in
imam hatip schools did so to expose them to more extensive religious
education, not to train them as imams. In May, President Sezer vetoed a bill
that would have eliminated the disadvantage faced by graduates of imam hatip
and other vocational schools seeking to enroll in the full range of
university social sciences programs.
Only the Diyanet is authorized to provide religion courses outside of
school, although clandestine private courses existed. Students who complete
5 years of primary school may enroll in Diyanet Koran classes on weekends
and during summer vacation. Many Koran courses functioned unofficially. Only
children 12 and older could legally register for official Koran courses, and
Mazlum-Der reported that police often raided illegal courses for younger
children.
Members of the Christian community reported that the Government revised
school textbooks in response to complaints about inaccurate, negative
references to Christianity. They said the revised versions represented a
significant improvement.
The 1923 Lausanne Treaty exempts non-Muslim minorities–which the Government
interprets as referring exclusively to Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian
Orthodox Christians, and Jews–from Islamic religious and moral instruction
in public schools upon written notification of their non-Muslim background.
These students may attend Muslim religious courses with parental consent.
Others, such as Catholics, Protestants, and Syriac Christians, are not
exempted legally; however, in practice they were allowed to obtain
exemptions. Officially recognized minorities may operate schools under the
supervision of the Ministry of Education. Such schools are required to
appoint a Muslim as deputy principal; reportedly these deputies had more
authority than their nominal supervisors. The curriculum of these schools
included Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish instruction. In May,
the Education Ministry stated that children with non-Muslim mothers could
attend minority schools; previously, only those with non-Muslim fathers were
permitted.
Some religious groups, particularly the Greek and Armenian Orthodox
communities, have lost property to the Government in the past and continued
to fight ongoing efforts by the Government to expropriate properties. Many
such properties were lost because the law allows the Vakiflar to assume
direct administration of properties that fall into disuse when the size of
the local non-Muslim community drops significantly. The Government
expropriated other properties that were held in the name of individual
community members who emigrated or died without heirs. The Vakiflar also
took control of non-Muslim foundations after the size of the non-Muslim
community in a particular district dropped below the level required to elect
foundation board members. In September, the Government adopted a regulation
allowing governors to expand the boundaries of electoral districts in cases
where there are not enough voters in a district to hold foundation board
elections.
The law allows the 161 minority foundations recognized by the Vakiflar to
acquire property and the Vakiflar has approved 292 applications by
non-Muslim foundations to acquire legal ownership of properties. However,
the legislation does not allow the foundations to reclaim hundreds of
properties expropriated by the State over the years. Foundations have also
been unable to acquire legal ownership of properties registered under names
of third parties, including properties registered under the names of saints
or archangels, during periods when foundations could not own property in
their own name.
In February, the Vakiflar expropriated an orphanage on the Prince’s Islands
that had belonged to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, asserting that the deed,
in the name of the Patriarch, was invalid and that the property belonged to
a Greek Orthodox foundation that had previously been expropriated by the
Government. In November, the High Court of Appeals upheld the expropriation.
By year’s end, the Patriarchate was unable to receive permission to repair
churches, including one damaged in the November 2003 terrorist bombings in
Istanbul.
In January, the Government replaced the Minorities Subcommittee, a body that
monitored minorities as potential threats to the country, with the Board to
Assess Problems of Minorities. Unlike the subcommittee, the board does not
include representatives of the military and intelligence agencies and is
charged with supporting the rights of non-Muslims. However, there were no
indications that the new board made any serious efforts to address the
concerns of non-Muslims during the year.
In September, Parliament adopted a law that prohibits forcing persons to
declare or change their religious, political, or philosophical beliefs or
preventing them from expressing or spreading such beliefs. The law
specifically prohibits the use of force or threats to prevent persons from
gathering for worship or religious ceremonies. Violations of the law are
punishable with 1 to 3 years in prison.
At year’s end, members of the Baha’i community continued to seek
authorization from a local board to renovate a sacred property in Edirne.
National identity cards list a person’s religious affiliation. Some
religious groups, such as Baha’is, alleged that they were not permitted to
state their religion on their cards; however, there were reports that
authorities have become more flexible regarding the religious affiliation
that may be listed. In September, an Ankara court approved the application
of a family requesting permission to leave the religion portion of their
children’s identity cards blank until they reach 18 years of age. Conversion
to another religion entails amending a person’s identity card; there were
reports that local officials harassed persons who converted from Islam to
another religion when they sought to amend their cards. Some persons who
were not Muslim maintained that listing religious affiliation on the cards
exposed them to discrimination and harassment.
In March, two bombers attacked an Istanbul Masonic Lodge, killing two and
wounding seven. It was widely believed in the country that Masons have
Zionist and anti-Islamic tendencies; evidence gathered in the subsequent
investigation suggested that anti-Semitism was at least a partial motivating
factor in the attack. According to press reports, one of the suspects
arrested also confessed to the August 2003 murder of a Jewish dentist in
Istanbul. Reports suggested that the crime’s perpetrator used his victim’s
address book and subsequently telephoned a number of Jewish board members of
a retirement home and threatened them with violence.
At year’s end, court proceedings continued in the Istanbul trial of 69
suspects charged in connection with the November 2003 terrorist bombings of
two synagogues, the British Consulate, and a bank. In an incident that arose
out of the bombings, a court case was opened in September against the
17-year-old son of one of the alleged perpetrators and three journalists on
anti-Semitism charges. The charges stemmed from an interview with the daily
Milliyet in which the youth said, “the attacks did not touch the hearts of
the members of my family because the target was Jews,” and, “if Muslims
hadn’t been killed, we would have been happy. We don’t like Jews.” Three
Milliyet journalists were charged with providing a platform for incitement
against members of another religion.
Some Muslims, Christians, Jews, and Baha’is faced societal suspicion and
mistrust. Jews and Christians from most denominations freely practiced their
religions and reported little discrimination in daily life. However, there
were regular reports that citizens who converted from Islam to another
religion were sometimes attacked and often experienced social harassment.
Proselytizing on behalf of non-Muslim religions was socially unacceptable
and sometimes dangerous. A variety of newspapers and television shows have
featured anti Christian and anti-Jewish messages, and anti-Semitic
literature was common in bookstores.
In October, the Government’s Human Rights Consultation Board issued a report
on minorities, which stated that non-Muslims are effectively barred from
holding positions in State institutions, such as the armed forces, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police, and the National
Intelligence Agency. A number of representatives of non-Muslim communities
confirmed the report’s conclusions (see Section 5).
During the observance of Ramazan in October-November, there were reportedly
several incidents of university students attacking students who were not
fasting. In October, the rector of Gaziosmanpasa University in Tokat opened
an investigation against 10 students and a faculty member in connection with
such attacks. In November, police intervened after fasting students at
Ankara University attacked nonfasting students, according to press reports.
In March, the Bursa court trying three members of the Nationalist Movement
Party accused of severely beating Yakup Cindilli, a convert to Christianity,
postponed hearings for 15 months on the grounds that such a period of time
was needed before a medical evaluation could be conducted to determine the
full extent of Cindilli’s injuries.
In April, an Ankara SSC sentenced Kerim Akbas of Baskent TV to 23 months in
prison for inciting attacks against local Protestants and their places of
worship. The court convicted Akbas for a series of broadcasts claiming
Protestants were bribing Muslims to convert and attempting to disturb the
peace. The ruling was under appeal at year’s end. Following the broadcasts,
vandals damaged several local Protestant facilities.
In September, Bodrum police closed a Protestant church and confiscated its
signs under orders from the Governor. Authorities reopened the church
several days later.
Members of a Protestant church in Kecioren, Ankara, said local residents
opposed to their presence repeatedly threatened them, attempted to attack
church members, and vandalized the church. They said police were dismissive
of their reports; church members filed a complaint against the local police
chief. Church members opened a case against the alleged organizer of the
harassment; however, at year’s end the suspect remained at large and the
threats and vandalism continued.
In September, an estimated 1,000 protestors gathered outside the Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul and burned an effigy of Ecumenical
Patriarch Bartholomew I. The protest was organized by the youth wing of the
Nationalist Movement Party, whose leaders accused the Patriarch of
interfering in internal politics by commenting on religious reform and the
country’s EU candidacy. In October, unknown persons threw a homemade bomb
over the wall of the Patriarchate; the bomb blew out several windows and
damaged the roof of a cathedral.
Jehovah’s Witnesses reported increasing official harassment of their worship
services because they were not members of an officially recognized religion.
On several occasions during the year, members of Jehovah’s Witnesses in
Mersin and Istanbul were fined for conducting religious meetings without
permission. Members also reported some difficulties in claiming
conscientious objector status and exemption from military service. Jehovah’s
Witnesses who were conscripted into the military refused to take the
military oath or carry weapons and, as a result, faced arrest and detention;
such detention generally lasted for about a month, after which the
individual was released pending trial.
For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International Religious Freedom
Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
Repatriation
The law provides for these rights; however, at times the Government limited
some of these rights. The Constitution provides that a citizen’s freedom to
leave the country could be restricted only in the case of a national
emergency, civic obligations (military service, for example), or criminal
investigation or prosecution. The Government maintained a heavy security
presence in the southeast, including numerous roadway checkpoints.
Provincial authorities in the southeast, citing security concerns, denied
some villagers access to their fields and high pastures for grazing.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not employ
it. There were no new cases of internal exile during the year.
Various NGOs estimated that there were from 1 to 3 million IDPs remaining
from PKK conflict, which reached its height between 1984 and 1990. The
Government reported that 378,000 residents “migrated” from the southeast
during the conflict, with many others departing before the fighting. In
July, Parliament adopted a law allowing persons who suffered material losses
during the conflict with the PKK to apply for compensation. Under the law,
IDPs who fled the region are eligible for cash or in-kind payment for losses
caused by terrorism or by the State’s antiterror operations. However, the
Foundation for Society and Legal Studies and a number of international
organizations criticized the law because some villagers who fled the region,
particularly those who fled the country, would have difficulty meeting the
1-year deadline for applying for payment and because villagers who received
token amounts of compensation in the past would be ineligible for benefits.
Residents of the southeast and representatives of regional bar associations
also said the law established unreasonable documentation requirements and
awarded levels of compensation far below standards established by the ECHR.
According to human rights activists, villagers, and some southeast members
of Parliament, the Government did not allow some displaced villagers to
return to the southeast unless they signed a document stating that they had
left their homes due to PKK terrorism, rather than government actions, and
that they would not seek government assistance in returning. Village guards
occupied homes abandoned by IDPs and have attacked or intimidated IDPs
attempting to return to their homes with official permission. Voluntary and
assisted resettlements were ongoing. In some cases, persons could return to
their old homes; in other cases, centralized villages have been constructed.
The Government claimed that a total of 127,927 displaced persons had
returned to the region as of November and that it had assisted in the
reopening of more than 400 villages and hamlets.
In August, the HRA reported that soldiers forcibly evacuated residents from
the village of Ilicak in Sirnak Province, marking the first such evacuation
in 3 years. Local officials arranged for the return of the villagers 3 days
later.
In September, the Governor and Jandarma officials in Sirnak Province evicted
village guards who were preventing a group of Syriac Christians from
returning to their homes. The Syriacs, who fled due to the PKK conflict,
returned during the year and found 20 village guards occupying their homes
in the village of Sarikoy. The Sirnak Governor cut off electricity to the
village, and Jandarma officers evacuated the village and disarmed the
village guards. The Syriacs reportedly paid local authorities $93,700 (126
billion lira) for the relocation effort.
Foreign governments and national and international human rights
organizations continued to criticize the Government’s program for assisting
the return of IDPs as secretive and inadequate.
There were no new developments in the Mersin trial of seven members of the
Migration and Humanitarian Aid Foundation (GIYAV) on charges of aiding and
abetting an illegal organization. There were also no new developments in the
separate Mersin trial in which prosecutors are seeking to disband GIYAV on
charges of establishing relations with foreign associations without seeking
the required approval from the Interior and Foreign ministries.
An administrative regulation provides for the granting of asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the definition in the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol; however, the
Government exercised its option under the Convention of accepting
obligations only with respect to refugees from Europe. The Government has
established a system for providing protection to refugees. In practice, the
Government provided protection against refoulement, the return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution. According to the Government,
Europeans recognized as refugees could remain in the country and eventually
acquire citizenship; however, it was not clear how often this happened in
practice. The Government cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting the small
number of European refugees and asylum seekers. Chechens, many of whom
arrived in 2001, reported problems making asylum applications with the
Government and renewing temporary residence permits.
The Government offered non-European refugees temporary asylum while they
were waiting to be resettled in another country. The UNHCR conducted refugee
status determination for applicants from non European countries and
facilitated the resettlement of those recognized as refugees.
The UNHCR reported that no recognized refugees were returned to a country
where they feared persecution during the year; however, three asylum seekers
whose applications remained under review by the UNHCR were deported to their
country of origin.
Detained illegal immigrants found near the country’s eastern border areas
were more likely to be questioned about their asylum status and referred for
processing than those caught while transiting or attempting to leave the
country. Even along the eastern border, however, access to the national
procedure for temporary asylum was hindered by the lack of reception
facilities for groups of interdicted migrants, potentially including asylum
seekers, and interpreters to assist security officials.
The UNHCR experienced difficulty gaining access to some persons who
expressed a wish to seek asylum while in detention and facing deportation.
According to the UNHCR, the Government deported 23 persons in this situation
during the year, in most cases to their country of origin, without giving
the UNHCR an opportunity to assess their possible need for international
protection.
Regulations require asylum seekers to apply within 10 days of arrival and
submit proof of identity in order to register for temporary asylum. An
appeal can be lodged within 15 days of a decision by authorities not to
receive an asylum claim; after the appeal procedure, rejected applicants are
issued a deportation order that can be implemented after 15 days. According
to the UNHCR, the Government demonstrated greater flexibility than in past
years in applying these regulations; however, asylum seekers arriving in the
country after transiting through one or more other countries continued to
face difficulties in lodging an application. As a result, some of the
refugees and asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR were unable to
register with the Government or otherwise legalize their status in the
country.
The Government provided free medical care to non-Europeans recognized as
refugees by the UNHCR, pending efforts to resettle them abroad. Local
authorities also extended support to non-European refugees in some cases.
The UNHCR remained the main source of support to refugees, working with the
Government and civil society organizations.
Section 3
Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change their
Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens generally exercised this right in practice through
periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage;
however, the Government restricted the activities of some political parties
and leaders.
The 2002 parliamentary elections were held under election laws that the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) found established
a framework for democratic elections in line with international standards;
however, the OSCE mission noted that several parties–notably the AKP, the
winner of the elections–faced action aimed at closing them down, and many
candidates were also prohibited from running. The mission reported that,
while there were a substantial number of cases of harassment reported by
some political parties and by human rights groups, the situation had
improved markedly compared with previous elections.
Political parties and candidates could freely propose themselves and be
freely nominated by various elements in the country; however, the High Court
of Appeals Chief Prosecutor could seek to close political parties for
unconstitutional activities by bringing a case before the Constitutional
Court.
There were no new developments during the year in the legal case seeking the
closure of the pro-Kurdish DEHAP on charges of separatism.
In February, the Constitutional Court ordered the Felicity Party to stop
using the abbreviation “SP,” which was the abbreviation used by the banned
Socialist Party.
In July, the High Court of Appeals overturned the April conviction of Leyla
Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan, and Selim Sadak, former members of
Parliament from the Democracy Party. An Ankara SSC had convicted the four
defendants in their retrial on charges of being members of, or supporting,
the PKK. The Court of Appeals ruled that the SSC had failed to conform to
recent legal reforms in its conduct of the retrial. The Court of Appeals’
reasons for overturning the verdict included the SSC’s rejection without
explanation of a defense request for the replacement of the chief judge, the
use of statements and testimony by the prosecution that were not read in
court, the SSC’s refusal to permit some defense witnesses to testify, and
the failure to have audio and video recordings used as evidence transcribed
by impartial parties. In June, the Court of Appeals ordered the release of
the defendants. As a result of the Court of Appeals ruling, a heavy penal
court in October began a new trial for the defendants.
In October, a Bursa court sentenced Genc Party leader Cem Uzan to 8 months
in prison for insulting the Government (see Section 2.a.).
During the year, police raided dozens of DEHAP offices, particularly in the
southeast, and detained hundreds of DEHAP officials and members. Jandarma
and police regularly harassed DEHAP members, through verbal threats,
arbitrary arrests at rallies, and detention at checkpoints. Security forces
also regularly harassed villagers they believed were sympathetic to DEHAP.
Although security forces released most detainees within a short period, many
faced trials, usually for supporting an illegal organization, inciting
separatism, or for violations of the law. In January, an Erzurum prosecutor
opened a case against DEHAP Chairman Tuncer Bakirhan on charges relating to
a 2002 speech. A court convicted Bakirhan and sentenced him to 1 year in
prison, but postponed the sentence. In February, the High Court of Appeals
upheld the conviction of DEHAP Party Assembly member Abdulkerim Bingol on
charges relating to a 2003 speech. Bingol began serving his 18-month prison
sentence in April. In April, DEHAP official Giyasettin Torun claimed that
Istanbul police kidnapped him, blindfolded him, and subjected him to threats
and beatings for several hours before releasing him without charge. In June,
a prosecutor in Van indicted local DEHAP Chairman Hasan Ozgunes, HRA
official Zuleyha Cinarli, and 11 others on terrorism charges stemming from
their participation in a press conference on the Kurdish problem and the
prison conditions of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. A court acquitted
them in August. In December, a Bursa prosecutor opened a case against eight
DEHAP members, including Murat Avci, head of the party branch in Bursa, in
connection with slogans allegedly shouted at a DEHAP event in June.
Corruption was a problem. Former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz and former
State Minister Gunes Taner were charged with corruption during the year and
were scheduled to be tried in 2005. Other former high-level officials faced
trial for allegedly abusing their authorities. Several retired military
officers were also charged with corruption, including former Naval Forces
Commander Ilhami Erdil, former NSC Secretary General Tuncer Kilinc, and
former Jandarma Commander Sener Eruygur. Prosecutors dropped the charges
against Kilinc because the statute of limitations had expired; legal
proceedings against the other former officers continued at year’s end.
Opposition party members criticized the ruling AKP for refusing to lift the
immunity of AKP parliamentarians suspected of corruption and other abuses.
In October 2003, the Government adopted the Freedom of Information Law,
under which citizens could apply to government institutions for information.
The HRF maintained that the law gives the Government broad leeway to reject
applications on national security and other grounds; HRF requests for
information during the year were denied, and there was no opportunity to
appeal. The Press Council reported that it received no complaints during the
year from journalists making applications under the law.
There were 24 women in the 550-seat Parliament. There was 1 female minister
in the 24-member Cabinet. There were no female governors but approximately
20 female subgovernors. Following the March local elections, there were 25
women among the 3,209 mayors in the country.
Some minority groups were active in political affairs. Many members of
Parliament and senior government officials were Kurds.
Section 4
Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated in many
regions, but faced government obstruction and restrictive laws regarding
their operations, particularly in the southeast. The Government met with
domestic NGOs (which it defined broadly to include business organizations
and labor unions), responded to their inquiries, and sometimes took action
in response to their recommendations.
The HRA had 34 branches nationwide and claimed a membership of approximately
14,000. The HRF, established by the HRA, operated torture rehabilitation
centers in Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, Diyarbakir, and Adana and served as a
clearinghouse for human rights information. Other domestic NGOs included the
Istanbul based Helsinki Citizens Assembly, the Ankara-based Turkish
Democracy Foundation, the Turkish Medical Association, human rights centers
at a number of universities, and Mazlum Der.
Human rights organizations and monitors, as well as lawyers and doctors
involved in documenting human rights violations, continued to face
detention, prosecution, intimidation, harassment, and formal closure orders
for their legitimate activities. For example, the HRA reported that
prosecutors opened 98 court cases and investigations against the
organization between October 2003 and August, and 58 cases remained ongoing
at year’s end.
In March, prosecutors dropped a case against the members of the HRF
Executive Board on charges of translating HRF reports into English and
distributing them without permission, soliciting donations on the Internet,
and encouraging protestors to engage in hunger strikes by providing
treatment to ill strikers. If convicted, the board members would have been
forced to resign.
There were no developments in the Government’s investigation of the HRA
headquarters and Ankara branch office. The investigation was opened
following the May 2003 police raid of the facilities.
Amnesty International maintained a headquarters in Istanbul and reported
good cooperation with the Government during the year. The Government also
cooperated with international governmental organizations such as the CPT,
UNHCR, and the International Organization for Migration. In October, the
Government permitted the visit of and met with the U.N. Special
Representative for Human Rights Defenders.
In October, the Interior Ministry issued a circular directing local
authorities to comply with U.N. and EU guidelines for protecting the rights
of human rights defenders.
Representatives of diplomatic missions who wished to observe human rights
developments were free to speak with private citizens, groups, and
government officials. However, security officials routinely placed such
official visitors in the southeast under visible surveillance. Visiting
foreign government officials and legislators were able to meet with human
rights observers. There were no public reports that the Government denied
permission for foreign officials to make such visits; however, police
reportedly harassed and intimidated some human rights activists in the
southeast after they met with foreign diplomats.
There were government-sponsored human rights councils in all 81 provinces
and 850 subprovinces to serve as a forum for human rights consultations
among NGOs, professional organizations, and the Government. The councils
investigated complaints and, when deemed appropriate, referred them to the
prosecutor’s office. However, some councils failed to hold regular meetings
or effectively fulfill their duties. Human rights NGOs generally refused to
participate on the councils, maintaining that they lacked authority and were
not independent, in part because unelected governors and subgovernors served
as chairmen.
A Human Rights Presidency monitored the implementation of legislation
relating to human rights, coordinated with NGOs, and educated public
officials. The Presidency was attached to the Prime Ministry; it did not
have a separate budget, and its resources were limited. Other government
human rights bodies include the High Human Rights Board, an interministerial
committee responsible for making appointments to human rights posts; a Human
Rights Consultation Board, which serves as a forum for the exchange of ideas
between the Government and NGOs; and a Human Rights Investigative Board, a
special body to be convened only in cases where lower-level investigations
are deemed insufficient by the Human Rights Presidency. The Human Rights
Investigative Board has never been convened.
The parliamentary Human Rights Committee, which has a mandate to oversee
compliance with the human rights provisions of domestic law and
international agreements, investigated alleged abuses, prepared reports, and
carried out detention center inspections.
Section 5
Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The Constitution regards all citizens as equal and prohibits discrimination
on ethnic or racial grounds; however, societal and official violence and
discrimination against women and minorities remained problems.
In May, Parliament amended the Constitution to specify that men and women
have equal rights and that it is the duty of the State to ensure that this
protection is put into practice. Before the amendment, the Constitution only
stated broadly that all individuals were equal before the law.
Women
Violence against women remained a chronic problem, and spousal abuse was
serious and widespread. The law prohibits spousal abuse; however, complaints
of beatings, threats, economic pressure, and sexual violence continued.
Beating in the home was one of the most frequent forms of violence against
women. A March 2003 study by Istanbul Bilgi University of married or
divorced women in 25 provinces found that 31.5 percent of the women were
beaten by their husbands; 21.5 percent were beaten by their fathers before
marriage; and 41 percent had entered into arranged marriages. While
approximately 35 percent of the group said they would file a complaint if
their husbands beat them, a 2003 study by Hacettepe University found that 39
percent of women believed husbands were justified in beating their wives
under certain circumstances. Citizens of either sex could file civil or
criminal charges for abuse but rarely did so. Spousal abuse was considered
an extremely private matter involving societal notions of family honor, and
few women went to the police in practice. Police were reluctant to intervene
in domestic disputes and frequently advised women to return to their
husbands.
The law provides that victims of spousal violence may apply directly to a
judge for assistance and authorizes judges to warn abusive spouses and order
them to stay away from the household for 6 months. Judges may order further
punishments for those who violate such orders. According to women’s rights
advocates, authorities enforced the law effectively, although outside of
major urban areas few spouses sought assistance under the law.
The law prohibits rape, including spousal rape; however, laws and ingrained
societal notions made it difficult to prosecute sexual assault or rape
cases. Women’s rights advocates believed cases of rape were underreported.
In September, Parliament adopted a new Penal Code that considers rape a
crime against the individual, rather than a crime against society. The Code
eliminates several rape-related laws that women’s rights advocates
criticized as discriminatory, including a measure that allowed rapists to
escape punishment by marrying their victims and another that linked
punishment for rape to the victim’s marital status or virginity.
Women’s rights advocates reported there were eight government operated guest
houses and three municipal shelters that provided services to battered
women. The Social Services and Child Protection Institution operated 53
family centers, and a number of NGOs operated community centers. Bar
associations in more than 30 provinces provided legal services for women. In
July, Parliament adopted a law requiring municipalities with populations of
over 50,000 to provide shelters for women and children.
Honor killings–the killing by immediate family members of women suspected
of being unchaste–continued in rural areas and among new immigrants to
cities. Women’s advocacy groups reported that there were dozens of such
killings every year, mainly in conservative Kurdish families in the
southeast or among migrants from the southeast living in large cities. In
September, Parliament adopted a law under which murders committed with a
motive related to “moral killing” are considered aggravated homicides,
requiring a life sentence. The law is designed to discourage the practice of
issuing reduced sentences in honor killing cases; however, some human rights
advocates argued that the wording of the law is not explicit enough to
prevent judges from viewing the honor killing tradition as a mitigating
factor for sentencing.
Because of sentence reductions for juvenile offenders, observers noted that
young male relatives often were designated to perform the killing.
In April, 14-year-old Nuran Halitogullari was killed by her father and
brother in Istanbul. According to press reports, a 32-member family council
had ordered her killing to “clean the family honor” after she was kidnapped
and raped earlier in the year. Prosecutors opened a case against the father,
whose trial continued at year’s end.
In February, 22-year-old Guldunya Toren was killed by two of her brothers in
an Istanbul hospital. According to press reports, a family member raped and
impregnated Toren in 2003. Toren fled Bitlis, in the southeast, for
Istanbul, where she gave birth. Two of her brothers later tracked her down
and shot her. She survived and was taken to a hospital, where her brothers
shot and killed her in front of witnesses. Prosecutors opened a case against
several family members; trial proceedings continued at year’s end.
Trial proceedings continued in the case of Semse Allak, who was killed by
relatives in Mardin Province in 2003 for becoming pregnant out of wedlock.
Trial proceedings also continued in the case of Kadriye Demirel, who was
killed by her 16-year-old brother in Diyarbakir in 2003 for becoming
pregnant out of wedlock.
In March, a Sanliurfa court sentenced the brother of 14-year-old Emine
Kizilkurt to life imprisonment for murdering her in 2002 because a neighbor
had raped her; the court sentenced 8 other family members to 17 years in
prison for approving the killing. The case was under appeal at year’s end.
Human rights organizations continued to report a high rate of suicide among
girls, particularly in the southeast and east. Observers said forced
marriages and economic problems contributed to the suicides.
Prostitution was legal; however, police made numerous arrests involving
foreigners working illegally as prostitutes.
Women continued to face discrimination in employment to varying degrees and
were generally underrepresented in managerial level positions as well as in
government. Women generally received equal pay for equal work in
professional, business, and civil service positions, although a large
percentage of women employed in agriculture and in the trade, restaurant,
and hotel sectors worked as unpaid family labor.
In March, Senol Demiroz, the newly appointed director of the state-owned TRT
broadcasting company, fired 13 female employees from high-level
administrative positions and replaced them with men. Demiroz told a reporter
that a rivalry among female employees at the company had made them
unproductive. Women’s advocacy groups and the women’s auxiliary of the
Republican People’s Party said the move reflected Government opposition to
women in leadership positions in the workplace.
The Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women, under the State
Minister for Women’s and Children’s Affairs, is responsible for promoting
equal rights and raising awareness of discrimination against women. In
October, Parliament adopted legislation that allows the Directorate General
to expand its limited staff.
Independent women’s groups and women’s rights associations existed but have
not significantly increased their numbers or activities, mostly due to
funding problems. There were many women’s committees affiliated with local
bar associations. Other organizations included the Association for
Supporting and Training Women Candidates (Ka-Der), Flying Broom, the Turkish
Women’s Union, the Association for Researching and Examining Women’s Social
Life, and the Foundation for the Evaluation of Women’s Labor. Women
continued to be very active in ongoing debates between secularists and more
religiously oriented persons, particularly with respect to the right to
choose whether to wear religious head coverings in public places, such as
government offices and universities (see Section 2.c.).
According to Flying Broom, there was a sharp increase during the year in the
level of media attention to women’s issues. The status of women at times
became an issue in the context of the country’s EU candidacy. Flying Broom
prepared 26 1-hour radio programs during the year; the print media also
covered women’s issues more closely than in the past.
Children
The Government was committed to furthering children’s welfare and worked to
expand opportunities in education and health, including a further reduction
in the infant mortality rate. The Minister for Women’s and Children’s
Affairs oversaw implementation of official programs for children. The
Children’s Rights Monitoring and Assessment High Council focused on
children’s rights issues.
Government-provided education through age 14 or the eighth grade is
compulsory. Traditional family values in rural areas placed a greater
emphasis on education for sons than for daughters. According to the Ministry
of Education, 95.7 percent of girls and 100 percent of boys in the country
attended primary school; however, a UNICEF report released during the year
indicated that, in the rural areas of some provinces, over 50 percent of
girls between 7 and 13 and over 60 percent of girls between 11 and 15 did
not attend school.
Gaps in social security and health insurance programs left approximately 20
percent of families and their children without coverage. Persons not covered
by insurance may use a special program to access public health care.
Immunization rates in some eastern and southeastern provinces lagged behind
the rest of the country. According to UNICEF, the infant mortality rate
dropped to 29 per 1,000 in 2003.
Child abuse was a problem. There were a significant number of honor killings
of girls by immediate family members, sometimes by juvenile male relatives
(see Section 5, Women).
In September, Parliament eliminated an article of the Penal Code under which
a mother who killed an illegitimate child to protect family honor could
receive a reduced sentence.
Child labor was a problem (see Section 6.d.).
Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, there were numerous
confirmed cases of trafficking of women and children to and within the
country for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor.
The law provides penalties for trafficking ranging from 8 to 12 years in
prison and, at judicial discretion, an additional penalty of up to 10,000
days (approximately 27.4 years) in prison.
As of November, the Government reported that prosecutors opened 12 cases
against alleged traffickers. Two cases resulted in seven convictions;
several other cases were ongoing at year’s end. In February, a Yalova court
convicted four of five defendants on trafficking charges and sentenced them
to 50 month prison terms and fines of $976 (1.3 billion lira). In May, a
Fethiye court convicted three defendants on trafficking charges and
sentenced them to 58-month prison terms and fines of $716 (966 million
lira).
In August, September, and October, police raided villages near the southern
city of Adana, freeing more than 20 victims from forced labor camps. Many of
the victims were orphaned minors or infirmed elderly with mental and
physical disabilities that prevented them from escaping. Police detained 11
patrons in the raids but later released them when the victims settled out of
court for compensation. Child protective services returned juvenile victims
to family members. Jandarma forces remanded elderly victims to state shelter
facilities if family could not be located.
In typical scenarios, victims were falsely led to believe that payment for
agricultural work (for male victims) and sex work (for female victims) was
forthcoming. Most victims reportedly lacked the capacity to understand the
terms of the agreements presented to them by their traffickers or to seek
redress when payment was continuously delayed.
Ambassador Murat Ersavci of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the National
Coordinator for the Government’s Task Force on Human Trafficking, which is
composed of representatives from the Ministries of Health, Interior,
Justice, and Labor, plus the Directorate General for Social Services and
Child Protection, the Directorate General on the Status and Problems of
Women, and scholars from Marmara University.
The Government participates in antitrafficking initiatives through the OSCE,
the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Council of Europe,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Center for
Migration Policy Development, Interpol, Europol, and the Stability Pact Task
Force on Trafficking in Human Beings. During the year, the Government
expanded bilateral and multilateral protocols with neighboring countries and
regional groups to include antitrafficking law enforcement agreements. The
Government’s effectiveness in assisting other countries in combating
trafficking varied. Counterparts in source countries reported that, in many
instances, Turkish law enforcement agencies refused to share intelligence,
evidence, and other critical trafficking case information. For example, a
February survey conducted through the National Bureau of Interpol in Ukraine
of 32 local law enforcement officers from 8 Ukrainian cities found that
nearly half of the Ukrainian officers polled asserted Turkish authorities
did not respond to repeated requests for information critical to their
investigations. In the remaining cases, local and national Turkish law
enforcement agencies reportedly failed to reply by legal deadlines. Typical
requests involved details about the location of brothels where victims were
exploited, the names of traffickers and their accomplices, the names of
Ukrainian trafficking victims awaiting repatriation from the country, and
statements from witnesses who were either citizens or residents of the
country.
In May, TNP officers raided the Flash Hotel in Istanbul, arresting a group
of traffickers and recovering evidence that led to the arrests of the
syndicate’s operators in Romania. TNP officers shared photos, financial
records, and customer logbooks with Romanian police officials, who acted on
the leads.
In June, the country joined 12 other member countries from the SECI Regional
Center for Combating Transborder Crime to conduct a sweep of regional sex
trafficking networks. Internationally, more than 1,000 police officers
reportedly coopeated to identify 594 victims and 545 traffickers. Teams from
the country were involved in at least five of the arrests.
In July, the Government assisted visiting federal police officers from a
destination country in their efforts to investigate possible trafficking
crimes and to obtain testimony against organizers of a migrant smuggling
network. The visiting officers complained of rigid bureaucratic hurdles that
hampered the speed of the investigation, but agreed that Turkish authorities
assisted in the investigation.
The country was a destination and transit point for human trafficking. Most
trafficking activity within the country, including for forced labor,
occurred in Antalya, Istanbul, Izmir, and Trabzon. Trafficking syndicates
also used the country as a transit country to supply the sex trade in
Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the former Yugoslavia, and Western
Europe. The Government placed the number of trafficking victims during the
year at more than 200; however, the Government did not have a reliable
system for victim identification. Various NGOs operating in the country and
in neighboring source countries estimated the number of trafficking victims
to be closer to 1,500. NGOs in Moldova reported assisting more than 105
Moldovan trafficking victims. While reliable data was not available, NGOs in
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan reported cases
totaling well over the Government’s estimate.
Some victims reportedly arrived in the country knowing that they would work
illegally in the sex industry; however, most arrived believing they would
work as models, waitresses, dancers, domestic servants, or in other regular
employment. Victims additionally reported the use of fraudulent documents,
sham marriages, and falsified work contracts. Traffickers typically
confiscated victims’ documents and confined them, then raped and beat them,
intimidated them by threatening their families, and forced them into
prostitution. In May, police took testimony from a 17-year-old Romanian
victim who described a common trafficking scenario. The victim reported that
when she was in ninth grade she came in contact with traffickers who
promised her a job with good wages in Istanbul as a baby sitter or
housekeeper. In October 2003, traffickers brought her to Istanbul by bus
with other Romanian girls and put her up in a hotel. Her captors destroyed
her passport and other identification documents, gave her false documents,
and threatened to kill her if she spoke to police. She was forced to have
intercourse with approximately 200 persons over an 8-month period.
Foreign victims trafficked to the country were typically recruited by small
networks of foreign nationals and Turkish citizens who relied on referrals
and recruitment from friends and family members in the source country. Such
groups could be as small as four or five persons. Trafficking networks
operating as tourist agencies or service firms in source countries brought
women to the country with official work permits. Most reports indicated that
profits were channeled into expanding the network’s capacity and affluence,
by adding computers, automobiles, and amenities for traffickers.
Networks tended to deposit proceeds in source country bank accounts, usually
through Turkish banking system transfers. Turkish Jandarma and officials at
the Interior Ministry maintained that trafficking in humans, arms, and
narcotics was closely connected.
Young women seeking employment, particularly from Moldova, Ukraine, Romania
and Russia, were at the greatest risk of being trafficked to the country.
There were allegations that police corruption at all levels contributed to
the trafficking problem and may have been responsible for the delays in
implementation of certain cooperative agreements, antitrafficking
operations, and other law enforcement measures.
During the year, the Ministry of Justice continued to investigate
allegations of further police misconduct in Erzurum following the 2003
conviction of police officers for trafficking.
In Istanbul, police confiscated a notebook in which traffickers required
victims to record customers’ names and personal information. News media
reported that the notebook included the names of police officers and
government officials.
In October, a shelter operated by the Municipality of Istanbul and the Human
Resource Development Foundation, an NGO, began accepting victims. The
facility was the first shelter for trafficking victims in the country; more
than 20 victims received health care as well as psychological and legal
assistance at the shelter during the year. While the 12-bed shelter remained
filled to capacity, the Government continued to shelter trafficking victims
in other locations on a case-by-case basis, using police safe houses,
shelters for elderly citizens and abused women, and hotels. Some local law
enforcement officers reportedly found accommodation for victims at their
personal expense.
Through the Health and Justice Ministries, the Government also implemented
programs to provide free medical and legal services to foreign victims who
chose to remain in the country. During the year, the Government amended its
humanitarian visa regulations to allow victims to remain in the country for
a maximum of 6 months. During their stay, victims are entitled to medical
and social services and are allowed to engage in regular work in the
economy. During the year, the Government issued 26 such humanitarian visas.
The Government did not have a repatriation program for victims, although
authorities repatriated some on a case by case basis.
There were credible reports that the Government continued its practice of
processing trafficking cases as cases of voluntary prostitution and illegal
migration, failing to pursue traffickers under available laws and summarily
deporting victims, who were often subjected to retrafficking.
Traffickers reportedly used a network of contacts to identify and intercept
deported victims at the port of departure, arrival, and in transit.
The Security Directorate published and distributed widely a comprehensive
guidebook on trafficking-related issues for law enforcement officers. The
guidebook was reportedly incorporated into police and Jandarma academy
training seminars for new officers.
To deter trafficking, the Government amended the law to require a
provisional period of 3 years before a foreign applicant may obtain
citizenship based on a marriage petition. The Ministry of Tourism further
established and implemented a questionnaire, in various languages, designed
to identify potential victims through the visa application process. The
Government also reported that warnings on visa applications now printed in
Russian direct potential victims to an emergency law enforcement hotline.
Persons with Disabilities
There was no discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment,
education, access to health care, or in the provision of other state
services, although they did suffer from a lack of economic opportunity. The
law does not mandate access to buildings and public transportation for
persons with disabilities. Persons with disabilities have some privileges,
such as the right to purchase products of State economic enterprises at a
discount or acquire them at no cost.
The Administration of Disabilities Office under the Prime Ministry has a
mandate to develop cooperation and coordination among national and
international institutions and to conduct research into issues such as
delivery of services to persons with disabilities. Companies with more than
50 employees were required to hire persons with disabilities as 2 percent of
their employee pool, although the requirement was not consistently enforced.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Constitution provides a single nationality designation for all Turks and
does not recognize ethnic groups as national, racial, or ethnic minorities.
Citizens of Kurdish origin constituted a large ethnic and linguistic group.
Millions of the country’s citizens identified themselves as Kurds and spoke
Kurdish. Kurds who publicly or politically asserted their Kurdish identity
or publicly espoused using Kurdish in the public domain risked censure,
harassment, or prosecution.
While there were some improvements during the year, the Government
maintained significant restrictions on the use of Kurdish and other ethnic
minority languages in radio and television broadcasts and in publications
(see Section 2.a.).
During the year, the HRF recorded fewer complaints that authorities
prevented parents from registering their children under traditional Kurdish
names.
During the year, private Kurdish language instruction courses were opened in
Istanbul and six southeastern cities (Van, Batman, Sanliurfa, Diyarbakir,
Kiziltepe, and Adana) pursuant to legislation adopted in 2002. According to
observers, officials had delayed the courses by raising bureaucratic
obstacles. For example, authorities in Batman required the school to expand
classroom doorframes by 5 centimeters, while authorities in Sanliurfa
required the school to install a fire escape for its two-story building,
even though many taller buildings in the area did not have fire escapes.
Kurdish rights advocates said students enrolling in the courses were
required to provide extensive application documents, including police
records, that were not required for other courses. They maintained that the
requirements intimidated prospective applicants, who feared police were
keeping records on students taking the courses.
No official estimate of the Romani population existed, but the population
may be significant in regions near Bulgaria and Greece, and Roma were found
in many cities throughout Anatolia. Human rights observers said many Roma
did not disclose their ethnic identity for fear of discrimination. The law
states that “nomadic Gypsies” are among the four categories of people not
admissible as immigrants.
In February, the Hurriyet newspaper’s publication of a report that Sabiha
Gokcen–an adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who was the country’s
first female pilot–was of Armenian descent drew a number of racist public
statements. The Turkish General Staff issued a statement criticizing the
reports on Gokcen’s Armenian ancestry as “a claim that abuses national
values and feelings” while the Turkish Air Association called the report “an
insult” to Gokcen and to Ataturk.
Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination
While the law does not explicitly discriminate against homosexuals,
representatives of the gay and lesbian rights organizations Lambda Istanbul
and Kaos GL claimed that vague references in the law relating to “the morals
of society” and “unnatural sexual behavior” were sometimes used to punish
homosexuality. Gay and lesbian rights activists maintained that homosexuals
risked losing their jobs if they disclosed their sexual orientation and said
the law did not protect their rights in such circumstances. In July, Kaos GL
reported that unknown persons smashed two windows at the organization’s
Ankara center.
Section 6
Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides workers, except police and military personnel, the
right to associate freely and to form representative unions, and they
generally did so in practice. However, the Government maintained some
limited restrictions on the right of association. Unions were required to
obtain official permission to hold meetings or rallies and to allow
government representatives to attend their conventions and record the
proceedings; however, these requirements were not always enforced.
Prosecutors could ask labor courts to order a trade union or confederation
to suspend its activities or to go into liquidation for serious infractions
based on alleged violation of specific legal norms; however, the Government
could not dissolve a union summarily. Approximately 1.6 million of the 11 to
12 million wage and salary earners were unionized. The labor force numbered
approximately 24 million, with approximately 35 percent employed in
agriculture.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination; however, such discrimination
occurred occasionally in practice. Union representatives claimed that
employers sometimes layed off workers because they had joined a union, using
alleged incompetence or economic crises as a pretext.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law allows unions to conduct their activities without interference, and
the Government protected this right in practice. Industrial workers and
civil servants have the right to bargain collectively, and approximately 1.3
million workers, or 5.4 percent of the workforce, were under collective
contracts. The law requires that, in order to become a bargaining agent, a
union must represent 50 percent plus one of the employees at a given work
site and 10 percent of all the workers in that particular industry. This
requirement favored established unions, particularly those affiliated with
Turk-Is, the confederation that represented approximately 80 percent of
organized labor. In June, the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions reported that the law resulted in workers in many sectors not being
covered by collective agreement.
The law prohibits strikes by civil servants, public workers engaged in the
protection of life and property, the mining and petroleum industries,
sanitation services, national defense, and education; however, many workers
conducted strikes in violation of these restrictions with general impunity.
The majority of strikes during the year were illegal; while some illegal
strikers were dismissed, in most cases employers did not retaliate.
The law requires a union to take a series of steps, including collective
bargaining and nonbinding mediation, before calling a strike; a union that
fails to comply with these steps forfeits its right to strike. The law
prohibits unions from engaging in secondary (solidarity), political, or
general strikes or in work slowdowns. In sectors in which strikes are
prohibited, labor disputes are resolved through binding arbitration.
The law allows the Government to suspend strikes for 60 days on national
security or public health and safety grounds. Unions may petition the
Council of State to lift such a suspension. If an appeal fails, and the
parties and mediators fail to resolve the dispute, a strike is subject to
compulsory arbitration at the end of the 60-day period. During the year, the
Government suspended a strike by the glass industry union Kristal-Is on
national security grounds.
There are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws in the
country’s 21 free trade and export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution and law prohibit forced or compulsory labor, including by
children; however, there were reports that such practices occurred. Some
parents forced their children to work on the streets and to beg (see Section
6.d.).
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
The law prohibits the employment of children younger than 15 and prohibits
children under 16 from working more than 8 hours a day. At 15, children may
engage in light work provided they remain in school. The Constitution
provides that no person shall be required to perform work unsuitable for
their age, gender, or capabilities, and the Government prohibited children
from working at night or in areas such as underground mining. The law
prohibits children attending school from working more than 2 hours per day
or 10 hours per week.
Child labor was widespread. The State Statistical Institute reported that
the number of child laborers between the ages of 12 and 17 dropped from
948,000 in 2003 to 764,000 during the year; however, some observers claimed
that the actual number of working children was rising. An informal system
provided work for young boys at low wages, for example, in auto repair
shops. Girls rarely were seen working in public, but many were kept out of
school to work in handicrafts, particularly in rural areas. According to the
Labor Ministry, 65 percent of child labor occurred in the agricultural
sector. However, some observers maintained that the bulk of child labor had
shifted to urban areas as rural families migrated to cities. Many children
worked in areas not covered by labor laws, such as agricultural workplaces
with fewer than 50 workers or the informal economy. According to the Labor
Ministry, the Government allocated $15 million (20.3 trillion lira) for
programs to eliminate child labor during the year.
Small enterprises preferred child labor because it was cheaper and provided
practical training for the children, who subsequently had preference for
future employment in the enterprise. If children employed in these
businesses were registered with a Ministry of National Education Training
Center, they were required to go to the center once a week for training, and
the centers were obliged by law to inspect their workplaces. There were 346
centers located in 81 cities; these centers provided apprenticeship training
in 113 occupations. The Government identified the worst forms of child labor
as children working in the streets, in industrial sectors where their health
and safety were at risk, and as agricultural migrant workers. In December
2003, the Government completed its report on the worst forms of child labor
and identified 18 provinces where the problem was most serious.
The Ministry of Labor effectively enforced these restrictions in workplaces
that were covered by the labor law, which included medium and large-scale
industrial and service sector enterprises. A number of sectors were not
covered by the law, including small-scale agricultural enterprises, maritime
and air transportation, family handicraft businesses, and small shops.
In June and April, the Labor Ministry issued regulations on child employment
that identified specific jobs that could threaten the physical or mental
well-being of children.
There were no reliable statistics for the number of children working on the
streets nationwide. The Government operated 28 centers to assist such
children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Minimum Wage Commission, a tripartite government-industry-union body
that reviews the minimum wage every 6 months, set the minimum monthly wage
for the second half of the year at $328 (444 million lira). The minimum wage
did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family;
however, most workers earned considerably more than the minimum wage.
Approximately one-third of the labor force was covered by the labor law and
received fringe benefits that, according to the Turkish Employers’
Association, accounted for approximately 63 percent of total compensation.
The law establishes a 45-hour workweek and a weekly rest day, and limits
overtime to 3 hours per day for up to 90 days a year. The Labor Inspectorate
of the Ministry of Labor effectively enforced wage and hour provisions in
the unionized industrial, service, and government sectors, which covered
approximately 12 percent of workers.
The law mandates occupational health and safety regulations; however, in
practice the Government did not carry out effective inspection and
enforcement programs. The law allows for the shutdown of an operation if a
five-person committee, which included safety inspectors, employee, and
employer representatives, determined that the operation endangered workers’
lives. In practice, financial constraints, limited safety awareness,
carelessness, and fatalistic attitudes resulted in scant attention to
occupational safety and health by workers and employers alike. The law
allows workers to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without
risking loss of employment, and they did so in practice.

–Boundary_(ID_K3bHUvvssmk44Lp88GmW0Q)–

Georgia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004

U.S. Department of State
Georgia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 28, 2005

Georgia is a republic with a Constitution that provides for a strong
executive branch that reports to the president. The president appoints
ministers with the consent of Parliament. Parliamentary elections held in
November 2003 were marred by serious irregularities, resulting in mass
street protests. In November 23, 2003, President Shevardnadze resigned as
president, culminating what became known around the world as the Rose
Revolution. New presidential elections were held on January 4, and
opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili won by over 90 percent. New
parliamentary elections were held in March, and Saakashvili’s National
Movement won the majority of seats. A civil war and separatist wars in the
early 1990s ended central government authority in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
and weakened central authority in the autonomous region of Ajara and
elsewhere in the country. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, the judiciary was subject to executive pressure and
corruption.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the Ministry of State Security
(MSS), which were combined in December to become the new Ministry of Police
and Public Order, have primary responsibility for law enforcement along with
the Prosecutor General’s Office. In times of internal disorder, the
Government may call on the Ministry of Police and Public Order or the
military. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control
of the security forces, there were some instances in which elements of the
security forces acted independently of government authority. Some members of
the security forces committed a number of serious human rights abuses.
The country, with a population of approximately 4.4 million, had a
market-based economy with a large agricultural sector. The gross domestic
product growth during the year was 8.4 percent. Wages did not keep pace with
inflation. Although corruption impacted the economy, the Government took
steps to address it during the year. Pensions and state salaries were paid
on time and arrears began to be retired for the first time in several years,
as a result of economic reform and anticorruption programs.
The Government’s human rights record remained poor; although there were
improvements in some areas, serious problems remained. Nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) blamed two deaths in custody on physical abuse. NGOs
reported that police brutality continued, and in certain areas increased.
Law enforcement officers continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse
detainees. Corruption in law enforcement agencies decreased, but remained a
problem. Arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems, as did lack of
accountability. The judiciary system continued to lack true independence,
and the executive branch and prosecutors’ offices continued to exert undue
influence on judges. There were lengthy delays in trials, and prolonged
pretrial detention remained a problem.
Law enforcement agencies and other government bodies occasionally interfered
with citizens’ right to privacy. The press generally was free; however,
journalists practiced increased self-censorship. In the beginning of the
year, security forces violently dispersed several peaceful rallies and
placed participants in pretrial detention. While violence against religious
minorities decreased, Government officials continued to tolerate
discrimination and harassment against some religious minorities. Violence
against women was a problem. Trafficking for the purpose of forced labor and
sexual exploitation was a problem.
International observers determined that the January presidential elections
and the March parliamentary elections represented significant progress over
previous elections and brought the country closer to meeting international
standards, although several irregularities were noted. In contrast to
previous years, there were fewer reports of harassment or violence against
religious minorities. Police bribery of motorists also decreased
significantly due to an overhaul of the highway police and elimination of
the traditional traffic police.
Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained unresolved.
Ceasefires were in effect in both areas, although sporadic incidents of
violence occurred in Ossetia. These conflicts and the problems associated
with approximately 230,000 IDPs from Abkhazia, 12,200 from South Ossetia,
and 2,600 refugees from Chechnya posed a continued threat to national
stability.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1
Respect for the Integrity of the Person
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
There were no reports of political killings; however, law enforcement
officers’ abuses officially contributed to one death. NGOs blamed another
death in custody, a suicide, on physical and psychological pressure.
On May 23, Khvicha Kvirikashvili died shortly after being taken home by
police officers following questioning in the police station of
Gldani-Nadzaladevi district in Tbilisi concerning a May 22 burglary. The
Prosecutor General opened an investigation into Kvirikashvili’s death and
found evidence that he was beaten while in the police station. In June,
police officer Roland Minadze was sentenced to 3-month pretrial detention in
connection with Kvirikashvili’s death. A criminal case began on September
21. The trial was ongoing at year’s end.
Killings were committed by elements on both sides of the separatist conflict
in South Ossetia. In August, fighting flared up in South Ossetia, and
several civilians and soldiers died on both sides of the conflict. No deaths
were prosecuted or punished. Partisan violence in Abkhazia significantly
decreased during the year. The Government took concrete steps to arrest
militia partisan groups and curtail their activities; most members of the
partisan organization The Forest Brothers have been arrested.
Both government and Abkhaz forces laid tens of thousands of landmines during
the 1992-93 fighting. There was a reduction in landmine casualties to two
during the year due to migration out of the area and to the activities of
landmine clearing organizations such as the Halo Trust.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
Partisan groups active in Abkhazia engaged in criminal activity and
frequently took hostages to exchange for captured compatriots. Partisans in
South Ossetia also were active during the summer in kidnapping, both to
exchange for captured compatriots and for ransom. Kidnapping for ransom
decreased significantly elsewhere in the country. The MIA reported 18 cases
of kidnapping in the first 10 months of the year and stated that
investigations had resulted in charges in 4 of these cases.
At year’s end, the whereabouts of Chechen refugee Adam Talalov, who
disappeared in 2003, remained unknown.
The investigation into the kidnapping and release of three U.N. military
observers in 2003 remained ongoing at year’s end.
Government and Abkhaz commissions on missing persons reported that more than
1,000 Georgians and several hundred Abkhaz remained missing as a result of
the 1992-94 war in Abkhazia (see Section 1.g.). The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) assisted joint official efforts to determine the
location and repatriate the remains of the dead. No repatriations had
occurred by year’s end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, law enforcement officers
continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees,
usually to extract money or confessions, and NGOs alleged the problem
increased since the most recent elections. Serious abuses and police
misconduct, such as the fabrication or planting of evidence, also remained
problems. During the year, there were several cases of police officers
brought to trial, dismissed, or demoted for abuses; however, impunity
remained a problem, particularly in outlying regions (see Section 1.d.).
Human rights advocates reported that while allegations of torture of
convicted criminals decreased, allegations of torture in pretrial detention
facilities and in police departments increased during the year. Reported
torture often included beating, electric shocks, and cigarette burns. During
the year, police increasingly brought suspects to police stations, beat or
tortured them, and released them without officially registering the
suspect’s presence at the station.
The investigation into the allegations that police subjected Irakli
Tushishvili to electric shock in MIA custody remained ongoing. Tushishvili
remained in pretrial custody at year’s end.
The most serious incidents of abuse occurred during pretrial detention when
police interrogated suspects. According to human rights observers, those who
suffered such abuse were held routinely for lengthy periods in pretrial
detention to give their injuries time to heal. Police often claimed that
injuries were sustained during or before arrest. Criminal agents within the
prison population also allegedly committed abuses in pretrial detention
facilities. Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of abused
children in the Isolator detention facility; the facility closed during the
year.
On January 10, police officers detained former Deputy Defense Minister Gia
Vashakidze and his associates Eldar Gogberashvili and Beniamin Saneblidze
under suspicion of involvement in the December 2003 kidnapping of banker
Tamaz Maglakelidze. Police officers took them to a local cemetery where they
beat Gogberashvili and Saneblidze in front of Vashakidze. On January 11,
police brought the three men to the Tbilisi City police station where all
were beaten and Saneblidze received electric shocks. After a January 12 bail
hearing, police officers returned them to the police office, where they
continued to beat them and forced them to sign a confession. Police did not
permit a medical examination requested by Saneblidze’s lawyer until 2 weeks
later. There were signs that officers had broken Saneblidze’s nose and
several of his ribs, administered electric shocks to his head and hands, and
burnt cigarettes into his legs. In May, Vashakidze was released from
detention on bail, after diplomatic intervention on his behalf.
On April 24, Sulkhan Molashvili appeared at the General Prosecutor’s office,
where he was taken into 3-month pretrial detention for abuse of power and
misappropriation of money. Molashvili’s lawyers reported that, in detention,
officers beat him, administered electric shocks, and burnt cigarettes into
his back. A medical examination was not administered. According to the NGO
Human Rights Information and Documentation Center, the Prosecutor General
did not begin an immediate investigation against Molashvili, although in
July, the Prosecutor requested an extension of pretrial detention for
investigation purposes. In July, the General Prosecutor opened an
investigation into Molashvili’s injuries that was ongoing at year’s end.
Criminal proceedings against two police officers for extortion and physical
abuse of 15-year-old D. Asaturov and his family remained pending at year’s
end.
There were no developments in the reported 2002 abuse cases.
During the year, the NGO Liberty Institute documented over 1,000 cases of
torture in pretrial detention, although it noted a significant decrease in
torture in prisons since early November.
During the year, the official number of detainees delivered to pretrial
detention facilities with injuries sustained during temporary detention was
136, an increase of 14 percent. Few of these incidents resulted in
prosecutions.
Government officials acknowledged that, in the past, MIA personnel routinely
beat and abused prisoners and detainees, and the Government took some steps
to address these problems. Government officials cited a lack of proper
training, poor supervision of investigators and guards, and a lack of
equipment as contributing to the continuation of these practices in law
enforcement facilities.
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) was responsible for overall administration of
the prison system; however, the law permits MIA personnel to staff the
facilities. During the year, the MIA and MSS transferred all remaining
prisons under their jurisdiction to the MOJ. Isolator Five, a pretrial
detention facility largely used for political prisoners and known for
abusive practices, no longer held prisoners and was shut down during the
year. The MIA only maintained overnight detention facilities at police
stations. The law permits the MIA to conduct investigations among inmates
without judicial approval to gather evidence for trials.
The MOJ maintained a monitoring board of civil society and NGO
representatives, which had the responsibility of reporting on human rights
abuses in detention facilities. Board members had the right to pay
unannounced visits to any detention facility. At the beginning of the year,
the board was abolished and not reestablished until September. Many NGOs
complained that several previous members of the board who were especially
critical of the new Government were not allowed on the new board. The board
members recommenced monitoring in November.
The U.N., the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and many
NGOs, including Human Rights Watch (HRW), continued to report inhumane and
life threatening prison conditions. Abuse and extortion of prisoners and
detainees by prison staff continued. Prison facilities remained unsanitary,
understaffed, and were in desperate need of repair. Continued overcrowding
was a particularly acute problem. Most prison facilities lacked basic
utilities and sanitary facilities. Regional penitentiaries and pretrial
detention facilities were without electricity for months. Payment of guards
and prison staff became more regular, which allegedly decreased corruption.
A 2002 U.N. Human Rights Commission review cited systemic problems with the
criminal justice and prison systems and continued widespread use of torture
and arbitrary detention by police. The Government had not responded to the
Commission’s recommendations by year’s end.
Attempted suicides and self-mutilation occurred in prisons as protests
against declining prison conditions and human rights violations. There were
also sporadic hunger strikes by prisoners to protest poor conditions,
visitor limitations, and the perceived arbitrary parole policy of the
Government.
In 2003, prisoners Givi Rukhaia and Zaal Chikhladze protested the alleged
false charges through 1 day of self-mutilation. Rukhaia mutilated himself
with nails and Chikhladze sewed his mouth shut. An independent investigation
by the Ombudsman supported the prisoner’s contention that police had
extorted money and gold from Rukhaia. An investigation into the case was
ongoing at year’s end.
The prison mortality rate reportedly improved; however, human rights NGOs
claimed that authorities kept official rates artificially low by releasing
terminally ill prisoners or by sending dying prisoners to the hospital.
Observers claimed deaths of prisoners without families usually went
unreported. During the year, there were 28 registered deaths in prison, 1
attributed to suicide and 1 attributed to a beating by a police officer (See
Section 1.a.); the remaining deaths were attributed to health complications.
According to the ICRC, tuberculosis was widespread in the prison system; in
cooperation with the MOJ, the ICRC treated nearly 2,600 infected prisoners
since 1998.
NGOs reported violence among prisoners decreased during the year.
Men and women were held separately. Juveniles were held separately in a
specially constructed facility; however, juveniles were infrequently
separated from other inmates in MIA temporary detention facilities. Pretrial
detainees were often kept with convicted prisoners due to overcrowding.
The ICRC had full access to detention facilities, including those in
Abkhazia, and was allowed private meetings and regular visits with
detainees. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe reported
bureaucratic delays but no serious problems in obtaining access to prisoners
or detainees; however, local human rights groups reported sporadic
difficulty in visiting detainees, particularly in cases with political
overtones. In March, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General’s
Office was abolished and not reestablished until October. Since November,
the unit enjoyed free access to prisons to monitor conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
Government frequently disregarded these provisions.
The MIA and Prosecutor General’s Office have primary responsibility for law
enforcement. The MIA controls the police, which are divided into functional
departments. A separate, independently funded police protection department
under the MIA provides security and protection to private businesses. Public
confidence in the police increased during the year due to a reduction in
corruption. During the year, police received their salaries more regularly.
Impunity, however, remained a problem. In July, the MIA took steps to reduce
police corruption by firing 13,000 officers, disbanding the corrupt traffic
police force, and replacing them with a new patrol police unit consisting of
newly hired officers with higher salaries. Only individuals under age 37
were allowed to apply for this new Patrol. Since then, the widespread
solicitation of bribes from motorists decreased substantially. In November,
the MIA transferred its armed internal troops to the Ministry of Defense.
The MIA announced its intentions to reorganize the remaining 3,000 lightly
armed internal troops into a Gendarmerie, responsible for keeping public
order. In December, the Government announced the merger of the Ministries of
Interior and State Security into a new Ministry of Police and Public Order.
All redundant departments were combined and the Department of Foreign
Intelligence became a stand-alone agency.
While the new Government prioritized rooting out corruption, its efforts
sometimes infringed on the rule of law. For example, between January and
March, the Government arrested a number of high profile, wealthy figures
close to former President Shevardnadze, charged them with abuse of office or
tax arrears, sentenced them to pretrial detention, and fined them a
predetermined sum, which was reportedly deposited in the State treasury.
Detainees were released without charge if they paid. If the individual
refused to pay, he or she remained in isolated pretrial detention and
experienced intimidation. The Government, in effect, used pretrial detention
as a bargaining tactic to induce payment.
Government officials, including President Saakashvili, also made public
comments that gave the impression they supported police brutality and
increased the atmosphere of impunity among police officers. Saakashvili and
other government officials later held several press conferences to publicly
condemn police brutality.
On February 20, law enforcement agents arrested Gia Jokhtaberidze, majority
shareholder in a large telecommunications company and son-in-law of former
President Shevardnadze. Jokhtaberidze was forcibly removed from a departing
airplane in an arrest widely broadcast throughout the country, and
immediately placed in pretrial detention. Commenting on the arrest,
President Saakashvili made public statements that violated due process. In
March, in contradiction to the law, Jokhtaberidze was transferred to
Isolator Number Five. Jokhtaberidze’s lawyers claimed he was repeatedly
threatened. The General Prosecutor offered to drop all charges if
Jokhtaberidze paid $15 million (30 million GEL). On April 26, after payment,
Jokhtaberidze was released from detention with all charges dropped.
Government officials, including the President, and media claimed that the
money was a fine; Jokhtaberidze and his company denied the payment was an
admission of wrongdoing.
An ongoing culture of impunity remained a problem. Despite this, some police
officers were arrested or administratively disciplined in high-profile cases
of physical abuse or deaths in custody. The MOJ maintained a system to
provide for medical examinations of prisoners transferred from police
stations to pretrial detention facilities in order to document injuries that
may have occurred in police custody and to establish baseline medical
condition information for each prisoner that could be used in cases of
alleged prison abuse. Injuries consistent with abuse were documented and
reported to the MOJ authorities, who in turn reported them to the MIA for
investigation. The system functioned effectively.
In general, officers were held accountable for abuses only in extreme cases,
and the Criminal Procedures Code limited a detainee’s ability to
substantiate claims of such abuses (see Section 1.e.). During the year, 179
criminal cases against MIA employees were opened by the Prosecutor General’s
Office. All of these cases were pending at year’s end. Many observers
claimed that prosecutors were frequently reluctant to open a criminal case
against police or they closed a case for lack of evidence. Human rights NGOs
also believed that many instances of abuse went unreported by victims due to
fear of reprisals or lack of confidence in the system.
A defendant may file a complaint of abuse only with the Prosecutor General’s
Office, whose decision cannot be appealed. NGOs claimed that this regulation
hindered their ability to substantiate police misconduct because of the
close ties between the Prosecutor General’s Office and the police.
The Criminal Procedure Code provides for the right of a witness to be
accompanied by a lawyer when being questioned by the police. Police can hold
a witness for 48 hours without bringing charges. Police frequently charged
witnesses as suspects at the end of this period. Human rights observers
continued to allege that police often called a detainee’s lawyer as a
witness, thereby denying him access to his client.
Parliament’s Committee on Human Rights and Ethnic Relations investigated
claims of arrest and detention abuse. The Committee’s chairperson reported a
significant decrease in the number of claims filed during the second half of
the year; however, NGOs did not report a decrease in incidents of torture
until November.
Judges issue warrants and detention orders and, by law, suspects must be
charged within 3 days. Judges have six possible preventive measures to
ensure suspects will appear at trial, including bail, pretrial detention,
and house arrest. In practice, 3-month pretrial detention was always
imposed, which may be extended by 3-month intervals up to 9 months. In
practice, suspects were detained in pretrial detention much longer than
legally permitted. The bail system was rarely used due to fear of being
subject to bribery accusations.
NGOs noted that, if a judge rules that an investigation must be renewed, the
9-month pretrial detention limits are also extended. In practice, as judges
lacked real independence from prosecutors, prosecutors could keep suspects
in jail as long as they liked. The Criminal Code states suspects cannot be
held for a combined period of more than 24 months once a trial has
commenced, which can be extended by the judge to 30 months. Judges sometimes
neglected these stipulations.
Police frequently detained persons without warrants and often planted drugs
or weapons in order to arrest individuals. Police frequently did not allow
witnesses during searches in which they “found” drugs or weapons, and then
forced individuals to sign witness statements. According to one NGO,
approximately 80 percent of all detainees in pretrial detention were being
held on charges of drug or illegal weapon possession.
On January 9, police raided the home of Zaza Ambroladze, entering without a
warrant and not allowing witnesses to the search. The police claimed to find
an illegal automatic weapon and placed Ambroladze under 3 months pretrial
detention. This event sparked large street protests that were violently
dispersed (see Section 2.b.). Several months later, the court sentenced
Ambroladze to 2 years’ imprisonment for illegal possession of arms.
Ambroladze’s lawyer’s appealed the ruling to the regional appellate court.
On August 2, police raided the office of independent newspaper Khalkhis
Gazeti. No search warrant was presented and no one was allowed to witness
the search. Police claimed to find drugs and detained the newspaper’s editor
Rezo Okruashvili, a critic of the Government. On August 4, Okruashvili was
sentenced to 3 months pretrial detention. After signing a confession,
Okruashvili was released pending trial. Okruashvili claimed he was beaten
and forced to sign the confession and appealed the charge.
Detainees had difficulty obtaining objective medical examinations in a
timely manner, which made it difficult to establish the cause of injuries.
Only a state employed forensic medical examiner, which in most cases was an
employee of the Ministry of Health’s Judicial Medical Expert Center, could
testify about injuries. Human rights advocates routinely criticized the
state forensic examiners as biased in favor of the Prosecutor General and
stated that permission for an independent forensic medical examination was
rarely granted.
Police often failed to inform detainees of their rights and denied them
access to family members and lawyers. Some observers charged that police
also conducted interrogations in apartments outside police stations to avoid
registering detainees. While suspects officially were charged within 3 days
of registration, observers claimed that police frequently delayed
registering detainees for long periods in order to seek bribes or to allow
time for injuries inflicted by the police to heal. Police reportedly
approached suspects’ families and offered to drop charges in exchange for a
bribe. Correct legal procedures were observed more often when a detainee was
charged and registered formally.
The Criminal Procedure Code grants witnesses the right to legal counsel;
however, this right was only occasionally observed in practice. It was
common police practice to label detained suspects as “witnesses” in order to
deny them access to a lawyer. In January 2003, the Constitutional Court
ruled that 5 changes had to be made to the criminal code, including that
detainees must have the right to a lawyer during the first 12 hours of
detention, and that thereafter, the detainee must have at least 2 hours
daily access to a lawyer. In October, Parliament passed an amendment to the
Criminal Procedural Code allowing suspects access to a lawyer immediately
upon detention. The other points of the Constitutional Court’s ruling have
not been implemented.
The Constitution provides for a 9-month maximum period of pretrial
detention, mandates court approval for detention over 72 hours, and imposes
restrictions on the role of the prosecutor (see Section 1.e.). These
provisions were often overlooked, and prosecutors continued to exert undue
influence over criminal procedures.
The Criminal Procedure Code calls for detainees to be charged within 72
hours. MOJ figures for the year showed that, for the Tbilisi pretrial
detention center, only one detainee was registered in violation of the
72-hour deadline. The most serious incidents of police abuse occurred in the
investigative phase of pretrial detention, when police interrogated suspects
(see Section 1.c.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in
practice, judicial authorities continued to experience pressure from the
executive branch and powerful outside interests. The judiciary did not
exercise full independence, and judicial impartiality was limited. Many NGOs
complained that judicial authorities often acted as a rubber stamp for
prosecutors’ decisions and that the executive branch exerted undue
influence. Investigators often planted or fabricated evidence and extorted
confessions in direct violation of the Constitution. Judges were reluctant
to exclude evidence obtained illegally if the Prosecutor General objected.
Courts continued to convict on the strength of confessions that may have
been extracted under torture. Bribery decreased as salaries for judges
increased.
President Saakashvili and other government officials often made public
statements concerning the guilt of detained suspects in high-profile
corruption cases before a trial had commenced, thus exerting undue influence
on impending court cases, as judges felt pressured to uphold the President’s
“opinions.”
The Council of Justice administered the three-tiered court system. The
Council has 12 members, 4 selected from within each branch of government. To
reduce incompetence and corruption, the law has established a three-part
testing procedure for working and prospective judges administered by the
Council. All judges, including Supreme Court judges, are required to take
Council-administered exams. At the lowest level are district courts, which
hear routine criminal and civil cases. At the next level are regional (city)
courts of appeal, which serve as appellate courts for district courts. The
regional courts also try major criminal and civil cases, review cases, and
either confirm verdicts or return cases to the lower courts for retrial. The
Supreme Court acts as a higher appellate court but is the court of first
instance for capital crimes and appeals from the CEC. Regional managing
judges continued to monitor the performance of lower courts throughout the
country.
A separate Constitutional Court arbitrates disputes between branches of
Government and rules on individual human rights violation claims; it
generally demonstrated judicial independence. The Court interpreted its
function in human rights case narrowly, agreeing to rule only in cases in
which human rights were violated as a result of specific articles of law.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court was significantly weaker than the
Supreme Court, and its rulings were sometimes not enforced.
The Constitution identifies the Prosecutor General’s Office as part of the
judicial system, and there were calls from legislators and others to move
the Office into the executive branch. Court orders were rarely enforced.
According to the Constitution, detainees are presumed innocent and have the
right to a public trial. A detainee has the right to demand immediate access
to a lawyer and the right to refuse to make a statement in the absence of
counsel. Officers must inform detainees of their rights and notify their
families of their location as soon as possible. However, these rights were
not fully observed in practice. Authorities frequently did not permit
detainees to notify their families of their location, and local police
authorities limited lawyers’ access to detainees. Lengthy trial delays were
common. Defense counsel is not required to be present at pretrial hearings,
and defendants and their attorneys regularly complained that they were not
notified of scheduled hearings. The Criminal Procedures Code does not
require the police to allow a lawyer to enter a police station unless hired
by a detainee. Juries were used. Defendants have the right to appeal and to
access evidence.
Attorneys were assigned to defendants unable to afford legal counsel, upon
the recommendation of the prosecutor’s office by the Office of Legal
Assistance, a part of the state-controlled Bar Association. In certain
cases, defendants were pressured or coerced by prosecutors to accept a
state-appointed attorney or other attorneys who did not vigorously defend
their interests. However, in general individuals who could afford to pay
were able to obtain the attorney of their choice in both criminal and civil
cases. The prosecutor’s office not only had control over state-appointed
lawyers it also determined whether to grant a defendant’s request to change
lawyers. Several NGOs provided free legal services in Tbilisi for victims of
human rights violations.
Prosecutors continued to direct investigations, supervise some judicial
functions, and represent the state in trials. They also continued to exert
disproportionate influence over judicial decisions. The Criminal Procedure
Code prohibits the judge who signed a warrant from hearing the case;
however, this rule frequently was disregarded outside of Tbilisi, since few
regions had more than one judge.
International and local human rights organizations varied on estimates of
how many political prisoners were in the country, reporting from 0 to 20.
The Parliamentary Human Rights Committee and Ombudsman claimed that there
were no official political prisoners in the country; however, many
individuals, including members of the former paramilitary group
“Mkhedrioni,” Zviadists (followers of the deceased former president
Gamsakhurdia), and several high-ranking officials from the previous
government, considered themselves political prisoners. According to human
rights observers, some Zviadist prisoners never took up arms and should be
considered political prisoners. In 2003, the Interim President appointed
former Gamsakhurdia Minister of Finance Guram Absandze as Deputy State
Minister charged with reviewing all cases against Zviadists, with the aim of
releasing them. Over 20 of the group were released this year.
In November 2003, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg
began reviewing the case of Tengiz Asanidze, who was pardoned by President
Shevardnadze in 1999, but was still held in prison by the Ajaran government
in contradiction to the central authorities. On April 8, the ECHR ruled that
Asanidze should be released and fined the Georgian government approximately
$202,500 (150,000 euros) and an additional $6,750 (5,000 euros) for legal
fees. In accordance with the ruling, Asanidze was released and paid.
The Government permitted international human rights and domestic
organizations to visit political prisoners, and some organizations did so
during the year.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits such actions without court approval or legal
necessity; however, in practice, the Government occasionally monitored
private telephone conversations without obtaining court orders. The
Government stated that security police and tax authorities entered homes and
workplaces without prior legal sanction. In contrast to last year, traffic
police no longer stopped and searched vehicles for bribes.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal
Conflicts
Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained unresolved.
Cease-fires were in effect, and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and
joint peacekeeping forces, respectively, were present in both areas,
although sporadic incidents of violence occurred in Abkhazia, in the
neighboring Georgian region of Samegrelo, and in South Ossetia. These
conflicts and the problems associated with the current numbers of
approximately 230,000 IDPs from Abkhazia, 12,200 from South Ossetia, and
2,600 refugees from Chechnya posed a continued threat to national stability.
In 1993, Abkhaz separatists won control of Abkhazia, and most ethnic
Georgians were expelled from or fled the region. A Russian peacekeeping
force has also been in South Ossetia since 1992 as part of a joint
peacekeeping force with Ossetians and Georgians. The Government had no
effective control over Abkhazia or South Ossetia during the year. In July
and August, a flare-up in the Ossetian conflict caused 17 MIA and MOD
casualties and an unknown number of deaths on the Ossetian side. The
conflict deescalated before year’s end.
There was limited information on the human rights situation in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia due to limited access to these regions. The U.N. Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC) Office in Abkhazia reported continuing modest improvements
in the human rights situation. However, systemic problems in the criminal
justice system, in particular the failure to conduct impartial
investigations and to bring alleged perpetrators to trial, sustained a
climate of impunity. Limited access to qualified legal counsel aggravated
the situation. The Parliamentary Human Rights Office remained concerned at
the length of pretrial detentions and violations of due process in
individual cases. Since 2002, an independent legal aid office in the Gali
district of Abkhazia provided free legal advice to the population.
A Human Rights Commission established by the nonrecognized government of
South Ossetia continued to operate. The South Ossetian Human Rights
Commission worked in close collaboration with the Commission for Human
Rights in the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia in the Russian Federation
and the representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Human
Rights.
In October, two Ossetian members of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces were shot
by partisans.
NGOs reported a deterioration in the human rights situation in the
autonomous region of Ajara under the region’s President, Aslan Abashidze. In
May, following public protests of Abashidze’s attempt to manipulate
parliamentary elections and tense negotiations with Tbilisi, Abashidze fled
for Moscow in May, which led to the restoration of Ajara to central
Government control and a decline in human rights abuses, particularly
concerning the press and freedom of association.
Section 2
Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however,
there were some incidents of government obstruction. Journalists were able
to publish wide-ranging and extremely critical views of officials and their
conduct; however, criticism of the Government in the media decreased during
the year due to increased self-censorship. A law on broadcasting was passed
in December converting the State television channel, Channel 1, into a
public television channel. The law allows the new channel state funding for
one more year, as well as commercial funding. Competitors complained that
their lack of analogous state funding during this period would put them at a
disadvantage.
There were approximately 200 independent newspapers in circulation. After
the November 2003 “Rose Revolution,” the Government privatized the
previously state-owned news agency Sakinfo. The press frequently criticized
senior government officials; however, few editorially independent newspapers
were commercially viable. Typically, newspapers were subsidized by and
subject to the influence of patrons in politics and business. Several
newspapers were reputable sources of information, although lack of financial
resources limited their circulation.
Following privatizations during the year, there were seven independent
television stations in Tbilisi, three with national coverage–Channel 1,
Rustavi-2, and Imedi. An international NGO estimated that there were more
than 45 regional television stations outside of Tbilisi, 17 of which offered
daily news. While these stations ostensibly were independent, a lack of
advertising revenue often forced them to depend on local government
officials for support; however, some regions, such as Samtskhe-Javakheti and
Kutaisi, had relatively independent media. After the resignation of Aslan
Abashidze, former President of the autonomous region of Ajara, the region
ceased jamming the national television stations. There were two independent
newspapers in Ajara, and Ajara also received the national independent
newspaper 24 hours.
While there were no physical attacks on media representatives during year,
state tax authorities occasionally harassed independent newspapers and
television stations. Journalists stated that they were vulnerable to
pressure from authorities, as well as from business and societal elements.
Media outlets complained that commercial firms refused to advertise on
certain channels critical of the Government for fear of losing the
Government’s favor.
Compared to 2003, physical harassment of the media decreased, although
self-censorship increased, likely due to a desire to please the new
government. There were some reports of legal harassment of media outlets by
the financial police.
Although most journalists had regular access to government officials and
agencies, a few government officials denied journalists access to public
briefings. For example, the Minister of Interior temporarily blocked the
television station Kavkasia access to the Ministry and to his public
briefings. The mayor of Poti prohibited television cameras from public
briefings and effectively blocked interviews of local government officials.
In December, the mayor of Poti was arrested on unrelated charges. The
Government also used financial pressures to influence media outlets and
sometimes sent financial tax investigators to investigate critical journals.
In February, on the eve of parliamentary discussions of constitutional
amendments proposed by the President (see section 1.e.), three of the most
popular nightly political talk shows were temporarily canceled, reportedly
due to “reformatting.” Commentators reported government officials exerted
pressure on the channels to cancel programming.
Early in the year, Iberia TV ceased news operations following a high-profile
raid on the station by the General Prosecutor’s office, which raided all
subsidiary media and nonmedia businesses owned by the parent company, Omega
Group. The Prosecutor’s office cited financial fraud as grounds for the
raid. Omega Group’s owner, then Member of Parliament Zaza Okuashvili, who
allegedly had close ties to Aslan Abashidze, fled the country. Omega Group’s
other media operations, Media News Agency, the newspaper Akhali Epoka, Omega
magazine, and a printing house went out of business.
During the March parliamentary elections, in Ajara, the regional government
under Aslan Abashidze did not allow opposition candidates media access or
television time. Opposition gatherings were also violently suppressed or
attacked, and opposition offices were ransacked. On March 5, unidentified
men in masks beat reporter Vakhtang Komakhidze at a border checkpoint and
confiscated his tapes, camera and notes. Komakhidze was later hospitalized
for several weeks (see Section 3).
On July 15, the Government passed a new law on defamation, which states
comments made in Parliament, court cases, and during political debates can
no longer be considered libel. The law also moves the burden of proof to the
accuser, and places entire companies, rather than individual reporters, as
defendants in a court case. In practice, the Government did not use libel
laws to inhibit journalism during the year.
In July 2003, head of the Georgian Railway Akaki Chkhaidze won a libel suit
against independent television station Rustavi-2 for information broadcast
on a program linking him to bribery scandals. The station was ordered to pay
$480,000 (1 million GEL) in moral damages. The station appealed the decision
to the Supreme Court and the fine was reduced to $50,000 (104,166 GEL).
Stations desiring benefits and better working relations with authorities
practiced increased self-censorship. In November, a dispute broke out
between the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) Patriarchate and reformist
seminary students and priests. Media coverage was initially intense. In
October, in a press conference, President Saakashvili called on the media to
be more responsible in their coverage of this dispute. Immediately, all
reporting on this dispute disappeared. However, no direct government
harassment was reported.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet. The Government did
not restrict academic freedom.
Media in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained
tightly restricted by their respective de facto governments.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly; however, both the
Government and local authorities restricted this right in practice. The
Government dispersed several peaceful demonstrations and arrested
participants for disrupting the peace.
The law requires political parties and other organizations to give prior
notice and obtain permission from local authorities to assemble on a public
thoroughfare. Most permits for assemblies were granted without arbitrary
restriction or discrimination; however, according to the law, the Government
has the right to disperse any assembly that is “a disruption of the public
order.” No mechanism is designated to determine what constitutes a
disruption of the public order. As a result, in contrast with previous
years, the police often used this imprecision to justify violently
dispersing several peaceful protests.
On January 11, protestors blocked the Tbilisi-Kutaisi highway to protest the
detention of Zaza Ambroladze (see section 1.d.). Police violently dispersed
the protest and pursued demonstrators into the forest, kicking them and
beating them with clubs before apprehending them. Seven demonstrators were
sentenced to 3 months pretrial detention for disrupting the public order. At
year’s end, these activists remained in detention and no trials had begun.
On July 1, riot police violently broke up a peaceful protest in front of
Tbilisi City Hall, beating the 40 to 50 earthquake victims who were on a
hunger strike due to the lack of funding for house reconstructions.
On September 2, 500 riot police violently dispersed a peaceful protest in
the Batumi central market protesting the removal of the market to a new
location. Riot police beat and kicked several participants, including M.P.
Koba Davitashvili, then loaded participants into vans; 11 participants were
charged and placed in 3 month pretrial detention for disrupting the public
order. All 11 remained in detention awaiting trail at year’s end.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. Authorities granted permits for
registration of associations without arbitrary restriction or
discrimination.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, in practice,
local authorities sometimes restricted the rights of members of
nontraditional religious minority groups. There were fewer reports of
violence against minority religious groups this year, but several groups
continued to report intimidation by local authorities.
The Constitution recognizes the special role of the GOC in the country’s
history but stipulates the separation of church and state. A constitutional
agreement (Concordat) signed by the President and the Georgian Orthodox
Patriarch gives the GOC legal status and states that, with the consent of
the GOC, the Government can issue permits or licenses for the use of
official symbols and terminology of the GOC, as well as for the production,
import, and distribution of worship articles. The tax code grants tax
exemptions only for the GOC. Although several churches signed formal
documents with the Orthodox Patriarchate agreeing to the Concordat, they
noted that a controversial article allowing GOC authority over construction,
as well as restitution issues, was not in the original agreed-upon document.
Some nationalist politicians continued to use the issue of the supremacy of
the GOC in their platforms and criticized some Protestant groups,
particularly evangelical groups, as subversive. Jehovah’s Witnesses in
particular were the targets of vocal attacks from such politicians.
There are no laws regarding the registration of religious organizations. The
GOC remained the only religion with legal status in the country, although
some religions registered affiliated NGOs. This lack of legal status
prevented religions from renting or registering property; many groups
registered property under an individual or affiliated NGO, although this
complicated ownership issues and exposed individuals to personal liability.
The new Government has not addressed a previous draft law to allow for
registration or proposed other changes. Unregistered religious groups are
not officially permitted to rent office space, acquire construction rights,
import literature, or represent the international church, although many
religious groups accomplished these goals through their locally registered
NGOs. Unregistered religious groups were also subject to an administrative
fine.
In late 2003, the new Government allowed the registration of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses NGO The Watchtower Bible Society. Jehovah’s Witness Groups
reported that since then, unlike in previous years, there has been no
violent persecution and they have had no difficulties in importing their
literature.
While less harassment was reported during the year, minority religions
continued to report intimidation from local government authorities and
obstructions to constructing worship halls. The Catholic Church, True
Orthodox Church, Baptists, Armenian Apostolic Church, and Protestant
denominations had difficulty in building churches during the year.
The Roman Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church were unable to
secure the return of churches closed or given to the GOC during the Soviet
period. The Jewish community also experienced delays in the return of
property confiscated during Soviet rule, including a former synagogue that a
2001 Supreme Court ruling instructed the Government to return.
The Ministry of Education requires all 4th grade students to take a
“Religion and Culture” class, which covers the history of major religions.
Many parents complained of teachers focusing solely on the Georgian Orthodox
Church. The Church has a consultative role in all curriculum development.
Regular and reliable information regarding separatist-controlled regions,
including South Ossetia, was difficult to obtain. An Abkhaz presidential
decree bans Jehovah’s Witnesses. A number of members of Jehovah’s Witnesses
were detained in the last few years; however, according to a representative
of Jehovah’s Witnesses, none were detained during the year.
Despite a general tolerance toward minority religious groups traditional to
the country–including Catholics, Armenian Apostolic Christians, Jews, and
Muslims–citizens remained very apprehensive towards Protestants and other
nontraditional religions, which were seen as taking advantage of the
populace’s economic hardships by gaining membership by providing economic
assistance to converts. Some members of the GOC and the public viewed
non-Orthodox religious groups, particularly nontraditional groups or sects,
as a threat to the national Church and the country’s cultural values and
argued that foreign Christian missionaries should confine their activities
to non-Christian areas. Reputable and repeated public opinion polls
indicated that a majority of citizens believed minority or nontraditional
religious groups were detrimental to the state and that prohibition and
outright violence against such groups would be acceptable to limit them.
Since 2000, the Government has prosecuted a criminal case against Father
Basili Mkalavishvili, an Orthodox priest, whose followers engaged in a
number of violent attacks on nontraditional religious minorities; however,
the investigation has proceeded very slowly. In 2003, Father Mkalavishvili’s
case was suspended due the Government’s inability to keep order in the
court, and Father Mkalavishvili went into hiding. In March, riot police
stormed the church where Father Mkalavishvili was hiding out, arrested him
and several of his supporters, and placed them in 3-month pretrial
detention. Father Mkalavishvili’s trial began on September 13 and was
ongoing at year’s end. Though his arrest was welcomed, many NGOs criticized
the excessive force used to apprehend him.
Unlike in previous years, there were no violent attacks against
nontraditional religious minorities by Basilists.
In June 2003, an ultra-Orthodox mob blocked the streets in front of a
Pentecostal minister’s house where services were being conducted and refused
to let parishioners through. Church members were threatened with violence.
Police were present but did not allow the parishioners to enter the street.
At year’s end, the Pentecostal group still had not been allowed access to
this meeting house. The same Pentecostal group filed a suit in the
Constitutional Court, complaining that they were denied legal registration
as a religious group in contradiction with the Constitution, in which
freedom of religion is guaranteed.
For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International Religious Freedom
Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
Repatriation
The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government generally
respected them in practice. Freedom of movement was restricted in the
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The de facto governments
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not allow their citizens to exit their
respective regions and their internal movement was also often obstructed by
police checkpoints. Many who did enter other parts of the country were
denied reentry into the separatist regions. Ethnic Mingrelians living in the
Gali region of Abkhazia were allowed movement throughout the rest of the
country, but were not allowed in other parts of Abkhazia.
The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not employ it.
Following a 1999 presidential decree to repatriate and rehabilitate
approximately 275,000 Meskhetian Turks relocated during the Soviet period,
there has been no additional legislation to allow for repatriation of
Meskhetian Turks. There was some official and public opposition to their
repatriation. There were 643 Meskhetians living in the country, most of whom
had citizenship. There were no repatriations during the year.
There were approximately 244,800 persons displaced at years end, due to
conflicts in the separatists regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well
as hostilities in Chechnya. IDPs occupied hotels, hospitals, and other civil
buildings in Tbilisi, or lived in private homes with relatives or friends
throughout the country, particularly concentrated in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, and
Gori.
The 1994 agreement between Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, and the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on repatriation in Abkhazia called for the
free, safe, and dignified return of the approximately 230,000 IDPs and
refugees driven from Abkhazia to Tbilisi and the western part of the
country. The Abkhaz separatist regime prevented such repatriation and
unilaterally abrogated the agreement. In 1999, the Abkhaz separatist regime
unilaterally invited IDPs to return to Gali but did not adequately ensure
their safety. The move did not significantly affect IDPs, who continued to
travel back and forth to the area to tend their property. As many as 40,000
persons were estimated to be living in Gali on a more or less permanent
basis, depending on the security situation.
The 1992 ethnic conflict in South Ossetia also created tens of thousands of
IDPs and refugees. In 1997, the UNHCR began a program to return IDPs and
refugees; however, both sides created obstacles that slowed the return.
During the year, the South Ossetian separatists continued to obstruct the
repatriation of ethnic Georgians to South Ossetia, although some families
returned. Meanwhile, South Ossetia continued to press for the return of all
Ossetian refugees to South Ossetia rather than to their original homes in
other regions of the country. The Government recognized the right of
Ossetian refugees to return to their homes but was unable to facilitate
returns, due to its limited authority in South Ossetia. Government
opposition to the return of illegally occupied homes has prevented the
return of Ossetian refugees to Georgia proper. Approximately 2,700 persons
were reported to be still dislocated from recent hostilities at year’s end.
The Government inconsistently paid stipends to IDPs of approximately $7 (14
GEL) per person per month and subsidized some monthly allocations of
electricity. Subsidies were paid more frequently in Tbilisi than elsewhere
in the country. IDPs also were not afforded the right to vote in local
elections (see Section 3).
During the year, approximately 1,000 IDPs housed in Tbilisi hotels were
effectively “bought out” through the Government’s privatization of the
hotels. IDPs received $7,000 (14,000 GEL) by the private investors to move
elsewhere, which the Government maintained was adequate compensation. IDPs
who accepted the buy out maintained their refugee status and government
stipends, but lost their right to a place in a collective center (shelter).
Absent a likely imminent return to their homes and a coordinated government
IDP policy, observers interpreted this status as temporary assimilation.
The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in accordance
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967
Protocol, and the Government has established a system for providing
protection to refugees. In practice, the Government provided some protection
against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution. The Government cooperated with the office of the UNHCR and
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seeks.
During the year, the Government processed approximately 4,000 refugee cases
and granted refugee status to approximately 2,500.
The Ministry for Refugees and Accommodation was responsible for the
screening and registration of refugees and new arrivals. Since the outbreak
of hostilities in Chechnya, the Government has admitted an estimated 4,000
to 5,000 refugees from the conflict. Since then, many have returned or
resettled. There are currently 2,500 registered refugees from Chechnya in
the country. Chechen refugees settled in the Pankisi Valley in the eastern
part of the country. International humanitarian organizations assistance to
refugees in the Pankisi Valley was sporadic. During the year, approximately
2,500 Chechen refugees were living in the Pankisi Valley and 35 in Tbilisi.
The majority of the Chechen refugees lived with the local Kist population;
only 15 percent were sheltered in communal centers.
Chechen refugees remained vulnerable to abuse, including police harassment
and threats of refoulement.
Section 3
Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their
Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercised this right through periodic elections,
held on the basis of universal suffrage; however, poor organization by
authorities, inaccurate voter registers, and lack of transparency in vote
counting and tabulation and other flaws marred elections over the past three
years. The irregularities in the November 2003 parliamentary elections led
to peaceful mass protests, which resulted in President Shevardnadze’s
resignation in November 2003 and the assumption of the post of Interim
President by Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze. The Supreme Court
subsequently annulled the results of the November 2003 parliamentary
contests. In January, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected President in the
constitutionally mandated presidential election. Repeat parliamentary
elections were held on March 7. President Saakashvili’s National Movement
Party won 133 of the 150 proportional seats. The only other party to win
proportional seats was the New Rightists, headed by David Gamkrelidze, who
won 17 seats.
On February 6, Parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments that
strengthened the power of the executive relative to the Parliament and
judiciary. According to international observers and civil society groups,
both the amendments themselves and the manner in which they were adopted
were problematic. Authorities ignored the constitutional provision for a
1-month debate period prior to adoption. NGOs criticized that the amendments
increased the powers of the president at the expense of the Parliament and
of judges. The amendments gave the president power to dismiss Parliament if
it fails to approve the state budget, or the appointment of the prime
minister or other ministers or in times of crisis. In addition, Parliament
must accept or reject the budget in its entirety and does not have power to
change separate line items in the budget.
The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
reported that the January presidential election demonstrated notable
progress, although it also noted that time constraints limited
administrative improvements to previous elections. ODIHR noted a continued
lack of separation between state administration and political party
structures and the tendency to misuse state administration resources. The
voter register also continued to be incomplete and sometimes inaccurate.
There was also notable political imbalance in the election administration at
all levels and election commissions displayed a lack of impartiality. The
National Movement and Democrat Parties (the allied parties of Saakashvili
and Burjanadze, respectively) selected 10 out of 15 members of the Central
Election Commission (CEC). Both parties provided regional election
committees with material resources and campaign literature. While the OSCE
reported the voting process itself as excellent in the majority of regions,
there were significant irregularities in Kvemo Kartli, the southernmost
region of the country, bordering Azerbaijan and Armenia, where vote count
and tabulation violations and ballot stuffing were reported.
The worst irregularities were recorded in Ajara, where no pre-election
registration was conducted and little to no campaigning occurred. Regional
authorities maintained until late 2003 that elections would not take place
on their territory, as they believed annulling the November 2003 election
was illegitimate. In December 2003, unknown men physically assaulted a
student leader active in a pro-election Public Committee. Journalists were
prevented entry into Ajara, and authorities blocked transmission of
television supporting the new Government. The election did take place;
however, turnout was low. After the election, several civil activists and
their relatives were detained.
International observers deemed the March parliamentary elections the most
democratic since independence, with voter registration procedures further
improved, including the addition of a consolidated computerized database;
however, there continued to be a lack of political balance and independence
in election commissions. During the election, international observers
noticed a number of irregularities, including campaign material on display
in several polling stations, implausible voter turnout (over 100 percent) in
certain regions, and an unusually high percentage of invalid votes.
Significant voting irregularities again took place in Kvemo Kartli,
including ballot stuffing and proxy voting.
Ajara remained the largest problem in the parliamentary elections. Then
Ajara President Abashidze initially threatened to prevent the region from
participating in Georgia’s national parliamentary elections, voter
registration information was inaccurate, and officials refused to cooperated
with officials of the CEC. NGOs reported that violence against the
opposition was higher than in previous elections. Opposition gatherings were
violently suppressed or attacked, opposition offices were ransacked, and no
television time was given to opposition parties. On March 5, unidentified
men in masks beat reporter Vakhtang Komakhidze at a border checkpoint and
confiscated his tapes, camera, and notes. Komakhidze was later hospitalized
for several weeks. Such abuse reportedly prompted large-scale
demonstrations, which were linked to Abashidze’s ouster in May.
The separatist governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia held periodic
elections. International organizations, including the U.N. and the OSCE, as
well as the Government did not recognize the Abkhaz presidential elections
held in October. In 2001, the unrecognized separatist government held
presidential elections in South Ossetia, resulting in the defeat of the
incumbent and a peaceful transfer of power.
Local elections, held on June 2, were the first elections to be conducted
under a new election code, which significantly tightened election rules to
prevent fraud. International observers noted that although the election
process was chaotic, with numerous errors in voter lists, the elections were
not seriously hampered by fraud. Election results mirrored polling data
running up to the election.
There were no government restrictions on political party formation beyond
registration requirements; there were 20 registered political parties, a
vast reduction from the previous year due in part to the vast popularity of
President Saakashvili’s National Movement Party.
Government corruption decreased significantly in the executive branch, but
remains widespread in the judicial branch and in some law enforcement
agencies. During the year, as opposed to previous years, most government
officials received salaries in a timely manner, reducing corruption
significantly. In February, Parliament passed an anticorruption bill that
introduced major changes to the criminal and criminal procedure codes. The
new legislation allowed the Prosecutor’s Office greater flexibility in
charging officials with criminal bribery, cancelled immunity for law
enforcement agency officials, authorized in absentia proceedings against
officials who fail to appear in court, and introduces the use of
plea-bargaining, as well of undercover recordings made by journalists in
trials.
In October, the Parliament adopted a new Code of Conduct, which established
ethical norms to govern Parliamentarians in an effort to strengthen public
accountability and provided a set of benchmarks for the public to measure
their elected representatives’ performance.
The Office of the Anticorruption Bureau was closed and its materials were
transferred to a new office with the NSC, which investigated fraud, waste,
and abuse.
The Government instigated several high profile arrests of former government
officials on corruption charges, though NGOs claimed that arrest and
interrogation methods compromised government dedication to the rule of law
and due process (see Section 1.d.). Observers also criticized the Government
for using harsh detention conditions as a form of pressure and a negotiating
tool in these cases, often to extract payment.
The law provides for public access to government meetings and documents;
however, few citizens or journalists employed it. The Government often
failed to register freedom of information act requests, and although the law
states that a public agency shall release public information immediately or
no later than 10 days, the release of requested information could be delayed
indefinitely and was sometimes ignored. A requesting party has no grounds
for appeal.
There were 22 women in the 235-seat Parliament. Female Speaker of
Parliament, Nino Burjanadze, served as Interim President from November 2003
until presidential elections in January, when she returned to Parliament as
Speaker. The majority head of Parliament was also a woman, and women held
important committee chairmanships and ministerial posts.
There were 8 members of minority groups (5 Armenians and 3 Azeris) in the
235-seat Parliament.
During the March parliamentary elections, the CEC provided ballots, manuals,
and voter education materials in Azeri, Armenian, and Russian in areas with
a concentration of national minorities. Training of election commissions was
provided in minority languages as well; however, in some instances, training
in Azeri-populated areas was conducted in Russian, and commission members
reportedly had difficulties. Generally, national minorities were
underrepresented on election commissions, even in areas where they were the
majority population.
Section 4
Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally
operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. While some NGOs enjoyed free access and
close cooperation with the Government, others complained of discrimination
from government members.
Unlike in the previous year, no NGO members were arrested while observing
elections.
An investigation of a 2002 attack on the Liberty Institute, the country’s
leading human rights organization, remained ongoing.
The law provides for the Ministry of Finance to access the funding records
of international NGOs, alarming some in the NGO community; however, no NGOs
complained of the Government using this provision in practice.
The UNHRC and the OSCE Mission’s joint human rights office in Abkhazia
operated sporadically due to security conditions but provided periodic
findings, reports, and recommendations.
NGOs viewed the Office of the Public Defender, or Ombudsman, as the most
objective of the Government’s human rights bodies. The constitutionally
mandated office monitored human rights conditions and investigated
allegations of abuses. The position remained vacant for most of the year,
until September. The Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Civil
Integration, as well as the National Security Council’s human rights
advisor, also had the mandate to investigate claims of abuse. The Prosecutor
General Office’s human rights unit focused on curbing pretrial detention
abuses and trafficking in persons. This position was abolished early in the
year and then reestablished in August. The Government maintained a
constructive relationship with several NGOs, although it restricted
government access to some who had fallen out of the Government’s favor.
The NGO Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights was denied access to
detention facilities, a right it enjoyed under the previous government. In
December, informational commercials on police torture prepared by Former
Political Prisoners for Human Rights were pulled from all television
channels. Channel representatives claim that the advertisements were pulled
on the order of the Ministry of Security. The Ministry claimed it merely
gave a recommendation and left the choice to the channels.
Section 5
Discrimination, Societal Abuse, and Trafficking in Persons
The Constitution recognizes that all citizens are to be considered equal
before the law, regardless of race; color; language; sex; religion;
political and other opinions; national, ethnic, and social belonging;
origin; property and title; and place of residence; however, in practice,
discrimination was a problem.
Women
Societal violence against women was a problem. There are no laws that
specifically criminalize spousal abuse or violence against women, although
the Criminal Code classifies rape, including spousal rape, and sexual
coercion as crimes. In 2003, 795 crimes were registered against women,
including 18 murders, 24 attempted murders, 52 rapes, and 41 attempted
rapes; the remainder consisted of battery, assault and lesser crimes.
Domestic violence was reportedly one of the leading causes of divorce but
was rarely reported or punished because of social taboos and because it is
not illegal according to the Criminal Procedural Code. Police did not always
investigate reports of rape. A local NGO operated a shelter for abused
women, and the Government operated a hotline for abused women but did not
provide other services.
The kidnapping of women for marriage occurred, particularly in rural areas,
although the practice continued to decline. Such kidnappings often were
arranged elopements; however, at times abductions occurred against the will
of the intended bride and sometimes involved rape. Police rarely took
actions in these cases even though the Criminal Code criminalizes
kidnapping.
Prostitution is not a criminal offense. Prostitution was widespread,
especially in the capital of Tbilisi. Several NGOs claimed that prostitution
increased during the year, due to continuing poor economic conditions.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation was a problem
(see Section 5, Trafficking).
Sexual harassment and violence against women in the workplace was a problem.
The law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace; however, it was rarely
investigated.
The Constitution provides for the equality of men and women; however, in
practice, this was not enforced. Women’s access to the labor market had
improved; however, overall women remained primarily confined to low-paying
and low-skilled positions, regardless of professional and academic
qualifications. As a result, many women sought employment abroad. Salaries
for women continued to lag behind those of men. According to the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP), employers frequently withheld benefits connected
to pregnancy and childbirth.
A number of NGOs promoted women’s rights, including the women’s group of the
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, the Women’s Center, and Women for
Democracy. Women’s NGOs took an active role in the presidential and partial
parliamentary elections during the year, engaging candidates on issues of
concern.
Children
The law provides for the protection of children’s rights and welfare;
however, funding shortages limited government services. Primary and basic
education is compulsory from age 6 or 7 to age 14, and provided up to age
16. Education was officially free through high school, and most children
attended school; however, in some places schools did not function or
functioned sporadically because teachers were not paid and facilities were
inadequate, particularly in winter when some schools could not afford to
heat buildings. Many schools lacked libraries or blackboards. Many parents
were unable to afford books and school supplies, and most parents were
obliged to pay some form of tuition or teachers’ salaries; in some cases,
students were forced to drop out due to an inability or unwillingness to
pay. Bribery was endemic in the education system to ensure acceptances,
recommendations, and good grades. Attendance in 2002 was assumed to be about
90 percent.
Free health care was available only for children over age 3.
There were some reports of abuse of children, particularly street children,
although there was no societal pattern of such abuse.
Incidents of sexual exploitation of children were reported, especially among
girls. Child prostitution and pornography are punishable by imprisonment for
up to 3 years. There were unconfirmed reports of trafficking in children
(see Section 5, Trafficking), street children and children living in
orphanages were allegedly particularly vulnerable. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs sponsored a Center for the Rehabilitation of Minors, which regularly
provided medical and psychological assistance to child and adolescent
victims of prostitution before returning them to guardians.
Difficult economic conditions broke up some families and increased the
number of street children. A local NGO estimated that there were
approximately 1,500 street children in the country, with 1,200 concentrated
in Tbilisi, due to the inability of orphanages and the Government to provide
support. The private voluntary organization Child and Environment and the
Ministry of Education each operated a shelter; however, the two shelters
could accommodate only a small number of street children. No facilities
existed outside of Tbilisi. The Government took little other action to
assist street children.
There were no confirmed reports of police violence against street children
this year.
Orphanages were unable to provide adequate food, clothing, education, and
medical care; facilities lacked heat, water, and electricity. The staff was
paid poorly, and wages were many months in arrears. Staff members often
diverted money and supplies provided to the orphanages for personal use. The
Government offered education grants and tutoring, including the option of
enrolling in military school, to some children who left orphanages.
Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, the country was a source,
transit point, and destination for trafficked persons.
The Criminal Code prohibits trafficking in persons, including minors, for
the purposes of sexual, labor, and other forms of exploitation. The basic
penalty is from 5 to 12 years’ imprisonment, with maximum penalties of 20
years for aggravated circumstances. A memorandum of understanding between
the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of State Security led to
greater cooperation, joint operations, and a number of arrests and charges
under trafficking statutes. No convictions had been reached by year’s end.
In December, a new Plan of Action was adopted by Presidential Decree that
established an ad hoc Interagency Commission against Trafficking under the
auspices of the National Security Council of the country. The human rights
unit of the NSC remained the government-wide antitrafficking point of
contact.
The Government dissolved an MIA antitrafficking unit, which received foreign
funding, and merged it with the antikidnapping unit, claiming it would give
the unit more ability to coordinate casework and exchange information with
investigators. In October, the MIA antitrafficking unit was reestablished
with two branches, one in Tbilisi and one in Batumi. Following the December
merger of the MIA and MSS, a Department of Special Operations on Trafficking
and Illegal Migration with a staff of 50 was being established within the
new Ministry of Police and Public Safety.
The country cooperated with other regional countries to uncover trafficking
rings and assisted in the repatriation of trafficked persons discovered in
transit through the country.
On June 22, Georgian police took 14 Uzbek women into custody who were being
trafficked to Dubai. Through the assistance of the acting Ombudsman, the
women were temporarily housed in an NGO facility, then an empty police
shelter for children; 12 of the victims were repatriated and 2 remained in
the shelter due to fraudulent documents, until they escaped 2 months later.
All 14 were eventually repatriated. Ashot Hovhannesian, a citizen, was
charged with organizing the human trafficking network and sentenced to 3
months pretrial detention. Tbilisi local police handled the case
exclusively. Police investigators did not have victims sign the intelligence
oath necessary for testimonies to be used in court. At year’s end, the case
was still pending.
Women were trafficked from the country to Turkey, Israel, United Arab
Emirates, the United States, and Western Europe to work in bars,
restaurants, or as domestic help. Many worked in the adult entertainment
sector or as prostitutes. There also was evidence that Russian, Ukrainian,
and Central Asian women were trafficked through the country to Turkey,
sometimes using fraudulently obtained passports. Georgian victims most
likely come directly from the impoverished former industrial centers of
Poti, Kutaisi, Rustavi, and Tbilisi. Local NGOs report that men were
trafficked to Russia, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and other destinations to
work in construction and manual labor. There were unconfirmed reports of
trafficking in children, street children and children living in orphanages
were allegedly particularly vulnerable.
Jobs abroad offered through tourism firms or employment agencies often lured
victims. Many of the women working in the adult entertainment sector as
prostitutes were informed, or led to believe, that they would be employed as
waitresses in bars and restaurants or as domestic help.
There were no government programs to help victims; however, several NGOs
provided assistance to victims. One internationally funded NGO operated a
trafficking hotline that offered psychological support and assistance,
though only a small percentage of the callers identified themselves as
victims of trafficking. The Government conducted some antitrafficking
training for police in the regions and maintained an OSCE-funded working
group with the NGO community to draft the new Plan of Action and additional
legislation including protections for victims’ rights.
The Ministry of State Security instituted and adhered to a policy protecting
the identity of victims and made numerous public statements that victims of
trafficking would not be held liable for their crimes associated with having
been trafficked, such as illegal border crossing, if they provided
significant information about the crime of trafficking.
The Government did not conduct any public awareness campaigns during the
year, although multiple NGOs continued informational brochures and local
television public announcement campaigns.
Persons with Disabilities
Discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education,
access to health care, or in the provision of other state services was a
problem. There is no law or official provision mandating access to buildings
for persons with disabilities and very few, if any, public facilities or
buildings were accessible. The law mandates that the Government ensure
appropriate conditions for persons with disabilities to freely use the
social infrastructure and to ensure proper protection and support and
provide special discounts and favorable social policies for persons with
disabilities, particularly veterans; however, in practice, a lack of funding
precluded much assistance. Most persons with disabilities were supported by
family members or by international humanitarian donations. Societal
discrimination against persons with disabilities existed.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Government generally respected the rights of ethnic minorities in
nonconflict areas but limited self government.
The Constitution stipulates that Georgian is the state language. Ethnic
Armenians, Azeris, Greeks, Abkhaz, Ossetians, and Russians usually
communicated in their native languages or in Russian. Both Georgian and
Russian were used for interethnic communication. School instruction in
non-Georgian languages was permitted. The new Parliament did not take up a
language law drafted under the previous Government that would make Georgian
compulsory for government employees. The State Language Chamber organized
free language courses for government employees in regions inhabited by
ethnic minorities, conducted in coordination with and through funding from
the OSCE. Armenians, on occasion, complained that they were being forced to
learn Georgian.
Section 6
Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The law provides for the right of citizens to form and join unions, and
workers exercised this right in practice.
The principal union was the Georgian Trade Union Amalgamation (GTUA), which
was the successor to the official union during the Soviet period. The GTUA
consisted of 31 sectoral unions and claimed 500,000 members, although
active, dues-paying membership was lower. During the year, prosecutors
initiated a criminal investigation of the president of the GTUA that
reportedly was related to efforts by the government to induce the GTUA to
divest itself of substantial real estate and other assets unrelated to the
essential functions of a labor federation, which the GTUA inherited from its
Soviet-era predecessor. There were two additional unions: The Free Trade
Union of Teachers of Georgia Solidarity (FTUTGS) and the Independent Trade
Union of Metropolitan Employees.
The law prohibits discrimination by employers against union members, and
employers may be prosecuted for antiunion discrimination and forced to
reinstate employees and pay back wages; however, the GTUA and its national
unions reported frequent cases of management warning staff not to organize
trade unions. Some workers, including teachers, employees of various mining,
winemaking, pipeline, and port facilities, and the Tbilisi municipal
government reportedly complained of being intimidated or threatened by
employers, including their public sector employers, for union organizing
activity. Observers also claimed that employers failed to transfer
compulsory union dues, deducted from wages, to union bank accounts. The
Ministry of Labor investigated some complaints but took no action against
any employers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law allows workers to organize and bargain collectively, and some
workers exercised these rights; however, the practice of collective
bargaining was not widespread.
The law provides for the right to strike with some restrictions, and workers
exercised this right in practice.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children;
however, there were reports that such practices occurred (see Section 5).
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for
Employment
The Labor Code governs all labor issues, including child labor, and the
worst forms of child labor are criminal offenses carrying steep penalties.
According to the law, the minimum age for employment of children is age 16;
however, in exceptional cases, children may work with parental consent at
ages 14 and 15. Children under age 18 may not engage in unhealthy or
underground work, and children between ages 16 and 17 are subject to reduced
working hours. The Ministry of Health, Social Service, and Labor was
responsible for enforcing laws regulating child labor; however, the actual
enforcement of these laws was questionable due to a general lack of
resources. Child labor was not considered a serious problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The national minimum wage for public employees was $4.50 (9 GEL) a month,
which did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
There was no mandated minimum wage for private sector workers, although the
lowest wage actually paid was $10 (20 GEL), which also did not provide a
decent standard of living. Average wages in private enterprises for 2003 was
$65 (126 GEL) monthly; in state enterprises, $58 (113 GEL). In general,
salaries and pensions were insufficient to meet basic needs for a worker and
family. Unreported trade activities, assistance from family and friends, and
the sale of homegrown agricultural products often supplemented salaries.
The old Soviet Labor Code, still in effect with some amendments, provides
for a 41-hour workweek and for a weekly 24-hour rest period. The labor code
permits higher wages for hazardous work and permits a worker to refuse
duties that could endanger life without risking loss of employment; however,
in practice, these protections were rarely, if ever, enforced.