Bishop of Nazianzos at the Ecumenical gathering organized at St Vartan Armenian Cathedral in NY

Greg Madatian
Oct 26 2023
Oct 26, 2023 | 16:30

 

in Archdiocese of America

 

On Tuesday, October 17, 2023, Bishop Athenagoras of Nazianzos represented Archbishop Elpidophoros of America at the Ecumenical gathering organized at Saint Vartan Armenian Cathedral, in New York City, in honor of the newly consecrated primate of the Diocese of the Armenian Church (Eastern), Bishop Mesrop Parsamyan. On October 8, 2023, he was consecrated as a bishop by the hand of Catholicos Karekin II, at Holy Etchmiadzin.

Bishop Athenagoras participated in the encounter with other ecumenical hierarchs and clergymen from the Oriental and Eastern Orthodox Churches, the Catholic Archdiocese of New York, and the Episcopal Church of New York. He was also accompanied by Rev. Protopresbyter Nicolas Kazarian, director of the Inter-Orthodox, Ecumenical and Inter-faith Department.

https://orthodoxtimes.com/bishop-of-nazianzos-at-the-ecumenical-gathering-organized-at-st-vartan-armenian-cathedral-in-ny/

Building bridge without peace “very complicated” – Armenian PM to Tbilisi Silk Road Forum

Emil Lazarian
Agenda, Georgia
Oct 26 2023

Nikol Pashinyan, the Armenian Prime Minister, highlighted the importance of peace at the ongoing Tbilisi Silk Road Forum by stressing it would be “very complicated to build any bridge” without it, and adding the South Caucasus region was in need of a “lasting peace”. 

The official stressed peaceful coexistence was the basis for his office developing the Crossroads Peace Project aiming to develop communications between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Iran and other regional countries by modernising and building road infrastructures, oil and power lines. 

Pashinyan further noted the railway infrastructure crossing northern and southern territories of Armenia had been present for the past three decades for several routes connecting East and West.

Activation of these routes will be a short and efficient way to connect the Caspian and Mediterranean seas. With modern communications, this can become an effective way to connect the ports and other infrastructure of Georgia. It will benefit all countries in our region", he said.

The PM also noted his office was working on a draft agreement to ensure peace and normalisation of relations with Azerbaijan following their long-running conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, adding “we hope to have the process completed in the next few months”. 

I also consider it necessary to present two more additional aspects of the peace issue that we agreed with Azerbaijan – Armenia and Azerbaijan recognise each other's territorial integrity, sharing that the Azerbaijani side recognises its respective territorial boundaries” he told the event.

“This ensures that applications made by both parties will not leave any space for the other party not to recognise the territorial integrity of the country, except for the internationally recognised borders", the official added.

Pashinyan also noted the 1991 Almaty Declaration and said the 12 republics – including Armenia and Azerbaijan – that had signed it following the dissolution of the USSR had recognised each other's territorial integrity, sovereignty in their administrative boundaries at the time.

https://agenda.ge/en/news/2023/4031

‘What’s this all for?’: Russian deserters call on former comrades to join them

Sonya Jalatian
The Guardian, UK
Oct 26 2023

Men tell of escape to Armenia, guilt and remorse as growing number of soldiers flee ‘criminal war’ in Ukraine

 Russia-Ukraine war – latest news updates

Sitting in a basement studio hidden in the centre of Yerevan, Artyom reflected on his decision to desert the Russian army after a year spent fighting in Ukraine.

Just two weeks earlier, the former platoon commander was living in a trench. He has since abandoned his post and fled to the Armenian capital.

“I did want to participate in this war. I wanted no part in the imperialistic habits of our ruler,” he said. “But I do feel guilt in front of Ukraine. Guilt that I didn’t do this earlier … I could have said no, I just didn’t know what the consequences would be.”

Artyom, who asked for his last name to be withheld out of fear for his safety, is one of the growing number of Russian combatants who have fled the army over the past 20 months of war.

Coming from a small city in southern Siberia, Artyom said he joined a military boarding school as a teenager “because the army sounded prestigious”. He signed a three-year contract with the Russian military but quickly became disillusioned and as Russian troops invaded Ukraine, he was stationed on the border training conscripts.

But as Russia’s invasion faltered, forcing the Kremlin to announce a large-scale mobilisation, he was ordered to join the fighting. “I told my commanders that I do not want to shoot people; they knew what my stance was even if they bullied me for it.”

Artyom was assigned to lead a signal platoon unit tasked with maintaining communications networks, electronic warfare, and signals intelligence on the battlefield. He denied killing Ukrainians in combat and claimed he did not participate in or witness war crimes such as the killings of prisoners of war and civilians. But he still grapples with his role in the fighting.

He said he would be told to keep quiet when he sometimes discussed his views with other soldiers. “We are at war, what are you, a traitor?” he said they would tell him.

“I don’t try to excuse myself. My work enabled other forces to take part in the hostilities,” he said. “Throughout my time there, I kept on thinking about how to escape.”

Desertion and “voluntary” surrender are punishable by lengthy jail terms in Russia, and Artyom said his commanders threatened him with prison if he dared to leave his post. He said he also heard stories of service personnel being locked up in basements in eastern Ukraine after refusing to fight, reports that have been backed up by independent Russian news organisations.

“Worst-case scenario was to end up in a ‘Storm-Z’ squad,” he said, referring to so-called “punishment battalions” sent to the most exposed parts of the front with heavy losses.

His chance came last month when his commander gave him a few days off, at which point he decided to flee with the help of a Russian anti-war organisation. “I knew I only had two-three days before they would start looking for me, so I had to be quick,” he said. Russian authorities have since opened up a criminal case against him.

He arrived in Armenia via a third country. Like Georgia and Kazakhstan, Russians can also enter Armenia without a visa, and all three countries serve as a logical first stop for those looking to escape the fighting.

Aleksei is a second deserter who spoke to the Guardian in Yerevan. He said: “You see other Russians on the street here and you might not even know that you served together. It is not something you talk about.”

Unlike Artyom who was a regular contract soldier, Aleksei was called up as part of Vladimir Putin’s mobilisation in September 2022.

“To say I was shocked when I was mobilised, wouldn’t be saying anything at all,” said Aleksei, who also asked for anonymity. “We quickly realised we would just be meat for the war machine.”

He described how conscripts like him received poor equipment and a lack of basic training: “We bought it ourselves with our own money, including uniforms and clothes.”

Once in eastern Ukraine, where he was assigned to a communication unit, Aleksei said he quickly saw first-hand that he was participating in an “illegal invasion”. He recalled being stunned when a local taxi driver told him: “No matter what, Ukraine will win anyway.”

“All these stories of some kind of Nazis in Ukraine, the reason why we started the fight, they are just empty words,” he said.

The mood soured in his unit over the summer as Ukraine launched its counteroffensive and casualties mounted. “During the day Ukraine would start shelling our position, and you weren’t able to stick your head out. At night you still had to get to work,” he said.

Aleksei described the daily moral dilemmas he faced as a soldier participating in a war he knew was wrong. “I felt a responsibility for my team, I didn’t want the guys I have come to know well to die because I failed. But I realised that by setting up communication lines, I was indirectly killing other people.”

He said he witnessed drunken brawls among fellow soldiers, claiming that some of them resulted in deadly shootings. “As time went on, soldiers started to think what is this all for? Many of those who were enthusiastic about fighting started to question the purpose of it all.”

Using the same escape route as Artyom, Aleksei eventually made it to Yerevan last month after he was allowed to return to Russia for a short break.

Both men were helped in their flight by the Georgia-based anti-war organisation Idite Lesom, an idiom that literally means “go through the forest” in Russian.

The phrase is most often deployed as a curse, roughly translatable as “go fuck yourself”, which was what one of the soldiers said to the Russian authorities by deserting.

Idite Lesom’s founder, Grigory Sverdlin, said his group had helped more than 500 Russian soldiers to desert so far.

“If we find out that a person is involved in war crimes, we will not help him,” Sverdlin said. “But we are not investigative agencies, we reason pragmatically – even if he managed to shoot three times, let him not shoot the fourth, and then there will be someone to investigate war crimes.

“We believe that this is absolutely correct both from a humanistic point of view and from a pragmatic one – so that Putin has fewer soldiers.”

The group has recently seen a noticeable increase in requests from those wanting to desert. It is an assessment backed up by data released by the Russian court system, where, according to a tally by the independent news outlet Mediazona, 2,076 criminal cases were opened in the first half of 2023 against soldiers accused of abandoning their units without official leave. This is twice the total for 2022 and three times higher than the prewar figure for 2021. The real numbers are likely to be greater given the Kremlin’s systematic attempts to hide information about the military.

Darya Berg, the head of relief and evacuations at Idite Lesom, said: “Some of those soldiers who are deserting now were injured in the fighting and don’t want to go back having seen the horror. Others are exhausted since they haven’t been rotated since the war started in Ukraine.”

Nearly 50,000 Russian soldiers have died in the war in Ukraine, according to a recent statistical analysis. Another study showed that in 2022 the war in Ukraine had become the leading cause of death for young Russian men.

“I quickly realised that you return from Ukraine either without legs or in a coffin,’ said Aleksei

For now, the two deserters’ future remains unclear. “I only have a vague idea about what’s next … I hope to get a refugee permit in a western country,” said Artyom, adding that he did not feel safe staying in Armenia given its proximity to Russia.

But claiming asylum in Europe could prove difficult. The west has not come up with a united approach to dealing with asylum claims submitted by men fleeing military service or the fighting.

Some western and Ukrainian officials have argued that by offering refugee status to Russian combatants, the host nation fails to hold them responsible for the invasion. The Lithuanian foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, has said that Russians opposing the war “should stay and fight against Putin”.

Others believe that encouraging Russian soldiers to desert would damage their country’s military abilities and enable Ukraine’s eventual victory in the war.

Pavel Filatyev, a former paratrooper, and Nikita Chibrin, a former army mechanic, both fled the Russian army from Ukraine and said they were still waiting for an decision after submitting an asylum application to France and Spain respectively.

More straightforward was Artyom’s message to his former comrades. “I would say to all those who are now at the front, those who know me and perhaps recognise me … guys, there is no need to participate in this criminal war. There is nothing sacred about it. There is always a way out.”

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/26/russian-deserters-call-on-former-comrades-to-join-them-armenia-soldiers-ukraine-war

Azerbaijan Shifts Focus To Iran For Land Corridor Amid Armenia Impasse

Greg Madatian
Iran International
Oct 26 2023

Azerbaijan Republic has redirected its efforts away from seeking a land corridor through Armenia to connect with the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan.

Instead, the nation is now exploring discussions with its southern neighbor, Iran, as disclosed by a senior Azerbaijani official on Wednesday.

Hikmet Hajiyev, a top foreign policy advisor to President Aliyev, told Reuters that "Azerbaijan had no plans to seize Zangezur," referring to the proposed corridor aimed at connecting mainland Azerbaijan to the Nakhichevan enclave, which shares a border with Turkey, a close ally of Baku.

He explained, "After the two sides failed to agree on its opening, the project has lost its attractiveness for us — we can do this with Iran instead."

Armenia strongly opposed the notion of such a corridor, apprehensive that it might lead to additional territorial concessions following Azerbaijan's swift military campaign resulting in the seizure of the long contested Nagorno-Karabakh region in September.

Although internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory, Karabakh had been under the control of ethnic Armenians since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, prompting the mass displacement of approximately 120,000 ethnic Armenians into Armenia.

Azerbaijan had recently urged the inclusion of its long-standing request for a transport corridor through southern Armenia in the ongoing peace treaty negotiations.

Iran’s defense ministry earlier warned that it will not tolerate any changes to international borders in the region.

Listen To The Armenian Song For Junior Eurovision 2023

Lilit Nahapetian
Oct 26 2023
By Belén García

AMPTV has revealed Yan Girls will represent Armenia at the Junior Eurovision Song Contest 2023. The girlband will perform the song “Do it my way”, composed by Tokionine and written by JESC 2021 winner Maléna and Vahram Petrosyan.

Once again, the Armenian broadcaster has opted for an internal selection to choose their entry for Junior Eurovision. This time, however, they haven’t followed the path of sending a soloist to the EBU’s show for kids as they have gone for something different and unusual, a band. Yan Girls is made up of Nane, Nensi, Kamilla, Syuzana and Aida, who are between 9 and 11 years of age. Both their style and song are influenced by K-Pop artists.

“Do it my way” was premiered along with the official music video, directed by Artur Manukyan, and talks about the importance of staying true to yourself, being confident and doing things the best way – their way. Listen to it below:

https://escbubble.com/2023/10/listen-to-the-armenian-song-for-junior-eurovision-2023/

WSJ: Pashinyan sees no advantage in Russian military presence in Armenia

Emil Lazarian
The Kyiv Independent
Oct 26 2023
by Martin Fornusek

Yerevan sees no advantage in the continued presence of Russian military bases in Armenia, as Moscow failed to live up to its commitment as an ally, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told the Wall Street Journal in an interview published on Oct. 25.

Armenia's rival Azerbaijan launched a military offensive last month against the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory, achieving full military victory after a day of hostilities.

Moscow failed to dissuade or stop Baku's advance even though Russian "peacekeepers" have been present in the region since the last Karabakh war in 2020. Russia is also Armenia's formal ally, as both countries are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military pact.

The military cooperation between the two nations includes Russian army garrisons in two locations on Armenian territory, as well as an airbase, Reuters said.

"These events have essentially brought us to a decision that we need to diversify our relationships in the security sphere, and we are trying to do that now," Pashinyan said in the interview.

Armenia has been increasingly looking further west for new allies. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said earlier this week that France agreed to strengthen the Caucasian country's air defense capabilities.

Pashinyan's steps sparked have ire in Russia. An unnamed Russian official told the state news agency TASS that the Armenian leadership is "trying to turn Armenia into Ukraine No. 3… and Pashinyan is taking leaps and bounds along the path of Volodymyr Zelensky."

In his speech in the European Parliament on Oct. 17, the Armenian head of government noted that not only did Yerevan's allies decline to fulfill their security obligations, but they also attempted to "subvert Armenia's democracy and sovereignty." He stopped short of naming a specific country, however.

Yerevan may need more reliable partners soon. Western leadership is reportedly growing worried that Azerbaijan may not satisfy itself with Karabakh and might try to conquer parts of Armenia in the coming months to create a land bridge with Turkey, the Journal said.

How the End of Nagorno-Karabakh Will Reshape Geopolitics

Toneyan Mark
Foreign Policy 
Oct 26 2023

By Samuel Ramani, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and the author of Russia in Africa.
OCTOBER 25, 2023, 4:47 PM

On Sept. 19, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale military offensive against the autonomous ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, known in Armenia as Artsakh. Within 24 hours, Azerbaijan secured effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Artsakh Defense Army was disbanded. These seismic events ended a three-decade frozen conflict, which included large-scale wars from 1988-1994 and in 2020, and resulted in the exodus of almost all ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.

Azerbaijan’s dramatic takeover in Nagorno-Karabakh has far-reaching geopolitical implications. Turkey views it as a strategic victory but is wary of Armenia’s resistance to its plans to economically integrate Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Iran regards Turkey’s win as its loss, as it fears Azerbaijan’s empowerment and opposes Turkey’s transport corridor projects, which could obstruct Iran’s shared border with Armenia.

While Russia was weakened by its refusal to defend its treaty ally Armenia, it maintains substantial capacity to destabilize and project power in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh could also create new opportunities for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. And Europe and the United States face an uneasy dilemma between providing humanitarian aid to Armenia and maintaining energy supplies from Azerbaijan.

Turkey believes that Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh will enable its Zangezur corridor project. The corridor would facilitate trade between Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, an Azerbaijani exclave located to the southwest of Armenia. This would allow for direct commercial ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan via Nakhchivan and fulfill Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s vision of uniting the Turkic world.

Turkey also supports Azerbaijan’s plan to construct a railway from Horadiz, Azerbaijan, to Kars, Turkey, which would cross through 25 miles of Armenian territory. Due to its infringement on Armenian territory, Armenia and Iran strongly oppose this railway project.

Turkey also sees an opportunity to bolster its energy connectivity with Azerbaijan. On Sept. 25, Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev attended a ceremony to launch the construction of a Nakhchivan gas pipeline. This pipeline, which was formally proposed in December 2020 and scheduled for completion in 2024, runs 50 miles between Igdir, Turkey, and the Turkey-Azerbaijan border, and a farther 11 miles into Nakhchivan. The pipeline would allow Azerbaijan to provide natural gas to Nakhchivan, which is currently reliant on Iran for supplies, and aid Erdogan and Aliyev’s ambitions of converting the Zangezur corridor into an energy transit route.

The success of Turkey’s connectivity projects hinges on Armenia’s acquiescence. The November 2020 cease-fire required Armenia to allow for unimpeded trade between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Despite this stipulation, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have disagreed on the necessity and location of border checkpoints. Armenia also fiercely opposes Azerbaijan’s plan to create a buffer zone on its territory, as it would result in no Armenian security officers being stationed within 2.5 kilometers (1.5 miles) of an Azerbaijan-run transit corridor.

To break the impasse, Turkey will likely highlight the economic benefits of Armenian participation in its connectivity projects. An Azerbaijan-Turkey pipeline that passes through Armenian territory would help Armenia divest from Russian natural gas giant Gazprom and increase Armenia’s value as an energy transit hub to Europe.

Despite these benefits and the reduction of Turkish-Armenian tensions since December 2021, domestic pressure could prevent Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from accepting Erdogan’s proposal.

The potential outcomes of Armenia’s rejection of Turkey’s connectivity projects are unclear. Erdogan recently claimed that Iran was open to allowing the Zangezur corridor to pass through its territory rather than Armenia, but Tehran has historically resisted this idea.

If Iran proves uncooperative, then Azerbaijan’s Aliyev could seek to forcefully construct a land bridge between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan. An Azerbaijani invasion of southern Armenia’s Syunik province would be the most plausible pathway toward achieving this goal. Armenia’s ambassador to the European Union, Tigran Balayan, warned on Aug. 6 that “We are now under imminent threat of invasion into Armenia.” While Azerbaijan may be well-placed militarily to vanquish Armenia, an invasion of Syunik could trigger Western sanctions on Azerbaijan and derail Erdogan’s South Caucasus reconciliation vision.

Iran treaded cautiously in response to Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh. Iranian officials have engaged regularly with their Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts. After Aliyev advisor Khalaf Khalafov and Armenian national security advisor Armen Grigoryan visited Tehran last week, Iranian officials called for an Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization and the expulsion of foreign forces from the region. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani voiced support for Nagorno-Karabakh’s integration with Azerbaijan, while the chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad Bagheri, demanded equal rights for the few minorities remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Despite its neutral-to-positive reaction to Nagorno-Karabakh’s integration with Azerbaijan, Iran views the new status quo in the South Caucasus with consternation. The empowerment of Azerbaijan is concerning for Iran, as relations between the two countries have deteriorated sharply since Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi took office in 2021.

Israel supplied Azerbaijan with an estimated nearly 70 percent of its arms between 2016 and 2020, which was strikingly higher than Turkey’s 2.9 percent export share from 2011 to 2020. Iranian officials view this close security partnership with deep suspicion. Provocative moves, such as Iran’s holding of large-scale drills near its border with Azerbaijan in October 2021 and Azerbaijan’s periodic arrests of alleged Iranian spies, have escalated tensions. While Raisi told Khalafov that he wanted improved relations with Baku, and Iranian-Azerbaijani relations did flourish from 2014 and 2016, mistrust between the two countries remains high.

Despite Erdogan’s questionable claims of a shift in Tehran’s position, Iran is steadfastly opposed to the Zangezur corridor as it is currently envisioned. In theory, Iran should welcome the corridor’s new road and railway networks. Enhanced regional connectivity would link Iranian exporters to markets in the South Caucasus and reverse the economic damage caused by Iran’s severed access from Soviet railway networks in 1990. Yet even with these commercial interests, which Erdogan has cited in his appeals to Tehran, Iranian officials view the project with deep suspicion. Iran fears that the Zangezur corridor will block its ability to trade across its shared border with Armenia and recently warned Azerbaijani officials against an invasion of Syunik.

The Strategic Council on Foreign Relations in Tehran, which is headed by former Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, has expressed fears that the corridor could allow Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey to foment instability in northern Iran’s Azeri regions. Iranian hard-liners view these destabilizing plans as part of a broader NATO strategy of encircling Iran, China, and Russia.

While the strategic picture is relatively optimistic for Turkey and potentially problematic for Iran, the implications of Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh for Russia are less clear. Russia’s security guarantees, which date back to a 1997 treaty with Armenia, only apply to Armenia’s internationally recognized territory.

Even though Russia’s passive response to Azerbaijan’s May 2021 incursions into Syunik undermined these security guarantees, the security pact categorically does not extend to Nagorno-Karabakh, which is legally part of Azerbaijan. But Pashinyan, the Armenian prime minister, still denounced Moscow’s inaction. Pashinyan publicly criticized Russia’s unreliability as an ally and highlighted the degradation of Russia’s military capabilities in Ukraine. The relationship has continued to decline: After the deaths of five Russian peacekeepers in an accidental clash with the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, Russia dismantled its observation posts in Nagorno-Karabakh on Oct. 5.

Despite these setbacks, Russia is not a spent force in the South Caucasus. As Russian-Armenian relations soured, its partnership with Azerbaijan has strengthened. Russia’s trade with Azerbaijan increased by 55.3 percent during the first quarter of 2023, compared to the previous year. Under a November 2022 agreement, Gazprom agreed to ship up to 1 billion cubic meters of gas to Azerbaijan’s SOCAR, a state-owned oil company, which fueled speculation that Azerbaijan was repackaging Russian gas and selling it to European markets. Leonid Slutsky, the chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee,  recently described Azerbaijan and Belarus as Russia’s two most reliable partners in the post-Soviet space.

Russia has also expanded its presence in Georgia. While the ruling Georgian Dream Party is not explicitly pro-Russian, as it has spearheaded Georgia’s European Union candidacy and broadly complies with U.S. secondary sanctions on Russia, it maintains a working relationship with the Kremlin. Russia’s naval presence on Georgia’s Black Sea coast is also set to expand, as it constructs a base in the separatist region of Abkhazia.

While its South Caucasus strategy will likely pivot toward Azerbaijan and Georgia, Russia will play the long game to rebuild its alliance with Armenia. Through information campaigns highlighting Pashinyan’s futile forays toward the West and his passivity regarding the plight of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia can foment anti-government unrest and boost Kremlin-friendly alternative candidates ahead of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections.

For its part, China has taken an ambiguous stance toward the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This ambiguity should not be confused with impartiality. Although China has historically exported weapons systems to Armenia, such as 130-km-radius AR1A multiple launch rocket systems, and viewed Pan-Turkism with suspicion due to its fears of Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang, it has strengthened its relationship with Azerbaijan in recent years.

Since 2005, China’s trade with Azerbaijan has increased by a staggering 2,070 percent. This far outstrips the 380 percent increase in Chinese-Armenian trade during the same time horizon. Chinese telecommunications company Huawei has expanded its digital footprint in Azerbaijan, and China has exported weapons systems to the Azerbaijani military, such as Polonez multiple launch rocket systems and Qasirga T-300 missile systems.

Due to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s courtship of Baku, China is well-positioned to benefit from Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh. As the Belt and Road Initiative already has developed a transit route from Georgia to Europe, the Zangezur corridor could give China a second access point from the South Caucasus to European markets. Shortly after the fall 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, Chinese Ambassador to Azerbaijan Guo Min controversially stated that the Zangezur corridor would contribute to China’s “One Belt, One Road” transport project.

Azerbaijan’s aspirations of becoming a trans-Eurasian telecommunications hub also dovetail with China’s so-called Digital Silk Road initiative. The new status quo in the South Caucasus could help Turkey market its “Middle Corridor” project to China. Like Beijing, Erdogan wishes to outflank the proposed India-Middle East-Europe corridor that was announced by multiple nations on Sept. 10 and would pass through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Greece.

Shifting power balances in the South Caucasus present quandaries for Western powers. Tensions between Armenia and Russia create opportunities for closer Western ties with Yerevan. The European Union Mission in Armenia, which was established in February 2023 without Azerbaijan’s acquiescence, and the U.S. joint military exercises with Armenia reflect Pashinyan’s Western pivot.

While France is poised to send military gear to Armenia, many Western officials acknowledge their inability to rein in Azerbaijan’s alleged ethnic cleansing policy in Nagorno-Karabakh. Hungary vetoed a European Union joint statement condemning Azerbaijan’s conduct, which prevented the bloc from pushing back against Baku’s narrative that it wants Armenians to stay in Nagorno-Karabakh.

And Azerbaijan’s 18 percent increase in gas exports to Europe in 2022, which included a 41.2 percent uptick in sales to Italy, as well as its critical role in the recently completed Greece-Bulgaria natural gas pipeline, limit the West’s ability to influence Baku’s conduct. Aside from providing emergency humanitarian assistance to help Armenia’s resettlement of refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States and EU will likely be bystanders to Aliyev’s next moves against Armenia.

Despite the mood of euphoria in Baku and despondence in Yerevan, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s resolution could benefit faraway powers even more than regional stakeholders. As external powers scramble to capitalize on new transport infrastructure projects and court an empowered Azerbaijan, human rights are likely to be put on the backburner. That is a tragic outcome for the more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians who saw their lives upended by Azerbaijan’s rapid-fire offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Joly announces more funding for Armenian refugees, stops short of threatening sanctions on Azerbaijan

Antranik Varosian
CBC Canada
Oct 26 2023
Raffy Boudjikanian · CBC News

Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly announced another $1 million in humanitarian funding Wednesday to help displaced ethnic Armenian refugees who recently fled a military operation launched by Azerbaijan — but she stopped well short of threatening to sanction Azeri government officials over the attack.

"I've said everything is on the table. That being said, we expect that Armenia's territorial integrity [will] be respected and for us, this is definitely something that we're watching," Joly told journalists during a visit to Armenia's capital Yerevan to open Canada's new embassy there. She was attending a press conference with her Armenian counterpart, Ararat Mirzoyan.

The $1 million has been earmarked for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, on top of $2.5 million Canada announced previously for refugee relief through the International Committee of the Red Cross.

More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians are believed to have fled Azerbaijan's shelling campaign in the long-disputed enclave of  Nagorno-Karabakh in September. Called an "anti terror" operation by Azerbaijan, the campaign also followed nine months of a blockade imposed by Baku that left the region short of food and medical supplies.

  • 'The world did nothing': Exhausted refugees flee Azerbaijan's crackdown on Nagorno-Karabakh
  • Canada's first ambassador to Armenia lands in Yerevan as Ottawa preaches peace in the Caucasus
  • Citing humanitarian crisis in Azerbaijan, Canadian Space Agency avoids international space congress

Nagono-Karabakh is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. Before last month's events, it had a majority Armenian population and a de-facto ethnic Armenian government that was not recognized by any country in the world.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought two wars over Nagorno-Karabakh since the fall of the Soviet Union. 

"We continue to work on mitigating the unjustifiable impacts of this military action on civilians, who have already been affected by months of an illegal blockade, and to find a sustainable negotiated settlement to this conflict," Joly said Wednesday.

In a statement posted to its website, Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs called Joly's statements at her news conference an "indication of the overt bias of Canada against Azerbaijan."

"Regarding the non-exclusion of sanctions as a tool against Azerbaijan, we would like to note that it is erroneous to speak with Azerbaijan in the language of threat, and that it will not bear any results to either side," the statement warned.

Azerbaijan's statement also accused Armenia of hindering the peace process. "It was the party which violated [those] principles with every effort during more than 30 years," it said. 

Joly's visit comes as some experts warn of the risk of further conflict between the two Caucasus countries.

Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has made repeated claims to a strip of land within Armenia's internationally recognized borders, the so-called Zangezur Corridor. Azerbaijan wants the corridor in order to connect its mainland to Nakhchivan, an Azeri enclave to Armenia's southwest.

Armenia says Azeri military forces have taken over roughly 50 square kilometres of Armenian territory after border skirmishes last year.

"I think the danger of this continuing or expanding is absolutely possible,"  said Kyle Matthews, the executive director of the Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies and Human Rights at Concordia University.

Matthews said Canada could lead the world in applying sanctions on Azerbaijan, instead of waiting to hear if allies like the United States and the European Union are willing to take part.

"This is the third time we've been hearing from the minister saying that everything's on the table," said Sevag Belian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of Canada, a  Canadian-Armenian political advocacy group. He was visiting Yerevan for the embassy's inauguration.

"Certainly, that is a step forward," he said, citing Joly's claim that "everything is on the table." He said he hopes the Canadian government can identify different pressure points on Azerbaijan.

While Azeri and Armenian officials have met for talks on a few occasions since September, Azerbaijan skipped out on a meeting brokered by the European Union earlier in October.

At Wednesday's news conference, Mirzoyan told journalists that a meeting that was scheduled for later this month between Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and European Council President Charles Michel won't be happening either.

"Obviously it is Azerbaijan's president who didn't find the time," Mirzoyan said, adding his government is ready for further talks. "I do hope the reason really is a scheduling issue, and it will be possible to find time to schedule another meeting."

Earlier this week, Azerbaijan publicized video of military exercises with Turkey, a long-time regional ally in its conflict with Armenia. Azerbaijan's defence department said some of the exercises occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia, meanwhile, has concluded a deal with France to purchase air defence equipment, a move Baku officials have described as provocative.

"I think Azerbaijan will use whatever reason it has at its disposal to attack," Matthews said, adding Armenia has a right to buy defensive equipment under international law, especially given the hostility of its neighbours.

Armenia has depended on a security alliance with Russia for decades, but ties between the two countries have become frayed in recent years.

Armenia blamed Moscow for failing to intervene in a 2020 war with Azerbaijan, as well as the more recent blockade and military action, despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

The Russian state-run news agency TASS quoted an unnamed Moscow official last week warning Armenia against becoming another Ukraine.

On Wednesday, the Wall Street Journal published an interview with Pashinyan, who said Armenia no longer sees any advantage in continuing to host Russian military bases on its territory.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/azerbaijan-armenia-nagorno-karabakh-1.7007939

In the ultimate irony, Russia’s obsession with Ukraine may have weakened its power over its other neighbors

Rose Khoyetsian
CNBC
Oct 26 2023
PUBLISHED THU, OCT 26 20231:11 AM EDTUPDATED 5 HOURS AGO
Holly Ellyatt
KEY POINTS
  • With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine its most pressing geopolitical priority for at least the last 19 months, Moscow has not had much time or opportunity to hold as much power and influence over all its other neighbors.
  • Russia’s influence in parts of the South Caucasus region — which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia — and other former Soviet republics, differs from state to state.
  • Analysts say the war in Ukraine has created the irony that Russia has lost a degree of control, power and influence over its backyard.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine its most pressing geopolitical priority for at least the last 19 months, Moscow has not had much time or opportunity to hold as much power and influence over all its other neighbors — a position it has enjoyed since the breakup of the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago.

Russia’s influence in parts of the South Caucasus region — which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia — and other former Soviet republics such as Belarus and those further afield, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, differs from state to state. It’s also largely dependent on the degree of pro-Western or pro-Russian sentiment among the people and leadership, as well as the level of economic and geopolitical reliance on Moscow.

But analysts say one thing is for certain: The war in Ukraine has created the irony that a distracted Russia has lost a degree of power, control and leverage over its own wider backyard.

Azerbaijan’s seizing of breakaway region Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia in September highlighted Russia’s somewhat weakened or reshaped role in the region — given its perceived lack of anticipation of the offensive and lack of intervention in a long-running dispute in which it has traditionally been a mediator.

In a sign that Russia was caught off guard by the conflict in its own backyard, just one day before Azerbaijan launched its lightning offensive, Russia’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the humanitarian situation was improving in Nagorno-Karabakh and hoped that would aid the “normalising” of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

The Kremlin rejects accusations that it no longer has the leadership status it once enjoyed, with President Vladimir Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov telling CNBC that “there is no such possibility” that Moscow’s influence has waned among its neighbors.

“Each area is equally important for Russia. Russia continues to play its role in the Caucasus,” Peskov said in emailed comments.

Geopolitical analysts are not so unequivocal, saying Russia’s failure to seize Ukraine in a matter of days — as Moscow expected — when its forces first invaded in February 2022, showed its military capabilities in a new light to its neighbors.

“The question arose about the real fighting capacity of the Russian army,” Vira Konstantinova, political scientist and international relations specialist, told CNBC.

Within the first month of fighting, and with Russian forces withdrawing from the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine’s armed forces had managed to debunk a “key myth of Russian propaganda,” she noted — that Russia’s army was powerful, well equipped and capable.

In fact, she said, Kyiv’s resistance highlighted to Russia’s neighbors and partners that “Russian power is a bubble with only a nuclear button in its center.”

Russian opposition politician Vladimir Milov, who once worked under Putin in the early days of his leadership, before becoming disillusioned with Russia’s geopolitical direction of travel, agreed that the war in Ukraine has, ironically, made Russia look weaker among its post-Soviet neighbors.

“If you take Ukraine out of the equation it’s really clear that Russia does not control the post-Soviet space, as Ukraine is bigger and more important than everything else. So it’s fair to say that if you do not control Ukraine, you do not control the post-Soviet space,” he told CNBC.

“When it was clear that Russia was failing to establish dominance over Ukraine, everybody else also saw that and started to behave more independently. People see that they [Russia] is not achieving this ultimate task and that means they are weak and have to turn elsewhere,” he noted.

Milov said there used to be two schools of thought in Russia two decades ago: one is that Moscow needed to reassert dominance over its post-Soviet neighbors and another — followed by Milov — believed Russia’s neighbors should be treated as equals and integrated, with Russia, into a broader Western space.

Milov said his school of thought had been erased over time — Putin, he said, “squeezed it out.”

Geopolitical analysts say Russia’s influence may have been shaken, but has certainly not disappeared — it remains a superpower among its neighbors and the possibility of further Russian intervention in Russian-backed breakaway regions such as Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia has not been discounted.

Igor Semivolos, executive director of the Center for Middle East Studies in Ukraine, noted that while it could be said that the “intensity” of Russia’s interactions in what it sees as its backyard has declined — particularly as it “concentrates the main effort on the Ukrainian question” — it’s not entirely correct to say that “Russia has lost its grip.”

“In general, so far, the weakening is observed only in the context of the reduction of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives in this region,” he told CNBC in emailed comments, adding that Russia still “maneuvers and tries to distribute the resources to keep the situation under control.”

But if Western nations wanted to take the opportunity to break Russia’s increasingly precarious hold over its neighbors, foreign policy initiatives and security guarantees are needed now, he said.

“It’s important that other powers start entering the region. The USA and Turkey [could] offer the countries their own security formulas [guarantees], and perhaps in the future, these security formulas will become more attractive than the Russian one,” he said.

Analysts say the West should certainly be reaching out to such Eurasian countries while the opportunity presents itself, and Russia is distracted with Ukraine. Azerbaijan’s decision to strike Armenia while Russia’s back was turned, metaphorically, showed that Moscow’s hands are largely tied, they note.

“Russia’s war on Ukraine has shaken stability in the South Caucasus, and Moscow may try to claw back influence in the region at the expense of regional peace and security,” Vasif Huseynov, head of the Western Studies department at the Center of Analysis of International Relations, a think tank based in Azerbaijan, noted in analysis.

But greater U.S. engagement with the likes of Azerbaijan could “reinforce a platform for peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia” and could help “counter threats to shared interests” from Moscow and Tehran, he noted.

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/26/russias-influence-over-its-backyard-declines-as-it-focuses-on-ukraine.html