IT SEEMS THAT WE WILL NEVER BE LEAVING IT OFF

Turkish Daily News
Oct 11 2005

We were saying that since the negotiating process with the European
Union has begun we can now focus our attention to Turkey’s important
problems that need urgent solutions, problems such as the Southeast,
Iraq and unemployment. Obviously, that is not going to be the case.

It becomes all too apparent what pathological frame of mind we are in,
especially when it comes to any issue related to the EU

Gunduz Aktan We were saying that since the negotiating process with the
European Union has begun we can now focus our attention to Turkey’s
important problems that need urgent solutions, problems such as the
Southeast, Iraq and unemployment. Obviously, that is not going to be
the case.

It becomes all too apparent what pathological frame of mind we are in,
especially when it comes to any issue related to the EU.

It is true that the start of accession talks with the EU on Oct. 3
was a very important event for us. However, it has more historic
significance for the EU than us. Time will tell whether it will prove
to be equally significant for Turkey.

Those who feel passionate about the EU continued to throw stones at
[former Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus President (KKTC) Rauf]
Denktas from time to time, making demagogical remarks about “jobs
and welfare” the EU would provide us. However, their hopes dimmed to
a great extent due to the stance the right-wing parties in France
and Germany had taken against Turkish membership, the EU’s Dec. 17
decision as well as the reciprocal declarations on Cyprus.

Their gloom increased when, during the days that preceded Oct. 3,
Austria acted in a recalcitrant manner, causing a meeting —
that would normally be brought to a conclusion in a few hours —
to turn into a marathon event. Then, thanks to the struggle waged
by Britain, a country that is at the peak of the art of diplomacy,
and also because the EU Commission did not deviate from its mission,
we ended up having the EU adopt the negotiating framework document
we now have in our hands.

Those who had their hopes dampened were in a state of euphoria by
this turn of events. Their exuberance was proportionate to the depth
of their gloom. They generously displayed their confidence that the
EU had thus guaranteed Turkish membership. It was as if they were
returning to the “golden age” of their childhood. The EU would make
the despotic (bad father) state toe the line and the no-good society
would be shaped up, thanks to external pressure.

They acted as if the negotiating framework document was not afflicted
with the same defects that had been inherent in the EU’s Dec. 17
decisions. It was as if, just as the Swedish prime minister said,
the additions made to the text had not reinforced the possibility
that Turkey would be given only “limited” and “conditional” membership.

These circles began formulating new arguments in line with their
wishful thinking. It must be admitted that they are very talented in
his regard. With an air of scorn for those who hold the opposing view,
they confidently declared that documents would not be so important
per se, that no document would bring about desired results unless
backed by political will, anyway, and that the mood that would reign
in the EU countries towards the end of the accession process would
determine the outcome of the talks.

Some of them said that it would be more beneficial to expose ourselves
to the “civilizational” influence of the EU during the accession
talks — just as we did during the first six years of our candidacy —
than actually being a full member. They even argued that it did not
matter if the EU would provide adequate funds for the civilizational
influence.

As they always do, they picked up a few points on which they are
right and then they spread these points thinly to veil so many
fallacies. Their passion for EU membership prevented them from making
an objective assessment.

If the negotiating framework document was not important then why
did the EU countries discuss the draft for 40 hours? Why was there a
constant threat that those talks would break down? If documents were
not important, why did the EU issue a counter-declaration to deal
with Turkey’s declaration on Cyprus? As EU Enlargement Commissioner
Olli Rehn has stressed, why did the EU ask Ankara for immediate
ratification and full implementation of the additional protocol
to the Ankara Agreement? If the EU’s financial contribution is so
unimportant, why have the EU’s 10 new members fought so hard to have
their own shares of EU funds increased?

Do these “intellectuals” think that during the EU ministers’ marathon
meeting the ministers did not remind one another that the negotiating
framework document provides the EU with all kinds of excuses not to
make Turkey a member?

These intellectuals know all this. However, they do not have the
courage to get rid of the fixations they harbor in their dream world.

They believe what they want to believe. With this kind of approach,
they give the impression that tomorrow they would not hesitate to
accept Greek Cypriot demands in Cyprus and Greek demands in the
Aegean as well as the genocide allegations of the Armenian diaspora
and Kurdish demands in the Southeast.

This melancholic mood regarding the EU naturally triggers a
counter-reaction. There are a growing number of people in Turkey who
reject dependence on the EU for the “survival” of Turkey. It is untrue
that these people want to set up an inward-looking, fascist government
in Turkey. Obviously, their only aim is to oppose the current state
of affairs.

No matter what happens, these “intellectuals” do not realize that their
attitude constitutes the biggest obstacle to Turkey’s EU membership. A
great majority of the Turkish nation rejects blind dependence on the
EU. These people do not want to make sacrifices from vital national
interests. They do not subscribe to the argument that preserving
national honor during the accession process would be qualified as
being over-emotional. They know that Turkey can seek EU membership
in a style that is quite different from that of the above-mentioned
“intellectuals.”

If we enter the EU one day, only the realists will have achieved it.

S.F. TAXI DRIVER, PASSENGER KILLED IN VIOLENT CRASH
By Marisa Lagos and Josh Wein
Staff Writers

San Francisco Examiner, CA
Oct 11 2005

SAN FRANCISCO – A longtime San Francisco taxicab driver and a
21-year-old Duke University student were killed in Pacific Heights
late Sunday night after their cab was broadsided by an allegedly
drunken driver fleeing the scene of another collision.

The driver, identified as 43-year-old San Francisco resident Kevin
McGuinness, was booked into the jail ward Monday at San Francisco
General Hospital on two felony counts of vehicular manslaughter and
drunken driving, police said. He was treated at the hospital earlier
in the day, SFPD Officer Maria Oropeza said.

Yellow Cab driver Zareh Soghikian, in his 70s, and the front-seat
passenger, 21-year-old Tyler Brown, were killed in the collision.

Brown’s stepbrother and their friend, Michael Giedgowd, were also
injured in the crash but were both in stable condition Monday evening.

Prior to the crash, McGuinness fled from another accident at the corner
of Polk and Washington streets, according to police. Oropeza said the
victim in the first crash followed McGuiness to the intersection of
Broadway and Webster streets, where the alleged drunken driver smashed
into Soghikian’s taxicab on the passenger side. Both Soghikian and
Brown were pronounced dead at the scene.

Oropeza said McGuinness tried to flee the second, fatal scene but
could not get out of his car. Soghikian, a taxi driver in The City
for at least two decades, was described as a well-liked man who
was known within the taxicab community for his work on the union
representing cab drivers. Ruach Graffis at the United Taxicab Workers
said Soghikian was born in Egypt but was Armenian by descent, and
lived on Scott Street in the Marina. He worked nights for Yellow Cab
and ran a travel business during the day, she said.

UTW posted a note on the Web site Monday morning, reading in part,
“Our dear friend and UTW activist Zareh Soghikian got killed Sunday
night in his Yellow Cab #701 … We will miss Zareh in our meetings
and on San Francisco’s streets.”

Brown, originally from Marion, Mass., was months away from earning
a bachelor’s degree in engineering from Duke University and was in
town visiting his stepbrother.

Brown was a member of his campus’ chapter of Engineers Without Borders
and recently traveled to Bande Aceh, Indonesia, to help repair villages
and airstrips damaged by the tsunami, according to a statement from
Duke University.

Brown’s parents arrived in San Francisco on Monday but could not
be reached for comment. Carol Brown, a neighbor from Tyler Brown’s
hometown who is not related to the family, said his death is already
affecting the community there.

“Our whole neighborhood is just devastated,” Brown said. “We are
deeply sad.”

‘FAMILY DISPUTE ENDED IN DEATH’
Nicki Walker

Norfolk Eastern Daily Press, UK
Oct 11 2005

Two men killed an associate by stabbing and shooting him at a Norfolk
factory before dumping his body in an isolated field, dousing it in
petrol and setting it alight, Norwich Crown Court heard yesterday.

Armenians Nishan Bakunts, 28, and his father-in-law Misha Chatsjatrjan,
44, allegedly killed their countryman Hovahannes Amiran over a ‘family
quarrel’, then sought to destroy evidence linking them to the crime.

But after an exhaustive two-year police investigation to establish
the dead man’s identity and track down his killers, the two defendants
were caught following a breakthrough lead – stemming from a scrap of
memo which was found near the burning body at Upton, near Peterborough,
in December 2002.

Bakunts, of Litchfield Road, Yarmouth, and Chatsjatrjan, who was
living in Holland, appeared at Norwich Crown Court yesterday charged
with the murder of 42-year-old Mr Amiran, alias Sako, who was the
godfather of Bakunts and his wife Arpine Karapetian, 24. Both men
have pleaded not guilty.

Prosecutor David Farrell QC, told the jury that police believed Sako
was murdered some time around Saturday, December 21, 2002 and the
two defendants then took his body by car to the field at Upton and
set it alight.

The body was discovered at 10am on the Saturday by an off duty fireman
Jake Ellard, who was cycling in the area.

Giving evidence, Mr Ellard told the court that he recognised the smell
of burning flesh and, after going to investigate, he saw that it was
in fact a body on fire and contacted the police.

A post mortem revealed the man had been shot in the face and neck by
home made bullets and stabbed in the trunk of his body. The man’s arms
had been cut and had wounds, indicating he had tried to defend himself.

At the murder scene police found a number of items, which had also
been set on fire.

Among these was a scrap of a medical memo with the names Talbot and
Armstrong on it.

A specialist who examined the body advised police that the dead man
could have been staying in the eastern region prior to his death.

This prompted detectives to send out more than 2000 letters to all
the people with the surnames of Talbot and Armstrong, in the hope it
would give them the breakthrough to identify the dead man and find
his killers.

And in September 2003 police got the vital lead they needed.

Vanessa Armstrong, a secretary at the Cooper Roller Bearings at King’s
Lynn, recognised the memo and contacted the police, the court heard.

Mr Farrell said it emerged memo had been sent out to a Paul Talbot
on December 18, three days before the body was discovered at Upton.

Mr Talbot was contacted and confirmed he had been in the medical room
and had dropped the memo in the bin as he left.

Police and scenes of crime officer visited the medical room and found
some surgical gloves – identical to a pair found at the site where
the body was dumped.

A thorough forensic investigation was then launched and blood matching
the victim was discovered in the medical room. Police had found their
murder scene, but at that stage had still not identified the dead man.

The court was told the investigation was then concentrated on the
Lynn factory and it was discovered Bakunts was working as a security
guard on the weekend of the murder.

A series of investigations showed Bakunts had known the dead man, and
had purchased guns and weapons prior to the murder. On the morning
of the murder, he had bought petrol and a can from a nearby garage
in Lynn.

Bakunts was arrested in October 2003, but was not psychologically
fit for interview until later in 2004.

During police interviews he replied “no comment”, but was later
charged with the murder of the dead man who was subsequently to be
identified as Sako.

Mr Farrell told the court there were a number of factors which linked
Bakunts and his father-in-law to the murder.

This included the identity and relationship between the accused and
the dead man, financial inquiries and purchases made by Bakunts,
forensic evidence, the foreign travel of Chatsjartrjan, and the sale
of Bakunts car, which the prosecution alleges, was used to transport
the body the 40-mile journey from Lynn to Upton.

Mr Farrell told the court it would be proved that on the day before
the murder, Chatsjatrjan travelled to Yarmouth after taking a ferry
to Britain from Holland and booked into a guest house then left the
country on December 22.

There was also forensic evidence found on a lighter to link him to
the murder scene.

Mr Farrell also told the court that a relative had contacted
Chatsjatrjan after hearing of Sako’s death.

He said Chatsjatrjan: “Confessed to her he had killed Sako at Bakunts’s
place of work.”

Mr Farrell added: “He confessed because he believed he only had three
months to live, because he believed he had cancer. He said the reason
was a family quarrel.”

Following the police investigation Chatsjatrjan was extradited in
January this year and charged with the murder of Sako.

Bakunts wife Karapetian, also of Litchfield Road, Yarmouth, was
arrested and charged with perverting the course of justice in
connection with the case.

The court heard although the couple were married in Belgium, their
marriage ceremony was infact invalid.

The trial, which is expected to last two weeks, continues.

;category=News&tBrand=edponline&tCategory=news&itemid=NOED10%20Oct%202005%2022%3A05%3A53%3A967

ARMENIA-NATO PARTNERSHIP
By M. Alkhazashvili

The Messenger, Georgia
Oct 11 2005

Armenia has expressed its desire to join the NATO Individual
Partnership Program (IPAP). Armenian ambassador to NATO Samvel
Mkrtchian stated at a joint seminar of the Armenian National Assembly
and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Yerevan that he hopes Armenia’s
IPAP will begin in 2006.

According to experts, Armenia’s wish to join the IPAP is indicative
of all the geopolitical changes that have been occurring in the
region. Traditionally pro-Russian, Armenia’s interest in cooperating
with NATO is interpreted by some as evidence that the U.S.A. has
strengthened its influence in the Caucasus. It is noteworthy that
IPAP programs in both Georgia and Azerbaijan began this year.

Armenia hopes that it will be able to learn about state security
systems quickly and reach out to its European neighbors. However
the Armenian ambassador to NATO Samvel Mkrtchian criticized Georgia
and Azerbaijan for having unrealistic expectations concerning NATO
membership.

“We are not as powerful as our neighbors, but we will do our best to
reach our goal. We sign the contracts that we are able to fulfill.

Georgia and Azerbaijan have taken on a huge responsibility. In the
given situation, they find it rather difficult to carry out their
obligations,” Mkrtchian stated, according to Khvalindeli Dghe.

INSURANCE GIANT IN GEORGIAN MARKET
By M. Alkhazashvili

The Messenger, Georgia
Oct 11 2005

American International Group (AIG) has entered the Georgian insurance
market. The branch office of AIG Europe S.A, AIG – Georgia, was
registered in April 2005 and in May it received the right to insure
real estate. According to statements from the company’s administration,
it plans on supporting healthy competition rather than threatening
local companies.

The American insurance company entered the Georgian market after the
government amended the previous insurance law in 2004. Under the new
law, any insurance company registered in OECD member countries is
now able to open branch offices in Georgia. The affiliated company
of AIG – AIG Europe S.A – whose head office is located in Paris-
was the first to take advantage of the new legislation.

According to AIG management, they have big plans for their Georgian
office. There are already signs that AIG will play an important role in
the Georgian insurance market: the total amount of premiums collected
by the company per year is approximately USD 90 billion.

Currently, Georgia’s largest insurance company, Imedi, takes in
premiums of about GEL 9 million.

Currently there are 17 insurance companies operating in Georgia. The
newspaper 24 Saati reported that they serve consumers with 16 types
of insurance products. According to the Georgian State Insurance
Supervision Service, in 2004 the remaining 16 companies earned a total
GEL 45,106,000 in premiums while paying GEL 12,631,000 in damages.

However, despite their deeper pockets, AIG is not planning on working
against Georgian companies. According to General Manager of AIG-Georgia
Nikoloz Kitiashvili, in the beginning the company will concentrate
largely on re-insurance operations because Georgian companies favor
using foreign insurance companies for this purpose.

The newspaper 24 Saati reported that AIG is already established in
Azerbaijan, where it holds 15 percent of the local insurance market –
largely in the form of big corporations. The AIG branch office founded
in Georgia will also operate in Armenia. “We have the opportunity
to reduce some of the risk for Armenian and Georgian insurance
companies. This means that additional currency will be imported into
Georgia to develop the insurance market in the Caucasus,” stated
the Kitiashvili.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

A VOTE FOR UNITY: ARMENIAN REPRESENTATIVE PLEDGES TO RE-OPEN MELKONIAN
By Jean Christou

Cyprus Mail, Cyprus
Oct 11 2005

DR VAHAKN Atamyan was the winner of the by-election on Sunday for
the Armenian seat at the House of Representatives, after garnering
52 per cent of the 1,500 votes cast at the polls.

Atamyan received a total of 769 votes. In Nicosia, he snagged 224
votes at one of the two polling stations in the capital, and another
272 at the second. In Limassol he received 113 votes and in Larnaca
160. He succeeds Bedros Kalaydjian, who died on September 1, aged 71.

The second of the two main candidates, Dr Antranik Ashdjian received
a total of 649 votes or 43.91 per cent. In Nicosia, he received 198
votes at the first polling station and 222 at the second, while in
Limassol Asdjian secured 89 votes and in Larnaca 140.

Outsider and late-entry candidate Parsegh Zartarian received a total
of 60 votes or 4.06 per cent. In Nicosia, he garnered 26 votes at
the first polling station and 15 at the second. In Limassol Zartarian
secured 13 votes and in Larnaca 6.

All three candidates were running on a ‘unity’ ticket, pledging to
bring the divided 3,000-strong Armenian community together to resolve
decades of polarisation within the ethnic group.

Immediately after his victory on Sunday, Atamyan promised to act as
representative for all Armenians in Cyprus and strive to meet his
pre-election commitments.

He called on all Armenians to join him in a struggle to promote
solutions to the serious problems faced by the community and said he
would be also be running for re-election in the May 2006 parliamentary
elections to finish the work he is about to start.

Atamyan said he had already begun contacts with all Cypriot political
parties to solve the problems faced by the Armenians in Cyprus.

He told the Cyprus Mail yesterday that he plans to visit the Armenian
Patriarch in Lebanon and to begin negotiations for the reopening of
the Melkonian, the only Armenian secondary school in Cyprus, which
was closed down for financial reasons.

Opponents of Atamyan, who had been on the school board, said he had
not done enough to help save the school.

“I will start in the next few days to have negotiations on the school
with the alumni and we will see how to proceed,” Atamyan said.

Commenting on the election results yesterday Ashdjian said he had
been honoured by the number of votes he received.

“It shows that nearly half of the Armenian community were pro change
and worried about the future and the mismanagement and closure of
the Melkonian,” he said. “I congratulated Dr Atayman last night and
I will see if his promises of cooperation will be met.”

Zartarian said he hadn’t expected to secure more votes than he had
“because of the deep polarisation that exists in the community”.

“However I am happy that my message was heard by all of the
electorate. I’m glad that I had a lot of positive feedback from people
and that the message was approved, even though for various reasons
it was not converted into votes,” he said. “People didn’t want to
switch. But it’s a start.”

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN ARMENIA: DECLARATION BY THE CHAIR OF THE COE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS

National Assembly of RA, Armenia
Strasbourg, 10.10.2005

Diogo Freitas do Amaral, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal
and Chairman of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, made
the following statement:

“After several months of intense debate, Armenia’s National Assembly
has just adopted a number of constitutional amendments, in line
with the country’s commitment undertaken when joining the Council of
Europe. The referendum to be held on 27 November on this reform will be
vital for Armenia. By turning out to vote during the referendum, the
people of Armenia will indeed be deciding on changes of fundamental
importance for their future. The expertise of the constitutional
amendments by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has shown
that the reform will allow the alignment of the Constitution with
European standards by enhancing the independence of the judiciary,
providing a more balanced distribution of power between the executive
and the legislative branches, as well as promoting local democracy
and freedom of the media.

I appeal to the sense of responsibility and concern for the common
good of Armenia’s political parties, beyond their differences, in
order to support this reform, which is essential to the country’s
future as a democracy. By participating in the referendum and showing
their attachment to the values of freedom and democracy, the people
of Armenia will show their desire to see Armenia fully assume its
part in the European construction.”

“After several months of intense debate, Armenia’s National Assembly
has just adopted a number of constitutional amendments, in line
with the country’s commitment undertaken when joining the Council of
Europe. The referendum to be held on 27 November on this reform will be
vital for Armenia. By turning out to vote during the referendum, the
people of Armenia will indeed be deciding on changes of fundamental
importance for their future. The expertise of the constitutional
amendments by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has shown
that the reform will allow the alignment of the Constitution with
European standards by enhancing the independence of the judiciary,
providing a more balanced distribution of power between the executive
and the legislative branches, as well as promoting local democracy
and freedom of the media.

I appeal to the sense of responsibility and concern for the common
good of Armenia’s political parties, beyond their differences, in
order to support this reform, which is essential to the country’s
future as a democracy. By participating in the referendum and showing
their attachment to the values of freedom and democracy, the people
of Armenia will show their desire to see Armenia fully assume its
part in the European construction.”

CEC SEAL IS DIFFERENT

A1+
| 19:18:24 | 10-10-2005 | Politics |

Today the Central Electoral Committee convened two blitz
sessions. During the first the structure got its second same Referendum
Electoral Committee (REC).

The only question which sounded during the first session of the
new Committee was that of Felix Khachatryan from Justice bloc. He
wanted to explain to members of the committee that elections cannot
be organized without the new Committee having its own seal.

No member of the Committee tried to understand that Felix Khachatryan
demanded only to abide by the law which does not allow to use the
CEC seal if that day other elections have been held.

Head of the CEC and REC Garegin Azaryan considered the question of
Felix Khachatryan rather odd, wondering if there is any difference
between the seals. “In that case you can seal the document with that
of the condominium”, Felix Khachatryan said. “Please do not compare,
our functions are different”, the head of the committee said.

The second session of the CEC confirmed several amendments to the
order of observers’ mission during the elections.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A PLAN FOR PEACE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

International Crisis Group, Belgium
Tbilisi/Brussels, 11 October 2005

Europe Report N°167
;id=3740

Settlement of the long running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict — the most
significant obstacle to stability in the South Caucasus — remains
elusive, despite more optimistic noises recently from Azerbaijan and
Armenia. Eleven years after the 1994 ceasefire, burgeoning defence
budgets, increasing ceasefire violations, and continuing demonisation
by each side of the other side are ominous signs that time for a peace
agreement is running out. But a compromise can now be constructed
around an approach that, while addressing all the matters in dispute,
leaves the core issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s ultimate status open for
later resolution, after other measures have been put in place.

Key elements of that proposed settlement package include the
withdrawal of the Armenia-backed Nagorno-Karabakh forces from
the occupied districts of Azerbaijan surrounding the entity; the
renunciation by Azerbaijan of the use of force to reintegrate the
entity; the deployment of international peacekeepers; the return
of displaced persons; and the re-opening of trade and communication
links. Nagorno-Karabakh’s status should ultimately be determined by an
internationally sanctioned referendum with the exclusive participation
of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris, but only after the above measures
have been implemented. Until then Nagorno-Karabakh would remain part
of Azerbaijan, though in practical terms it would be self-governing
and enjoy an internationally acknowledged interim status.

Today Armenia and Azerbaijan remain divided on vital points.

Azerbaijan does not accept any compromise of its territorial integrity,
nor does it agree that Nagorno-Karabakh’s population alone can vote
on determining its final status. Armenia is not willing to support
withdrawal from the seven occupied districts around Nagorno-Karabakh,
or allow the return of Azerbaijan internally displaced persons (IDPs)
to Nagorno-Karabakh, until the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh is a
reality. There has been tentative discussion of a possible plebiscite
to determine the entity’s final status, but with none of the necessary
detail agreed as to who would vote on what, when and how, nor any
agreement as to what other settlement conditions would create the
context for such a vote.

The Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), currently co-chaired by France, Russia and the U.S.,
has been facilitating negotiations since 1994. After a decade of
fruitless talks, a new format of meetings, the Prague Process,
involving direct bilateral contact between the foreign ministers
of Armenia and Azerbaijan was initiated in 2004. During the past
twelve months the participants and OSCE co-chairs alike have publicly
expressed optimism that a deal can be reached soon. But there is an
urgent need to translate that generalised optimism into very specific
agreement and action.

An earlier Crisis Group report explored how the Armenian and Azeri
communities of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts live
today and view resolution of the conflict.[1] Against that background,
this report examines the causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
analyses the OSCE-led negotiations process as it has evolved since
1992, and identifies the necessary elements of a workable and
achievable peace plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To Avoid a Resumption of Fighting:

1. All parties to the conflict should respect the 1994 ceasefire,
refrain from using force, not promote the use of force, and end the
arms race in the region by halting the rise of defence budgets.

To Create an Appropriate Environment for Conflict Settlement:

2. Azerbaijan should resume direct contact with the de facto
Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and facilitate the development of closer
contact between Karabakh Azeris and Karabakh Armenians.

3. The de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should end support
for settlement of formerly Azeri majority areas with Armenians,
including by:

(a) stopping privatisation of land, homes and businesses in those
areas;

(b) ceasing to establish local administrations and infrastructure in
the occupied areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh; and

(c) protecting the remaining Azeri homes.

4. Armenia should encourage the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities
to take a more conciliatory stance on resolution of the conflict.

To Address the Substantive Matters in Dispute:

5. The parties should sign an agreement that includes the following
elements:

(a) renunciation of the threat or use of force to settle disputes,
including any that may arise in connection with the implementation
of the peace agreement;

(b) creation of a joint commission including Azerbaijan and
Nagorno-Karabakh representatives and chaired by the OSCE to supervise
implementation;

(c) incremental withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces backed by
Armenia from all occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, but
beginning with five districts and occurring simultaneously with the
deployment of international peacekeepers;

(d) withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces backed by Armenia from the
Kelbajar district once appropriate security measures are in place
at the Murov mountain pass, and from the Lachin district following
agreements guaranteeing secure communications through the Lachin
corridor;

(e) safe and voluntary return of displaced persons to their pre-war
homes in the formerly occupied districts, once withdrawal and
international deployment have been completed;

(f) assurances for free movement of people and goods, including the
lifting of all blockades and the reopening of all transport and trade
routes (road and rail) closed as a result of the conflict;

(g) implementation of confidence-building measures in cooperation with
international organisations including the UN, International Committee
of the Red Cross, OSCE and non-governmental organisations; and

(h) identification of a referendum mechanism for resolving the final
status of Nagorno-Karabakh, as set out below, with provision until
then for the entity to have internationally recognised interim status,
and its governing bodies to be elected under international supervision.

6. The final status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be decided by a
self-determination referendum, which would:

(a) be held after the return of displaced Azeris to former
Azeri-majority areas in Nagorno-Karabakh and after an international
conference determines that Nagorno-Karabakh has met international
preconditions for statehood, including the protection of minority
rights, such review to be conducted for the first time five years
after the signing of the peace agreement;

(b) give Nagorno-Karabakh an appropriate range of options, including
unity with, and secession from, Azerbaijan;

(c) be held with the exclusive participation of Karabakh Armenians
and Azeris; and

(d) have its exact modalities agreed upon in talks chaired by the OSCE,
based on the principle that all parties will recognise the validity
of its result.

To Facilitate Public Acceptance of the Settlement:

7. Azerbaijan should allow Karabakh Azeris to play a bigger role
in the negotiations and the internal political process, including
by passing legislation allowing Karabakh Azeris to elect the head
of their community, ensuring voting rights for displaced persons in
the 2005 parliamentary elections, and permitting all candidates to
campaign in collective centres.

8. Government officials and media in Azerbaijan and Armenia should
refrain from using belligerent and xenophobic language against
“the other”.

9. Officials involved in the negotiations process should agree to
a broad common strategy for disseminating information about that
process, coordinate efforts to present to the public elements of a
possible agreement, and not be reluctant to start a debate on highly
sensitive questions.

To Build Confidence and Guarantee Sustainable Peace:

10. Donors should assist Armenia and Azerbaijan in developing and
carrying out small, cross-border, sub-regional trade, humanitarian
and public health projects, including in response to disasters, and
should fund and help carry out programs aimed at improving mutual
understanding, tolerance and reconciliation that target civil society,
teachers and journalists.

11. Donors should carry out a common assessment mission of needs in
Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied districts, and once a peace
agreement is signed should hold an international donor coordination
conference and begin implementing projects in the former conflict zone.

12. Armenia and Azerbaijan should each investigate war crimes,
prosecute those responsible and adopt legislation to give amnesty
to those who participated in the conflict but did not commit serious
offences.

13. Armenia and Azerbaijan should establish joint commissions to:

(a) make a political assessment of the conflict’s causes and
consequences; and

(b) deal with inter-state property return and compensation questions.

To Increase the Prospects for a Peace Agreement and to Give It
Stability:

14. The UN Security Council, the OSCE and the EU Council of Ministers
should pledge to serve as guarantors of the peace agreement.

15. The OSCE should expand the mandate of the Personal Representative
of the Chairman-in-Office to include working with civil society,
media and opposition political forces in order to facilitate contacts
between the sides at the local level and build confidence and opening
an office in the occupied territories, staffed with political, human
rights and elections officers.

16. The EU should become more actively engaged in the conflict
resolution effort by basing the office of its Special Representative
for the South Caucasus in the region.

17. The EU should include long-term programs and strategies to promote
confidence building in its Action Plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

—————————————————————-
[1] Crisis Group Europe Report N°166, Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the
Conflict from the Ground, 14 September 2005.

–Boundary_(ID_KsU/FMr0T5NANI5H+zHBuQ)–

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A PLAN FOR PEACE

International Crisis Group, Belgium
Oct 11 2005

;id=3740&m=1

Tbilisi/ Brussels, 11 October 2005: A compromise peace in
Nagorno-Karabakh looks possible, but significant stumbling blocks
remain.

Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace,* the latest report from the
International Crisis Group, examines the causes of the conflict,
analyses the negotiation process led by the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and identifies the necessary
elements of an achievable peace plan. An earlier Crisis Group report,
from 14 September 2005, explored how Armenian and Azeri communities
view resolution of the conflict.

“The two sides appear close to agreeing on key principles of a peace
deal”, says Sabine Freizer, Director of Crisis Group’s Caucasus
Project. “It is essential that the governments now begin preparing
their people for a compromise”.

Major elements of the proposed settlement package include:

Leaving the core issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status open for later
resolution; withdrawal of Armenia-backed Nagorno-Karabakh forces
from the occupied districts of Azerbaijan surrounding the entity;
renunciation by Azerbaijan of the use of force to reintegrate the
entity; deployment of international peacekeepers; return of displaced
persons; and re-opening of trade and communication links.

Nagorno-Karabakh’s status should ultimately be determined by an
internationally sanctioned referendum with the exclusive participation
of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris, but only after the above measures
have been implemented. Until then, Nagorno-Karabakh would remain part
of Azerbaijan, though in practical terms it would be self-governing
and enjoy an internationally acknowledged interim status.

Eleven years after the 1994 ceasefire, burgeoning defence budgets,
increasing ceasefire violations, and continuing demonisation by
each side of the other side are ominous signs that time for a peace
agreement is running out.

“So far, despite progress in the negotiations, the resumption of war
remains as likely as peace”, says Alain Deletroz, Crisis Group’s Vice
President for Europe.