EUROPA (press release), Belgium
March 7 2006

Benita Ferrero-Waldner
European Commissioner for External Relations and European
Neighbourhood Policy
European Neighbourhood Policy
Swedish Institute for International Affairs and the European
Commission Representation in Sweden
Stockholm, 7 March 2006

Reference: SPEECH/06/149 Date: 07/03/2006

SPEECH/06/149

Swedish Institute for International Affairs and the European
Commission Representation in Sweden
Stockholm, 7 March 2006

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First let me thank Mr Anders Hellner and the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs for co-hosting this seminar with the Commission
in Sweden.

I am very happy to be here today in this beautiful city, on my first
visit to Sweden as Commissioner for External Relations.

Sweden has always played an important role in promoting international
peace, understanding and solidarity. It has a distinguished record of
statesmen and women of which it is rightly proud, from Raoul
Wallenberg to Dag Hammarskjold, from Olof Palme to Anna Lindh. With
such an international pedigree Sweden clearly makes an enormous
contribution to the EU’s international standing.

Giving the EU a stronger voice in the world is one of the four
priorities of the Barroso Commission, together with prosperity,
solidarity and security. Our most urgent task is to restore dynamic
and sustainable growth in Europe and provide more and better jobs to
Europe’s citizens. All of which requires a strong EU, able to promote
and protect its interests on the international stage.

We are also facing another major challenge – the gap between the EU’s
achievements and the way its citizens perceive it. Across Europe
people are asking what the EU is for, what it is doing to respond to
their concerns and how it will help meet 21st century challenges.

The EU has to deliver results in areas its citizens deem important –
jobs, security, energy and migration.

The stronger we are, the more we can deliver. And by achieving
concrete results we will re-establish confidence in the EU and
demonstrate to our citizens the benefits of European Union in the
21st century.

***

Which brings me to the topic of today’s seminar, the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Many of you here will remember the
genesis of ENP. It’s a policy which has always had strong support
from the Swedish government. Anna Lindh and Leif Pagrotsky were among
its chief proponents.

The EU’s aim is to expand the zone of prosperity, stability and
security beyond our borders. The question is how to use our soft
power to leverage the kinds of reforms that would make that possible.

The answer, in the decade following the fall of the Berlin wall, was
enlargement. This has been a tremendously successful policy, with a
momentous impact on the European continent. EU enlargement has made
an extraordinary contribution to peace and prosperity, thanks to our
strategic use of the incentives on offer. And I know Sweden has been
a strong supporter of this policy.

Nor is it over – we still have work to do to consolidate 2004’s
enlargement and there are new enlargement commitments on which we
must deliver.

Yet it is clear that the EU cannot enlarge ad infinitum.

So how else can we pursue our geo-strategic interest in expanding the
zone of stability, security and prosperity beyond our borders? How
best can we support our neighbours’ political and economic
transitions, and so tackle our own citizens’ concerns? ENP provides
the answer.

At its heart is the question of borders – not as a way of defining
ourselves, but because they are key to many of our citizens’ urgent
concerns – security, migration and economic growth. As Sweden knows
full well, borders cannot be solely about barriers and obstacles.
They must work flexibly as a facilitator of economic, social and
cultural exchanges.

That, in its essence, is what the European Neighbourhood Policy is
about. It is about responding to our citizens’ concerns for
prosperity, security and stability, not with an abstract concept but
with concrete, measurable results. And it is about helping our
neighbours towards their own prosperity, security and stability, not
by imposing reforms, but by supporting and encouraging reformers.

We offer our eastern and southern neighbours many of the benefits
previously associated only with membership, such as a stake in our
internal market, involvement in EU programmes, and cooperation in
transport and energy networks.

It is designed to offer a privileged form of partnership now,
irrespective of the exact nature of the future relationship with the
EU.

ENP is based on the same kind of positive conditionality underpinning
the enlargement process. We agree Action Plans with our partners
which set out the path to a closer relationship. Differentiation is
key – each country’s Action Plan responds to its particular needs and
capacities. In addition, progress is rewarded with greater incentives
and benefits. Only as our partners fulfil their commitments to
strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights;
promote market-oriented economic reforms; and cooperate on key
foreign policy objectives such as counter-terrorism and
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, will we offer an
even deeper relationship.

Knowing the important role Sweden has played in the Northern
Dimension, I should point out that ENP is coherent with and
complementary to other processes in which we participate with our
partners. The principle of differentiation applies to our relations
with all our partners. With each one we promote our mutual goals in
ways specific to that country.

Questions have been raised as to whether the incentives on offer are
sufficient to encourage reform, and whether this is not simply a
repackaging of old policies in new clothes. My response is two-fold.
First, the impetus for meaningful reform must always come from
within. If that desire is not there, no amount of external assistance
or pressure will build sustainable reform. That is why the EU
believes in encouraging not imposing reform. Second, the EU’s offer
through ENP is not a second-best option to enlargement, but rather a
highly-desirable step-change in our relations offering substantive
benefits to all involved.

ENP has enabled us to tackle some of our citizens’ most pressing
concerns, like energy supplies, migration, and security.

1) Energy

Energy has been an important component of ENP since its inception.
But the events at the beginning of the year between Russia, Moldova
and Ukraine were a wake-up call, reminding us that energy security
needs to be even higher on our political agenda.

We need to continue to pursue close energy cooperation with our
partners in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and the Mediterranean. In
all my visits to neighbourhood countries, including Ukraine last week
and the South Caucasus last month, energy features heavily.

ENP promotes integration with Europe’s energy market and helps to
create the regulatory environment in which private sector investment
in infrastructure can take place. It also helps the countries
concerned come in line with European standards and norms.

In 2006 we will be boosting our energy cooperation as part of a
broader EU effort on energy supply – which will be outlined in the
Commission’s Green Paper tomorrow.

2) Migration

Migration is a highly sensitive issue for EU public opinion. In
uncertain times, it is understandable that our citizens are worried
about employment and increased competition for jobs.

Europe needs migration. Our populations are getting smaller and
growing older.

Through ENP we are trying to manage migration better: welcoming those
migrants we need for our economic and social well-being, while
clamping down on illegal immigration.

Throughout our neighbourhood we support projects to strengthen
institutional capacities; improve border controls; upgrade reception
facilities for asylum applicants and refugees; and fight illegal
immigration and people trafficking. We are also helping to build
institutions that enforce the rule of law and promote respect for
human rights.

3) Security

We are also using the ENP Action Plans to help increase security. We
have fostered practical cooperation between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority on issues such as trade, energy and transport.
Increasing cooperation and economic growth are absolutely vital for a
sustainable solution to the Middle East conflict. We will continue
these actions with the new Palestinian government, providing it seeks
peace by peaceful means, recognises the state of Israel and respects
its international commitments.

The border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine is designed to
contribute to resolving the long-running sore of the Transnistria
conflict. And the Action Plans we are currently discussing with
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will address issues relating to
Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia’s internal conflicts.

4) Stability

An important part of ENP is the commitment partner governments make
to political reform. We are offering extra financial assistance to
those countries making real progress in implementing political
reforms and promoting human rights.

ENP also promotes economic and social reform, both for reasons of
solidarity, but also because we want stability in our neighbourhood
and thus added security for ourselves. So we are tackling poverty
through employment creation schemes; funding health and education
projects; and promoting economic development by improving the trade
and investment environment and stimulating small businesses and
entrepreneurs.

Through the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, we are working
to build bridged between different peoples and cultures. As recent
events have shown, this must remain an important focus of our
attention. Here we can build on the great experience and credibility
of our member states, particularly Sweden.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We hope to expand full participation in ENP to Belarus, Libya and
Syria. But the political conditions are not yet ripe. Will the
elections in Belarus in less than two weeks pave the way for
increased democracy and so participation in ENP? Unfortunately, the
signs are not good. Until that day we have to look for alternative
ways of fostering the conditions for democracy. Over the last year we
have found innovative ways to channel assistance, such as the daily
broadcasts produced by Deutsche Welle, and our support for the
European Humanities University in Vilnius. Last week our new 2
million project for independent television and radio broadcasting
began. We will continue our commitment to the Belarusian people,
whatever the results of the elections, for democratic change is a
long term project which requires sustained commitment from us all.

We hope that after its elections at the end of this month Ukraine
will be in a position to take its cooperation with the EU still
further. We would like to do more, like moving towards a free trade
area as soon as Ukraine joins the WTO and finalising visa
facilitation and readmission.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am grateful for Sweden’s continued support for the implementation
of the European Neighbourhood Policy and I look forward to discussing
with Minister Freivalds and the Riksdag later today how we can go
further together.

Our task is to build on ENP’s early achievements and to make it a
truly beneficial policy for both our neighbours and ourselves. As we
deliver results we are not only benefiting our neighbours, but also
demonstrating to our citizens that the European Union does bring them
an added value.

On the eve of international women’s day, let me leave you with the
words of one of Sweden’s most outstanding women, Anna Lindh, `For
democracy to work in our society and passivity to disappear,’ she
said, `people must first come together and learn to work together for
common goals.’ We owe it to her memory, and the memory of Olof Palme,
the 20th anniversary of whose death was last week, not only to work
together, but to achieve those common goals.

Thank you.

A1+

AND PERSECUTIONS LATER

07:10 pm 07 March, 2006

«Such a behavior towards «Heritage» party and its leader is one of the links
of the chain pretensions realized by administration», – that’s how
charàcterizes the press service of the party the incident which happened
several days ago.

Let’s remind that on March 4, Saturday, at about 14:00 an alarm call was got
by an unknown citizen, that «K.G.B ( State Security Committee ) officials
were breaking» the door of the «Heritage» party central office. The
representatives of the party arrived on the scene and witnesses the last
touches of replacing the broken lock of the door.

According to the message, the incident is connected with

PBS’ perverse genocide debate

Big Bird stabs Armenians in the back

Los Angeles Times
March 9, 2006
Op-Ed

By Aris Janigian

I am a devoted viewer of PBS. From “Masterpiece Theater” to “Sesame
Street,” I have always considered it a bastion of creative and
intelligent TV. But two weeks ago, PBS stabbed me and every other
Armenian American in the back when it announced that its upcoming
documentary, “The Armenian Genocide,” will be followed on some stations
by a panel discussion featuring two so-called scholars who claim that
the genocide is a myth. Worse, according to genocide historian Peter
Balakian, PBS threatened to pull the documentary if he and another
genocide scholar declined to participate “on the other side” in the
panel discussion, which was taped in January. Although the documentary
is not slated to run until April, programmers across the country are now
deciding whether to air it at all, air it alone or air it with the taped
debate.

“We believe [the genocide] is settled history,” said Jacoba Atlas,
senior vice president of programming at PBS, but “it seemed like a good
idea to have a panel and let people have their say.”

This is perverse. Either there was a genocide or there wasn’t. Would
anyone tolerate David Irving, the notorious Holocaust revisionist,
hashing it out on a panel with Elie Wiesel after a documentary on the
Nazi concentration camps? Should we give janjaweed reps airtime the next
time we run a documentary on their genocide in Darfur?

Why has PBS resorted to double-speak in regard to the Armenian genocide?
The answer is simple: PBS is capitulating to politics. For years the
Turks, America’s so-called allies, have issued threats against any
organization or country that challenges their quack reading of history.
When the French recognized the Armenian genocide, the Turks recalled
their ambassador to France, boycotted French products and canceled
military contracts. They have threatened to withdraw strategic support
from our country if we should dare make the same mistake.

Article 301 of the Turkish penal code makes it a crime to “denigrate”
Turkey by, for instance, mentioning the Armenian genocide in public. In
March, the famous Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk did just that and faced
charges. International outcry and a technicality got his case dismissed,
but others are still in peril.

One of PBS’ genocide deniers, University of Louisville history professor
Justin McCarthy, was invited by the Turkish Grand Assembly – reeling
from European Union pressure to come clean about its genocidal past –
for a pep talk in March. “I know that the Turks will resist demands to
confess to a crime they did not commit,” McCarthy intoned, “no matter
the price of honesty. I have faith in the integrity of the Turks.” These
rousing words brought the lawmakers, many of whom had sanctioned Article
301, to their feet. Does PBS really want to give such a belligerent
falsifier airtime?

“It seemed like a good idea,” Atlas said.

Raphael Lemkin wouldn’t agree. He coined the word “genocide” in 1944,
and viewed the Armenian case as a seminal example of such an atrocity.
Norman Mailer, Carol Gilligan, John Updike and Cornel West wouldn’t
think so either. They signed a petition, along with 150 other scholars
and writers, reaffirming the genocide’s historical truth. Directors of
Holocaust research centers around the world – including Wiesel and
Yehuda Bauer in 2000 – also signed a statement declaring the Armenian
genocide an incontestable historical fact. Even the Turks are on the
record as acknowledging the truth. When Turkey was defeated in World War
I, the allied powers created a tribunal that included members of the new
Turkish government. The butchers behind the genocide had fled by then,
but they were found guilty and sentenced to death in absentia.

Certainly the few remaining genocide survivors, now in their 90s,
wouldn’t think it “a good idea” to give the deniers a forum. They were
children when hundreds of thousands of Armenians were herded like cattle
through the scorching slaughterhouse of the Anatolian desert toward one
of 25 concentration camps. They watched as their people were murdered,
raped, tortured and left to starve in those camps. Armenian homes and
shops were occupied and looted; ancient churches were turned into
mosques or barns, used for target practice by the Turkish army or burned
to the ground to eliminate any trace of Armenians in those lands.

By the time the Turks were finished, an estimated 1.5 million people had
perished – more than half the Armenian population in Turkey. Armenians
called it Medz Yeghern: “The Great Cataclysm.”

The denial of genocide, as many have rightly observed, is the
continuation of genocide. It should be clear to PBS, to Atlas and to
programmers across the nation that the American public broadcasting
system should not be complicit in a murderous lie.

ARIS JANIGIAN is the author of the novel “Bloodvine.”

commentary/la-oe-janigian9mar09,0,5500780.story?co ll=la-home-commentary

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
—————————————— —-
PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
375010 Telephone: +37410. 544041 ext 202
Fax: +37410. 562543
Email: [email protected]

PRESS RELEASE

07-03-2006

Minister Oskanian Receives Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew J. Bryza

Minister Oskanian received Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs on March 7.

During the meeting, the two discussed the present status and future
prospects for Armenian-American relations, as well as a wide range of
international and regional issues. The Minister expressed appreciation for
the US Government’s continuing support of Armenia’s democratic development,
human rights protections and economic reforms. In this connection, they
discussed some details associated with the Millennium Challenge Compact to
be signed in Washington later this month.

Further, the Minister and the Deputy Assistant Secretary focused on regional
energy issues from the perspective of Armenia’s energy diversification
efforts.

Minister Oskanian briefed Mr. Bryza on some key issues in Armenian foreign
policy, paying special attention to implementation of Armenia’s NATO
Individual Partnership Action Plan and ongoing talks with the EU on the
European Neighborhood Policy, the second phase of which had concluded
successfully on March 6.

Toward the end of the meeting, Mr. Oskanian and Mr. Bryza explored several
issues having to do with regional cooperation, as well as the situation that
followed the recent presidential meeting on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
settlement.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Haaretz
Thursday March 9, 2006
ml

The holy basin: sovereignty, autonomy, internationalization or division?

By Nadav Shragai

The poet Uri Zvi Greenberg devoted his first speech to the First Knesset
to “the divided Jerusalem” and to his longing for the Old City beyond
the border. Greenberg, who accepted Menachem Begin’s offer to assume the
second spot on the Herut movement’s list for Knesset, emphasized that
the name Jerusalem meant only the area within the walls, “in which lies
the Temple Mount.” The city outside the walls was considered the
“outskirts of Jerusalem.”

As Israel heads toward the elections for the 17th Knesset, most elected
officials are a long way from echoing the feelings expressed by Uri Zvi
Greenberg. (Five years ago, at the most recent Camp David summit, the
Barak government even showed its readiness to concede roughly one-half
of the Old City, as well as a major share of Israeli sovereignty over
the Temple Mount.) But on the eve of elections, the parties prefer not
to engage in an open discussion about the future of the most serious
core of disagreement in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

As opposed to their readiness to discuss the transfer of Arab
neighborhoods in East Jerusalem to the Palestinian Authority, when it
comes to the Old City and the Temple Mount, there is still reticence
among Israeli political parties when it comes to shattering public
conventions. The same public opinion that favors the concession of Arab
neighborhoods is opposed to concessions on the Old City and Temple
Mount. But on one matter there is no dispute: These are the most
sensitive and emotionally charged places in the world.
One fact, not necessarily a major one, found in the Lapidoth report,
which was issued a few years ago, possibly tells the entire story. The
report, which for the first time mapped out in detail the 900 dunams
(225 acres) that are so charged with emotion, that hold such significant
symbols and memories, revealed that the holy places have a tendency to
reproduce. Particularly in Jerusalem. And especially in the Old City. In
1949, a list of 30 holy places in Jerusalem was submitted to the United
Nations. Only half a century later, three authors – an Israeli Jew, a
Palestinian Armenian Christian and a Palestinian Muslim – prepared a
list that enumerated no less than 326 holy places.

The Lapidoth committee, which labored in the framework of the Jerusalem
Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS), also placed at the disposal of
policy makers a type of “holy meter,” which was developed by Dr. Yifrah
Zilberman, who proposed eight indicators for ranking holiness of the
holy sites in Jerusalem.

Currently, Professor Ruth Lapidoth, who on the upcoming Independence Day
will receive the Israel Prize for Justice, heads another team, also in
the framework of the JIIS. The team submitted to the policy makers
several weeks ago options for a settlement in the “historic basin of
Jerusalem” – that is, the Old City and adjacent territories.

Lapidoth and her team are not the first to offer a different solution to
the Old City and to the holy basin, and to the rest of Jerusalem. For
example, as early as April 1992, in an article that appeared in a
Jordanian newspaper Adnan Abu Odeh, chief of the Royal Court of Jordan
and an aide to the late King Hussein, raised the idea of expropriating
all political sovereignty from Jerusalem within the walls, and to see it
as a holy place worthy of being governed by a joint council of Jews,
Muslims and Christians.

“The Old City within the walls should be divided from the areas outside
the walls,” Abu Odeh wrote. “The main holy sites of the three religions
are clearly defined, distinguished and known: The Church of the Holy
Sepulcher for Christians, the Western Wall for Jews, and the Temple
Mount for Muslims – the true and holy Jerusalem will not belong to any
state or any single religion. It would belong to the entire world and to
the three religions, such that no state would have political sovereignty
over it.” Abu Odeh even suggested a complete ban on flags waving between
the walls.

Similarly, in the numerous meetings held between Yitzhak Rabin and King
Hussein, use was made of the term “Super-sovereignty” in relation to the
Old City and the holy places. Rabbi Menachem Fruman of Tekoa, a Hassid
of inter-religious dialogue, has for years called for the definition of
areas that would have no sovereignty, and their assignment to members of
the religions. Lapidoth herself, raised the idea during the 1990s of
suspending Israeli sovereignty in the Old City for an agreed-upon
period, even up to 20 or 30 years.

However, the current report, which was composed by the JIIS team headed
by Lapidoth, to a large extent abandons the idea of areas devoid of
sovereignty, and – in the majority of the options it proposes – returns
to the old-style partition. The five options that were recently
presented to the Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the chairman of
the Likud and Labor parties were formulated by a series of experts
gathered by the JIIS: Professor Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ora Ahimeir, Dr.
Shmuel Berkowitz, Dr. Moshe Hirsch, Dr. Yifrah Zilberman, Dr. Maya
Choshen, Dr. Kobi Michael, Reuven Merhav, Israel Kimhi, Dr. Yitzhak
Reiter, Amnon Rimon and Dr. Emanuel Sharon.

The first option proposes full sovereignty and control by Israel
throughout the basin, while granting some autonomy to the Palestinian
residents, and perhaps also determining a special status for the holy
places to Christianity and Islam. The meaning of this proposal is
essentially institutionalization of the existing situation, as even now
the Muslims and Christians operate their institutions autonomously. This
option also proposes to explore the possibility of granting
international immunity to the holy places or to the clergymen serving in
them.

The second option is the exact opposite: Full sovereignty and control by
the Palestinians throughout the basin, with autonomy for the Jewish
residents (for instance in the Jewish Quarter) and special status for
holy places to Jews. This option would perhaps be acceptable to the vast
majority of Palestinians, but one may safely assume that the State of
Israel would reject it out of hand, just as the Palestinians would
reject the first option.

The third option proposes a territorial division between the sides, with
international supervision. In this option, following an agreement on the
borderlines, each side is the sovereign and the source of authority in
the territory allocated to it in the agreement. The territorial division
of the historic basin, between Israel and Palestinians, could be
executed on the basis of a wide variety of alternate borderlines, which
the team lays out in the form of five sub-options:

1.The Jewish Quarter and Armenian Quarter would be included in the
sovereign territory of Israel. The Muslim Quarter and the Christian
Quarter would be under Palestinian sovereignty. The Temple Mount would
be included in the sovereign territory of Israel.

2.The Jewish and Armenian quarters would be included in the sovereign
territory of Israel. The Muslim and Christian quarters would be under
Palestinian sovereignty, and the Temple Mount would be under Palestinian
sovereignty.

3.The Jewish Quarter would be under Israeli sovereignty, the other three
quarters and the Temple Mount would be under Palestinian sovereignty.

4.The Jewish, Armenian, and Christian quarters, and the Temple Mount,
would be under Israeli sovereignty, and the Muslim Quarter under
Palestinian sovereignty.

5. Each of the above options, with territorial division of the Temple
Mount between Israel and the Palestinians.

The issues raised by this sort of division are complex, and some of them
seem unsolvable at first glance. A few examples: The request for freedom
of Jewish ritual on the Temple Mount, the issue of supervision of
construction, human rights, preservation of antiquities, border-crossing
conditions, restrictions on security matters, the scope of judicial and
criminal jurisdiction of each side over citizens of the other side that
enter territory under their control.

On the basis of this option, the two sides would grant surveillance and
oversight authorities to an international body. The international body,
which would function as an “observer,” would have to examine whether the
sides were in fact carrying out the directives of the arrangement.

A fourth option proposes joint management, and a division of authorities
between the two sides with international backing. The Old City basin
would operate as a single unit, and the sides would share the majority
of administrative and policing authorities in the basin. The
international body would be responsible to assume its authorities from
the sides and to apply them in areas in which the joint operation would
for whatever reason fail. The agreement could determine a minimal or
maximal period of time upon the conclusion of which the international
body would have to restore to the different sides those authorities that
it assumed.

The fifth option. Similarly, based on this option, the historic basin
would “usually” be administered as a single unit, although this would be
carried out by the international body itself, and not by the sides.
Nevertheless, it is possible that relatively small areas, primarily
those holy places on which there is no dispute, would be divided among
the sides on a territorial basis. According to this plan, which would
essentially mean the internationalization of the holy basin, the
international body would retain not only supervision and oversight
authorities, but would also be responsible for administration of the
holy basin, and would constitute the source of authority and control of
it.

One of the more interesting questions is who would operate the
international body, and here, once again, the team lays out several
sub-options, such as an international organization such as the UN, a
multi-national organization that would be established especially for the
purposes of this task, or a country such as the U.S. or Switzerland.

The permanent settlement team of the JIIS did not give its express
recommendation of any of these options, but it does favor some sort of
international involvement in administration of the Old City, mainly in
the area of security and preservation and supervision of the holy
places. The bottom line of the new report states: “It is especially
complicated to plan and put into place a special regime for the historic
basin, but it may be assumed that there is no other solution that could
gain the agreement of the two sides and of the international community.”

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PRESS RELEASE
Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, Information Services
Address:  Vagharshapat, Republic of Armenia
Contact:  Rev. Fr. Ktrij Devejian
Tel:  (374 10) 517 163
Fax:  (374 10) 517 301
E-Mail:  [email protected]
March 9, 2006

Supreme Spiritual Council Discusses Armenian Diocese of Georgia

On March 7, a meeting of the Supreme Spiritual Council was convened in the
Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, under the presidency of His Holiness Karekin
II, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians, with the
participation of the members of the Supreme Spiritual Council residing in
Armenia.

During the meeting, His Grace Bishop Vazgen Mirzakhanian, Primate of the
Armenian Diocese of Georgia, presented a report regarding the pastoral,
spiritual and church-building activities within the diocese.  He
particularly noted that the renovations of the church of Saint Gevork
(diocesan headquarters) and the church of Holy Etchmiadzin (in Tbilisi) are
planned for this year, the architectural drawings for which will soon be
completed.  His Grace happily reported on the spiritual reawakening within
the diocese, underlining the need for new clergymen to be assigned,
specifically to the vicarage in Javakhk.  He also noted that the
applications to Georgian state authorities have yet to be resolved,
regarding granting of appropriate legal standing to the diocese and the
return of six historic Armenian churches.  His Grace also stated that
certain mass media agencies within Georgia continue with anti-Armenian
announcements and commentaries, which create an atmosphere of intolerance
and tension.

In response to a query from the Supreme Spiritual Council, Bishop Vazgen
confirmed that the Synod of the Georgian Orthodox Church, with their
decision of February 6, 2006, announced the creation of a new diocese within
the Republic of Armenia entitled Tashir-Agarak, subject to the bishop of the
Diocese of Dmanisi in Georgia, `…with the intent of reestablishing its
historic diocese’.

The Supreme Spiritual Council expressed disappointment that the Georgian
Orthodox Church did not inform the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin regarding
the creation of a new diocese located in the northern region of the Republic
of Armenia; and further, that their Synod is creating a new diocese in a
region where the Georgian Church has no faithful; while the rights of
hundreds of thousands of faithful Armenians living in Georgia to have the
Armenian Diocese granted appropriate legal standing and historic Armenian
churches returned are being ignored and disregarded.

The Supreme Spiritual Council received the report of the Primate of the
Armenian Diocese of Georgia with appreciation and satisfaction, and
commended his successful implementation of his mission, exhorting him to
enthusiastically continue his efforts aimed towards the enrichment of the
Armenian Diocese of Georgia and the strengthening of the centuries-old
fraternal relations between the Armenian and Georgian people and Churches.

YEREVAN PRESS CLUB WEEKLY NEWSLETTER

MARCH 3-9, 2006

HIGHLIGHTS:

“PRESS CLUB+”: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC UNION ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
AND ARMENIA’S PLACE IN THE REGION

2005 REPORT OF US DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REGULATION BODIES GIVE ACCOUNT

“PRESS CLUB+”: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC UNION ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
AND ARMENIA’S PLACE IN THE REGION

On March 7 the first issue of “Press Club+” talk show cycle went on “Yerkir
Media” TV evening air (see YPC Weekly Newsletter, February 17-23, 2006).

The guests of Aram Abrahamian, program host, Chief Editor of “Aravot” daily,
were the leaders of National Democratic Union. The experts invited were
representatives of media and NGOs. The TV discussion was on the amendments
to RA Constitution, adopted at November 27, 2005 referendum, within the
context of separation of power braches, and Armenia’s place in the South
Caucasus, possibilities of developing regional cooperation.

It is planned that next Tuesday, March 14 at 21.00 the representatives of
“Orinats Yerkir” party will share their views on hot issues at “Press
Club+”.

2005 REPORT OF US DEPARTMENT OF STATE

On March 8 US Department of State released its report on human rights
practices in 2005 in different countries of the world, prepared by the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

Referring to the situation of freedom of speech and press in Armenia, US
Department of State notes in particular “while the law provides for freedom
of speech and of the press, the government partially limited freedom of
speech” and “there were incidents of violence, intimidation, and
self-censorship in the press”.

According to the authors of the report, private print media actively
expressed various views, “but no newspaper was completely independent of the
patronage from economic or political interest groups or individuals”.

Because of low newspaper circulation, most people in Armenia relied on
broadcast media for information, which, similarly to print media, are mainly
private. “In the capital and regional cities, private television stations
offered generally independent news coverage of good technical quality.”
Alongside this, the report emphasizes, that the substantive quality of TV
and radio news reporting varied due to self-censorship by journalists and
the stations’ dependence on patronage. The major broadcast media “generally
kept to progovernment lines”. “Economic pressure on broadcast media was more
common than outright political pressure, including authorities requesting
bribes, and advertising revenues used to influence programming.”

The report runs that senior officials of RA President’s office “continued to
provide policy guidance” to First Channel of Public Television of Armenia.
While its coverage was mainly factual, First Channel avoided editorial
commentary or criticism of the government.

Not giving broadcast license to “A1+”, “one of the country’s last
independent television stations”, was, as observers think, politically
motivated for criticizing President Kocharian’s administration. The attempts
of the TV Company to resume air are still unsuccessful, the report notes.

According to US Department of State, foreign media overall freely operate on
the territory of the country. At the same time, for three days beginning on
the day of the constitutional referendum (November 27, 2005), Radio “Free
Europe”/Radio “Liberty” broadcasts were periodically inaudible. The Public
Radio of Armenia (the First Program of which is aired on the same frequency
as the Armenian Service of RFE/RL) explained these disruptions by technical
problems. However, “some observers alleged the disruptions were politically
motivated”, the report says.

Harassment of the journalists is still a problem, the State Department
emphasizes, noting that “there were unconfirmed reports of incidents of
harassment and intimidation of journalists outside the capital”.

In contrast to the previous years, in 2005 “there were no reports of police
beating journalists”. One of the official documents of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs mentioned one case “involving possible violence against a
reporter” still under investigation, “at year’s end the circumstances
surrounding the case were unclear”. The report also refers to a very mild
punishment on the case of assaulting a photo reporter in August 2004 in
Tsaghkadzor.

“There was no official censorship; however, there were continued reports of
intimidation of journalists, and some print journalists continued to
practice self-censorship to avoid problems with the government and because
of pressure from official sources”, the report stresses. US Department of
State concluded that “during the year there were no charges brought against
journalists for libel of a public official”.

REGULATION BODIES GIVE ACCOUNT

In “TV Alik” weekly (review of TV and radio programs) of March 6-12, 2006,
account on the activity of the Council of RA Public TV and Radio Company in
2005 was published. Earlier, in the same weekly (February 27 – March 5,
2006) a report was publicized on the last year work of National Commission
on Television and Radio, the body, regulating private broadcasting. The
accounts are issued in compliance with RA Law “On Television and Radio”.

When reprinting or using the information above, reference to the Yerevan
Press Club is required.

You are welcome to send any comment and feedback about the Newsletter to:
[email protected]

Subscription for the Newsletter is free. To subscribe or unsubscribe from
this mailing list, please send a message to: [email protected]

Editor of YPC Newsletter – Elina POGHOSBEKIAN

Yerevan Press Club
9B, Ghazar Parpetsi str.
375002, Yerevan, Armenia
Tel.: (+ 374 10) 53 00 67; 53 35 41; 53 76 62
Fax: (+374 10) 53 56 61
E-mail: [email protected]
Web Site:

PRESS RELEASE
Armenian American Society for Studies on Stress & Genocide
130 W 79th Street
New York, NY 10024-6387
Tel: 212-362-4018
Fax: 201-941-5110
E-mail: [email protected]
Web:

ARMENIAN AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR STUDIES ON STRESS & GENOCIDE (AASSSG)
INVITES YOU TO A SYMPOSIUM & WORKSHOP
Genocide denial & healing: The case of the Genocide of the Armenians
On
Friday, 7 April 2006 -7 PM
at
Fordham University, 113 W 60th St., (Off 9th Avenue) NYC
12th Floor Faculty Lounge

Recipient of 2005 AASSSG Outstanding Achievement Award
Professor Ervin Staub, Professor of Psychology at the University of
Massachusetts

`Roots of Evil & Denial: The case of Genocide of the Armenians, and a
presentation by
Professor Elif Shafak, Professor of Literature, University of Arizona
`Silence and Secrets in Women’s Stories: Tracing the Effects of the
Massacres and Deportation of Armenians in 1915 in Contemporary Women’s Culture in
Turkey.
Family Constellations by
Sophia Kramer-Leto and Chiara Hayganush Megighian Zenati

Special Performance by: Armenian Dance Group from Long Island
Armenian Dances from Historic Western Armenia
Chairperson: Dr. Anie Kalayjian, Fordham University and President of
AASSSG &
Association for Disaster & Mass Trauma Studies.
KRIEGER Essay Contest winners will be announced and certificates given
Hosted by: Fordham Psychology Association, SPSSI NY, Association for
Disaster & Mass Trauma Studies, and Fordham Psi Chi

REFRESHMENTS WILL BE SERVED
Admission free with Fordham ID
For information contact Dr. Kalayjian @ E-mail: [email protected]_
(mailto:[email protected]) , 201 941-2266

Armenian National Committee of America – Western Region
104 North Belmont Street, Suite 200
Glendale, California 91206
Phone: 818.500.1918 Fax: 818.246.7353
[email protected]
PRESS RELEASE
Thursday, March 9, 2006

Contact: Lerna Kayserian
Tel: (818) 500-1918

ANCA-WR PARTICIPATES IN CALIFORNIA REPUBLICAN PARTY CONVENTION

— Meets with Governor and Other Republican Leaders in San Jose

SAN JOSE, CA – Representatives of the Armenian National Committee of
America – Western Region (ANCA-WR) traveled to San Jose to participate
in the California Republican Party (CRP) Convention held from February
24th through 26th. During the three-day convention, ANCA-WR Director
Armen Carapetian and ANCA activist Jack Hadjinian met with California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as well as other Republican leaders to
discuss issues of concern to Armenian Americans.

Carapetian and Hadjinian joined the CRP Volunteer Organization
Committee meeting with the California Congress of Republicans,
California State Republican National Hispanic Assembly, and California
Federation of Republican Women, among others, where participants
discussed opportunities to collaborate on initiatives. Many candidates
for statewide offices were on-hand during the meeting to provide
updates on their campaigns. Governor Schwarzenegger greeted the
volunteer organizations and thanked them for their
support. `Volunteers have always been extremely important in
campaigns,’ said the Governor in his remarks.

Following the meeting, Jack Hadjinian spoke with the Governor and
thanked him for his principled stance on the Armenian
Genocide. Hadjinian, a Montebello resident, extended a special
invitation to the Governor for this year’s commemoration of the
Armenian Genocide at the Armenian Martyrs Memorial Monument at
Bicknell Park. Paying homage to the victims of the Armenian Genocide
at the monument is an annual tradition for Los Angeles area Armenian
Americans. This commemoration regularly draws over 10,000 visitors,
including many elected officials. Most notably, in 1969, then Governor
Ronald Reagan joined His Holiness Khoren I in commemorating the
Armenian Genocide at the monument. This year’s remembrance event will
take place on Sunday, April 23rd.

The convention provided the ANCA-WR the opportunity to reach out to
California Republican elected officials and candidates for elected
office. Congressman Darrell Issa (CA-48), who was the only
Congressional member at the convention, reiterated his support for the
Armenian Genocide legislation pending in the House of
Representatives. State Senator Chuck Poochigian (Fresno) invited the
ANCA representatives to a special reception and briefed them on his
campaign for Attorney General. Carapetian and Hadjinian also met many
Republican Party activists over the weekend, including Armenian
Americans involved in the CRP and various campaigns.

`It’s important for us to be here, and it’s good to see that Armenian
Americans are involved at this crucial level of the political
process,’ said Carapetian. `We have received nothing but appreciation
for coming to this convention, and we will continue to build on the
relationships we established this weekend.’

The ANCA-WR sponsored an exhibitor table at the convention to
familiarize those in attendance with the organization, its programs
and initiatives. Carapetian and Hadjinian also took part in workshops
hosted by the CRP aimed to train activists in all areas of
campaigning. The next CRP Convention will be held in the fall.

The ANCA is the largest and most influential Armenian American
grassroots political organization. Working in coordination with a
network of offices, chapters, and supporters throughout the United
States and affiliated organizations around the world, the ANCA
actively advances the concerns of the Armenian American community on a
broad range of issues.

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Monday, February 27, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 39

IN THIS ISSUE:
*Putin ignores 50th anniversary of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech
*Kazakh oilfields to be explored by Rosneft
*Aliyev welcomes Putin to Baku

KHRUSHCHEV’S SECRET SPEECH AND PUTIN’S PUBLIC PRAISE

Besides the Olympic headlines, in the last two weeks the Russian media
has presented a remarkable variety of comments and reflections on an
event that shocked the country 50 years ago. On February 14, 1956, the
20th Communist Party Congress opened in Moscow. It proceeded routinely
until the last day, February 25, when Nikita Khrushchev delivered his
“Secret Speech,” describing the scale of internal repressions in the
country from the mid-1930s until Stalin’s death on March 6, 1953.

The astounded delegates had then to inform all party members in strict
confidentiality that the “Great Leader” was in fact a bloody tyrant. The
Soviet leadership was deeply split about this speech, which was not
written prior to the start of the congress. Khrushchev insisted that his
decision was partly driven by the struggle for power and partly by the
desire to escape from the fear that had dominated their lives for so
many years (Argumenty i fakty, February 15; Nezavisimaya gazeta,
February 17; Grani.ru, February 22).

There were several events around this anniversary, including a
conference at the Gorbachev Foundation, but Russian President Vladimir
Putin chose to ignore it. He covered a great many topics at his extended
press conference on January 31, found time to congratulate every Russian
Olympic champion, issued special decrees to commemorate composer Dmitry
Shostakovich and scholar Dmitry Likhachev, but did not say a word about
that remarkable watershed, much the same way that he never mentions the
coup of August 1991.

There is certainly more to this silence than just the political gut
feeling to avoid issues that remain divisive and might damage his
popularity in some marginal groups. The main guideline of the
“de-Stalinization” campaign launched by the 20th Congress was against
the super-concentration of power in one pair of hands — and that is
exactly what Putin has been doing since arriving at the Kremlin. A
carefully orchestrated PR campaign has sought to prove that this style
of governance suits Russia the best, so now 57% of Russians are sure
that the country needs a determined leader who could rule with a “firm
hand” (Newsru.com, February 25). This opinion ties logically with
others: 47% of respondents have a generally positive view of Stalin and
21% perceive him as a “wise statesman” (Vedomosti, February 14).

The main target of Khrushchev’s emotional condemnation was the KGB,
which had been the main instrument of repression. Putin, in recent
weeks, has been busy strengthening the role of the FSB, the direct and
proud successor of the all-penetrating structure created by Felix
Dzerzhinsky and empowered by Lavrenty Beria. The shadows of these
“founding fathers” were probably present at the annual meeting of the
FSB top echelon where Putin expressed his full satisfaction with their
work, praising particularly the success in countering espionage
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 8). He was far more generous with praise
to his former colleagues than to the system of law enforcement that,
according to his address to the session of the General Prosecution
Collegium, was unable to check the “alarming trends” in crime growth
(Vremya novostei, February 6). Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov,
nevertheless, apparently feels quite safe in his job, as he proved his
loyalty beyond a doubt by making the criminal case against Mikhail
Khodorkovsky and his colleagues.

These declarations and evaluations were followed by a potentially very
significant presidential decree, “On Measures in Countering Terrorism,”
since the main initiative among these measures was the creation of the
National Anti-Terrorist Committee under the chairmanship of FSB Director
Nikolai Patrushev (Lenta.ru, February 17). This Committee will include
representatives of all military and paramilitary structures, from the
General Staff to the Ministry of Emergencies, and will be served by the
Federal Operational Headquarters with a staff of 300 officers that would
constitute a separate unit in the FSB structures. The State Duma, always
very attentive to signals from the Kremlin, has urgently approved
legislation that provides a formal mandate for the new bodies (Lenta.ru,
February 22). It is quite obvious that terrorism has not suddenly
acquired new scale or urgency that would require
large-scale counter-measures. The newly created Committee might in fact
have very little to do with the threat of terrorism but quite a lot to
do with the struggle for influence and power between the key “power
structures.” The FSB has accepted the main responsibility for fighting
terrorism (which it carefully denied during the crises in Beslan and
Nalchik) and thus secured for itself the dominant position vis-à-vis
the Ministry of Interior and every other state authority (Kommersant,
February 17).

This certainly does not mean that the Kremlin clock is turned back to
Stalin’s times. Putin’s regime remains essentially “bloodless” and
cannot reproduce the fear of repressions; the FSB is not disciplined by
any ideology and its main driving force is greed, which makes a big
difference. The stylistic resemblance, nevertheless, is unmistakable —
and it probably explains why the Russian political establishment was so
upset by the resolution on the “Need for international condemnation of
crimes of totalitarian Communist regimes” adopted by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (Expert, 12 February).

Putin’s courtiers fancy themselves as heirs of the Generalissimos, but
at the same time they want to be accepted as equal members in “elite
clubs” like the G-8. The influx of “petrorubles” has made them
arrogantly self-confident but money can buy them only time – and
probably not that much of it. They are busy exploiting their special
gift – to turn every real proposition into a fake:
Quasi-authoritarianism and pseudo-democracy, phony elections and PR
exercises instead of “national projects.” That is why reflections on the
revelations at the 20th Congress are so disturbing for them: At the most
inappropriate moment somebody might suddenly stand up and establish for
fact that their emperor is wearing no clothes.

–Pavel K. Baev

ROSNEFT EXPANDING ITS ROLE IN KAZAKHSTAN

The chairman of Russia’s state oil company Rosneft, Sergei Bogdanchikov,
has completed a round of discussions in Kazakhstan with Kazakhstan’s
Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov, Energy and Mineral Resources Minister
Baktykozha Izmukhambetov, and the KazMunayGaz state oil and gas company
management. During the concluding news conference Bogdanchikov told the
press that Rosneft is set for a significant expansion of its role in
Kazakhstan’s oil extraction and transportation. Before outlining those
intentions, Bogdanchikov claimed that Rosneft now holds first place
among oil companies worldwide regarding estimated oil reserves. The only
certainty about this claim is that Rosneft’s assets grew spectacularly
as a result of the destruction of the Yukos company by the Russian
state.

Kurmangazy Field: Rosneft and KazMunayGaz have decided to form a common
management structure for their joint venture at the offshore oilfield
Kurmangazy and start drilling this spring the first of two exploratory
wells. Kurmangazy’s recoverable reserves are estimated at 900 million to
1 billion tons of oil. The production sharing agreement, signed in July
2005, envisages total investments of billion for a 55-year period,
including 10 years for exploration and 45 years for extraction.

The KazMunayTeniz offshore oil company — a division of KazMunayGaz —
holds a 50% stake in the project; Rosneft, 25%; and another Russian
state company, Zarubezhneft (specializing in offshore drilling) the
remaining 25%. The field is situated at a shallow depth in the northern
part of Kazakhstan’s Caspian sector. Bilateral agreements on seabed
delimitation in 1998 and 2002 placed Kurmangazy under Kazakhstan’s
jurisdiction. However, Kazakhstan had to agree that the field would be
turned into a parity joint venture with Russia and that Kurmangazy’s
output would have to be exported via Russia (as opposed to a
trans-Caspian westbound route).

Imashev Field: The sides have initiated discussions on joint development
of the Imashev offshore field. The field holds estimated reserves of 130
billion cubic meters of gas and 21 million tons of condensate, adding up
to some 200 million tons of oil equivalent, and with a high sulfur
concentration of at least 20%. Under a border delimitation agreement
signed in 2005, Imashev is to be developed as a parity venture. At least
two issues remain to be resolved: first, which Russian company (or
companies) will be designated to hold Russia’s 50% stake; and, second,
where to separate the sulfur content from the field’s mix of
hydrocarbons.

Atasu-Alashankou Pipeline: Rosneft expresses “serious interest” in
delivering oil to China through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline.
Apparently, the Russian company intends to match the Kazakh oil volumes
that are slated for delivery to China through that line. Commissioned
in December 2005 and financed entirely by China, the 990-kilometer
pipeline is scheduled to start commercial operation this coming May. The
initial throughput capacity of 10 million tons annually is slated to be
expanded to 20 million tons annually from 2010 onward. Oilfields owned
by China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in Aktobe and Kumkol
(western and central Kazakhstan, respectively) will feed the pipeline,
but it may not be commercially profitable without additional volumes
coming from Siberian oilfields.

Yuganskneftegaz, formerly the main production unit of Yukos, seized by
Rosneft, is slated to supply most of the volumes Rosneft plans to pump
through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline. Rosneft seeks urgent
clarification on three major issues: First, overhauling and expanding
the capacity of the Omsk (Russia)-Pavlodar (Kazakhstan) pipeline and
linking it with the Atasu-Alashankou line; second, determining the
volumes and schedules of Rosneft’s oil deliveries to China; and, third,
setting the transit charges for those deliveries on Kazakhstan’s
territory. All this will require negotiations in several formats,
including a quadripartite one among Rosneft, Russia’s state oil pipeline
company Transneft, KazMunayGaz, and CNPC.

In a concurrent development, the government of Kazakhstan has confirmed
the intentions of KazMunayGaz and Gazprom’s Orenburg gas processing
plant (on Russian territory close to Kazakhstan) to sign in coming
months a joint venture agreement. They envisage delivering 15 billion
cubic meters of Kazakh gas annually (up from approximately 6 billion
cubic meters annually at present) for processing at the Orenburg plant.
The Karachaganak field in northwestern Kazakhstan will supply that
volume. The field, among the world’s largest, is being developed by the
Karachaganak Petroleum Operating in which Italy’s state company ENI and
British Gas hold stakes of 32.5% each, ChevronTexaco 20%, and Russia’s
Lukoil 15%. It seems an odd development to route gas to Russia at a time
of looming problems with the supply of Western countries.

(Interfax, February 23, 24)

–Vladimir Socor

PUTIN IN AZERBAIJAN

Russian President Vladimir Putin paid an official visit to Azerbaijan on
February 21-22, presumably to inaugurate the “Year of Russia in
Azerbaijan 2006” celebration, following the “Year of Azerbaijan in
Russia 2005.” While cordial, the atmosphere was far more sober than the
love fest of Armenian President Robert Kocharian’s Moscow visit last
month to inaugurate the “Year of Armenia in Russia” (see EDM, January
16). Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev described the bilateral
relationship as an “example of relations between neighbors, practical
good-neighborly relations” (Azertaj, February 21). Far from eroding
Azerbaijan’s reliance on the United States to advance common energy and
security interests, Putin’s visit inadvertently underscored how little
Russia can offer Azerbaijan in those regards.

Oil: Azerbaijan declines Russian proposals to increase its reliance on
the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline for export of Azerbaijani oil. Azerbaijan
uses this pipeline only as a backup option while committing almost its
entire export volumes to non-Russian routes. In 2005, Azerbaijan’s State
Oil Company pumped 4.1 million tons of oil to Novorossiysk, up from 2.5
million-2.7 million tons annually in the preceding years. This temporary
increase was necessitated by delays in commissioning the Turkish section
of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, even as Azerbaijan’s oil extraction grew on
schedule, requiring an outlet. Transneft, owner of the Russian section
of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, charges a transit fee of .67 per ton
of oil. The charge is exorbitant, though relatively tolerable as long as
oil market prices remain high. However, Transneft cuts further into
Azerbaijan’s profits by mixing the
low-quality Russian Urals blend with high-quality Azerbaijani oil before
the latter reaches the world market. A compensation mechanism known as
“oil quality bank” is standard international practice, but Russia
refuses to use this mechanism with Azerbaijan and other Caspian oil
producers.

In 2006, Azerbaijan intends to scale back its oil export to Novorossiysk
to 3 million tons, provided that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline’s Turkish
section is commissioning by May 27 as now rescheduled. Once that problem
is resolved, Azerbaijan may reduce its export to Novorossiysk even below
the pre-2005 level of 2.5 million tons, unless the Russian side agrees
to use the oil quality bank mechanism. In Baku, Russia’s Industry and
Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko renewed a proposal to Azerbaijan to
move from annual contracts to a long-term contract for using the
Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. However, this is clearly not in Azerbaijan’s
interest (Interfax, February 21, 22; Trend, February 23).

Gas: Azerbaijan is extricating itself from dependence on
Russian-delivered gas. Azerbaijan imports gas from Russia in order to
save fuel oil, which it previously used for electricity generation. It
imported 4.5 billion cubic meters of gas in 2005 from Russia and has
contracted for the same volume in 2006, despite the price hike to 0 per
one thousand cubic meters, up from in previous years. According to
Industry and Energy Minister Natig Aliyev, this year’s price is
reasonable, but the import volumes after 2006 will depend on the price
of Russian gas — i.e., that import may decline. Azerbaijan’s State Oil
Company plans to raise gas extraction to 4 billion cubic meters annually
from the Guneshli field and 9 to 10 billion cubic meters from the
Shah-Deniz field by 2008, sufficient to cover internal consumption and
some export (Turan, February 21, 22; Trend, February 23).

Military Issues: The two presidents’ joint communiqué mentions the
possibility of “cooperation in military industry,” implying procurement
of Russian equipment by Azerbaijan. The country is creating a new
Ministry for Defense Industry in charge of military procurement.
According to First Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Abbasov during Putin’s
visit, Azerbaijan will cooperate in that regard “not only with Russia,
but with various countries, not excluding Russia” (Trend, February 21;
Interfax, February 22).

Two contentious issues in the military and security sphere were not
publicly addressed during Putin’s visit to Baku. The first is
Azerbaijan’s concern over the transfer of some Russian heavy weaponry
from bases in Georgia (which are slated to be closed) to Armenia. The
other issue is Moscow’s proposal for the creation of a joint naval force
of the five Caspian countries, Casfor, under de facto Russian control.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov again raised this issue in a
curtain-raiser interview on the eve of Putin’s visit (Zerkalo [Baku],
February 21). Azerbaijan, however, has resisted this proposal since its
inception in 2005 and continues to do so.

At the presidents’ joint news conference, Putin announced that he has
made a “promise” to invite Kocharian to Russia in the near future to
discuss a resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The move seems intended
to catch up with the United States, which currently leads the effort to
settle that conflict. While it may play spoiler, Moscow has few
resources to drive that process.

–Vladimir Socor

The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].

Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.

The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)

Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.