A sure time to halt genocide?

University of Oregon News, OR
Feb 17 2007

A sure time to halt genocide?

SAN FRANCISCO, Calif. – (Feb. 15, 2007) – Follow your intuition and act?
When it comes to genocide, forget it. It doesn’t work, says a
University of Oregon psychologist. The large numbers of reported
deaths represent dry statistics that fail to spark emotion and
feeling and thus fail to motivate actions. Even going from one to two
victims, feeling and meaning begin to fade, he said.

In a session Friday at the annual meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science devoted to "Numbers and Nerves," Paul
Slovic, a UO professor and president of Decision Research, a
non-profit research institute in Eugene, Ore., urged a review and
overhaul of the 1948 Genocide Convention, mandated by much of the
world after the Holocaust in World War II. "It has obviously failed,
because it has never been invoked to intervene in genocide," Slovic
said.

Slovic is studying the issue from a psychological perspective, trying
to determine how people can utilize both the moral intuition that
genocide is wrong and moral reasoning to reach not only an outcry but
also demand intervention. "We have to understand what it is in our
makeup – psychologically, socially, politically and institutionally –
that has allowed genocide to go unabated for a century," he said. "If
we don’t answer that question and use the answer to change things, we
will see another century of horrible atrocities around the world."

In the 20th century, genocides have occurred in Armenia, Ukraine,
Nazi Germany, Bangladesh, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Zimbabwe. Currently, killings continue in Darfur. "America has done
little or nothing to stop genocide," Slovic said, adding that the
lack of response has come from both Republican and Democratic
administrations. Research shows that people cannot trust moral
intuitions to drive action. "Instead, we have to create institutions
and laws that will force us to do what we know through moral argument
is the right thing to do."

Figuring out how to reach that critical mass for decision-making,
however, will be a challenge. It is thought that every life is
equally important, and thus the value of saving lives rises linearly
as the numbers of people at risk increase.

However, models based on psychology are unmasking a haze on the
issue. One model suggests that people react very strongly around the
zero point. "We go all out to save a single identified victim, be it
a person or an animal, but as the numbers increase, we level off," he
said. "We don’t feel any different to say 88 people dying than we do
to 87. This is a disturbing model, because it means that lives are
not equal, and that as problems become bigger we become insensitive
to the prospect of additional deaths."

In Slovic’s latest research, evidence is mounting for an even more
disturbing "collapse model" that he described in his talk. "This
model appears to be more accurate than the psychophysical model in
describing our response to genocide," he said. "We have these large
numbers of deaths occurring, and we are doing nothing."

His new research follows up an Israeli study published in 2005 in
which subjects were presented three photos. One depicted eight
children who needed $300,000 in medical intervention to save their
lives. Another photo depicted just one child who could be helped with
$300,000. Participants were most willing to donate for one child’s
medical care. The level of giving declined dramatically for donating
to help the entire group.

Slovic and colleagues Daniel Vastfjäll and Ellen Peters used the same
approach but narrowed the focus. Participants in Sweden were shown a
photo of a starving African girl, her individual story and the
conditions of the nation in which she lives. Another photo contained
the same information but for a starving boy. A third photo showed
both children. The feelings of sympathy for each individual child
were almost equal, but dropped when they were considered together.
Donations followed the same pattern, being lower for two needy
children than for either individually.

"The studies just described suggest a disturbing psychological
tendency," Slovic said. "Our capacity to feel is limited." Even at
just two individuals, he added, people start to lose sympathy.

If we see the beginning of the collapse of feeling at just two
individuals, "It is no wonder that at 200,000 deaths the feeling is
gone," Slovic said. This insensitivity to large numbers is
understandable from an evolutionary perspective. Early humans fought
to protect themselves and their families. "There was no adaptive or
survival value in protecting hundreds of thousands of people on the
other side of the planet," he said. "Today, we have modern
communications that can tell us about crises occurring on the other
side of the world, but we are still reacting the same way as we would
have long ago."

The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, based in Menlo Park,
Calif., is a major supporter of Slovic’s current research.

2.15.07-Slovic-AAAS-Genocide.html

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

http://www.uoregon.edu/newsstory.php?a=

The Pigeon on the Bridge Is Shot

Middle East Report Online, DC
Feb 17 2007

The Pigeon on the Bridge Is Shot

Ayþe Kadýoðlu

February 16, 2007

(Ayþe Kadýoðlu is an associate professor of political science at
Sabanci University in Istanbul.)

`Sometimes they ask me what it is like to be an Armenian. I tell them
that it is a wonderful thing and I recommend it to everyone.’ These
were Hrant Dink’s opening remarks at a conference entitled `Ottoman
Armenians During the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire,’ held in
Istanbul on September 24 and 25, 2005. Those of us lucky enough to
hear the mischievous introductory lines received them with joyous
laughter, but we also knew we were witnesses to a lecture of historic
significance, a momentous step forward in the efforts of Armenians
and Turks to come to terms with the horrors of the past.

Little more than a year later, on January 19, 2007, Dink, the
editor-in-chief of the Armenian-Turkish newspaper Agos, was
assassinated in front of his office on a busy street in Istanbul. On
the day of his funeral, when more than 100,000 people (mostly Muslim
Turks) marched with banners proclaiming `We are all Armenians’ and
`We are all Hrant Dink,’ I could not help but think that we had
indeed taken him up on his advice. Yet this time, most of us were
crying.

Hrant Dink was a meticulous writer and speaker. He chose his words
carefully, including the ones for which he was prosecuted by the
Turkish state. I think he was referring to two things when he
recommended becoming Armenian to his audience at the conference.
First, he was pointing to the need for empathy in modern societies —
an essential theme that he underlined on other occasions. He urged
Turks to listen to the grievances of Armenians and empathize with
these people, whose ancestors were deported and massacred by the
crumbling Ottoman Empire in 1915. He also exhorted diaspora Armenians
to empathize with the Turks, who do not want to think of their
ancestors and themselves as perpetrators of genocide. Second, he
wanted to make clear that one could belong to a national or religious
community by voluntary declaration. Dink was against ascriptive
criteria for community membership; these inevitably led, in his
opinion, to racism. Citizenship, in his eyes, was really an
allegiance to a multi-national, constitutional state, rather than
loyalty to a single nationality or religion. As a country, Turkey
belonged to all the groups that inhabited its territory, not just the
Turks. He saw that Anatolian soil had been a mosaic prior to the
Turkification policies instigated by the Turkish state in the
twentieth century. In that soil Dink found his salvation.

HRANT DINK AND AGOS

Hrant Dink was born in the inner Anatolian town of Malatya on
September 15, 1954. He moved to Istanbul with his family when he was
seven years old. When the family faced financial problems and his
parents divorced, he was placed, with his two brothers, in the
orphanage of an Armenian church in Istanbul. Dink spent ten years at
the orphanage. After attending Armenian primary and secondary
schools, he studied zoology and later philosophy at Istanbul
University. He met Rakel in the orphanage. She was 17 and he was 22
when they got married. They had three beautiful children and a
granddaughter. His wife called him `Çutak,’ meaning `violin’ in
Armenian, because he was tall and slim. He used this nickname in his
column in the Marmara newspaper. His granddaughter, who is just
learning to speak, changed this word to `Tutak’ in the language of a
toddler. For three summers in a row, Dink and his wife Rakel worked
together with the children of the orphanage on the construction of a
summer camp in Tuzla, Istanbul. They planted trees and created a
dreamland for the orphans. The camp was taken away by the state in
1983 as part of a confiscation policy directed at non-Muslim
religious foundations.

In 1996, Dink and a few friends founded a weekly newspaper called
Agos, with the encouragement of the Armenian patriarch. From this
point onward, Agos became the most visible platform for descriptions
of the injustices faced by Armenians in Turkey today and in the past.
Of the paper’s 12 pages, nine are in Turkish and three are in
Armenian. This distribution, by the interpretation of Baskýn Oran, an
Ankara University political scientist and Agos contributor, is
symbolic of the wish on the part of the Armenian community in Turkey
to `integrate’ into Turkish society `without being assimilated.’ A
month before Dink’s assassination, the staff celebrated the
newspaper’s tenth anniversary with a party featuring Armenian and
Turkish songs.

Despite the fact that Dink’s name became increasingly associated with
the Armenian community, he always found continuities with the
injustices suffered by other groups in Turkey — the Kurds, for
instance, and women who wear the headscarf. He was a democrat in that
he was interested in a common venue for exposing all such injustices.
At one roundtable discussion on civil society organizations held in
Istanbul, he talked about the daily discrimination faced by
Armenians. When I murmured during his talk, `Just like the issues of
women,’ he turned to me in excitement and said, `Yes, that is exactly
what we need to talk about: manifestations of discrimination that are
shared by various underprivileged groups.’

MINORITIES AND THE STATE

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was in
decline. As the Ottomans lost territory to the Russians, Austrians
and Greeks, Muslims from these lands began to migrate to the center
of the empire in the Anatolian peninsula, leading to unease among
non-Muslims residing there. At the end of the Balkan wars in 1914,
Ottoman elites embraced the idea of formal population exchanges,
geared toward creating a modern and more homogeneous Turkish state.
The Ottoman embassy in Athens raised official objections to pressures
upon Muslims in western Thrace. The Ottoman and Greek states reached
a verbal agreement upon a non-coerced exchange of Anatolian Greeks
and Muslims in Greece, but implementation came to a halt with the
outbreak of World War I. During the war, reactionary pressure
increased to address the `problem’ of the non-Muslims within the
empire and, in 1915, the rump imperial state oversaw the deportation
and massacre of hundreds of thousands of Armenians.

The official population exchange of Anatolian Greeks and the Muslims
in Greece took place pursuant to the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in
1923 between the Western powers and the Republic of Turkey that
emerged on the Anatolian peninsula following the Ottoman Empire’s
dissolution. While the number of non-Muslims in the lands that
constitute today’s Turkey was `one in every five persons’ in 1913,
this ratio had fallen to `one in forty’ by the time of the
proclamation of the republic. The Treaty of Lausanne assured equal
treatment under the law to Turkey’s `non-Muslim minorities’ —
Armenian Christians, Greek Christians and Jews. In practice, however,
all of these official minorities, as well as unofficial Muslim
`minorities,’ have faced discrimination from state and society. Such
Muslim groups as the Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Georgians and Lazes
are perceived as `different,’ mainly because their native tongue is
not Turkish. Alevis, whether they are Kurdish, Arab or Turkman, are
ill-treated because they adhere to a non-Sunni sect of Islam. The
state viewed all these groups as obstacles to the formation of a
Turkish national identity built upon a single religion and language.

By 1928, the state was engaged in efforts to create a single language
at the expense of the other languages that existed in Turkey. The
`Citizen, Speak Turkish’ campaigns led to policies that outlawed the
use of languages other than Turkish in public places such as movie
theaters, restaurants and hotels. Such policies, and riots and
vandalism targeted at Jews and Christians, prompted further
migrations of non-Muslims out of Turkey over the ensuing decades.

The daily lives of the remaining Armenians in Turkey became
increasingly more difficult, and anti-Armenian sentiment rose, in the
1970s, when the Armenian nationalist organization ASALA began
assasinating Turkish diplomats all over the world. In the 1980s,
bogus allegations of ties between ASALA and the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK), which had launched an insurgency in southeastern Turkey,
surfaced in major Turkish newspapers. Amidst these developments,
Armenians in Turkey increasingly felt they had to mask the Armenian
aspects of their identity, and began to assimilate more and more into
Turkish society at the expense of their language and religion. The
1990s brought still greater pressures on the Armenian community in
Turkey since Armenia, which declared its independence after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, invaded the Armenian-populated
part of Azerbaijan (a Turkic-language country considered by Turkey as
within its sphere of influence). Relations between Turkey and Armenia
were curtailed.

A prevalent theme in Turkish politics has been preservation of the
state and its autonomy in the face of popular or political pressures.
Appointed state officials, whether military officers, civilian
bureaucrats or the president of the republic, have always regarded
elected politicians as well as the people as immature and in need of
guidance. These officials encouraged the growth of religious and
nationalist organizations to debilitate those political currents that
opted for mobilization and empowerment of the people. Turkey’s
recurrent military coups were legitimized in terms of preservation of
the state. Fear of losing a unified state has always been the key
motivator for various nationalist organizations, including those
inclined to a kind of fascism.

All these developments accelerated the coupling of demos and ethnos
in Turkey: the view that full citizenship was (or should be)
tantamount to Turkish national identity. Despite the fact that
Armenians in Turkey were legal citizens, more and more they found
they had to hide their non-Turkish and non-Muslim identities.
Citizenship had become an instrument of assimilation with a Turkish
national identity rather than a guaranteee of a set of rights,
including the right to a `different’ identity in Turkey.

NEW POLITICAL CLEAVAGES

Following the 1999 Helsinki summit, when Turkey became an official
candidate for membership in the European Union, the Turkish
parliament began to pass major legislative reforms with respect to
minority rights, including the lifting of barriers to the use of
minority languages and the practice of minority religions. These
reforms became the backdrop for a nationalist backlash.

Contemporary Turkish politics are, in many ways, defined by a tension
between two fundamental currents. The first current consists of those
pushing for democratization by, among other things, furthering the
rights of the non-Turkish and non-Muslim citizens of Turkey. The
second is made up of those who fear that the ground beneath `the
Turks’ is slipping — so much so that `the Turks’ are losing their
privileged status. Despite all the legislative reforms, there are
still laws that uphold this privilege. On October 7, 2005, Hrant Dink
was convicted of violating one such law, Article 301 of the Turkish
penal code, which makes it a crime to `denigrate Turkishness.’

Dink had published a series of articles concerning Armenian identity
in Agos in February 2004. In one article, he criticized the
inflexible views of some diaspora Armenians, saying that `the clean
blood that the Armenians need in order to establish a noble current
of relations with Armenia [will be found] if/when they can cleanse
their blood of the poison of Turks.’ By `the poison of Turks,’ he
meant hatred of Turks. He was calling upon diaspora hardliners to let
go of this hatred (using the expression `clean blood’ as a metaphor
for a clean break with old habits) and focus on building relations
with Armenia instead. But nationalists in Turkey blinded themselves
to context and chose to read Dink as saying that Turkish blood is
poisonous. Thus did this sentence inspire charges against Dink for
`denigrating Turkishness.’ Nationalist bullies vandalized the
courtroom hearing his case and dared him to `come and see the clean
Turkish blood.’ A report of experts presented to the local criminal
court underlined the importance of reading Dink’s lines `in context’
in order to comprehend his intentions, and opposed the charge against
him. Nevertheless, the court handed down a verdict of guilty. The
conviction was approved by the Court of Appeals on June 6, 2006, and
Dink was given a suspended sentence. He was taking his case to the
European Court of Human Rights when he was killed.

Legal codes like Article 301 make it possible to read every criticism
directed at past and present policies of the Turkish state,
regardless of their moral content, as a basis for the accusation of
`denigrating Turkishness.’ Indeed, when taken to its logical
conclusion, the law makes it impossible to be critical of activities
carried out by Turks. Certainly, the law has become the weapon of
nationalist groups who oppose multiculturalism in Turkey as much as
they oppose Turkey’s membership in the European Union. They maintain
that Turkey belongs only to Turks. They expect Turkish citizens who
are not Turks to adopt a Turkish mask, sublimating their religious,
linguistic and cultural identities in order to enjoy the fruits of
citizenship.

Though several writers and journalists, including Turkey’s Nobel
laureate Orhan Pamuk, have faced charges under Article 301, Dink is
the only one to date whose `guilty’ verdict was upheld by the Court
of Appeals. He was visibly very sad on this occasion, saying that he
would never denigrate Turkishness, because all his life he had
opposed racism. Indeed, it is possible to argue that it is the very
existence of such legal codes that denigrates Turkishness. After his
conviction, Dink considered leaving Turkey. But whenever he traveled
abroad, he missed his country. He had tried so hard to construct a
life for himself and his family in Istanbul. In the end, he decided
to stay.

Hrant Dink labored to open channels of communication between
Armenians in Turkey, Turks, diaspora Armenians (who are mostly in the
United States) and the government and people of Armenia. He invited
all parties to be self-critical to facilitate dialogue. Use of the
word `genocide’ to refer to the mass deportations and massacres of
Armenians in 1915 is, of course, the biggest bone of contention
between Turks and Armenians. Dink had a distinctive approach to the
controversy. In his speech at the conference on Ottoman Armenians, he
uttered the phrase `Armenian genocide,’ and immediately added, `All
right, perhaps it is better not to use that expression.’ Dink did not
want that one word to close the ears of some in the audience to the
rest of his words. He wanted to move the debate over the past away
from the term `genocide’ to the possibility of dialogue. While he
advised Turks to grow out of their denial of the enormity of the
massacres, at the same time he admonished Armenians to be careful not
to bring indignity to Turks by constantly dwelling on the atrocities
of their ancestors. (Ironically, in fact, the words that led to his
conviction for `denigrating Turkishness’ were directed at negative
Armenian attitudes about Turks.) In sum, Dink suggested that
Armenians and Turks both `get out of this 1,915-meter deep well’ and
start listening to one another. Since the Anatolian people carried
pain with dignity, he thought, Armenians and Turks could carry their
pain without dishonoring each other.

His funeral, with its mixed procession of Armenians and Turks, was an
occasion for such dignity. An Agos contributor at the funeral said he
heard Turkish kids shouting, `Long live the Armenians,’ quite a
change from earlier experiences when expressions such as `Armenian
dogs’ or `deceitful Armenians’ were more common.

THE WATER FOUND ITS CRACK

Hrant Dink was buried in a cemetery in Istanbul. As his wife told the
thousands who had gathered, while he had left her embrace and his
children, granddaughter and loved ones, he would never leave his
country.

Dink’s friends could not help but be reminded of a story he told: He
once received a phone call from an elderly man in a village in Sivas
who told him that an old Armenian woman had passed away. The
villagers wanted Dink to help them find her family. He located the
woman’s daughter in France and told her about her mother’s death. The
daughter said the old woman’s family had been deported from that
village in Sivas; every year she had been traveling from France in
order to spend a few months in her birthplace. When the daughter came
to get her mother’s body, she called Dink from the village and
started crying on the phone — because of what that the old man in
the village had told her. `Uncle, what have you told her?’ Dink
asked, prepared to be angry. But the man responded, `I did not say
anything bad. I just told her that this village was her mother’s
home.’ He quoted the Turkish proverb: “The water found its crack.’
She should bury her mother here rather than taking her body to
France.’ After telling this story, Dink would conclude, with tears in
his eyes: `Yes, Armenians have an eye on Turkish soil — not to come
and take it, but to come and be buried under it.’

In his last column in Agos, Hrant Dink wrote about the threats he had
received. Nationalist organizations had vandalized the courtroom
hearing his case and demonstrated in front of Agos. He admitted to
being intimidated. `It is unfortunate that I am now better known than
I once was,’ he wrote. `I feel much more the people who throw me that
glance that says, `Oh look, isn’t he that Armenian guy?’ And I
reflexively start torturing myself. One aspect of this torture is
curiosity, the other unease…. I am just like a pigeon, obsessed
equally by what goes on to my left, to my right, in front of me and
in back.’ His only consolation in such anxiety was his faith that the
pigeons could live freely in crowded urban centers, even if
fearfully. He thought the pigeons would not be harmed.

Yet Dink also maintained the people after him were not as ordinary
and visible as they seemed. He was, in other words, pointing his
finger at what reformers in Turkey call the `deep state’ — the
relations between the military and security establishment and
clandestine, paramilitary organizations. The 17-year old man who
gunned Dink down was arrested shortly after the assassination. He is
from Trabzon, a city on the Black Sea known as a center of right-wing
nationalist activity. Soon, the police chief of Trabzon was removed
from his post. A brief look into the chief’s past, provided on
January 27 by the journalist Can Dündar in his column in the daily
Milliyet, revealed his web of affiliations with police chiefs,
retired military officers, lawyers and paramilitary youth working to
`save’ Turkey from disintegration in the hands of the pro-European
Union civil society groups and policymakers.

Soon after Dink’s murder, some of the nationalist groups donned the
same white beret worn by the gunman when he fired the fatal shot.
These `white berets’ aim to frighten Turkish democrats who, like
Dink, are interested in constructing bridges of dialogue.
Undoubtedly, they have allies inside the organs of the state. On
February 2, police in Trabzon posed Dink’s killer in front of a
Turkish flag. Video footage of the scene, which made the assassin out
to be a national hero, shocked many Turks but undoubtedly pleased
many others. The crude nationalists in soccer stadiums shouting
slogans exalting Dink’s killer, as well as the white berets in the
streets of Istanbul, are indicators that a dangerous number of
citizens are willing to endorse crimes committed in the name of
preserving the state.

Nowadays, one can observe competition between various `nationalisms’
on Turkey’s primetime television programs. People feel compelled to
say they are nationalists in order to render the rest of their claims
legitimate. Some of the nationalists are loaded down with fears that
the privileged status of ethnic Turks in Turkey will soon be lost. In
their zeal to sever Turkey’s ties with everyone except ethnic Turks,
they are like trench diggers on a battlefield.

Hrant Dink lived his life like a pigeon on a bridge connecting the
feelings and thoughts of Armenians in Turkey with those outside, as
well as with Turks. He was a pigeon on a mission to make such bridges
more than symbolic. He was shot by trench diggers, who remain
powerful opponents of his mission. On the day of his funeral,
however, Hrant Dink’s bridge was flooded by thousands who wanted to
guard it in his name. He would have loved the sight.

http://www.merip.org/mero/mero021607.html

OSCE Yerevan supports Armenia’s govt in promoting Aarchus convention

Arka News Agency, Armenia
Feb 17 2007

OSCE YEREVAN OFFICE SUPPORTS ARMENIA’S GOVERNMENT IN PROMOTING
AARCHUS CONVENTION IN ARMENIA IN 2006

YEREVAN, February 16. /ARKA/. The OSCE Yerevan Office supported
Armenia’s Government in promoting the access to the ecological
information, as well as in contributing to decision-making and
providing access to environment-related legal proceedings in 2006,
says the report on the 2006 OSCE activities in Yerevan.
According to the report, these are the fundamental principles of the
Aarchus Convention ratified by Armenia in 2001.
The document says that the Yerevan Office assisted in opening new
centers in Siunik, Tavush and Lori regions of Armenia. According to
the document, being a unique link between the government and the NGOs
in elaborating the policy and improving public awareness, the centers
help providing transparency in environmental issues and contribute to
democratization and effective management in the region.
The Aarchus Convention is to protect people’s right of favorable
environment, access to information, participation in decision making
and access to justice on environment-related issues. N.V. -0-

S Markedonov: Yerevan tired of being hostage to Kremlin and Gazprom

PanARMENIAN.Net

Sergey Markedonov: Yerevan tied of being hostage to Kremlin and Gazprom
17.02.2007 13:35 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Moscow and Yerevan’s vision of the Armenian-Russian
partnership and the Nagorno Karabakh problem weren’t traditionally a
topic of bilateral consensus, head of the department of international
relations at the institute of political and military studies Sergey
Markedonov said in an interview with PanARMENIAN.Net. `In this view,
hopes for Baku’s joining the `anti-Tbilisi’ pact were not justified.
Moscow’s wish to restraint Azerbaijan encouraged Baku for activation
of talks with NATO and conclusion of a trilateral
agreement. Meanwhile, implementation of a railway project bypassing
Armenia strengthens Azerbaijan’s positions more than Turkey’s.

Sergey Markedonov recollected the words of Turkish researcher Burcu
Gültekin, who said that Turkish policy is a hostage to relations with
Azerbaijan. `In her opinion, `opening of borders can make Armenians
see Turkey in a better light and bring the relations between the two
states out of today’s crisis.’ Actually, Baku receives an extra trump
card in its game in the South Caucasus. On one hand, a railroad will
bypass Armenia, on the other hand, Azerbaijan will tie Georgia’s hands
with a credit. Furthermore, neither Turkey nor the U.S. incumbent
administration will stand against. Thus, Russia’s rude and
shortsighted moves to hold Baku in check gave birth to new problems in
the South Caucasus,’ the Russian political scientist said.

In his opinion, it’s not surprising that Armenia tries to join the
Transcaspian gas pipeline. `Although Armenia is not included in the
list of constructors the aspiration of the republic to find
`insurance’ sources to symbolically come out of Russia’s energy
guardianship. Yerevan is tired of being hostage to Kremlin and Gazprom
and is not ready for the role of geopolitical infantry in combinations
against Tbilisi and Baku. Moscow needs serious reconsideration of its
policy of `energy imperialism’. This tool is not working well and no
one has been forced to knees so far. On the contrary, it attracted
`non-regional players’ and strengthened a pro-western tendency among
the post-soviet states,’ said Markedonov.

Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku became railway variant of Baku-Ceyhan?

PanARMENIAN.Net

Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku became railway variant of Baku-Ceyhan?
17.02.2007 13:38 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ `The sharp cooling of the Russian-Azeri relations in
late 2006 formally began with outer reasons. First, Moscow requested
Baku to suspend gas delivery to Georgia. When Baku refused to form an
anti-Georgian alliance Gazprom raised the gas prices not for Georgia
but also for Azerbaijan,’ head of the department of international
relations at the institute of political and military studies Sergey
Markedonov said in an interview with PanARMENIAN.Net. He reminded
that Azerbaijan had to pay $235 instead of $110 for thousand cu m of
gas. `For its part Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that such
price `discords with the spirit and essence of the Russian-Azeri
relations.’ Moreover, Aliyev junior did not rule out that `oil and gas
relations between Moscow and Baku maintain a political implication.’
The result was that the Azeri authorities and Gazprom did not sign an
agreement on delivery of Russian gas to Azerbaijan in 2007. The story
was continued. February 7, in Tbilisi, top leaders of Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Turkey held a regional summit, which resulted in
signing of agreement on construction of a strategically important
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railroad. Some experts began speaking of
a railway variant of Baku-Ceyhan. It’s worth mentioning that the
project is supposed to be completed by 2009 without Russia’s
participation and in bypass of Armenia. In general, such a development
was expected but only the event of February 7, 2007 showed that the
project will be launched in bypass of Armenia. The project tightened
the Tbilisi-Baku economic knot. Moreover, Azerbaijan did a little
`service’ to Georgia in the form of a $200 million credit,’ said
Markedonov.

Dutch party wants to ban Turks from Cabinet

PanARMENIAN.Net

Dutch party wants to ban Turks from Cabinet
17.02.2007 14:59 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The Dutch anti-immigration Party for
Freedom (PVV) on Thursday called for politicians with
dual nationality, including Nebahat Albayrak who also
has Turkish citizenship, to be banned from being
members of Parliament or the Cabinet, reports the
Turkish Daily news. Politicians holding dual
nationality might serve foreign interests instead of
Dutch interests, PVV deputy Sietse Fritsma said in a
proposed amendment to existing laws on citizenship,
published on the party’s Web site. `When, for example,
the Armenian Genocide is being discussed, we suddenly
see some [politicians with double nationality] talking
with two hats or shamelessly defending the Turkish
point of view,’ he wrote. `It is unacceptable that
serving foreign interests is possible by [Dutch]
Cabinet members,’ added he. Two politicians set to
join the Cabinet, Nebahat Albayrak and Ahmed
Aboutaleb, have Turkish and Moroccan passports
respectively in addition to their Dutch passports,
according to Dutch daily NRC Handelsblad. Albayrak is
a member of parliament, while Aboutaleb is an
Amsterdam city councilor.

Deadlines of Rural Community Development Fixed

Panorama.am

18:41 17/02/2007

DEADLINES OF RURAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FIXED

Press services of the foreign ministry of Armenia told
Panorama.am that the management of Hayastan All
Armenian Fund met with community organization involved
in rural development in Armenia and Karabakh.

Representative of Hayastan All Armenian Fund from
France, USA, Canada, Iran, Argentina, Switzerland were
present. The sides discussed issues on rural
development. Deadlines and implementation mechanisms
are set.

Source: Panorama.am

Orhan Pamuk Leaves Turkey Because of Fear for Life

Panorama.am

18:43 17/02/2007

ORHAN PAMUK LEAVES TURKEY BECAUSE OF FEAR FOR LIFE

Orhan Pamuk, Turkish writer and Nobel Prize winner,
left Turkey because he was afraid for his life. Pamuk
receive threats from the person suspected in the
murder of Hrant Dink, editor-in-chief of Akos
newspaper. Pamuk left for the United State to deliver
lectures in American universities.

Newru.com writes citing from `Sabah’ newspaper that
Pamuk took out $400,000 from his bank account and said
that he would never return Turkey. Moreover, he
refused to visit Germany upon the invitation. That
country is known for its large Turkish community.

Pamuk does not hide his civic disposition connected
with the Armenian genocide and discrimination against
Kurds in Turkey. A criminal prosecution was instituted
against him for insulting the dignity of Turks.
Istanbul court demanded from 6 to 36 months of
imprisonment. However, the court ruled in favor of
Pamuk last summer.

Source: Panorama.am

LDU May Combat Elections on Its Own or in Union

Panorama.am

18:50 17/02/2007

LDU MAY COMBAT ELECTIONS ON ITS OWN OR IN UNION

Seiran Avagyan, leader of Liberal-Democratic Union
(LDU) of Armenia, told reporters after the fourth
session of the party that consultations are held with
other political forces on possible union to combat
elections in the parliament. It does not mean that LDU
must by all means participate in a block. Avagyan
believes the party has all chances to get into the
parliament. During the last parliamentary elections,
the party collected 4.7 percent of votes and did not
manage to get 0.3 percent to get into the parliament.
Avagyan says ideologically close parties, both liberal
and democratic, may join LDU. Avagyan refused to say
what party they are negotiating with promising to say
that in 5-6 days.

Source: Panorama.am

Catholicos Leaves for France and India

Panorama.am

19:53 17/02/2007

CATHOLICOS LEAVES FOR FRANCE AND INDIA

Catholicos of All Armenians, Garegin B, will take part
in the first meeting of diocese representative bodies
in Paris to be held within the framework of Armenia’s
days in France.

Holy See Echmiatsin press services report that on
February 22, the Catholicos will leave for India from
France. During the 10-day visit he will visit Dely,
Kalcata, Madras and Bombay. The head of the Armenian
church will also pay visit to the Armenian embassy and
will hold meetings with the Armenian community.

The Catholicos will pay visit to different Armenian
holy sites, among them Chinsura St. Hovhan Karapet
Armenian church, one of the oldest Christian church in
the East.

Source: Panorama.am