Armenians will head to the polls on June 7 to elect all 101 members of parliament, a vote with critical regional and geopolitical consequences. Following the 2018 Velvet Revolution and 2020-23 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the country has embarked on a new path of democratic reform and foreign policy alignments. Previously dependent on Russia for security guarantees and economic stability, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is now forging stronger ties with the European Union (EU) and United States, while redefining the country’s relationship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. The election presents a choice beyond minor policy options; voters can decide between different visions for the country’s governance and geopolitical alignment. Given the stakes, both domestic and foreign actors have intensified their tactics, manipulating existing vulnerabilities, and present serious threats to the election process.

BACKGROUND:

The election is taking place at a historic pivot point for Armenia’s positioning in the region and beyond. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia has been tied to Russia militarily, economically, and ideologically. Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russian initiative to ensure economic integration, but has suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led security alliance. Russia has been Armenia’s largest supplier of military aid and remains a dominant trading partner. Russia also owns key infrastructure in Armenia, including railways and telecommunications. However, Russia’s failure to defend Armenia during the Second Karabakh War damaged ties between the two states.

While turning away from Russia, the government has pursued EU accession and signed a framework agreement to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which aims to establish a major trade route in the South Caucasus. Further, regional calculations have dramatically changed, paving the way for a redefined relationship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a provisional peace agreement being formed with the former and new border and trade discussions with the latter. 

Two main opposition blocs, which are closely tied to Russia, are challenging the governing Civil Contract party of Pashinyan, who is running on a “peace” platform defined by continuing the negotiations with Azerbaijan and building closer ties with the EU and US. The opposition blocs oppose the government’s peace agreement, accuse the government of being under Azerbaijani and Turkish control, and say EU goals are unrealistic.

While the political contest does not fall along neat “pro-West vs. pro-Russian” divides as in some frontline democracies, and none of the viable parties embraces a full break from Russia (mindful that the plurality of Armenians believe Russia is the country’s most important political partner), the parties do differ significantly on the nature of the relationship with Moscow. The Kremlin has taken note and activated its hybrid warfare playbook, employed in Georgia, Moldova, and other democracies, to defeat the ruling party.  

The political landscape is also shaped by a fierce conflict between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church, headed by Patriarch Karekin II, who accuses the Pashinyan government of “losing” the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and has called for the prime minister’s resignation. In turn, the government has pushed for Karekin’s removal and prosecuted several bishops on charges ranging from “calling for a coup” to drug charges, prosecutions which many independent groups believe lack strong evidence. Opposition parties have seized on this issue, criticizing the government and defending the Church.

IMPLICATIONS:

Given the partisan divergence on the country’s foreign policy orientation, the geopolitical stakes in the election are high, activating malign actors. The Kremlin sees clearly the threat posed by the ruling Civil Contract party, which has pledged more decoupling from Russia and greater alignment with Europe and the US. While recently on a pre-election assessment mission to Yerevan, government officials, civil society representatives, diplomats, and observers described Russia’s hybrid warfare in the country as “unprecedented.” There was also widespread agreement that the country was not adequately prepared for the threat, made worse by the elimination of USAID and its support in bolstering the country’s defenses.

Information is central to the Kremlin’s strategy. Russia dominates the airwaves, with Russian channels freely broadcasting messages on television and social media, where there are few regulations. Narratives focus on Armenia’s need for Russian security, and how the Pashinyan government has ceded sovereignty to Azerbaijan, and for the Russian market. Emphasis is on Armenia as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Disinformation about elections, institutions, and democracy is prevalent, particularly sowing distrust in the integrity of the upcoming election. Russian information campaigns bolster opposition talking points, such as those accusing the government of suppressing speech and political prosecutions.   

The Kremlin has infiltrated charities, movements, and foundations, such as the “Foundation to Battle Injustice,” established by the late Wagner Group head Yevgeniy Prigozhin. Russia and Armenian Church leaders are also in lockstep, each amplifying the other’s attacks on the government, messaging on traditional values, and criticism of Western institutions. Russia has also mobilized the Armenian diaspora to vote in previous elections, paying for transport and vote buying. Russian banks and businesses operate throughout the country making financing of influence operations and proxies easy. 

It is widely acknowledged in Yerevan that the country is not adequately prepared to defend against this threat. Government bodies are poorly resourced and often lack the mandate, technology, and tools to investigate or conduct counter efforts. There are also legal loopholes, such as the lack of regulation on third parties that frequently engage in political activity. Civil society groups, research institutes, and independent media – central to building resilience to hybrid threats – are also poorly resourced, particularly since the elimination of USAID.

Electoral victory for the main opposition blocs, the beneficiaries of Russian influence, would entail a reversal of the country’s current trajectory. A Russian citizen, Samvel Karapetyan, owner of the Russian Tashir Group, founded the opposition Strong Armenia. The other main opposition bloc, Armenia Alliance, is led by former President Robert Kocharyan who serves on the board of directors for Sistema PJSFC, one of Russia’s largest investment companies. In addition to their obvious Russian ties, the parties reject Pashinyan’s peace agreement with Azerbaijan (but do not offer a clear alternative), do not approve of TRIPP, and believe Armenia is “not ready” for the EU. 

According to recentopinion surveys, Civil Contract is polling at 24 percent, Strong Armenia at 9 percent, and everyone else below the threshold needed for parliamentary representation. Polling data also shows the majority of support for the ruling party comes from older (56+) and more urban citizens. Importantly, those who favor Civil Contract are far more likely to identify as “pro-Western” (73 percent) while those who support Strong Armenia believe the country’s policy should be “pro-Russian” (71 percent).

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s election could lead to the continuation of the country’s new foreign alignment course, forging new economic and security relationships and exerting greater freedom from Russian control. Alternatively, the country could abandon this direction, taking a closer path to that of neighboring Georgia, which has alienated the West and forged closer ties with Russia, China, and Iran. At a time of upheaval and uncertainty in the region, a strong alliance of pro-Russian governments along the vertical axis from Moscow to Tehran would have significant geopolitical consequences. It could block Western interests in and access to the region and beyond, lead to new destabilization between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and embolden Russia to act elsewhere. 

Enhanced U.S. and European support would help fortify the elections from malign actors through increased technical assistance, intelligence, financing, and training to Armenian partners.

This article was originally published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst and is reprinted under a partner post arrangement with Eurasianet.