FREEDOM HOUSE:
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004
AZERBAIJAN
Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: Not Free
GNI per capita: $710
Population: 8,200,000
Life Expectancy: 72
Religious Groups: Muslim (93 percent), RussianOrthodox (3 percent), Armenian
Orthodox (2 percent),other (2 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Azeri (90 percent), Dagestani (3 percent),Russian (3
percent), Armenian (2 percent), other (2 percent)
Capital: Baku
Ratings Change: Azerbaijan’s status declined from Partly Free to Not Free
due to the holding of seriously flawed presidential elections in October and
a subsequent government crackdown on opposition supporters.
Ten Year Ratings Timeline [OMMITTED]
Overview
The October 15, 2003 presidential election marked the end of an era in
Azerbaijan, as the ailing President Heydar Aliev, who had long dominated the
country’s political life, withdrew from the race less than two weeks before
the vote. His son, Ilham, who was widely regarded as his father’s preferred
successor, was voted head of state in an election marred by systematic and
widespread fraud. The results of the poll sparked public protests and a
violent police crackdown, followed by the detention of hundreds of
opposition supporters.
After having been controlled by the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth
century, Azerbaijan entered the Soviet Union in 1922 as part of the
Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Republic, becoming a separate Soviet republic
in 1936. Following a referendum in 1991, Azerbaijan declared independence
from the disintegrating Soviet Union.
In June 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey, leader of the nationalist opposition
Azerbaijan Popular Front, was elected president in a generally free and fair
vote. A military coup one year later ousted him from power and installed the
former first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, Heydar Aliev, in
his place. In the October 1993 presidential elections, Aliev reportedly
received almost 99 percent of the vote. Azerbaijan’s first post-Soviet
parliamentary elections, held in November 1995, saw five leading opposition
parties and some 600 independent candidates barred from the vote in which
Aliev’s Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) won the most seats. In October 1998,
Aliev was chosen president with more than 70 percent of the vote in an
election characterized by serious irregularities.
In a widely expected outcome, the ruling YAP captured the majority of seats
in the November 2000 parliamentary election. The Azerbaijan Popular Front
and the Communist Party came in a distant second and third, respectively.
International monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe cited mass electoral fraud,
including the stuffing of ballot boxes and a strong pro-government bias in
state-run media. Despite widespread criticism of the elections, the Council
of Europe approved Azerbaijan’s application for membership just days after
the vote, a decision widely criticized by international human rights groups.
An August 2002 national referendum led to the adoption of a series of
constitutional amendments, some of which critics charged would further
strengthen the ruling party’s grip on power. One particularly controversial
amendment stipulates that the prime minister becomes president if the head
of state resigns or is incapacitated. Critics charged that the aging and
ailing Aliev would appoint his son, Ilham, prime minister in order to
engineer a transfer of power. Opposition groups and the OSCE charged that
the referendum was marred by fraud, including ballot-box stuffing,
intimidation of election monitors and officials, and inflated voter-turnout
figures of nearly 90 percent.
Throughout 2002, a number of demonstrations were held to demand various
political and economic changes, including Aliev’s resignation. In June, an
unarmed protestor was shot and killed by police in the town of Nardaran, the
first time that such a tragedy had occurred since Azerbaijan’s independence
more than a decade ago. The government blamed the riots on radical Islamic
groups, although residents insisted that the authorities used these
accusations as a pretext to repress dissent. In April 2003, 15 individuals
arrested in Nardaran in 2002 were found guilty of fomenting the unrest and
given prison terms or suspended sentences; during the year, the four
defendants who had been imprisoned were pardoned and released.
In the months preceding the October 15, 2003 presidential elections, the
political atmosphere was marked by uncertainty over Aliev’s declining health
and its ramifications for his reelection bid. The 80-year old Aliev, who had
a history of heart trouble, collapsed during a live television broadcast in
April and left Azerbaijan that summer to receive medical treatment in Turkey
and the United States. At the same time, government officials continued to
deny that his health problems were serious, and he remained the official YAP
candidate for the presidential election.
Heydar Aliev’s son, Ilham, was officially nominated as a presidential
candidate in June by a group of residents from the autonomous exclave of
Nakhichevan, the home territory of the Aliev family. He was appointed prime
minister in August, but took a leave of absence from his post just days
after being appointed so that he could legally run for president (the
election code prohibits a serving prime minister from running for
president). On October 2, the elder Aliev withdrew his candidacy in favor of
his son’s.
Final figures released by the Central Election Commission showed Ilham Aliev
defeating seven challengers with nearly 77 percent of the vote. His closest
rival, opposition Musavat Party leader Isa Gambar, received only 14 percent
of the vote, while six other candidates received less than 4 percent each.
According to OSCE observers, the election was marred by widespread fraud and
failed to meet international standards for democratic elections. Among the
irregularities noted were partisan election commissions favoring the
governing party and its supporters; the failure of authorities to adequately
implement a new electoral code; the use of flawed procedures to deny
registration to several potential candidates; serious flaws in the counting
and tabulation of votes; limitations on election observation by domestic
civic groups; and biased media coverage favoring Ilham Aliev.
Meanwhile, the authorities’ obstruction of many opposition rallies and the
beating and arrest of hundreds of opposition activists overshadowed much of
the campaign and election period. After violent clashes between security
forces and demonstrators in Baku on October 15 and 16, in which at least one
person was reportedly killed and several hundred were injured, the
authorities unleashed a crackdown against the opposition in which more than
600 people were detained. Among those arrested were opposition party leaders
and supporters who had not been directly involved in the preceding days’
violence, along with many election officials who refused to certify
fraudulent election results.
In a region of the world wracked by years of instability, the ramifications
of Ilham’s victory are being watched closely by both domestic and
international observers. A post-election challenge for Ilham, who is
described as lacking his father’s commanding presence, will be consolidating
his power base among the ruling elite. At the same time, Aliev is expected
to continue many of his father’s economic policies, including supporting the
lucrative Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, a key energy project for the West.
A lasting settlement for the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, over
which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought in the early 1990s, remained elusive
during the year. The region, which is formally part of Azerbaijan, is now
predominantly ethnic Armenian and effectively under Armenian control.
Several violations of the 1994 ceasefire occurred during the summer of 2003,
although they did not erupt into full-scale fighting.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Citizens of Azerbaijan cannot change their government democratically. The
country’s constitution provides for a strong presidency, and in practice
parliament exercises little independence from the executive branch. The
1993, 1998, and 2003 presidential and 1995 and 2000 parliamentary elections
were considered neither free nor fair by international observers. Amendments
to the constitution, adopted in a 2002 referendum, included a provision
replacing the proportional-representation system, under which one-fifth of
the members of parliament were elected, with single-mandate constituency
races, under which the remaining four-fifths of parliament were already
chosen. Opposition parties argued that the proportional system was the only
way for them to participate in elections, since most lack nationwide
organizations.
More than 40 political parties are registered. However, most opposition
parties are weak and are based on personalities rather than political
platforms, and they have been unable to unite in lasting alliances to
challenge the government. Hundreds of opposition activists and leaders were
detained by police in the weeks surrounding the October 2003 presidential
election.
Corruption is endemic throughout Azerbaijani society, with government
officials rarely held accountable for engaging in corrupt practices.
Transparency International’s 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked
Azerbaijan 124 out of 133 countries surveyed.
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the press,
journalists who publish articles critical of the president or other
prominent state officials are routinely harassed and prosecuted, and
self-censorship is common. State-owned newspapers and broadcast media
reflect the position of the government. Independent and opposition papers
struggle financially in the face of low circulation, limited advertising
revenues, and heavy fines or imprisonment of their staff. In March, 400
delegates from some 170 print media outlets gathered to establish a press
council to address ongoing pressures faced by the country’s media. However,
an alliance of six other publications boycotted the meeting over concerns
that the selection of members to the council had not been conducted
transparently. Libel is a criminal offense. In early 2003, Elmar Huseynov,
editor-in-chief of the independent Monitor magazine, was convicted of libel
in connection with an article he wrote about the prevalence of corruption in
Azerbaijan, including comparisons of the government with the Sicilian mafia.
Huseynov has been targeted with legal harassment for several years over his
criticisms of government policies.
During the run-up and aftermath of the 2003 presidential election,
journalists suffered increased intimidation and attacks, including physical
assaults while reporting on political opposition rallies. Other restrictions
on the nonstate media included editorial interference and lawsuits for
criticizing government officials. Rauf Arifoglu, editor of the opposition
Yeni Musavat newspaper, was arrested for allegedly organizing public
demonstrations on October 16 and sentenced to three months in prison; he
remained in detention as of November 30.
The government restricts some religious activities of members of
“nontraditional” minority religious groups through burdensome registration
requirements and interference in the import and distribution of printed
religious materials. Islam, Russian Orthodoxy, and Judaism are considered
traditional religions, and their members can generally worship freely.
Some faculty members and students reportedly were pressured to support
governing-party candidates in the 2003 presidential election and were
instructed to attend pro-government events, according to an OSCE report. A
number of teachers were allegedly targeted for reduced work hours or
dismissal in connection with their membership in opposition political
parties, according to the 2003 U.S. State Department human rights report.
Security services are believed to monitor some telephone conversations and
Internet traffic, particularly of prominent political and business figures,
according to the U.S. State Department report.
The government frequently restricts freedom of assembly, particularly for
political parties critical of the government. Although a number of political
demonstrations took place without incident during the weeks surrounding the
2003 presidential election, local authorities frequently obstructed
opposition rallies and beat and arbitrarily arrested many participants of
unauthorized protests. Police assaulted dozens of party leaders,
journalists, and others at a peaceful campaign event on September 21 in
Baku. On the eve of the election, security forces attacked peaceful
protestors who had gathered in front of the headquarters of the opposition
Musavat Party. The following day, several thousand people gathered at an
unsanctioned rally at Azadliq Square in Baku to protest preliminary election
figures. After some of the participants began beating security officers and
damaging government buildings, police and military troops used excessive
force to disperse the demonstrators, killing at least one person and
injuring several hundred others. As of November 30, the government had not
arrested any law enforcement officials or announced the findings of an
investigation in connection with the violent disturbances.
Registration with the Ministry of Justice is required for a nongovernmental
organization (NGO) to function as a legal entity, and the registration
process has been described as cumbersome and nontransparent. Amendments
adopted in 2003 to NGO laws further complicated requirements for registering
grants. In 2003, several leading human rights defenders, including Eldar
Zeynalov, the chair of the Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan, were subjected
to harassment and intimidation believed to be state-sanctioned. Although the
law permits the formation of trade unions and the right to strike, the
majority of trade unions remain closely affiliated with the government, and
most major industries are state-owned. There is no effective collective
bargaining system between unions and management representatives.
The judiciary is subservient to the executive branch and is corrupt and
inefficient. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common, particularly for
members of the political opposition. Detainees are often held for long
periods before trial, and their access to lawyers is restricted. Police
abuse of suspects during arrest and interrogation reportedly remains
commonplace, with torture sometimes used to extract confessions. According
to a report by Human Rights Watch, law enforcement officials tortured many
of those detained in the post-October 2003 election crackdowns against the
political opposition. The group also documented many more cases of police
beatings during the 2003 presidential campaign than during the 2000
parliamentary election campaign. Local human rights groups maintain that
more than 100 political prisoners are held in detention throughout the
country. Prison conditions are reportedly harsh and even life-threatening,
with many inmates suffering from overcrowding and inadequate medical care.
Some members of ethnic minority groups, including the small Armenian
population, have complained of discrimination in areas including education,
employment, and housing. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azeris who fled the
war in NagornoKarabakh have been prevented by the Armenian government from
returning to their homes and remain in Azerbaijan, often living in appalling
conditions.
Significant parts of the economy are in the hands of a corrupt elite, which
severely limits equality of opportunity. Supporters of the political
opposition face job discrimination, demotion, or dismissal. In 2003, Human
Rights Watch documented more than 100 cases in which opposition supporters
or their relatives were fired from their jobs because of their opposition
activities. Traditional societal norms and poor economic conditions restrict
women’s professional roles; there are 12 women in the country’s 125-seat
parliament. Domestic violence is a problem, and there are no laws regarding
spousal abuse. Azerbaijan is a country of origin and a transit point for the
trafficking of women for prostitution.
—
n.htm
Category: News
Freedom In The World 2004: Georgia
FREEDOM HOUSE:
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004
GEORGIA
Political Rights: 4
Civil Liberties: 4
Status: Partly Free
GNI per capita: $590
Population: 4,700,000
Life Expectancy: 77
Religious Groups: Georgian Orthodox (65 percent), Muslim (11 percent),
Russian Orthodox (10 percent), Armenian Apostilic (8 percent), other (6
percent)
Ethnic Groups: Georgian (70 percent), Armenian (8 percent),Russian (6
percent), Azeri (6 percent), Ossetian (3 percent),Abkhaz (2 percent), other
(5 percent)
Capital: Tbilisi
Ten Year Ratings Timeline [OMMITTED]
Overview
After a decade as president, Eduard Shevardnadze stepped down in 2003 in the
face of a popular uprising against his rule. Widespread reports of serious
fraud during the November parliamentary election provoked three weeks of
mass, peaceful protests that culminated in the storming of the parliament
building during the legislature’s opening session. The dramatic
confrontation led to the resignation of Shevardnadze the following day, the
cancellation of the proportional component of the parliamentary election,
and the scheduling of new presidential elections for January 4, 2004.
Meanwhile, relations with Russia continued to be marked by tensions, while a
final settlement to the protracted conflicts in the separatist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained elusive.
Absorbed by Russia in the early nineteenth century, Georgia gained its
independence in 1918. In 1922, it entered the U.S.S.R. as a component of the
Transcaucasian Federated Soviet Republic, becoming a separate union republic
in 1936. An attempt by the region of South Ossetia in 1990 to declare
independence from Georgia and join Russia’s North Ossetia sparked a war
between rebels and Georgian forces. Although a ceasefire was signed in June
1992, the territory’s final political status remains unresolved.
Following a national referendum in April 1991, Georgia declared its
independence from the Soviet Union, which then collapsed in December.
Nationalist leader and former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected
president in May. The next year, he was overthrown by opposition forces and
replaced with former Georgian Communist Party head and Soviet foreign
minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Parliamentary elections held in 1992 resulted
in more than 30 parties and blocs gaining seats, although none secured a
clear majority.
In 1993, Georgia experienced the violent secession of the long-simmering
Abkhazia region and armed insurrection by Gamsakhurdia loyalists. Although
Shevardnadze blamed Russia for arming and encouraging Abkhazian separatists,
he legalized the presence of 19,000 Russian troops in Georgia in exchange
for Russian support against Gamsakhurdia, who was defeated and reportedly
committed suicide. In early 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia signed an agreement
in Moscow that called for a ceasefire, the stationing of Commonwealth of
Independent States troops under Russian command along the Abkhazian border,
and the return of refugees under UN supervision. In parliamentary elections
in November and December 1995, the Shevardnadze-founded Citizens’ Union of
Georgia (CUG) captured the most seats, while Shevardnadze was elected with
77 percent of the vote in a concurrent presidential poll.
The ruling CUG repeated its victory four years later, in the October 1999
parliamentary election. Election observers from the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that despite some
irregularities, the vote was generally fair. In the April 2000 presidential
poll, Shevardnadze easily won a second five-year term with a reported 81
percent of the vote. While Shevardnadze’s win was widely anticipated, the
large margin of his victory led to accusations of electoral fraud. Election
monitors noted numerous and serious irregularities, including the stuffing
of ballot boxes, inflated voter turnout figures, and a strong
pro-Shevardnadze bias in the state media.
Following the parliamentary elections, various competing factions developed
within the CUG, which had dominated Georgian politics for much of the 1990s.
Shevardnadze himself faced growing opposition from prominent members,
including then speaker of parliament Zurab Zhvania and then Justice Minister
Mikhail Saakashvili, who criticized the president’s failure to contain
widespread corruption throughout the country. While Shevardnadze resigned as
CUG chairman in September 2001, Saakashvili left the CUG to form his own
party, the National Movement, and a formal party split was ratified in May
2002. Local elections held in June saw the CUG lose its long-standing
dominance to several rival parties, including the New Rights Party, which
was formed by many prominent businessmen, the National Movement, and the
Labor Party. Subsequently, Saakashvili was named to the influential post of
chairman of the Tbilisi City Council.
With Shevardnadze legally required to step down after his second consecutive
full term in office, the November 2, 2003 parliamentary election was watched
closely as a prelude to the 2005 presidential vote that would determine his
successor. According to official Central Election Commission (CEC) results,
the For New Georgia pro-presidential coalition–led by Shevardnadze and
composed of the CUG, Socialist Party, National Democratic Party (NDP), and
Great Silk Road movement–received 21 percent of the vote. The Union of
Democratic Revival (UGR), a party led by Aslan Abashidze, the leader of the
republic of Ajaria, won almost 19 percent of the vote. Saakashvili’s
National Movement came in a close third with 18 percent, followed by the
Labor Party with 12 percent. The only other two parties to pass the 7
percent threshold to enter parliament were the opposition
Burjanadze-Democrats alliance formed by Zhvania and Speaker of Parliament
Nino Burjanadaze, which captured almost 9 percent of the vote, and the New
Rights, which secured 7 percent.
A domestic monitoring organization, the International Society for Fair
Elections and Democracy (ISFED), conducted a parallel vote tabulation,
concluding that the National Movement had won the election with nearly 27
percent of the vote, with For New Georgia placing second with about 19
percent. Monitors from the OSCE reported that the elections fell short of a
number of international standards for democratic elections. Among the
violations noted were ballot-box stuffing, inaccurate voter lists, biased
media coverage, harassment of some domestic election monitors, and pressure
on public employees to support pro-government candidates.
Over the next three weeks, major opposition party leaders, including
Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Burjanadze, launched a series of mass public
protests against widespread reports of serious electoral fraud. The
demonstrations, which received extensive coverage by the popular independent
television station Rustavi-2, were a culmination of years of deep discontent
over widespread poverty, separatist conflicts, and corruption during
Shevardnadze’s long tenure in office. A November 9 meeting between
Shevardnadze and the opposition failed to resolve the situation. The
political crisis climaxed on November 22, when a large group of protestors
led by Saakashvili burst into the parliament chamber where Shevardnadze was
addressing the legislature’s opening session. Saakashvili declared “the
velvet revolution has taken place in Georgia,” while he and his followers
distributed flowers throughout the chamber. A startled Shevardnadze, who was
quickly led out of the building by bodyguards, called the revolt a coup
d’etat and declared a state of emergency. However, the country’s military
and police refused to back Shevardnadze against the demonstrators, and no
serious incidents of violence were reported.
Russia’s foreign minister was dispatched to Georgia to mediate between
Shevardnadze and the opposition, while U.S. government officials worked
behind the scenes to ensure a peaceful transfer of power. Georgia’s
stability was regarded as crucial for both Moscow and Washington, which have
key–and often competing–strategic and economic interests in the region.
After receiving assurances for his personal safety, Shevardnadze announced
his resignation the following day, and Burjanadze was named interim
president. The Supreme Court cancelled the results of the election under the
proportional, party-list system (but not the results the single-mandate
races). Snap presidential elections were scheduled for January 4, 2004, with
Saakashvili widely considered to be the favorite for president. As of
November 30, the date of new parliamentary elections had not yet been
approved. Observers view the upcoming polls as an important test of whether
the authorities will be willing to hold democratic elections and can restore
public confidence in the country’s election process.
Georgia’s relations with Russia, which had become especially tense during
2002 over charges that Georgia was harboring Chechen rebels in its lawless
Pankisi Gorge region bordering Russia, continued to be strained in 2003. In
March, parliament ratified a bilateral security pact with the United States,
drawing angry reactions from the Russian parliament already concerned by a
U.S. antiterrorist training program for the Georgian military initiated the
previous year. Tbilisi and Moscow continued to disagree over a timetable for
the withdrawal of Russian troops from two military bases in Georgia, with
Russia insisting that it needs about a decade to do so. In May, the appeals
chamber of Georgia’s Supreme Court ruled against extraditing three Chechens
to Russia, a decision that further irritated the Kremlin. At the same time,
Russia made inroads into Georgia’s energy sector when Georgia signed a
25-year deal with the Russian energy company Gazprom in July, and Russia’s
Unified Energy Systems (UES) purchased a majority of Tbilisi’s electricity
distribution network, Telasi, in August from the U.S. energy firm AES.
Long-standing demands of greater local autonomy continued unresolved
throughout the year. A final agreement to the protracted conflict in
Abkhazia remains elusive, as leaders in Tbilisi and Sukhumi, the capital of
Abkhazia, continued to disagree on key issues, including the territory’s
final political status. While the Georgian government has stated its
willingness to grant the territory broad autonomy, Abkhazia’s leadership
continues to insist on full independence. South Ossetia has maintained de
facto independence from Tbilisi since 1992. In the southwestern region of
Ajaria, Aslan Abashidze exercises almost complete control over the
territory, which has retained considerable autonomy since 1991.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
The November 2003 parliamentary elections fell short of international
standards for democratic elections. No voting took place in the separatist
territory of Abkhazia and parts of South Ossetia, which remained largely
outside central government control. Subsequent opposition-led mass public
protests resulted in the cancellation of the results of the poll under the
proportional, party-list system (but not the results the singlemandate
races), the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze, and the scheduling
of fresh presidential elections for January 4, 2004. As of November 30, the
date of new legislative elections had not been decided. Most political
parties tend to be more centered around specific individuals than detailed
policy platforms.
Although the government initiated a high-profile anticorruption campaign in
2000, corruption remains endemic throughout all levels of Georgian society.
The prevalence of corruption undermined the credibility of Shevardnadze’s
government and is an obstacle to foreign investment. In its 2003 Corruption
Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Georgia 124 out of 133
countries surveyed.
While the country’s independent press often publishes discerning and
critical political analyses, economic difficulties limit the circulation of
most newspapers, particularly outside the capital. Independent newspapers
and television stations face some harassment by the authorities, and
journalists in government-controlled media frequently practice
self-censorship. In March, several men forced the independent Dzveli Kalaki
radio station off the air when they knocked its rooftop antenna to the
ground. The station is known for its willingness to report on politically
sensitive issues, including corruption. In July, a former police officer was
sentenced to 13 years in prison for the 2001 murder of journalist Georgy
Sanaya. Many of Sanaya’s family members and former colleagues maintain that
his killing was politically motivated and that those who masterminded his
murder remain unpunished. The independent television station Rustavi-2,
which for years faced harassment and politically motivated tax audits for
investigative reporting on issues including government corruption, broadcast
reports of voter fraud in the November 2003 election and the subsequent
protests that led to Shevardnadze’s resignation. Libel laws inhibit
investigative journalism; the Rustavi-2 investigative program “60 Minutes”
lost two separate politically motivated libel cases in 2003. In June,
parliament ratified an amendment to the criminal code imposing longer jail
sentences for slandering government officials. Although the government does
not limit Internet access, widespread poverty limits its availability to
much of the population.
Although the government does not restrict academic freedom, the quality of
the country’s educational system has been compromised by endemic corruption.
Students frequently pay bribes to receive high marks or pass entrance
examinations.
Freedom of religion is respected for the country’s largely Georgian Orthodox
population and some minority religious groups traditional to the country,
including Muslims and Jews. However, members of nontraditional religious
minority groups, including Baptists, Pentecostals, and Jehovah’s Witnesses,
face harassment and intimidation by law enforcement officials and certain
Georgian Orthodox Church extremists. Over the years, police have failed to
respond to repeated attacks by followers of defrocked Georgian Orthodox
priest Father Basili Mkalavishvili against Jehovah’s Witnesses and members
of other faiths. The attacks have included burning religious material,
breaking up religious gatherings, and beating parishioners. The Georgian
Orthodox Church and the government signed an agreement in October 2002
giving the Church a more privileged status than other religions, although it
stopped short of naming the Church as the official church of Georgia.
The authorities generally respect freedom of association and assembly. A
series of opposition-led demonstrations in November against election fraud
proceeded without incident. However, on November 19, a peaceful opposition
demonstration was violently attacked by pro-government supporters in the
southern Bolnisi district while police did not intervene. Other instances of
violence occurred during earlier opposition demonstrations in September in
Bolnisi and in October in the republic of Ajaria. Nongovernmental
organizations, including human rights groups, are able to register and
operate without arbitrary restrictions.
The constitution and Law on Trade Unions allow workers to organize and
prohibit anti-union discrimination. The Amalgamated Trade Unions of Georgia
(ATUG), the successor to the union that existed during the Soviet period, is
the principal trade union confederation. It is not affiliated with and
receives no funding from the government. The ATUG has reported cases of
workers being warned by management not to organize unions, and some workers
have been threatened for engaging in union activities. Collective bargaining
practices, though legally permitted, are not widespread.
The judiciary is not fully independent, with courts influenced by pressure
from the executive branch. The payment of bribes to judges, whose salaries
remain inadequate, is reportedly common. In 2003, Shevardnadze openly
pressured the judiciary, including in August when he called on the
Constitutional Court to consult with the government before making important
decisions. Police reportedly beat prisoners and detainees to extract
confessions and fabricate or plant evidence on suspects. Kidnapping for
ransom occurs frequently throughout the country, with senior law enforcement
officials allegedly involved. In June, three UN hostages were freed after
having spent five days in captivity in the Kodori Gorge area located between
Abkhazia and Georgia proper. Prison inmates suffer from overcrowding and
inadequate sanitation, food, and medical care.
The government generally respects the rights of ethnic minorities in
nonconflict areas of the country. Freedom of residence and the freedom to
travel to and from the country is generally respected. However, Georgia
continues to face serious refugee problems stemming from the long-standing
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as from the war in the
neighboring Russian republic of Chechnya, with repatriation efforts
proceeding slowly.
The country’s economy continued to suffer from problems including high rates
of unemployment, sporadic payment of government pensions, energy shortages,
and widespread corruption.
Sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace are problems that are
rarely investigated. Social taboos limit the reporting and punishment of
rape and spousal abuse, and the trafficking of women abroad for prostitution
remains a problem. In June, parliament approved amendments to the criminal
code making human trafficking a criminal offense punishable by 5 to 10 years
in prison, or up to 12 years for a repeat conviction.
—
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Freedom In The World 2004: Nagorno-Karabakh
FREEDOM HOUSE:
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004
Armenia / Azerbaijan
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: Partly Free
Population: 150,000
Religious Groups: Armenian Apostolic Church (majority)
Ethnic Groups: Armenian (95 percent), other (5 percent)
Ten Year Ratings Timeline [OMMITTED]
Overview
Internationally mediated efforts to find a political settlement to the
protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict made little progress in 2003. With
presidential elections scheduled for both Armenia and Azerbaijan during the
year, neither country’s leadership appeared willing to risk a public
backlash by agreeing to compromises over the disputed territory’s status.
Meanwhile, a mounting number of cease-fire violations led to concerns over a
possible threat of renewed larger-scale confrontations.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, a territory largely populated by
ethnic Armenians inside the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan, was
established in 1923. In February 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh’s regional
legislature adopted a resolution calling for union with Armenia. The
announcement triggered the first mass violence related to the conflict with
attacks against Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait several days
later.
Successive battles and counteroffensives were fought over the next several
years between various Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Nagorno-Karabakh forces. At
its inaugural session in January 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh’s new legislature
adopted a declaration of independence, which was not recognized by the
international community. By the time a Russian-brokered cease-fire was
signed in May 1994, Karabakh Armenians, assisted by Armenia, had captured
essentially the entire territory, as well as six Azerbaijani districts
surrounding the enclave. Nearly all ethnic Azeris had fled or been forced
out of the enclave and its surrounding areas, and the fighting had resulted
in thousands of casualties and an estimated one million refugees.
In December 1994, the head of Nagorno-Karabakh’s state defense committee,
Robert Kocharian, was selected by the territory’s parliament for the newly
established post of president. Parliamentary elections were held in April
and May 1995, and Kocharian defeated two other candidates in a popular vote
for president in November of the following year.
In September 1997, Foreign Minister Arkady Ghukasian was elected to replace
Kocharian, who had been named prime minister of Armenia in March of that
year. In the territory’s June 2000 parliamentary vote, 123 candidates
representing five parties competed for the assembly’s 33 seats. The ruling
Democratic Union Artsakh (ZhAM), which supported Ghukasian, enjoyed a slim
victory, winning 13 seats. The Related Territories Reports 643 Armenian
Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutiun won 9 seats, the Armenakan Party
captured 1 seat, and formally independent candidates, most of whom supported
Ghukasian, won 10. International observers described the electoral campaign
and voting process as calm and largely transparent, although problems were
noted with the accuracy of some voter lists.
In February 2001, former Defense Minister Samvel Babayan was found guilty of
organizing a March 2000 assassination attempt against Ghukasian and
sentenced to 14 years in prison. His supporters insisted that the arrest was
politically motivated, as Babayan had been involved in a power struggle with
Ghukasian. Others, however, welcomed the arrest and conviction of Babayan,
who had been accused of corruption and reportedly wielded considerable
political and economic power in the territory.
Ghukasian was reelected to a second term as president on August 11, 2002,
with 89 percent of the vote. His closest challenger, former parliament
speaker Artur Tovmasian, received just 8 percent. Voter turnout was close to
75 percent. Observers from countries including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France reported no serious violations. While a number of
domestic and international nongovernmental organizations concluded that the
elections marked a further step in Nagorno-Karabakh’s democratization, they
did voice some criticisms, including the limited access for the opposition
to state-controlled media. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry described the
election as a violation of international norms, insisting that a legitimate
vote could be held only after a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
With both Armenia’s president, Robert Kocharian, and Azerbaijan’s president,
Heydar Aliev, poised to seek reelection in 2003 – and the domestic political
risk associated with either leader’s making significant public concessions
over the territory during a campaign year – few observers expected any
breakthroughs in the conflict during 2003. An upsurge in shooting incidents
along the ceasefire line in the summer, which both Armenian and Azerbaijani
officials accused the other side of instigating, fueled concerns of a
further and more widespread escalation of violence. Meanwhile, speculation
grew over the impact of Aliev’s failing health and the October election of
his son, Ilham, to succeed him as president on prospects for a negotiated
settlement to the conflict.
Despite continued high-level discussions in the framework of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group – which
was established a decade earlier to facilitate dialogue on a political
settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status – a resolution of the long-standing
dispute remained elusive at year’s end. While Yerevan insists that
Nagorno-Karabakh should be left outside Azeri jurisdiction, Baku maintains
that the territory may be granted broad autonomy while remaining a
constituent part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan also has refused to negotiate
with Ghukasian, who has demanded direct representation in the peace process.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
A self-declared republic, Nagorno-Karabakh has enjoyed de facto
independence from Azerbaijan since 1994 while retaining close political,
economic, and military ties with Armenia. Parliamentary elections in 1995
and 2000 were regarded as generally free and fair, as were the 1996 and
1997 presidential votes. However, the elections were considered invalid by
most of the international community that does not recognize 644 Freedom in
the World – 2004 Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. Nagorno-Karabakh’s
electoral law calls for a single-mandate system to be used in
parliamentary elections; lawmakers have rejected the opposition’s demands
for the inclusion of party-based lists.
The territory officially remains under martial law, which imposes
restrictions on civil liberties, including media censorship and the banning
of public demonstrations. However, the authorities maintain that these
provisions have not been enforced since 1995, a year after the cease-fire
was signed.
The government controls many of the territory’s broadcast media outlets, and
most journalists practice self-censorship, particularly on subjects dealing
with policies related to Azerbaijan and the peace process. Some observers
maintain that the government used the attempted murder of President Arkady
Ghukasian in 2000 as a pretext to intensify attacks against its critics.
The registration of religious groups is required under Nagorno-Karabakh’s
1997 law on religion. The Armenian Apostolic Church, which is the territory’
s predominant religion, is the only faith registered with the state.
According to Forum 18, a religious-freedom watchdog group based in Norway,
members of various minority faiths, including Pentecostals, Adventists,
Baptists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, have faced restrictions on their
activities. In 2003, a local Baptist was beaten, was threatened with
mind-altering drugs, and had threats made against his wife by law
enforcement officials for distributing religious literature on the street,
Forum 18 reported; authorities denied that any threats were made against
him.
Freedom of assembly and association is limited, although political parties
and unions are allowed to organize.
The judiciary, which is not independent in practice, is influenced by the
executive branch and powerful political and clan forces. Former defense
minister Samvel Babayan alleged that he had been physically assaulted during
his interrogation and detention as a suspect in the failed assassination
attempt against President Ghukasian in March 2000. The presiding judge in
the case announced that the subsequent guilty verdict against Babayan was
based on pretrial testimony in which Babayan confessed to the charges,
although he later retracted his admission of guilt, claiming that it had
been obtained under duress. The republic’s government announced that it had
replaced the death penalty with life imprisonment as of August 1, 2003.
The majority of those who fled the fighting continue to live in squalid
conditions in refugee camps in Azerbaijan, while international aid
organizations are reducing direct assistance to the refugees. Landmine
explosions continue to result in casualties each year, with children and
teenagers among the most vulnerable groups. According to the International
Committee of the Red Cross, at least 50,000 anti-personnel mines were laid
during the war, although in many cases, records of minefield locations were
never created or were lost. The HALO Trust, a British nongovernmental
organization, is the major de-mining group operating in the territory.
Nagorno-Karabakh’s fragile peace has failed to bring significant improvement
to the economy, particularly in the countryside, and pensioners are
particularly hard hit. Widespread corruption, a lack of substantive economic
reforms, and the control of major economic activity by powerful elites limit
equality of opportunity for most residents.
—
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Humanitarian Assistance Appropriated
A1 Plus | 18:27:27 | 24-09-2004 | Social |
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATED
One of international organisations has sent 650 tons wheat seeds as
assistance to the republic’s six regions stricken by frost in 2002 and 2003.
It became known recently that 2,100 kg of that amount were distributed
wrongly.
Journalists without borders organisation discussed that incident Friday.
The thing is that Lyudvig Khlghatyan, the headman of Armavir region’s
Dimitrov village, pocketed the aid using his levers.
A suit was filed against him. Villagers say wrongdoer Khlghatyan is backed
by more senior officials. In particular, territorial regulation an
industrial infrastructures minister Hovik Abrahamyan had been named very
often in this connection.
Assyrians make the village population’s 30 percent. That’s why the villagers
view the incident as ethnic minorities’ rights discrimination. The minister’
s deputy Gagik Aslanyan says his chief can’t tolerate persons like Hovik
Abrahamyan.
He promised that things will be put right.
Armenian PM’s adviser on ethnic minorities issues Hranush Kharatyan says
minority tinge will help to solve the problem. If the village was completely
Armenian, there would be less chances for solving the issue through court.
High Time To Speculate How To Save Armenia
A1 Plus | 18:59:43 | 24-09-2004 | Politics |
HIGH TIME TO SPECULATE HOW TO SAVE ARMENIA
Participants of the discussion held Friday by the National Citizen’s
Initiative compared current situation in Armenia with that of short period
of Armenia’s independence from 1918 to 1920. Political analyst Artsrun
Pepanyan said the then situation was even worse than one can imagine.
He said quoting one of the then governors “we had neither state mentality
nor state world vision”.
Lawyer Hrayr Tovmassyan joined him in criticizing the first republic by
saying election fraud and scandals of that time overdid today’s ones.
In his words, Dashnak party activists were forcing people to go to polling
stations by threatening them with guns.
These facts were remembered at the discussion to show on what legacy our
present republic is built. Thirteen years have already passed since
declaration of independence in 1991, but so far a majority of Declaration
provisions is not put into reality.
In Pepanyan’s opinion, very few intellectuals remain in Armenia today.
After his speech the event participants came to sad realization that Armenia
is badly in need of being saved. Time has come to speculate over the matter
to save the republic, they said.
Armenian DM sets three conditions for Karabakh settlement
Armenian defence minister sets three conditions for Karabakh settlement
Public Television of Armenia, Yerevan
24 Sep 04
Armenian Defence Minister Serzh Sarkisyan has received Marco Zacchera,
vice-president of the Assembly of the Western European Union. The
minister said that Yerevan had put forward three principles for the
Karabakh settlement. From now on, Nagornyy Karabakh cannot exist as an
integral part of Azerbaijan, it cannot be isolated from Armenia and it
should have land borders with Armenia.
As for ties with Turkey, the minister said that diplomatic relations
with Ankara should be established without preconditions. Sarkisyan
said that Turkey should recognize the Armenian genocide in order to
settle all other problems.
Zacchera promised to cover these issues in his upcoming report for the
Parliamentary Assembly of the European Union.
Armenian, British Defence Ministries sign cooperation memo
Armenian, British Defence Ministries sign cooperation memo
Mediamax news agency
24 Sep 04
YEREVAN
The Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom and the Ministry of
Defence of the Republic of Armenia have agreed a memorandum of
understanding in defence contacts and cooperation.
Armenian Minister of Defence Serzh Sarkisyan and British ambassador to
Armenia Thorda Abbott-Watt signed the memorandum at a brief ceremony
at the Armenian Ministry of Defence in Yerevan today.
The aim of the memorandum is to further strengthen good relations
between the two ministries and to serve as a basis for increased
cooperation between them in the field of defence.
Over the last year the United Kingdom has sponsored a variety of
training courses outside Armenia for 16 members of the Armenian Armed
Forces, including the first Armenian cadet ever to attend the Royal
Military Academy, Sandhurst.
The British Ministry of Defence also funds English language training
within the framework of the Peacekeeping English Programme run by the
British Council Armenia at the Armenian Ministry of Defence.
The memorandum of understanding notes that stable and democratic
sovereign states contribute to confidence, stability and security in
Europe as a whole. It will put the existing cooperation programme on a
formal footing, and enable Britain and Armenia to develop further
contacts in areas such as defence management in democratic societies,
language training, peace support in humanitarian operations and arms
control.
Official Says Karabakh Report Meets British Oil Companies’ Interests
Armenian official says Karabakh report meets British oil companies’ interests
Mediamax news agency
24 Sep 04
YEREVAN
The draft report on Nagornyy Karabakh prepared by PACE ex-rapporteur
Terry Davis, who is presently holding the post of secretary-general of
the Council of Europe, “is not impartial and reflects the interests of
British oil companies”, the deputy speaker of the Armenian parliament,
Vaan Ovanesyan, said at the National Press Club in Yerevan today.
According to him, “it should be taken into account that PACE’s new
rapporteur on Nagornyy Karabakh David Atkinson is also British and his
report will be most likely based on the documents prepared by his
predecessor”.
Armenia’s foreign debt totals over 1bn dollars
Armenia’s foreign debt totals over 1bn dollars
Yerkir web site
24 Sep 04
YEREVAN
As of 30 June 2004, Armenia’s foreign debt totalled 1.07bn dollars, of
which loans received under Armenia’s state guarantee amounted to
858.9m dollars (80.2 per cent). The Armenian Central Bank’s foreign
debt amounted to 211.4m dollars (19.8 per cent), Armenpress news
agency reports.
The Armenian Finance and Economy Ministry reports that Armenia’s state
debt has dropped by 0.8 per cent as against the same period in 2003
and by 2.5 per cent as against 31 December 2003.
As of 30 June 2004, 90.1 per cent of Armenia’s foreign debt are loans
from different creditors, and the remaining 9.9 per cent falls to the
share of loans from double sources.
[Passage omitted: minor details]
BAKU: Azeri president meets Spanish foreign minister in New York
Azeri president meets Spanish foreign minister in New York
Lider TV, Baku
24 Sep 04
[Presenter] Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is due to deliver a
speech at the 59th session of the UN General Assembly today. The
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will be the key topic of the president’s
speech. The president has already held a number of meetings.
[Correspondent over video of Ilham Aliyev meeting named officials]
President Ilham Aliyev, who is on a visit in New York, has received
Solomon Pasi, chairman of the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe]. The president called on the OSCE chairman to
boost the organization’s efforts in the settlement of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. The sides exchanged
opinions on the OSCE’s future activities and its expansion. Pasi
informed President Ilham Aliyev of Bulgaria’s position on this issue.
Following this meeting, President Ilham Aliyev met the president of
Exxon Mobile. The Exxon Mobile president congratulated Ilham Aliyev on
the 10th anniversary of the Contract of the Century. He spoke about
successful projects of development of the Caspian natural
resources. The meeting also discussed the Exxon Mobile company’s
future activities in Azerbaijan.
President Ilham Aliyev also met Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
Moratinos. Extending greetings from Spanish King Juan Carlos I and
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero to President Ilham
Aliyev, Moratinos said that the Spanish government was closely
observing processes in Azerbaijan and was of high opinion of President
Ilham Aliyev’s policy. The president noted great potential for the
development of relations between the countries. By exploiting this
potential, we should expand political, economic and other ties, the
president said, adding that our country was successfully integrating
into European structures. Since Azerbaijan joined the European Union’s
Wider Europe policy, we have been planning to bring our ties with this
body to a new stage, end quote.
One of the meetings President Ilham Aliyev held throughout the day was
with the president of the Open Society Institute, George
Soros. Stating that he is very keen on processes in Azerbaijan, Soros
said that our country is developing economically.
Mahsati Seyidzada for Lider TV.