Category: News

Interfax
March 29 2004

Comsup to invest $3.5 mln in Armenian mining outfit

Moscow. (Interfax) – The U.S. company Comsup Commodities will in the
first year of its privatization be investing $3.5 million in Agarak
GOK (mining and benefication combine), Armenian Trade and Economic
Development Minister Karen Chshmarityan announced at a Friday press
conference in Yervan.
The GOK privatization agreement should be signed soon.

Chshmarityan noted that the investment will go to addressing pressing
problems at the combine. In the year following the moment of
privatization, the U.S. company should be providing the Armenian
government with an investment program for the enterprise’s
development.

Comsup Commodities is obligated to keep the enterprise’s jobs intact
and pay back wages. It had offered $500,000 for the GOK.

A1 Plus | 14:07:24 | 29-03-2004 | Politics |

ARMENIANS IN JAVAKHK SUPPORTING THE GOVERNING BLOC

Ruling “National Movement-Democrats” Bloc won absolute majority of votes in
Javakhk region at the parliamentary elections in Georgia. It gained 90% in
Akhalqalaq District, 70% in Tsalka, and 80% of votes in Akhaltckha.

About 90% of Javakhk electorate partook in the elections.

—

New York Daily News, NY
March 29 2004

Easter, at least, for St. Ann flock

By RALPH R. ORTEGA
DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER

A 157-year-old Manhattan church in danger of closing will be open for
at least one more Easter celebration.
The 50 faithful who attend the sole Sunday Mass at St. Ann’s on E.
12th St. learned yesterday that Palm Sunday and Easter services would
still be held in their beloved church.

Ushers distributed flyers directing them to other churches for all
other Holy Week Masses.

It was a welcome reprieve for those who fear the worst as the
Archdiocese of New York mulls whether to sell the aging church.
Everyone except St. Ann’s English-speaking worshipers were relocated
to other churches last month.

“We’ll be praying that it continues to stay open,” said Michael
Krzyzanowski, 61, who kissed the sooty facade of the Gothic church as
he walked inside.

St. Ann’s is the latest Catholic church to face closure. Two others
have shut their doors since Edward Cardinal Egan took over in 2001
and began work that eliminated a $20 million annual operating
deficit.

Archdiocese spokesman Joseph Zwilling said St. Ann’s fate will be
determined as part of a “realignment” effort to close and consolidate
churches based on usage. “Selling the building is a possibility,”
Zwilling said.

St. Ann’s has not had enough congregants to be considered a parish
for more than 20 years. Still, Masses have been celebrated there in
English, Latin and Spanish. It also has allowed a rite of Armenian
Catholics to use the church as its North American headquarters since
1983.

There are signs that church leaders are preparing for a final
celebration. A statue of Our Lady of Quinche, an image of the Virgin
Mary honored by Ecuadorans, was removed when the Spanish Masses
ended.

“This is a surprise,” said Taco Guillermo, a painter who was born in
Ecuador and lives in Jamaica, Queens. “We never expected not to find
her here.”

Posted by Julian Broxup
Caucasus Links
41 Barnov Street, Tbilisi
tel 292399; email [email protected]

LINKS Election Report on the 28 March 2004
Parliamentary Elections (Party List) in Georgia,
issued 29 March 2004.

The new government of Georgia that came to power after the resignation of
president Shevardnadze in November 2003 inherited huge problems in all
spheres of governance. It moved swiftly and with courage and determination
to deal with some of the more serious problems, particularly corruption,
organized crime and local feudalism and with preliminary efforts to tackle
the country’s economic and social problems. Since the new government’s
accession to power was based first and foremost on the demand for free and
fair elections, expectations in this field were correspondingly high. It is
therefore unfortunate that in dealing with issues of democracy and human
rights the new government has shown a tendency to cut corners. By not
giving sufficient priority to the electoral process over other issues, the
government has initiated a worrying trend of the legitimation of significant
political changes at the ballot box only after the event.

The March 2004 parliamentary elections brought to a close the constitutional
vacuum which has persisted in Georgia since the events of November 2003.
Although there were considerable improvements in several areas compared to
the November parliamentary poll, in other areas serious problems persisted.
We reiterate that it is not possible to hold a fair and inclusive electoral
process without an accurate and comprehensive voters’ register. It is
regrettable that the high degree of political competition evident in the
November campaign has subsided to produce a significantly less pluralist
political arena. The inability of the opposition parties to join forces and
present the government with a credible challenge further contributed to a
vacuum that is dangerous in a democratic society. We also regret a
disappointing deterioration in the activity of the media over the electoral
period. We hope that the government will understand the need for an
inclusive approach to the resolution of Georgia’s many problems, and in this
regard the emergence of a younger generation of leaders amongst the
opposition forces is an encouraging development.

I Background

On 28 March a new run of the annulled 2 November 2003 parliamentary
elections was held in Georgia. It was allegations of fraud in the November
elections that triggered political turmoil in the country, eventually
leading to the resignation of President Shevardnadze. In a controversial
decision the Georgian Supreme Court ruled for only a partial annulment of
the November election results. Only the proportional representation vote
(150 of 235 mandates), whereby candidates are elected on the basis of party
lists, was annulled, while the results to the majoritarian,
‘first-past-the-post’ system were retained (75 of the remaining seats, with
10 retained by deputies representing the seceded territory of Abkhazia).
The arguments for and against this decision remained unresolved, with
numerous political forces openly declaring the majoritarian results to have
also been marred by serious fraud.

Although some saw the 28 March election as a repeat election, it in fact
represented a new electoral process in a radically changed political
environment. Following the November events, a triumvirate of opposition
leaders emerged as the country’s new leadership: Nino Burjanadze, Acting
President, Mikheil Saakashvili, leader of the United National Movement, and
Zurab Zhvania, leader (with Burjanadze) of the Burjanadze-Democrats party.
In their taking control of the country the triumvirate attempted as far as
possible to remain within the constitutional order, although many questions
regarding the legitimacy of this process persist and are likely to be
revisited in the future. A pre-term presidential election was held on 4
January 2004 to elect Shevardnadze’s successor, in which Mikheil Saakashvili
was elected with an overwhelming 96.3% of the vote. Although the
International Election Observation Mission welcomed these elections as an
expression of the new leadership’s political will to hold free and fair
elections, LINKS was more critical in its assessment. Several shortcomings
of previous elections were again seen in the January poll; furthermore, a
questionable new registration process de facto cut the electorate by nearly
one third.

Following the November events and President Saakashvili’s election, a
high-profile anti-corruption campaign was initiated, targeted against many
prominent figures from the previous administration. Although this had
formed part of President Saakashvili’s election manifesto, and was welcomed
by many in principle, the manner in which this campaign was conducted
involved excessive use of force by law-enforcement agencies. There were
also significant concerns voiced in Georgian society regarding the
selectivity of this campaign and breaches of human rights.

In early February a package of far-reaching constitutional changes proposed
by the new government were approved by the reconvened 1999-2003 parliament.
These altered the system of checks and balances in Georgia in important
ways, introducing the office of Prime Minister with wide-ranging powers,
weakening the legislative branch of government vis-à-vis the executive and
making the President the Chair of the Judiciary Council with new powers to
appoint and discharge judges. There are serious concerns regarding the
haste with which these changes were adopted: presented on 3 February, they
were rushed through Parliament without serious debate and adopted on 6
February. They were signed by the president on the same day. Working at
unusual speed, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe was able to
provide an assessment of the changes by 6 February. The Commission voiced
numerous concerns regarding both the coherence and expedience of these
changes. There were also credible reports of serious pressure applied to
members of parliament to ensure support, and despite the fact that the
Georgian parliament was effectively voting to weaken its own prerogatives,
only nine MPs voted against. The lack of public debate was compounded by
the fact that several of the more respected Georgian NGOs offered no
significant criticism to these changes or the manner of their adoption,
although much stronger concerns were expressed in private.

The immediate pre-election period was dominated by confrontation between the
leadership of the Adjarian Autonomous Republic and the central government.
Simmering since the replacement of the Shevardnadze administration, with
which the Adjarian authorities had aligned themselves in the November poll,
centre-periphery relations reached crisis point in mid-March. This was
sparked by the barring of President Saakashvili from entry into Adjara,
leading to a three-day ‘blockade’ of the autonomous republic by the central
government. The dispute was resolved following intense negotiations, which
included guarantees made by the Adjarian authorities regarding the
unrestricted conduct of the elections. Both campaigning activities and
preparations for the elections in Adjara were severely disrupted as a result
of these developments.

II Political Parties and Aspects of the Election Campaign

Possibilities for a meaningfully pluralist campaign were sharply curtailed
by the prevailing political climate. Georgia’s new government disregarded
recommendations offered by the OSCE and the Council of Europe and other
international organizations, in particular recommendations that the
elections be held later rather than sooner and that the 7% threshold for
securing representation be lowered to 4-5%. In a climate where the
political arena was still extremely fluid in the aftermath of the November
events, this further narrowed the likelihood of opposition parties securing
entry into the new parliament. The campaign was consequently overshadowed
by fears that a single-bloc parliament supporting the new government would
be returned.

Parties outside the new ruling bloc continued to suffer from internal
turmoil following the change of government. Despite a number of contingency
alliances, the opposition remained fragmented. In total 5 blocs and 14
parties were registered to contest the election. Two new alliances formed
by pre-existing parties, New Rightists-Industrialists’ and ‘National
Democrats-Traditionalists’, sought to establish themselves as ‘constructive
opposition’ blocs. The Labour, Socialist and Revival parties were
consistently highly critical of the new government. The Liberty party,
headed by Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, the eldest son of Georgia’s first
president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was a new addition to the political scene, but
appeared to be trading more on its associations with the Gamsakhurdia family
name than any substantive political programme. Regrettably, most of the
debate between parties during the campaigning period concerned abuses within
the electoral system, rather than substantive political issues on which the
electorate could make an informed choice.

The election campaign was sluggish, only gathering some momentum in the
final week before election day. Most opposition parties presented their
programmes with only a few days to spare, although some used the final days
of the campaign touring the country to get their message across. Some
opposition party representatives complained that the withdrawal of two of
Georgia’s most popular political talk-shows (see below, Media) had denied
them an important forum. Both talk shows had high viewership and were
considered the news flagships of both stations. Effectively the only access
to TV for opposition political parties was through paid advertising, which
in some cases was sharply limited by the paucity of campaign funds. By
contrast the new ruling bloc, National Movement-Democrats, enjoyed the
benefits of incumbency. There were credible reports of the blurring of
boundaries between local executive organs (particularly in the activity of
local governors appointed by the president) and the electoral
administration, repeating the pattern of previous elections. President
Saakashvili campaigned widely for the National Movement; on numerous
occasions he openly questioned the need for a parliamentary opposition.
This was regrettable, since although the changes to the Constitution adopted
in February permit the President to simultaneously hold the leadership of a
political party, the Unified Electoral Code (UEC) expressly prohibits state
officials from engaging in campaigning activity (Article 94).

In Adjara the local authorities did not provide appropriate conditions for
the conduct of a meaningful campaign. The entire campaigning period took
place under conditions of a state of emergency declared by the Adjarian
authorities, itself of questionable legality. Contrasting political
platforms were presented to the Adjarian electorate in the distorted form of
clashes between pro-government demonstrators and local security agencies and
the confrontation between the regional authorities and the central
government.

III The Electoral Process

(1) Voter Registration and Voters Lists

Voter registration for 28 March continued the process initiated before the 4
January presidential poll. Through February and March the CEC continued to
work towards the refinement of voters’ register used in that election,
including the computerization of a single centralised list. Between 8 and
21 March the CEC organized a new registration period for hitherto
unregistered voters, by the end of which some 102,700 new voters had
registered. Regrettably, as a result of fears that significant numbers of
voters would still be omitted the mechanism of same-day registration was
retained. Prior to election day some 2.2 million voters had been
registered, a figure which did not dispel concerns over the failure to
include a significant number of eligible voters. Overall, the CEC
demonstrated increased control over the voter list compilation process than
its predecessor, yet the new voters’ register was again marred by
significant inaccuracies, including repeated entries, omissions and
significant discrepancies in the numbers of new voters registered held at
the CEC and in local PECs.

Several more months’ work was required for the CEC to be able to provide a
comprehensive, accurate and transparent voters’ list. Since this is a
prerequisite for any free and fair election, the Georgian government’s
decision not to postpone the election date until May, as recommended by a
number of international organizations, raised the question of their
political commitment to an inclusive electoral process.

The Adjarian authorities failed to supply the CEC with timely or
satisfactory voters’ lists; this led in one instance to the firing of a PEC
chair in Khelvachauri district by the CEC. Amid controversy over the size
of the Adjarian electorate, the CEC initiated a new registration process in
the region. The CEC also claimed to have been presented with evidence by
domestic observers that blank voters’ certificates for those voters lacking
other ID documentation were being issued illegitimately in Adjara
(Sharabidzeebi village).

(2) The CEC

The CEC, under the direction of Mr Zurab Chiaberashvili, was far better
organized and more transparent in its work than its predecessor. However
its conduct continued to attract controversy. The CEC inherited a number of
unresolved legal ambiguities from the January presidential election. A
number of provisions that were stipulated specifically for the January
election were retained without renewal or review, including the same-day
registration mechanism and the range of legitimate ID documents permitted
for voting. Many new issues were decided by means of CEC decree (including,
inter alia, simplification of the protocol forms and timing of the mobile
ballot box run), despite the fact that the CEC lacked legal authority to
make some of these changes. In part the CEC’s exceeding of its mandate was
due to parliamentary inertia. A package of changes to the electoral code
submitted to parliament at the end of February was not considered by
parliament, which failed to gather the necessary quorum. The fact that
parliament could be sufficiently mobilized to adopt the controversial
constitutional changes of 6 February, and to rubber stamp the appointment of
senior officials, but not to review changes to the electoral code
demonstrated a lack of political commitment on the part of Georgia’s new
leaders to the electoral process.

The most significant of the CEC’s decrees was to change the basis of the
calculation of the 7% threshold for party representation to turnout on
election day rather than the total number of voters registered. In
principle this decision was to be welcomed in facilitating the accession to
the incoming parliament of opposition parties. However, we remain concerned
that important decisions affecting electoral outcomes are still being
determined on an ad hoc basis by the CEC, rather than through a transparent
and accountable legal framework. Perceptions that the CEC is acting as an
instrument of policy regarding electoral provisions diminish public
confidence in the election administration and the electoral process as a
whole.

These problems apart, the CEC made effective use of international funding to
run a wide-ranging information campaign, including TV clips (subtitled in
Russian), leaflets, a new web-site and a poster campaign. It also expended
commendable efforts to ensure that electoral materials were available in
Georgia’s main minority languages, Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian.

III Election Day

Polling was conducted in a generally calm and orderly fashion. Turnout was
steady but by no means heavy. Election fatigue also appeared to be a factor
in some regions.

The efforts to improve the voters’ register notwithstanding, there were
still widespread instances of voters being turned away because of
inappropriate identity documentation or for being registered in the wrong
district. On the one hand this indicates that PEC staff were attempting as
far as possible to remain within official procedures. On the other, it
demonstrates that considerable progress still needs to be made in the voters
‘ list. We also observed cases where the number of persons on the voters’
list was double the actual number compiled by the PEC; in one PEC over one
thousand names were incorrect or double entries (Akhalkalaki). The
mechanism of on-the-day registration did not appear to be abused; numbers of
voters registered in this way were relatively modest.

Although in principle the significant presence of civil society and party
observers is to be welcomed, we are concerned that many observers
encountered were not familiar with their duties, or were not even aware of
which organization they were representing. Unfortunately we observed a
number of serious incidents of ballot stuffing, perpetrated, inter alia, by
uniformed policemen (Alkhalkalaki) and PEC staff (Adjara). We also observed
instances of PECs being situated in local government buildings in Kvemo
Kartli and Adjara, and the occasional presence of campaigning material
within precincts.

Once again the mechanism of voter marking did not prove to be effective,
with numerous instances observed of cases where there was no checking of
those entering electoral precincts, ineffective voter marking and the
permitting of voting without marking.

IV The Media

The pre-electoral period was characterised by deterioration in the working
environment of both state and independent media. There are some serious
issues of concern regarding the conduct of the new government towards media
channels it perceives as unsympathetic to its goals. In this context the
abrupt and surprising decision to take off air two of Georgia’s most popular
political talk-shows, broadcast on the Rustavi-2 and Mze channels, was a
source of serious concern. There were furthermore instances of intimidation
towards outlets associated rightly or wrongly with opposition groups. In
mid-February shots were fired into the apartment of Luba Eliashvili,
anchorwoman of the dialogi news programme on the oppositional Iberia TV
channel; on 19 February the offices of Iberia TV were raided by security
forces, as part of an anti-corruption operation directed against the channel
‘s holding company Omega Group, whose directors were included in the Revival
party list. Furthermore, on 19 February a knife was thrown into the offices
of Zviad Pochkua, editor-in-chief of the English-language daily Georgian
Times. However, neither outlet ceased operations. There were also credible
reports of journalists within the state-run Channel 1 being subjected to
unprecedented pressure in support of the new government.

The coverage of the elections broadcast on Channel 1 reflected a
pro-government bias, with the National Movement’s political advertising
enjoying pride-of-place interspersed with coverage of leading stories, all
of which were invariably connected with coverage of the activities of
leading government personalities. Coverage of opposition parties on TV
channels with national or near-national coverage was marginal. This was
compounded by the fact that the limited campaigning activities of opposition
groups provided relatively little newsworthy material. Channel 1 also
regularly broadcast free political advertising of the pro-governmental
movement Our Adjara under a rubric of ‘social advertising’.

In Adjara regional media outlets provided saturation coverage of the local
regime and the Revival party. Journalists from national media outlets
working in Adjara faced consistent harassment, and in some cases their
equipment was confiscated. There were also instances of physical assault on
journalists representing nationwide media in Adjara, for instance an attack
on a Rustavi-2 journalist was beaten up as he was leaving the region.

V Civil Society

The change of government confronted Georgian civil society groups, several
of which were closely associated with its accession to power, in a new and
difficult position. Overall their activities were significantly muted
compared to their leading role in the November parliamentary poll.
Furthermore, the split within one of the leading domestic observation
groups, the International Society for Democracy and Fair Elections (ISFED),
leading to the formation of the similarly named Fair Elections Foundation
(FEF), was a source of considerable confusion in the pre-election period.
Three major domestic observer groups, ISFED, FEF and New Generation-New
Initiative deployed over 2,000 observers apiece on election day, while a
fourth, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) also fielded several
hundred observers. In addition, ISFED carried out a parallel vote
tabulation (PVT) based on 20% of PECs.

Regrettably, however, the proliferation of domestic observer groups has not
resulted in improved standards of observation. We are concerned that
observers from some domestic NGOs were again seen to be actively
participating in managing the electoral process.

VI Adjara

The crisis in relations between Adjara and the central government imposed
further obstacles to an already strained electoral process in Adjara. The
period since the January presidential election was marked by regular reports
of clashes between pro-government activists and local security agencies,
against a backdrop of government-led criminal investigation of business
interests based in Adjara. Following negotiations to resolve the crisis on
18 March, the Adjarian authorities offered a number of guarantees of freedom
of association and movement and the uninhibited right of opposition groups
to meetings in public spaces. These appeared to be only partially
implemented, however, with opposition groups continuing to complain of
barred access to public buildings in the final week of the campaign.
Controversy also continued to surround the size of the Adjarian electorate.
While the Adjarian electoral administration claimed a figure in the region
of 276,000 voters, opposition groups cited figures closer to 200,000. In
the event, some 85,000 voters were registered prior to election day in
Adjara. Although Adjara TV began to advertise the need for voters to
register as of 17 March, raised tensions and a charged political atmosphere
throughout the Autonomous Republic may have discouraged voters from doing
so.

Polling in Adjara was generally peaceful but marked by a tense and
intimidatory atmosphere; we did not observe a heavy turnout. The working
environment in some PECs was highly strained, with serious confrontations
between PEC staff members; in other PECs opposition representatives and
domestic observers were passive. A large number of PECs were characterized
by the presence of unauthorized individuals, who at times attempted to
direct the electoral process. In some instances we both witnessed and
received reports of PEC members who were intimidated by local security
forces. Considerable confusion was evident both among the electorate as to
which identity documents could be used to vote, and in the list of
pre-registered voters. In some instances (e.g. Khelvachauri district) this
resulted in dozens of voters being turned away. There were credible reports
that local administrative bodies had not supplied voters without identity
documents with the appropriate certificate, or were in fact demanding
payment for its issue.

We witnessed the extensive use of so-called ‘carousel’ voting, particularly
in Kobuleti district. During the count we observed evidence of blatant
ballot stuffing by PEC staff. Furthermore, envelopes were not counted
lessening control of further manipulation during the counting process, and
we also saw ballot papers being discarded on the floor. Unfortunately,
party and NGO observers remained passive in the face of these flagrant
violations.

VII The Role of the International Community

The role of the international community vis-à-vis the electoral process in
Georgia has long ceased to be only one of observation. International
governmental organisations, non-governmental organizations and individual
governments are involved deeply in all stages of the election process. What
started off as a modest process of support for Georgia’s fledging democracy
has turned into an expensive operation involving thousands of people. This
has tended to distort the role of the international community as an
objective detached observer of the Georgian electoral process. There is
increasing questioning in some Georgian political circles regarding the role
of international community vis-à-vis the electoral process. This issue needs
to be addressed through greater transparency and accountability since the
international community still has an important role to play in promoting
free and fair elections Georgia.

In the run up to the 28 March elections the international community could
have done more to persuade the Georgian government that elections should
only be held when a proper electoral register had been compiled and to
ensure that conditions were provided for a more level playing field for
meaningful choice. Given the seismic changes in the Georgian political
system after November 2003, a full reappraisal of strategies and tools was
required to ensure that the electoral process, including the election
mechanism, the political parties, and both domestic and international
observers, provided for a system of checks and balances guaranteeing voter
confidence in the process.

VIII National Minorities

Some limited gains were achieved in the enduring problem of raising the
quality of national minority participation in Georgian elections. For the
first time in recent elections the CEC provided ballot papers and voters’
lists in minority languages, as well as other electoral materials. This
represents a positive step in making the electoral process accessible to
non-Georgian speaking populations. However, it remains a source of
considerable concern that problems in the Georgian electoral process
continue to be particularly prominent in areas of compact minority
settlement. Furthermore, the underlying problem of raising national
minority participation in the Georgian body politic remains outstanding.
According to 2002 census data national minorities account for some 17% of
the population in Georgia. However, representatives of national minorities
accounted for less than 3% of the party list candidates fielded in this
election, with the result that the incoming parliament will consequently be
the least representative parliament ever so far as national minorities are
concerned.

IX Conclusion

Georgia now has a new political and constitutional order, which enjoys
legitimacy among a majority of the Georgian people. However, given the
shortcomings persisting in its conduct the 28 March poll cannot be
considered to put to rest the many criticisms that have dogged the Georgian
electoral process over recent years. Given this the government must remain
open to constructive relations with opposition forces, even those outside
parliament. The resolution of Georgia’s many problems will be difficult and
will require a significant degree of agreement among the country’s disparate
political forces . All political groups in Georgia must now work within the
new order to hasten the process of democratic state-building in Georgia.
The first priority of this process must be the elimination once and for all
of continuing doubts regarding the Georgian electoral process.

for further information please contact:

in London Niall Blackwell on +44 2077352080 or [email protected]
in Tbilisi Julian Broxup on +995 32 292399 or [email protected]

A1 Plus | 18:26:09 | 29-03-2004 | Politics |
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POLICEMEN PROVOKING AND APPEARING IN HOSPITAL

“Justice” Bloc held a meeting in Gyumri. Naturally, the meeting organizers
had beforehand appealed to Municipality for permission. {BR}

Gyumri Mayor Vardan Ghukasyan had informed the meeting organizers that
Municipality couldn’t guarantee safety of meeting participants.

Meeting took place irrespective of everything. “Justice” Bloc leader Stepan
Demirchyan, “Republic” Party Chair Albert Bazeyan, Arshak Sadoyan and other
bloc members partook in it.

Some women in the square were holding posters with “Go away! Leave us alone,
Stepan Demirchyan, Artashes Geghamyan!”.

Some police employees in civil clothes tried to provoke disorders.
Provocation was prevented but a few policemen received bodily injuries and
are now in hospital.

But the provokers didn’t stop. Eggs were thrown at the meeting organizers
from the building roof. It’s a new method of self-protection by Authorities
since no eggs had been thrown at Opposition leaders and no provocations had
occurred before serious steps directed to power change were announced for.

4 people – Karen Margaryan /Albert Bazeyan’s driver/, Hamlet Lazarian
/non-Party man/, Tigran Ter-Margaryan /People’s Party of Armenia/ and Karen
Lazarian /Republic Party/ were arrested after the incidents.

Albert Bazeyan and Viktor Dallaqyan are now in Gyumri to make more accurate
the legal bases and reasons for their arrest.

It is to state that a few days ago President Robert Kocharyan instructed all
the policemen to wear uniforms to keep the public vigilant.

Suren Surenyantc, head of Information Service of “Republic” Party, is sure
that Authorities are the masterminds of disorders. He said that Opposition
is ready to resist those provocations. He informed that after clarifying the
status of those arrested Bloc will appear with a political assessment.

—

PRESS RELEASE
2004 Middle East & Central Asia Conference Committee
c/o Political Science Department
260 S. Central Campus Dr.
OSH Building, Room 252
The University of Utah
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
USA
Tel: +1-801-581-6047
Fax: +1-801-585-6492

The 2004 MIDDLE EAST & CENTRAL ASIA
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, and SOCIETY CONFERENCE:
Transitions and Inequality in the 21st Century

September 9th to 11th, 2004
The University of Utah
Salt Lake City, USA

*** Deadline for proposals: May 15, 2004 ***

The second annual multidisciplinary conference on the Middle East and Central
Asia will be held on the picturesque campus of the University of Utah in Salt
Lake City. The objective of the conference is to bring together academics,
analysts, and policy makers with interests in the Middle East and Central Asia
who wish to network and share research endeavors.

The three-day conference will include at least two prominent keynote speakers:
Dr. Michael Collins Dunn, editor of the Middle East Journal of the Middle East
Institute in Washington, DC.; and Prof. Shirin Akiner, lecturer in Central
Asian Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University
of London. There will be an estimated 44 conference sessions, and a special
plenary discussion panel on `The Post-9-11 World’. Other attractions include
two complementary meals, an evening of Middle Eastern and Central Asian dance
and music performances, and screening of films and documentaries.

The topics to be covered by the conference encompass interdisciplinary social
science approaches to analysis and problem solving in the regions of Middle
East and Central Asia and may fall within the following themes:

* Problems of Economic and Democratic Transitions
* State and Society Relations
* Religion and Politics
* Islam and Islamic Movements
* Challenges of Post-Communism
* The Impacts of Globalization
* Culture, Gender, and Ethnicity
* Natural Resources, Conflict, and Sustainability
* Media, Cinema, and Film
* Diaspora
* Human Rights and Minorities
* Post-9-11 Regional and International Affairs
* Afghanistan and Iraq Nation-building Projects
* Politics of External Actors (U.S., Russia, EU, China, etc.)
* Israel and Palestine Studies
* U.S.-Iranian Relations
* Uighurs
* Chechnya
* Armenia-Azerbaijan Relations
* Cypriot Reunification
* Terrorism and State Violence
* Conflict Prevention and Resolution
* Regional Organizations and Cooperation
* Civil Society

Selected papers from the 2003 conference were subsequently provided to editors
of The Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs and Critique: Journal of Critical
Studies of the Middle East.

Those interested in presenting papers in the 2004 Middle East and Central Asia
Politics, Economics, and Society Conference are asked to submit the following:

* Title of paper
* 250-word paper abstract
* Your full name
* Brief academic Resume
* Institutional affiliation
* E-mail address
* Telephone numbers (work and home)
* Postal address
* Indicate willingness to serve as a session Chair or Discussant

Please e-mail the above to the conference committee:

[email protected] OR [email protected]

*** DEADLINE FOR PROPOSALS: May 15, 2004 ***

Updates will be included in the conference web page:

Please note that the Conference Committee is unable to provide for participant
travel and lodging expenses. All prospective participants are expected to seek
funding from their own institutional and organizational affiliations. We will,
however, assist overseas participants whose paper proposals have been approved
by sending official letters necessary for acquiring entry visas into the U.S.
For all information, go to the website.

ArmeniaNow.com
26 March 2004

Say You Want a Revolution?: Opposition parties say change of power only
weeks away

By Zhanna Alexanyan ArmeniaNow reporter

Armenia ‘s fractured and, so far, politically impotent oppositional parties
are rumbling again with talk of a change of power and comparing their aim
with Armenia ‘s break from Soviet control nearly 16 years ago.

The republic’s 10 or so oppositional parties maintain that President Robert
Kocharyan’s election a year ago was illegitimate. Some are whispering
revolution, and hanging hopes on a resolution adopted by the Constitutional
Court last April 17, which allows for a Referendum of Confidence within a
year of that date.

Since February 2, the Ardarutiun (Justice) oppositional bloc of the National
Assembly has boycotted Assembly meetings in protest of the current
government.

And in something like pre-election campaigns, the bloc, led by secretary of
the Justice faction at the Parliament Victor Dallakyan, has organized
meetings to strategize and even established a headquarters it says will be
used for the eventual change of power.

The coalition of opposition parties strengthened this week, when the
National Unity Party, led by one-time presidential candidate Artashes
Geghamyan added its support to the Justice Bloc.

But, typical of 2003’s pre-presidential campaign, when 16 parties agreed to
form a union, but couldn’t agree on a single candidate to represent the
union, the bloc lacks a unified aim at how to achieve its purpose.

“Some (bloc members) insist it’s still possible to try to pass a law in the
National Assembly and hold a Referendum of Confidence. Others believe it’s
not possible,” says Hanrapetutiun (Republic) party leader Albert Bazeyan.
“The nearest time for the beginning of activities was set for the end of
March and the furthest date is from April 10 to 12.”

The People’s Party of Armenia (PPA) agrees with the Justice Bloc’s
timeframe, however, the National Unity party says May is the time for
action.

In any case, while Kocharyan’s “illegitimate” government has a year of
relative calm on its ledger, oppositional leaders – perhaps still envious of
Georgia ‘s successful opposition that overthrew a president – are calling
for revolution.

“Only one constitutional possibility for change of power is left, which is
mentioned in the second paragraph of the Constitution, ‘In the Republic of
Armenia power belongs to the people’,” says Hanrapetutiun secretary Suren
Surenyants. “People can gain that right only with the help of revolution,
the way it was in 1988.”

Surenyants says former Prime Minister Aram Sargsyan is the man to lead the
revolution. But then adds that another or two might also fulfill the task.

“Our party offers a model of change of power by means of democratic
revolution and we are sure under the leadership of Aram Sargsyan it will be
the best way of bringing that model into life,” Surenyants says. “However,
Hanrapetutiun doesn’t exclude the possibility of having Stepan Demirchyan or
Artashes Geghamyan as a leader because in any case people must decide by
means of elections, who will become president.”

A strategy of action is still somewhat a bloc secret, as it doesn’t want to
tip the administration to its intentions.

It is clear, however, that any groundswell of support will start in the
regions, where oppositional rallies are already routine. In response, in
fact, Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan has urged members of the government
to visit the regions to offset the influence of opposition propaganda.

Press Secretary of the Justice Bloc Ruzan Khachatryan says visits to regions
are very important for the opposition, as during those visits they prepare
people for a change of power. She says April 10 to 13 will be the time for
revolt.

The Justice Bloc is also expected to organize two mass rallies in Yerevan ,
after which it will urge supporters to conduct sit-ins outside the
Presidential Residence.

“Power must be changed,” says leader of the National Democratic Union Vazgen
Manukyan. But he raises questions concerning things which must be done after
the change.

“People will agree to rise in the name of some ideas, in the name of change
of power only in case they know for sure what is taking place,” the former
presidential candidate says.

Manukyan further concludes that the opposition lacks unity and needs a clear
leader.

“We need unity to change the power. Different candidates from the bloc got
different percents (during presidential elections) but the opposition has no
leader as it was in 1988 when the Karabakh Committee was a valuable leader,”
he says. “All of them are ‘black boxes’ for me as none of them are
experienced in political struggle and none of them have strongly pronounced
ideas.”

If revolution is to come, it will count on the opposition’s belief that
there is widespread discontent and a crisis of confidence – claims Kocharyan
rebutted recently in an address at Yerevan State University .

“To say there is a political crisis in the country where there is 13.9
percent of economic growth, where, according to all showings, considerable
developments are obvious, means not to understand quite well what ‘political
crisis’ means,” Kocharyan said.

The President further elaborated the achievements of his first year of his
second term.

“They are unprecedented indexes in our modern history, after declaration of
independence, they are the best accounting among CIS countries,” he said.

A day after the President addressed students, oppositional party leader
Geghamyan met with the same students and countered Kocharyan’s claims.
Armenia is 217 th out of 220 countries in percentage of malnourished,
Geghamyan claimed, and:

“Tens, hundreds of organizations and services sectors don’t pay taxes to the
state budget. Forty to 60 percent of the economy is ‘shadow’. The reason the
President didn’t mention it is because the people in power are the owners of
the shadow economy.”

Ten days ago date, Kocharyan fired his Prosecutor General and replaced him.
He has also held meetings with heads of police – both measures seen by some
as the president preparing for a showdown.

Kocharyan told reporters he would continue measures to increase internal
stability.

“We strengthen these bodies and we strengthen them in all directions,” said
Kocharyan. “The psychology of a bum in the poitical field is dangerous for
the country.”

Next Tuesday, the Justice Bloc is expected to make an announcement calling
on citizens to rally for a change of power.

—

PRESS OFFICE
Diocese of the Armenian Church of Canada
Contact; Deacon Hagop Arslanian, Assistant to the Primate
615 Stuart Avenue, Outremont-Quebec H2V 3H2
Tel; 514-276-9479, Fax; 514-276-9960
Email; [email protected], Website;

News From the Canadian Armenian Diocese

Bishop Bagrat Galstanian to participate in the Spiritual Supreme
Council meetings

Upon the invitation of His Holiness Karekin II Catholicos of All
Armenians His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian, Primate of the
Canadian Armenian Diocese will be traveling to motherland Armenia, on
Monday 29th of March 2004, in order to attend the Spiritual Supreme
Council Meetings in the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin. Due to this
emergency meeting, His Eminence’s pastoral visitations will be
rescheduled after his return from the Mother See.

Unfortunately, Bishop Galstanian will not be able to attend the
luncheon organized by the Archbishop of the Anglican Church of
Montreal, His Eminence Andrew Hutchison to honor the Armenian Primate
of Canada.

Saintly Women’s Day in the Diocese of the Armenian Church of Canada

On Saturday March 20, 2004 Saintly Women’s’ day was celebrated in the
Armenian Holy Apostolic Church Canadian Diocese. Celebrations were
held in Montreal (Province of Quebec) and in Hamilton (Province of
Ontario).

For Ladies Guild Committees in the Province of Quebec the celebration
was held at St Gregory the Illuminator Armenian Cathedral. Present
were the Pastor Rev Fr Vazgen Boyajyan and over 100 women from Laval,
Quebec City and Montreal area. During the Sunrise office of the
Armenian Holy Apostolic Church Rev Fr Vazgen Boyajyan read Bishop
Bagrat Galstanian’s Greeting on this unique occasion. After the Church
service a reception held at Marie Manoogian Hall. This year the Life
of St Sahakadoukhd was presented by Mrs. Verjin Assadourian.

For Ladies Guild Committees in the Province of Ontario the celebration
was held at St Mary Armenian Apostolic Church of Hamilton. Present
were the Primate, His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian and Pastors of
Ontario Armenian Churches. The Sunrise ceremony of the Armenian Church
was officiated during which, Bishop Galstanian greeted the
participants and blessed them. During the reception followed at the
Church Hall the Life of St Sahakadoukhd was presented by Mrs. Seta
Guzuyan.

Reverend Father Hayrik Hovhannisyan arrives at Armenian Holy Apostolic
Church Canadian Diocese

It is with deep spiritual joy that we learned about the appointment of
Reverend Father Hayrik Hovhannisyan by His Holiness Karekin II
Catholicos of All Armenians to serve the Canadian Armenian Diocese.

Reverend Father Hayrik Hovhannisyan is a member of the Brotherhood of
the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin. Rev Fr Hayrik Hovhannisyan was
born on March 1st, 1975 in Yerevan, Armenian. His baptismal name was
Hovik. In 2001 he graduated from the Gevorkian Theological Seminary of
the Mother See with Honors and was ordained a celibate priest in 2003
by His Eminence Archbishop David Sahakian. He was renamed
Fr. Hayrik. Before his ordination to the rank of celibate priesthood
Father Hayrik Hovhannisyan had served as chaplain at the Defense
Ministry of the Republic of Armenia.

His Eminece Bishop Bagrat Galstanian, Primate expressed his joy on
this occasion and thanked the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All
Armenians His Holiness Karekin II. Fr Hayrik Hovhannisyan will be
attending special university program by the order of His Eminence
Bishop Bagrat Galstanian.

Bishop Bagrat Galstanian in Toronto

Friday March 26, 2004 His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian presided
over a meeting of the Board of Trustees of Holy Cross Armenian Day
School of Toronto. His Eminence has always been caring in this regard
and pays a very special attention to the role and the mission of
Armenian Schools in Diaspora.

His Eminence Bishop Galstanian celebrated the Divine Liturgy on Sunday
March 28 and headed the Annual Assembly of the Parish of Holy Trinity
Armenian Apostolic Church of Toronto.

The Schedule of His Eminence Bishop Galstanian for the month of April

We hereby would like to present to the Clergy, Diocesan Council
members, Parish councils and faithful of the Armenian Holy Apostolic
Church, Diocese of Canada the Schedule of His Eminence Bishop Bagrat
Galstanian for the month of April 2004.-

March 29-April 5 Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin
April 5- Diocesan Council meeting
April 8- Maundy Thursday Divine Liturgy Ceremony of the washing of the feet,
khavaroom, St Gregory the Illuminator Armenian Cathedral of Montreal.
April 9-Burial of our Lord St Gregory the Illuminator Armenian Cathedral
Montreal.
April 10- Easter Eve meeting with the Christian Education Council Sunday
School Department.
April 10- Divine Liturgy, Holy Trinity Armenian Church of Toronto
April 11- Easter (Zadik) St Gregory the Illuminator Cathedral of Montreal
April 12- Food Drive (In support of Sun Youth celebrating there “50-th
anniversary” a local charitable organization which helps less fortunate families.
Foods gathered on this occasion will be given to Sun Youth by the Diocese of
the Armenian Church of Canada on behalf of Canadian Armenian community).
April 18- New Sunday, Communion and Blessing of Alex Manoogian-Armen Quebec
Armenian school, Montreal St Gregory the Illuminator Armenian Cathedral.
April 22- Toy Drive (In support of the Montreal Children’s Hospital
celebrating “100 years of caring for Children”. Toys gathered will be donated to
Montreal Children’s Hospital. Bishop Galstanian, Clergy of the Diocese and Youth
council executive will be present).
April 23- Martyr’s Prayer and Ecumenical service commemoration of April 24th,
Armenian Genocide organized by Diocesan Youth Council and ACYOC’s of Montreal
and Laval. The key speaker will be the Archbishop of the Anglican Church of
Montreal His Eminence Archbishop Andrew Hutchison at Saint Gregory the
Illuminator Armenian Cathedral, Montreal.
April 24- Divine Liturgy Toronto Holy Trinity Armenian Church. Toronto Church
leaders and politicians will be present on this occasion.

Divan of the Diocese

ChronWatch.com
March 28 2004

Gun Control, Dianne Feinstein, and the ”Assault Weapons” Ban

by Howard Nemerov
~~o~~

`The Senators and Representatives shall … in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other
Place.’ – U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1.

It’s Okay to Lie in Congress

The preceding excerpt from the Constitution is our origin of
what is called legislative immunity. It means that if Diane
Feinstein prefers to lie while carrying out her job as Senator, we
cannot hold her liable. Furthermore, if her dishonest comments are
quoted by the New York Times, it is given an aura of authority. If
other newspapers use quotes from the New York Times, often called the
paper of record, in their own articles, pretty soon it becomes gospel
truth, because you can read it just about anywhere.

Diane Feinstein sent this in response to a request she uphold
the Constitution that protects her from arrest for using her position
to lie about firearms.

”Thank you for writing to me about the Assault Weapons Ban.
I appreciate hearing from you on this matter and welcome the
opportunity to respond.

”In 1994, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Bill, which was
signed into law. One provision of this bill banned the manufacture,
transfer, or possession of semi-automatic assault weapons for a
preliminary period of ten years. Since 1994, it has become even
clearer through chilling examples, such as the 1999 shootings at
Columbine High School in Colorado and at the Jewish Community Center
in Los Angeles, that military-style assault weapons are a danger on
our streets and to our children. Semi-automatic assault weapons
which fire up to 250 rounds of ammunition within seconds and without
warning are weapons of war that do not belong on the streets of our
communities.”

She combines the terms ”semi-automatic” and ”assault
weapons” together. True assault weapons, meaning military-grade
firearms, are fully automatic, and have been outlawed for civilians
since the National Firearms Act of 1934. In practice, the law
focuses on guns which have cosmetic similarities to fully automatic
military weapons. The term is so vague that the Fresno, California,
District Attorney sued the state attorney general over the confusing
state assault weapons ban. (1) ”Assault weapons” is becoming so
general a term that most semi-automatic handguns are included.

Let’s look at what she doesn’t say about the Columbine
killers. The two murderers broke 19 existing laws, including using
straw purchasers to buy guns for minors, manufacturing and possessing
explosive devices, and manufacturing a sawed-off shotgun. (2)

She assumes that the two mass murderers would have been
stymied by lack of available firearms and not seek out the black
market. She also assumes they would not focus their efforts into
making and installing more effective explosive devices, which would
have raised the death toll.

The Jewish Community Center murderer had also violated
existing gun laws, being a felon on parole. As such, it was illegal
to possess a firearm. (3)

The next Big Lie is ”semi-automatic assault weapons which
fire up to 250 rounds of ammunition within seconds.” Only fully
automatic weapons are capable this type of dispersal. Fully
automatic weapons, not available to civilians, are rarely used in
crime. (4)

Feinstein also ignores other pertinent facts:

Between 1977 and 1997, states with citizen-friendly Right to
Carry (Shall Issue) laws averaged 25 fewer multiple victim murders
than states that did not trust their tax-paying citizens the right of
self-defense in public. (5)

In states without Shall Issue laws, there have been 15 school
shootings between 1977 and 1995, but only one in Shall Issue states.
The five school shootings in 1997-1998 occurred after the 1995
Gun-Free Zones law banned firearms within 1,000 feet of schools. (6)

These omissions highlight the manner in which gun control
advocates seek to slant the discussion by omitting the costs of gun
control laws, and ignoring the benefits of trained, law-abiding
citizens exercising their Second Amendment rights for self-defense
and community protection.

Feinstein: ”Unless acted upon by the United States Congress
and President Bush, the assault weapons ban will expire, as
scheduled, in September 2004. On May 5, 2003 I introduced a bill, S.
1034, which would reauthorize the assault weapons ban for another ten
years. The success of this bill depends on support from the House,
the Senate, and the administration. President Bush and Attorney
General Ashcroft have both publicly stated their support for an
extension of the ban, and I intend to hold them to their promise.
Please know that I will keep your thoughts in mind as I continue to
fight for this important legislation.”

Feinstein has warned us: call and write your Congressional
representatives and tell them to stop any renewal or expansion of the
1994 Assault Weapons ban.

Gun Control Means Confiscation

”If I could have gotten 51 votes in the Senate of the United
States for an outright ban, picking up every one of them, Mr. and
Mrs. America, turn ’em all in, I would have done it.” – Senator
Dianne Feinstein, CBS-TV’s 60 Minutes, February 5, 1995.

Feinstein wants us to believe mass murderers would be stopped
if law-abiding gun owners were disarmed. If gun-banners wanted only
some ”reasonable steps” to insure that people were protected from
accidental gun death and gun violence, why are they still asking for
more gun control after 20,000 gun laws? They cite new ”loopholes”
that allow criminals access to firearms. (7, 8) They justify it with
the mantra ”If it saves one life, it’s worth it.” But they never
factor in the costs of not owning a gun for personal protection, nor
the lives saved because a physically weaker woman shot and killed the
man who was stalking her with intent to kill, or the children who
still have a mother. (9)

Nor do they talk about the costs to society when civilian
firearms are confiscated, such as what is happening in Britain. (10)

Nor do they mention that no study has concluded that the 1994
Assault Weapons ban (17) or that gun control laws reduced crime. (18)

So why do they continue wanting more gun control?

Confiscation Leads to Mass Murder

It is curious that law-abiding gun owners are considered
guilty without any evidence showing their culpability in crime, but
national governments, with ample evidence to the contrary, are still
assumed to be the most able protectors of the people.

Rudolph J. Rummel, professor emeritus of the University of
Hawaii and author of numerous books on the depredations of
governments, has a web site (13) packed with data covering what he
calls democide: ”The murder of any person or people by a government,
including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.” (14)

Following are some facts relating to governments which
disarmed their people as a prelude to democide.

”The Soviet Union appears the greatest mega-murderer of all,
apparently killing near 61,000,000 people. Stalin himself is
responsible for almost 43,000,000 of these.’ (15)

”In sum the communists probably have murdered something like
110,000,000, or near two-thirds of all those killed by all
governments, quasi-governments, and guerrillas from 1900 to 1987.
(15)

Professor Rummel estimates over 35 million people were
slaughtered by the Chinese Communists. (16)

”By genocide, the murder of hostages, reprisal raids, forced
labor, ‘euthanasia,’ starvation, exposure, medical experiments, and
terror bombing, and in the concentration and death camps, the Nazis
murdered from 15,003,000 to 31,595,000 people…Among them 1,000,000
were children under eighteen years of age. And none of these
monstrous figures even include civilian and military combat or
war-deaths.” (17)

What Hitler, Mao, and Stalin all have in common is civilian
disarmament. They banned the people’s guns first. Then, in their
arrogance and self-righteousness, they began to remove the
”undesirables.” These are only the most heinous examples.
Professor Rummel documents the democide of over 170 million civilians
in the 20th century, a common thread being civilian disarmament.

Via email interview, Professor Rummel reported a variation of
confiscation: ”For the Khmer Rouge, there was no general gun
confiscation, but anyone found with one was murdered on the spot.”
Khmer Rouge killed ”only” 2 million. (18)

”[Include] Turkey’s genocide of the Armenians and Greeks.
Weapons were seized beforehand as part of the step-by-step
implementation of what the Young Turks planned in the highest
councils.” During the WWI era, Turkey murdered 1.5 million of its
Armenian citizens. (18)

Conclusion

Every despot had a ”reasonable” explanation for their power
grab. Communism was supposed to free the little people from the
depredations of nobility and industrialists. It ended up merely
changing terms, from serf to proletariat, murdering over 100 million
along the way. Hitler wanted to create a superior human race. He
ended up being instrumental in causing the deaths of tens of
millions.

We are now faced with a reality check. There is no proof that
civilian disarmament reduces crime. On the other hand, civilian
disarmament is proven to lead to increased crime and genocide. Given
the nature of those who seek to gather power unto themselves, there
is no third option.

It is time for you to choose.

Footnotes

(1) Fresno official sues the state over ban on assault weapons,
Sean Scully, The Washington Times, November 5, 2001.
;ArticleID011105-28385456

(2) High School Shooters Broke 19 Laws, Professor J.D. Crouch,
April 29, 2000.

(3) Furrow pleads guilty to shootings, will avoid death penalty,
get life without parole. CNN.com, January 24, 2001.

(4) Full Auto Weapons, GunCite.
au.html

(5) The Bias Against Guns, page 106, John Lott, 2003.

(6) Gun Facts Version 3.3, page 15. Guy Smith, 2003.
Go to and select the format you prefer.

(7) The Gun Show Loophole, Americans for Gun Safety.

(8) Flashbunny.org provides instructional Flash video on the
fantasy of the Gun Show Loophole.

(9) A Clarksdale man was shot to death by a 12-year-old girl
Saturday night as he allegedly attacked the girl’s mother, police
said. Jeff Piselli, Clarksdale Press Register, April 30, 2001.
;BRD38&PAG=461&dept_id=230617&rfi=6

(10) Gun Crime Rockets 35 Percent. Bob Roberts,
UK Mirror, January 10, 2003.
;method=full& siteid=50143

(11) Impacts of the 1994 Assault Weapons Ban:
1994-1996. National Institute of Justice, March 1999.

(12) First Reports Evaluating the Effectiveness
of Strategies for Preventing Violence: Firearms Laws, CDC
Publication, November, 2002

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16) China’s Bloody Century By R.J. Rummel

(17) DEMOCIDE: NAZI GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER by
R.J. Rummel

(18)

~~o~~

Howard Nemerov is a Bay Area freelance writer who receives e-mail at:
[email protected].

__________________________________
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Los Angeles Daily News
March 28 2004

Vote set on school holiday
Proposal would give students day off on Armenian Christmas

By Naush Boghossian
Staff Writer

GLENDALE — The school board will vote Tuesday on two new student
attendance calendars, both of which include having Jan. 6, Armenian
Christmas, as a day off.

The financially strapped district lost about $250,000 in state
funding this year because so many Armenian students stayed home on
Jan. 6 to celebrate their culture’s Christmas holiday. About 10,000
of the district’s 29,200 students are of Armenian descent.

“If students are not in attendance, then that disrupts their
opportunity to have the continuity of instruction,” said Cathy
McMullen, the district’s assistant superintendent of human resources.
“We need to do everything to maximize instructional opportunities,
our financial resources and to be respectful of our community’s
needs.”

Under both calendars — the product of several meetings with parents
and the teachers’ association — students on a traditional school
year would receive the mandated 180 days of instruction between Sept.
8 and June 23, but would have Jan. 6 and the day before Thanksgiving
off.

The district originally was considering starting the school year a
week early and adding a week to its winter break to incorporate
Armenian Christmas as a school holiday, but the idea was thrown out
after complaints from parents.

School board member Greg Krikorian said it is unlikely they will be
able to please everyone in the community but the calendars that have
been settled on will allow the district to save a great deal of money
and be respectful of a holiday.

“We are steadfast in incorporating Jan. 6 as a day off in our school
district for students and staff because it helps us address the
budget challenge, it gives us a better opportunity to educate more
children on that day, and finally, it helps us be more culturally
sensitive to our large Armenian population,” Krikorian said.

Nearby school districts have made accommodations for days they
experience high student and staff absenteeism in order to avoid
losing average daily attendance revenues.

The Las Virgenes Unified School District, which has a large Jewish
student population, has a staff development day on Sept. 17 to
coincide with Yom Kippur.

The Los Angeles Unified School District has tried to build its
calendars around days when a large number of students and staff are
absent — including Good Friday and Yom Kippur.

Naush Boghossian, (818) 546-3306 [email protected]

IF YOU GO: The Glendale Unified School District board will meet at
3:30 p.m. Tuesday in the board room of the school administration
center at 223 N. Jackson St. For more information, call (818)
241-3311.
From: Baghdasarian