Category: News

GORAN LENNMARKER MET AZERBAIJAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION AT OSCE PA
[November 27, 2004, 19:51:46]
AzerTag, Azerbaijan State Info Agency
Nov 27 2004
On 25 November, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly special envoy on
the Nagorny Karabakh conflict Goran Lennmarker has met delegation of
Azerbaijani MPs at this Organization.
The delegation comprised of Sattar Safarov, Eldar Ibrahimov, Fattah
Heydarov, Rabiyyet Aslanova, who expressed concern with delay of the
Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorny Karabakh conflict, on the unsuccessful
activities of OSCE. They protested to the expression “disputable
territory” in the report of special envoy and explained on the
map that the region belongs to Azerbaijan. Noting inadmissibility
of equalization of the aggressor and victim, the MPs have stressed
that the people of Azerbaijan is peaceful, and that the leadership
of country makes every effort for peaceful resolution to the problem.
But destructive position of the Armenians impedes it. Tens of nations
live in Azerbaijan in peaceful coexistence, because the Azerbaijanis
are tolerant towards all the ethnics and religions. The OSCE should
demonstrate fair position and the problem be settled in the frame of
international law and within the principle of territorial integrity
and inviolability of borders.
Mr. Goran Lennmarker said that he was aware of the sequences of the
conflict and that the refugees and IDPs want quick solution of the
problem. He also agreed with the remarks of the Azerbaijani MPs related
to the “double standards” approach of the international community
and Western delegations, and added that there should not be “double
standards” in such questions. The conflict should be settled in peace
way. Mr. Lennmarker made suggestions on close interference of Europe
into the problem. “I consider necessary the inter-parliamentary links
and discussion between the parliamentarians, which would be useful”,
he emphasized. “I have told the same in meeting with esteemed your
President”, he added.
Mr. Goran Lennmarker assured that he understands well the importance
of his mission.

boston.about.com
Nov 28 2004
The Christmas Revels
Celebrating Traditions of the Winter Solstice
by Guide John Maihos
If you think Christmas is all about shopping and fighting the crowds
at the malls, you might have found a new tradition, or lost an old one.
Without a doubt, a visit to the Sanders Theatre to see The Christmas
Revels, will bring you back to the traditions of your culture, and
the winter solstice. The Revels are a rare reminder of Christmas past.
In 1971, The Christmas Revels began in Cambridge, Massachusetts with
two shows. Now, they offer eighteen shows here, and are acted out
in eleven other cities across the country. The Sanders Theatre in
Memorial Hall on the campus of Harvard University remains the home
of the original production. The theatre is as much a part of the
tradition as the theme.
Audience participation is a tradition of the Revels. There is
singing and dancing, and actors engage people throughout the show.
People greeted each other like friends and family, even though it
was evident that they only knew each other from prior-year shows. The
thousand-plus people all seemed to have a connection.
The 2002 show focused on the traditions of the Armenian people through
the ages. The stage was draped with beautiful carpets, and performers
were dressed in period garb, and played period instruments. The songs
were in Armenian, including many of the ones that the audience joined
in on. The quick language lesson by song-leader, David Coffin, was
enough to create a pleasant chorus.
The 80-member cast of both professional and amateurs actors,
conveyed the holiday spirit and traditions of Armenia through folk
tales, music and dance. The narrator, Paula Plum, tied all the scenes
together and interacted well with the other actors and the audience.
The scenes with children were especially heart-warming and humorous.
Another highlight of the show was Sayat Nova, the “King of Songs,”
played by Haig Faniants. His voice brought the language to life,
even for those who understood no Armenian.
Past themes have included Nordic/Scandinavian, with a focus on
creation myths, and music and dance from Finland, Iceland, Norway
and Karelia. The Victorian England show reflected the many Christmas
elements that were reinstituted and rediscoverd during that era.
Their Celtic shows have highlighted different regions, including
Ireland, Wales, and most recently, Brittanny. Other themes include
Italian Renaissance, Tudor England and Mesoamerican. A Scottish
production is in the works. The original Revels theme, and still the
favorite, is Medieval English.
Whatever culture The Revels bring to stage is researched thoroughly,
involves local descendants, and when applicable, includes on-site
trips to distant lands. It is their goal to preserve traditional folk
music, songs, dances, rituals, poetry, and folk plays from cultures
around the globe. They have a full line of 19 seasonal recordings,
three songbooks, and many other educational materials, any of which
would make a great holiday gift.
Welcome Yule!

Sun-Gazette, PA
Nov 28 2004
What’s in a Stamp?
LKW dancer’s perform for United Nations
Stephanie Farr Sun-Gazette Staff
Their bodies flowed fluidly before the canvases, recreating the
pain and pleasure forever locked within the strokes of the paintings.
Just as the artist used a paintbrush to capture the thoughts and
visions only his mind knows, so too did their bodies use movement to
bring his illustrations to life.
When the LKW Senior Dance Team of Montoursville was invited to
perform at the United Nations Postal Administration’s Human Rights
stamp unveiling, members knew they had a lot to live up to, and only
two weeks to do it in.
The artist who created the stamps, Yuri Gevorgian, specifically
requested the dance team to perform at the unveiling ceremony at the
Jacob Javits Center in New York City on Oct. 14.
His hopes were that the dancers and their coaches would portray
the progression of human rights as illustrated in each of the six
stamps he designed for the United Nation Postal Administration.
Alison Dean, a teacher at the LKW studio, was asked to
choreograph the piece. All she had to work with under such strict
time restrictions were photographs of the paintings that Gevorgian
would release.
“It was amazing,” Dean said. “The work I’ve seen of his is
beautiful. He’s an incredible artist, but these were just
breathtaking.”
As soon as she received copies of the paintings, Dean set to
selecting the appropriate music and movements to portray the artist’s
work. She settled upon a modern lyrical dance choreographed to such
songs as “Turning to Peace,” “Fear Not My Child” and “Gloria” by Paul
Schwartz.
Dean said it was the inspiration of the paintings and events in
her personal life which led her to pick the music and the movements.
Gevorgian also gains inspiration from experiences in his personal
life.
Born in Soviet Armenia in 1956, he was one of the youngest
artists ever to gain entrance into the famous Akop Kodjoyan School of
Art in the Armenian capital of Yerevan. He then went to the Yerevan
University of Art and Architecture, but upon graduation, realized his
creative expression would be limited under the Armenian government.
Gevorgian married a woman who gained entrance into the United
States, but was not allowed to join her for seven years. During that
time, he came to understand the true hopes and fears of refugees, and
he continues to implement those themes in his paintings today.
When Gevorgian was reunited with his wife in the United States,
they realized that the separation had caused conflicts and that his
commitment to his art form made it impossible to stay together.
Moving out on his own, Gevorgian soon found himself homeless and
living on the streets of Los Angeles. Out of discarded supplies he
gathered from the sidewalks, Gevorgian created his “Hollywood
Boulevard” series, an attempt to capture the unique spirits found
within his homeless brothers and sisters.
The series eventually lead to his artistic success, but he would
also use it as an inspiration for both of his United Nations stamps
series. Besides the Human Rights stamps which were unveiled in
October, Gevorgian also designed the 2000 Respect for Refugees stamp
series for the United Nations.
The six Human Rights stamps depict the progression of human
rights from the repression of creative and ethnic freedoms to the
realization of individuality and the ability to take the first steps
towards one’s dream.
Gevorgian’s trade mark is the blue rose; a symbol of love,
tenderness and compassion. This rose appears in a majority of his
paintings, including each of the six Human Rights stamps. For the day
of the unveiling, each member of the dance team had a blue rose
painted on their arms as an homage to Gevorgian.
After the ceremony, while signing autographs for the dance team
members, he told them that they did more than dance the themes of the
paintings, they brought them to life. The team then got a private
tour of the United Nations building before returning home.
“For us as performers it was nice to have a story to tell,” Dean
said. “And a story that is so powerful, not like I went to the mall
and bought a dress.”
Kaitie Burger, a 14 year-old member of the LKW dance team,
agreed.
“It was a really great opportunity to get to go, and his
paintings inspired us to dance,” she said. “It was special because we
had a really good reason why we were dancing and knew what we were
trying to interpret.”
As a result of the performance for the United Nations Postal
Administration, the LKW dance team has been invited to perform at
many future functions in such cities as Los Angeles, Chicago and
Philadelphia. The team has even garnered an invitation to the United
Nations headquarters in Austria, a trip for which they are currently
seeking sponsors to cover traveling expenses.
What those in attendance at the unveiling experienced that day
was more than a marriage between dance and art, it was a union of
creative expression; a union born out mankind’s love for freedom and
his right to share that beauty with others.
Gevorgian once said, “Most people think of human rights in epic
terms. Every single thing we have and do in life is a human right. I
can paint what I want, I can dress how I want and I can read what I
want. Freedom is the ability to explore our minds, our bodies — our
dreams.”
–Boundary_(ID_Zrj5VDzT6Ok63HVnRf5aDA)–

Winston-Salem Journal, NC
Nov 28 2004
Human-rights rules of EU rankle Turkey
Multiculturalism not an acceptable idea in country of ‘unity’
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
ANKARA, Turkey
As a child, Hrant Dink dreamed of becoming a homicide detective, but
he faced an insurmountable obstacle. In overwhelmingly Muslim Turkey,
Jews and Christians can’t join the police.
Now that unwritten rule, the product of a history of ethnic strife
and distrust of non-Muslim minorities, is coming into heated debate
as Turkey faces up to the reforms it must undertake to achieve its
cherished goal of joining the European Union.
Participants almost came to blows earlier this month at a news
conference by a semi-official human-rights body, when its chairman,
Ibrahim Kaboglu, suggested that Turkey must expand minority rights.
Fahrettin Yokus, a civil-service-union leader, grabbed the papers
from Kaboglu’s hands and ripped them up.
“We don’t recognize this report; it is aimed at dividing the
country,” he shouted.
The EU demands, he charged, “are threatening our unity.”
Kaboglu, whose Human Rights Advisory Council was created by the prime
minister’s office, has asked for police protection. His critics,
meanwhile, have petitioned state prosecutors to file treason charges
against Kaboglu and those who signed the statement that he read.
Tensions have heightened since an EU panel ruled last month that for
Turkey to negotiate its way into the EU, a prosperous 25-nation bloc,
it would have to meet European standards of democracy and human
rights.
It urged Turkey to grant more rights to ethnic Kurds and recognize
Alawites, a religious sect rooted in Islam, as a minority. Jews and
Christians already have minority rights but still suffer such
discrimination as exclusion from the police, Foreign Ministry and
military officers’ corps, the panel said.
But although multiculturalism may be the norm in much of Europe, it’s
an explosive concept in Turkey. Here children open the school day by
saying: “Happy is the one who says ‘I am a Turk,'” and the word
“minority” is seen by nationalists as code for national
fragmentation.
More than a quarter of Turkey’s 71 million people are either Kurds or
Alawites or share both identities. The nation has about 130,000
non-Muslims – Greek, Armenian and other Christians, and Jews.
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer says that the debate over minority
rights is “destructive” and that every citizen of the state – Muslim
or other – is a Turk and is bound to the Turkish state.

Jounalists create “Caucasian Club”
ITAR-TASS News Agency
November 26, 2004 Friday
MOSCOW, November 26 — A new public organization of journalists – the
Caucasian Club, has been established on Friday under the auspices of
the International Federation of journalist unions and the Union of
Russia journalists. The goal of the new organization is to make a
positive contribution to the coverage of international problems and
in the long run to the stabilization of the situation in the Caucasus.
Journalists from Moscow, Chechnya, Dagestan, North Ossetia the
Krasnodar territory, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia were among the
first to join the Caucasian Club, which is open to new members to join.
The main credo of the new Club is strict objectivity, impartial
coverage and delicacy when covering ethnic problems, Besides. the
Caucasian Club will discuss economic and social problems of the
Caucasus, integration of national Diasporas, problems of ethnic crime.

“Russia’s Slippery Foothold in Abkhazia Becomes a Slide”
PINR
29 November 2004
Over the past two months, Moscow’s geostrategy has suffered serious
setbacks in Ukraine and Abkhazia, a mini-state on the Black Sea that
broke away from Georgia in 1993 and has since been dependent for its
existence on Russian support.
The guiding aim of President Vladimir Putin’s geostrategy is to restore
Moscow’s influence over its periphery, which it lost after the fall
of the Soviet Union. The Putin regime envisions a trade and security
alliance that would incorporate some of the republics of the former
Soviet Union in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, in which
Russia would be the dominant power. Moscow pursues its goal by trying
to promote and cultivate friendly governments in the target states.
Wherever Moscow attempts to reassert its influence, it meets with
opposition from the Euro-American alliance, which has the strategic
aim of incorporating Russia’s periphery — especially in Eastern Europe
and the Caucasus — into the Western system of market democracies. If
Ukraine tilted westward, it would be a candidate for admission to
the European Union and N.A.T.O. If Abkhazia were to be reabsorbed
into Georgia, Moscow would lose one of its important footholds in
the Transcaucasus to a pro-Western state.
The Putin regime has responded to its persistent structural conflict
with the West by taking a proactive approach toward the political
systems of its target states and dependencies. In Ukraine and Abkhazia,
Moscow has most notably attempted to influence the outcomes of
presidential elections overtly through Putin’s endorsements of favored
candidates and by sending in political operatives to strategize and
support those candidates.
In both cases, Moscow’s tactics have backfired; it has not been able
to overcome internal divisions within the target states and it has
awakened resistance in electorates to outside influence, resulting in
disputed elections that have brought endemic conflicts to a head and,
in Abkhazia’s case, institutional failure. Through overplaying its
hand, Moscow now finds itself threatened with a permanent loss of
influence in Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus. The situation in
Abkhazia is particularly revealing, because that small country with
a quarter-million people shows in microcosm how even a society that
is radically dependent on Moscow and is pro-Russian will resist its
protector when it feels that it is subject to undue pressure.
Abkhazia’s Disputed Election
Until its first contested presidential election on October 3, 2004,
Abkhazia was ruled by strong man Vladislav Ardzinba who had followed
an unwavering pro-Moscow line. Unrecognized by any state, including
Russia, Ardzinba’s regime was subject to an economic blockade by
Georgia and was only able to survive through the presence of Russian
“peacekeepers” who kept the Georgian military at bay.
During Ardzinba’s tenure, Abkhazia’s economy collapsed, leaving half
the country’s working-age population unemployed. Criminal activity
became rampant and corruption and cronyism were rife within the state
bureaucracies. Nonetheless, when it came time to replace the aging
Ardzinba, Moscow hit upon a plan of contested elections, which it
calculated would result in the victory of its favorite, Raul Khajimba,
an ex-K.G.B. agent and the incumbent prime minister, and would have the
added benefit of conferring a modicum of legitimacy on the mini-state,
which would strengthen its position in any future deal with Georgia
or pave the way to some regularized and permanent form of separation.
>>From all appearances, the Abkhazian elections seemed to be a win-win
situation for Moscow. All five candidates were pledged to maintain
Abkhazia’s special relation with Russia. Indeed, they could not do
otherwise: the civil war of 1992-1993 had resulted in the ethnic
cleansing of the Georgian half of the country’s population, leaving
its ethnic Abkhaz, Armenian and Russian components completely dependent
on Moscow for protection against an irredentist Georgia, which gained
enhanced Western backing after the 2003-2004 Rose Revolution.
Despite the fact that Russian interests were not likely to be impaired
whomever won the presidential election, Putin made it clear that
he endorsed Khajimba by meeting with him and no other candidate,
and posing with him for a photograph that became an icon of the
campaign. Moscow also dispatched operatives to plan and support
Khajimba’s campaign.
To the surprise of Moscow and political analysts, Putin’s efforts
to manipulate the election had the opposite of their intended
effect. Opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh, running on a platform
of continued ties with Russia and promises of an anti-crime and
anti-corruption administration, won slightly more than 50 percent of
the vote (44,002) to Khajimba’s 30,815 votes, with the other candidates
splitting the rest.
Analysts attributed Bagapsh’s unexpected showing to widespread public
resentment against Abkhazia’s corrupt political system and Moscow’s
efforts to perpetuate it. The slogan “We Can Decide Ourselves”
appeared on the streets, signaling popular defiance of Moscow.
Although Abkhazia’s Central Electoral Commission certified Bagapsh’s
victory, the election was clouded by charges of irregularities and an
unconstitutional revote in the Gali district, to which Bagapsh and
Khajimba agreed. When the Central Electoral Commission met to reach
its decision on October 6 and 11, supporters of Bagapsh occupied the
building where it was deliberating, setting a precedent of direct
action that would be repeated over the coming weeks by both sides,
finally eventuating in institutional failure and political paralysis.
Institutional Failure
Despite having agreed to the revote in Gali, Khajimba did not accept
the Commission’s verdict and sued to have the vote overturned by the
country’s Supreme Court. On October 28, after having heard testimony
that Bagapsh supporters had threatened commissioners during their
deliberations, the Court declared the Commission’s decision to be
valid. Upon learning of the Court’s verdict, Khajimba’s supporters
seized the court building and held the judges hostage until they
reversed their decision and replaced it with a ruling ordering
the Central Electoral Commission to set up a revote. On October 29,
incumbent President Ardzinba issued a decree requiring new elections,
setting the stage for a downward spiral to institutional failure.
In quick succession, Bagapsh’s forces took over the state television
and Khajimba’s sealed off parliament, in which Bagapsh supporters
have a majority, to prevent it from declaring Ardzinba’s decree
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Commission refused
to meet to plan new elections and Ardzinba replaced Khajimba as prime
minister with former Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations operative
Nodar Khashba, a Moscow loyalist.
With different institutions under the control of opposing factions,
Abkhazia’s political system became paralyzed as neither candidate
proved willing to compromise, despite repeated negotiations. Bagapsh
insisted that he would be inaugurated on December 6, whereas Khajimba
demanded a revote.
The stand off spiraled out of control on November 12 when, during
a large rally of Bagapsh supporters, a group of them seized control
of the government complex in Abkhazia’s capital Sukhumi, including
the president’s office, supposedly to allow Bagapsh to set up his
new administration. In the commotion, 78 year old Tamara Sharkyl — a
linguist, human-rights advocate and respected Abkhaz nationalist — was
killed by a ricocheting bullet fired by Ardzinba’s presidential guard.
At the urging of Bagapsh, his supporters left the government complex,
but remained outside it, preventing official business from being
conducted there. Since then, the tensions have deepened. After Bagapsh
supporters brought two presidential guards to the prosecutor’s office
in connection with Sharkyl’s death, security forces loyal to Ardzinba
launched a commando raid on the office and freed them, setting
off a chain of events leading to a “declaration of disobedience”
by 2000 police officers who vowed to refuse to follow orders from
the government.
Throughout the deepening tensions, Moscow supported Ardzinba, Khashba
and Khajimba, refusing to concede anything to Bagapsh. On November 12,
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Alexander Yakovenko
placed Moscow’s support behind the Ardzinba regime and threatened
Russian intervention: “If the situation continues to follow the illegal
track, the Russian side will have to protect its interests. In Abkhazia
one and all should know that all responsibility for the likely effects
will be placed on Bagapsh and his followers.”
Not only did Moscow’s hard line fail to break the resolve of the
Bagapsh faction; it also provoked a strong response from Tbilisi,
which regards Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Despite the failure of
its assertive posture, Moscow has continued to try to exert pressure,
redeploying some of its peacekeepers from Abkhazia’s Georgian border
toward Sukhumi and temporarily closing crossings along Abkhazia’s
border, threatening to impede Abkhazia’s citrus harvest from going
to market.
With Moscow taking one side in the election dispute and Abkhazian
state institutions divided and deadlocked, a last attempt at
conflict resolution was undertaken by the Council of Elders, an
extra-constitutional public body of clan and local leaders. When the
Council met in Sukhumi on November 20, its proceedings were disrupted
by an invasion of 100 old people bussed in by the Bagapsh camp. The
meeting was quickly called off after a decision was made to reconvene
the Council with new membership.
On November 23, the Council met again and declared that Bagapsh
should assume the presidency and that he and Khajimba should form
a team. Earlier, Bagapsh had offered Khajimba the posts of prime
minister or vice president, which the latter had refused, calling
instead either for a revote or for both candidates to drop out in
favor of a new election with new candidates, one of whom presumably
would be Moscow’s current protégé Khashba. Khajimba responded to
the Elder’s decision by appearing to back down for the first time,
saying that he would consult with his supporters before reaching a
decision. Meanwhile, Khashba threatened to resign as prime minister if
the supporters of both candidates did not vacate the public property
that they had seized and disband their militia, and Ardzinba announced
that he would not vacate the presidency on December 6.
In response to Ardzinba’s announcement, parliament passed a resolution
on November 26 declaring Bagapsh’s victory to be valid and demanding
that the State Guard Service “provide for the inauguration of the
president elect” on December 6. Khajimba labeled the resolution
“absurd” and Ardzinba’s office announced that the incumbent
president had not instructed state agencies to obey the parliamentary
instructions. Deputies in the Parliament who are opposed to Bagapsh
reported that 200 of his supporters had invaded the chamber, demanding
that their candidate’s victory be recognized.
Moscow Hardens its Line and Georgia Senses an Opportunity
With Moscow’s strategy in a state of collapse, Abkhazia appears to
be headed for yet another confrontation on December 6, when Bagapsh
has vowed to be inaugurated as president and Ardzinba has pledged
to remain in power. In order to head off a Bagapsh takeover, Moscow,
speaking through anonymous government sources and Alexander Tkachov,
governor of Krasnodar territory, which borders Abkhazia, ratcheted
up its hard-line rhetoric, threatening — if Bagapsh assumed the
presidency — to cut off pensions to Russian citizens in Abkhazia
and to close the country’s border with Russia, blocking the citrus
exports and tourist trade that are Abkhazia’s major sources of income.
In a sharp break from his previous pro-Russian position, Bagapsh
responded that if Moscow followed through on its threats, Tbilisi
would have an opportunity to restore its control over Abkhazia,
an opinion echoed by Alexander Shakov, an analyst at the Russian
Institute of Strategic Research.
Thus far, Moscow’s position has been eased by the reluctance of the
United Nations, which monitors the cease-fire between Georgia and
Abkhazia, and the United States to intervene in the conflict. Tbilisi,
however, has sensed an advantage and has stated that the “people’s
will” should prevail in Abkhazia, a shift from its standard line
that nothing that transpires in the breakaway republic’s political
system is legitimate or worthy of comment. Georgian Minister for
Conflict Resolution and Prevention Georgy Khaindrava offered Sukhumi
“the widest authority ever known in international practice.”
Tbilisi believes that time is on its side. In a news conference
on November 24 celebrating the anniversary of the Rose Revolution,
Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili noted that Georgia’s budget
in 2005 will be triple its current figure, that much of the increased
spending will go to beef up the military and that N.A.T.O. and the
E.U. are considering Georgia as a candidate for membership. With
reference to Abkhazia, Saakashvili said that “it is the main goal and
task of my life, my personal life,” adding that Tbilisi is getting
ready to reassert sovereignty over the breakaway region and that
“we need patience,” but not “excessive pacifism.”
Conclusion: The Pitfalls of Neo-Imperialism
It is reasonable to conclude that Moscow has acted to the detriment
of its interests in Abkhazia. The cause of the mini-state’s
institutional failure and political implosion resides less in the
internal divisions of its society than in Moscow’s “neo-imperialist”
policies. Like their neo-conservative counterparts in Washington, the
Russian neo-imperialists are long on vision and short on a realistic
appraisal of actual conditions. Just as the neo-conservatives believed
that U.S. forces would be welcomed in Iraq, Moscow hard liners
were confident that their favored candidate would win in Abkhazia’s
contested election, simply by dint of Putin’s endorsement, government
control of the local media, the Abkhazian population’s pro-Russian
attitudes and its dependency on Moscow, and Moscow’s campaign
support. They did not reckon with the large number of people in the
mini-state who were disaffected by a decade of economic depression,
rampant crime and corrupt rule, and were willing to back a member of
the established political class who promised to bring reform while
maintaining good relations with Moscow.
When the election did not yield Moscow’s desired result, Putin could
have accepted defeat and turned it into an opportunity by playing the
role of honest broker and arranging the kind of deal that the Council
of Elders proposed and Bagapsh offered, allowing Bagapsh to assume the
presidency and giving the prime minister’s post to Khajimba. Instead,
Moscow refused to recognize its mistake and has continued to back
the losing side, now to the point of threatening the population with
severely punitive economic sanctions and possible military coercion.
Moscow has stood by and watched Abkhaz political society split apart,
counting on the resulting stress to bring its adversaries and the
general population around to heed its dictates. Abkhazia’s plunge
into direct action and political gang rule, verging on civil warfare,
cancels any possibility of a legitimized pro-Moscow regime there. If
Moscow succeeds in installing a president to its liking in Sukhumi,
his regime will be perceived as an imposed domination both inside and
outside Abkhazia. If Bagapsh assumes the presidency, Moscow will either
institute punitive measures, driving Sukhumi to bargain with Tbilisi,
or it will have to mend fences with its former opponent. The latter
option is the only one that is consistent with Russian interests,
but it is not clear that Putin will take it.
Moscow has managed to cause a shift in attitudes that was unthinkable
before the October 3 election. Bagapsh, who consistently asserted that
Abkhazia had to be pro-Russian, because if it was not, it would be
“swallowed” by Georgia, is now saying that Moscow is forcing Abkhazia
into Tbilisi’s arms. Tbilisi is now signaling that it will be generous
to a “popular” government in Sukhumi. It is a difficult feat to bring
Georgians and Abkhazians together after a bloody civil war and ethnic
cleansing, but it seems possible that Moscow is doing just that.
The Euro-American alliance stands to gain the most from Moscow’s
mismanagement of Abkhazia, just as it does in Ukraine. What appeared
immediately after the October 3 election to be a minor slippage in
Russia’s foothold in Abkhazia has now become a slide that will be
difficult to arrest.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight
into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests
involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report
may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written
permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed
to [email protected].
–Boundary_(ID_I0gAUsMHnziW7BRrd+oGAQ)–

The New FACE of Guelph
by NAOMI POWELL
Guelph Mercury (Ontario, Canada)
November 27, 2004 Saturday Final Edition
GUELPH
The first thing that struck Rodolfo Hennigs when he walked into a
recent salsa dance at Guelph’s eBar wasn’t the blasting horns or the
timba beats.
It wasn’t the scrape of the guiros or the flickering lights.
It was the dancers.
“There were Chinese people, black people, Vietnamese people –
everybody dancing the salsa,” the Chilean native said, opening his
arms up wide to describe the scene. “I couldn’t believe it. Guelph is
not the place it was 20 years ago. Just look around you. Everything
is changing.”
In the last decade, Guelph’s visible minority population has grown
from 8,340 people to more than 12,380 people – an increase of 48 per
cent, the latest Statistics Canada census data shows.
More than 50,000 people are expected to arrive in Guelph over the
next two decades, pushing the total population from 115,000 to beyond
the 165,000 mark. A significant portion of these new Guelphites will
likely be visible minorities – many of them new Canadians.
“This could be a spillover effect from Toronto,” said Harald Bauder,
a professor in the University of Guelph’s geography department.
Although many immigrants traditionally made their first homes in city
centres, the last 20 years has seen more new Canadians choosing to
settle outside the Greater Toronto Area where real estate is cheaper
and competition for jobs is not as fierce, said Bauder, who
specializes in immigration and labour markets.
“There is a trend of newly arrived immigrants arriving in the suburbs
of the city. I would not be surprised if they are coming to Guelph
now.”
Guelph’s growing industrial sector – where many new Canadians find
their first jobs – and the city’s proximity to Toronto, Waterloo
Region and Hamilton make it an attractive community to live in. The
University of Guelph is also an important draw because of its
renowned agriculture and food science programs, said Sheila Nicholas,
director of Guelph’s St. George School for English as a Second
Language Training.
“Many come for work, many come because they have family and friends
here,” Nicholas said. “And you can feel it in the city. When I was a
kid there was one Chinese family in town and they owned the local
Chinese restaurant. Now you walk downtown and you see Greek, Indian,
Afghan restaurants. There is so much diversity.”
The city has seen substantial growth in its Chinese, Korean and south
Asian populations, which have all increased by more than 50 per cent.
The Latin American population is one of the fastest growing groups in
the city – having swelled from 290 people in 1996 to 750 people in
2001, the latest available census data shows.
That’s an increase of 159 per cent – a phenomenal growth.
Spanish language masses are held every second week at St. Joseph’s
Church and, for the first time, this year’s Santa Claus parade
included a Latin American-themed float. It carried new Guelphites
from Guatemala, Colombia, Nicaragua, Argentina, Chile, Cuba and the
Dominican Republic.
“You can expect even more Spanish-speaking people to arrive,” said
economist David Foot, author of Boom, Bust& Echo, a study of Canada’s
demographic profile.
“Countries with the highest number of people in their 20s tend to
have the most moveable populations. In the 60s and 70s that was
southern Europe. In the 80s and 90s it was southeast Asia. Mexico and
South America will be the next place.”
When Hennigs first arrived in Guelph in 1981 “everyone was very
white,” he said.
“This city was a lot less colourful then,” said the 50-year-old, who
had married a Canadian before moving to Canada with her. “I felt very
different. And people weren’t as tolerant then. The first time I
heard a racist remark was in Guelph. I was shocked.”
Embarrassed by his limited ability to speak English, Hennigs found a
job at a leather tannery and retreated into a shell.
“In the factory I just worked, I didn’t have to talk,” he said. “That
was good because I was afraid of being laughed at if I tried.”
Hennigs eventually became a machinist, working in the trade until he
opened the Salsateria restaurant in downtown Guelph four years ago.
Although it took him a long time to gain confidence in his language
skills, he now loves meeting new people and sharing stories.
“Guelph is more welcoming than some places, but I still think there
should be more support for newcomers,” Hennigs said. “They need not
just material things. They need the emotional support.”
At the St. George School – where enrolment has grown from 100
students in 1984 to more than 1,500 in 2004 – students often act as
an informal support network.
“Coming to this school helps very much,” said Arusyak Abrahamyan, who
moved to Guelph from Armenia this year. “I’ve made some friends here
who are going through the same things as me.”
Like many immigrants, Abrahamyan arrived in Guelph only to learn that
her qualifications as a laboratory technologist were not recognized.
It was a shock for the 35-year-old mother of two, who says she was
told by Canadian officials that her knowledge would be a welcome
asset in the country.
“I get very anxious at times,” says Abrahamyan, whose husband is
doing post-doctoral work at the University of Guelph.
“I try to think optimistically but I even know doctors who are
working in factories.”
If the city is to take advantage of the breadth of skill and
experience new Canadians bring, it will need to provide the programs
necessary to support them, Foot said.
“These people bring linguistic skills to the table, they bring
cultural diversity. Let their expertise come forward and they’ll be
great examples for their peers.”
GUELPH FACT
The City of Guelph projects that more than 20,000 new jobs will be
created in the city in the next 20 years. About 46 per cent of those
jobs will be in the industrial sector, where many immigrants find
work.
AN ABORIGINAL MEETING PLACE
The aboriginal community is among the fastest growing groups in
Guelph, the most recent census data show.
The number of aboriginal people in the City of Guelph swelled from
540 people in 1996 to 830 people in 2001, an increase of 54 per cent.
“It doesn’t surprise me at all,” said Lois MacDonald, employment
development officer for Guelph’s Anishnabeg Outreach Centre.
“We are seeing more First Nations people coming here to escape the
high rate of unemployment and low rate of education on the reserves.
Mohawk, Onandaga, Ojibwa – they come from everywhere.”
Guelph is a historical meeting place for First Nations people who
used to trade their wares along the Speed River, MacDonald said.
“I think Guelph has always had a draw for aboriginal people,” she
said.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Britain knew of Equatorial Guinea coup plot in advance: report
Agence France Presse — English
November 27, 2004 Saturday 11:59 PM GMT
LONDON Nov 28 — Britain received a full outline of a plot to stage
a coup d’etat in Equatorial Guinea at least two months before it was
nipped in the bud, the Observer newspaper reported Sunday.
Citing “confidential documents,” it said Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
“was personally told of the plans at the end of January” but failed
to warn the government of the small, oil-rich west African state.
Five South Africans and six Armenians were jailed by a court in
Equatorial Guinea last Friday for plotting to overthrow President
Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the country’s iron-fisted ruler since 1979.
The complex coup bid was foiled last March when a team of mercenaries
was arrested in Zimbabwe, where a number of other participants —
including a British national, Simon Mann — have also been convicted
and sentenced.
In South Africa, Sir Mark Thatcher, son of former British prime
minister Margaret Thatcher, is awaiting trial for allegedly helping
to bankroll the plot. He was arrested in August, and denies the charge.
The Observer said Straw and his junior minister for Africa, Chris
Mullin, had been told of the coup plot on January 30.
It said two “highly detailed” reports had been sent, in December
2003 and January this year, from Johann Smith, a former commander in
the South African Defence Forces, to two senior British intelligence
officers.
The reports included dates, details of arms shipment and key players,
the newspaper said.
Copies of the reports, marked “strictly confidential,” were also
sent to “a senior colleague” of US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
it said.
It said the documents featured the names of many South African
mercenaries who have since been sentenced for their roles in the plot,
and that the January report stated that the coup would be attempted
“in mid-March 2004”.
The author of the January report added: “Knowing the individuals as
well as I do, this timeline is very realistic and will provide for
ample time to plan, mobilise, equip and deploy the force.”
In a statement to The Observer, the Foreign Office said: “We do not
comment on intelligence issues. But ministers and officials (in the
ministry) acted promptly on receipt of relevant information.”
Straw told parliament earlier this month that the Foreign Office had
received “confidential information” about a coup plot, but said that
they had added nothing significant to rumours circulating at the time.
The Sunday Times meanwhile reported that police in South Africa want
to question the new EU trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, over any
knowledge he might have had about the coup plot.
It said investigators were curious about allegations by a coup
suspect that he had twice approached Mandelson — who is close to
Prime Minister Tony Blair — to know how the British government might
feel about a coup.
“They do not regard Mandelson as a suspect, but they want to know
what he knows,” a South African government source was quoted as saying.
A spokesman for Mandelson said the trade commissioner, a two-time
cabinet minister under Blair, “categorically denies” speaking to
anybody about the coup plot.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The Virginian-Pilot(Norfolk, Va.)
November 25, 2004 Thursday Sun Edition
Teacher introduces Armenia to U.S. culture
SUFFOLK
SUFFOLK — Laura Pritchard Dobrin, an English teacher at
Nansemond-Suffolk Academy, recently returned from a two-and-a-half
week educational and cultural exchange program in Armenia. She was
one of 36 teachers nationwide selected by the US-Eurasia Awards for
Excellence in Teaching Program.
As an educational ambassador, Dobrin visited schools, gave lectures on
U.S. culture and teaching methods and discussed educational challenges.
She taught in two schools and talked with students and future English
teachers attending an university in Armenia. She gave presentations
on the use of technology in the English classroom, independent
school education in the United States, and strategies for successful
teaching of English at the Association of English Language Teachers
in Armenia chapter meeting, the Teacher Resource Center in Vanadzor,
and a workshop for teachers at a school in Vanadzor.
The program, which began in 1996, provides teachers from the United
States the opportunity to serve as education ambassadors in Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISORY BOARD
The Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Working Group Report
October 2004
The report which was updated and approved by the General Assembly on 1
October 2004 (signed by Working Group members on July 2003)
Presented to the Prime Ministry on 22 October 2004.
1) THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF MINORITY IN THE WORLD
The concept of “minority” has been used in the world from the sixteenth
century down to the present day. When the form of government called
absolute monarchy was founded and when, approximately in the same
period, religious minorities came into being (Protestants in Catholic
monarchies and Catholics in Protestant monarchies), it became necessary
for these minorities to be mutually protected and only then did the
concept of minority emerge. After 1789, the concept of national minority
was to be added to that of religious minorities.
After the European states internally settled the question of protecting
these minorities, they turned outwards and engaged in efforts to protect
the non-Muslims within the Ottoman Empire and thereby to intervene in
Ottoman affairs. As a result, European countries came into conflict with
each other and this led to the emergence of the “Eastern Question”.
These international protection efforts started in the form of unilateral
edicts of protection (for example, the 1598 Edict of Nantes) and
bilateral treaties (for example, the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz), and
moved in the nineteenth century to the phase of multilateral treaties
(for example, the 1856 Treaty of Paris) and, finally, the foundation of
the League of Nations in 1920 ushered in the period of “minority
protection under the guarantee of an international organisation”. The
world continues to be in that phase, and the international mechanism of
minority protection is conducted under the umbrella of such
organisations as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European
Union and the OSCE.
2) THE CONCEPT OF MINORITY IN TURKEY, ITS DEFINITION AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Ever since the period of the League of Nations, the concept of minority
has been defined on three criteria: ethnic, linguistic and religious.
However, in 1923 in Lausanne, Turkey refused to accept all three of
these criteria and managed to have it accepted that its non-Muslim
citizens alone constituted a minority and were therefore entitled to
international protection of minorities.
Nevertheless, as nearly eighty years have passed since then and the
concept, definition and rights of minorities have considerably developed
in the meantime across the world, Turkey is now faced with serious
difficulties. Moreover, since 1990, minority rights have further widened
and strengthened in terms of both space and quality.
These difficulties arise not only from the limited definition in the
Treaty of Lausanne. By some sort of reservation it makes to
international conventions to which it accede, Turkey asserts an even
narrower principle. In accordance with this “Statement of
Interpretation”, Turkey asserts in the international area the
restrictions imposed by the 1982 Constitution as well as those in the
Treaty of Lausanne and declares that the rights granted by conventions
to which it accedes shall not apply in Turkey if they extend to any
minorities other than those recognised in the Treaty of Lausanne or if
they are among the rights prohibited by the 1982 Constitution.
Turkey’s difficulties in this area can be summed up in two points:
1) This restrictive position of Turkey is increasingly at variance with
the current trend in the world. After the interpretation of the UN Human
Rights Committee in 1990ies, the trend is not asking a country whether
there are any minorities in that country but accepting that there are
minorities in that state if there are groups who “differ in ethnic,
linguistic or religious terms and consider such difference to be an
inseparable part of their identity”. However, it is up to the discretion
of the nation-state whether to recognise or not to recognise these as
minorities.
Here, we should immediately note that the European Union has no demand
whatsoever from Turkey to give minority status and rights to different
cultural groups. The only requirement is equal treatment to all citizens
of different cultures.
2) Turkey does not duly implement the Treaty of Lausanne, either, and
thus violates even some of the provisions of this founding treaty of its
own.
To start with, the rights granted to the non-Muslims are not fully
implemented. These rights are allowed only to the three great minorities
(namely, the Armenians, the Jews and the Greeks) and denied to other
non-Muslims (for example, the right of education in Article 40 for the
Syriacs), while the rights granted, albeit without international
protection, by Part III of the Treaty of Lausanne to people other than
these non-Muslims are effectively ignored by the State.
One example of the former case is the so-called “1936 Declaration” and
one example of the latter case is the situation regarding Article 39/4
of the Treaty of Lausanne, which provides “all Turkish nationals” with
the right “to use any language they wish in commerce, in public and
private meetings and in all types of press and publication media”. In
other words, government offices are the only exception to that right. On
this subject, for example because nobody was allowed to make radio and
TV broadcasts in any language they wished, the third Package of
Harmonisation was adopted on 3 August 2002, but, since it was also not
implemented, it became necessary to adopt a seventh Package on 30 July
2003. At the end of November 2003, the Radio and Television High Board
has drafted a Regulation on this issue, but it also envisages
restrictions as to time and space.
However, if Article 39/4 of the Treaty of Lausanne was implemented, this
would automatically put an end to the troublesome controversies over the
issue of Kurdish broadcasting, which are unnecessarily wasting Turkey’s
time. Such a step would bring great benefits to Turkey in four respects:
1) It is certain that Turkey will soon have to abandon the “Statement of
Interpretation”, which has not been of benefit to Turkey, anyway. With
regard to the concept of national sovereignty, it is very important for
Turkey to do so voluntarily rather than as a result of EU pressure, and
this would be done by implementing the provisions of the Treaty of
Lausanne, which is Turkey’s own founding treaty.
2) It is inevitable that one day everyone will be able to make
broadcasts in any language. Instead of trying to pass new and
controversial laws in transition to that situation, the argument that
the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, which already have at least
constitutional effect, are being implemented would make life greatly
easier for the State.
3) It is obvious that, in order to avoid creation of minorities under
international protection, it is necessary to grant as wide freedoms are
possible to all citizens, and the Article in question refers to “all
Turkish nationals”.
4) There is no doubt that for the State in Turkey to treat its own
people more humanely would be greatly beneficial for “unity and
cohesion” in the country. A country of “compulsory citizens” is a weak
country. Making people happy and turning them into “voluntary citizens”
would strengthen the State itself. A citizen to be feared the least by
the State is a citizen whose rights it acknowledges.
3) RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE IN TURKEY
The legislation that concerns minorities and therefore cultural rights
in Turkey is more restrictive than the concept of minority and the
minority rights in the country. The main source of this is Article 3/1
of the Constitution: “The Turkish State, with its territory and nation,
is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.”
The State being an indivisible entity with its territory is a very
natural and undisputed point throughout the world. However, the concept
of the “indivisible entity of the nation” is quite perverse to a
Westerner although it comes natural to us. It implies that the nation is
monolithic, effectively denying the various sub identities that make up
the nation and therefore contravening the essence of democracy. In the
area of international human rights, the criteria used in the restriction
of rights include “national security” and “territorial integrity” but
not the “indivisible entity of the nation”. In cases brought to it, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) passes judgements of violation on
grounds that “asserting the existence of minorities in the country”
cannot be prevented.
In addition, it is entirely impossible to understand the phrase “Its
[the Turkish State’s] language is Turkish”. A State does not have a
language, but it has an official language, and citizens of that country
speak in various languages and broadcast in these languages in addition
to using that official language in their relations with the State. As a
matter of fact, in the 1961 Constitution this is expressed as: “The
official language is Turkish” (Article 3).
When the principle of the “indivisible integrity of the State with its
territory and nation”, which is repeated in countless articles of the
Constitution and laws, is interpreted in such a way as to reject sub
identities, the legislation in Turkey becomes legislation that tends to
assume that “recognition of sub identities” is meant to disturb the said
identity, and therefore to charge those who do so with “separatism and
subversion”. Important laws such as the Law for the Fight Against
Terrorism, the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Police, the Radio and
Television Law, the Law of Associations and the Law of Political Parties
heavily punish “creation of minorities by asserting the existence of
minorities based on ethnic and linguistic differences.”
When the Constitution is such, certain laws and regulations can bring
provisions which are not compatible at all with the way in which the
term “Turkish” was understood by Atatürk. For example, the “Regulation
Concerning Protection from Sabotage”, which was issued on 28 December
1988 and applied until 1991, included non-Muslim citizens of Turkey
within the category of people who could engage in acts of sabotage,
which consisted of “local foreigners (of Turkish nationality) within the
country and people of foreign race”. Article 24/1 of Law no. 625 on
Private Education Institutions, which concerns the appointment of
“Turkish chief deputy principals” to “private schools established by
foreigners”, is applied also to the schools for minority members who are
Turkish nationals. Moreover, Article 24/1 provides that this chief
deputy must be “of Turkish origin and Turkish nationality” and this
provision is still in force.
The fact that non-Muslim citizens were recorded in the book of
“foreigners” until the 1940s, that such citizens were taxed more heavily
than Muslims under the Wealth Tax Law of 1942 by implementing a list “G”
(the initial letter of the Turkish word for “non-Muslim”) which was not
in the Law, and that admission into military schools and even civilian
institutions was subject to the condition of “being a Turkish national
and a member of the Turkish race” until the 1950s, all this is not
simply a thing of the past. Even today, one does not encounter any
non-Muslim officials in state institutions, including especially the
Turkish Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police and
the National Intelligence Agency, excluding universities. These are
practices which seriously prevent Turkey from achieving the position it
deserves in the twenty-first century and which damage national unity
within the country, because they reflect the usage of the term “Turk” in
the context of race and even religion.
4) RELEVANT COURT JUDGEMENTS IN TURKEY
The Constitutional Court and Decisions for the Banning (Closing) of
Political Parties
With such legislation, the Constitutional Court often adopts decisions
to ban political parties.
Nevertheless, it is also true that the Constitutional Court, while
making interpretations, ignores certain fundamental concepts of law and
thus causes further damage to democracy in Turkey.
For example, in its decision to ban the DEP in June 1994, while stating
that “it would not be meaningful to turn unlimited rights into limited
rights and being part of the nation into being a member of a minority”,
the Court ignored the distinction between “negative/individual rights”
(equal rights granted to all citizens) and “positive/group rights”
(additional rights granted only to disadvantaged citizens). Moreover,
that statement by the Court is such as to regard citizens who belong to
the majority as first-class and those who belong to a minority as
second-class.
Again for example, in its decision to ban the TEP, the Constitutional
Court first stated that it was possible to speak of the existence of
different identities but maintained its former position by immediately
adding afterwards that the assertion of different identities would lead
to “a tendency to break away from the whole in the course of time”
(Decision banning the TEP, Case: 1979/1, Decision Number: 1980/1).
This attitude stems from a fear that recognition of the existence of
people from different ethnic, religious, cultural, etc. backgrounds in
Turkey would result in the fragmentation of the State.
Relevant Judgements by the Court of Cassation and the Council of State
Unfortunately, some citizens in Turkey are perceived as “foreigners”. In
addition to such a mistake being made among ordinary people, it is
observed that the Court of Cassation also made (and even insisted on)
this serious mistake in its judgements on the so-called “1936
Declaration” concerning non-Muslim foundations.
As a matter of fact, in a judgement delivered in 1974, the Court of
Cassation General Assembly of Civil Law Departments stated that
“.foreigners are prohibited from acquiring property in Turkey” and thus
decided that the Balýklý Greek Hospital Foundation, which is a
non-Muslim Turkish establishment, was not entitled to acquire property.
After the defence lawyers pointed to this mistake, the same Assembly now
stated “It is indeed mistaken to refer in our judgement of approval to
‘the laws prohibiting foreigners from acquiring property in Turkey’
given the fact that the defendant foundation was established by Turkish
citizens”, but added: “Therefore, it is now decided that the phrase in
question should be removed from the judgement by way of correction, but
otherwise. the appeal should be rejected” (The General Assembly of Civil
Law Departments, Case: 1971/2-820, Judgement: 1974/505, Date: 8 May
1974). In other words, the Court of Cassation effectively insisted on
its mistake. However, such mistakes are highly damaging to the concept
of nation and bring discredit to Turkey in the international area.
Although this question of the “1936 Declaration” was corrected in the
fourth Package of EU Harmonisation which was adopted on 2 January 2003,
the injustice still continues in practice. As a matter of fact, it
became necessary to deal with the same issue in the sixth Package of
Harmonisation which was adopted on 19 June 2003. In practical terms, no
result has yet been achieved.
Finally, although the 1936 Declaration has been abolished, it is simply
grave that the Treasury, in the legal action it brought in February 2003
against the Surp Haç Armenian High School Foundation, based its claims
on a decision of the “Minorities Sub-Committee at the Ministry of
Internal Affairs”. When it is a question of property owned by citizens
whose religion happens to differ from the majority religion, reference
is made to such a sub-committee, which is not part of the legal order of
the State. It is probably difficult to find a more striking example of
ethnic and religious discrimination.
As for the administrative judiciary, the Second Administrative Court of
Istanbul referred to a Turkish citizen of Greek-Orthodox origin as a
“citizen of the Republic of Turkey with foreign affiliation” (Case:
1995/1271, Judgement: 1996/552, Date: 17 April 1996). Moreover, when
this very interesting term, which was the basis of the Court’s
judgement, was brought to the attention of the Twelfth Department of the
Council of State, it was not regarded as a valid ground for appeal, and
the Department unanimously upheld the judgement of the local court
(Case: 1997/2217, Judgement:1997/4256, Date: 24 December 1997).
5) FOUNDATIONS OF THE SITUATION IN TURKEY
It is clear that the question of minorities, which we discuss here, is
considered from a very narrow and very mistaken viewpoint in Turkey. The
fundamental reasons for this viewpoint may be summarised as follows:
1) Instead of keeping track of developments in the world with regard to
the minority concept and law, Turkey is stuck with 1923 and moreover
interprets the Treaty of Lausanne incorrectly/deficiently.
2) Recognising the different identity of a minority and granting
minority rights are considered to be the same. However, the former
implies an objective situation while the latter is a matter of
discretion for the State.
3) It is thought that “internal self-determination”, which means
democracy, is the same as “external self-determination”, which means
fragmentation, and consequently the recognition of different identities
is held to be the same as the territorial fragmentation of the State.
4) Oneness and unity with respect to nation are considered to be the
same and it is not realised that the former is gradually destroying the
latter.
5) While speaking of the Turks as a nation, it is not realised that the
term “Turkish” also denotes an ethnic group.
These facts have two causes, one of which is theoretical and the other
historical/political.
The Theoretical Cause: The Relationship between the Super identity and
Sub identities in the Republic of Turkey
While replacing the Ottoman Empire after it collapsed, the Republic of
Turkey completely inherited the sub identities that existed within it
(the various ethnic, religious and other groups). However, while the
super identity in the Empire (the identity accorded by the State to its
citizens) was “Ottoman”, it emerged as “Turk” in the Republic of Turkey.
Thus, one of the sub identities was determined as the super identity.
This super identity tends to define the citizen with race and even with
religion. For example, when “our kinsfolk abroad” are mentioned, people
of ethnic Turkish origin are meant. In addition, it is clear that one
must also be a “Muslim” in order to be considered a “Turk” because our
non-Muslim compatriots are referred to not as “Turks” but simply as
“citizens”. In Turkey, nobody uses the word “Turk” when talking about,
say, a Greek or Jewish citizen because they are talking about a
non-Muslim citizen. Regrettable examples of this in state practices are
sufficiently given above.
The Historical and Political Cause: The Sèvres Syndrome
It is known that in the early 1990s Turkey suffered from a “Sèvres
Syndrome” that the country was about to disintegrate. It is disturbing,
and weakening the nation, that such an argument is still put forward and
even turned into paranoia. Those who argue that a Pontus State will be
founded in the Eastern Black Sea region, that Turkey is governed by the
Converts, or that the Phanar Patriarchate seeks to establish a
Vatican-like state in Istanbul, are trying to create such an atmosphere
of paranoia.
This atmosphere results in interpreting even the most innocent demands
for identity in Turkey as a desire to divide Turkey and wants to
immediately suppress them. This situation also invites interventions by
the major Western countries because it is contrary to democracy, which
Turkey has willingly agreed to implement effectively in order to join
the EU. Delaying of democracy in one’s own country through such paranoia
is not a service to Turkey. In particular, when it is a question of
reforms to be introduced concerning the use of Kurdish, there is
immediately talk about the fragmentation of Turkey, it is said that this
will give new life to terrorism, and efforts are made to prevent all
types of reform in such an atmosphere of paranoia. And those who do so
fail to see that some circles could again be led into perceiving
terrorism as the only option if reforms are hindered.
Nevertheless, the process of preparations for EU membership has brought
the question of minority rights in Turkey into a very positive process
despite everything. This process is a direct extension of the legal
reforms that Kemalism introduced in the 1920s and 1930s by “revolution
from above” to modernise the country.
Just as violent reactions from below emerged to this Kemalist revolution
from above in those years, reactions are arising today to these Packages
of Harmonisation. The mentality that feeds on the “Sèvres Paranoia” is
fiercely resisting the reforms.
CONCLUSION
Anatolia, which has been home to very different cultures for many
centuries, is also a cradle of great cultural and historical wealth.
Following the Ottoman period with its concept of Islamic brotherhood and
with a variety of identities, considerable steps were taken to create a
homogenous nation with a single culture in Turkey. However, the
different identities and cultures have continued to exist as a rich
mosaic on the territories of Anatolia.
That policy, which was very natural in the 1920s and 1930s when the
Kemalist revolution was made, is now outdated as a requirement of
Atatürk’s own thesis of “Contemporary Civilisation”. Today, contemporary
civilisation is not the Europe of the 1920s and 1930s but the Europe of
the 2000s. Now, it is essential to review the existing concept of
citizenship and to adopt the multi-identity, multi-cultural, democratic,
free and pluralistic social model of contemporary Europe.
Accordingly, it is necessary to define the political and legal status of
free, independent individuals who can easily use their creative
capacities and cultural rights and who are conscious of their rights and
obligations. This definition, which is sought to be made in a piecemeal
fashion through the EU Harmonisation Laws, is possible by screening all
of our laws and putting into practice the principles of:
a- The right to personal freedoms,
b- The right to enjoy freely economic and social opportunities,
c- The right to participate in government, and
d- The right to cultural pluralism.
In the context of implementing these principles:
1) The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and all related laws must
be rewritten to give them a liberal, pluralistic and democratic content
and with the participation of all organisations of civil society.
2) Guarantees must be provided for the rights of people with a different
identity and culture to protect and develop their identities (such as
the rights of publication, self-expression and education) based on equal
citizenship.
3) The central government and local governments must be made transparent
and democratic, based on public participation and control.
4) International conventions and basic instruments that include the
universal norms of human rights and freedoms, particularly the Framework
Convention of the Council of Europe, must be signed, ratified and
implemented without reservation. From now, no reservations or statements
of interpretation that would mean a denial of the sub identities in
Turkey must be made to international conventions.