Category: News

The Hindu, India
December 13, 2004
WHY IN CALCUTTA?
BURIED IN the Armenian Church’s well-kept, well-shaded cemetery on
Armenian Street is the Rev. Harathun Shimavonian, who died in 1824.
Having lived a hundred years, his longevity itself made him a
noteworthy figure. But as his tombstone marked by an open book
attests, he was even more noteworthy for a signal contribution he
made to the Armenian nation, at the time scattered in many parts of
the world – including Madras and Calcutta. That contribution was “the
first Armenian Journal in the World”, Azdarar , which he printed and
published in 1794 in a printing press he established near the church.
The founder-editor of Azdarar could not make a success of the paper,
given the small number of Armenians in and around the city, but he
did, it is believed, print several Armenian classics in Classical
Armenian.
One of Armenia’s best-known sculptors, Levon Tokmajian, is now at
work in Calcutta, which still has an Armenian presence – though much
diminished in numbers – sculpting a 5-foot marble statue of the
Armenian priest who spent most of his life in the Madras church of
the Armenian Orthodoxy.
But the statue is to be raised in January in front of the Armenian
Church on Armenian Street in CALCUTTA. Now, I wonder why that is
being done when the Rev. Harathun Shimavonian’s achievements were in
MADRAS. Do the Armenians in Calcutta consider the tombstone in Madras
memorial enough to a pioneer in the world of printing?
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
December 13, 2004, Monday
WHY WE NEED UKRAINE
SOURCE: Ekspert, No. 46 (446), December 6, 2004, pp. 17-20
by: Pavel Bykov, Olga Vlasova
Russia has an interest in seeing Ukraine become an integral, strong,
democratic state with its own independent policies. This is entirely
self-evident: Russia needs effective partners, not more problem zones
along its borders. Moscow doesn’t need yet another burden around its
neck; it already has enough problems in the CIS and within Russia
itself.
Russia’s authorities are only just starting to restore order in the
administration of Russia’s regions. The situation in the North
Caucasus remains explosive. The problem of the Kaliningrad region’s
future still hasn’t been resolved. Relations with “friendly Belarus”
are fairly tense. The Trans-Caucasus conflicts are frozen, but not
resolved. Moscow accepts the military presence of Washington in
Central Asia as a good thing. These are the realities. So how can
anyone talk of Russia exerting real, direct control over Ukraine, a
nation with 50 million people and considerable problems of its own?
The fewer problems Kiev has, the easier things will be for Moscow.
The stronger Ukraine becomes, the more opportunities there will be
for mutually beneficial cooperation. Russia needs an ally that would
take on part of the responsibility for military and political
stability in our region of the world: a suitable partner for
implementing large-scale international business projects in the CIS,
the Black Sea region, the Balkans, and Europe.
Thus, the break-up of Ukraine would not be to Russia’s advantage.
After all, that scenario would not only deprive us of a potentially
very strong partner, but also create a giant conflict zone along our
borders – one that would make the break-up of Yugoslavia and the
Trans-Dniester war seem minor. It would put all of Russia’s border
cities – from Rostov-on-Don to Bryansk – at risk of finding
themselves on the front line.
There would be another risk if Ukraine split into Western Ukraine and
South-Eastern Ukraine: the risk of a border revision process starting
throughout the post-Soviet states. Following the break-up of the
USSR, Russia had a very narrow escape from finding itself enmeshed in
series of regional wars, similar to those in Yugoslavia. Nothern
Kazakhstan, Eastern Ukraine, the Crimea, the Trans-Dniester region,
ethnic Russians in the Baltic states: there would have been more than
enough pretexts for intervention on the grounds of defending the
interests of Russian minorities. At least as many pretexts as the
Serbs had.
And now, in the event that Ukraine does break up, the general public
in Russia would find it very hard to reject the idea of supporting
the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine in a confrontation with
the West. There is no harm in support, as such, but it contains a
hidden danger: should the West suddenly decide that this is “a matter
of principle,” this could lead to a simultaneous deterioration in
Russia’s relations with the United States and the European Union, and
thus a more hard-line regime in Russia itself. And then it would be
only one small step to a direct confrontation over Kaliningrad
(following the Berlin crisis pattern), and an exacerbated situation
throughout the Baltic region. Control over the Trans-Dniester region
would be part of the plan for supporting South-Eastern Ukraine. The
logic behind developments is such that by starting with Ukraine,
Russia would very soon find itself in a confrontation with NATO
across the entire Western front.
What’s more, even if Ukraine breaks up rapidly and painlessly, it is
by no means certain that part of it would join Russia. Becoming the
president of an independent, industrially-developed country close to
the Black Sea is a far more enviable destiny than that of a
semi-appointed regional leader within Russia. In that event, we would
probably end up with another Belarus on our borders: a country held
back from real integration with Russia by a leader who is hostile to
the West, regardless of mutual attachments between the peoples and
pro-Moscow rhetoric.
In short, “break-up of Ukraine” scenarios don’t promise any benefits
for Moscow.
Neither would Russia stand to gain from the prospect of an
economically weak Ukraine, not self-sufficient, becoming part of the
periphery of the European Union. Practically all of Europe’s
politicians and analysts are now saying that the EU has had nothing
to do with the events in Ukraine. According to them, the West didn’t
favor either presidential candidate, initially; it was only after
Russia’s unseemly role became apparent – its determination to secure
a win for pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich – that the West
started condemning these events and supporting opposition candidate
Viktor Yushchenko. That may be a fair statement for some EU
countries, but not all of them. For example, a number of the EU’s
newest member states were overtly pro-Yushchenko even before they
joined the EU. Above all, this applies to Poland.
Poland has never been known to have any great liking for the
brother-people of Ukraine, though it has attempted to extend its
influence into Ukraine on more than one occasion. Yet now the Poles,
most of whom used to be skeptical about their neighbor-state, are
simply overflowing with inexplicable love for Ukraine. Even the
Ukrainians admit that only Poland’s active support helped draw the
European Parliament’s special attention to the situation in Ukraine
and prompt it to refuse to recognize Yanukovich as the winner.
Poland’s love for the freedom-loving people of Ukraine did not arise
suddenly. Long before Ukraine’s election, Polish politicians were
starting to glance in the direction of their south-eastern neighbor.
The Poles claim that the EU absolutely must declare that EU
membership for Ukraine is a possibility. At the latest East-West
Economic Forum, held in Poland this autumn, President Alexander
Kwasniewski stated openly that Poland considers EU membership for
Ukraine to be its own mission, and will do all it can to achieve that
goal.
Poland’s persistence is by no means altruistic. Poland actually hopes
to resolve many of its own problems by pushing for Ukraine to be
accepted into the European Union. For example, despite Poland’s
recently-acquired EU member status, the development of its economy
has stalled. Compared to Poland, Ukraine seems a far more attractive
prospect for many investors: Ukraine is free of the bureaucratic
obstacles created by endless EU regulations, and it has a skilled
labor force prepared to work for relatively low wages. Ukraine’s
economig growth has been in the double digits this year: and this is
causing bitterness in neighboring Poland, where the economy has been
in stagnation for some years. The Poles would much prefer to see a
“velvet revolution” scenario in which factories stand idle, banks
stop functioning, and investors start seeing the political situation
in Ukraine as extremely unstable.
Poland – a weak state on the periphery of Western Europe, with a
semi-agrarian economy – is striving to move towards the center of
Europe by shifting its own current role as “the periphery” onto its
eastern neighbor. Even the negotiation process for EU membership for
Ukraine actually strengthens Poland: it brings Ukraine within the
jurisdiction of EU regulations, thus making it pointless for
investors to go into Ukraine, since its legal status is
indeterminate. Essentially, Poland gains complete control over the
situation: by becoming the mediator between the EU and Ukraine, it
can directly influence the decision-making process for Ukraine’s most
important political and economic issues.
Ukraine will have to be forced to accept that scenario. By summer
2004, the prevalent attitude in Ukraine was that EU membership is not
worth pursuing. President Leonid Kuchma called on his fellow citizens
to heed the negative experience of integration into the EU among the
states of Eastern Europe, and not to be over-hasty in seeking to
integrate Ukraine into the EU with the status of “younger sister.”
The Ukrainian government was intent on developing relations with
Brussels in the areas where this would be to Ukraine’s advantage,
without making any unnecessary commitments. Ukraine’s business
community was preparing to skim some cream: as soon as the nations of
Eastern Europe joined the EU, consumer prices for essential goods
rose sharply, and people from Eastern Europe flooded into Ukraine to
buy up everthing they could. Ukraine’s border regions started
building new supermarkets, aiming to attract consumers from among the
new citizens of the EU. But now these obvious economic advantages for
Ukraine are suddenly in doubt. Viktor Yushchenko has stated
repeatedly that he is in favor of closer relations with the EU. If
the mandate of Ukraine’s new president is determined by EU support
more than by the Ukrainians themselves, he will have to be more
accommodating.
In any event, we should bear in mind that Ukraine’s economy is
stronger than that of Poland. Potentially, it could be stronger than
the combined economies of all Ukraine’s EU-member neighbors. Poland
will find it very difficult to impose the “economic periphery” role
on Ukraine; this plan could only succeed if it’s possible to disrupt
the trend of establishing Ukraine as an independent power which is
bound to play a key role in the region.
A strong, independent Ukraine would generate a fundamentally
different situation throughout Europe. The cornerstone concept in the
EU’s strategy regarding the countries of the East is that they all
wish to become EU members. So Brussels can pick and choose the
candidates, imposing its own terms on them. The EU has a strategy for
dealing with weak neighbors, but it lacks one for dealing with strong
neighbors. That is precisely why relations between Moscow and
Brussels deteriorated in early 2004: the EU’s strategy designed for a
weak Russia wasn’t working (gradually integrating Russia into the
EU’s sphere of influence, piece by piece, on the EU’s own terms), and
the EU had no other strategy. The same situation applies to Ukraine.
If even the slightest doubts arise about whether it’s really
worthwhile for Ukraine to join the EU, this makes all the
pressure-applying procedures of the Eurobureaucrats pointless. The EU
would no longer be viewed as a desirable “heaven on earth”; rather
than making demands, it woould have to seek attention – and that’s an
entirely different ball-game.
If Ukraine can manage to break out of the relations strategy now
being imposed on it by the EU, this would be to Russia’s advantage.
There has been a lot of mud-slinging directed at Russia by the
Europeans this year, and this is largely due to the EU being at a
loss. Its script, designed for a weak Russia, has been in place for a
long time; the entire colossal bureaucracy of the EU is following it.
The fact that Russia has suddenly started to rise just doesn’t fit
into the EU’s plans – and it’s so very reluctant to change those
convenient plans and concepts. It’s far easier to try to persuade
everyone that Russia remains weak and desperately in need of the EU’s
support – while any attempts by Russia to defend its own interests
are only vestiges of the past or imperialist ambitions.
If Ukraine chooses the path of a strong and independent European
power, this would force the EU to admit that its old strategy no
longer works: not because of any “imperialist ambitions,” but due to
the objective process of development among former Soviet countries.
The interests of Ukraine itself, as well as the interests of Russia,
would be served if events develop along these lines.
Events would develop differently if the revolution wins in Ukraine.
The laws by which revolutions develop are such that the leader who
wins is forced to become a dictator – otherwise he is unable to hold
on to power, and would be replaced by a more radical leader. The most
recent and obvious example of this implacable principle in action is
Georgia’s “revolution of roses,” from which the leaders of the Kiev
demonstrators are copying their plans. Mikhail Saakashvili, the “rose
revolutionary,” is being forced to keep on with revolutionary
policies, relying on direct support of the masses and his own
popularity. Saakashvili’s cult of personality has practically been
established in Georgia already – even though the costs of state
administration are covered solely through donations from abroad, and
the economic situation is deteriorating.
There is one fundamental difference between the “revolution of
roses,” for example, and the revolution of 1968, which many observers
are currently citing. In 1968, the revolution failed to win in any
country; but the ideas and movements that drove it were accepted by
the elites and integrating into the existing order. The participants
in that protest movement called for change, but set themselves the
goal of taking power. That was why the revolution of 1968 succeeded.
But if the students of Paris had actually taken power back then, what
would France be like today? The memory of 1968 probably wouldn’t seem
nearly as romantic.
And this is precisely why it’s important now that the “chestnut
revolution” in Ukraine should not win. It would be acceptable for
some opposition leaders to take up government office. There can and
should be some political reforms, and the interests of the protesters
should be taken into account. But all this should take place solely
on the basis of existing laws, and a system of compromises with the
ruling elites. A total victory for the “orange opposition” – a
victory for the power of the streets – would be a Pyrrhic victory for
Ukraine. If that happens, Ukraine would be a source of instability on
post-Soviet territory for a long time to come. The priorities of any
and all victorious revolutionaries are to radically purge the field
of domestic politics and export the revolution – not to ensure the
necessary conditions for the nation’s economic and social development
(and we are already seeing some disastrous consequences of the
revolution for Ukraine’s economy).
A second success for “velvet revolutions” within the CIS will lead to
further attempts to stir up revolutionary uprisings everywhere:
Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Central Asian nations. To put it
plainly, this would not be about democratization; it would be yet
another phase of regime change in former Soviet countries. There is
probably no need to spell out where this can lead. And Ukraine would
undoubtedly be the center of this revolutionary movement; it has
already become a testing-ground where revolutionaries from all over
the CIS are gathering experience.
Those in the West who have inspired Ukraine’s current revolution –
the likes of Zbigniew Brzezinski – do not conceal that in the event
of success in Ukraine, the main target of the international
revolutionary-democratic movement will be Russia. Brzezinski recently
said: “There is no doubt that if democracy is established in Ukraine,
this will provide great momentum for democratic forces in Russia.”
Indeed, the momentum would be great. The opposition within Russia
would become more radical, inspired by the achievements of its
neighbors. We should also expect a threat to come from the
redistribution of influence among Ukraine’s economic elites; the
finance channels of Ukraine and Russia are intertwined, so a
redistribution in Ukraine would destabilize the situation within
Russia’s elites as well. And there’s another destabilizing factor:
Ukraine could become a refuge for critics of the Kremlin’s policy in
the Caucasus. Not only theoretician critics, but practical critics:
the Russian-Ukrainian border is virtually open (so far), and close to
the Caucasus. And finally, the “loss” of Ukraine – which is precisely
how many interest groups in Russia and abroad would view an
unequivocal win for Yushchenko – may weaken the domestic and foreign
policy positions of President Vladimir Putin. At the very least, he
would be sure to face increased pressure.
It would certainly be foolish to oppose the development of democracy
in Russia. Yet the version of it currently being proposed to us by
our Western partners does seem odd: an “orange” victory at any cost,
with no consideration whatsoever of the opinions and interests of the
other side. Zero tolerance for the opposing point of view: is this
democracy?
The track record of how the current crisis in Ukraine is being
resolved, as well as analogous crises in Serbia and Georgia over
recent years, indicates one important point. The West does not have a
complete collection of the tools required to resolve such situations
to its own advantage. And Russia doesn’t even need to obstruct the
West’s revolution-managers in order to stymie them; all Russia has to
do is refrain from helping them. In one case after another, the
intervention of Russian mediators during the final stages of
conflicts has been the only factor that prevented situations from
getting out of control.
In this regard, it is very instructive to note the outcome of the
latest South Ossetia crisis. Moscow did not permit Saakashvili to
provoke it into using force; but neither did it give in to
Saakashvili’s blackmail – Moscow did not start putting pressure on
South Ossetia to agree to terms that South Ossetia considered
unacceptable. What cooled the fervor of Georgia’s leader was a
principled stand by Moscow: if Georgia wants to regain full control
over South Ossetia, it ought to reach agreement with the South
Ossetians themselves, rather than with Washington or Moscow. This
approach by Moscow proved sufficient.
Moscow has now adopted a similar stance with regard to Ukraine. It is
not in the Kremlin’s power to persuade Ukraine’s political elite or
the Ukrainian people to act in one way or another. Is the West
capable of doing so? The Western media have been full of discussion
about the importance of separating Ukraine from Russia and preventing
Russia from gaining control over Ukraine. Thus, allegedly, Ukraine
will make a conclusive choice in favor of freedom and democracy. We
have no wish to argue with commentators who say so. Ukraine should
indeed choose freedom.
Translated by Pavel Pushkin

ArmenPress
Dec 13 2004
GEORGIAN ARMENIANS REJECT AMALGAMATION
AKHALKALAKI, DECEMBER 13, ARMENPRESS: Ethnic Armenian
non-governmental organizations in Georgia’s southern region of
Samtskhe Javakheti held last Saturday their first conference to
discuss ways out of heavy social, economic and cultural conditions,
experienced by the region’s mostly Armenian population.
Titled as Integration but not Merging the conference organizers
invited representatives of the UN, OSCE, European Commission, foreign
diplomats stationed in Tbilisi, parliament members, representatives
of local and central authorities and from Armenia, but only a
representative of the OSCE office in Tbilisi was present. Also
Armenian members of Georgian parliament elected from the region did
not attend it.
Local Armenians say in principle they are not against closer
integration with the rest of Georgia, but they reject the central
authorities’ integration policy which they say leads to their merging
with ethnic Georgians.
The conference adopted a resolution that outlines ways out of the
deep crisis experienced by the region. It also decided to set up a
task force that will be seeking to design development plans together
with Georgian government officials.

DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER OF ARMENIA, LT. GENERAL MANVEL GRIGORYAN
RE-ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF BOARD OF UNION OF VOLUNTEERS “YERKRAPAH”
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 13. ARMINFO. Deputy Defense Minister of
Armenia. Lieutenant General Manvel Grigoryan is re-elected Chairman of
Board of the Union of Volunteers “Yerkrapah.”
The election took place in the course of the 6th Congress of the
“Yerkrapah” UV. Some 40 people were elected members of the Board,
including Ara Ketikyan and Myasnik Malkhasyan occupied the posts of
Vice Chairmen of the Board.

“YERKRAPAH” MEMBERS SURE THAT FORCES BACKING TERRORIST ACT IN ARMENIAN
PARLIAMENT WILL BE PROSECUTED BY PEOPLE
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 13. ARMINFO. Members of the union of volunteers
“Yerkrapah” (UVY) estimates the terrorist act in the Armenian
parliament on Oct 27, 1999 as a crime against Armenia and irrespective
of a decision on dismissal of the criminal case concerning the
organizers of the terrorist act, the UVY members express confidence
that the forces backing the crime will be brought to the justice of
the people. It is said in the resolution of the 6th congress of UVY.
As it is also said in the resolution the UVY condemns the terrorism as
a means to solve political problems. The UVY, as a fruit of Karabakh
movement, will be consecutive in the reaching fair settlement of the
Karabakh problem on the basis of the right of the people for
self-determination. “UVY members think that the fair resolution of the
Karabakh problem is possible only in the case of conducting balanced,
flexible and reasonable foreign and internal political course”, said
in the resolution.

ARMENIANS HOLD ACTION OF PROTEST NEAR TURKEY’S EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 13. ARMINFO. A group of Armenians held an action of
protest near the embassy of Turkey in Washington recently, where a
reception was held on the occasion of the American-Turkish assembly.
Turkish newspaper Hurriyet informs, the participants of the action
were scanning “the 1915 must not be repeated”, “We are ashamed for
Turkey”, “Turkey must not be permitted into the European
Union”. several turks, taking art in the reception at the embassy,
came to the demonstrators and made return statements. After the
interference of law-enforcement bodies “the duel of slogans” was
stopped.

FORUM “INTEGRATION BUT NOT MERGER” HELD IN SMATSKHE JAVAKHETI
AKHALKALAKI, DECEMBER 13. ARMINFO. The Council of Armenian NGOs of
Samtskhe Javakehti held Saturday a forum entitled “Integration but Not
Merger” concerning the social-economic problems of this mostly
Armenian region of Georgia.
The forum participants said that the region’s population is not
against integrating into Georgia but cannot accept Tbilisi’s version
of integration which in fact implies merger.
Attending the forum were OSCE ethnic minorities representative to
Georgia Beatrice Schulterier, manager of the Akhalkalaki program of
European Ethnic Minorities Center Michael Gertoft, Armenia members of
the Georgian parliament, foreign ambassadors, officials.

ArmenPress
Dec 13 2004
COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMISSION CALLS FOR BALANCED RELATIONS AMONG POWER
BRANCHES IN AMENDED ARMENIAN CONSTITUTION
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 13, ARMENPRESS: The Council of Europe Venice
Commission has welcomed two options of major constitutional changes
drafted by the ruling coalition and the United Labor Party
parliamentary factions, which together with a third package of
amendments, designed by a parliament member Arshak Sadoyan, were sent
to it for examination and assessment.
An interim resolution adopted by the Venice Commission during
December 3-4 session described the two packages as a step forward
that could promote Armenia’s more effective fulfillment of a range of
commitments which it assumed when joining Europe’s biggest human
rights organizations.
However, the resolution said more drastic changes should be
carried out to ensure more balanced relations among power branches.
The resolution said also that the package of constitutional changes,
presented by Arshak Sadoyan, failed to address a string of key
issues, such as protection of human rights and basic freedoms.
The resolution of the Venice Commission emphasizes a wide
involvement of all strata of the public in the process of the
Constitutional improvements.
Speaking to reporters today Arshak Sadoyan said that all political
forces concerned with the nation’s future should combine their
efforts to build such a system of power that would be welcomed by the
authorities and the public at large. He said this could be achieved
by consensus cooperation.

ArmenPress
Dec 13 2004
ARAKEL MOVSISIAN WINS PARLIAMENT SEAT IN BY-ELECTION
ARMAVIR, DECEMBER 13, ARMENPRESS: Armenia’s Central Election
Commission (CEC) said today that Arakel Movsisian, the sole candidate
for a vacant parliamentary seat in by-election, received 27,032 votes
of all 27,474 people who went to the polls on Sunday.
The seat, contested under majoritarian election system became
vacant after Arakel Movsisian’s brother, Mushegh, died in autumn
following a heavy road accident.

EU ministers clash on ‘second-class Turkey’ fears
By Daniel Dombey in Brussels
FT
December 13 2004
European Union foreign ministers clashed over Turkey on Monday, with a
number of countries mounting a rearguard action against proposals they
fear could relegate Turkey to second-class status within the EU.
The meeting was to prepare for an EU summit on Thursday and Friday,
which is expected to take the decision to begin membership talks with
Ankara. The negotiations could last a decade.
But the UK, Italy and Belgium are worried about draft summit proposals
that suggest the EU consider preventing normal rules from coming into
force for any new member.
The proposals are part of the draft conclusions for the summit, which
say “long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or
permanent safeguard clauses may be considered” in such instances.
A senior European Commission official warned: “If the word
‘derogation’ appears, that really opens the door to a privileged
partnership rather thanfull membership.”
At Monday’s meeting, José Manuel Barroso, Commission president,
complained that the draft went much further than the Commission’s
official recommendation on Turkey, which suggested the EU could
consider safeguards on the movementof labour, to be implemented in
cases of economic instability.
Ankara, which has tried to deepen ties with the EU for four decades,
is hostile to any suggestion that negotiations could end with an
agreement short of full membership. But France, Austria and Denmark,
which support the proposals on safeguards, believe the EU has to leave
open the possibility of a fall-back agreement should the negotiations
stall.
Michel Barnier, French foreign minister, said the EU had to give
reassurances that Turkey’s membership was not preordained – though it
should begin negotiations with the aim of membership.
Mr Barnier also said France would seek Turkish recognition of killings
of Armenians between 1915 and 1923 as genocide, once accession talks
begin.
Although he made clear that such recognition was not a condition for
the start of talks, his remark drew an angry response from Turkish
officials, who have always denied genocide.
Croatia accession
Croatia could start talks to join the EU in the spring of 2005
provided it co-operates fully with war crimes investigators, EU
foreign ministers agreed on Monday, George Parker reports from
Brussels. The date for the start of talks will be finalised by EU
leaders at this week’s summit, but European diplomats said they could
begin as early as March.
Britain and some Nordic countries are reluctant to give Croatia a date
to start talks because they believe Zagreb has failed to honour
commitments tohand over all suspected war criminals.
Meanwhile Austria and Germany, historically close to Croatia, want the
Balkan state to join the union at the earliest opportunity.
Assuming Croatia proves it is working with the international war
crimes tribunal in The Hague, it could join the EU in either 2008 or
2009.
European leaders will have to agree on the question of who decides
whether Croatia is co-operating fully with the tribunal: the EU
itself, or the authorities in The Hague.
Ivo Sanader, Croatia’s prime minister, wrote to the EU’s 25 leaders
earlier this month urging them to give his country the green light to
start talks.
Responding to criticisms from chief war crimes prosecutor Carla del
Ponte, he said Croatia would co-operate with the tribunal “without
reserve, withholding or duplicity”.