Category: 2024

Agenda, Georgia

Jan 26 2024

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili on Friday highlighted his office had “consistently advocated” for establishment of “lasting peace and stability” in the South Caucasus region, in a Tbilisi press briefing with his Armenian counterpart Nikol Pashinyan.

Garibashvili stressed his Government was “always prepared” to play a role in fostering “enduring peace”, which he said would bring benefits to countries across the region. 

We observe the ongoing dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia [to resolve the long-running dispute between the states over the Nagorno-Karabakh region] with great optimism. I wish to convey our hope that Armenia and Azerbaijan will expeditiously reach a peace agreement, undoubtedly contributing to the reinforcement and sustenance of the prevailing peace in the region -  an imperative for our nations", he said. 

The Georgian Government succeeded in mediating peace between the neighbouring states when in 2021 Garibashvili and the United States Department of State official Philip Reeker brokered a deal involving Azerbaijan’s release of 15 Armenian prisoners of war in exchange for receiving from Armenia a map of landmines in the Agdam district of the disputed region. 

Tbilisi has also hosted top officials from the two states over the past years to encourage peace talks between Baku and Yerevan.

https://agenda.ge/en/news/2024/261

Crisis 24

Jan 26 2024

Pro-Armenian activists plan to protest in urban centers in 15 European countries Jan. 27-28. The purpose of the demonstrations is to denounce Azerbaijan's control of Nagorno-Karabakh and demand sanctions against the government in Baku. Organizers are planning gatherings in over 50 cities, including Berlin, London, Madrid, and Vienna. A list of cities is here, although further impromptu events are likely. The largest events are likely to be in Paris and Berlin, as France and Germany have the largest Armenian diaspora in Europe.

As of Jan. 26, locations and start times have only been announced for events in France, including:

• Marseille: Simultaneous gatherings at Beaumont Armenian Apostolic Church of Marseille on Impasse des Monts and Prado church on Avenue du Prado starting at 12:00 Jan. 28

• Nice: Courthouse (Palais de Justice) in the Vieille Ville from 11:30 Jan. 27.

• Paris: Place du Canada from 13:00 Jan. 28

• Strasbourg: Allee des Droits de l'Homme opposite the European Court of Human Rights from 13:00 Jan. 27

Heightened security and localized transport disruptions are likely near all demonstration sites. Low-level confrontations between demonstrators and law enforcement officers or counterprotesters cannot be ruled out.

https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2024/01/europe-pro-armenia-activists-to-demonstrate-in-major-cities-in-multiple-countries-jan-27-28-update-1

Jan 26 2024

2023 ended with positive notes for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, but the new year has so far failed to maintain the momentum. Despite a successful prisoner exchange, and Armenia’s endorsement of Azerbaijan’s COP29 candidacy, recent statements from the respective governments have presented a mixed picture. While the Azerbaijani side has not indicated any setbacks in the ongoing talks yet, the Armenian government has criticized the recent statements by the Azerbaijani leader as unconstructive for the peace process.

Complicating matters further, disagreements have intensified regarding the possible regulations along the Zangezur corridor. The latest developments highlight a disparity in the visions of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for this corridor. Unfortunately, these developments suggest that the obstacles in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty talks may be more fundamental, potentially leading to indefinite delays in the process.

The interview of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev with local TV channels on January 10 was the cause that sparked the extensive discussions. Despite President Aliyev’s explicit denial of any intention by his government to invade Armenian territory, Armenian officials, experts, social media users, and some Western officials fueled a fearmongering campaign, alleging Aliyev’s intent to invade Armenia. The situation escalated to the point where the High Representative of the European Union, Josep Borrel, and the spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Peter Stano, warned Azerbaijan against such actions, threatening Baku with “severe consequences”.

What is perplexing is why European officials are joining this campaign, when it is evident that such a military operation could yield counterproductive outcomes for Baku. Leaders in Azerbaijan, being widely known for their pragmatic foreign policy approach, comprehend this reality and have consistently refuted any intentions or preparations for such an invasion. Nevertheless, the statements from Brussels, combined with anti-Azerbaijani resolutions from the European Parliament and the French Senate, have already had adverse effects on EU-Azerbaijan relations, eroding trust between the two sides.

This is accompanied by escalating disagreements among the three signatories of the 10 November 2020 trilateral statement (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia), particularly regarding the final provision pertaining to the reopening of regional transportation links. The statements released by each side in January underscored their divergent positions. Azerbaijan advocates for an unimpeded passage without customs and security checks for passengers and cargo through what it refers to as the Zangezur corridor, connecting the western part of Azerbaijan to Nakchivan. In stark contrast, Armenia firmly rejects this proposal, which had been otherwise envisioned in the trilateral statement.

Interestingly, Russia also advocates for customs and security checks on this route, but with a condition – insisting that Russia’s border guards oversee these measures. A similar discord arises over the responsibility for ensuring security on this route, with Russia and Azerbaijan expecting Armenia to comply with the trilateral statement and accept the deployment of Russia’s border guards. However, Yerevan rejects this provision as well. Given the opposition of the United States to the deployment of the Russian border guards, the issue turns out to be another act in the theater of geopolitical rivalries between Russia and the West, rather than a matter between the two directly involved countries.

This disagreement has evolved into a significant impediment, especially after President Aliyev’s declaration on 10 January that Baku will not consider opening Azerbaijan’s borders with Armenia elsewhere unless the Zangezur corridor is operational. This raises the question of whether Baku would be willing to sign a peace treaty with Armenia without reaching an agreement on the Zangezur corridor. Considering the current circumstances and the importance Baku places on this corridor, the answer to this question appears to be in the negative.

Nevertheless, there have been also one important development over the past month which gives a glimmer of hope that the two countries are still on the path of reconciliation. It is related to an apparent understanding between Baku and Yerevan that the remaining legal hurdles for the peace treaty should be eliminated. As it has been emphasised for a long time, Armenia’s existing constitution contains a territorial claim against Azerbaijan and Turkiye, calling for unification of Karabakh with Armenia and naming the eastern part of Turkiye as “Western Armenia”. In 2021, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan referred to this fact as a challenge to the peace efforts in the region. “There is a territorial claim against Türkiye in the Constitution of Armenia. They should abandon that. They need to revise and re-adopt their constitution… they must give up their claims against Türkiye and Azerbaijan”, said Aliyev in an interview with a Turkish media channel.

The call for a new constitution by the Armenian premier is therefore interpreted as a breakthrough to this challenge. On January 19, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, explaining the need for a new constitution, stated that it would maintain the present parliamentary system. He underscored “external security” and “internationally recognized sovereign territory” as the main elements on the agenda that will be addressed in the constitutional reform. It is however likely that the process for Armenia adopting a new constitution will take a long time  – another reason why we may expect delays in the peace talks,

In conclusion, the recent complexities surrounding the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process suggest a more profound and enduring challenge than initially anticipated. Disagreements over the Zangezur corridor, exacerbated by geopolitical interests, have become significant obstacles. While a potential breakthrough as a result of the prospect of Armenia’s constitutional reform offers a glimmer of hope, the path to a comprehensive peace treaty remains fraught with hurdles, hinting at potential indefinite delays in the process.

 

Jan 26 2024

eurasianet

Jan 26 2024

So far, the campaign for the February 7 presidential election is probably the most boring in Azerbaijan's history. 

Not because of its predictability. All elections in Azerbaijan, which has been classified as a "hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime" where elections serve only to strengthen the incumbent, are notoriously predictable. 

Nor because of the praise being lavished on the regime by all the candidates. That's not new either.

Instead, it's because the public is disengaged from politics to an unprecedented degree. 

That in turn is caused by the genuine popularity of incumbent Ilham Aliyev, who continues to bask in the glory of Azerbaijan's restoration of sovereignty over the previously contested Nagorno-Karabakh region, and the fact that his government is ramping up repressions ahead of the vote.

Apathy has grown sharply since the last presidential election in 2018, which was accompanied by at least some actual politics. 

Back then, the genuine opposition National Council not only boycotted the poll, it organized several massive rallies in Baku in the run-up to the election.

But no major protests have been staged in the capital since January 2019. Only a few dozen people took part in a rally against the continuing Covid-related closure of the country's land borders in July 2022 that was organized by now-imprisoned opposition activist Tofig Yagublu. 

Since then, opposition parties have largely stopped trying to mobilize the public around any cause. 

This is connected to the fact that, since the summer of 2020 the country's political agenda has been dominated by relations with Armenia and the Karabakh issue. After Baku's military victories in 2020 and 2023, which resulted in the Armenian exodus from Karabakh, the government discourse has grown more and more anti-Western. The collective West is accused of double standards, pro-Armenian stances, and jealousy. 

Ahead of the Azerbaijani delegation's preemptive withdrawal from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), pro-government media waged a campaign against the "Islamophobic and Turkophobic" Council of Europe – an institution that defended Azerbaijani civil society with its Court of Human Rights, which often rendered verdicts in favor of former political prisoners, including compensation. 

While the upcoming election will be observed by the OSCE, other European institutions are not invited to monitor the poll, including the European Parliament and PACE.

What do the candidates say?

Azerbaijan's largest opposition parties are boycotting this poll, as they have done for the past two presidential elections and the past six elections overall.

And as in years before, Aliyev's "challengers" are in fact largely sycophants who echo the regime's talking points. 

In the first debate on the public channel ITV, all candidates praised Ilham Aliyev's role in the victory in the Karabakh conflict. 

One nonpartisan candidate, Zahid Oruj, directly called on his supporters to vote for the government. 

In the following debate, the nonpartisan candidate Fuad Aliyev called for closer cooperation with Russia- and China-dominated entities such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and the Eurasian Economic Union. He also called to drift away from the "hostile" collective West. 

Ultra-nationalist Elshad Musayev of the "Greater Azerbaijan Party" advocated officially laying claim to the Zangezur (Armenia's Syunik Region), which he calls  Azerbaijani "historical land." 

Surprisingly there was a modicum of criticism from MP Gudrat Hasanguliyev, the head of the Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, who lamented the lack of democracy in the country and backed a transition to a parliamentary system. 

He also called for renaming the country the "North Azerbaijan Republic," a move popular among pan-Turkic nationalists as it implies territorial claims on ethnic Azeri-populated northwestern Iran. 

Other candidates issued vague appeals regarding social rights and offered ideas for improving housing and education. 

None mentioned the president's name in a negative context. There was no serious criticism of the government. It was not serious political discourse.

Few people bother to watch the debates on TV, and their online views numbers are paucal. Amid the voter apathy, jailed critics and lack of serious challengers, the current government will easily be re-elected. More easily than ever. 

Jan 26 2024

The owner of one of Armenia’s largest mobile operators, MTS Armenia, has announced that it will give the government 20% of its shares at no cost. The decision comes after the government approved the sale of the operator’s shares to Fedilco Group Limited, having previously blocked the move. 

The mobile operator stated that the move was being made in light of the ‘strategic importance’ of the network for Armenia. However, commentators noted that this was the third such transfer of shares from a major company to take place since 2021, and raised warnings regarding the Armenian government’s attitude to companies operating within the country. 

MTS Armenia previously belonged to Aramayo Investments Limited, a company registered in Cyprus but owned by the Russia-based MTS group. The company sold its shares to the Cyprus-registered Fedilco Group Limited on Wednesday, with the sale including MTS Armenia’s subsidiary, the MobiDream payment system. 

The operator’s statement noted that the new shareholder company was owned by Zhe Zhang and Konstantin Sokolov, whom the press release described as ‘professional investors with a diverse background in telecommunications, finance, energy, investment, and asset management’. 

A spokesperson for the Russia-based MTS mobile operator, MTS Armenia’s parent company, told Interfax that the deal was part of the Russia-based group’s ‘transformation strategy’. 

‘If there are favourable offers, MTS will sell non-core assets or assets with limited potential for growth in value, and direct the proceeds to the development of its key ecosystem business in Russia’, they said. 

However, MTS applied to obtain 100% of its Armenian wing from Aramayo Investments in August 2023, but was rejected by Armenia’s Public Service Regulatory Commission (PSRC).

This marks the third instance since 2021 that large companies have transferred shares to the Armenian government for free. In October 2021, Geopromining offered the government 15% of the Zangezur Copper Molybdenum Combine. On 18 January 2024, Armenia’s government accepted a 12.5% share of Lydian Armenia, greenlighting the operation of the contested Amulsar gold mine.

Reports that MTS Armenia’s shares might be sold began to circulate in late 2022. 

In April 2023, Armenia’s Public Service Regulatory Commission (PSRC) rejected an application submitted in January for the transfer of 100% of MTS Armenia's shares owned by Aramayo Investments Limited to Fedilco Group Limited. 

The application was rejected on the grounds that the transaction ‘harms or may harm national security and state interests’, based on an assessment by Armenia’s Ministry of High-tech Industry in collaboration with ‘interested bodies’, likely including Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS). 

However, in November of the same year, the same bodies approved the sale, with the Ministry stating that it had ‘no objections’ and the NSS that it had no comments. 

Following Thursday’s announcement, Armenian commentators raised concerns that the transfer of the share to the government might affect the country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. 

‘At first glance, we, the citizens (the state), become owners of large assets, which is gratifying, but serious reputational risks arise from the point of view of the country's investment attractiveness’, wrote economist Haykaz Fanyan. ‘Any major investor considering the possibility of entering Armenia will undoubtedly take these circumstances into account, and since such transactions are usually accompanied by 0% transparency, the assumptions will become more “hardened” ’.

Fanyan also warned that Armenia might be moving towards ‘state capitalism’. 

‘I remembered how in the 2000s the Russian population was rejoicing that the authorities were taking back from oligarchs the strategic assets privatised for pennies in the 90s, hopefully the parallels will be limited to that’, wrote Fanyan. 

According to Cyprus’ State Register of Companies, Fedilco was registered in April 2022. Hetq reported that two companies also registered in Cyprus, Nofal Holdings Limited and Ortasano Investments Limited, hold 75% and 25% shares in the company, with the ultimate owner of both companies, via Wimthed Limited, being Andreas Ourris. 

All four companies were registered in 2022, with almost no information available about them aside from press relating to MTS Armenia. 

European Bank for Reconstruction & Development

Jan 26 2024

Los Angeles – Jan 26 2024

Things have been quiet for a while, but construction is getting back into swing at the future Armenian American Museum in Glendale.

The museum announced this week that the first structural steel beams have been put into place at the construction site, which sits just east of Brand Boulevard at the southern edge of Glendale Central Park. They will eventually form the frame of a a two-story, approximately 51,000-square-foot building with a basement garage.

Alajajian Marcoosi Architects is designing the museum, which will have a jagged exterior modeled on rock formations seen in the Armenian Highlands. Inside, plans call for permanent and temporary exhibition galleries on the building's upper level, with a lobby, an auditorium, offices, and other functions below.

Gallagher & Associates is leading the design team for the museum's permanent exhibition, which will focus on the Armenian Genocide.

The project's location within Glendale Central Park is thanks to a $1-per-year ground lease agreement between the museum and the City of Glendale. The lease runs for an initial term of 55 years, with four optional 10-year extensions that could push that total to 95 years.

Construction of the Armenian American Museum will be paired with a planned revamp of Glendale Central Park, which will convert a parking lot into park to space to replace the open area lost to the museum footprint.