Category: 2023

In a remote corner of southern Armenia, along a 40-mile border with Iran, is a patch of land largely unknown to the rest of the world — the Syunik/Zangezur region. From a resource perspective, it offers little. But from a geopolitical perspective, it could become the trigger for a conflict between Turkey and Iran that would resonate across global energy markets. Ostensibly the byproduct of a centuries-old territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Syunik/Zangezur region — currently under Armenian control — has become attractive to both Azerbaijan and Turkey for economic purposes. Iran, however, has indicated that any effort by Azerbaijan to take over the region would trigger an Iranian military response, a conflict that would likely draw in Azerbaijan’s ally, Turkey.

The name of the Syunik/Zangezur region in itself reflects controversy that dates back to the Russian Empire and its collapse in 1917 — which gave birth to the then briefly independent republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Known by its Armenian name, Syunik, since antiquity, Russian authorities renamed the territory Zangezur in the 19th century, reflecting the Azeri majority population at the time. Britain — which intervened in the region at the end of World War I — sustained that practice when it approved Azerbaijan’s administration of the territory. Armenian forces, however, seized control of the Zangezur region in November 1919, and when Soviet control was asserted over both Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1920, the region was formally transferred to Armenian sovereignty as the Syunik Province.

The First and Second Nagorno-Karabakh Wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan, fought in 1993-94 and 2020, respectively, resulted in turmoil that saw the political map of the region drastically changed. A decisive Armenian victory in the first war resulted in the loss of significant territory by Azerbaijan, as Armenia created a land bridge between Armenia proper and the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. A similarly decisive Azerbaijani victory in 2020 erased these Armenian gains, and Azerbaijan won control over part of Nagorno-Karabakh. After renewed fighting in September 2023, Azerbaijan gained control over the rest of the break-away region, resulting in an exodus of Armenians, and raising the specter of Azerbaijan trying to seize control of the nearby Syunik/Zangezur region as well.

Pan-Turkic Dreams

The importance of the Syunik/Zangezur region goes beyond the assertion of historic territorial claims. A mutual blockade between Armenia and Azerbaijan, instituted in 1989, resulted in the economic isolation of the Nakhichivan enclave, an Azerbaijani-controlled territory wedged between Turkey, Armenia and Iran. During Soviet times, Nakhchivan was connected to Azerbaijan proper by a railroad that ran through the Syunik/Zangezur region. The 2020 ceasefire agreement that brought an end to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War mandated that the 1989 blockade be terminated, and that Armenia facilitate the opening of so-called “transport connections” between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan that would permit the “unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions.”

Initial discussions about the reopening of the Soviet-era rail link, however, soon got bogged down over the concept of a more expansive “Zangezur corridor” introduced into the diplomatic mix by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. In 2021, during meetings with Turkish President Recep Erdogan, Aliyev stated that a Zangezur corridor would “unite the whole Turkic world.” Aliyev was playing on a long-held Turkish desire for a direct link between it and Azerbaijan that would eliminate Iran’s physical access to Armenia, while opening a direct land route from Turkey, through Azerbaijan, to northern Iran, where there is a majority Azeri population, and Central Asia. Aliyev outlined this vision in November 2021 at a meeting of the Organization of Turkic States. The subversive aspects of this campaign were reflected in the recent appearances of posters in the Iranian city of Tabriz, home to a sizeable Azeri population, proclaiming that “Zangezur is Azerbaijani” and promoting the creation of a Baku-Tabriz-Ankara axis.

The Iran Factor

Iran’s 40-mile border with Armenia has become one of the most strategically important pieces of terrain when it comes to Iran’s perceptions of its national security interests. Iran deployed some 50,000 troops to the border zone in 2022 in a signal to both Turkey — a Nato member — and Azerbaijan that it would not tolerate any change in international borders in the region and that the territorial integrity of Armenia must be preserved. Those troops remain at a high state of readiness. This isn’t simple posturing by Iran. Indeed, Iran has made it clear that any redrawing of borders that removes Armenia as a neighbor represents a red line. The opening by Iran, in August 2022, of a consulate in Syunik/Zangezur has been seen by many regional analysts as a clear sign of Iran’s commitment to the territorial integrity of Armenia.

For the moment, Iran appears to be seeking a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. In separate meetings on Oct. 4 with the secretary of the Armenian Security Council, Armen Grigorian, and the president of Azerbaijan’s representative for special assignments, Khalaf Khalafov, Iranian President Ebraham Raisi warned both men that Iran viewed the Zangezur Corridor concept as a “springboard for Nato in the region,” and that Iran was “resolutely opposed” to all efforts to facilitate its creation, according to Mohammad Jamshidi, the deputy head of the Iranian Presidential Administration. Instead, Raisi emphasized the need for all parties to make use of the so-called “3 plus 3 format” — which brings together Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on the one hand, and Turkey, Iran and Russia on the other — when it comes to resolving disputes.

The war now between Hamas and Israel has added a new, extremely dangerous geopolitical twist to an already complex drama. Israel is very concerned about the war with Hamas expanding to include Hezbollah in Lebanon, and perhaps Iran. Armenian politicians, such as the former deputy of the national assembly, Arman Abovyan, have expressed concern that, given the history of close cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan regarding both the Azeri-Armenian conflict and in containing Iran regionally, the Zangezur Corridor crisis could be elevated and accelerated in an effort to divert Iranian resources away from a potential conflict with Israel — either by proxy via Hezbollah or directly — by having Azerbaijan position itself to seize control of the Syunik/Zangezur region by force.

Global Uncertainty

At a time when the world is consumed by conflict (the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian, the still simmering Armenian-Azerbaijani and the freshly erupted Hamas-Israeli wars, to name three), the last thing needed now is a new round of conflict between two regional powers, Turkey and Iran. That would have an undeniably detrimental impact on global energy security. While the Iranian preference for the “3 plus 3” format might bode well for a political solution if the issues were limited to those of the region, the Nato “springboard” dimension and possible desire to create a distraction for Iran complicate any formula for a negotiated settlement. Today, the term “Zangezur Corridor” is known to only a handful of regional specialists. However, if war breaks out, it is a term that will become a household word, given the scope and scale of the global consequence such a conflict could have.

Scott Ritter is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer whose service over a 20-plus-year career included tours of duty in the former Soviet Union implementing arms control agreements, serving on the staff of US Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf during the Gulf War and later as a chief weapons inspector with the UN in Iraq from 1991-98. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

Fleeing the mountainous enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in the face of Azerbaijan’s assault last month, the 12-year-old girl had an unexpected encounter. After crossing the Lachin corridor westward to Goris in Armenia proper, she found her beloved social worker waiting.

Arpe Asaturyan, founder of Frontline Therapists (FLT), was astounded as well. Amid the 100,000 refugees from what Armenians call their homeland of Artsakh, she had found the very same child displaced three years earlier. A special bond formed with then-9-year-old Karolin, who had gripped her tightly before returning home.

Located within internationally recognized Azerbaijani territory, the Armenian enclave suffered a bloody 44-day war in 2020. Over 6,000 soldiers died before a Russian-backed ceasefire left local Armenian authorities in control of only a portion of formerly held Artsakh land.

Karolin and her family went back anyway, vowing to continue their multigenerational presence. But after suffering malnutrition during an Azerbaijani-imposed nine-month blockade, they trudged three days in the slow-moving convoy of cars and buses across Lachin—the only road connecting the enclave with Armenia.

Over the week-and-a-half exodus, Artsakh residents crossed at a rate of 15,000 per day.

But the bittersweet reunion with Karolin is far from the worst of Asaturyan’s ordeal. Suffering in the chaos of relocation and the fog of war, several mothers told their children they would find their daddy in Armenia.

As counselor, Asaturyan was asked to tell them that their fathers had died.

“It is heartbreaking, and you know this will be the worst day of the rest of their lives,” Asaturyan said. “With all that has happened, it is hard to find faith.”

When the 2020 war broke out, the California native left behind a successful practice in trauma counseling to join her ethnic kin in ministering to returning soldiers and new widows. Funded by the Armenian diaspora, she oversees a small staff of paid and volunteer therapists providing free mental health services.

But in the weeks following last month’s conflict, her office turned into a humanitarian hub. Already, 20 truckloads of aid have been sent to Goris and the summer camp refuge in central Armenia where she first met Karolin.

“They know their life there was tenuous—they even laminate their documents,” Asaturyan said. “This is still the shock phase, but grief is set aside as bereft mothers must struggle now to find a job.”

The Armenian government initially prepared to receive 40,000 displaced from Artsakh; that was the single-day inflow on September 27 alone. The total number represents 3.4 percent of Armenia’s population, added to an existing refugee population of about 35,000. This does not include at least 65,000 Russians who fled to Armenia due to the Ukraine war, driving up real estate prices by 20 percent with skyrocketing rents.

The Armenian government is providing a relocation payment of $260 per person, with a promised monthly support of $100 to assist with rent and utilities. The UN High Commission for Refugees has called for $97 million in international assistance, and the United States has led the way with a pledge of more than $11.5 million.

“Peanuts,” said Marina Mkhitaryan, executive director of the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), a 180-year-old organization with institutional links to the Armenian Apostolic Church. “The level of support only adds insult to injury.”

Partnering with World Central Kitchen, AGBU has helped provide 80,000 nutritious hot-food boxes to those in greatest need. Soon AGBU will shift to dry-food packages so families can cook their own meals for up to four days. But a strong focus is on integration, equipping the displaced to live on their own.

A logistics center assists with mundane matters like official documentation, establishing bank accounts, and understanding taxes. And AGBU has partnered with a local employment agency to help the displaced find jobs and to provide training in entrepreneurship and the skills necessary for entry-level positions in Armenia’s strong IT sector.

But, being careful with terminology, Mkhitaryan wants more for Artsakh’s former residents than current stability.

“These are displaced persons who will eventually return to our historic homeland,” she said. “Refugee implies a state of no return, and that is not our stance.”

Pastor Vazgen Zohrabyan believes this will only be possible as Azerbaijani citizens.

“But there is no hope they will go back now,” he said. “My number one concern is where they will live.”

His 400-family Abovyan City Church (ACC) opened its doors, provided hot showers, and laid mattresses on the floors for as many as could fit. In all, they have helped 300 people find temporary shelter onsite and elsewhere, with ongoing food supply for 150 families.

Many had fled for their lives, leaving behind family pictures, shoes, and paperwork.

During the 2020 war and aftermath, Samaritan’s Purse and other organizations helped him offer aid to 12,000 families. While the US-based charity has since returned to Armenia, ACC’s current funding has been provided by a Pentecostal pastor in Argentina of Armenian descent.

But Zohrabyan has been approaching the end of his resources and nearly the end of his faith.

“We prayed for victory, and thought God would give it,” he said. “It was a very painful lesson: Jesus did not die for land, but for the souls of these precious people.”

Last Sunday, 40 refugees from Artsakh proclaimed their faith in Christ. Zohrabyan’s earlier outreach resulted in 70 new believers, who returned to the enclave to plant a sister church. He visited them once a month until the blockade severed their physical connection.

He says many Armenians put much of the blame on Russia.

Not absolving Azerbaijan, typical analysis says the northern neighbor plays one side against another to cement its regional power. And concerned about Armenia’s emerging democracy, the Kremlin is allegedly fomenting unrest through opposition parties, who claim the historic Christian nation can only survive if tied to Moscow.

Many Armenians are frustrated that Russia stood aside as Azerbaijan breached the ceasefire. Five Russian peacekeepers were even killed during the operation, with no protest issued.

Meanwhile, prime minister Nikol Pashinyan recently invited American forces for joint military exercises and joined Armenia to the International Criminal Court (ICC)—where Russian president Vladimir Putin faces war crime charges. Having seen evangelical colleagues cowed to silence in Russia, Zohrabyan fears that a proposed political union with Moscow will similarly harm believers at home. But he also does not trust the West as a consistent replacement ally for Armenia.

All is determined by interests, he said, not shared values.

“We are under huge pressure,” he said. “Pray for us—we want to see light at the end of this tunnel.”

There may be some, domestically.

“We say we want back our lands in Turkey, but we haven’t yet filled Armenia,” said Aren Deyirmenjian, Armenia director for the Armenian Missionary Association of America (AMAA), of genocidal displacement following World War I. “This is a golden opportunity.”

AMAA has joined in the early relief efforts, initially opening its small church in Goris to refugees and eventually providing short-term housing for 500 people at a summer camp and ten other centers throughout Armenia. Another 1,000 people have benefitted from food, clothing, and medical aid.

But Deyirmenjian has begun the medium-term planning. With the capital of Yerevan already overcrowded, refugees should be resettled in the rural hinterlands, he said. AMAA is planning an asset replacement project—to provide five cows, for example, to an Artsakh farmer who left five cows behind.

Armenia has many under- and depopulated villages ready to receive them. These are “strategic areas,” he said, because Azerbaijan has laid rhetorical claim on the nation’s southern region of Syunik, which stands in great need of development.

We are hard pressed on every side, Deyirmenjian quoted from 2 Corinthians 4, but not crushed… Therefore, we do not lose hope.

The 2020 ceasefire called for opening a corridor parallel to Armenia’s border with Iran, connecting Azerbaijan with its noncontiguous enclave of Nakhchivan, which narrowly borders Turkey. The initial proposal called for Russian peacekeepers to guard the corridor. But however it is negotiated, Armenia fears a threat to its territorial sovereignty.

Azerbaijan has threatened force, and marshaled troops on the southern border. For this reason, Deyirmenjian said many Artsakh refugees are understandably reluctant to resettle there, lest they be displaced again. Yerevan is much preferred, but many are talking of possible asylum in Canada, Russia, or Cyprus.

The AMAA has had meetings with Armenia’s ministry of social affairs and sees congruence with government strategy. If Artsakh residents can become self-sufficient in Syunik, Armenia as a nation will benefit from the additional 100,000 residents.

Even though their presence in Armenia is a historic injustice.

“First starve them, then scare them, so that they flee,” Deyirmenjian said. “Azerbaijan’s strategy was executed perfectly, but whatever means you use, it is ethnic cleansing.”

ICC statutes say that “forcible” displacement is not restricted to physical force but includes the threat or other abuses of power. Melanie O’Brien, president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, stated the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh created such a “coercive environment.”

Azerbaijan, however, has consistently stated that Armenians in the enclave would be welcomed as full citizens. Soldiers were pictured offering chocolate to children, while the new authorities opened a shelter for vulnerable residents who stayed behind.

A UN team visiting Nagorno-Karabakh stated it heard no reports of violence against civilians and saw no evidence of damage to hospitals, schools, or agricultural infrastructure. Though there were rumors circulating of atrocities in the villages, testimonies gathered by journalists revealed that most refugees did not encounter a single soldier.

Human Rights Watch interviewed over two dozen refugees and officials but did not report any abuses and stated that people fled “in fear and panic.” One woman stated that her local authorities told her to leave within 15 minutes. Another woman asked her village administrator if she could later return and was told that if she faced massacre, it would not be their responsibility.

“No one has pushed them to leave the territory,” said an Azerbaijani pastor, requesting anonymity to speak about political issues. “I hope they come back.”

Freedom House calls Azerbaijan “not free,” ranking the nation No. 13 from the bottom in its world freedom index.

The pastor recalled earlier days when Armenians and Azerbaijanis would live side-by-side in peace. Normal people do not hate each other, he said, but those who lost their homes or relatives in the conflict have grown bitter. He recalled that when Armenians took control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1994, 500,000 Azerbaijani refugees fled the enclave, and another 186,000 left Armenia.

Around 30,000 people were killed on both sides, and 350,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan.

“I believe incidents [against Armenians] may have happened,” said another Azerbaijani Christian leader, requesting anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation. “But compared to the history of the conflict, this takeover has been very peaceful.”

The leader said Azerbaijani soldiers would be unlikely to look favorably on the Armenians, who would understandably distrust official promises of fair treatment. But having seen his Muslim country evolve into a secular regime that grants freedom to Christian converts from Islam, he believes that Armenians would be welcome and protected.

If they return, within five years the region will be prosperous, he said. And with Nagorno-Karabakh returned to Azerbaijani sovereignty, he expressed hope that the two nations could now conclude a peace treaty.

Pashinyan has indicated a readiness for negotiations, the success of which he puts at 70 percent. Economic benefits would flow through trade, the Azerbaijani source anticipated, and oil pipelines could connect the two nations with Turkey and Europe.

“They didn’t have to leave,” he said. “But I can envision a future where Armenians and Azerbaijanis travel freely between the two countries.”

A third Azerbaijani Christian leader was terse in assessing the displacement.

“There is official news from both sides,” he said. “I don’t know anything more than that.”

Eric Hacopian, an Armenian political analyst with The Civilitas Foundation, dismissed the official accounts absolving Azerbaijan of ethnic cleansing.

“The UN visit was a much-ridiculed joke,” he said. “No one takes their report seriously.”

Noting how it was conducted by the Azerbaijani branch office after the atrocities were committed and cleaned up, Hacopian said he watched videos of alleged abuses posted by the soldiers themselves. And while only a handful of Armenians remained in the territory to testify, the UN’s greatest omission was not visiting the countryside villages from which the residents fled.

The truth will come out, he said.

And this is Asaturyan’s next major project. Working with a team of international specialists, she will prepare an academic paper comparing the trauma from 2020 to the trauma experienced by refugees now. To be peer reviewed and professionally published in a reputable journal, it will evaluate and then establish eyewitness accounts as fact.

Many have told Asaturyan secondhand stories of rape, beheading, and death by burning. Anonymous text messages told them they had 24 hours before the Lachin corridor closed for good, followed by other messages encouraging them to integrate into Azerbaijan. But one grandmother, who with her husband had at first sat on their front porch with gun in hand to defend their land, related the experience of why they left.

They beat a pregnant woman, she said, who later died of internal bleeding.

Nagorno-Karabakh officials reported that ten civilians—including five children—died in the Azerbaijani offensive that killed at least 200 soldiers. At least 400 others were wounded.

For these and the other 100,000 displaced, the relief work continues.

AGBU is refitting part of its center in Yerevan to house 170 people displaced from Artsakh. AMAA will continue to pay the salaries of its 79 Artsakh staff workers for a full year. ACC is preparing new believers for baptism and discipleship. And alongside its regular counseling sessions, FTL has provided emergency aid for over 500 families.

But why are they there in the first place, and not in their historic homeland? Even the monks have departed their monasteries—said to be the first time in 1,700 years that there are no Armenian Christian prayers in Artsakh.

“There is a natural instinct to protect your life and family,” said Asaturyan. “But the way they left—something happened.”

NEWSJulia Cieri — Published  5 minutes

Over 100,000 refugees have fled from Artsakh to Armenia, most of which have had to go without essential supplies for days according to the United Nations refugee agency.

The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh is a separatist ethnic-Armenian enclave within the borders of Azerbaijan. It was occupied by Armenia for decades before Azerbaijan won a fight in 2020 with the aid of the Turkish government and therefore gained the area as territory following the surrender of the Armenian government. 

On Sept. 19, Azerbaijan launched a military operation on Nagorno-Karabakh labeled as an “anti-terrorist” campaign by the country’s defense ministry. Following the attack, over 200 people have been killed, leaving Nagorno-Karabakh with no choice but to capitulate due to their being overwhelmed with the Azerbaijan army.

Tensions between the two regions had already been running high due to the nine month blockade that went on beforehand, during which the importation of food was completely prevented. 

Armenian National Committee of Canada (ANCC) executive director and Ontarian of Armenian origin Sevag Belian explained that Nagorno-Karabakh was under total blockade before the events of Sept. 19 and that the people barely had any food, medicine, fuel and other basic necessities. “Not only these people were attacked, but ten months prior to that, they were being starved by Azerbaijan, and the media didn’t talk about it until the people were forcibly uprooted and we witnessed one of the worst refugee crises.”

Through the difficulties of her community overseas, Maral, who did not want to disclose her name for safety reasons, a student of Armenian descent at Concordia University expressed her commitment to raising awareness on the issue.”Personally for me, everything I do has to be for this cause right now, I can't look away. I can't distract myself, I can't pretend it's not there. I just can't have normal conversations. I'm not gonna fake anything, I think people should know what's happening.”

Maral shared her pain regarding the bombings from the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, that killed over 200 people. “When you feel that heart-to-heart connection to a land and then it’s being bombed, you kinda feel like you're losing someone,” she said, “the first emotion I felt was why am I here in Montreal? Why am I not hurting with my people? I felt guilt and resentment and anger.” 

Matthew Doramajian, an engineering student at Concordia, was born in Canada but has grandparents  immigrated from western Armenia to Egypt and then Canada in the 1960s. He is also feeling deep sadness and hurt. “I feel my nation is my family so even though I'm so far away, it's like my own family being violated.” 

Although he feels this way, Doramajian is nonplussed about such events occurring. “It's almost horrible to say, but it doesn’t surprise me. As bad as it is, there's nothing us Armenians haven't seen before,” he said. “Right now, I witness my brothers and sisters being massacred, just how my parents in the 80s and 90s also saw their brothers and sisters being massacred, just how my grandparents witnessed massacre as well. It's continuous, we feel helpless; it's not a comfortable feeling.”

Belian voiced his disappointment on the reactions happening on a global level. “The fact that 100 years later the Armenian people are once again witnessing the same thing brings a lot of frustration and outrage in us because the international community really didn’t take their responsibility to protect vulnerable populations seriously” he said. He continues,“there's a sense of devastation, there's a sense of haunting memories coming back and also a sense of anger and frustration that this all happened in the 21st century, a modern day genocide.” 

Belian delved deeper into his perspective of the situation: “Forcing people to leave their land under pressure, it’s a form of genocide,” he said. “It deprives them of what they hold most dear to their heart, and that is their belonging, their spatial recognition, and their connection to the land that has been their indigenous land for millennia.” 

Maral started a journey in activism, standing in protest in front of McGill University. She wore a traditional Armenian dress, a skirt called a taraz, and played Armenian music to bring awareness to the crisis overseas. “It was just this symbolism for pain and suffering. It was human, not just tied to culture, just like the human pain that comes with terrorism. It’s something else when you stand with your people.” 

There are doubts by the Armenian community on whether mainstream media is properly covering the conflict.  “We were covered by CBC news and anytime I said the word genocide, […] the news cut off the word,” Maral said. “I think it's important for people to know who the aggressor is. The world seems to not want to be upfront about it.” 

Belian explained that the media comes in only when an issue reaches a very critical point. “This sudden attention that we're getting is like bringing flowers to someone's funeral,” he said. “After everything is done, after all the damage is done, the media takes interest and starts talking about the misery of the population,” Belian said. 

Doramajian believes interventions from international governments are essential to ignite change.

“In politics, it is not the crime that is important, it is who is doing it. If they are a threat, then countries will push for their crimes to be punished. If not, they don’t care,” he said.

https://thelinknewspaper.ca/article/ethnic-armenians-face-military-oppression-by-azerbaijan

I first started working on this article on September 17. I was supposed to turn in a draft article about the high risk of Azerbaijan launching an offensive at Nagorno-Karabakh and next invading Armenia within a week. I told my editor we needed to publish the article as soon as possible because war could break out anytime. And it did. I was at work on September 19 when, at 1 pm, I refreshed my Facebook page, and the first news story I saw was that Azerbaijan had started indiscriminately shelling Stepanakert, the capital of the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (NK hereafter). I knew the possibility of this happening was very high as I have been obsessively following news from the beginning of the year. But some small part of me had hoped the negotiation process would avert this tragedy. It did not. In a span of two weeks, this article’s focus changed from the possibility of war hanging over the region to Azerbaijan launching a massive offensive against NK to the mass exodus of NK Armenians from the region, which could only be described as ethnic cleansing, to the high risk that Azerbaijan is going to invade Armenia next. Therefore, this article is as messy as my feelings for the past two weeks. I would not have been able to finish this article if it was not for my belief that another war awaits us, and I need to bring attention to the facts on the ground.

During its latest offensive, Baku repeated its 2020 strategy: creating facts on the ground by military force, then directing its Western PR agencies to whitewash war crimes and state-sanctioned violence. Baku is notorious for its so-called “caviar diplomacy,” and sources reveal that it has funneled $2.9 billion into its lobbying efforts in Europe. After Azerbaijan’s latest assault, which came after months of starving the local population in a cruel blockade, more than 100,000 remaining Armenians were forcibly displaced from their ancestral homeland as Nagorno Karabakh’s de facto authorities have been forced to disarm and disband. This is ethnic cleansing. There is no other way to describe it. While the Aliyev regime was the one that launched a full-scale offensive on NK and is guilty of numerous war crimes for which it will never answer because of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical significance, Armenian governments – current and previous – bear a share of responsibility for their revisionist foreign and domestic policies that have brought us to this point in history and this specific outcome. 

Armenia after the First NK War

Without going into too much details of the First NK War and how everything began, here are a few points on the NK Conflict to give those unfamiliar with the region some context. This is in no way a comprehensive introduction to the conflict as this article is more strictly about Armenia rather than the NK Conflict: it’s just that it is hard to imagine today’s Armenia without the latter. 

Nagorno Karabakh was an autonomous region under Soviet Azerbaijan with a majority ethnic Armenian population. As the Soviet Union was collapsing in 1988, the NK Armenians demanded unification with the Armenian state. As a result, in the late 1980s, communal violence broke out in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, forcing Armenians in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis in Armenia to flee their respective countries. The ground zero of the war was NK and its surrounding regions, as NK is an enclave inside Azerbaijan. From 1988 to 1994, Armenians and Azerbaijanis fought a bitter war until a ceasefire agreement was achieved in 1994. 

The Armenian side emerged victorious from the First NK War, and for the past decades, the discourse around NK has been that our “glorious” army is why we have gained and maintained control over NK. This cheap imitation of the Israeli nation-army doctrine held sway in the public discourse as successive Armenian regimes failed to achieve an agreement over the region. For decades, the negotiation process was fruitless while its primary mediators, Russia, France, and the US, formerly known as the Mink Group co-chairs, pushed for their interests in the South Caucasus region, thwarting any progress. Hence, this region became a place for global and regional powers to score political points at the expense of the working people: Armenians and Azerbaijanis alike. 

Since 1991, the NK Conflict has been central to Armenia’s domestic politics. A succession of Armenian governments drew their legitimacy from this issue. Any time the people would protest against the regime, the government would accuse them of destabilizing the country. I remember growing up hearing the saying, “The Turk sees this and is delighted [about perceived divisions in Armenia]” whenever the government wanted to silence its critics. We had to live a lie because the truth would make the “enemy” happy. 

The revisionism in the Armenian education system was such that up until after the war, many people did not know the geography of NK or that NK and its surrounding regions were two different categories in the negotiation process, documented by many announcements, protocols, and principles that the previous governments signed under. The majority of the public was completely unaware of the decades-long negotiation process. It was blindsided to find out that what they called Artsakh included not only the former autonomous region (NKAO) but also the surrounding seven regions, whose almost entirely ethnic Azerbaijani population, over half a million people, had been expelled by the Armenian forces in 1992-93. The state rhetoric was that the surrounding seven regions were buffer or security zones between NK and Azerbaijan. Then again, in mainstream media, these lands were only ever referred to as liberated Armenian historical lands. Therefore, they served different purposes under different state narratives. 

Before the Second NK War in 2020, I, too, was deluded by post-Soviet nationalism, which had us all under what could only be described as hermeneutical injustice. Despite occasional escalations, as Azerbaijan was ramping up its military for decades – by 2010, Azerbaijan’s military budget exceeded Armenia’s entire state budget – the threat of war was never seriously considered by the wider Armenian society. Unlike now when we all are very much aware of it. During the Second NK War in 2020, Baku took control of most of the conflict zone, including the “seven surrounding regions.” In 2020, Azerbaijan also took over former NKAO territories and displaced over 40,000 Armenians from its Hadrut and Shushi regions. 

Before the regime change in 2018, when the so-called Velvet Revolution overthrew Serzh Sargsyan’s corrupt regime, governments treated state security and democracy as a zero-sum game (their proponents still do it). These governments were corrupt but not due to the Soviet legacy, as some literature has framed it, but as any other liberal democracy working in service of capitalism, implementing austerity and privatization could be, especially in the world-systems periphery. There is, of course, a certain Armenian, NK-related specificity to this “corruption.” While there are no in-depth studies (at least in Armenian) on the primitive accumulation that happened during the occupation of NK’s seven surrounding regions, I have heard oral stories from veterans of the First NK War about high-ranking military officials looting the homes of displaced Azerbaijani people, especially the high-ranking former Soviet Azerbaijani officials. An in-depth study on how the Armenian political elite or the Armenian political capitalist class came to be after the collapse of the Soviet Union and how the natural and other resources of NK and its surrounding regions were integral pillars of their wealth and power is of utmost importance (this also applies to Azerbaijan and its political capitalist class but it is not in the scope of this article to cover it).

Another pillar of the Armenian political capitalists’ existence is their close relationship with Russian political capitalists, which made them confident that they could hold onto not only NK but also its surrounding regions for as long as they wanted, boastfully declaring that the NK Conflict was resolved. In 2002, in exchange for its $98 million debt, Armenia signed the Equity-for-Loans deal with Russia, which sold out most of its economic infrastructure to Russian capital for a closer military alliance with Moscow. This economic infrastructure included telecommunications, railways, electricity, and gas distribution networks. Meanwhile, the Armenian elites who signed the deal later became board members of the same Russian companies that bought Armenia’s recently privatized Soviet infrastructure.  The regime advertised the sale as foreign investments that would create new jobs during a recession economy. Needless to say, that did not happen.    

Armenia: too small to matter

This region, and especially Armenia, has a complex geopolitical orientation. Armenia is often derogatorily referred to as part of Russia’s backyard. Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia is too geopolitically insignificant for the West and Russia to have a conflict over. Some, however, have been tempted to categorize the 2018 regime change as a “color revolution,” but the facts on the ground have always pointed to the fact that it was a genuine grassroots movement that overthrew a government that was illegally in power. Social movements are dynamic, and analyzing the protest participants and their leadership requires nuance. The protest leadership made sure not to say or do anything explicitly anti-Russian, strictly keeping the line that the protests were directed at domestic political elites. One of the reasons the name “Velvet Revolution” was chosen for the regime change was to avoid any associations with color revolutions. 

While the current (Pashinyan) government argues that the regime change in 2018 was an actual revolution that ousted the oligarchic class that has been in charge of the country since 1998, since the beginning of the mass protests, it has been apparent to many that the protest leadership, and subsequently, this administration was, at best, center-right. This government has continuously promoted neoliberal ideology through its rhetoric and policies, much like its predecessors. From the PM saying that, for poor people, “poverty is in their heads” during the introduction of flat taxation in 2019 to his administration’s close cooperation with certain oligarchs, it is clear that this government does not have a revolutionary track record. Other than failed prosecutions against a few highly visible political capitalists, such as former presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, most of the oligarchs’ wealth has remained untouched. Some even became MPs, and others, through cooperation with the government, enjoy tax breaks in industries they have monopolized while posing as philanthropists.

After coming to power, the current government has tried to continue the complementary foreign policy Armenia had before, balancing between Russia and the West. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that it has actively tried to sever its ties with Russia and pivot to the West when, in 2019, at Russia’s request, it sent a noncombatant team to Syria, refused to vote against Russia at the UN after the invasion of Ukraine for which it was criticized both domestically and internationally; and then finally this year, the Armenian PM stood next to Putin during the Victory Day Parade.

However, Russia’s post-Soviet frozen conflicts policy meant it would not pick sides between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the NK Conflict. This was also because it was both countries’ biggest arms supplier. As long as the conflict was frozen and Armenia and Azerbaijan were buying arms from it, the Russian military-industrial complex was making a profit. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan’s geopolitical options were and still are not so limited. With its oil reserves and powerful ally Turkey, it was able to break through Russia’s influence. Between 2018 and 2022, Israel became Azerbaijan’s second-largest arms supplier. During the Second NK War in 2020, the Israeli high-tech weapons gave the Azerbaijani military a significant advantage over the Armenian forces, fighting with Soviet time weapons, resulting in high casualties. Meanwhile, after the 2020 War, Armenia has tried to buy weapons from Russia amounting to $200 million; however, Russia has not supplied the weapons and, according to rumors, refuses to give back the payment. 

But in 2023, Moscow picked a side – Azerbaijan. This is not a result of the Armenian government being West-friendly, which is what Russia’s propaganda channels claim. It is a cover for the fact that Azerbaijan, with the help of Turkey, is pushing Russia out of this region while its disastrous invasion of Ukraine weakens it. Thus, reorientation was the only option for the already geopolitically constrained Russia. Moscow wants a stake in the new economic plans the Turkish and Azerbaijani governments have for this region, namely an extraterritorial route through southern Armenia connecting Azerbaijan to its own exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (and by extension to Turkey). This way, the already landlocked Armenia will lose its border with Iran. 

What the future holds for the negotiations

Two issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to be of concern in the context of Armenia-Azerbaijan state borders. The first is the already mentioned extraterritorial route Baku demands from Yerevan. According to the November 9, 2020, ceasefire agreement, Russia’s security services should be in charge of the transit routes, including this extraterritorial route Azerbaijan and Turkey call the “Zangezur Corridor.” This arrangement gives Russia a stake in the new order of the region. Azerbaijan and Turkey promote it as “uniting the Turkic world” and connecting Europe to Central Asia. The November 9 agreement also had provisions for opening of all economic and transport connections, which ironically would benefit landlocked Armenia the most. However, Azerbaijan has been exclusively talking about this one extraterritorial route, which shows it has no intention of opening other economic routes. Western analysts also see this route as a way to bypass Russia and its blockade of global supply chains. Russia, at Armenia’s expense, has found a way to also benefit from this route that is supposedly against it. As Broers puts it, “Ironically, it makes Russia a stakeholder in the ‘Middle Corridor’ that is promoted as an alternative to Russia’s own ‘Northern Route,’ rendered obsolete by Western sanctions.” The only regional player that is against the so-called corridor is Iran. But as Iran will not start a war to defend its border with Armenia, a deal could be made with Russia, which would be satisfactory to the Iranian government. Tehran is also worried about Armenia’s recent so-called pivot to the West, and it has signaled that it would not like any changes in the status quo in the region. 

The second issue is the delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which was not done due to the First NK War, and the two sides cannot agree on which maps to use for the delimitation. Azerbaijan has resorted to violent borderization over the past three years, invading Armenia once in May 2021 and again in September 2022. Due to the First NK War, only the Armenian side has civilians in the southern parts of the border. If Baku orchestrates another attack, they are at high risk of displacement. Many NK Armenians who have found refuge in southern Armenia could be displaced yet again. This border on the Armenian side is being monitored by a civilian mission the EU sent here at the beginning of the year. But this mission cannot effectively do its job when Azerbaijan does not allow them to monitor its side of the border, and there is no pressure from Brussels on Baku to let it do so. With Brussels’s incredibly frustrating bureaucratic processes, this mission’s only job is to save the EU’s face after it declared Azerbaijan a reliable partner in supplying gas. It is worth noting that only 3% of the EU’s total consumption is delivered by Azerbaijan. Hence, the idea that the EU’s inaction about NK being ethnically cleansed is purely a result of the EU’s energy insecurity is slightly exaggerated. 

With the Minsk Group no more, a three-track negotiation process is happening between Armenia and Azerbaijan, led by Russia, the US, and the EU. This, for Armenia, is the worst-case scenario. It has to keep up with the solutions (i.e., demands) of three mediators, which, as you can only imagine, not only at certain points go against the interests of Armenia but are directly at odds with each other. For instance, in early 2022, Western mediators convinced the Pashinyan government that if he recognized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, as in NK as part of Azerbaijan, they would help Armenia secure the rights of NK Armenians. So, in April 2022, he made a speech declaring that Armenia wanted only security guarantees for NK Armenians from Azerbaijan. But as there were too many negotiation tracks and too many regional powers trying to insert their self-interests into the conflict to sway Azerbaijan away from the West, Moscow offered Baku the ultimate deal – Nagorno Karabakh itself. Its peacekeepers stationed there since November 2020 did not take any measures to deter or stop the Azerbaijani offensive; according to Baku, they were informed about it beforehand. Meanwhile, the Western governments were all too happy to pretend they believed the Aliyev regime’s blatant lies since it is being reported that a few hours before launching the attack, Aliyev assured Blinken that they would not attack NK.  

Pashinyan government’s new mission: survive another war

The public was optimistic about Pashinyan’s government until domestic and international challenges showed how his reform-obsessed rhetoric was not meeting expectations. His government was elected in free and fair elections, so unlike his predecessors, he did not need the NK Conflict to legitimize his rule. Nevertheless, he did engage in populist rhetoric, notably when, in 2019, he said, “Artsakh is Armenia. The End.” This was the beginning of the end. This and the idea that he could start the negotiation process from a new page were the early failures of the post-2018 government’s diplomacy in preventing this outcome.  

In 2020, when Azerbaijan launched a full-scale attack on NK, the current Armenian government went to war it could not possibly win due to the power asymmetry between the two armies. Still, it adopted a dangerous narrative that “a new war meant new territories conquered.” As already stated, the public bought into the hyper-militarized and hypermasculine doctrine of the nation-army, so the support for the war was high throughout the 44 days it lasted. The voices against the war were very few; whoever dared to point out the incredibly dangerous rhetoric the government had adopted at the beginning of the war committed social suicide because they were endlessly harassed and called traitors and defeatists.

But Pashinyan survived the consequences of the disastrous 2020 War. The following year his government was reelected in a stunning turn of events. This was mainly due to two factors: first, Pashinyan promised to bring a new era of peace to Armenia, i.e., the end of the NK Conflict, which was a welcome decision albeit a late one. Second, the political capitalists from the previous governments were mobilizing against Pashinyan’s government because they saw the domestic instability as an opening to come back to power through elections, i.e., weaponizing the NK Conflict once again. Pashinyan survived the consequences of the 2020 War not because he was popular but because the public did not see a suitable alternative to him and was scared of the previous government coming back to power.

Now, Pashinyan needs yet another internal or external enemy to legitimize his staying in power, although, in a truly democratic country, he would have resigned a long time ago due to the incompetence of his government. This time, he is rallying the public against Russia. Even though I’m not justifying Russia’s actions vis-à-vis NK, a confrontation with Russia can cause more harm to Armenia than good. For instance, Russia is still Armenia’s main gas supplier, and it can easily throw Armenia into an energy crisis if it cuts the gas supply; it can make it harder for Armenia’s export industries to sell their goods in Russia, and it can make life harder for Armenian migrant workers currently working in Russia. Finally, a direct confrontation with Russia means closing the door on diplomacy. Armenia cannot afford to alienate any of the mediators, mainly because it would only give Azerbaijan more trump cards.  

It was inevitable that Russia would reorient itself geopolitically in the South Caucasus after its invasion of Ukraine weakened it. It abandoned the frozen conflicts doctrine in the case of NK when Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, forced its hand. Russia still needs Armenia to stay relevant in this region. Azerbaijan got NK out of this latest offensive, effectively throwing Russian peacekeepers out of its internationally recognized territories. Hence, a weakened Russia sees Armenia, or rather Armenian territory, as its last stronghold in the region. 

The Pashinyan government, however, is framing Russia’s breach of trust as an attack on him and, therefore, on Armenia’s sovereignty and democracy. He is framing his political survival as the survival of the republic. The strong anti-Russian sentiment the public harbors due to Russia sacrificing NK for its interests will only legitimize Pashinyan’s framing of the next war as a war of independence. But if Moscow wanted regime change in Yerevan, it would have already happened, considering just how entrenched Russian capital is in Armenia’s economy. I’d argue that Russian propagandists and officials have been so vocally against Pashinyan in order to create a façade concealing the fact that they would benefit if Pashinyan headed into another disastrous war. For Moscow to reassert its control over the region after Baku kicked it out of NK, it needs a more “willing” country to station its troops. With the high risk of Azerbaijan invading Armenia, Russia only needs to wait for its turn to play up its role as the exclusive deal broker in the region and station Russian armed forces on Armenian lands to do more “peacekeeping” or to serve the geopolitical and capital interests of Russian elites. What is a more convenient pretext for Russia’s aspirations than another war between Armenia and Azerbaijan? As the saying goes, if Russia could choose sides between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the conflict, it would choose the conflict.

Moscow wants to trade with Baku and Ankara over Armenian territories and economic routes. Considering Armenia’s weak position, those in charge of its government would not be Moscow’s highest priority. Meanwhile, the so-called geopolitical pivot to the West this government has been touting is a widely miscalculated move about which even Western officials have openly questioned this government. The West will not guarantee the security of Armenia, so there are no deterrents against Azerbaijan. The current confrontation with Russia is only in Pashinyan’s interest, not Armenia’s. He is making a bet on a third party – right now, the West – instead of directly engaging with the country’s immediate neighbors and opponents to reduce the possibility of war. Because of this short-sighted foreign policy, Armenia can become a place for geopolitical proxy wars, and no state survives a proxy war.  

Some reflections for the future

Armenia’s future is uncertain, and it would be premature to make conclusive predictions. However, based on the assessment of the current geopolitical situation and where the conflict sides and stakeholders stand, it is clear that Armenia finds itself between a rock and a hard place where its choices are limited by forces far greater than itself. The Armenian government hammers the point that a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is imminent. However, it is obvious that they only say this because they are terrified of Baku abandoning the Brussels and Washington-led processes just as it did with the OSCE Minsk Group. It is possible that if pushed too hard by either Washington or Brussels or both, for example, if sanctions are imposed on Azerbaijani elites, Baku will completely abandon the talks mediated by the West and closely cooperate with Russia to get a better deal from Moscow. Baku has already made such a step after the NK takeover. On October 5, there was supposed to be a meeting between the Armenian PM and Azerbaijani President mediated by France, Germany, and the EU at the European Political Community summit in Granada, Spain. Aliyev pulled out of it at the last minute, citing “biased,” “pro-Armenian” sentiments expressed by the mediators. The only two countries Baku is concerned with are Russia and Turkey.

Another alarming issue is tensions in Armenia’s domestic affairs. With over 100,000 displaced people, of which every third is a child, Armenia’s already poor socioeconomic conditions will worsen. Western governments have already pledged financial aid to Armenia. So far, they are not huge sums and are nothing more than pocket change for them. There will not be a Big Push by the West simply because Armenia’s future is volatile and geopolitically insignificant. 

The future for NK Armenians remains uncertain. While I am not afraid of protests sponsored and organized by the previous regime satellites since they never gained massive traction among the general public, I fear societal divisions nonetheless. Displaced people have lost their homes, livelihoods, and sense of security. Some have joined anti-government protests, and their anger and frustration at this government are valid. After all, this government’s failed foreign policy has brought them to this outcome. But as I wrote, these protests are poorly attended as most locals associate the protest leadership with previous governments, i.e., oligarchs. I fear that this government’s media channels only fuel such social divisions with media reports that paint NK Armenians as violent and entitled. This results in ugly conflicts around the country that can harm the integration process of the displaced.

What happens next remains to be seen. However, political uncertainty and economic deprivation can serve as an opening for right-wing ideologies and parties to prosper and find solid constituencies. I fear that the humanitarian catastrophe that is the ethnic cleansing of NK, the complete displacement and dispossession of its people, will be weaponized by different groups seeking political legitimacy, which can only deepen the crisis in Armenia. If last month’s poor turnout during Yerevan’s mayoral elections is any indicator, the electorate is tired of Pashinyan as well as his opposition parties. A disenfranchised electorate but a highly politicized public can be a breeding ground for conspiratorial thinking and anti-intellectualism. It could give rise to militarism, ethnonationalism, and various stripes of right-wing ideologies. This would only harm Armenia’s working class and its progressive movements, destroying whatever little legacy there is left of the 2018 mass movement that was explicitly against oligarchs and the rule of the political capitalist class. 

Sona Baldrian is a Yerevan-based independent researcher whose main research areas are social movements in Armenia from feminist and Marxist perspectives. Through her Armenian women’s movement work, Sona has been closely involved in feminist consciousness-raising initiatives and documenting the movement through oral history and archival work. Her master’s thesis focused on the mass anti-regime protests that swept over Armenia in the Spring of 2018. By assuming there were collective actions from above and below – meaning the ruling elites and the protest participants – Sona examined how the ruling elites shaped the political economy of Armenia, which made mass collective action from below a possibility.

“Now we don’t have anything with us. We spent two unbearable nights on the road to Goris. The children were hungry, but we had neither bread nor water,” says Karen.

Karen and his wife Oksanna were forced to flee their home for Armenia after hostilities in the South Caucasus region renewed — they were among the tens of thousands of refugees that arrived in Armenia in less than a week. Many of the families are fleeing with just the few possessions they can carry and are arriving in Armenia distressed, exhausted, hungry and apprehensive about the future.

Learn more about the refugee crisis in Armenia, the families being impacted by this humanitarian emergency and how UNHCR is providing critical support. 

1. When did the refugee crisis in Armenia begin? 

2. How many refugees have fled to Armenia?

3. Who is the refugee crisis in Armenia affecting?

4. How is UNHCR supporting the refugee crisis in Armenia?

5. How can you support the refugee crisis in Armenia?

1. When did the refugee crisis in Armenia begin?

Following the escalation of a decades-long conflict in the region at the end of September 2023, more than 100,000 refugees were forced to flee from their homes to Armenia. A majority of refugees are arriving in Goris — a small border town in south-eastern Armenia — where they’re receiving support from humanitarian organizations, including UNHCR. Some families plan on staying in Goris so they can remain close to home, while others like Hovhannes are thinking about moving on. 

Joining the thousands forced to flee their homes, Hovhannes, his wife and their five children arrived in Goris on September 28, 2023. Two of his children have disabilities and the entire family is in need of safety, shelter and protection. 

“It was very difficult to be on the road for two days with children who have disabilities. We had nothing to eat, and the road was hard to cope with,” Hovhannes recalls. “The road that otherwise would take 2 hours, took three days!” 

Now, Hovhannes and his family are in Goris and receiving much-needed support from UNHCR and local volunteers. 

Although his family found safety and security in Goris for the time being, he would like to continue on and bring his family to Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. “We would like to live in Yerevan so that I can find a decent job, but I am not sure we will be able to find an affordable place to live in Yerevan. And then we have to find a solution for our children who have disabilities.” 

2. How many refugees have fled to Armenia?

As of October 6, 2023, the humanitarian emergency in the South Caucasus has forced more than 100,600 refugees to flee to Armenia. An average of 15,000 people are arriving per day, with a peak of 40,000 refugees entering the country on September 27, 2023. The total number of new arrivals now constitutes 3.3 percent of the entire Armenian population (2.8 million), or 1 in 30 people. Before this crisis, there were already 35,000 refugees, asylum seekers and stateless people of other nationalities living in Armenia. 

After arriving in Armenia, many refugees are settling in areas where they have family, access to services and feel supported. Refugees are now located in different regions in Armenia with a majority residing in the capital, Yerevan (43 percent), followed by Syunik (15 percent), Kotayk (9 percent) and Ararat (8 percent). Refugees like Anna, who arrived in Goris with her 3-year-old son Erik, plan on staying in the area rather than relocating further away from home. 

“We were so scared! We were hungry all the way to Armenia, and I had no sweets for my son, and he was crying all the way to Goris,” says Anna. “Please, find a way for me to stay in Goris. I don’t want to live far.”

3. Who is the refugee crisis in Armenia affecting?

The refugees fleeing to Armenia include vulnerable groups such as older people, women and children, pregnant women and newborns, people living with disabilities and people with chronic health conditions. More than half of the refugees are women and girls, approximately 30 percent are children and 18 percent are elderly. 

When the emergency began, families were forced to flee their homes at a moment's notice with just the few possessions they could bring, spending several days on the road with very little food and water. On the road to Armenia, Syuzanna and her four children were not just worried about how they would get food — they were worried about the dangerous conditions they could face on the way there.  

“I cannot explain how hard the road to Goris was. We were praying to God all the way to Armenia. The kids were asking me – ‘Mom, will they shoot in Armenia too?’” Syuzanna recalls. 

After experiencing many hardships on the road to Armenia and grappling with the uncertainty of the future, refugees like Syuzanna and her family are now arriving traumatized, exhausted and hungry, and need urgent psychosocial support and emergency assistance, including warm clothes and medicine. 

The host community in Armenia has responded to this refugee crisis with unwavering support and generosity. They are lending their support to families in need by volunteering their time and opening their doors to those in need of shelter. National and municipal authorities across the region are actively responding to this crisis as well, working with volunteers, national and local nongovernmental organizations and civil society actors to support those in need.

4. How is UNHCR supporting the refugee crisis in Armenia?

UNHCR is on the ground providing immediate assistance and closely monitoring the situation in Armenia. UNHCR teams are assessing the needs of refugees and providing them with protection, counseling and information. Initial assessments reveal that refugees urgently need food, clothing, accommodation and medicine. UNHCR is also providing technical equipment to facilitate government registration of refugees and new arrivals. 

UNHCR is leading the inter-agency refugee response with UN Agencies and humanitarian Organizations and finalized the Armenia Emergency Refugee Response Plan (RPP). The joint plan brings together 60 partners and covers relief efforts to support 196,000 people, including 101,000 refugees and 95,000 members of local host communities. UNHCR continues to call for greater international support as the crisis continues. 

“We call upon the international community to urgently support refugees and their hosts. Local host communities have generously opened their doors and displayed tremendous solidarity with refugees. The local response, led by national authorities, volunteers and civil society has also been equally remarkable. International support is crucial, however, to sustain this welcome and to enable us to respond to immediate needs and to also build upon the resilience of this population”, said Filippo Grandi, UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 

5. How can you support the refugee crisis in Armenia?

In the span of a week, tens of thousands of families in the region were forced to flee from their homes to Armenia. They are arriving in Armenia now traumatized, exhausted and hungry, fearful of what the future holds for their children and family. During this moment of uncertainty, you can provide them with what they need now more than ever — hope for the future. Join USA for UNHCR in supporting refugee families forced to flee and ensure they get the resources and help they need to move forward. 

https://www.unrefugees.org/news/what-to-know-about-the-refugee-crisis-in-armenia/

On September 19th, 120,000 Armenian Christians were attacked by Azerbaijan after almost a year of starvation at the hands of a suffocating blockade. After fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh, their lives are in complete chaos. Tom sits down with Armenian Christian Simone Rizkallah to hear more about the Christian persecution happening right under our noses. 

• Simone Rizkallah’s Website

Tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians have fled from Nagorno-Karabakh ever since the territory surrendered to Azerbaijan on September 20. This conflict has evolved into a matter encompassing civil rights, human rights, and various other concerns.

Across the globe, ethnic Armenians are fervently advocating for the preservation of their ancestral lands, which are gradually being encroached upon by Azerbaijan.

Alexis Ohanian, who has Armenian roots from his father, Chris' side, recently took to social media to express his deep dismay after witnessing a person disrespecting and trampling upon the flag of the Republic of Artsakh.

Ohanian voiced his fears that Azerbaijan may continue its aggressive expansion into Armenian territories in the upcoming months if the international community doesn't stand up against this injustice and provide assistance to the Armenians during this challenging period.

"They're not even trying to be diplomatic about it. Watch Azerbaijan press on to conquer even more Armenian land in the coming months. When will the world push back?" Ohanian posted on X (formerly Twitter).