Author: Kajoyan Gevork

THE MEDIATION MISSION WAS HANDLED POORLY
by Aleksandr Gabuyev

Kommersant
June 27 2011
Russia

[translated from Russian]

Russia was unsuccessful in reconciling Azerbaijan and Armenia.

At the meeting in Kazan last Friday, the presidents of Azerbaijan and
Armenia Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsian, despite expectations, were
unable to agree on a “road map” for settlement of the conflict in
[Azerbaijan’s breakaway region of] Nagornyy Karabakh, but promised
to continue the talks. But these talks may occur then without the
participation of Dmitriy Medvedev. As Kommersant has learned, the
Russian Federation president is so disappointed with the results of
the Kazan summit meeting that he is ready to terminate his mediation
mission. He intends to organize the next meeting between Mr Aliyev
and Mr Sargsian only on condition that the presidents of Armenia
and Azerbaijan at long last sign a document on the principles of a
Karabakh settlement.

The summit meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia
in Kazan, which occurred under Dmitriy Medvedev’s sponsorship,
ended without the result that all the organizers of this meeting
were counting on, the signing of the basic principles for settling
the conflict in Nagornyy Karabakh. This document, which the OSCE’s
Minsk Group (Russia, the United States, and France) had worked hard on
preparing since the start of the year, was supposed to become a “road
map” for resolving one of the most chronic conflicts in post-Soviet
space (Kommersant wrote about its substance on 24 June).

On the eve of the summit meeting, the mediators put colossal pressure
on Baku and Yerevan to make them sign the hard-won document. A day
before the meeting in Kazan, French President Nicholas Sarkozy wrote a
letter where he urged the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to “show
courage and wisdom by making the choice in favour of peace.” And US
President Barack Obama telephoned Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsian in
order to personally persuade them to sign the agreement.

But the signing of the “road map” in Kazan did not work out. Instead of
that the participants in the meeting, which lasted more than an hour,
got off with a brief statement. In it the presidents of Azerbaijan
and Armenia thanked the cochairmen of the Minsk Group and “praised
the personal efforts of the Russian Federation president.”

But as for the essence of the talks, the participants in the summit
meeting merely said that they had “established the achievement of
a mutual understanding on a number of issues whose resolution helps
create the conditions for the approval of the basic principles.”

According to Kommersant’s source close to the negotiations, this
wording means that the parties simply “once again recorded the
remaining disputed issues.”

The disagreements between the parties surfaced in public right after
the summit meeting was over. On Saturday Edvard Nalbandyan, the head
of the Armenian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], announced that the
meeting of the presidents in Kazan was not a breakthrough because of
Baku’s unconstructive position. “Azerbaijan proved to be unwilling
to accept the last version of the basic principles of a Karabakh
settlement presented,” he said. “Baku presented about 10 changes,
which in fact was the reason for the absence of a breakthrough.”

The response from Baku followed immediately. “Unfortunately,
the Armenian side once again asked for too many concessions. The
Kazan meeting showed that Armenia is distorting the essence of the
seven-year-long negotiation process,” Elmar Mammadyarov, the head
of Azerbaijan’s MID, announced that same day. And yesterday the
country’s President Ilham Aliyev, while speaking before the start of
a military parade timed to coincide with the country’s Armed Forces
Day, declared: “I am altogether certain that our territorial integrity
will be restored by any means. To do that we must be even stronger.

Armenia’s occupation of 20 per cent of Azerbaijani territory is a
temporary phenomenon.”

And although Baku and Yerevan say that they are willing to continue
the negotiations, the fate of their dialogue remains in question since
the failure of the Kazan summit meeting. According to the Kommersant
source who is a diplomat participating in the negotiations process,
disagreements that the mediators had already considered resolved long
ago suddenly surfaced. “They include questions of both a technical
character and fundamental ones – like determining the future status of
Nagornyy Karabakh,” the Kommersant source explained. “But the problem
is not even the disagreements themselves, but that the parties changed
their positions several times apiece. And it cannot be done that way.”

The failure of the Kazan meeting may also have direct consequences
for the peacemaking initiative of Dmitriy Medvedev, who has been
actively working on reconciling Azerbaijan and Armenia since the
autumn of 2009, and has already organized nine trilateral meetings
on Russia’s territory during that time. According to Kommersant’s
highly placed source in the Kremlin, Mr Medvedev is so disappointed
with the meeting in Kazan that he is ready to terminate his mediation
efforts in the Karabakh sector.

“If Azerbaijan and Armenia do not show a willingness in the very
near future to try to resolve the problems that have built up, we
will consider this mediation mission over,” Kommersant’s source warned.

Moreover, according to him, Dmitriy Medvedev in effect gave an
ultimatum to the participants in the conflict: the next trilateral
summit meeting is possible only in the event that a preparatory
plan on Karabakh is signed there. “The meeting will now take place
only when both parties firmly announce their willingness to sign the
principles of a settlement,” Kommersant’s interlocutor in the Kremlin
said categorically.

[translated from Russian]

US HAILS ARMENIA’S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO NATO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
BYLINE: Lilit Gevorgyan

Global Insight
June 28, 2011

On 27 June, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia,
Eurasia and Ukraine, Celeste Wallander, met with Armenian Defence
Minister Seiran Oganian during her visit to the South Caucasian
country. She highlighted the importance that the US administration
and other NATO members attach to Armenia’s contribution to the
military bloc’s peacekeeping operations. She particularly hailed
the Armenian National Assembly’s decision on 11 May to increase the
number of Armenian troops serving in Afghanistan from 45 to 130 and
extend the length of their mission until 2012. The soldiers will
serve with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
and will co-operate closely with the German contingent.

Part of their mission will be guarding the airport in northern Afghan
city of Kunduz, which has been under German command since January
2010. The Armenian military will also train local Afghan security
forces to prepare them for transfer of power. During her talks with
her Armenian counterparts, Wallander promised continued US support in
implementation of Armenia’s military reforms, as well as in the review
process of Armenia’s Defence Strategy. The parties also discussed
the most pressing security issue that Armenia currently faces, the
ongoing low-intensity conflict over Azerbaijan’s Armenian-populated
and self-declared republic Nagorno-Karabakh. Oganian urged the US to
exercise pressure on Azerbaijan to pursue peaceful solution of the
conflict and also maintain the 1994 tripartite ceasefire.

Significance:Armenia’s commitment to increasing its co-operation
with NATO in the anti-Taliban mission in Afghanistan is particularly
valuable for the military bloc as it comes at a time when most Western
countries, including the US, are considering scaling back the mission.

This is mostly due to domestic popular pressure, especially after
the elimination of the leader of the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden. The
Armenian government’s increased commitment to the NATO mission
contrasts with its close military links with Russia, which still
maintains its military base in the country. Despite the need for
qualified troops along the Line of Contact with Azerbaijan, the
Armenian population in general supports the anti-Taliban campaign.

During the 1988-1994 Nagorno-Karabakh war, which claimed 30,000
lives on both sides, Armenian troops captured Taliban members
fighting for Azerbaijan. For many military personnel–and indeed the
wider public–the Taliban threat has implications for the regional
conflict, hence the popular support for the mission. Furthermore,
working with NATO troops is an opportunity to gain military training
and understanding of operational procedures under NATO, with which
Armenia co-operates under the Partnership for Peace framework.

ON SOUTH SUDAN: ETHNIC MINORITIES AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY
By Dr. Evgeni Klauber

Magazine – Independent commentary from Israel and the Palestinian territories

June 29 2011

With Ethiopian peacekeepers en route to try and secure calm in Abyei,
a contested region that lies on the border between Sudan and Southern
Sudan, Dr. Evgeni Klauber considers how the future of the region will
determine relations between what will soon be two sovereign states.

Earlier this week, the leaders of the Sudanese government and the Sudan
People~Rs Liberation Movement agreed to withdraw their troops from the
contested Abyei region, after the United States requested that the UN
Security Council authorize the deployment of peacekeepers from Addis
Ababa to monitor the problematic region. Western commentators argued
that this is a good way to ease the tension along the border region
between the North and South ~V a border that will divide two sovereign
states, which will declare their independence on July 9. In January of
this year, the United States and the international community celebrated
with the people of South Sudan their future indepencence ~V a political
outcome of the referendum in which 98 percent of southerners agreed
to secede from the North and to establish their new independent state.

Issues of state building, nation building, and political arrangements
with ethnic minorities thus arise once again. What is the best
political arrangement that the future state of Southern Sudan should
adopt in order to solve the problem of ethnic groups, such as Misseriya
and Dinka in Abyei? Should it give these ethnic minorities group
rights to preserve their culture within Southern Sudan or should
the newly emerged state limit them to individual rights, which would
allow them to preserve their culture in the private sphere, but not
to sustain their uniqueness as a group? Can political autonomy provide
a feasible and peaceful solution for the minorities in the region?

The political status of Abyei, which is situated in the border area
between the North and the South, has yet to be decided. The Southern
region is rich in oil ~V about 80 percent of Sudan~Rs oil is in the
south). Various ethnic minorities live in the South ~V for example,
the Misseriya and Dinka, who identify with the country~Rs North
and South, respectively. If the Misseriya aren~Rt well-treated,
they will know to ask for military assistance from the militant,
failed and disintegrating North. The basis for the future conflict
can already be identified: earlier this month, Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir accused the militant forces of the South (SPLA) for
attacking the North~Rs forces (SAF) in the disputed region. Although
Western observers claimed that the South did not initiate any violence,
the president gave order to his fighter planes to bomb the civilian
population in the region. Primary victims of the bombing last month
were members of the Dinka ethnic group, who were historically located
in the Abyei region and for the thirty last years have suffered from
attacks from the North. This bombing of the Dinka earlier this month
is quintessential, after years of marginalization policies along
with the attempts to drive them from the region ~V a process that
would provide the North with the political claim to the area even
after the declaration of the South~Rs independence, which will most
probably include the Abyei area.

Under the agreement signed in 2005, the Abyei region is to hold a
referendum through which it will decide whether it wants to join
the Southern state or to stay with the North. The problem is that
al-Bashir makes great efforts to clean up Abyei from Dinka and to
insert nomadic Misseriya tribes who are closer in their political
views to the regime in Khartoum, the capital of the North. This
deliberate policy toward the Dinka was developed to strengthen the
North~Rs claim to the future of Abyei.

According to materialist logic, if the disputed area, rich in oil,
lies in the Southern state, then the North will do anything in
its power to regain control over the region. This could entail
supporting rebels who identify with the North, explaining to the
international community how its diaspora is being oppressed by the
~Sbloody~T Southern regime, and investing efforts to increase the
presence of the tribal Misseriya identified with the North in order
to gain a foothold in the region. But materialistic logic is not
always right: states do not necessarily tend to intervene to protect
their diasporas even in commercially benefical places. For example,
see Russia: it did not intervene on behalf of the Russian-speakers in
the coal-rich Donbas, or on behalf of the Russian-speaking minority
in Kazakhstan. Russia did intervene, however, in 2008, on behalf
of ethnic minorities who identified themselves with Russia but did
not provide the Russian state with unique economic benefits. This
was in the case, of course, of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two
autonomous regions inside Georgia, which after the events of August
2008 were recognized by Russia as sovereign states.

Intervention for minorities who are politically autonomous is more
common. States intervene on behalf of organized groups ~V those groups
that have enough institutional resources to become sovereign nations.

If so, what explains the intervention of one state on behalf
ethnic minorities in newly emerged states? I would argue that
what explains political intervention in newly emerged states is
a political arrangement, such as autonomy, that makes an ethnic
minority more ~Seligible~T for such assistance. If the newly emerged
state provides an ethnic minority with political autonomy (self-rule
within the territory of a sovereign state), then the intervention of
the homeland state on behalf of this minority is more likely. Countries
tend to intervene for organized minorities with functional elites that
control already existing organizational resources. Russians intervened
in Georgia for Russian-speaking autonomous regions ~V South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, but did not intervene to assist minorities that are
not organized by means of political autonomy (like Russian-speakers
in Baltic states). Armenians intervened in the autonomous Nagorno ~V
Karabakh region on behalf of their Armenian diaspora in Azerbaijan,
but they did not intervene to assist the not-autonomous Armenian
diaspora in Georgia.

If that is the case, what should we expect in Sudan? If Southern
Sudan~Rs future government grants Muslim minorities in the Abyei region
politically autonomous status, this may lead to a renewed conflict.

After gaining political autonomy, the Muslim minority will acquire
organizational resources, symbols of statehood, and will very quickly
formulate its claim for annexation back to Northern Sudan or for the
establishment of a new sovereign state in the region. This scenario
could end in another civil war. It is important to note that political
autonomy is not always the wrong solution: autonomy can be also a
useful tool that secures group rights for ethnic minorities. The
solution of political autonomy worked relatively well (as it turned
out recently) in the Basque country, Catalonia, South Tyrol, and
Scotland. But political autonomy may lead to violence in the context
of the newly emerged states, which build their nations at a faster
pace. For newly emerged countries, nationalism is not only a project
to acquire an independent state but also a tool to establish and
to accumulate political legitimacy. Newly emerged states are often
~Snationalizing states~T with an accelerated pace of nation and
state building. Autonomous minorities in newly emerged nationalizing
states may choose an exit strategy that leads to secession if they
feel scared. Fast nation building might scare autonomous minorities:
the newly emerged state can change its language overnight, for example.

Autonomous Muslim minorities, then, may rise in the future against
the government in the South ~V which will increase the chances of
the North~Rs intervention. This scenario can lead to more violence
in the region.

Let’s turn now to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I argue that political
autonomy is an originating mechanism responsible for the genesis of
an institution, which make ethnic mobilization possible. Imagine a
newly emerged Palestinian state with a Jewish minority in Hebron. The
first scenario would be to integrate Jews into this newly emerged
Palestinian nation – an unlikely scenario due to the religious
differences between the two groups. Another scenario would be to
provide Jews in the newly emerged Palestinian state with group rights
– i.e. granting them political autonomy. This scenario will lead to
them acquiring institutional resources of self-governance that would
make Israeli intervention on behalf of its autonomous Jewish diaspora
more likely. We cannot imagine that Israel will intervene in Syria
on behalf of ill-treated Jews, because the Jewish minority in Syria
is not politically autonomous. Autonomous Jews in the newly emerged
Palestinian state, however, will be a different story. Here, chances
are that Israel will intervene once group rights or even individual
rights of this autonomous institutionalized diaspora will be violated.

As long as Israeli intervention in the possibly-emerging Palestinian
state depends on the political arrangement between the Jewish minority
and the Palestinian state, the status of Jews living within its
borders should be a top priority for resolution.

Dr. Evgeni Klauber received his PhD in Comparative Politics and
International Relations at the University of Delaware, specializing in
ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Republics. A Fulbright scholar,
he is now back at Tel-Aviv University as a visiting lecturer. His
current research concentrates on regime change in Russia and the
post-Soviet Bloc.

ARTHUR ABRAHAM GRANTED EQUIPMENT OF 100 THOUSAND EUROS TO BOXING SCHOOL IN ARMENIA

Panorama
June 29 2011
Armenia

Famous Armenian boxer Arthur (King) Abraham gifted 100 thousand euros
to Armenian Olympic boxing school after Vladimir Yengibaryan, to the
sportsmen and the coaches of the school.

New sport equipments that the school has received will contribute
to the appearance of new sportsmen and champions. Arthur Abraham
is sure there are many talented sportsmen and coaches in Armenia,
and that necessary conditions are needed to reveal them. They surely
need international competitions to get experienced.

“I’d like to express my gratitude to my school, where I used to be
trained which helped to reach serious results,” Arthur Abraham said.

POSTANJYAN DISAGREES WITH CRITICS TO HER PERSON AFTER HER QUESTION TO RA PRESIDENT IN PACE

PanARMENIAN.Net
June 29, 2011 – 18:18 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – Member of Parliament from Heritage oppositional
party Zaruhi Postanjyan does not agree with critics to her person
followed by her question to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

“It is absolutely incorrect to conduct comparison with authoritarian
regime in Azerbaijan, or between authoritarian regimes of other
countries. We have problem with becoming a democratic state,”
Postanjyan told a press conference in Yerevan.

“Presence of an oppositional member in Parliamentary delegation of
PACE does not rule out that the country is not authoritarian,” said
the Member of Parliament expressing her disagreement with Mr.

Sargsyan’s illegal holding of the Armenian President’s office.

Postanjyan said that from 1995 all elections held in Armenia are
not legal.

Postanjyan also disagreed with the opinion that she involves external
forces to the Armenian interior and underlined that Armenia is a
full member of PACE, and this organization is called up to protect
Armenian citizens’ rights.

During President Serzh Sargsyan’s speech at PACE on June 22, Zaruhi
Postanjyan offered him to hold a quick election, saying that now
Armenia is an authoritarian state. In his turn, the President replied
that no elections will be held in Armenia noting that he respects
the opinion of the Parliament Member, but does not think European
partners of Armenia share this view.

ISSUES ON MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF MULTI-APARTMENT BUILDINGS DISCUSSED

ARMENPRESS
JUNE 29, 2011
YEREVAN

A consultation on management, operation and preservation of
multi-apartment buildings’ fund in Armenia was held today at the RA
Government. The consultation was headed by RA Prime Minister Tigran
Sargsyan.

An official from the information and PR department of the RA Government
told Armenpress that the “5-Year Strategic Program for Improving the
Management, Operation and Preservation of Multi-Apartment Buildings’
Fund in the Republic of Armenia” project was discussed during the
consultation. The main principles of the reforms of the sphere, as
well as the directions and mechanisms of the project’s implementation
were presented. The participants expressed their opinion about the
presented document.

RA PRESIDENT GETS ACQUAINTED WITH CONDITIONS OF SEVAN LAKE’S PUBLIC BEACHES

ARMENPRESS
JUNE 29, 2011
YEREVAN

RA President Serzh Sargsyan arrived today in the province of
Gegharkunik on a working visit. Armen Gevorgyan, RA vice prime
minister, territorial administration minister, and Aram Harutyunyan,
RA minister of nature protection, accompanied the president.

The president visited the public beaches, created with the decree
of the RA president, in the territory of “Sevan” national park. The
public beaches are intended to ensure free-of-charge and free use of
water, efficient organization of rest. All the services except for
food are free-of-charge. The president got acquainted with the works
implemented in N 1 and 2 beaches.

Aram Harutyunyan informed that the ministry received 66 million AMD
from the Government’s reserve fund for organizing and furnishing
the beaches. The free-of-charge beaches are provided by “Phoenix”
benevolent fund, the expenses of preserving the beaches will be covered
by “Sevan” national park. The “AG” holding took up the retail trade
in the beaches during the holiday season. It will organize the garbage
removal of the area and will pay 500 000 AMD per month for each public
beach. People can buy food in the beaches with the same price “Star”
offers in its supermarkets in Yerevan.

Aram Harutyunyan said every day over 2000 people can organize their
daily rest in the beaches.

CIRCASSIAN GENOCIDE VICTIMS’ MEMORIAL TO BE ERECTED IN GEORGIA

PanARMENIAN.Net
June 29, 2011 – 18:07 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – A memorial to victims of Circassian genocide will
be erected in Georgia’s Black Sea coast, said Nugzar Tsiklauri, the
head of a Georgian parliamentary committee for Diaspora affairs.As he
further noted, creation of a center of Circassian culture, featuring
materials on the genocide is also planned, with a relevant resolution
to be passed at July 1, 2011 parliamentary sitting.

On May 20, Georgian parliament voted for recognition of 1763-1864
events as the genocide of Circassian people.

ARMENIA FACES MAJOR OBSTACLES IN TERMS OF ATTRACTING INVESTMENTS – BUSINESSMAN

Tert.am
29.06.11

Armenia is not an attractive country for foreign investments and new
businesses, a Diaspora-Armenian businessman finds.

Vahagn Hovnanyan told reporters on Wednesday that the country is facing
numerous obstacles in terms of enlivening its business environment.

“There are a lot of problems that affect Armenia’s economy, businesses
and attractiveness of investments. You don’t have a big market and
there are very few people, so they cannot bring many products, attract
investments or set up new businesses. Monopolies here create lots of
difficulties,” he said. “You face big pressures if you want to import a
new product. It is a big problem here for us, as that prevents small
business owners from coming here and making investments.”

MP Manvel Badeyan, also attending the news conference, disagreed with
the businessman. He pointed out to other factors creating difficulties.

“No country can be said to be attractive for investments now,
as the entire world is facing a crisis situation. But apart from
such significant factor, Armenia faces other restrictions, such as
political and geographic factors, and the small market,” he said,
stressing the importance of skilled governance.

“While we cannot increase our market capacities or change our
geographical location, we do have the chance and are obliged
to exercise proper governance, eliminating subjective factors,”
Badeyan said, pointing out to such major obstacles as corruption and
monopolization of the market.

POLITICAL ANALYST: AZERBAIJAN’S BELLICOSE RHETORIC INTENDED EXCLUSIVELY FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION

/ARKA/
June 29, 2011
YEREVAN

Azerbaijan’s bellicose rhetoric is intended exclusively for domestic
consumption, Alexander Markarov, director of Armenian branch of the
CIS Countries Institute, said Tuesday at the Yerevan-Moscow video
bridge focused on results of trilateral meeting on Karabakh conflict
settlement.

“Warlike gestures became Azerbaijan’s visiting card recently,” he
said. “However, regarding its three-billion military budget, its
readiness for war is not as important as its ability to win this war.

And this is doubtful.”

The political analyst thinks that if Azerbaijan was ready for a short,
but victorious war, it perhaps would resort to force.

But, he said, Baku acknowledges very well that the international
community will any condemn any breach of peace process not only by
imposing sanctions. That is why Azerbaijan’s bellicose rhetoric is
intended for internal usage and should be taken adequately.

Karen Bekaryan, political analyst, on his side, said expressed opinion
that if Azerbaijan was sure that Armenia and Karabakh were unable to
resist its military attacks, it would start fighting.

He thinks that horrible is that Azerbaijan has managed to impose
the following idea on the international community and co-chairs: it
is a big concession from Azerbaijani side to refrain from resorting
to force.

“Azerbaijan’s bellicose rhetoric has produced a remarkable effect –
some forces and grups proposing to make a preventive strike against
Azerbaijan instead of waiting for attacks from its side appeared here
in Armenia,” Bekaryan said.

Karabakh conflict broke out in 1988 when Karabakh, mainly populated
by Armenians, declared its independence from Azerbaijan.

On December 10, 1991, a few days after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, a referendum took place in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the majority
of the population (99.89%) voted for secession from Azerbaijan.

Afterwards, large-scale military operations began. As a result,
Azerbaijan lost control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven regions
adjacent to it.

Some 30,000 people were killed in this war and about one million
people fled their homes.

On May 12, 1994, the Bishkek cease-fire agreement put an end to the
military operations.

Since 1992, talks brokered by OSCE Minsk Group are being held over
peaceful settlement of the conflict. The group is co-chaired by USA,
Russia and France.