WIKILEAKS: AZERI, TURKISH DIASPORAS ATTEMPT TO FORM ‘SINGLE ORGANISM’
Nanore Barsoumian
ep 20, 2011
At a forum held in Baku in March 2007, Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev said the Azerbaijani and Turkish diasporas must function
“as a single organism.” The forum’s goal was to create “dialogue and
cooperation” and an outputting of unified efforts and initiatives,
in large part to counter the weight of the Armenian Diaspora. U.S.
ambassadors in Ankara and Baku took interest in the event, drafting
reports released by WikiLeaks in recent weeks, with one ambassador
concluding: “They [the Turkish and Azerbaijani diasporas] have a long
way to go.”
Azeri, Turkish Diasporas Attempt to Form ‘Single Organism’
The “Forum of World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora Organizations”
sought to establish “an organized counterbalance to the influence of
the Armenian diaspora worldwide,” wrote U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Ross Wilson in a cable titled “Turk-Azeri Diaspora Takes Aim at
Armenian Diaspora.” According to two embassy cables, the forum drew
513 participants, including businessmen, politicians, and leaders
representing various diaspora organizations in 48 countries.
Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Reccep Tayyip Erdogan, and the leader of
“The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” Mehmet Ali Talat, attended
the forum’s opening ceremony.
In his speech, Aliyev said the Azeri diaspora must be active in its
host countries both politically and in the business sphere, and
highlighted the importance of disseminating the Azeri historical
narrative. “All NGOs acting abroad must establish very serious
cooperation,” he said. “I repeat, this must be coordinated with
members of the government and parliament. We must necessarily do it
if we want our voice to be heard and the problems worrying us to be
settled rapidly.”
A “key part” of Aliyev’s speech “dealt with the challenges posed to
Azerbaijan and Turkey by the ‘well-organized Armenian lobby’ and the
Armenian diaspora’s ‘big financial resources,'” reported the Embassy
in Baku. “Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan and Turkey have had to face
the onslaught of Armenian propaganda, slander, and distortion of
historical facts,” the embassy added.
U.S. Ambassador to Baku Anne Derse noted that “independent
commentators” supported the forum’s goals and “emphasized the need
to counter the Armenian diaspora’s influence.” Forum participants
signed the “Baku Declaration,” which expressed the goal of unifying
the efforts of both diasporas. According to the embassy in Ankara,
participants adopted two other resolutions: a “Joint Strategy on the
Activities of the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations,”
and an “Appeal to the Turkic-speaking Peoples.”
Despite Gokce’s assertions, Ambassador Wilson concluded that “the
forum’s aim is clear: both the Turks and Azeris want to beat the
powerful Armenian diaspora organizations at their own game. The
evidence indicates they have a long way to go.”
One of the cables observed how most local commentators supported
the forum’s aims, even the individuals with opposing viewpoints,
approving efforts that counter the work of Armenian lobby groups.
An official from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suleyman
Gokce, said the forum was not aimed at isolating the Armenian
government or wholly directed to offset the Armenian Diaspora’s
influence. However, he expressed his concern at the increased level of
“influence and power” that the Armenian Diaspora has in Armenia’s
politics. Meanwhile, Ambassador Derse remarked that “The GOAJ
[government of Azerbaijan], as well as broader Azerbaijani society,
believe that the Armenia lobby has undermined Azerbaijan’s relations
with other countries, including the United States.”
More than two years after the forum convened, a third cable-titled
“Azerbaijan’s Diaspora Small, Not Politically Active”-shed light on
developments in the Azeri diaspora. U.S. Embassy Charge d’Affaires
Donald Lu, in answering a list of questions, noted that although the
Azeri diaspora was not active in Azerbaijani or U.S. politics, two
groups had recently formed: “one pro-government and one pro-democracy.”
Overall, Azerbaijan’s diaspora is “poorly organized” and “cannot truly
be described as an identifiable community,” wrote Lu, remarking on
the GOAJ’s recent efforts at outreach “as a way to counter the much
larger Armenian diaspora in the United States and Europe.” Their
efforts are “almost entirely” dedicated to lobbying host countries
to change positions on Nagorno-Karabagh, he said.
Their main recruitment route has been the U.S. Azeris Network
(), “which also works closely with the Turkish
Coalition of America,” Lu said. “While not exactly ‘peace-building,’
the organization does call for the peaceful resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict within the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan. The organization also campaigns against any recognition
on a state or federal level of the Armenian ‘genocide.'”
Below are the three U.S. Embassy cables.
US embassy cable – 07ANKARA641
TURK-AZERI DIASPORA TAKES AIM AT ARMENIAN DIASPORA
Identifier:
07ANKARA641
Origin:
Embassy Ankara
Created:
2007-03-21 12:05:00
Classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
Tags:
PREL PGOV AM AJ TU
Redacted:
This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2022
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AM, AJ, TU
SUBJECT: TURK-AZERI DIASPORA TAKES AIM AT ARMENIAN DIASPORA
REF: A. ANKARA 468
B. ANKARA 159
C. YEREVAN 149
Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for Reasons 1.4
(b,d)
1. (C) Summary: A recent Turkish-Azeri diasporas forum in Baku is
seeking to develop an organized counterbalance to the influence of the
Armenian diaspora worldwide. Possible Turkish-Armenian rapprochement
looks bleak, although MFA sources tell us FM Gul plans to approach
Secretary Rice with a positive move after Turkish parliamentary
elections currently scheduled for November. End Summary.
2. (U) According to Turkish MFA and press reports, 513 businessmen and
prominent political and civil society leaders representing Turkish
and Azeri diasporas from 48 countries participated in the inaugural
Forum of World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora Organizations on
March 9 in Baku. Azeri President Aliyev and Turkish PM Erdogan gave
opening speeches. Along with participants from Central Asia, Europe,
North America, Russia and Iran, “TRNC President” Mehmet Ali Talat
also attended.
3. (C) Participants adopted three major resolutions: a “Joint
Strategy on the Activities of the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora
organizations,” an “Appeal to the Turkic-speaking Peoples,” and a
broader “Baku Declaration.” MFA Acting DDG for Caucasus and Central
Asia Suleyman Gokce called the statements generic in nature and
said organizers did not decide upon the timing and location of a
second meeting.
4. (C) Gokce told us that Turkey and Azerbaijan jointly came up with
the Turk-Azeri diaspora idea one year ago. The Azeris then took the
initiative to establish this forum for “dialogue and cooperation.”
Gokce asserted that the forum is not solely targeted at countering
the Armenian diaspora’s influence and is not intended to push the
Armenian government into a corner. Gokce noted that it would also
look at improving joint lobbying, holding common cultural events and
establishing stronger business ties.
5. (C) On prospects for Turkey-Armenia rapprochement in the
near future, Gokce opined that even a symbolic gesture by Turkey
towards Armenia at this point would not be enough for Armenian
diaspora hardliners. He said FM Gul will approach Secretary Rice
with a positive move, but not until after the Turkish parliamentary
elections currently scheduled for November 4. He called Armenian FM
Oskanian “intransigent and unhelpful” vis-vis Turkey, particularly
as Armenia’s May 12 elections approach and Oskanian must position
himself accordingly. Gokce raised concerns about recent changes in
Armenian law that he said increased the influence and power of the
Armenian diaspora in GOAM politics.
6. (C) While in Baku, PM Erdogan also visited Sangachal terminal
(the starting point of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline), inaugurated
the new Turkish Embassy with President Aliyev and visited two Turkish
schools. The Turkish Ambassador also organized a 300-person working
lunch between the Turkish and Azeri delegations. Gokce said Erdogan
and Aliyev met one-on-one but he had no details on what was discussed.
7. (C) Comment: The timing of this forum comes ahead of the April
24 Armenian Remembrance Day and the possibility Congress could pass
an Armenian genocide resolution soon. Although Gokce took pains
to emphasize that the forum was not only targeted at countering
the Armenian diaspora’s influence, the forum’s aim is clear: both
the Turks and Azeris want to beat the powerful Armenian diaspora
organizations at their own game. The evidence indicates they have a
long way to go. End Comment.
Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at
WILSON
US embassy cable – 07BAKU386
BAKU HOSTS FIRST AZERBAIJANI AND TURKISH DIASPORA CONFERENCE
Identifier:
07BAKU386
Origin:
Embassy Baku
Created:
2007-04-06 13:43:00
Classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
Tags:
PGOV PREL TU AJ
Redacted:
This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU, AJ
SUBJECT: BAKU HOSTS FIRST AZERBAIJANI AND TURKISH DIASPORA CONFERENCE
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) Summary. In an effort to galvanize enhanced cooperation among
Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations, Azerbaijan hosted
the first conference of World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora
organizations from March 9-10. Reflecting the importance assigned
to the event, President Ilham Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyib
Erdogan, and the leader of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus Mehmet Ali Talat, in his capacity as head of the diaspora
association of Cyprus, attended the conference’s opening session.
Aliyev’s speech at this session called upon diaspora organizations to
be more active and identified the conference’s “historical achievement”
as ensuring that Turkish and Azerbaijani diaspora organizations
function “as a single organism.” Ramil Hasanov, Director General of
the State Committee on Work with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, told us
the GOAJ’s goal for the conference was to energize and give direction
(unspecified) to diaspora organizations’ efforts. Most independent
commentators we spoke with support the conference’s goals and
emphasized the need to counter the Armenian diaspora’s influence.
At Greek urging, local EU embassies – except the UK – boycotted the
Conference’s opening out of fear that the Conference would adopt
statements in support of Northern Cyprus. End Summary.
Background
-~W–
2. (U) Azerbaijan hosted the first conference of World Azerbaijani and
Turkish Diaspora organizations from March 9-10. According to local
press, the conference included 513 participants from forty-eight
countries. President Ilham Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyib
Erdogan, and the leader of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Mehmet Ali Talat attended the opening session on March 9. Participants
signed the “Baku Declaration” during the conference, which expressed
Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations’ intent to unify their
efforts, according to local press.
Aliyev’s Speech
-~W-~W-
3. (SBU) President Aliyev gave a speech to the opening session of
the conference. Aliyev’s speech reaffirmed the traditional close
links between Azerbaijan and Turkey, while calling upon diaspora
organizations to be more active and collaborative in promoting both
countries’ interests. Aliyev noted that the Azerbaijan State Committee
on Work with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, which played a key role
in organizing the conference, was the focal point for organizing and
mobilizing the Azerbaijani diaspora. Aliyev identified the conference’s
“historical achievement” as “consolidating our activity” and ensuring
that Turkish and Azerbaijani diaspora organizations function “as a
single organism.” Aliyev later noted that more united efforts should
be directed toward strengthening the political and economic influence
of the Azerbaijani and Turkish diasporas in different countries.
4. (SBU) Several quotations from Aliyev’s speech – taken from Aliyev’s
official website – reflect the GOAJ’s attempt to energize diaspora
activities. Speaking about his goals for the Azerbaijani diaspora,
Aliyev said, “it needs to be active, partake in political processes,
possess high positions in the business world, and to benefit our
opportunities” in this area. Aliyev continued, “…we must support
them (diaspora organizations), strengthen their policy in countries
they live in. Different events are and must be held. Conferences,
publication of books, distribution of realities on our history –
past and present – this process must be permanent. All NGOs acting
abroad must establish very serious cooperation. I repeat, this must
be coordinated with members of the government and parliament. We must
necessarily do it if we want our voice to be heard and the problems
worrying us to be settled rapidly.”
5. (SBU) Aliyev’s speech was not solely focused on Armenia, but it
was a key part of the address. In the final section of the speech,
Aliyev dealt with the challenges posed to Azerbaijan and Turkey
by the “well-organized Armenian lobby” and the Armenian diaspora’s
“big financial resources.” Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan and Turkey
have had to face the onslaught of Armenian propaganda, slander,
and distortion of historical facts.
State Committee Hails Conference as Success
-~W-~W-~W-~W-~W-~W-~W-
6. (C) Ramil Hasanov, Director General of the State Committee on
Work with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, told us the GOAJ regards
the conference as a success. Hasanov said the GOAJ’s goal for the
conference was to energize and give direction to the efforts of all
the various diaspora organizations. He emphasized that independent
organizations had played a role in organizing the conference and that
the State Committee primarily provided logistical support. (Comment:
>>From our perspective, the governments of Azerbaijan and/or Turkey
appear to have been central in organizing the conference. The
conference does not appear to have been a grass-roots or “bottom-up”
initiative.) Hasanov said the “Coordination Council of World
Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora” had helped to organize the conference
and that the March 9-10 event was the “founding conference” for this
organization. Hasanov told us that a central point of contact for
this organization has not yet been identified because it includes
many diaspora organizations. Hasanov also sought to deflect attention
to the conference’s focus on countering the Armenian lobby, stating
that the conference “was not aimed at any country.”
Other Perspectives
-~W-~W-~W
7. (C) Most local commentators – even those with opposition leanings –
we spoke with supported the broad goals of the conference, while some
had questions about the level of the GOAJ’s involvement in organizing
diaspora activities. A common thread from local commentators was
that the Azerbaijani diaspora needed to be more unified to counter
the strength of the Armenian lobby.
8. (C) Nasib Nasibli – an opposition MP – said the conference’s key
goal was to strengthen the Azerbaijani diaspora vis-a-vis the Armenia
diaspora. Nasibli said that while he was a member of the opposition, as
an Azerbaijani patriot, he agreed that the Azerbaijani diaspora needs
to be more active. Nasibli cautioned, however, that the GOAJ also may
be using the conference to better control the diaspora. Leyla Aliyeva –
a prominent Western-educated academic – said that the common Turkish
and Azerbaijani interest in countering the Armenia lobby was a key
driver behind the conference. She also claimed that the conference
reflected Turkey’s growing regional influence. Natig Mammadov, who
teaches the history of Turkic peoples at Baku State University and
edits the webpage for Radio Free Europe, characterized the conference
as “an official demonstration” of a union of interests between
Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations that already exists.
Mammadov observed that the diaspora does not act as a cohesive
whole, while lamenting the lack of patriotism among some diaspora
organizations. Mammadov expressed some cynicism about the efficacy of
the conference in energizing the diaspora, saying that it contained
an element of “political propaganda.”
The Cyprus Angle
-~W-~W–
9. (C) At Greek urging, local EU embassies – except the UK – boycotted
the high-profile opening session of the conference. According to both
Greek and UK diplomats, the EU embassies feared that the Conference
would adopt statements in support of Northern Cyprus. The Greek
Ambassador privately speculated to us that Greece’s role in leading
the EU boycott of this high-profile event may have played some role in
Minister of Economic Development Heydar Babayev’s last-minute decision
to cancel his planned March 12 visit to Athens for energy discussions.
(Babayev’s visit subsequently was rescheduled for May 23-24.)
Comment
-~W-
10. (C) The conference reflects the GOAJ’s desire for the Azerbaijani
diaspora to play a more active role in countering the perceived
strength of the Armenia diaspora in other countries. The GOAJ,
as well as broader Azerbaijani society, believe that the Armenia
lobby has undermined Azerbaijan’s relations with other countries,
including with the United States.
DERSE
US embassy cable – 09BAKU743
AZERBAIJAN’S DIASPORA SMALL, NOT POLITCALLY ACTIVE
Identifier:
09BAKU743
Origin:
Embassy Baku
Created:
2009-09-18 06:05:00
Classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
Tags:
PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL SMIG AJ
Redacted:
This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, PREL, SMIG, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN’S DIASPORA SMALL, NOT POLITCALLY ACTIVE
REF: STATE 86401
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Robert Garverick, Reasons
1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Summary: Azerbaijan’s diaspora of permanent migrs [migrants]
is small, although there are possibly 2 million labor migrants in
Russia and Turkey. The diaspora has not been active in affairs in
Azerbaijan or in the United States, but two new groups have recently
formed: one pro-government and one pro-democracy. End Summary.
2. (C) In response to reftel, post provides the following answers.
A) To what extent are diasporans from your host country an identifiable
community? Are there existing diaspora networks, organizations or
online communities available as platforms for outreach?
– Azerbaijanis living abroad are poorly organized and cannot truly be
described as an identifiable community. The largest group, estimated at
about two million, lives in Russia, but these are largely temporary
labor migrants rather than permanent migrs. There are also large
numbers of labor migrants in Turkey. There are few Azerbaijanis in
the U.S., largely students or other temporary workers. There are,
however, a larger number of ethnic Azeris from Iran in America,
although anecdotal evidence indicates that they identify more as
Iranians than Azerbaijanis. There are two Azerbaijani-American
organizations that have formed recently: U.S. Azeri Network (USAN)
is pro-government and Azerbaijani-Americans for Democracy (AZAD) has
begun lobbying for more USG attention to the Azerbaijani government’s
failings on democracy and human rights.
B) What is the nature of the connection of the diaspora community to
the host country? Examples include kinship networks; educational or
other institutional ties; financial support as from remittances; and
direct participation in community or country affairs and civil society.
– Remittances from family members in Russia and Turkey play a large
role in supporting families in Azerbaijan, particularly families
outside Baku where there are fewer economic opportunities. There seem
to be few educational or other institutional ties.
C) To what extent has your host country or government activated
its diaspora communities for humanitarian relief? How would you
characterize the level of response? If outreach is relatively recent,
do you foresee opportunities to maintain diaspora community involvement
in country over the long term?
– The government has just begun to reach out to its small diaspora,
largely as a way to counter the much larger Armenian diaspora
in the United States and Europe. This work is almost entirely
centered on lobbying foreign governments to change their positions
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While some of its messaging may
have humanitarian rhetoric, it is not trying to raise money for
humanitarian assistance.
D) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in long-term
investment in country, for example micro enterprise development, job
creation, entrepreneurship, and institutional capacity building? What
is post’s assessment of the future potential for long-term and
sustained engagement of the diaspora community in such efforts?
– Post sees no evidence of diaspora long-term investment in the
country. Given the small size of the diaspora, there is not a large
potential for this type of work.
E) To what extent is the diaspora community working toward scientific,
engineering, medical and educational institution building? How might
diasporans with backgrounds in these fields or otherwise affiliated
with the Academy, or professional and technical societies, become
engaged in science diplomacy programs?
– Post sees no evidence that the diaspora is involved in science
diplomacy.
F) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in conflict
resolution and peace building? Do you see future potential to translate
diaspora community participation in these processes into other
priorities governing the bilateral (and/or regional) relationship?
– As explained above in sections A and C, the government has just
begun to reach out to its American diaspora community through the U.S.
Azeris Network (), which also works closely with the
Turkish Coalition of America. This organization periodically calls
on its members to email their government representatives to change U.S.
policies regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or
Armenia/Azerbaijan balance in general. While not exactly
“peace-building,” the organization does call for the peaceful
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan. The organization also campaigns against any
recognition on a state or federal level of the Armenian “genocide.”
G) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in meeting the
health, education and welfare needs of indigenous peoples?
– Post is not aware of any such activity.
H) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in democracy
promotion, electoral reform and civil society development? Are there
key milestones in your host country or host government’s development
that would create opportunities for such engagement in the future?
– As mentioned in section A, a group called Azerbaijani-Americans
for Democracy (AZAD) has begun lobbying for more USG attention to the
Azerbaijani government’s failings on democracy and human rights. This
group has recently been active in lobbying for the freedom of jailed
youth bloggers Emin Milli and Adnan Hajizade, including organizing a
protest in front of Azerbaijan’s Embassy in Washington. The group
previously sponsored protests against changes to Azerbaijan’s
constitution.
I) How would you characterize the level of concern and attention
given to diaspora communities by your host government? If applicable,
please describe the host government’s organization and strategy
dedicated to relationship-building with its diaspora communities. For
example, host governments may have established promotion offices
to encourage diasporans’ return, bringing with them know-how and
financial resources.
– There is an Azerbaijani government State Committee on Work with
the Diaspora, but this Committee is not very prominent or active.
Azerbaijan recently opened a Consulate in Los Angeles, and its
first Consul Elin Suleymanov has been highly active in organizing
Azerbaijani-Americans into a community.
It also supports the U.S.-Azeri Network. None of these organizations
seem to be involved in encouraging diasporans to return to the country,
but rather to advocate for Azerbaijan’s interests with their host
government.
J) If post has undertaken programs to reach out proactively to diaspora
community members, please share the circumstances that prompted the
outreach effort, how outreach was conducted or programmed, personal
impressions from the experience, and benefits from the outreach effort.
– Given the small size of the diaspora community, post had not
conducted any programmatic outreach to them.
K) If post has received unsolicited requests from the diaspora
community, please share the nature the requests, the considerations
post took into account in formulating respective responses, and the
outcomes of interaction.
– Post has not received any unsolicited requests from the diaspora
community.
L) To what extent has post designed or participated in public diplomacy
programs customized to diaspora community needs and interests? Does
post anticipate taking advantage of such opportunities in the future?
– Post has not participated in any public diplomacy programs for the
diaspora community. Post does not anticipate any such programs in
the near future.
M) In planning future programs and anticipating requests for assistance
from diaspora community actors, what types of knowledge management
tools and information materials would be most helpful to action
officers at post? If the Department were to develop a reach-back
program to academics in the field of diaspora community engagement,
what are post’s preferences for accessing such a mechanism?
– Post does not have any such requests.
Finally, posts are asked to include a point of contact for their
respective submissions for S/GPI and S/P’s future reference and
follow-up.
– The point of contact for diaspora questions is Political Officer
Joanna Ganson who can be reached at [email protected]
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2011/09/20/wikileaks-azeri-turkish-diasporas/
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
www.usazeris.org
www.usazeris.org