While displacement disrupts normalcy, basketball can restore structure and stability.
YEREVAN (Armenia) – Continuity can provide relief during displacement. Taking part in regular, known activities reconnects people with familiar patterns and counters disorder – even if only temporarily. These moments of relief combat the uncertainty of being unanchored from everyday life.
Following the 2023 escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, more than 100,000 people were displaced and sought refuge in Armenia, leaving behind their homes, communities, and daily routines.
Young people from Nagorno-Karabakh are now spread across Yerevan and various regions of Armenia. Beyond losing their homes and interruptions in education, there is also limited access to sports facilities and equipment for children.
Restart Through Basketball: Support for Nagorno-Karabakh Players is a Basketball for Good project that ensures these young girls and boys in Armenia can continue with structured basketball training and continue to build their personal and athletic lives while being displaced within the country – something to rely on in an uncertain environment.
SECURING SOLIDARITY
The Basketball Federation of Armenia created Restart Through Basketball: Support for Nagorno-Karabakh Players to identify displaced young basketball players from Nagorno-Karabakh and provide them with access to secure facilities, training, and equipment – and an overall sense of stability despite their unpredictable circumstances.
Local schools and community centers supported the team in finding participants and offered access to facilities. Professional coaches and mental health specialists contributed their time and expertise at training sessions to advance individual resilience and cultivate impact beyond the court.
MAINTAINING SKILLS DEVELOPMENT & RENEWED ATTITUDE
Approximately 100 displaced boys and girls, ages 10-18 from Nagorno-Karabakh, participated in training sessions and project activities. 300 additional community members, including family members, volunteers and coaches, were able to take part in various tournaments, events and outreach activities as well – capitalizing on the influence of basketball as a tool to facilitate community inclusion.
The objectives on the court were met. Training attendance targets were reached. The young hoopers did not miss a beat in their skills development – some players even returned to regular competitions and played for teams in Armenian Championships as members of local teams.
Armenian Senior League Players and National Team players and coaches participated in the training sessions, shared their experiences and stepped up as role models for the young athletes. Their presence kept the players motivated and fostered an even deeper sense of belonging in the basketball community.
The combination of these efforts helped strengthen confidence, discipline, and were an avenue for socializing and reinforcing solidarity between the young athletes and their fellow community members – advancing overall social well-being.
REVIVING A LOST PASSION
One 14-year old boy from Nagorno-Karabakh was no longer able to play basketball and lost access to his local club and teammates after being displaced. After joining the project and working with the coaches, he not only overcame initial struggles with confidence and motivation, but his revived enthusiasm and discipline in practice led to improvements as a player and even to the Armenian Championship as a member of one of the local teams. Through this process, he slowly began to feel part of something again. He found comfort in the rhythm of training, rebuilt trust in others, and regained a sense of stability.
PRESERVING ACCESS TO BASKETBALL & CONNECTION
The Restart Through Basketball initiative showcased the importance of continuity for displaced populations and how consistent basketball activities can help create stability and instill confidence and motivation for displaced girls and boys. The FIBA Foundation is excited to support the purpose-driven Basketball Federation of Armenia as they look to build on existing program strengths and capabilities and carry out this dedicated mission to preserve engagement in basketball.
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The FIBA Foundation is the social and legacy arm of FIBA that addresses the role of sports and particularly basketball in society, preserving and promoting basketball’s values and its cultural heritage.
The FIBA Foundation believes that basketball has the power to empower, educate and inspire youth and facilitates this by implementing Basketball For Good projects around the world.
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Why Russia Still Isn’t Finished with Armenia
Armenia’s continued movement away from Moscow will depend on the passage of constitutional reforms.
The results of the June 7 Armenian national elections are in, and Russia’s attempt to reclaim its waning influence in the South Caucasus has suffered a major setback. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s victory underscores Moscow’s failure to install a leadership more receptive to Russian interests in Yerevan.
The next steps will be crucial. Whether Armenia continues its gradual shift toward the West, advances regional normalization, and strengthens its economic sovereignty will depend on the government’s ability to secure the constitutional changes necessary to finalize a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Washington should pay close attention and encourage Yerevan to move forward. The opportunities for peace, increased prosperity, and greater US influence in an area historically dominated by Russia are also at stake. If successfully implemented, the reforms in Armenia could help prevent unresolved Soviet-era disputes from resurfacing in the future.
Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission confirmed that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won 49.7–49.8 percent of the vote, securing 64 seats in the new 105-seat National Assembly. The more pro-Moscow opposition coalition Strong Armenia won 29 seats (23.2 percent), while the Armenia Alliance won 12 seats (9.9 percent). A marginal 0.01 percent difference kept another pro-Russian party, Prosperous Armenia, below the 4 percent threshold required for parliamentary representation. Pashinyan’s party retained a governing majority, but lost seven of the 71 seats it held in the current legislature.
The opposition has rejected the election results and begun mobilizing supporters, while the government is preparing further action against Kremlin-linked political adversaries. The election unfolded amid growing Russian pressure on Armenia. On June 15, the head of SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence service, Sergei Naryshkin, dismissed the election outcome as “relatively inconclusive and somewhat questionable.” This signals Moscow’s intent to continue exploiting Armenia’s domestic fault lines even though its allies were electorally unsuccessful.
While the Kremlin can be expected to encourage the Armenian opposition to continue casting doubt on the election’s legitimacy, the battle has shifted to the far more critical task of preventing the prime minister’s party from amending the constitution. Civic Contract fell short of the two-thirds supermajority needed for constitutional amendments, which is particularly significant because Azerbaijan has made constitutional reform a prerequisite for finalizing the 2025 peace agreement.
The constitutional issue is frequently misunderstood. The dispute does not rest on an explicit territorial claim within the constitution’s articles, but on the preamble’s incorporation of Armenia’s Declaration of Independence as a foundational legal reference. That declaration invokes the 1989 decision on the “reunification” of Armenia and what it terms “Nagorno-Karabakh,” embedding a historical claim to territory internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. This creates a legal and symbolic claim that Baku views as preserving both a territorial claim and the Soviet-era nomenclature for Karabakh, while other countries formerly bound by the Soviet Union are rejecting Moscow-imposed place names.
A treaty signed by the Pashinyan government today cannot neutralize constitutional provisions that future governments may reinterpret. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, peace must rest on legal permanence rather than political contingency. So long as Armenia’s constitutional framework continues to derive authority from texts that include historical references to Karabakh, the risk persists that a future government could reopen territorial claims. Constitutional reform thus becomes a central test of whether Armenia is prepared to translate diplomatic normalization into an irreversible acceptance of post-Soviet borders.
Pashinyan has argued that constitutional amendments are necessary not only to advance normalization with Azerbaijan but also to support broader institutional reforms at home. If he can assemble the roughly 70 votes needed in parliament, his relatively strong popular mandate would then give him the political space to frame the referendum as a national endorsement of peace with Azerbaijan and potentially mobilize sufficient public support for passage.
With his party six seats short of the supermajority required for constitutional amendments, one option for Pashinyan is to construct a cross-party parliamentary coalition around narrowly defined reform provisions rather than attempting to secure wholesale opposition alignment. This would likely involve issue-by-issue bargaining with centrist or pragmatic opposition elements, focusing on specific constitutional clauses tied to the peace agreement while avoiding broader ideological alignment.
This strategy would require framing the amendments as technical prerequisites for international normalization rather than as partisan concessions, thereby lowering the political cost of opposition deputies supporting them. Even if full cooperation is not achievable, partial defections or abstentions from non-aligned blocs could be sufficient to bridge the six-seat gap and meet the two-thirds threshold.
The Trump administration could facilitate by providing diplomatic cover and sequencing support to help translate Armenia’s parliamentary arithmetic into a viable constitutional referendum pathway. This would mean leveraging Washington’s relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan to reinforce the logic of constitutional adjustment to consolidate the broader settlement associated with the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) connectivity framework.
By doing so, the United States would be aligning institutional stabilization in Yerevan with the strategic objective of opening and securing the Trans-Caspian corridor at a moment when both Russia and Iran are comparatively constrained. From a US perspective, this creates an opportunity to entrench long-term influence in the South Caucasus by anchoring peace, infrastructure, and regulatory alignment within a Western-backed regional order.
About the Author: Kamran Bokhari
Kamran Bokhari, PhD, is a senior resident fellow at the Middle East Policy Council and a senior director at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington. A strategic forecaster, Bokhari teaches Eurasian geopolitics at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. Dr. Bokhari is the author of Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/why-russia-still-isnt-finished-with-armenia?fbclid=IwY2xjawSkNfRleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeLb75r7PqsNCPqlkL_DAlCj-ouY1yIHtQJDM2JzgZy1RnxKECWxv1EsZoIEk_aem_5ZJNk4TsP9O3WyLeW_ZISw
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Armenia After the Election: Diversification Without Decoupling from Russia
Armenia’s parliamentary election is over. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won nearly 50% of the total vote, comfortably outperforming its competitors while falling short of a constitutional majority. Moscow’s overt pressure and hybrid interference against Pashinyan appear to have backfired, and the result amounted to a vote of confidence in his diversification strategy following Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, including closer ties with the European Union and the United States.
However, electoral campaigns tend to sharpen political cleavages and oversimplify complex issues, often intentionally polarising the electorate for the benefit of candidates. The country’s real state of affairs will be clearer once the campaign fever fades.
Yerevan is walking a tightrope, using a window of opportunity to reformat relations with Moscow in an effort to transform Russia from an owner into a partner.
Pashinyan’s victory should not be interpreted as a mandate for breaking ties with Russia. Rather, Yerevan is walking a tightrope, using a window of opportunity to reformat relations with Moscow in an effort to transform Russia from an owner into a partner. Yet the window is unlikely to remain open indefinitely, and, importantly, Pashinyan has not burned bridges with Moscow.
Choice Between Russia and the West? Between Peace and War?
Both western media and Russian officials dichotomised the picture: this is Armenia’s choice between Russia and the west. Indeed, Yerevan–Moscow relations have deteriorated since the Russia-backed Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) failed to support Armenia during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which was ultimately recaptured by Azerbaijan in 2023.
The Washington Summit in August 2025 created momentum for Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty negotiations, effectively sidelining Russia—long accustomed to exploiting its mediator role in the South Caucasus to cement geopolitical influence. Furthermore, the US launched a new initiative, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), to establish a transport route between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia.
US Vice President JD Vance travelled to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February to follow up on Trump’s initiative. In late May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio briefly visited Yerevan and signed a Charter on Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership, while President Trump expressed his “complete and total endorsement” of Pashinyan on social media. Earlier the same month, Pashinyan hosted the inaugural EU–Armenia Summit and the European Political Community Summit, bringing together nearly 50 world leaders.
Pashinyan’s campaign capitalised on these dichotomised perceptions, framing the election as the choice between a pro-western and a pro-Russian course, and between peace and war. During the Yerevan Dialogue, an annual international forum organised by the Armenian Foreign Ministry and held this year back-to-back with the EU–Armenia Summit, Pashinyan argued for lasting peace, the unblocking of regional communications, and the promotion of European values, stressing the economic benefits of his “Crossroads of Peace” initiative. Yet Russia’s enduring presence in Armenia remained the elephant in the room.
Pashinyan’s main challengers were Strong Armenia (23.27%), led by Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan; Armenia Alliance (9.92%), led by former president Robert Kocharyan; and Prosperous Armenia, led by Gagik Tsarukyan (3.98%), which appears to have fallen just short of the 4% threshold required to enter parliament. Opposition parties campaigned on improving ties with Moscow, claims of persecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and criticism of the peace process. Nagorno-Karabakh remains a particularly sensitive issue for Armenian society. Pashinyan’s campaign intentionally associated the opposition with a possible revision of the peace treaty initialled at the White House and a resumption of war with Azerbaijan, calling opposition leaders a “three-headed war party.” Notably, Azerbaijan’s state-controlled media also favoured Pashinyan, portraying him as the candidate of peace and the opposition as revanchist forces.
Among the opposition figures, Karapetyan—the owner of the Moscow-based Tashir Group, which controls significant energy assets in Armenia—was widely viewed as Moscow’s preferred candidate. In June 2025, Karapetyan was detained and placed under house arrest on charges of publicly calling for the seizure of power amid escalating tensions between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Armenian parliament adopted a law nationalising Karapetyan’s Armenian Electric Networks (AEN), the country’s grid operator. During the Armenia–Russia summit in April, Putin demanded that Russia’s “friends,” likely referring to Karapetyan, be allowed to run for parliamentary elections.
Ultimately, Moscow’s political and economic pressure aided Pashinyan by consolidating the perception of the incumbent prime minister standing up to Moscow, likely increasing voter turnout.
Continued Systemic Dependence on Russia
Despite widespread narratives about the decline of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus and elsewhere, Moscow retains significant leverage over Yerevan through trade, energy, military, intelligence, labour migration, and cultural connections. Armenia’s dependence on Russia remains substantial and exceeds that of many other post-Soviet states. As a result, Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.
After achieving a record trade volume of $12 bn in 2024, largely due to the re-export of western goods via Armenia, bilateral trade shrank by roughly half. Nevertheless, Russia still accounts for 35.5% of Armenia’s foreign trade, followed by China (12.5%) and the EU (11.8%).
Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.
Putin made it clear that membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and participation in an EU customs union are incompatible. In response, Pashinyan argued that developing relations with the EU under the current framework remains compatible with Armenia’s membership in the EAEU, assuring Putin that Armenia’s “relations with Russia have never been and will never be in question.” Neither argument is new. In 2017, Armenia and the EU concluded the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Tailored to Armenia’s obligations under the EAEU, the agreement excluded a free trade component.
Nevertheless, to punish Yerevan’s European aspirations, Russia escalated economic coercion against Armenia, whose exports heavily rely on the Russian market. Russian regulatory bodies introduced unilateral restrictions on Armenian alcoholic beverages, fruits, vegetables, and flowers, and imposed additional inspections. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk implied that flights between Yerevan and Moscow could be suspended if Armenia moved closer to the EU. Most importantly, Moscow signalled that Armenia’s preferential gas pricing could be revised. The Armenian section of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is also controlled by Gazprom.
Although the US and Armenia completed negotiations on an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in February, Armenia’s Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant—the only nuclear power plant in the South Caucasus, which generates about 30-40% of Armenia’s electricity—remains closely integrated with Russia’s nuclear fuel cycle, and cannot be replaced easily. After the election, the government announced that the ongoing life extension programme could allow the plant to operate until 2036. At the same time, Yerevan is considering proposals from six countries to build a small modular reactor (SMR), while refraining from making a final decision in the near term.
During Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow in April, he raised the issue of transferring the Armenian railway concession from Russia’s South Caucasus Railway to a country considered friendly to both Yerevan and Moscow. However, Moscow signalled it had no intention of handing over its concession.
After the EU–Armenia Summit, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Gyumri, a city that hosts a Russian military base, and attended an Armenia-France concert, drawing public attention. However, although Yerevan has suspended its participation in the Russia-led CSTO because of dissatisfaction with the organisation’s passive response during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it has no intention of requesting the removal of Russian troops from the country.
Given continued pressure from Moscow, Pashinyan’s European slogans are likely to subside.
FSB border guards left Armenian border checkpoints, including the Zvartnots International Airport, and Pashinyan established a Foreign Intelligence Service, possibly with western support. However, the National Security Service (NSS) maintains personal—and likely institutional—ties with Russian counterparts.
Pashinyan’s victory will not necessarily consolidate his overtly pro-European stance during the election campaign. Given continued pressure from Moscow, Pashinyan’s European slogans are likely to subside.
Peace Process in Stalemate?
The key to Armenia’s economic diversification largely lies in the peace process with Baku. Armenia’s trade dependence on Russia has been exacerbated by its landlocked geography and the Azerbaijani–Turkish blockade since the 1990s. Unblocking regional communications would improve Armenia’s access to European and Middle Eastern trade networks and strengthen its role in the emerging Middle Corridor. However, the full opening of borders with its two neighbours is contingent on the conclusion of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and subsequent normalisation of Armenia–Türkiye relations—outcomes that Russia is attempting to prevent.
The full opening of borders is contingent on the conclusion of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and normalisation of Armenia–Türkiye relations—outcomes that Russia is attempting to prevent.
For the peace treaty, Baku has not withdrawn its demand for amendments to the preamble of Armenia’s Constitution, which it claims contains implicit territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Although Pashinyan stated that Civic Contract would not seek coalition partners, securing constitutional amendments would require a two-thirds constitutional majority, which Pashinyan currently lacks. The need to secure cooperation from opposition parties could place Pashinyan in a difficult position. Moreover, the constitutional amendment process concerns not only the preamble but also the drafting of a new constitution and is expected to be lengthy and complex.
Nevertheless, without waiting for the conclusion of the peace treaty, both Baku and Ankara have taken practical steps toward normalising relations with Armenia. Türkiye opened its borders to third-country citizens, simplified visa procedures, and launched direct flights between Ankara and Yerevan. There is speculation that Ankara may decouple the full opening of borders from the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process. Azerbaijan also lifted its long-standing ban on the transit of goods to Armenia, which, however, ironically connected Armenia with Russia. The construction of the Trump Route is not necessarily linked to the progress of the peace process. During Rubio’s visit to Yerevan in May, the US and Armenia agreed to a Framework Agreement on the TRIPP, including the establishment of a joint venture, the TRIPP Development Company.
Baku’s position remains important. Recent developments suggest that, despite irritation over Putin’s remark during his meeting with Pashinyan that “we come back to [the Karabakh issue] time and again,” Azerbaijan has begun mending ties with Moscow by formally settling its dispute with Russia over the downing of the Azerbaijani passenger airliner. However, this does not mean that relations between Baku and Moscow will return to the level envisaged in the 2022 Declaration on Allied Cooperation. In April, Volodymyr Zelensky made his first visit to Baku since the start of the war. Azerbaijan is likely seeking to extract gains from the current limbo in the peace process.
Armenians are closely watching developments on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine has created strategic space for Yerevan. However, unfavourable developments for Ukraine in 2024–25, combined with the resumption of US–Russia bilateral talks, have led some in the Armenian security community to argue that Yerevan should recognise Russia’s continued geopolitical interests in the region and avoid adversarial approaches to Moscow. Yet the tide may be turning again in 2026. In May, Zelensky made his first visit to Yerevan for the European Political Community. Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia is not an ally of Russia when it comes to the war against Ukraine.
After the Election
So, is Europe merely part of Pashinyan’s electoral rhetoric? No. His election strategy reflects both declining public trust in Russia and growing support for closer ties with the EU since 2023. The most recent public opinion survey indicates that around 75% of Armenians support the country’s possible accession to the European Union. Expectations are therefore high.
Two years ago, the EU committed €270 mn under its Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia (2024–27) to support the country’s socioeconomic resilience and investments in business and connectivity. More recently, the EU has expanded its efforts to help Armenia withstand Russian disinformation and economic coercion. Nevertheless, without sustained long-term engagement, these initiatives will do little to reduce Armenia’s systemic dependence on Russia.
When the post-election euphoria has faded, elected officials must confront political realities and structural constraints, which ultimately shape a country’s course. Pashinyan’s diversification strategy, including closer ties with the west, is supported by a majority of Armenian voters. A window of opportunity remains open. Yet it is unlikely to remain so indefinitely. Its duration will depend largely on the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the sustainability of western engagement in the region, particularly beyond Donald Trump’s second term.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).June 18, 2026
Armenia’s parliamentary election is over. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won nearly 50% of the total vote, comfortably outperforming its competitors while falling short of a constitutional majority. Moscow’s overt pressure and hybrid interference against Pashinyan appear to have backfired, and the result amounted to a vote of confidence in his diversification strategy following Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, including closer ties with the European Union and the United States.
However, electoral campaigns tend to sharpen political cleavages and oversimplify complex issues, often intentionally polarising the electorate for the benefit of candidates. The country’s real state of affairs will be clearer once the campaign fever fades.
Yerevan is walking a tightrope, using a window of opportunity to reformat relations with Moscow in an effort to transform Russia from an owner into a partner.
Pashinyan’s victory should not be interpreted as a mandate for breaking ties with Russia. Rather, Yerevan is walking a tightrope, using a window of opportunity to reformat relations with Moscow in an effort to transform Russia from an owner into a partner. Yet the window is unlikely to remain open indefinitely, and, importantly, Pashinyan has not burned bridges with Moscow.
Choice Between Russia and the West? Between Peace and War?
Both western media and Russian officials dichotomised the picture: this is Armenia’s choice between Russia and the west. Indeed, Yerevan–Moscow relations have deteriorated since the Russia-backed Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) failed to support Armenia during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which was ultimately recaptured by Azerbaijan in 2023.
The Washington Summit in August 2025 created momentum for Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty negotiations, effectively sidelining Russia—long accustomed to exploiting its mediator role in the South Caucasus to cement geopolitical influence. Furthermore, the US launched a new initiative, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), to establish a transport route between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia.
US Vice President JD Vance travelled to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February to follow up on Trump’s initiative. In late May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio briefly visited Yerevan and signed a Charter on Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership, while President Trump expressed his “complete and total endorsement” of Pashinyan on social media. Earlier the same month, Pashinyan hosted the inaugural EU–Armenia Summit and the European Political Community Summit, bringing together nearly 50 world leaders.
Pashinyan’s campaign capitalised on these dichotomised perceptions, framing the election as the choice between a pro-western and a pro-Russian course, and between peace and war. During the Yerevan Dialogue, an annual international forum organised by the Armenian Foreign Ministry and held this year back-to-back with the EU–Armenia Summit, Pashinyan argued for lasting peace, the unblocking of regional communications, and the promotion of European values, stressing the economic benefits of his “Crossroads of Peace” initiative. Yet Russia’s enduring presence in Armenia remained the elephant in the room.
Pashinyan’s main challengers were Strong Armenia (23.27%), led by Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan; Armenia Alliance (9.92%), led by former president Robert Kocharyan; and Prosperous Armenia, led by Gagik Tsarukyan (3.98%), which appears to have fallen just short of the 4% threshold required to enter parliament. Opposition parties campaigned on improving ties with Moscow, claims of persecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and criticism of the peace process. Nagorno-Karabakh remains a particularly sensitive issue for Armenian society. Pashinyan’s campaign intentionally associated the opposition with a possible revision of the peace treaty initialled at the White House and a resumption of war with Azerbaijan, calling opposition leaders a “three-headed war party.” Notably, Azerbaijan’s state-controlled media also favoured Pashinyan, portraying him as the candidate of peace and the opposition as revanchist forces.
Among the opposition figures, Karapetyan—the owner of the Moscow-based Tashir Group, which controls significant energy assets in Armenia—was widely viewed as Moscow’s preferred candidate. In June 2025, Karapetyan was detained and placed under house arrest on charges of publicly calling for the seizure of power amid escalating tensions between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Armenian parliament adopted a law nationalising Karapetyan’s Armenian Electric Networks (AEN), the country’s grid operator. During the Armenia–Russia summit in April, Putin demanded that Russia’s “friends,” likely referring to Karapetyan, be allowed to run for parliamentary elections.
Ultimately, Moscow’s political and economic pressure aided Pashinyan by consolidating the perception of the incumbent prime minister standing up to Moscow, likely increasing voter turnout.
Continued Systemic Dependence on Russia
Despite widespread narratives about the decline of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus and elsewhere, Moscow retains significant leverage over Yerevan through trade, energy, military, intelligence, labour migration, and cultural connections. Armenia’s dependence on Russia remains substantial and exceeds that of many other post-Soviet states. As a result, Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.
After achieving a record trade volume of $12 bn in 2024, largely due to the re-export of western goods via Armenia, bilateral trade shrank by roughly half. Nevertheless, Russia still accounts for 35.5% of Armenia’s foreign trade, followed by China (12.5%) and the EU (11.8%).
Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.
Putin made it clear that membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and participation in an EU customs union are incompatible. In response, Pashinyan argued that developing relations with the EU under the current framework remains compatible with Armenia’s membership in the EAEU, assuring Putin that Armenia’s “relations with Russia have never been and will never be in question.” Neither argument is new. In 2017, Armenia and the EU concluded the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Tailored to Armenia’s obligations under the EAEU, the agreement excluded a free trade component.
Nevertheless, to punish Yerevan’s European aspirations, Russia escalated economic coercion against Armenia, whose exports heavily rely on the Russian market. Russian regulatory bodies introduced unilateral restrictions on Armenian alcoholic beverages, fruits, vegetables, and flowers, and imposed additional inspections. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk implied that flights between Yerevan and Moscow could be suspended if Armenia moved closer to the EU. Most importantly, Moscow signalled that Armenia’s preferential gas pricing could be revised. The Armenian section of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is also controlled by Gazprom.
Although the US and Armenia completed negotiations on an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in February, Armenia’s Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant—the only nuclear power plant in the South Caucasus, which generates about 30-40% of Armenia’s electricity—remains closely integrated with Russia’s nuclear fuel cycle, and cannot be replaced easily. After the election, the government announced that the ongoing life extension programme could allow the plant to operate until 2036. At the same time, Yerevan is considering proposals from six countries to build a small modular reactor (SMR), while refraining from making a final decision in the near term.
During Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow in April, he raised the issue of transferring the Armenian railway concession from Russia’s South Caucasus Railway to a country considered friendly to both Yerevan and Moscow. However, Moscow signalled it had no intention of handing over its concession.
After the EU–Armenia Summit, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Gyumri, a city that hosts a Russian military base, and attended an Armenia-France concert, drawing public attention. However, although Yerevan has suspended its participation in the Russia-led CSTO because of dissatisfaction with the organisation’s passive response during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it has no intention of requesting the removal of Russian troops from the country.
Given continued pressure from Moscow, Pashinyan’s European slogans are likely to subside.
FSB border guards left Armenian border checkpoints, including the Zvartnots International Airport, and Pashinyan established a Foreign Intelligence Service, possibly with western support. However, the National Security Service (NSS) maintains personal—and likely institutional—ties with Russian counterparts.
Pashinyan’s victory will not necessarily consolidate his overtly pro-European stance during the election campaign. Given continued pressure from Moscow, Pashinyan’s European slogans are likely to subside.
Peace Process in Stalemate?
The key to Armenia’s economic diversification largely lies in the peace process with Baku. Armenia’s trade dependence on Russia has been exacerbated by its landlocked geography and the Azerbaijani–Turkish blockade since the 1990s. Unblocking regional communications would improve Armenia’s access to European and Middle Eastern trade networks and strengthen its role in the emerging Middle Corridor. However, the full opening of borders with its two neighbours is contingent on the conclusion of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and subsequent normalisation of Armenia–Türkiye relations—outcomes that Russia is attempting to prevent.
The full opening of borders is contingent on the conclusion of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and normalisation of Armenia–Türkiye relations—outcomes that Russia is attempting to prevent.
For the peace treaty, Baku has not withdrawn its demand for amendments to the preamble of Armenia’s Constitution, which it claims contains implicit territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Although Pashinyan stated that Civic Contract would not seek coalition partners, securing constitutional amendments would require a two-thirds constitutional majority, which Pashinyan currently lacks. The need to secure cooperation from opposition parties could place Pashinyan in a difficult position. Moreover, the constitutional amendment process concerns not only the preamble but also the drafting of a new constitution and is expected to be lengthy and complex.
Nevertheless, without waiting for the conclusion of the peace treaty, both Baku and Ankara have taken practical steps toward normalising relations with Armenia. Türkiye opened its borders to third-country citizens, simplified visa procedures, and launched direct flights between Ankara and Yerevan. There is speculation that Ankara may decouple the full opening of borders from the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process. Azerbaijan also lifted its long-standing ban on the transit of goods to Armenia, which, however, ironically connected Armenia with Russia. The construction of the Trump Route is not necessarily linked to the progress of the peace process. During Rubio’s visit to Yerevan in May, the US and Armenia agreed to a Framework Agreement on the TRIPP, including the establishment of a joint venture, the TRIPP Development Company.
Baku’s position remains important. Recent developments suggest that, despite irritation over Putin’s remark during his meeting with Pashinyan that “we come back to [the Karabakh issue] time and again,” Azerbaijan has begun mending ties with Moscow by formally settling its dispute with Russia over the downing of the Azerbaijani passenger airliner. However, this does not mean that relations between Baku and Moscow will return to the level envisaged in the 2022 Declaration on Allied Cooperation. In April, Volodymyr Zelensky made his first visit to Baku since the start of the war. Azerbaijan is likely seeking to extract gains from the current limbo in the peace process.
Armenians are closely watching developments on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine has created strategic space for Yerevan. However, unfavourable developments for Ukraine in 2024–25, combined with the resumption of US–Russia bilateral talks, have led some in the Armenian security community to argue that Yerevan should recognise Russia’s continued geopolitical interests in the region and avoid adversarial approaches to Moscow. Yet the tide may be turning again in 2026. In May, Zelensky made his first visit to Yerevan for the European Political Community. Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia is not an ally of Russia when it comes to the war against Ukraine.
After the Election
So, is Europe merely part of Pashinyan’s electoral rhetoric? No. His election strategy reflects both declining public trust in Russia and growing support for closer ties with the EU since 2023. The most recent public opinion survey indicates that around 75% of Armenians support the country’s possible accession to the European Union. Expectations are therefore high.
Two years ago, the EU committed €270 mn under its Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia (2024–27) to support the country’s socioeconomic resilience and investments in business and connectivity. More recently, the EU has expanded its efforts to help Armenia withstand Russian disinformation and economic coercion. Nevertheless, without sustained long-term engagement, these initiatives will do little to reduce Armenia’s systemic dependence on Russia.
When the post-election euphoria has faded, elected officials must confront political realities and structural constraints, which ultimately shape a country’s course. Pashinyan’s diversification strategy, including closer ties with the west, is supported by a majority of Armenian voters. A window of opportunity remains open. Yet it is unlikely to remain so indefinitely. Its duration will depend largely on the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the sustainability of western engagement in the region, particularly beyond Donald Trump’s second term.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).
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Armenian court revokes ARMNOC ownership of Tsaghkadzor
The organisation led by Gagik Tsarukyan has lost a property portfolio in the country’s leading tourist destination following a judicial decision after his political party’s failure to secure parliamentary seats in the national elections.
According to the Armenian Report, the Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the Administrative Court had upheld a lawsuit to overturn the ownership rights of the Armenian Olympic Committee over a 225.1-hectare plot in the Tsaghkadzor ropeway area. Prosecutors value the area at over 36.4 billion drams, making it one of the most valuable cases of state property currently before the courts.
The organisation, headed by long-standing leader, the businessman and politician Tsarukyan since 2004, obtained the property’s registration in December 2005. This was originally based on a decision issued by the governor of Kotayk Province, as well as on provisions contained within amendments to the national Land Code.
However, the Administrative Court concluded that these legal provisions could not serve as a basis for granting ownership rights, as the transfer occurred after the relevant legislation had entered into force. Consequently, the judge declared the registration invalid, ruling that the state-owned property should not have been registered in the name of the Olympic Committee. Once the ruling comes into effect, ownership of the 225.1-hectare area will transfer back to the Republic of Armenia.
Tsaghkadzor is a major tourist city and ski resort. Due to its high altitude, it also attracts many foreign athletes who prepare for the new season in the mountains. ARMNOC also runs a large sports complex with a hotel in Tsaghkadzor.
The decision comes at a politically sensitive time for Tsarukyan, whose Prosperous Armenia Party was dealt a significant blow in the recent parliamentary elections. According to the final results published by the Central Election Commission, the party received 58,287 votes (3.9893% of the total), falling just short of the 4% threshold required for parliamentary representation.
Following the recalculation of the results, Tsarukyan’s party would eventually receive 4%. However, the CEC then cancelled the votes of three polling stations, which affected the results, and Prosperous Armenia lost again.
Tensions between pro-government forces and Tsarukyan began to escalate a few months before the elections. This was when the businessman announced his plans to stand in the elections as part of the opposition. Tsarukyan was one of three main pro-Russian opposition figures to the ruling party, ‘Civil Contract’, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which was eventually elected with majority of the voices and will form the new government.
On 10 April, just a day before the scheduled ARMNOC elections, which would have seen Tsarukyan elected for a sixth term as the sole candidate, the Weightlifting Federation of Armenia, led by Pashinyan’s adviser Arayik Harutyunyan, turned to the court to suspend the proceedings. The ARMNOC election process has now been stopped until the court’s decision.
Harutyunyan later accused Tsarukyan of impeding the development of sports in the country. According to some sources, the Armenian government sees former ARMNOC president Ishkhan Zakaryan as a potential replacement for Tsarukyan. Zakaryan led the ARMNOC from 2000 to 2004 and stepped down after the country failed to win a medal at the 2004 Athens Olympics. He was replaced by Tsarukyan’s, and during his 22-year tenure, Armenia has won 19 Olympic medals: one gold, 10 silver and eight bronze.
Zakaryan has led the Pan Armenian Games Committee since 2011 and was a long-standing member of Tsarukyan’s party. However, he now maintains close relationships with the current government.
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EU Neighbors East: Participatory public discussion on equal opportunities held
The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Republic of Armenia held a dialogue on 26 May with civil society organisations (CSOs) on state-funded programmes to advance equal opportunities during the 2027-2029 period.
Organised with the support of the EU4Gender Equality Reform Helpdesk project, funded by the European Union and implemented by Niras, the meeting was led by the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Tatevik Stepanyan.
Over 60 participants attended the event, including representatives from the ministry and various CSOs that focus on issues related to gender equality, women’s and children’s rights, trafficking in human beings, as well as issues affecting people with disabilities and the elderly.
The hybrid event, conducted both online and in-person, provided an opportunity for civil society organisations that implement state-funded programmes or provide social services with the ministry’s financial support to learn about the programmes planned for the next three years. In Armenia, state budget funding is allocated according to a medium-term expenditure framework that spans three-year periods. This framework serves as the basis for the annual state budget, allowing the government to allocate funds in line with its policy priorities and medium-term budget objectives.
During the meeting, each division of the ministry provided an overview of its programmes, detailing target beneficiaries, proposed funding allocations, and the social services to be offered. These programmes address a wide range of issues, including support for survivors of domestic violence and human trafficking, initiatives to promote the social inclusion of persons with disabilities, day care services for children, and assistance for the elderly.
Additionally, the ministry presented ongoing sub-legislative amendments to establish new criteria for the care of children and the elderly, as well as broader reforms that are currently being implemented.
This public discussion was organised as part of the EU4Gender Equality Reform Helpdesk Project’s support for gender equality and women’s empowerment across the Eastern Neighbourhood region, including in Armenia. Further details on the event are available on the website of Armenia’s Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
Learn more about the EU’s support for gender equality in the Eastern Neighbourhood region
Factsheet on the EU4Gender Reform Helpdesk Phase II
EU4Gender Equality Reform Helpdesk Phase II project page
Gender Equality Library
EU4Gender Equality Reform Helpdesk Phase I project page
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Al Arabiya English obtains 14-point draft of US-Iran Memorandum of Understandi
Al Arabiya English has obtained a copy of the 14-point agreement expected to be signed on Friday between Washington and Tehran.
1. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, together with their allies in the current war, declare upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and undertake that from now on they will not launch any hostile action against each other, and will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. The final agreement will confirm the provisions of this Article and the remaining Articles.
2. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
3. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to negotiate and reach a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent.
4. Immediately upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, the United States Lift the naval blockade and prevent any interference or obstruction against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and restore traffic within a maximum of 30 days to its full capacity; the traffic of ships shall be proportional to the pre-war volume of traffic on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States also undertakes to withdraw its forces from the surrounding areas within 30 days after the final agreement.
5. Upon signing this Memorandum of Understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately take steps to ensure that the movement of merchant ships from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa is resumed within 30 days to the pre-war volume, taking into account the need for the removal of technical obstacles and the neutralization of mines by Iran.
6. The United States undertakes, together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan agreed upon by both parties for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, While ensuring financing of at least $300 billion. The implementation mechanism of this plan, as part of the final agreement, will be formulated within 60 days.
7. The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed upon as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran, including resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, both primary and secondary.
8. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have agreed that the fate of enriched material and the fate of all other mutually agreed nuclear-related issues, including Iran’s nuclear needs, will be adequately addressed in a final agreement; the final agreement will confirm the provisions of this Article.
9. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that, pending a final agreement, they will maintain the status quo: Iran will maintain the status quo on its nuclear program, and the United States will not impose new sanctions on Iran or strengthen its forces in the region.
10. The United States undertakes that immediately after the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and until the date of the lifting of sanctions, the United States Treasury Department will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and the like.
11. The United States undertakes that, in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement, frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made fully available. These funds, whether held in the master account or transferred, will be used for any final beneficiary payment determined by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will be fully available for use. The United States undertakes to issue all necessary permits and licenses on this basis.
12. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that an implementation mechanism will be established to oversee the successful implementation of and future commitment to the Final Agreement.
13. Following the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and upon receipt of assurances regarding the commencement of implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this Memorandum of Understanding, and the continued implementation of these steps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States will enter into negotiations for a Final Agreement solely with respect to the remaining Articles.
14. The final agreement will be approved through a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.
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Russian wheat shipped to Armenia via transit through Azerbaijan
A new batch of wheat from Russia has been shipped to Armenia via transit through Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani APA news agency reported.
Seven railway wagons carrying a total of 490 tons of Russian-origin wheat have been dispatched, according to the report.
According to APA, to date, more than 29,000 tons of grain, over 7,000 tons of fertilizer, 414 tons of anthracite coal, 133 tons of aluminum, and 68 tons of buckwheat have been transported from Russia to Armenia via transit through Azerbaijan.
In addition to transit shipments, petroleum products are also exported from Azerbaijan to Armenia.
So far, more than 13,000 tons of diesel fuel, 979 tons of AI-92 gasoline, and 2,955 tons of AI-95 gasoline have been exported from Azerbaijan to Armenia.
The rail cargo passes through Georgian territory because the direct Armenia–Azerbaijan railway has not yet been restored.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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WATCH: Armenian troops train with domestically produced Atlant multiple rocket
Armenian Armed Forces servicemen have conducted exercises using domestically produced Atlant multiple rocket launchers.
The Defense Ministry’s Zinuzh Media covered the drills and released a video showing the exercises.
The report said that, in accordance with the training plan, the missile and artillery unit carried out assigned operational tasks.
The designated mock targets were successfully struck through precise actions.
The exercise was aimed at assessing the combat readiness of the participating unit, evaluating the effectiveness of personnel actions, and improving coordination among the troops.
The report noted that the weapon system recently added to the Armenian Army’s arsenal is designed to engage personnel, firing positions, and convoys, as well as to suppress rocket artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft batteries.
The system features an automated operating mode, an integrated meteorological station, and provides a high rate of fire. One of the system’s main advantages is that it can be operated remotely, thus enhancing troop safety in case of enemy fire.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Hungarian president signs amendment limiting PM term, blocking potential retur
Hungarian President Tamás Sulyok, an appointee of former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, on Friday approved a constitutional amendment barring the same Orbán from returning to office.
The amendment limits prime ministers to no more than eight years in office. Orbán served a total of 20 years. The Hungarian parliament overwhelmingly approved the amendment on Monday, sending it to the president’s desk for his signature.
The amendment follows a longtime campaign promise by the Magyar government to introduce term limits, which would also apply to Prime Minister Péter Magyar, too.
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party criticized the law, calling it a personalized measure with retroactive effect.
In his decision, Sulyok wrote that the popularly dubbed “lex Orbán” was “virtually unique both in Europe and worldwide.” Although he signed the amendment instead of sending it to the Constitutional Court for review, he said that the decision would be “limiting” the will of the people, POLITICO reported.
Meanwhile, Magyar is working to remove president Sulyok from office, accusing him of being a “puppet” of the previous regime. The incoming prime minister’s efforts to turn the page on the Orbán regime ran into trouble earlier this year when Sulyok rejected Magyar’s demand that he resign, setting up what Sulyok has called a “constitutional crisis.”
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Armenpress: Behind every refugee’s story is a human destiny: Ombudsperson
The Human Rights Defender of Armenia, Anahit Manasyan, released a statement on the occasion of World Refugee Day, emphasizing the importance of protecting the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and forcibly displaced persons.
In a statement published by her office, Ombudsperson Manasyan noted that on June 20, the world marks World Refugee Day, reaffirming the principle that every person, regardless of status, location, or other circumstances, should be protected and safe.
“This day is not only an _expression_ of solidarity and support for the millions of people who have been forced to leave their homes, but also a call to the international community and states to reaffirm their commitment to protecting the rights of refugees,” Manasyan stated.
The Human Rights Defender emphasized that millions of people around the world continue to be deprived of the opportunity to live safely due to war, armed conflict, persecution, and violence.
The protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and forcibly displaced persons is one of the Human Rights Defender’s Office’s priority areas, Manasyan emphasized.
Manasyan noted that her staff continuously conducts monitoring, studies, and analyses in this field, prepares reports, cooperates with international and national partners, and carries out awareness-raising activities.
The Human Rights Defender also highlighted the work of the Public Council on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Forcibly Displaced Persons, recently established at her initiative under the Human Rights Defender’s Office.
The Council, she said, serves as an important platform for discussing issues jointly, developing solutions, and ensuring that the voices of beneficiaries are heard more widely.
Manasyan also stressed the importance of cooperation with international partners, particularly the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in strengthening mechanisms for the protection of the rights of refugees and forcibly displaced persons.
“World Refugee Day is yet another opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to the idea that every refugee, asylum seeker, and forcibly displaced person should be provided with safe and dignified living conditions,” the Human Rights Defender emphasized.
Manasyan emphasized that behind every refugee’s story is a human destiny filled with hardships, loss, and hope.
She stressed that state authorities, international organizations, civil society, and all actors involved in the protection of human rights must continue their joint efforts toward a world where no one is left behind and where the dignity and rights of every individual are protected.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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