Armenia’s parliamentary election is over. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won nearly 50% of the total vote, comfortably outperforming its competitors while falling short of a constitutional majority. Moscow’s overt pressure and hybrid interference against Pashinyan appear to have backfired, and the result amounted to a vote of confidence in his diversification strategy following Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, including closer ties with the European Union and the United States.
However, electoral campaigns tend to sharpen political cleavages and oversimplify complex issues, often intentionally polarising the electorate for the benefit of candidates. The country’s real state of affairs will be clearer once the campaign fever fades.
Yerevan is walking a tightrope, using a window of opportunity to reformat relations with Moscow in an effort to transform Russia from an owner into a partner.
Pashinyan’s victory should not be interpreted as a mandate for breaking ties with Russia. Rather, Yerevan is walking a tightrope, using a window of opportunity to reformat relations with Moscow in an effort to transform Russia from an owner into a partner. Yet the window is unlikely to remain open indefinitely, and, importantly, Pashinyan has not burned bridges with Moscow.
Choice Between Russia and the West? Between Peace and War?
Both western media and Russian officials dichotomised the picture: this is Armenia’s choice between Russia and the west. Indeed, Yerevan–Moscow relations have deteriorated since the Russia-backed Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) failed to support Armenia during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which was ultimately recaptured by Azerbaijan in 2023.
The Washington Summit in August 2025 created momentum for Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty negotiations, effectively sidelining Russia—long accustomed to exploiting its mediator role in the South Caucasus to cement geopolitical influence. Furthermore, the US launched a new initiative, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), to establish a transport route between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia.
US Vice President JD Vance travelled to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February to follow up on Trump’s initiative. In late May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio briefly visited Yerevan and signed a Charter on Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership, while President Trump expressed his “complete and total endorsement” of Pashinyan on social media. Earlier the same month, Pashinyan hosted the inaugural EU–Armenia Summit and the European Political Community Summit, bringing together nearly 50 world leaders.
Pashinyan’s campaign capitalised on these dichotomised perceptions, framing the election as the choice between a pro-western and a pro-Russian course, and between peace and war. During the Yerevan Dialogue, an annual international forum organised by the Armenian Foreign Ministry and held this year back-to-back with the EU–Armenia Summit, Pashinyan argued for lasting peace, the unblocking of regional communications, and the promotion of European values, stressing the economic benefits of his “Crossroads of Peace” initiative. Yet Russia’s enduring presence in Armenia remained the elephant in the room.
Pashinyan’s main challengers were Strong Armenia (23.27%), led by Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan; Armenia Alliance (9.92%), led by former president Robert Kocharyan; and Prosperous Armenia, led by Gagik Tsarukyan (3.98%), which appears to have fallen just short of the 4% threshold required to enter parliament. Opposition parties campaigned on improving ties with Moscow, claims of persecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and criticism of the peace process. Nagorno-Karabakh remains a particularly sensitive issue for Armenian society. Pashinyan’s campaign intentionally associated the opposition with a possible revision of the peace treaty initialled at the White House and a resumption of war with Azerbaijan, calling opposition leaders a “three-headed war party.” Notably, Azerbaijan’s state-controlled media also favoured Pashinyan, portraying him as the candidate of peace and the opposition as revanchist forces.
Among the opposition figures, Karapetyan—the owner of the Moscow-based Tashir Group, which controls significant energy assets in Armenia—was widely viewed as Moscow’s preferred candidate. In June 2025, Karapetyan was detained and placed under house arrest on charges of publicly calling for the seizure of power amid escalating tensions between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Armenian parliament adopted a law nationalising Karapetyan’s Armenian Electric Networks (AEN), the country’s grid operator. During the Armenia–Russia summit in April, Putin demanded that Russia’s “friends,” likely referring to Karapetyan, be allowed to run for parliamentary elections.
Ultimately, Moscow’s political and economic pressure aided Pashinyan by consolidating the perception of the incumbent prime minister standing up to Moscow, likely increasing voter turnout.
Continued Systemic Dependence on Russia
Despite widespread narratives about the decline of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus and elsewhere, Moscow retains significant leverage over Yerevan through trade, energy, military, intelligence, labour migration, and cultural connections. Armenia’s dependence on Russia remains substantial and exceeds that of many other post-Soviet states. As a result, Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.
After achieving a record trade volume of $12 bn in 2024, largely due to the re-export of western goods via Armenia, bilateral trade shrank by roughly half. Nevertheless, Russia still accounts for 35.5% of Armenia’s foreign trade, followed by China (12.5%) and the EU (11.8%).
Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.
Putin made it clear that membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and participation in an EU customs union are incompatible. In response, Pashinyan argued that developing relations with the EU under the current framework remains compatible with Armenia’s membership in the EAEU, assuring Putin that Armenia’s “relations with Russia have never been and will never be in question.” Neither argument is new. In 2017, Armenia and the EU concluded the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Tailored to Armenia’s obligations under the EAEU, the agreement excluded a free trade component.
Nevertheless, to punish Yerevan’s European aspirations, Russia escalated economic coercion against Armenia, whose exports heavily rely on the Russian market. Russian regulatory bodies introduced unilateral restrictions on Armenian alcoholic beverages, fruits, vegetables, and flowers, and imposed additional inspections. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk implied that flights between Yerevan and Moscow could be suspended if Armenia moved closer to the EU. Most importantly, Moscow signalled that Armenia’s preferential gas pricing could be revised. The Armenian section of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is also controlled by Gazprom.
Although the US and Armenia completed negotiations on an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in February, Armenia’s Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant—the only nuclear power plant in the South Caucasus, which generates about 30-40% of Armenia’s electricity—remains closely integrated with Russia’s nuclear fuel cycle, and cannot be replaced easily. After the election, the government announced that the ongoing life extension programme could allow the plant to operate until 2036. At the same time, Yerevan is considering proposals from six countries to build a small modular reactor (SMR), while refraining from making a final decision in the near term.
During Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow in April, he raised the issue of transferring the Armenian railway concession from Russia’s South Caucasus Railway to a country considered friendly to both Yerevan and Moscow. However, Moscow signalled it had no intention of handing over its concession.
After the EU–Armenia Summit, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Gyumri, a city that hosts a Russian military base, and attended an Armenia-France concert, drawing public attention. However, although Yerevan has suspended its participation in the Russia-led CSTO because of dissatisfaction with the organisation’s passive response during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it has no intention of requesting the removal of Russian troops from the country.
Given continued pressure from Moscow, Pashinyan’s European slogans are likely to subside.
FSB border guards left Armenian border checkpoints, including the Zvartnots International Airport, and Pashinyan established a Foreign Intelligence Service, possibly with western support. However, the National Security Service (NSS) maintains personal—and likely institutional—ties with Russian counterparts.
Pashinyan’s victory will not necessarily consolidate his overtly pro-European stance during the election campaign. Given continued pressure from Moscow, Pashinyan’s European slogans are likely to subside.
Peace Process in Stalemate?
The key to Armenia’s economic diversification largely lies in the peace process with Baku. Armenia’s trade dependence on Russia has been exacerbated by its landlocked geography and the Azerbaijani–Turkish blockade since the 1990s. Unblocking regional communications would improve Armenia’s access to European and Middle Eastern trade networks and strengthen its role in the emerging Middle Corridor. However, the full opening of borders with its two neighbours is contingent on the conclusion of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and subsequent normalisation of Armenia–Türkiye relations—outcomes that Russia is attempting to prevent.
The full opening of borders is contingent on the conclusion of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and normalisation of Armenia–Türkiye relations—outcomes that Russia is attempting to prevent.
For the peace treaty, Baku has not withdrawn its demand for amendments to the preamble of Armenia’s Constitution, which it claims contains implicit territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Although Pashinyan stated that Civic Contract would not seek coalition partners, securing constitutional amendments would require a two-thirds constitutional majority, which Pashinyan currently lacks. The need to secure cooperation from opposition parties could place Pashinyan in a difficult position. Moreover, the constitutional amendment process concerns not only the preamble but also the drafting of a new constitution and is expected to be lengthy and complex.
Nevertheless, without waiting for the conclusion of the peace treaty, both Baku and Ankara have taken practical steps toward normalising relations with Armenia. Türkiye opened its borders to third-country citizens, simplified visa procedures, and launched direct flights between Ankara and Yerevan. There is speculation that Ankara may decouple the full opening of borders from the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process. Azerbaijan also lifted its long-standing ban on the transit of goods to Armenia, which, however, ironically connected Armenia with Russia. The construction of the Trump Route is not necessarily linked to the progress of the peace process. During Rubio’s visit to Yerevan in May, the US and Armenia agreed to a Framework Agreement on the TRIPP, including the establishment of a joint venture, the TRIPP Development Company.
Baku’s position remains important. Recent developments suggest that, despite irritation over Putin’s remark during his meeting with Pashinyan that “we come back to [the Karabakh issue] time and again,” Azerbaijan has begun mending ties with Moscow by formally settling its dispute with Russia over the downing of the Azerbaijani passenger airliner. However, this does not mean that relations between Baku and Moscow will return to the level envisaged in the 2022 Declaration on Allied Cooperation. In April, Volodymyr Zelensky made his first visit to Baku since the start of the war. Azerbaijan is likely seeking to extract gains from the current limbo in the peace process.
Armenians are closely watching developments on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine has created strategic space for Yerevan. However, unfavourable developments for Ukraine in 2024–25, combined with the resumption of US–Russia bilateral talks, have led some in the Armenian security community to argue that Yerevan should recognise Russia’s continued geopolitical interests in the region and avoid adversarial approaches to Moscow. Yet the tide may be turning again in 2026. In May, Zelensky made his first visit to Yerevan for the European Political Community. Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia is not an ally of Russia when it comes to the war against Ukraine.
After the Election
So, is Europe merely part of Pashinyan’s electoral rhetoric? No. His election strategy reflects both declining public trust in Russia and growing support for closer ties with the EU since 2023. The most recent public opinion survey indicates that around 75% of Armenians support the country’s possible accession to the European Union. Expectations are therefore high.
Two years ago, the EU committed €270 mn under its Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia (2024–27) to support the country’s socioeconomic resilience and investments in business and connectivity. More recently, the EU has expanded its efforts to help Armenia withstand Russian disinformation and economic coercion. Nevertheless, without sustained long-term engagement, these initiatives will do little to reduce Armenia’s systemic dependence on Russia.
When the post-election euphoria has faded, elected officials must confront political realities and structural constraints, which ultimately shape a country’s course. Pashinyan’s diversification strategy, including closer ties with the west, is supported by a majority of Armenian voters. A window of opportunity remains open. Yet it is unlikely to remain so indefinitely. Its duration will depend largely on the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the sustainability of western engagement in the region, particularly beyond Donald Trump’s second term.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).June 18, 2026
Sanshiro HosakaResearch Fellow
Armenia’s parliamentary election is over. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won nearly 50% of the total vote, comfortably outperforming its competitors while falling short of a constitutional majority. Moscow’s overt pressure and hybrid interference against Pashinyan appear to have backfired, and the result amounted to a vote of confidence in his diversification strategy following Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, including closer ties with the European Union and the United States.
However, electoral campaigns tend to sharpen political cleavages and oversimplify complex issues, often intentionally polarising the electorate for the benefit of candidates. The country’s real state of affairs will be clearer once the campaign fever fades.
Yerevan is walking a tightrope, using a window of opportunity to reformat relations with Moscow in an effort to transform Russia from an owner into a partner.
Pashinyan’s victory should not be interpreted as a mandate for breaking ties with Russia. Rather, Yerevan is walking a tightrope, using a window of opportunity to reformat relations with Moscow in an effort to transform Russia from an owner into a partner. Yet the window is unlikely to remain open indefinitely, and, importantly, Pashinyan has not burned bridges with Moscow.
Choice Between Russia and the West? Between Peace and War?
Both western media and Russian officials dichotomised the picture: this is Armenia’s choice between Russia and the west. Indeed, Yerevan–Moscow relations have deteriorated since the Russia-backed Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) failed to support Armenia during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which was ultimately recaptured by Azerbaijan in 2023.
The Washington Summit in August 2025 created momentum for Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty negotiations, effectively sidelining Russia—long accustomed to exploiting its mediator role in the South Caucasus to cement geopolitical influence. Furthermore, the US launched a new initiative, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), to establish a transport route between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia.
US Vice President JD Vance travelled to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February to follow up on Trump’s initiative. In late May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio briefly visited Yerevan and signed a Charter on Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership, while President Trump expressed his “complete and total endorsement” of Pashinyan on social media. Earlier the same month, Pashinyan hosted the inaugural EU–Armenia Summit and the European Political Community Summit, bringing together nearly 50 world leaders.
Pashinyan’s campaign capitalised on these dichotomised perceptions, framing the election as the choice between a pro-western and a pro-Russian course, and between peace and war. During the Yerevan Dialogue, an annual international forum organised by the Armenian Foreign Ministry and held this year back-to-back with the EU–Armenia Summit, Pashinyan argued for lasting peace, the unblocking of regional communications, and the promotion of European values, stressing the economic benefits of his “Crossroads of Peace” initiative. Yet Russia’s enduring presence in Armenia remained the elephant in the room.
Pashinyan’s main challengers were Strong Armenia (23.27%), led by Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan; Armenia Alliance (9.92%), led by former president Robert Kocharyan; and Prosperous Armenia, led by Gagik Tsarukyan (3.98%), which appears to have fallen just short of the 4% threshold required to enter parliament. Opposition parties campaigned on improving ties with Moscow, claims of persecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and criticism of the peace process. Nagorno-Karabakh remains a particularly sensitive issue for Armenian society. Pashinyan’s campaign intentionally associated the opposition with a possible revision of the peace treaty initialled at the White House and a resumption of war with Azerbaijan, calling opposition leaders a “three-headed war party.” Notably, Azerbaijan’s state-controlled media also favoured Pashinyan, portraying him as the candidate of peace and the opposition as revanchist forces.
Among the opposition figures, Karapetyan—the owner of the Moscow-based Tashir Group, which controls significant energy assets in Armenia—was widely viewed as Moscow’s preferred candidate. In June 2025, Karapetyan was detained and placed under house arrest on charges of publicly calling for the seizure of power amid escalating tensions between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Armenian parliament adopted a law nationalising Karapetyan’s Armenian Electric Networks (AEN), the country’s grid operator. During the Armenia–Russia summit in April, Putin demanded that Russia’s “friends,” likely referring to Karapetyan, be allowed to run for parliamentary elections.
Ultimately, Moscow’s political and economic pressure aided Pashinyan by consolidating the perception of the incumbent prime minister standing up to Moscow, likely increasing voter turnout.
Continued Systemic Dependence on Russia
Despite widespread narratives about the decline of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus and elsewhere, Moscow retains significant leverage over Yerevan through trade, energy, military, intelligence, labour migration, and cultural connections. Armenia’s dependence on Russia remains substantial and exceeds that of many other post-Soviet states. As a result, Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.
After achieving a record trade volume of $12 bn in 2024, largely due to the re-export of western goods via Armenia, bilateral trade shrank by roughly half. Nevertheless, Russia still accounts for 35.5% of Armenia’s foreign trade, followed by China (12.5%) and the EU (11.8%).
Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.
Putin made it clear that membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and participation in an EU customs union are incompatible. In response, Pashinyan argued that developing relations with the EU under the current framework remains compatible with Armenia’s membership in the EAEU, assuring Putin that Armenia’s “relations with Russia have never been and will never be in question.” Neither argument is new. In 2017, Armenia and the EU concluded the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Tailored to Armenia’s obligations under the EAEU, the agreement excluded a free trade component.
Nevertheless, to punish Yerevan’s European aspirations, Russia escalated economic coercion against Armenia, whose exports heavily rely on the Russian market. Russian regulatory bodies introduced unilateral restrictions on Armenian alcoholic beverages, fruits, vegetables, and flowers, and imposed additional inspections. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk implied that flights between Yerevan and Moscow could be suspended if Armenia moved closer to the EU. Most importantly, Moscow signalled that Armenia’s preferential gas pricing could be revised. The Armenian section of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is also controlled by Gazprom.
Although the US and Armenia completed negotiations on an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in February, Armenia’s Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant—the only nuclear power plant in the South Caucasus, which generates about 30-40% of Armenia’s electricity—remains closely integrated with Russia’s nuclear fuel cycle, and cannot be replaced easily. After the election, the government announced that the ongoing life extension programme could allow the plant to operate until 2036. At the same time, Yerevan is considering proposals from six countries to build a small modular reactor (SMR), while refraining from making a final decision in the near term.
During Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow in April, he raised the issue of transferring the Armenian railway concession from Russia’s South Caucasus Railway to a country considered friendly to both Yerevan and Moscow. However, Moscow signalled it had no intention of handing over its concession.
After the EU–Armenia Summit, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Gyumri, a city that hosts a Russian military base, and attended an Armenia-France concert, drawing public attention. However, although Yerevan has suspended its participation in the Russia-led CSTO because of dissatisfaction with the organisation’s passive response during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it has no intention of requesting the removal of Russian troops from the country.
Given continued pressure from Moscow, Pashinyan’s European slogans are likely to subside.
FSB border guards left Armenian border checkpoints, including the Zvartnots International Airport, and Pashinyan established a Foreign Intelligence Service, possibly with western support. However, the National Security Service (NSS) maintains personal—and likely institutional—ties with Russian counterparts.
Pashinyan’s victory will not necessarily consolidate his overtly pro-European stance during the election campaign. Given continued pressure from Moscow, Pashinyan’s European slogans are likely to subside.
Peace Process in Stalemate?
The key to Armenia’s economic diversification largely lies in the peace process with Baku. Armenia’s trade dependence on Russia has been exacerbated by its landlocked geography and the Azerbaijani–Turkish blockade since the 1990s. Unblocking regional communications would improve Armenia’s access to European and Middle Eastern trade networks and strengthen its role in the emerging Middle Corridor. However, the full opening of borders with its two neighbours is contingent on the conclusion of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and subsequent normalisation of Armenia–Türkiye relations—outcomes that Russia is attempting to prevent.
The full opening of borders is contingent on the conclusion of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and normalisation of Armenia–Türkiye relations—outcomes that Russia is attempting to prevent.
For the peace treaty, Baku has not withdrawn its demand for amendments to the preamble of Armenia’s Constitution, which it claims contains implicit territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Although Pashinyan stated that Civic Contract would not seek coalition partners, securing constitutional amendments would require a two-thirds constitutional majority, which Pashinyan currently lacks. The need to secure cooperation from opposition parties could place Pashinyan in a difficult position. Moreover, the constitutional amendment process concerns not only the preamble but also the drafting of a new constitution and is expected to be lengthy and complex.
Nevertheless, without waiting for the conclusion of the peace treaty, both Baku and Ankara have taken practical steps toward normalising relations with Armenia. Türkiye opened its borders to third-country citizens, simplified visa procedures, and launched direct flights between Ankara and Yerevan. There is speculation that Ankara may decouple the full opening of borders from the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process. Azerbaijan also lifted its long-standing ban on the transit of goods to Armenia, which, however, ironically connected Armenia with Russia. The construction of the Trump Route is not necessarily linked to the progress of the peace process. During Rubio’s visit to Yerevan in May, the US and Armenia agreed to a Framework Agreement on the TRIPP, including the establishment of a joint venture, the TRIPP Development Company.
Baku’s position remains important. Recent developments suggest that, despite irritation over Putin’s remark during his meeting with Pashinyan that “we come back to [the Karabakh issue] time and again,” Azerbaijan has begun mending ties with Moscow by formally settling its dispute with Russia over the downing of the Azerbaijani passenger airliner. However, this does not mean that relations between Baku and Moscow will return to the level envisaged in the 2022 Declaration on Allied Cooperation. In April, Volodymyr Zelensky made his first visit to Baku since the start of the war. Azerbaijan is likely seeking to extract gains from the current limbo in the peace process.
Armenians are closely watching developments on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine has created strategic space for Yerevan. However, unfavourable developments for Ukraine in 2024–25, combined with the resumption of US–Russia bilateral talks, have led some in the Armenian security community to argue that Yerevan should recognise Russia’s continued geopolitical interests in the region and avoid adversarial approaches to Moscow. Yet the tide may be turning again in 2026. In May, Zelensky made his first visit to Yerevan for the European Political Community. Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia is not an ally of Russia when it comes to the war against Ukraine.
After the Election
So, is Europe merely part of Pashinyan’s electoral rhetoric? No. His election strategy reflects both declining public trust in Russia and growing support for closer ties with the EU since 2023. The most recent public opinion survey indicates that around 75% of Armenians support the country’s possible accession to the European Union. Expectations are therefore high.
Two years ago, the EU committed €270 mn under its Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia (2024–27) to support the country’s socioeconomic resilience and investments in business and connectivity. More recently, the EU has expanded its efforts to help Armenia withstand Russian disinformation and economic coercion. Nevertheless, without sustained long-term engagement, these initiatives will do little to reduce Armenia’s systemic dependence on Russia.
When the post-election euphoria has faded, elected officials must confront political realities and structural constraints, which ultimately shape a country’s course. Pashinyan’s diversification strategy, including closer ties with the west, is supported by a majority of Armenian voters. A window of opportunity remains open. Yet it is unlikely to remain so indefinitely. Its duration will depend largely on the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the sustainability of western engagement in the region, particularly beyond Donald Trump’s second term.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).
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