Author: Andres-Papazian

ANC EUROPE PRESIDENT VISITS ROMANIAN ARMENIANS

[ Part 2.2: “Attached Text” ]

Tuesday, August 27th, 2013 
[romania.jpg]

The two-day seminar included lectures and discussions for the community

BUCHAREST, Romania-On August 18, 2013, the President of the European
Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy (ANC of Europe), Kaspar
Karampetian, visited the monastery of Hagigadar in the city of Suceava
in Romania.

The Hagigadar monastery was built in 1512 and is considered miraculous
by both Armenians and Romanians. Every year hundreds of believers
gather at the monastery for pilgrimage.

A religious ceremony was performed by Prelate Bishop Datev Muradian.

During the ceremony, Romanian Minister of Economy Varoujan Vosganian,
member of the Romanian Parliament Varoujan Pambuccian, and other
representatives from the Armenian Community were present.

During his visit to the two-day seminar in the city of Suceava,
EAFJD President Kaspar Karampetian talked about the activities and
actions of his organization and the Armenian Cause.

In the city of Bucharest, Karampetian met with the Prelate Bishop and
with the Romanian Minister of Economy and President of the Armenian
Community in Romania, Varoujan Vosganian. They discussed the current
status and potential of the Armenian Community, and the possibilities
of a more active pursuit of the Armenian Cause.

Karampetian said, “The Armenian Community of Romania is one of the
oldest and historical communities. Over the centuries, the Armenian
Community of Romania has managed to maintain its national identity
and values and today has its own State Minister and Members in the
Romanian Parliament.

“It is worthy to mention that the Government of Romania cares about
our community and preserves Armenian religious and cultural heritage.

The Romanian Government also provides our community with significant
amounts of funding in order to achieve community projects.

“We express our readiness to assist the Community in an active pursuit
of the Armenian Cause and we are satisfied that both religious and
secular leadership are willing to support this patriotic initiative”.

From: A. Papazian

AZERBAIJAN FOLLOWS USA’S EXAMPLE AND PUTS ANNA CHAPMAN ON BLACK LIST
by Ashot Safaryan

ARMINFO
Tuesday, August 27, 16:40

Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan has again grown hot over the visit of
foreign citizens to the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. This time, they
have targeted a group of Russian journalists, including Anna Chapman,
ex-agent of the Russian intelligence, author and host of the program
“World’s Secrets” on RenTV.

According to 1news.az, the stance of official Baku on the visits
of foreigners to Nagorno Karabakh has not changed. All the foreign
citizens visiting Nagorno Karabakh will be recognized personas
non-grata in Azerbaijan.

The delegation that has lately visited Artsakh comprised also Denis
Dvornikov, a member of the Public Chamber of Russia, Sergey Karnaukhov,
a human rights defender, and Alexander Ryzhkov, a correspondent of
Russian Reporter Magazine and DairyNews, and others.

Earlier, the NKR Foreign Ministry strongly condemned Baku’s policy
of sanctions against foreign visitors of Nagorno Karabakh.

“These extremely irresponsible steps of Baku undermine any efforts
of confidence building between NKR and Azerbaijan, which is of great
importance for peaceful resolution of the conflict,” the NKR Foreign
Ministry said in a statement.

From: A. Papazian

BERRIES CULTIVATED ABOVE THE GROUND IN ARMENIA ARE EXPORTED TO PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES

19:43, 27 August, 2013

YEREVAN, AUGUST 27, ARMENPRESS: The strawberry and rapsberry growing
with special technologies in Akunk village of Armenian Kotayk region
1 meter above the ground and in boxes which are put on the ground
are exported to United Arab Emirates.

“Armenpress” reports that about this informed one of founders of “Biga”
Armenian-Dutch joint company Rafik Eganyan during press conference
on August 28.

The berries are fed by drip method. “This nice technology is not
very laborious. Just one person by clicking a button can do all the
irrigation and fertilization problems of the territory. The harvest
mainly is exported to United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and other
countries of Persian Gulf,” mentioned Eganyan adding that part of
berries is sold in Armenian market. The average strawberry yield
is 45-50 tones from one hectare and raspberry – 10 tones from one
hectare. He clarified that the strawberry is grown above the ground
in order to exclude infection with land deceases.

He also informed about exporting berries to Russia. The businessman
is sure that Armenia can become one of leading countries of fruit
and berry export.

From: A. Papazian

AVANESYAN: TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMENIA AND BELARUS SHOULD BE RAISED TO NEW LEVEL

YEREVAN, August 27. /ARKA/. Armenian Economy Minister Vahram Avanesyan,
co-chair of Armenian-Belarusian Intergovernmental Commission
for Economic Cooperation, speaking today at a briefing after the
commission’s 10th session in Yerevan, said that trade and economic
relations between the two countries should be raised to a new level.

Congratulating participants on completion of the two-day session,
he said that a good job has been done within these two days – trade,
economic and humanitarian ties between the two countries have been
discussed. Contractual and legal issues have been discussed as well.

The minister said that the two countries officials placed it on
record that a firm groundwork is already laid for development of
Armenia-Belarus relations in all the areas of mutual interest.

“We have also pointed out certain progress in economic relations, but
we still have plenty to do here to develop them to a higher level,”
Avanesyan said. “It applies to trade, mutual investments and economic
projects.”

His fellow co-chair, Belarusian Forestry Minister Mikhail Amelyanovich,
on his side, expressed confidence that the protocol signed upon
completion of the session will spur economic relations between the
countries.

“Our cooperation is developing from year to year and trade turnover
is growing,” he said. “But there are still untapped reserves and
opportunities in some areas of mutual interest. That is why we outlined
particular ground for cooperation and joint projects which will enable
us to use this potential.”

The first session was held in January in 2000 in Minsk.

On May 26, 2001, the parties signed an investment-protecting agreement,
which took force on February 10, 2002.

According to the latest data, ten companies with Belarusian capital
operate in Armenia now.

National Statistical Service of Armenia says trade between Armenia and
Belarus amounted to $20.1 million in Jan-May 2013 – 19.7% year-on-year
growth. —-0—-

– See more at:

From: A. Papazian

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER: THE ACTIONS BY THE ARMENIAN POLICE ARE ILLEGAL AND EQUAL TO TRAFFICKING
by Ashot Safaryan

ARMINFO
Tuesday, August 27, 16:31

The actions by the Armenian Police regarding civil activists are
illegal and equal to trafficking, the head of the Helsinki Association
Vanadzor Office, Artur Sakunts, said at today’s press-conference. He
also added that policemen confound a victim with a criminal. Moreover,
in fact they cover lawbreakers, he said.

“There is no ground for beating up and detaining people to the police
departments. Activists have to inform Prosecutor General’s Office and
Special Investigation Service about every case of the law breaking
by the Police”, – Sakunts said.

He also added that perhaps the actions of the criminal gang which
attacked activists near the Mayor’s Office may seed the climate of
fear among activists, as total lawlessness also promotes that.

Nevertheless, such an activeness of hooligans, which protect interests
of “their fathers” in such a unique way, cannot be of a mass nature,
he said.

Participants in the picket near Yerevan Mayor’s Office, Mihran
Margaryan and Babken Ter-Grigoryan were attacked and beaten up by
10 persons on 25 August. Those which attacked, demanded from the
participants in the protest action not to dare acting against their
“fathers”. Activists filed a police report.

From: A. Papazian

ARMENIA’S AGRICULTURE MINISTER FOR COOPERATIVES’ CREATION

16:07, 27 August, 2013

YEREVAN, AUGUST 27, ARMENPRESS: One of the guarantees of the
development of agriculture in Armenia is the creation of the
cooperative farms. This was stated by the Minister of Agriculture
of the Republic of Armenia Sergo Karapetyan on August 27 during his
visit to the Kotayk Marz. “I connect the future development of the
agriculture of the Republic with the creation of the cooperatives. It
is an urgent issue for us and quite serious works are being carried
out in that direction”, – said the Minister of Agriculture of the
Republic of Armenia, as reported by Armenpress.

In the beginning of the 90s of the previous century in the result of
the privatization of the land, livestock, agricultural machinery and
other industrial equipment in Armenia about 340,000 farms were formed,
which are functioning at present as well.

From: A. Papazian

LE SALON DES VINS DE PARAKAR A PERMIS AUX CONSOMMATEURS DE MIEUX CONNAITRE LES VINS ARMENIENS

ARMENIE

Le salon des vins qui a eu lieu le 18 août dans le village armenien
de Parakar près d’Erevan a permis aux consommateurs armeniens d’en
apprendre davantage sur la production de vin de leur pays a decalre
Nune Manoukian, directeur de la Fondation du Festival d’Areni.

Elle a dit que cinq entreprises de vinification, situes a proximite
de la capitale armenienne, ont repondu positivement a l’appel de
presenter leurs produits.

Mme Manoukian a declare que les organisateurs envisagent d’organiser
cet evenement tous les mois car cela va beneficier a la fois aux
producteurs et aux consommateurs qui pourront une fois par mois
acheter du vin armenien moins cher que dans les supermarches.

Actuellement, l’Armenie dispose de 20 petites et moyennes caves. On
estime que quelque 40000 agriculteurs dans le pays sont engages dans
la viticulture. Environ 90% du raisin est utilise pour produire du
cognac et seulement 10% du vin. Selon les statistiques, la production
de vin au cours des six premiers mois de cette annee a augmente de
20,7% a 2,4 millions de litres.

mardi 27 août 2013, Stephane ©armenews.com

From: A. Papazian

Undeclared warfare between Iran and Turkey

Sunday, 25 August 2013 KSA 10:10 – GMT 07:10

Sunday, 25 August 2013
Mahir Zeynalov

Turkey’s strange ties with Iran, still presented as a significant
pillar to the region’s stability, have deteriorated into virtual
unacknowledged warfare, with two countries literally waging a proxy
war beyond their borders in the region.

Throughout the last century, Iran and Turkey had difficult times to
understand how they relate to each other but couldn’t risk severing
ties despite numerous confrontations over a wide range of regional
issues. In the past few years, Turkish government officials used a
treaty signed between Ottoman and Iranian delegates in the city of
Qasr-e Shirin to describe how the borders of the two countries have
remained unchanged since the agreement was signed in 1639, a widely
accepted myth.

Turkish officials frequently refer to the Qasr-e Shirin agreement to
illustrate how their relationship is solid and based on mutual
respect. Since the famous agreement, six states have been established
in both countries (two in Turkey and four in Iran) and the borders had
changed for ten times, the last time in 1931. Presenting the Qasr-e
Shirin myth as a cover for a number of wars the two countries fought
in the past four centuries also characterizes today’s relationship
between Iran and Turkey.

Unrestrained

There are privately held views among Turkish government officials that
Iran should get the wrecking-ball treatment as a way of preserving
Turkey’s national interests.

Mahir Zeynalov

While Iranian political and military officials are unrestrained in
their critical remarks about Turkey, often tantamount to threats,
Turkish officials are much softer while talking about their
relationship, emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the
two nations. It is unclear how false description of ties helps prevent
further confrontation at a time when the two nations are even fighting
a proxy war in Syria, where more than two years of civil war has left
at least 100,000 people dead, mostly civilians.

When Turkey kicked off its ambitious foreign policy in the region
under the leadership of its popular prime minister, Recep Tayyip
ErdoÄ?an, his then adviser and later Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu
tried to assure the neighboring countries that Turkey’s rise is
peaceful and that it only aims to advance peace in the region.
DavutoÄ?lu’s goal was to cultivate relations among countries in
Turkey’s vicinity by abolishing visa requirements, creating free trade
zones, and constantly holding high-level political consultations.
Deepening ties with Iran was a cornerstone of this project that is now
crumbling after Iran has started to sabotage Turkey’s interests in the
region.

Hero’s welcome

During his visit to Beirut in 2010, ErdoÄ?an received a hero’s welcome
but Turkey’s influence in the country has declined precipitously since
then. Kidnapping of Turkish citizens are on the rise while its
interests are under great danger. In Iraq, Turkish diplomats had a
rare ability to talk to every segment of the war-torn nation and
Turkey conducted a flurry of diplomacy during government formation
process in 2010. In the case of Syria, the relationship has been one
of the best success stories of modern times. From the brink of war in
1999, only prevented thanks to mediation of former Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak, to lifting what they called `artificial borders’ in
2010, Turkey slowly drifted Syria out of Iran’s orbit of influence,
contributing to Syria’s integration to the Western world.

In a region of constantly shifting ground, Turkey failed to maintain
these ties and it still refuses to publicly acknowledge that Iran is
to blame for much of the foreign policy mess Turkey is involved in in
neighboring countries.

Turkey’s mistake

Turkey’s mistake was to put too much trust on Iran’s conduct of
foreign policy. Without having any kind of bargaining deal, Ankara
shielded Iran against the fourth round of U.N. Security Council
sanctions at the expense of its strategic ties with the United States.
It also prevented NATO from openly describing its anti-missile radar
system stationed in Turkey as an installation built against Iran.

Turkey has received little, if any, in return. Despite Turkey’s
reluctance to cut import of natural gas from Iran as part of
unilateral sanctions by Washington, Iran charges around $500 for a
thousand cubic meters of natural gas, more than any of Turkey’s gas
trade partners.

Iranian officials bash Turkey every week, sometimes issuing
threatening statements. When inquired, they claim that the officials
are only expressing their `personal views’ and that they don’t fit
into Iran’s official policy towards Turkey.

In Lebanon, Iran’s destabilizing role is not unknown. They largely
bankroll Hezbollah to fight a war on behalf of the Syrian regime
against rebels backed by Turkey. In Syria, Tehran is providing a
credit line to Damascus, frequently sends cargo planes full of weapons
and dispatch military advisers and militants to fight against the
rebels. Iran’s backing of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is no doubt
one of the reasons why rebels failed to make progress since April this
year, a major setback for Turkey’s interests.

Bleak situation

In Iraq, the situation remains as bleak as ever. Turkey is not talking
to Baghdad and its companies that used to receive lucrative deals are
under tremendous pressure by the central government. Since the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in December 2011, Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and ErdoÄ?an have exchanged a war of words,
both accusing each other of destabilizing Iraq. It is also not
surprising to see that the Iranian-backed government of Maliki has
done everything to sabotage Turkish interests in the country despite
efforts by Washington to reverse this course.

There are privately held views among Turkish government officials that
Iran should get the wrecking-ball treatment as a way of preserving
Turkey’s national interests. Failing to recognize that Iran is the
source of many of the woes that characterize Turkey’s ailing foreign
policy could spell further harm for Ankara’s interests. Iran and
Turkey should start seriously discussing the scope of their relations,
agree to disagree on a wide array of regional issues and make strict
`give and take’ deals. History has shown time and again to bet on
Iran’s conduct in foreign policy initiatives carries with it risk.

______________
Mahir Zeynalov is an Istanbul-based journalist with English-language
daily Today’s Zaman. He is also the managing editor of the Caucasus
International magazine. You can follow him on Twitter @MahirZeynalov

From: A. Papazian

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Aug 25 2013

New thinking for the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement?

ZAUR SHIRIYEV
[email protected]

The local media in Azerbaijan reported the appointment of a new US
co-chair — Ambassador James Warlick — to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group earlier this
month as a sign of renewed political engagement from the US.

Given the current US-Russia tensions, it seems likely that Washington
would like to `punish’ Moscow. But beyond the work of the Minsk Group,
there is a need first to `restore’ negotiations between the parties.
However, there is no guarantee for a quick solution of the conflict,
or that the national interests of the US, Russia or France/EU have
changed in such a way that the group will be galvanized into new
action toward conflict resolution.

Azerbaijan always argues that more than 30,000 Armenians are living
peacefully in Azerbaijan, and Baku could help with the post-conflict
rehabilitation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories.
But such thinking has, until now, been limited to a few publications
on post-conflict resolution. However, thinking becomes reality when
you turn it into strategy, and Azerbaijan should consider building and
implementing its engagement strategy with Karabakh Armenians. Within
Azerbaijan, the `isolation camp’ has until now been stronger than the
`engagement camp’ in regard to opening economic relations with
Karabakh Armenians in advance of the withdrawal of Armenian forces
from the occupied territories. Discouragingly, the engagement camp is
small, consisting mainly of intellectuals. The past 20 years of
negotiations suggest that the solution is largely dependent on the
conflict parties, mutual trust and the potential for cooperation.

The key issue for this strategy is that even if both sides can reach
an agreement, the `third party’ (Karabakh Armenians) could block it.
This was seen in 1997-1998, when Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossian brought the country to the brink of a compromise which
then collapsed, largely due to the role of Karabakh Armenians who,
with the diaspora and some political groups, pushed the president to
resign. Ultimately, if the Armenian leadership will not make
concessions, official Baku needs to change its engagement with
Karabakh Armenians. The aim is to avoid a situation wherein either the
Armenian leadership or the Karabakh Armenian de facto authorities can
take the peace process hostage.

In this regard, Azerbaijan can develop an Engagement, Cooperation and
Coexistence Strategy with Karabakh Armenians. Karabakh Armenians are
living under the patronage of de facto separatist authorities outside
Azerbaijan and also under an information blockade. This strategy might
also be beneficial for Azerbaijan because it does not question the
principle of territorial integrity, nor does it force Azerbaijan to
recognize the self-proclaimed independence of Nagorno-Karabakh
separatists.

The strategy should consist of the following principles:

First, that Karabakh Armenians are citizens of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan
pledges not to threaten the physical security of its people, to
provide all security guarantees to them and to open up economic
opportunities. Under this approach, the Azerbaijani government should
reassure Armenians that the target of the threat is not the civilian
population, but the Armenian leadership. Otherwise, any statements
containing threats will be used in a PR campaign against Azerbaijan.
Military intervention should be an option in the event of failed
negotiations.

Second, that Karabakh Armenians can benefit from coexistence with
Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani government allocates money in the state
governmental budget to Karabakh Armenians, which they can access from
a `third country,’ for example Azerbaijan’s Tbilisi embassy. The
budget cannot be used for any activity by the de facto authorities.
For example, the Azerbaijani government is now repaying Soviet era
bank deposits to Azerbaijanis. Karabakh Armenians can also access
their deposits; all they need to do is show the record of the deposit
and their ID. This could be a simple way of beginning the engagement
process via a neutral financial procedure. The more difficult strategy
would be to create a state `Post-Rehabilitation Fund,’ whereby the
government would allocate money for reconstruction after conflict
resolution. This would be one way of marketing the conflict resolution
strategy, in particular to Karabakh Armenians.

Third, one of the key goals is to strengthen the bargaining power of
the EU and US in the Karabakh conflict. This has been seen in the case
of Georgia, where the EU tried to build stronger ties with Abkhazia,
which, in turn, could be used to increase Abkhazia’s contacts with
Georgia, or to nudge Sukhumi toward creative legal formulae on the
question of status in future negotiations. Before the 2008 August War,
Georgia did not have an `engagement without recognition’ strategy. But
before declaring this policy in 2010, Georgia’s fear was that the EU
or US support for NGO activities could legitimize the breakaway
entities. However, Azerbaijan can coordinate NGO activities, along
with the EU and US. In this way, Azerbaijan could ask the US and the
EU to refrain from implementing projects that could strengthen the
Karabakh authorities, and instead to focus on initiatives that will
increase the trust of Karabakh Armenians in Azerbaijan. After the
initial implementation of soft economic engagement and NGO projects
with Karabakh Armenians, the government could declare later the full
points of engagement policy and add security guarantees if the
conflict is resolved.

Obviously, there is a risk that nationalistic anxieties and the
exploitation of patriotic themes can serve as powerful political
instruments to legitimize curtailing further engagement in Karabakh.
But it is possible that this type of thinking also makes it impossible
to justify any engagement projects and/or moves toward
confidence-building. Possibly, the majority of Karabakh Armenians and
their supporters will be blamed for having `sold out national
interests for the sake of Azerbaijani funds.’ But, it is possible that
such a strategy could change the trajectory of conflict resolution and
could facilitate a new endeavor on conflict resolution — without
waiting for the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to generate movement, or
for Yerevan’s concessions.

From: A. Papazian

US Official News
August 23, 2013 Saturday

ErdoÄ?an Aims to Distract with His Latest Remarks Against Israel

Washington

The Center for American Progress has issued the following news release:

On Tuesday Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an publicly stated
that he had evidence that Israel orchestrated the July 3 military coup
in Egypt, which overthrew the democratically elected government of
Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. It soon emerged, however, that Prime
Minister ErdoÄ?an’s allegations were based on nothing more than a
paranoid interpretation of a two-year-old YouTube video. But this
allegation is just the latest example of the populist and increasingly
inflammatory turn in Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an’s rhetoric, designed to
distract domestic political debate away from several serious
challenges to Turkey’s growth and regional stability by exploiting
resentment against Israel. The prime minister’s thinly veiled
anti-Semitism is unhelpful to Turks and hurts Turkey’s image in the
world.

First, Turkish economic growth has slowed significantly in recent
weeks, and the country’s macroeconomic outlook is increasingly bleak.
The expected slowdown in the U.S. Federal Reserve’s stimulus measures
has reverberated through a number of emerging markets, none more so
than Turkey. Turkey had enjoyed large capital inflows from investors
seeking higher returns than they could earn from U.S. bonds, the
prices of which were depressed by the Fed’s bond-buying program. But
with the end of this stimulus, the bubble has begun to deflate. This
slowdown has been particularly visible in light of a spate of large
infrastructure and real-estate investments, such as the Gezi Park
redevelopment that sparked Turkey’s recent protests; a new bridge
across the Bosphorus, also known as the Istanbul Strait, which
connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara; and a new international
airport, meant to be the world’s largest.

What’s more, the value of the Turkish lira has dropped 4.5 percent
compared to the U.S. dollar in recent months, and the Turkish stock
market fell 9 percent in the first week of June. This, along with the
implosion of Syria’once a major trading partner and a centerpiece of
Turkey’s `zero problems with neighbors’ policy’has significantly
slowed Turkish economic growth, undermining the Justice and
Development Party’s, or AKP’s, most impressive achievement.

Second, Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an and his party have not addressed the
concerns of liberal and moderate Turks that surfaced during the Gezi
Park protests. Rather than respond as a leader of all of Turkey’s
citizens, Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an has vilified legitimate political
protest and accelerated a long-running crackdown on independent
journalists and media outlets. Likewise, progress on drafting a new
constitution has stalled, meaning that Turkey continues to be governed
by a document ratified in 1982, when the country was still under
military rule, which contains numerous problematic or overly broad
clauses that allow the abuse of state authority and prevent full
reconciliation of Turkish minority ethnic groups.

The current populism of the AKP leadership represents a significant
shift away from the AKP’s earlier attempts to reverse a tradition of
nationalist indoctrination by enlisting the help of private schools,
universities, and civil-society organizations. The uncompromising
pushback against protesters and journalists alike is undermining the
hope that 21st century Turkey can be a democratic society in which
citizens are encouraged to question their government and individual
freedoms are protected within the broader national identity.

Third, Turkish policy toward Syria is fraying. Despite Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an’s repeated condemnations of the abuses under Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the humanitarian situation in Syria
continues to deteriorate, and refugee flows into Turkey continue
unabated. The strain of caring for more than 400,000 refugees is
taking a toll on border communities, and a number of incidents, such
as the May 11 bomb attack in the border town of Reyhanli, illustrate
the continuing risk of the violence spilling over into Turkey.

It is important to remember that the Turkish government, and
especially the prime minister’master of clamorous announcements and
symbolic politics’dramatically raised expectations early on in the
conflict. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an took this bold, pro-intervention
stance despite reluctant public opinion in Turkey and the more
cautious position of the United States. It was Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu who raised the option of establishing a
buffer zone on the Syrian-Turkish border in late 2011. Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an was the second regional leader, after Jordan’s King Abdullah
II bin Al-Hussein, to call for President Assad to step down. Not much
has happened since, and domestic criticism of the prime minister’s
aggressive position has mounted.

Fourth, progress in the government’s delicate negotiations with the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, has been slow, and nationalist Turks
fear that the unrest in Syria and the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan have
created the conditions needed for the establishment of an independent
Kurdish state. This is not just a question of short-term politics, but
one that goes to the core of national Turkish self-perception. It is
important to finally settle the Kurdish conflict and reckon with the
ethnic cleansing of Armenians in 1915. After decades of delay, Turkish
society is beginning to address these issues, and the outcome will
shape the future of the country.

These developments, along with the harsh sentences handed down in the
long-running Ergenekon trial of alleged right-wing coup plotters, have
inflamed opinion in the military and among the vestiges of the old
Kemalist’the secularist ideology of the founder of modern Turkey,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’apparatus in Ankara and Istanbul. While these
segments of society do not represent Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an’s
political base, he has energized his political opponents and opened
himself up to criticism that may resonate with some deeply
nationalistic Turks.

Inveighing against foreign interlopers is not unique to Turkey; it is
a common tactic of leaders looking to draw attention away from their
own domestic failures. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an’s rhetoric, while deeply
offensive, is designed to distract Turks and shift the terms of the
domestic debate away from a series of touchy political and economic
issues. The prime minister is failing yet another leadership test by
resorting to tired political slogans denouncing Israel. This weakness
is further underlined by the shelving of Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an’s
long-held ambition to revamp the Turkish presidency in order to become
Turkey’s first democratically elected president and prolong his rule.

While turning attention toward external bogeymen may be an effective
short-term political tactic, in the longer term it only serves to
further isolate Turkey and compound the international community’s
sense that Turkey’s democratic development has taken a wrong turn. It
also threatens to undermine American domestic support for the
U.S.-Turkey relationship. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an would be wiser to
focus on addressing the bread-and-butter concerns of the entire
Turkish society.

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From: A. Papazian