Monitoring the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan

Monitoring the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan
Rapporteur STRÄSSER, Christoph (Germany, SOC)

Translation from French
Doc. 13079

December 14, 2012

Monitoring the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan Report1

Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Mr. Christoph STRÄSSER
Germany Socialist Group Summary

The issue of political prisoners is still not settled in Azerbaijan,
despite the ongoing efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly. In addition
to several unsolved cases dating from the accession of Azerbaijan to
the Council of Europe, several new cases of political prisoners have
appeared concerning politicians and activists linked to the
opposition, as well as journalists, of bloggers and peaceful
protesters sentenced to long prison terms.

In many cases, humanitarian reasons, including age of some prisoners
and the deterioration of their health, require their immediate
release, regardless of any other criteria.

In a number of these cases, the European Court of Human Rights has
found a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Cases of
alleged political prisoners are still pending before that court, while
other prisoners were encouraged to abstain before the Court in due
course against the promise of an amnesty that did not materialize by
thereafter.

The Azerbaijani authorities are invited, on the one hand, to find a
rapid solution to the cases of persons who are on the checklist of
alleged political prisoners are still in prison and without requiring
in return for their release they admit their guilt or repent publicly
and, secondly, to take the necessary measures to ensure that no new
cases of alleged political prisoners appeared, including failing to
adopt the participants in peaceful demonstrations and pursue against
them by failing to criminalize the expression of political views and
religious media, putting an end to torture and other forms of
ill-treatment of suspects in custody order and remand, allowing
suspects to be assisted by counsel of his choice and ensuring that any
search and seizure is conducted in the presence of witnesses truly
independent.

Contents Page

¹ Draft resolution. ¹ Explanatory memorandum by Mr StrÀsser
rapporteur. Âą Introduction. Âą Current state of the process and
geographical scope of the report. Âą The historical context of the
issue of political prisoners in the Council of Europe: the accession
of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Âą Distribution of tasks between the
European Court of Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly. Âą The
concept of “political prisoner” according to the definition used by
the independent experts of the Council of Europe. Âą Offences purely
political. Âą Other political offenses. Âą lack of political offenses. Âą
Burden of proof. Âą Summary of criteria. Âą General acceptance of the
criteria by independent experts. Âą Application of the definition in a
number of cases of alleged political prisoners. Âą Methodology. Âą Cases
of alleged political prisoners. Âą Conclusions. Âą – List of alleged
political prisoners (in alphabetical order). Âą – Persons appearing
once on the list of alleged political prisoners, but which are no
longer imprisoned (in alphabetical order). A. Draft resolution2

1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls that the definition of
“political prisoner” was developed in 2001 by the Council of Europe by
the independent experts of the Secretary-General, whose mission was to
assess cases of alleged political prisoners in Armenia and Azerbaijan
in the framework of the accession of these two countries to the
Organization.

2. It notes with satisfaction that the general criteria by independent
experts at the time were approved by all stakeholders, including the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary
Assembly and the Armenian authorities and Azerbaijan. The Assembly
reaffirms its adherence to these criteria.

3. The Assembly notes that the issue of political prisoners is still
not settled in Azerbaijan, despite the ongoing efforts of the
Assembly, which adopted Resolutions 1359 (2004) and 1457 (2005) and
Recommendation 1711 (2005), specially devoted to this subject. It
fully endorses the findings and recommendations of the Commissioner
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe following his visits to
Azerbaijan in March 2010 and September 2011.

4. This also applies to a number of people on the second list of 107
political prisoners, called “forgotten”, whose fate was known after
the publication of the final report of the independent experts.

5. In addition, several new cases have emerged since the completion of
independent experts concerning politicians and activists linked to the
opposition, as well as journalists, bloggers and peaceful protesters
sentenced to heavy prison sentences.

6. In a number of cases, these prisoners have already spent so much
time in prison they should be free not to be discriminated against
vis-Ã-vis other prisoners convicted of similar offenses, even if the
verdicts pronounced against them following the controversial trial
were based.

7. In many cases, humanitarian reasons, including age of some
prisoners and the deterioration of their health, require their
immediate release, regardless of any other criteria.

8. The Assembly is aware that every prisoner may, in principle, bring
an application before the European Court of Human Rights when it
considers that the case meets the criteria for the definition of
political prisoners.

9. The Assembly notes that, in a number of these cases, the European
Court of Human Rights has found a violation of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5). Cases of alleged political prisoners are
still pending before that court, while other prisoners were still
encouraged to abstain before the Court in due time against the promise
of an amnesty that did not materialize thereafter.

10. The Assembly recognizes that it is not competent to decide on the
merits of individual cases of alleged violations of human rights. But
she believes have the duty to investigate allegations of systemic
problems in the protection of human rights in all member states, as
well as analyze and assess, in terms of legal and political any case
or group of cases may clarify the types of violation of human rights
which need to be addressed by appropriate policy and legal measures.

11. The Assembly notes that several people who were on the checklist
of alleged political prisoners or earlier versions of such lists have
been released for various reasons, for example because they have
received a presidential pardon for reasons health or simply after
serving their sentence.

12. In view of the foregoing, the Assembly urges the Azerbaijani authorities:

12.1. to find a rapid solution to the cases of persons who are on the
checklist and are still imprisoned without charge in return they admit
their guilt and repent publicly:

12.1.1. releasing immediately, pursuant to the provisions of the
Criminal Code relating to parole, the presumed political prisoners who
have already served several years of their sentence;

12.1.2. releasing or retrying presumed political prisoners who were
sentenced in violation of the right to a fair trial;

12.1.3. releasing all compassionate presumed political prisoners who
are seriously ill;

12.1.4. releasing or retrying presumed political prisoners who were
involved in political events and to a lesser degree very minor, given
that the alleged instigators of these events were themselves already
pardoned;

12.1.5. by releasing presumed political prisoners who have no
connection with the events in question as being relative, friend or
acquaintance of prominent members of previous governments;

12.2. to take the necessary measures to ensure that no new cases of a
political prisoner, considered as such under the above criteria,
appears, including:

12.2.1. by failing to stop participating in peaceful demonstrations
and to prosecute against them;

12.2.2. by failing to criminalize the expression of political views
and religious media, including on the Internet, however, that it is
hate speech and incitement to violence continue to be prosecuted
accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights;

12.2.3. putting an end to torture and other forms of ill-treatment of
suspects in police custody and pre-trial detention;

12.2.4. allowing suspects to be assisted by counsel of his choice;

12.2.5. ensuring that any search and seizure is conducted in the
presence of witnesses truly independent.

B. Explanatory memorandum by Mr StrÀsser, rapporteur

1. Introduction

1.1. The current status of the procedure and geographical scope of report

1. This report was initially consider the two terms for which I was
appointed rapporteur, respectively on March 24 and 16 December 2009,
on:

– “Monitoring the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan”

– “The definition of political prisoners.”

2. The two terms have been grouped rapporteur on the decision of the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights at its meeting on 24 June
2010. During the same meeting, on the basis of an introductory note
that I présentée3 and an expert hearing, the Committee endorsed the
proposed criteria for the definition of political prisoners and
allowed me to make a study visit to Baku. At its meeting on 5 October
2011, the Committee was renamed the Joint Report “Review the issue of
political prisoners” on a proposal from the President, through a
compromise with the Azerbaijani delegation, which objected to its
countries be designated separately in the title of the report and
refused to allow me to make a study visit.

3. At the meeting of 8 March 2011, the Azerbaijani delegation tried to
reverse the decision of 24 June 2010 and split the dual mandate,
restoring the initial two distinct mandates, this proposal was
rejected by the commission. I tried several times, unsuccessfully, to
obtain the cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities to organize my
study visit. In August 2011, my visa application was officially
rejetée4. Two other attempts to organize a visit in November 2011 and
late January 2012 also failed, despite several interventions by the
Presidents of the Commission, Mr. Pourgourides and Mr Chope. After
setting a deadline of March 12, 2012 invitation by the President at
the meeting in January 2012, the Committee was informed at its meeting
of March 12, 2012 a date of visit was scheduled for the first week of
May 2012. Unfortunately, a week before the visit agreed during the
part-session in April 2012, the Azerbaijani delegation submitted the
grant of my visa to a new condition: I had to agree to consider only
the theoretical definition of political prisoners not suspected of
Azerbaijani Political Prisoners. I made a point to emphasize to
perform a study visit based on the dual mandate that was entrusted to
me. I did not finally get a visa and visit already scheduled for next
week has been canceled. The Committee, at its meeting of April 24,
2012, has authorized me to present my report without making the usual
study visit.

4. At its meeting of 21 May 2012, the committee finally decided to
split my dual mandate and asked to submit two separate reports, one on
the definition of politiques5 prisoners and the other suspected
political prisoners. As explained by the Secretary General of the
Parliamentary Assembly during the same meeting, the decision restores
the situation that existed before the merger of the two proposals on
24 June 2010. As a result, changing the title to which he had been
made in October 2011 is no longer valid.

5. Regarding the geographical scope of this report, the first of two
proposals on which it rests is expressly limited to Azerbaijan. The
second regards the definition of political prisoners, is not a
specific country. The decision to combine these two proposals in one
report, taken in June 2010, resulted in no change in the geographical
context. Having renamed in October 2011 over the future (new title:
“Review the issue of political prisoners”) allowed me to extend the
geographical scope of my mandate as possible, in accordance with the
explanation given by the Chairman of the Committee of Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, which had proposed the new title. But considering
the cancellation, May 21, 2012, the decision to merge the two reports,
there is more reason to change the title of the report, or to
potentially extend the geographical scope.

6. By way of introduction, I will give an overview of the long and
painful history of the issue of political prisoners in Armenia and
Azerbaijan (Section 1.2 below) and I remember the views that I have
defended, and the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has
endorsed at its meeting on 24 June 2010, about the division of tasks
between the Assembly and the European Court of Human Rights (“the
Court”) ( Section 1.3 below). I mention in the first major section of
this report (Section 2 below), the current definition, fully
recognized, political prisoners, in principle, applicable to all
Member States of the Council of Europe, as reaffirmed by the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights at its meeting on 24 June 2010. The
second major part (chapter 3 below) will consist of an application of
these criteria to a number of cases and classes of cases of alleged
political prisoners in Azerbaijan. 1.2. The historical context of the
issue of political prisoners in the Council of Europe: the accession
of Armenia and Azerbaijan

7. The issue of political prisoners in the Council of Europe back to
the negotiations on the accession of Azerbaijan to the United Nations.
Azerbaijan was especially committed “to release or retry those
prisoners who are considered” political prisoners “by organizations to
protect human rights” 6. In November 2000, the Committee of Ministers
adopted Resolutions Res (2000) 13 and Res (2000) 14, which invited
simultaneously Armenia and Azerbaijan to become members of the Council
of Europe, which status should be confirmed Once fixed the date of
accession. To allow some states to overcome their reluctance towards
these two memberships at the time, a compromise was reached in the
Committee of Ministers, under which it was also decided in November
2000 that the Committee of Ministers ensure regular monitoring of the
democratic development of the two countries. Armenia and Azerbaijan
adhered to the Council of Europe on 25 January 2001. The Committee of
Ministers then approved on 31 January 2001, the initiative taken by
the Secretary-General to appoint three prominent “independent experts”
7 to examine the lists of cases of alleged political prisoners
established by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Armenian and
Azerbaijani human rights Rights8. Before the review, the independent
experts had undertaken to determine, almost acting as judges, which
people could “be considered political prisoners on the basis of
objective criteria, in the light of the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human rights and standards of the Council of Europe “9. They
then proceeded to the examination of 716 cases on the list to define,
based on a series of predetermined criteria and accepted by all
relevant bodies of the Council of Europe and the Azerbaijani
authorities, if the detainees in question were indeed “political”
prisoners 10. The Committee of Ministers has also created a panel
chaired by the Italian Ambassador at the time Mr. Ago (“the Group
Ago”) to monitor the implementation of this commitment. Unfortunately,
716 cases have not all been resolved in a timely manner. Twenty-three
cases of the initial list, which had 716, were given priority by
experts as “test cases”. In April 2003, a good portion of the 716
cases had been resolved and the list reduced to 212 cases, which have
been the subject of a second term experts. In July 2004, the experts
submitted their final report to the Secretary General. Besides the 20
opinion about the business drivers, they made 104 Reviews relating to
212 cases that had been transmitted. They thus concluded that 62
detainees had the quality of political prisoners, which was not the
case and more than 62 others.

8. An additional list of 88 new cases of alleged political prisoners
was then established by NGOs. It contains the names of persons
arrested or convicted before January 1, 2001 and who were erroneously
omitted from the initial list of 716 presumed political prisoners or
have been arrested or convicted between 1 January 2001 and 14 April
2002 date of entry into force of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”) in Azerbaijan. Only the
Parliamentary Assembly has made an assessment of this list, which is
annexed to its report of January 2004 (Doc. 10026). In its Resolution
1359 (2004) on political prisoners in Azerbaijan, the Assembly had
unsuccessfully invited the Secretary General at the time, Mr. Walter
Schwimmer, to extend the work of independent experts by assigning a
third term for this list additional. The Assembly made another list of
107 new cases in its report on “Monitoring of Resolution 1359 (2004)
on political prisoners in Azerbaijan” 11, which led to the adoption of
Resolution 1457 (2005) and Recommendation 1711 (2005).

9. Since the accession of Azerbaijan in 2001, the Parliamentary
Assembly has examined four times the issue of political prisoners in
Azerbaijan in January 2002, June 2003, January 2004 and June 200512.
In the last resolution on this subject, Resolution 1457 (2005), the
Assembly

“Strongly reaffirmed its position of principle that prisoners who were
recognized as political prisoners must be released. She asks the
Azerbaijani authorities to find a speedy and final issue of political
prisoners and presumed political prisoners:

i. by releasing the three remaining political prisoners, as recognized
by independent experts, or by opening the opportunity to see their
business effectively considered by the European Court of Human Rights,
at a retrial or appeal, as proposed the Azerbaijani authorities;

ii. releasing immediately, pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal
Code relating to parole, the presumed political prisoners who have
already served several years of their sentence;

iii. releasing or retrying presumed political prisoners whose
judgments are contrary to the principles of the right to a fair trial;

iv. releasing, for humanitarian reasons, the presumed political
prisoners who are seriously ill;

v. releasing or retrying presumed political prisoners who were
involved in political events and to a lesser degree very minor,
knowing that the suspected instigators were themselves already
pardoned;

vi. by releasing presumed political prisoners who have no connection
with the events in question as being relative, friend or acquaintance
of the leading members of former governments;

and welcomes the commitment of the Azerbaijani authorities to use all
possible legal procedures (amnesty retrial court of higher instance,
parole, release for health reasons, thanks) to solve this problem. ”

10. Despite some progress made as a result of various resolutions
adopted by the Assemblée13, this issue is still not resolved, as
recalled in the following terms the authors of one of the proposals on
which this report is based:

“No action was unfortunately the recommendations of the Assembly. We
recorded no result and the action group was much less active since the
adoption of Resolution 1545 (2007). He has had two meetings. No decree
of grace has been taken since March 2007 despite promises to do so.

At the same time, the list of alleged political prisoners continues to
grow. Some journalists who were sentenced for defamation were declared
prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International. In total, the list
of the Federation of Azerbaijani organizations defending human rights
includes 72 political prisoners, nine political prisoners and 10
probable ex-political prisoners’. Some of them were arrested for the
second time. Mrs. Faina Kungurova, former political prisoner, died in
prison (18 November 2007) in unclear circumstances “14.

11. In June 2010, the Assembly debated a report on the functioning of
democratic institutions in Azerbaijan, in his chapter on human rights
and fundamental freedoms, highlights a number of cases of journalists
and imprisoned activists, which should settle urgence15. Following the
co-rapporteurs visit Azerbaijan 31 January to 2 February 2012, the
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member
States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) considered a
briefing note of these last, dated 25 April 2012, which evokes once
more cases of opposition activists and journalists detained, as well
as the need for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to
clarify the concept of prisoner politique16.

12. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the time, Thomas Hammarberg,
published in March 2010 and September 2011 two reports in which he
denounced the use of counts fabrications to stop and silence
candidates parliamentary elections, journalists and members of groups
jeunesse17. In light of my findings, I fully agree with how the
findings of the Commissioner and recommandations18 summarize the
identified problems.

13. On 17 December 2009, the European Parliament stated that “concern
about the deterioration of media freedom in Azerbaijan, [he deplored]
practices of arrest, prosecution and conviction of opposition
journalists accused of various crimes” and urged the Azerbaijani
authorities “to immediately release jailed journalists.” On 24 May
2012, the European Parliament adopted another résolution19 who
strongly criticized the recent arrests of journalists and activists in
Azerbaijan and calls that “persons detained for political reasons” are
released.

14. Among the cases occurred recently and deserve, in my opinion, to
be urgently addressed include those young journalists of the Internet
(“bloggers”) and youth activists who were sentenced to heavy prison
sentences for “hooliganism” after themselves victims without
provocation, aggression forces sécurité20. In November 2011, Amnesty
International issued an urgent appeal for the release of 17 “prisoners
of conscience” 21. Recent cases reflect the persistence of Azerbaijan
structural problem in the use of imprisonment to silence any
opposition.

15. Many of the “old cases” eventually become urgent humanitarian
issues given the time that the parties have already spent in prison
and given their age and poor health. It is unfair to keep people in
prison at the time the alleged offenses were committed, which were
extremely young and single accessory could complicity in the worst
case be charged, while the quality of political prisoners has been
recognized the instigators and organizers, who have been released long
ago. It is equally unfair to hold detainees in prison after the expiry
of the mandate of independent experts who could not be taken into
account in the work of these for that reason alone. They continue to
serve a sentence for having participated in the commission of offenses
whose instigators and organizers, again, were released long after the
quality of their political prisoners had been recognized. 1.3.
Division of tasks between the European Court of Human Rights and the
Parliamentary Assembly

16. The criteria for the definition of “political prisoners”
frequently refer to the European Convention on Human Rights. Is
considered a political prisoner detained person in violation of the
Convention (and in particular Articles 5, 6 and 10). It goes without
saying that the authentic interpretation of the Convention is the sole
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Since the entry
into force of the Convention in Azerbaijan, the Court is also
competent to examine individual applications submitted by persons who
consider themselves victims of a violation of their rights under the
Convention. Recall in this regard that on 22 April 2010, the Court
concluded that Mr. Fatullayev, imprisoned in April 2007 after writing
a series of articles critical of the government, had been wrongly
imprisoned and requested his release immédiate22. But the fact that a
number of cases of alleged political prisoners are still pending
before the national courts or the European Court of Human Rights does
not in principle prohibit the Assembly to proceed with the evaluation
policy a possible systemic problem: the frequent imprisonment of
political opponents and independent journalists, either due to lack of
compliance with the relevant legal standards of the Council of Europe,
is an application incompatible with the provisions of these standards
in question. According to a well-established within the Assembly23,
reporters are free to discuss individual cases to identify and
illustrate possible structural violations, and to comment on these
matters, in order to propose possible solutions. Of course, the
Assembly has no intention when wearing a political assessment of these
cases on the basis of the Convention, to interfere in the independence
of the Court, it has consistently asserted and defended. As the Court
is currently flooded with requests individual countries problems
caused by “systemic”, the Assembly can do useful work in addressing
such problems based on carefully documented examples and proposing
solutions to national authorities may dry up the source of this
massive influx queries. 2. The notion of “political prisoner”
according to the definition used by the independent experts of the
Council of Europe

17. Judge Stefan Trechsel presented the conclusions reached by his
colleagues and himself on the definition and criteria of the notion of
“political prisoner” at the hearing of the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, the June 24, 2010 at Strasbourg24. Independent
experts have based their work on those of Professor Carl Aage
NĂžrgaard, who was then President of the European Commission of Human
Rights and was invited by the Security Council of the United Nations
to define the quality of prisoner “policy” Namibia in 1989 and 1990.
The teacher’s aide NĂžrgaard, Andrew Grotrian, is also among the
experts heard at the hearing on 24 June. The third expert present
during the hearing was Javier GĂłmez BermĂșdez, Judge President of the
Criminal Chamber of the Audiencia Nacional (Spain). Following these
discussions with experts, the Committee endorsed the conclusions of my
note introductive25et invited me to continue my work on the basis of
these objective criteria.

18. During these discussions, the experts agreed that those convicted
of violent crimes, such as terrorism, could not claim the status of
“political prisoners”, even though they claimed to have acted for
“political” reasons. GĂłmez BermĂșdez said that this principle was
applicable to democratic states run by legitimate governments, where
there can be no question of “legitimate resistance”, as was the case
for the “Resistance” French during World War II. This argument is
supported by Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
entitled “Prohibition of abuse of rights” 26.

19. RĂ©sumer27 to, the following framework has been established by
independent experts on the basis of the European Convention on Human
Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, it
depends on the nature of the offense for which the person is
imprisoned. 2.1. Purely political offenses

20. These are offenses which relate solely to the political
organization of the State, as “defamation” in respect of its
authorities or other offenses of the same type.

21. All offenders imprisoned for these reasons do not have the quality
of “political prisoners”. The criterion of the legality of their
detention under the European Convention on Human Rights, as
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, can be
distinguished. The speech “political nature”, including when highly
critical towards the government and the ruling power is in principle
protected by Article 10, the wording does not permit the prohibition
on behalf of a “pressing social need” in a “democratic society” 28.
But sometimes the political discourse goes beyond the limits set by
the Convention, for example when incites violence, racism or
xénophobie29. It should be noted that whenever the Court held that the
suppression of speech permissible under the Convention, the sentences
imposed by the courts were largely symbolic. As the interpretation of
the Convention must be consistent and free of contradictions, a person
convicted under Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention shall be
considered as illegally detained under Article 5 or, by accordingly,
have the status of political prisoner. It is understood, however, that
the penalties for holding about a political nature which do not enjoy
the protection of Article 10 may be contrary to the Convention (and
raise the issue of “political” character of the prisoner concerned)
when the sentence is disproportionate, discriminatory or the result of
a trial marred iniquity. 2.2. Other political offenses

22. These offenses committed for political reasons (not interest) and
which affect both the interests of the State and those of other
individuals, as is the case of terrorist acts. Of course, the state
territorial jurisdiction where such acts are not only entitled to
prosecute the perpetrators, it also has a positive obligation. As a
result, persons convicted of such offenses and remanded in custody on
suspicion of having committed such offenses do not have the status of
political prisoners. This principle, however, suffers the same
exceptions as in the previous category where the sentence is
disproportionate, discriminatory or imposed after an unfair trial.
2.3. Devoid of political offenses

23. Persons detained for offenses of a political character lacking
(that is to say, any other offense in which neither the act nor
criminal intent does not have a political connotation) have not, in
principle the quality of political prisoners. Again, this principle
has a number of exceptions. A person convicted of an offense devoid of
political character may have the status of political prisoner when the
government incarcerates for political reasons. These can become
evident when the sentence is completely disproportionate to the
offense or when the procedure is clearly tainted with iniquity. 2.4.
Burden of proof

24. The distribution of the burden of proof is particularly crucial in
an area that depends largely on the “political” motivation or other of
the offender or the government. The approach taken by the independent
experts of the Council of Europe is as follows: it is first and
foremost to those who claim that a particular individual has the
quality of political prisoner to provide a prima facie case. These are
then submitted to the State concerned, which, in turn, will have the
opportunity to present evidence that refutes this allegation. As
summarized by Stefan Trechsel30,

“Except state capacity to demonstrate that the defendant’s detention
is fully consistent with the provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights, such as has interpreted the European Court of Human
Rights on the bottom the case that the rules of proportionality and
non-discrimination have been met and that the deprivation of liberty
is the result of a process, the person should be considered a
political prisoner. ”

25. The people responsible for establishing the political nature of
detention may also apply, by analogy, the case made by the Court on
presumptions of fact in cases where the respondent State refuses to
cooperate by providing documents, or other information held
exclusively by the government publics31. 2.5. Summary critĂšres32

26. “A person deprived of his personal liberty should be seen as a”
political prisoner ”

a. if the detention was imposed in violation of the fundamental
guarantees set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
and its Protocols, in particular freedom of thought, conscience and
religion, freedom of expression and information and freedom of
assembly and association;

b. if the detention was imposed for purely political reasons unrelated
to any offense;

c. if, for political reasons, the duration of the detention or the
conditions are clearly disproportionate to the offense for which the
person has been convicted or is alleged to have committed;

d. if, for political reasons, the person is detained in conditions
creates a discrimination against others or,

e. if the detention is the culmination of a process that was clearly
flawed and that seems to be linked to political motivations of the
authorities. ‘

33

27. To say a person is a “political prisoner” must be based on solid
evidence, it is therefore the State in which the person is held to
prove that the detention is in full compliance with the Convention
European Court of Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court
of Human Rights on the merits of the case, that the principles of
proportionality and non-discrimination have been met and that the
deprivation of liberty is the result of a fair trial.

28. Careful examination of these criteria shows a person to whom the
quality of prisoner “policy” is recognized is not necessarily
“innocent”. The political dimension of a case may reside, for example,
the selective application of the law, in the infliction interested in
a heavy punishment, disproportionate to that which would be convicted
of an offense similar people without history ‘political’, or in the
absence of procedural fairness, which can still lead to the conviction
of the guilty. Therefore, the recognition of an inmate as a prisoner
“policy” does not necessarily immediate release: the most appropriate
way to remedy this situation is likely to try again in a fair trial.
That said, given the time that many of these prisoners have already
spent in prison, is to release an emergency, even if they are actually
“guilty” of the crimes alleged against them, is now often the only way
to dispel the suspicion that the particularly harsh treatment that has
been applied was for “political” reasons. 2.6. General acceptance
criteria by independent experts

29. Criteria summarized above were sent to all parties concerned. As
stated in the information document of the Secretary General on the
results of work carried out by independent experts, “[n] o substantive
objections were raised [about these criteria]” 34. At their 765th
meeting on 21 September 200135, the Deputies “[took] note with
appreciation of the report of the independent expert of the Secretary
General on alleged political prisoners in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as
contained in document [SG / Inf (2001) 34 and Addendum I and Addendum
II] (…) “and adopted the following statement on this issue:

“The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has learned with
satisfaction that the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, August
17, 2001, by decree pardoned 89 political prisoners, 66 were released
and 23 have been their sentences reduced (…) “(emphasis added to
highlight the fact that the term” political prisoners “was used by the
Committee of Ministers itself)

30. Three years later, at the end of the second term of independent
experts, the background paper prepared by the Secretary-General
reaffirms that “[t] hese criteria were accepted by the Azerbaijani
authorities and all instances of the Council of Europe” 36. Subsequent
resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly also relied on the generally
accepted criteria established by experts indépendants37.

31. During my current term Rapporteur, some members of the commission
have repeatedly tried to reopen the question of the definition of
prisoners politiques38. But I remain convinced that any attempt to
“reinvent the wheel” would only distract us from the important mission
which is ours: to help Azerbaijan to settle permanently the issue of
political prisoners.

32. I would like to recall in this connection that there is no doubt
that the terrorists of ETA, PKK or any other terrorist organization
does not fall within the scope of the definition of political
prisoners, even if they say they committed their heinous crimes for
“political” reasons. However, those accused of terrorist acts and
sentenced for political reasons, given this time by the authorities,
on the basis of an unfair trial and dubious evidence (“confessions”
extracted under torture or testimony obtained under duress, for
example) may well be presumed “political prisoners” if sufficient
evidence lead us to believe that these violations have actually
occurred. 3. Application of the definition in a number of cases of
alleged political prisoners 3.1. Methodology

33. During the investigation for the preparation of this report, I
proposed the Azerbaijani authorities to follow a six-step process:

– First step: to establish a “draft checklist of alleged political
prisoners” from the list of alleged political prisoners presented by
different NGOs.

– Second step: transmitting “project checklist” to the Azerbaijani
authorities to bring their observations.

– Third step: communicate observations authorities to NGOs sent the
names of the parties, asking them to comment on these observations.

– Step Four: During the study visit planned in Baku to discuss with
the authorities and representatives of civil society results from the
first to the third step.

– Step Five: Analyze the information obtained and assess each case in
the light of criteria reaffirmed by the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights at its June 2010 meeting.

– Sixth step: present conclusions in the form of a draft resolution
and a report for adoption by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, and the Parliamentary Assembly.

34. Unfortunately, the authorities have not submitted their comments
on the list that I have provided in December 2011. The expert selected
by the authorities and invited to the hearing of January 2012 has also
chosen to examine only general questions and did not comment on the
merits of the case that I raised. As I already indiqué39, the
Azerbaijani authorities have not I allowed to make a study visit to
Baku, which would have given yet another opportunity to submit an
official point of view on business question.

35. I have however received numerous comments, additional information,
clarification and further explanation about the different categories
of cases from non-governmental organizations, which I consulted before
and after the hearing of January 2012 . 10 and 11 May 2012, in
particular, I had the opportunity to work with two defenders
Azerbaijani Human Rights, who visited Berlin and we have forwarded to
my colleagues and myself, a profusion information on a number of
selected cases. I would like to thank MM. Anar Anar Mammadli and
Gasimli for professionalism and patience they have shown in dealing
with the pace of the questions we have asked for two days of work
intense40.

36. Insofar as the cases in question dating back to successive terms
independent experts of the Council of Europe, I relied heavily on case
studies experts. I do not seek to challenge the findings of the post
independent eminent experts, who received for their work resources far
superior to those available to me as rapporteur of the Assembly. NGO
representatives who had previously worked with independent experts
told me on the basis of solid evidence that the lack of recognition of
the quality of political prisoners has sometimes only been due to the
fact that the applicants had not provided expert information that
allowed them to determine the existence of a “prima facie” 41.
According to the NGOs, this can be explained by a lack of legal advice
or assistance provided to interested NGOs, which do not all show the
same professionalism and objectivity same. Some people whose names
were on the list may have wrongly feel that their inclusion on the
list would automatically release. As this occasion is perhaps the last
chance for them to be released, I decided to include them on the
“Draft checklist of alleged political prisoners” transmitted to the
authorities and representatives of civil society for comments. When I
had in these cases sufficient evidence for me to conclude that a prima
facie reason to consider that these cases concerned were “political,”
while the authorities did not provide any evidence that showed the
opposite I have registered on the final list. These cases included the
case of very young (at the time) special forces of the Ministry of the
Interior (“OPON”), who had taken part in a failed coup in 1995,
obeying the orders of their superiors. While their superior officers,
that is to say, the organizers and instigators of the coup attempt
were released long after the quality of “political prisoners” they
were recognized by the Council of Europe, several troops and drivers,
in particular, are still in prison. They should be free too, otherwise
show discrimination towards them, unless they have been convicted on
the occasion of a fair trial for crimes committed during the attempted
coup for which the responsibility of their leaders could not be
committed.

37. As I mentioned haut42, I realize that this Assembly is not a
court. This is why I will set no definitive conclusion on cases of
alleged political prisoners brought to my attention. But I gathered a
considerable amount of information drawn from various sources.
Azerbaijani authorities as I have not made known their views on the
information that I have transmises43 I applied, mutatis mutandis, the
legal principle of the presumption of fact that the European Court of
Human Rights uses when the respondent State does not another version
credible facts presented by the requérant44. In the light of this
principle, a careful examination of all the information I had thus led
me to recognize a number of persons as political prisoners “alleged”
45. It is appropriate to release these people or at least try them
again in a fair trial, unless the authorities fail to refute point by
point specific elements underpinning my appreciation. As the
Azerbaijani authorities have not taken this step in the preparation of
this report, they will now be carried out under the monitoring report,
if they do not want to be held absolutely responsible for allowing
that, in a Member State of the Council of Europe, cases of alleged
political prisoners find no way out. It is up to others to determine
timely consequences of such a situation.

38. Cases of alleged political prisoners will be presented in this
report by category, to replace the more clearly in their political
context. Lack of space, only one or two particularly representative of
each category will be presented in detail. For ease of reference, an
alphabetical list of all the cases examined annexe46 figure. The main
report includes only the case of persons who, at the time of writing,
were still imprisoned. However, I made a second list in the appendix
which lists persons who meet the criteria of “political prisoners”,
but which are no longer in prison, either because they have served
their sentence, either because they were pardoned . The existence of
such cases is a further illustration of the systemic problems that
this report intends to address. The same reason led me to gather some
cases in a “watch list” of people who are remanded in custody and have
not yet been sentenced. Anyway, the lists that I have not set the
ambition to be exhaustive, it is very likely that a number of cases
have escaped my attention. 3.2. Cases of alleged political prisoners

39. Presentation of cases of alleged political prisoners will be
divided into two main parts: new cases, which occurred after the last
report of the Assembly of 2005, and the older cases, dating back to
the era of independent experts Council of Europe or are related to
these cases. 3.2.1. New cases

40. The “new” cases of alleged political prisoners are divided into
five main categories. The first case includes leaders and activists of
the main opposition parties laity (including “Musavat” and “Popular
Front”). The second category includes cases of civil rights activists
(including members of “Citizens’ Assembly” / Ictimai Palata, which
brings together several civil society groups and the opposition, but
not all of them) . The third category includes journalists (many of
which are on my “watch list” of persons remanded in custody). The
fourth category includes various series of cases involving Islamic
militants, while the fifth and final category of other emblematic
cases, such as former ministers who have distanced themselves from the
current regime. 3.2.1.1. The case of leaders and activists of the main
opposition parties lay

41. This category includes a number of young people arrested during a
peaceful demonstration organized by General “Citizens’ Assembly” April
2, 2011, while the authorities feared that the “Arab Spring” will
spread to Azerbaijan. They are accused of primarily caused “unrest” at
the event or have participated.

Case 1: Abbasli (Abbasly) Tural

42. Mr. Abbasli, president of the youth organization of the opposition
party “Musavat”, was a student at the University of Baku (Master of
Journalism), it was excluded at the time of his arrest. He was
arrested on April 2, 2011, at the beginning of the rally organized by
the “Citizens’ Assembly”, while chanting slogans in favor of freedom
and the resignation of the government. According to his lawyers, two
policemen beat him with batons and took him to the police Yasamal
district, where he was again beaten, this time by the head of police.
When his lawyer, Mr. Gasimli, went to the police station, he found
bruises (around the eyes and on the legs of Mr. Abbasli) and an
investigator asked permission to take photos, which was refused. The
investigator also refused to be photographed. During the trial, Mr.
Abbasli informed the judge that he had been struck. The judge ordered
the prosecutor to open an investigation in writing, that the
prosecutor refused. According to prosecutors, bruises, whose presence
had meanwhile been confirmed by an expert, were caused by M. Abbasli
himself, then he offered resistance at the time of his arrest.

43. September 7, 2011, Mr. Abbasli was convicted of the offense under
section 233 of the Criminal Code (organization of an act that causes a
disturbance to public order) and sentenced to two years and six months
imprisonment.

44. The maximum penalty under Article 233 of the Penal Code is three
years imprisonment. This arrangement offers several alternatives to
imprisonment, such as fines, community service or a maximum penalty of
two years of restriction of liberty. Fourteen people in total were
arrested at the rally on April 2, four as organizers and the other 10
to be taken “active.” Three of the four “organizers”, Mr. Abbasli Mr.
Hajili (Case No. 34) and Mr. Majidli (Case No. 64), were sentenced to
long terms of imprisonment, the fourth Fuad Gahramanli has only house
arrest while he was one of the official organizers of the event.
Defenders of human rights believe that this difference in treatment is
a strategy of “divide and rule”, to encourage rumors of collusion with
the authorities, so as to conquer the mistrust between opposition
activists.

45. However, having found Mr. Abbasli guilty of being an “organizer”
of this gathering is a manifest miscarriage of justice: when the
organizing committee of the event met and decided to hold this rally
April 2, 2011, that is to say on 18 March 2011, Mr. Abbasli was
actually placed in administrative detention. He was arrested on 12
March 2011 following a gathering of youth organizations March 11, 2011
and was not released until March 19, 2011.

46. Heavy sentences against the organizers and participants of the
rally on April 2 were motivated by the alleged “violence” committed by
some participants. According to lawyers and NGOs, who provided the
footage of événements47 that seem to confirm their claims, this event
corresponded peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression.
While windows were broken at the end of the event by persons unknown
to the organizers (and suspected “agents provocateurs”), some police
beat the protesters, who were content to raise his arms to protect
themselves batons. The testimony of certain prosecution witnesses,
shop owners in a market close to the venue, which argued that access
to their shop had been disturbed to such an extent that they were
forced to close temporarily, were “perfectly repeated,” according to
the lawyers. In any event, none of the persons convicted for having
organized or participated actively in this event has been accused of
committing acts of violence and even fewer convicted for violence.

47. Amnesty International has recognized Mr. Abbasli quality “prisoner
of conscience”. I also considered a political prisoner under alleged
“criteria Trechsel.” The fact of organizing an event or participate in
exercising their right to peaceful expression of his opinions should
not be criminalized and should certainly not lead to imprisonment as
heavy. Procedural irregularities and the establishment illogical facts
corroborate the presumption again the political nature of this case.

Case No. 23: Eyvazli Zulfugar (Zulfuqar) / EYVAZOV Zulfigar

48. Mr. Eyvazli is president of the section of the opposition Popular
Front (AXCP / AWP) of Nizami District. He was sentenced to one year
and six months imprisonment for taking an “active part” in the event
of 2 April 2011 (see Case 1 above).

Case No. 33: Hajili (Hajily), Arif

49. Mr. Hajili directs the central apparatus of the Musavat Party, he
was arrested during the rally “Citizens’ Assembly” 2 April 2011 (see
Case 1 above) and sentenced to two years and six months imprisonment.
Mr. Hajili had previously been arrested during a protest rally
organized after the 2003 presidential election and sentenced to one
year of imprisonment.

50. On 10 January 2012, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in
favor of Mr. Hajili48 in finding a violation of Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention (right to free elections). Although this case
is not related to the reason for his imprisonment, it illustrates the
political conflict between Mr. Hajili the Azerbaijani authorities.

51. Amnesty International has recognized Mr. Hajili quality “prisoner
of conscience”. It is also a political prisoner suspected, given the
political nature of his action, disproportionate punishment which was
inflicted and the context in which the trial is registered and the
other activists, amid conflict with previous authorities about the
right to free elections.

Case No. 34: Hajibeyli, Rufet (Rufat)

52. Mr. Hajibeyli took part in the activities of political parties and
opposition movements and was convicted of taking an “active part” in
the event of 2 April 2011 (see Case 1 above) and was sentenced to one
year and six months imprisonment.

Case No. 35: Hasanli, Shahin

53. Mr. Hasanli responsible for management of the opposition Popular
Front, was arrested before the event on April 2, 2011, when he spent
the night with her mother outside Baku. He had left his home after
being notified of his arrest. When police raided the home of his
mother during the night, he did not resist, but refused to sign the
minutes of search in the absence of independent witnesses required by
law. During the search in question, the police found a cartridge.
Witnesses of the search appeared at the trial, but the defense said
they were not on the premises at the time of the search. July 21,
2011, Mr. Hasanli was convicted of taking a “active” in the event of 2
April 2011 (see Case 1 above), not to have executed an order given by
the police and illegal possession of ammunition and was sentenced to
two years imprisonment.

54. The political nature of the act he was convicted and the
disproportionate nature of the heavy penalty of imprisonment to which
he was sentenced make him a political prisoner alleged (curiously,
when he was an “organizer” official event on April 2, he was there
because he had not been previously arrested and convicted for having
taken an “active”). The fact that he was convicted of possession of
ammunition seems particularly suspect under the circumstances: in
addition to the alleged lack of witnesses, why would he brought a
cartridge in the house of his mother he had reason to fear imminent
arrest?

Case No. 36: Hasanov, Babek

55. Mr. Hasanov is a militant opposition, he was convicted of taking a
“active” in the event of 2 April 2011 (see Case 1 above) and sentenced
to a term of a year and a half in prison.

Case 57: Kerimov, Sahib

56. Mr. Kerimov is a militant opposition, he was convicted of taking a
“active” in the event of 2 April 2011 (see Case 1 above) and sentenced
to a term of two years’ imprisonment.

Case No. 60: Majidli, Elnur

57. Mr. Majidli is a militant opposition, he was convicted of taking a
“active” in the event of 2 April 2011 (see Case 1 above) and sentenced
to a term of a year and a half in prison.

Case No. 61: Majidli, Mohammad (Mohammad)

58. Mr. Majidli is vice president of the opposition Popular Front
(AXCP / PPFA), he was convicted of being one of the organizers of the
event on 2 April 2011 (see Case 1 above ) and sentenced to two years
imprisonment.

Case No. 64: Mammadli (Mamedli), Ahad

59. Mr. Mammadli is an active member of the opposition party Musavat,
was convicted of taking an “active part” in the event of 2 April 2011
(see Case 1 above) and have opposite resistance by force of state
officials (Article 315 of the Penal Code) and was sentenced to three
years imprisonment.

Case No. 80: Quliyev, Ulvi

60. Mr. Quliyev is an opposition activist. He was convicted of taking
a “active” in the event of 2 April 2011 (see Case 1 above) and have
resisted by force of state officials (Article 315 of the Penal Code)
and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. 3.2.1.2. Cases of civil
rights activists

Case No. 43: Iskenderov (Isganderov) Vivadi

61. Mr. Iskenderov was an independent candidate in the 2010
parliamentary elections. He is president of the public association
“Help protect democracy” and advocates for civil rights, he was
convicted of 27 August 2011 “pressures on voters” (Article 159.3 of
the Penal Code ), “interference with the electoral commission members”
(Article 160.1), of “assault and physical violence” (Article 132) and
sentenced to three years imprisonment.

62. According to his lawyers, the following events took place in a
polling station in the district Agdash-Goychay during the 2010
parliamentary elections: Mr. Iskenderov, which was entitled, as a
candidate to be present in the office vote, said a ballot stuffing. He
asked for the annulment of the results of this poll and started a
discussion with the members of the electoral commission who were
there. Unauthorized persons present in the polling station were forced
to leave, while Mr. Iskenderov passively trying to protect his
physical integrity and the right to be present in the polling station.
Witnesses called by the prosecution at the trial had a relationship
with the members of the electoral commission and authorized observers
present in the polling station did not confirm that Mr. Iskenderov
struck anyone. The allegation of ballot stuffing in this poll has been
no investigation despite evidence (including video recordings)
produced by M. Iskenderov.

63. The authorities were apparently unhappy that he Mr. Iskenderov
provides free legal advice to residents of the region
Goychay-Kurdemir.

64. Given the political connotation of facts which he was convicted,
activities of political activist and civil rights, as well as the
heavy sentence imposed after a trial suspect, apparently to punish his
insistence to denounce electoral fraud, I believe Mr. Iskenderov as a
political prisoner alleged. 3.2.1.3. “Observation list”: persons
remanded in custody, arrested in suspicious circumstances, but not yet
convicted

65. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has asked me to report the following two
cases of civil rights activists arrested in suspicious circumstances:

Case No. 54: Khasmammadov, Taleh

66. Mr. Khasmammadov lawyer, defender of human rights and blogger
Goychay, he was arrested in November 2011 under the charge of
“hooliganism” and assault on a public official. Mr. Khasmammadov
specializes in investigations into allegations of violence and illegal
activities committed by police officers. I share the concerns of HRW:
he may be the victim of retaliation by the police unhappy with their
investigations.

Case No. 62: Mamedov, Bakthiar

67. Mr. Mamedov Baku, is also a lawyer, he defended the rights of two
families evicted illegal in the District of Bail in Baku. According to
Amnesty International, he was arrested on 30 December 2011 under the
apparently false charge of extortion and fraud is still remanded in
custody.

Case No. 29: Gulaliyev, Ogtay

68. Human Rights House (HRH) and several other NGOs have also asked me
to write the following case of emergency on our “watch list.”

69. Mr. Gulaliyev is a defender of human rights known, who coordinates
the center “Kura”, whose goal is to help victims of floods in April
and May 2010 to get the help that State has promised them. After
denouncing serious mismanagement and corruption, he was arrested on 8
April 2012. The treatment has been reserved in custody and the
investigation is extremely inquiétants49. It was released June 13,
2012 by the Court of Sabirabad, but the charges against him would
continue according to the information I received just before the
adoption of this report.

Case No. 84: Seyidov Elnur

70. A group of prominent members of the Coordinating Council of
“Citizens’ Assembly” Azerbaijan has asked me to draw attention to the
following case, which concerns the brother of an important political
leader of the opposition, Ali Karimli, which suffer several years of
pressure from the authorities.

71. Mr. Seyidov, which has no political activity and suffers from a
severe physical disability (multiple sclerosis), was arrested on 27
March 2012 under the charge of fraud apparently fabricated. According
to many observers, this arrest was to put pressure on Mr Ali Karimli.
This case is being investigated by the Ministry of National Security,
contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure classic. 3.2.1.4.
Cases of imprisoned journalists

72. Any of the following, except the first, were communicated to me by
Human Rights Watch in April 2012. I have also discussed in detail with
the two lawyers Baku came to Berlin on 10 and 11 May 2012. Unlike the
other cases discussed in this report, it was not included in the
initial list of suspected cases of political prisoners made by the
Azerbaijani NGOs who participated in the hearing of January 2012.

Case No. 21: Bayramov, Ramin

73. Mr. Bayramov is editor of the website “Islamazeri.az.” He was
arrested July 11, 2011 and January 26, 2012 sentenced to a term of one
year and six months’ imprisonment for possession of drugs and
firearms. According observateurs50, one may wonder about the real
reasons for his arrest, which took place the same day as the leaders
of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (AIP) 51. The Ministry of National
Security initially suspected Mr. Bayramov maintain links with the
Iranian Cultural Centre in Baku and be part of the radical Shiite
group “Jafari”, but was subsequently accused of drug possession and
weapons fire.

74. According to a militant defense of human rights which can not be
suspected of sympathy towards particular Islamist ideas, the charges
against Mr. Bayramov subject are not very convincing. The drug was
found in the pocket of a faithful Muslim traditionalist stopped in the
street allegedly by chance and whose forensic examination revealed
that he was not a drug addict.

75. The website is published by Mr. Bayramov highly critical vis-Ã-vis
the government in terms of Islam and is, for example, opposed the ban
on wearing the Islamic headscarf (“hijab”) to the Ă©cole52.

Case No. 49: Janiyev, Aydin

76. Mr. Janiyev of the daily Khural Lankaran, was sentenced to three
years’ imprisonment in November 2011 for “hooliganism” in retaliation
seems there articles he had published. 3.2.1.5. “Observation list”:
persons remanded in custody, arrested in suspicious circumstances, but
not yet convicted

77. Human Rights Watch and other local human rights have asked me to
draw attention to the following cases of journalists who are still on
remand:

Case No. 20: Bayramli Anar

78. Mr. Baramli journalist, television Iranian “Sahar” was arrested on
17 February 2012, under the charge obviously suspect drug possession.
He went himself to the local police station after being informed at
his home by police officers that their manager wanted to talk to him.
On his arrival at the police station, he had to leave his jacket in a
room and was taken to another room. The chief of police never came and
Mr. Bayramli has not been questioned, he was then brought back into
the first room where the police searched his clothes. Counsel for Mr.
Bayramli, they found 0.387 grams of heroin in his jacket pocket. The
driver Bayramli Mr. Ramil Dadashov was arrested separately on the same
day under the charge equally dubious drug possession.

79. Human Rights Watch pointed out to me that Azerbaijani forces often
use false charges of drug possession against people who criticize the
government in order to silence them, as was the case in recent cases
Fatullayev, Jabbar Mirza and Savanli Zakit. I was informed shortly
before the distribution of this report that Mr. Bayramli was indeed
sentenced June 11, 2012 by the Court of Binaqadi to two years in
prison for drug possession.

Case No. 28: Gonagov, Vugar

Case No. 30: Guliyev, Zaur

80. Mr. and Mr. Guliyev Gonagov, respectively Executive Director and
editor of television Xayal TV Guba, have since March 13, 2012 in
custody for having “organized and took part in public disorder and
abuse of office. ” These charges appear to be related to the fact that
they had posted on “YouTube” the speech by a senior official of the
country Guba, which was, according to many people, the trigger mass
protests Guba March 1 , 2012.

81. Their treatment while in detention is cause for concern: they were
illegally detained in a police cell until 6 April 2012, when they were
transferred to the prison of Kurdakhani. Mr. Guliyev has not been
allowed to receive visits from his lawyer from March 13 to April 6.
Mr. Gonagov could receive twice visited by his lawyer, only to learn
at the second visit that the lawyer refused to defend himself,
probably because of the pressure that was exerted on him. Until their
transfer to Kurdakhani, they were not allowed to receive visits from
family members. Despite numerous requests, the lawyers of the two
journalists did not have access to their records. Mr. Guliyev also
suffers from severe ulcers. Although he was examined by a doctor in
the detention center, the hotel claims to not have the necessary drugs
for its treatment.

Case No. 89: Zeynalli, Avaz

82. Mr. Zeynalli, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Khural, was
arrested in October 2008 and is still remanded in custody under the
charge of extortion questionable; according to HRW, it is apparently
retained in retaliation for critical articles published in Khural. The
charges against Mr. Zeynalli were selected under the pressure of a
parliamentary member of the ruling majority. Mr. Zeynalli was also
accused in March 2012 of tax evasion. In addition, the newspaper was
seized by bailiffs in October 2011, following the non-payment of fines
for libel in actions brought by the Head of the Presidential
Administration and the Director of the National Fund of Assistance to
Media mass. 3.2.1.6. Cases of Islamist militants

83. This category of cases is particularly difficult and is
unquestionably incomplete list. I spoke in defense associations of
human rights in Azerbaijan distinguish three sub-categories, which
include well over 200 cases: first, members of political organizations
and illegal armed groups and illegal, and secondly, members the
“Islamic Party of Azerbaijan” is not officially registered, but is
openly and non-violently, and thirdly, the faithful and clergy
Dadashbeyli related to Said, who are persecuted because of their
religious activities .

84. It should be remembered, to put the situation in context, the
Azerbaijani Muslims are divided into 70% Shiite and 30% Sunni. Shiites
are traditionally turned to Iran and live mainly in the southern
provinces of Lankaran, Astara, and Masally Bilasuvar but Baku and
regions have also Sumqayit important Shiite communities. Sunnis live
mainly in the north or in the Baku region, as well as in other
regions, their communities, then consisting of refugees from areas
occupied the center of the country. They are traditionally linked to
Dagestan and Chechnya and some of them participated in the Jihad in
the North Caucasus and Afghanistan, under the influence of radical
foreign trends as Wahhabism (Saudi Arabia).

85. According to my interlocutors in civil society, there is no
evidence that the PIA group and Said Dadashbeyli resort to violence,
although they seem to have chosen the underground (Group Dadashbeyli
never sought registration PIA official and did not attempt to
challenge before the courts the refusal to register opposite the
Ministry of Justice). Interlocutors told me that the goal of these
groups was much the establishment of sharia, certainly by peaceful
means, which would mean the abolition of many of the rights protected
by the European Convention on Human Rights .

86. It did not prove possible, for obvious reasons, to meet the
imprisoned leaders of these groups in Azerbaijan. However, I consulted
the direction of PIA by mail, through their lawyer, Mr. Gasimli, with
whom I talked at length of the cases presented below at our workshop
in Berlin on 10 and 11 May , 2012. I asked this question during the
“irreverent” on the political goals of the party leaders and how they
intend to use to achieve power. They have always given me answers
“well suitable” in rejecting the archaic principles of Sharia and
unreservedly condemning violence. However, I must admit that I still
have some difficulties in evaluating these types of cases particularly
diverse. Faithful to the agreed criteria for the definition of
political prisoners, I focused mainly to verify the existence of a
fair trial. It is perfectly legitimate and expressly permitted by
Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights that a state can
defend its constitutional order against groups that wish to overthrow
establish a new regime with the rights and freedoms protected by the
Convention. But it may happen that a person is innocent, even if she
is convicted of a violent act constituting an offense by a court
obviously biased and based on, for example, confessions extracted
under torture, and that the quality of political prisoner he is
recognized if it is persecuted for political reasons. I can only urge
solemnly Azerbaijani authorities, including the judicial authorities
to refrain from unfair and illegal methods in the fight against
Islamic extremism. The use of torture, trumped up charges, handling of
witnesses or a partial appreciation of evidence, for example, ended
only by depriving the fight against extremist groups legitimacy and
strengthen them giving rise to “martyrs.” This is the position adopted
by the Assembly in the light of recent reports, such as Dick Marty and
Lord Tomlinson, dealing with various aspects of the fight against
terrorism, while promoting respect for human homme53; I totally agree.

87. In view of the foregoing, I will focus a few emblematic cases on
which I have collected enough information précises54. 3.2.1.7.
Activists of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan

88. The President, Vice-President and other members of the PIA were
arrested in 2011 for attempted coup. According to observers, the
persecution of members of the party began after a speech by the
President and posted on internet55, who strongly criticized the
government and called on all Muslims to overthrow him. Weapons were
found at the home of several party members or their family members,
but the searches, seizures and trial were marred by significant
irregularities. I will present in more detail the case of the party
chairman, Movsum Samedov, I could ask his lawyer during our work
session in Berlin on 10 and 11 May 2012. Most of the following cases,
listed in alphabetical order, are related to this case (with the
exception of those of four other activists PIA, Mr. Ganiyev (Case No.
25) and Mr. Ilyasov (Case No. 40) ).

Case 3: Abbasov Faramiz (Faramaz)

89. Mr. Abbasov was arrested in 2011 and sentenced to 11 years in
prison for attempted coup.

Case # 5: Abdullayev, Vagif

90. Vice-President of the Islamic Party, he was arrested in 2011 and
sentenced to 11 years in prison for attempted coup.

Case 7: Ahundzade, Ruxulla (Akhundazadeh, Rufulla)

91. President of the Regional Astara section of the Islamic Party, he
was arrested in 2011 and sentenced to 11 years and six months
imprisonment for attempted coup.

Case No. 25: Ganiyev, Arif

92. PIA eminent activist, Mr. Ganiyev was arrested July 11, 2011 (at
the same time that the Islamic blogger Ramin Bayramov) 56 and
sentenced on 26 January 2011 under the false charge of possession of
drugs and armes57.

Case No. 40: Ilyasov, Fahri

93. Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years and six months
for “hooliganism”, Mr. Ilyasov is an Islamic theologian and a leading
member of the IAP. He was arrested during a demonstration to protest
against the separate prohibition of “hijab” in the city of Ganja and
was convicted of degradation of police equipment and “affect the
harmonious working conditions” of Police, solely on the basis of
evidence presented by the police.

Case No. 63: Mamedrzayev, Firdovsi

94. Member of the Islamic Party, Mr. Mamedrzayev was arrested in 2011,
sentenced to 10 years in prison for attempted coup and held in
solitary confinement in prison.

Case No. 82: Samedov, Dayanat

95. This member of the family of the president of the Islamic Party
was arrested in 2011, accused of attempted coup and sentenced to 10
years imprisonment.

Case No. 83: Samedov, Movsum

96. Mr. Samedov is Chairman of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan and
physician training. He was placed in administrative detention January
7, 2011, in custody January 20, 2011 and October 7, 2011 convicted and
sentenced to 12 years in prison for attempted coup (“seizure of power
by violence” ).

97. The main evidence on which his conviction was based on his speech.
Mr. Samedov has accused the government of being corrupt and “friend of
the Zionists”, he stated that “the Azerbaijani people [would] end this
cruel regime.” The significance of this speech, constitute an attempt
to “seize power by violence,” was assessed by an expert appointed by
the court, a physicist by training. Cons-demand expertise made by the
defense was rejected by the court.

98. Mr. Samedov was also convicted of preparing acts of terrorism
against the Jews of Guba region (known as the “Mountain Jews” and are
considered particularly well integrated into Azerbaijani society). The
Crown has not provided any details on this supposed conspiracy. A
parliamentary Jewish area, Mr. Jevda Abrahamov publicly stated that
his community had no dispute with the Muslims of the area.

99. The procedure followed during the phase before the trial is
questionable. While Mr. Samedov was arrested Jan. 7, 2011, members of
his family did not know where he was. They turned to a lawyer on
January 12, asking for help in their search. The lawyer wrote to all
authorities (Ministries of Interior and Justice, Prison
Administration) but got no response for a week. The following week, he
met his client once, the Ministry of the Interior and under police
surveillance. Mr. Samedov was remanded in custody and charged with a
criminal offense (attempt to seize power by violence, the element of
the offense is the speech above) until 20 January 2011.

100. Weapons were found in the members of his family: a Kalashnikov,
three grenades and some ammunition in the mini-market which belongs to
his nephew, a week later, another Kalashnikov and other grenades were
found at the home of One of his brothers. In both cases, the minutes
of search were signed by persons brought by the police. They were
described as “part-time police” by his lawyer, who told me they have
evidence that the police had consistently used the same witnesses, who
attested their presence sometimes at the same time in different
places.

101. His lawyer has described another type of procedural error as
follows: the witnesses called by the prosecution had been “well
prepared”, but they started to lose ground to the issues of defense,
the judge put an end to their interrogation. Thus, a witness who
identified himself as a “devout man” was asked about the frequency of
his daily prayers, he said he prayed “17 times” per day, after which
the judge interrupted the questioning.

102. Lawyers were not able to meet their client constructively during
the trial: it continued all day, day after day, without lawyers can
not see their client after the hearing.

103. As Mr. Samedov was accused and convicted of being the mastermind
of an alleged conspiracy and an alleged attempted coup, it is
surprising that, despite the obvious opportunities for surveillance of
persons suspected of such acts The prosecution has not even attempted
to present evidence, for example messages or conversations
intercepted, to expand the charges, which are apparently remained very
vague.

104. Given the political nature of the offense of which he was
convicted (a public speech), the political role played by Mr. Samedov,
arrest and conviction of side the entire party leadership, and the
apparent procedural irregularities and inconsistencies in the
prosecution’s case, I believe Mr. Samedov as a political prisoner
under the assumed criteria. 3.2.1.8. The “group Dadashbeyli Said”

105. The following cases are those of members of a group consisting
mainly of young people arrested on 13 January 2007 for an alleged coup
attempt. This group is deemed pro-Islamic. It seems that the process
has been marred by numerous irregularities. Defendants reported high
pressures and torture, some of them have filed an application with the
European Court of Human Rights. Observers from local NGOs, who
generally have no sympathy for the political objectives of the group
believe that there is little or no evidence of actual or planned
violence by it and many Leaders charges were fabricated (“discovery”
of weapons or drugs).

106. The following cases belong to this category. I will discuss in
more detail the case of Mr. Dadashbeyli staff.

Case 6: Agayev, Farig (Farid) Nadir

107. Mr. Agayev was sentenced to 13 years in prison, and his case is
pending before the European Court of Human homme58.

Case 9: Aliyev Ceyhun (Djeyhun / Jeyhun) Saleh

108. Sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.

Case No. 13: Aliyev, Rashad Ismail

109. Sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.

Case No. 22: Dadashbeyli Said Alakbar

110. Mr. Dadashbeyli was born in 1975, was arrested on 13 January 2007
and convicted December 10, 2007 under eight different articles of the
Penal Code, including attempt to seize power by violence (Article
228.4), unlawful detention arms and ammunition (section 228.1),
formation of a terrorist group (section 218.2) and use of counterfeit
money (Article 204.3.1). He was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.

111. He was convicted of being the leader of a terrorist plot
Islamist. About 35 alleged conspirators were arrested and placed in
solitary confinement in cells of the Ministry of National Security for
two days. Eleven of them were indicted: 10 were sentenced and eleventh
died in custody. According to my informants, convicted of nine
families have refused to pay bribes wine that would have been required
(no proposal had been made to the family of Mr. Dadashbeyli). It is
assumed that releases twenty other prisoners were “purchased.” None of
the new row has never publicly criticized the government.

112. Some alleged members of this group are known to be secular,
others to be Shiites and Sunnis for others. Judgments speak of
relationships maintained with Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as
Masonic lodges. My interlocutors find it unlikely that the Shiites
(backed by Iran) and Sunnis (supported by Saudi Arabia) take part in a
conspiracy together with the Freemasons. Relations between the two
main branches of Islam in Azerbaijan are generally deemed as cold as
those between the two countries known to support them. Observers
believe more likely that the authorities have referred to a
“conspiracy Islamist” imaginary strengthen support Azerbaijanis
secular and Western regime.

113. Although some members of the group have “confessed” to being part
of this conspiracy, it seems that their confessions were extracted
under torture. One of the defendants, Mr. Emin Mammadov, died while in
custody. The prosecution said he had died of disease. The families of
alleged members of the group were pressured so they do not maintain
with the defenders of human rights. After the judgment, the families
of those convicted but have created a support group and said that such
confessions were extracted under torture the accused. Mr. Dadashbeyli,
which introduced me as a grown man, who speaks with distinction, also
complained of having been tortured. He said during the trial that he
was beaten and had been forced to ingest psychotropic drugs.

114. According to lawyers, the searches that led to the seizure of
weapons and ammunition are marred by flaws such as those conducted in
the affairs of PIA59. Investigators have, it seems, not even presented
search warrants or collected fingerprints on the seized items.

115. Mr. Dadashbeyli was described in the judgment of “leader” of this
group, without any justification or evidence. According to lawyers,
most people accused of being a member of the group said during the
trial that they did not even know personally before their arrest and
had only crossed occasionally in a cafe, where they discussed
political issues and religious prosecution has not proved otherwise,
outside of a video without son60 taken in a cafe and on which many of
the accused were présents61.

116. I learned that the judge in the trial of Mr. Dadashbeyli Mr.
Anvar Seyidov was often seized political cases and the European Court
of Human Rights had found numerous violations of the Convention in
cases assigned to that judge. In this case, the judge would Seyidov
sent a letter dated December 24, 2007 the Minister of National
Security, ME Mahmudov, asking him to reward officers of the Department
who worked on this affaire62. This seems to be a violation of
constitutional and conventional separation of powers, neutrality and
objectivity of judges.

117. Given the troubling lack of evidence, with the exception of a few
confessions obtained under questionable circumstances, the death of a
prisoner during his detention and pressures on family members of the
accused, what adds the unlikely scenario of a common conspiracy
between Shiites supported by Iran, Sunnis backed by Saudi Arabia and
Freemasons, I consider Mr. Dadashbeyli and other members of his group
assumed as alleged political prisoners.

Case No. 27: Gocayev (Gojayev), Samir Edik

118. Mr. Gocayev been sentenced to 13 years in prison, his case is
pending before the European Court of Human homme63.

Case No. 31: Guliyev (Quliyev) Baybala (Beybala) Yahya

119. Mr. Guliyev was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment. He suffers
from tuberculosis and psychiatric hospital established Sumgayit about
it in August 2004 the following diagnosis: “schizoid type person.”

Case No. 39: Idrisov, Garib Mikayil

120. Mr. Idrisov was sentenced to 12 years in prison, he suffers from
serious health problems. His case is pending before the European Court
of Human homme64.

Case No. 53: Karimov (Kerimov), Rasim Rafig

121. Karimov was arrested on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca, he
spent nine months in a detention center of the Ministry of National
Security and was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment.

Case No. 56: Kerimov (Karimov), Jahangir Ramiz

122. Mr. Kerimov was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and suffering
from tuberculosis.

Case No. 69: Mehbaliyev, Emin (Emil) Nuraddin

123. Mr. Mehbaliyev was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. 3.2.1.9.
“The case of the hijab” 65

124. The following group of cases concerns a number of people, mostly
young, arrested May 6, 2011 while protesting outside the Ministry of
Education against the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf (hijab) to
school. They were sentenced to between one year and six months and
three years and six months imprisonment. According to NGO observers,
violence alleged against them were primarily intended to allow them to
defend themselves against physical violence, the security forces have
used against them, which is why their cases can be compared to those
of young activists arrested for acts committed in favor of PIA
(chapter 3.2.1.7 above) 66.

125. The expert who examined the judgments (in Azeri) my demande67
concluded that “the charges against them were exaggerated and
sometimes seemed frivolous.” Thus, in the judgment against the first
group, 7 October 2011, five participants of the event were accused of
injuring 30 policemen armed with batons in their resisting with sticks
and stones. The accused, on the video recordings, not manipulated nor
stick nor stone were precisely those whom the heaviest sentences were
imposed. None of the members of the second group, convicted Dec. 5,
2011, had been filmed a stick or a stone in his hand, but they were
also sentenced to the heaviest penalties. None of the members of the
third group, condemned December 23, 2011, did not appear with a weapon
on a record. No lesions were detected in only one protester, when they
were accused of having opposed a strong resistance to arrest; video
recordings of police did not show any protester also striking a police
officer or a vehicle. According to the expert, even the official
version of events confirms that the protest was peaceful, at least
until the police begin to disperse.

126. The case of Hasan Mammadov (Case No. 65) and Ilgar Musayev (Case
No. 70) are not related to the protest against the hijab ban of 6 May
2011, but relate to a separate event, which took place in Jalilabad 2
June 2011.

Case # 2: Abbasov Elshan Sardar

127. Mr. Abbasov was sentenced to one year of imprisonment.

Case 8: Alekberov, Taleh

128. Mr. Alekberov was sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment.

Case No. 16: Arbarov, Taleh

129. Sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment.

Case No. 17: Asgarov, Mammad Tofiq

130. Mr. Asgarov was sentenced to three years imprisonment.

Case 19: Bagirov, Kamil Taleh

131. Mr. Bagirov was sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment
in its capacity as “organizer”.

Case No. 42: Iskandarov (Isgandarov), Zaur Shahlar (Toghrul)

132. Mr. Iskandarov was sentenced to three years in prison December 5,
2011, this sentence was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Baku on 29
February 2012.

Case No. 45: Ismaylov, Araz Vasif

133. Mr. Ismaylov was sentenced to two years and six months imprisonment.

Case No. 47: Ismaylov, Tarlan

Case No. 48: Jabiyev, Azer

Case # 1468: Mammadov, Ahmad Nurani

134. The three individuals were sentenced to two years imprisonment.

Case No. 65: Mammadov (Mammedov), Hasan Alipasha

Case No. 70: Musayev, Ilgar

135. Mr. Mammadov and Mr. Musayev were sentenced to a term of three
years and six months and three years imprisonment for “hooliganism”
for a public speech against the ban on headscarves in Jalilabad to
occasion of the feast of “Ashura”, June 2, 2011. The verdict was based
solely on the testimony of police officers who claimed that the
detainees had resisted at the time of their arrest.

Case No. 75: Novruzov, Chingiz Farman

136. Mr. Novruzov was sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment.

Case No. 76: Nuriyev, Fazil Rufat

137. Mr. Nuriyev was sentenced to two years imprisonment.

Case No. 88: Valiquliyev (Valiguliyev), Rashad

138. Mr. Valiquliyev was sentenced to one year and six months
imprisonment. 3.2.1.10. Other business policies emblematic

139. The following are perhaps the most emblematic of the treatment by
the police in what they regard as political opponents, and they relate
to the former Minister of Economic Development Farhad Aliyev. The
authorities have not only targeted the former minister, who was
arrested for participating in an alleged coup, and after 17 months of
detention, has been charged with offenses radically different, but
they also persecuted members of his family and former colleagues. The
authorities’ strong commitment is also reflected in the fact that they
have not even responded to numerous calls for the release of Mr.
Aliyev on humanitarian grounds, considering the serious health
problems, especially initiated by the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights Assembly.

Case No. 10: Aliyev, Farhad

140. The former Minister of Economic Development was arrested on the
eve of the 2005 parliamentary elections and accused of involvement in
an attempted coup. But during his trial, he has only been accused of
economic crimes (abuse of office and theft of public property) and
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

141. During the course of his duties as Minister of Economic
Development Farhad Aliyev criticized the widespread corruption and
lack of transparency in the use of oil revenues, he had undertaken
substantial reforms to prevent abuse of functions government officials
(eg reducing the number of business activities subject to licensing,
which was from 270 to 30, and the creation of a Petroleum Fund) 69. A
campaign was then launched against him and all his family and several
of his close associates, including Alihuseyn Shaliyev, who apparently
died in custody after refusing to testify against Farhad Aliyev. Upon
the arrest of Mr. Aliyev, November 3, 2005, the President of
Azerbaijan allegedly made threatening remarks against him and
expressed his intention to nuire70. The trial of Mr. Aliyev was
apparently flawed as particularly serious. The initial charge of
attempted coup could not be corroborated in any way, new charges, this
time consisting of “economic crimes” had been brought against him
after 17 months of detention . It would have been the occasion of very
high pressures (including being threatened with being accused of
responsibility for the murder of the famous journalist Elmar Huseynov)
to accept to recognize that he had planned to do an “orange
revolution” with the complicity secret services of several Western
countries. The trial was held in a small courtroom, which seats had
been previously occupied by alleged “victims” of Mr. Aliyev, in order
to effectively prevent the defenders of human rights, journalists and
foreign representatives to attend the hearing. His lawyers and
witnesses called by the defense have also been pressured and his
lawyers did not have the opportunity to challenge the evidence
presented by the prosecution, or to present their own evidence.
Finally, persons arrested and indicted along with Mr. Aliyev was
released after testifying against him. A close associate of Farhad
Aliyev at the Ministry of Economic Development, Mr Alihuseyn Shaliyev,
was also arrested and allegedly tortured to accept to testify against
him. He died in the prison hospital and causes of death have
apparently never been investigated in due form.

142. Farhad Aliyev suffers from serious health problems. The Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has asked the authorities to release
him on humanitarian grounds in September 2011. The European Court of
Human Rights found several violations of Articles 5 and 6 of the
Convention71 (his brother Rafiq has succeeded before the Court on 6
December 2011).

143. Given the political overtones of the case against a former
minister, whose economic reforms threatened beneficiaries monopolies
linked to the authorities in place, many flaws committed before and
during the trial, persecution parallel family and close associates of
Mr. Aliyev, as well as burdensome the punishment that was imposed
excessively harsh treatment and that this old man is seriously ill
subject, I think Farhad Aliyev assumed as a political prisoner under
our critĂšres72 .

Case No. 12: Aliyev, Rafiq

144. Rafiq Aliyev’s brother Farhad Aliyev (Case No. 10) and former
president of the company “Azpetrol”. Like his brother, he was arrested
on the eve of the 2005 parliamentary elections and accused of economic
crimes (abuse of office, theft of public property). Many observers
believed at the time that the arrest was intended to put pressure on
his brother Farhaq so he “confessed” his participation in a political
conspiracy. Once expired the maximum length of pretrial detention
foreseen in cases of economic crime, he was accused of involvement in
an attempted coup. This accusation could not be corroborated by any
item, it has been sentenced to nine years in prison for various
economic crimes.

145. Like his brother, Rafiq Aliyev succeeded to the European Court of
Human homme73, which found several violations of the Convention on
account of the excessive length of his detention, the lack of judicial
and interference with his right to private property (Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1). In my opinion, Rafiq Aliyev, for the same reasons
that his brother, a political prisoner alleged.

Case No. 11: Aliyev Mamedali Dilavar

146. Although it is a “new” case, insofar Mamedali Aliyev was arrested
in 2008, it is closely related to the “general case” (supposedly
attempted coup d ‘ state). Persons convicted in the case were on the
“list of 716 people” examined by independent experts of the
Secretary-General (that is to say Rahim Gaziyev, Alikram Gumbatov
Elkhan Abbasov Huseynbala Huseynov Rafiq Agayev). In 2002, experts
have recognized each quality political prisoner, whereupon they were
all libérés74. Unfortunately for him, Mamedali Dilavar Aliyev, a
supporter of former president Ayaz Mutalibov and vice-chairman of the
Labour Party pro-Mutalibov was arrested in 2008 alone. His case has
therefore not been reviewed by independent experts. But I am convinced
that the quality of political prisoners would be recognized under the
same criteria and that therefore they must be released without delay.

147. Mr. Aliyev is 70 years old and is in very poor health. It is
therefore also release on humanitarian grounds.

Case No. 24: Farzullayev Jeyhun Hidayet

148. Mr. Farzullayev was arrested January 8, 2011 by Nasimi district
police at the same time that Nemat Panahov (Case No. 81 below), the
famous opposition activist. The deputy head of the police reportedly
ordered Mr. Farzullayev to give false testimony against Mr. Panahov.
When he refused to do so, he was arrested, indicted along with Mr.
Panahov and finally sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for
“hooliganism.”

Case No. 77: Panahov Neymat (Panahly, Nemat)

149. Mr. Panahov is one of the historical leaders of the national
liberation movement in Azerbaijan. He returned some time ago with his
political activities in opposition to the current government, which he
strongly criticized in public. He was arrested on January 8, 2011 for
“hooliganism” (article 221 of the Penal Code) and assault and battery
(Articles 126 and 127) and sentenced to six years imprisonment. There
are serious allegations of procedural defects, including pressures
that police attempted to exert on another person Farzullayev Jeyhun
Hidayet (Case No. 24 above), so that it engages in false testimony
against Mr. Panahov. During the hearing, the alleged victim (insults
and assault) and other witnesses presented by the prosecution were in
fact denied the charges. The court was apparently content to ignore
these stories, as well as eyewitnesses to the defense, who said that
no offense had been committed. Lawyers came to work with me to Berlin
in May 2012 confirmed these allegations, I first struggled to believe.
They cast a shadow on the objectivity and even professionalism
demonstrated by Azerbaijani courts in judicial matters of a political
nature.

150. Other human rights homme75 out that the arrest of Mr. Panahov is
mainly due to criticism he leveled at the government in the daily “PS
Note”, deploring in particular electoral fraud he attended in his
constituency. These activists also note that items seized at the home
of Mr. Panahov, such as videotapes related to the National Liberation
Movement, have no connection with the charge of “hooliganism.” In
addition, they noted that pressures were also carried out on the
family of Mr. Panahov (he is in charge of six children and two elderly
parents), including through cutting electricity and heating home late
December 2011. The father of Mr. Panahov, 83 years old and lived in
his home died as a result of heart problems. Contrary to the
provisions that provide prison azerbaĂŻdjanaises76 Mr. Panahov has not
even been allowed to attend his father’s funeral.

151. An application brought by Mr. Panahov was pending before the
European Court of Human Rights.

152. Given the harsh treatment and discrimination that he reserved the
court and prison authorities, which can only be explained by motives
related to his political activities, I consider Mr. Panahov assumed as
a political prisoner.

Case No. 32: Gurbanov, Maarif

153. Mr. Gurbanov was responsible for management of the Department of
Economic Development at the time of his arrest in 2005, he was
sentenced to seven years and six months imprisonment for embezzlement
and corruption. This case is directly related to the Aliyev brothers
(Nos. 10 and 12 above), alleged political prisoners. Mr. Gurbanov
refused to give false testimony against Farhad Aliyev was sentenced in
retaliation for a particularly heavy prison sentence.

154. It would have made an application to the European Court of Human Rights.

Case No. 41: Insanov Ali

155. This is another typical case, which has already been mentioned in
several resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly. Mr. Insanov is a
former Minister of Health, medical scientist of international repute
and a former member of the executive committee of the World Health
Organization (WHO). He was arrested on 20 October 2005, on the eve of
elections, and accused of involvement in an attempted coup. During his
trial, however, it was only charged and convicted of economic offenses
(abuse of office, theft of public property). He was sentenced to 11
years in prison and is being held in particularly hard, despite his
age (Mr. Insanov was born in 1946) and serious health problems which
he suffers.

156. Members of his family and former colleagues were intensely
persecuted. Many of them have lost their jobs, had their property
confiscated or were prosecuted for charges apparently fabricated. The
sale of the medical work of Mr. Insanov the treatment of tuberculosis,
yet internationally acclaimed, has even been banned in Azerbaijan.

157. The case of Mr. Insanov has already been mentioned in two texts
adopted by the Assembly on 16 April 200878 June 6 200777et. His
complaint lodged on 31 March 2008 before the European Court of Human
Rights is still pendante79.

158. Given the political context of this case, the modification of the
charges during detention on remand, strong pressures on family members
and colleagues of the discriminatory treatment of Mr. Insanov, which
evidenced by the unusual length of his sentence, confiscation of all
his property, the prohibition of the sale of its medical work and
harsh conditions of detention despite his age and his health problems,
I can only consider Mr. Insanov assumed as a political prisoner.
3.2.2. “Case elders” of alleged political prisoners

159. The following cases are either those of the list of 716 alleged
political prisoners arrested until 2000 and reviewed by independent
experts, but which have not yet been resolved, the case is
subsequently arrested for having participated in the same or events
that have been inadvertently omitted from this list of 716 names, but
were included in the second list of 107 cases examined by the first
monitoring report of the Assembly in 2004. 3.2.2.1. OPON (events of
March 1995)

160. The first three are the most emblematic status as a “political
prisoner” they were recognized by independent experts and stakeholders
in 2002 have still not been released. These inmates were involved in
the mutiny of the special police unit “OPON” (events of March 1995).

Case No. 15: Amiraslanov, Elchin Samed

Case No. 55: Kazymov, Arif Nazir

Case No. 78: Poladov, Safa Alim

161. The case of these three people have been studied very accurately
by independent experts, who regarded them as pilot cases and
recognized quality politiques80 prisoners. Stakeholders continue to
serve their sentences of imprisonment in prison Qobustan.

162. Recognition of their status as a “political prisoner” is based on
serious procedural defects, including serious allegations of torture
suffered by Mr. and Mr. Amiraslanov Kazymov, the refusal to allow Mr.
Amiraslanov be assisted by a counsel before and during his trial,
harassment of family members, including severe beatings by police
officers to the younger sister of Mr. Amiraslanov, the use of
confessions made during the investigation by Mr. Kazymov, which is
then retracted, and finally, the lack of independence and impartiality
of the judiciary at the trial where former retired officers have
played the role of “people’s assessors”.

163. In September 2007, the last members of the “Working Group on
political prisoners” (including several representatives of major NGOs
were excluded at the time) would have agreed with the authorities that
Elchin Amiraslanov Samed, Arif Kazymov Safa and Alim were Poladov made
“criminals.” Mr. Poladov was retried and convicted again.

164. The following five cases also relate to people who have
participated in the mutiny “OPON”, but which independent experts did
not recognize the status of “political prisoners.”

Case # 4: Abdullayev, Shamsi Vahid81

165. The quality of political prisoner has not been recognized Mr.
Abdullayev by independent experts. In this case, it does not claim to
have been tortured. Independent experts have not found the lack of
independence and impartiality of the court, even if Mr. Abdullayev was
found in the same trial that Mr. Amiraslanov (Case No. 15 above).
Determining element, Mr. Abdullayev has confessed to the murder,
common law, a businessman.

Case No. 50: Karimov (Kerimov) Dayanat Kerim82

166. The quality of political prisoner has not been recognized more
Karimov by independent experts. Again, any act of torture was alleged.
Karimov has been convicted of serious common crimes, including
homicide, in five separate trials. No judgment mentions the
participation of Mr. Karimov events of March 1995 (mutiny OPON).

Case No. 72: Mustafayev, Hasan Huseyn83

167. The quality of political prisoner has not been more recognized
Mr. Mustafayev by independent experts in the absence of allegations of
torture, was found guilty of serious common crimes, including homicide
and the taking of hostages.

Case 87: Tahirov, Aliyusif Damet84

168. Mr. Tahirov was not considered a political prisoner, although he
was also convicted for his participation in the events of March 1995
(OPON), insofar as it was also sentenced to a number of serious crimes
unrelated to these events (murder and kidnapping), his case was
mentioned in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 19
January 2006 (Application No. 35608/02).

169. I share the opinion of independent experts concerning the above
cases (case Nos. 4, 50, 72 and 87). The quality of political prisoners
should not be recognized because the detainees were convicted of
serious common crimes unrelated to their participation in the events
of March 1995 (mutiny OPON).

170. According to the information I have provided NGOs, the quality of
political prisoners has been recognized several persons tried and
convicted along with three cases (Nos. 15, 55 and 78), which have
never appeared on any list of alleged political prisoners or were
removed from these lists for reasons that have nothing to do with
their alleged criminal activities and are still in prison today. Since
these members OPON were extremely young at the time of the facts, they
were soldiers of rank or lower grades and they were content to obey
the orders of their superiors, without committing any violent offense
margin of their participation in the events of March 1995, and given
the time they have already spent in prison and serious procedural
flaws that plague this class action lawsuit, they must be released.

171. This argument is even more valid after the amnesty was granted in
late 2011 Mr. Nizami Orudj Shamuradov, commander of all soldiers OPON
still incarcerated today. He spent only four years in prison after
being on the run for several years and have made himself in 2007. To
avoid this “irony” in the words of a lawyer Azerbaijan defender of
human rights, it is important that the authorities now turn the page
and also release the soldiers of rank or lower grades who still make
this group of cases. 3.2.2.2. The supporters of former Prime Minister
Suret Huseynov / Guseynov (“SH case”)

172. Another category of “historical” cases is that supporters of
former Prime Minister Suret Huseynov. Firstly convicted of attempted
coup in 1994, the quality of political prisoners has been recognized
by experts indépendants85 and was subsequently released. But a number
of his supporters are still in prison. The status of political
prisoners they have not been recognized by independent experts because
they have been convicted of serious crimes, common law, committed with
violence, including homicide, robbery and kidnapping in the absence of
allegations of torture or other particularly serious procedural flaws.

173. The following fall into this category.

Case No. 37: Huseynov, Magsud Vagif (Maqsud Vaqif) 86

174. Mr. Huseynov is the son of Vagif Huseynov (Case No. 38 below).

Case No. 38: Huseynov, Vagif (Vaqif) Rza87

175. Huseynov was a close supporter of former Prime Minister and a
Parliamentary Azerbaijan Popular Front, an opposition party. But he
was convicted after trial, in which he enjoyed basic rights of the
defense, serious common crimes committed with violence (homicide,
robbery, kidnapping), and “theft of power “in an administrative
district, parallel to the attempt coup Suret Huseynov.

Case No. 46: Ismaylov, Rashid Nurulla88

176. Mr. Ismaylov joined the army unit commanded by Suret Huseynov
after escaping from the prison where he was remanded in custody for
having participated in a crisis amok with an armed gang. The experts
found that “although the facts which Mr. Ismaylov was convicted are
linked to political events, their legal qualification of law.”

Case No. 52: Karimov (Kerimov) Keramat Pasha89

177. Karimov, cousin Suret Huseynov, was one of the main “performers”
of the attempted coup d’Etat which Suret Huseynov was instigated in
1994. But after the trial, he participated in acts of violence
(including without political crimes, such as homicide, robbery,
kidnapping and torture) and inciting others to commit such acts, so
that the term of imprisonment that was imposed can not be regarded as
disproportionate for political reasons. Allegations of acts of torture
he was subjected during his detention, his family, have not been taken
up by Mr. Karimov during his trial.

Case No. 71: Mustafayev, Elshad Teyyub90

Case No. 73: Mustafayev, Maqsad Teyyub91

178. They were both members of the armed group Vaqif Huseynov, who
took part in the attempted coup d’Ă©tat Suret Huseynov was the
instigator (see above Case No. 38). They have been convicted of crimes
without political and committed with violence, including premeditated
murder of a prosecutor. Certain contradictions in the judgment,
including the fact they should both still be in prison to serve their
sentences earlier when they were supposed to have committed some of
the crimes they were charged in the indictment .

179. Several human rights Azerbaijan noted, about the refusal of
independent experts to recognize the above cases a status of
“political” (case Nos. 37, 38, 46, 52, 71 and 73), it was quite
possible that one or more of these individuals was not informed of the
proceedings ongoing or has not benefited from the services of a
competent lawyer and has not provided for this reason a prima facie
evidence of the existence of serious violations as required by the
criteria defined by the experts.

180. Rejecting these considerations makes me uncomfortable, but I’m
not able to challenge the subsequent conclusions of the independent
experts, who had means much more important than me to scrutinize these
cases. That said, considering the time they have already spent in
prison, they should be eligible for parole under the ordinary rules.
If the authorities persist in refusing to apply the provisions of
these ordinary people, this could in itself constitute discrimination
and raise suspicions of political motivation. 3.2.2.3. Members of the
paramilitary group “Quaranqush” (Swallow), 1993

181. Le détachement « Quaranqush », composé de huit volontaires, avait
été créé pour la défense du district frontalier de Gubadli à cause de
la menace d’une invasion militaire de l’ArmĂ©nie. Un membre de ce
groupe avait été tué au combat et célébré Ã titre posthume comme un
héros ; un autre membre avait quitté le détachement aprÚs avoir été
blessĂ© au combat. AprĂšs la crĂ©ation de l’armĂ©e nationale
azerbaĂŻdjanaise en octobre 1991, les six derniers membres du
détachement « Quaranqush » avaient été transférés dans des unités
rĂ©guliĂšres de la police et de l’armĂ©e. Selon les autoritĂ©s, ils
avaient continué Ã mener ensemble des activités criminelles dignes de
gangsters dans ce district ; elles leur reprochaient Ă©galement d’avoir
attaquĂ© à main armĂ©e un service de police et d’avoir assassinĂ© cinq «
traĂźtres » supposĂ©s le jour de l’invasion armĂ©nienne. D’aprĂšs les ONG
de dĂ©fense des droits de l’homme, les liens que ce groupe entretenait
avec le mouvement du Front populaire92 inquiétaient les autorités
nouvellement en place, qui en ont persécuté les membres avec une
dureté particuliÚre. Un membre du groupe, F. Shahmuradov, a été tué au
cours de son arrestation. Un autre membre, M. Maharramov, s’est
suicidé. Un troisiÚme, M. Qayibov, a tenté de se suicider à deux
reprises (lors de son arrestation et pendant sa détention). Deux
autres membres, les frĂšres Novruzov, sont morts pendant l’instruction.

Cas n° 58 : Maherramov, (Maharramov) Nadir Eldar

182. M. Maherramov a été condamné en 2002 Ã une peine de prison Ã
perpétuité en tant que membre supposé de « Quaranqush ». Il figurait
sur la « liste des 107 » examinée par les premiers rapports de
l’AssemblĂ©e sur les prisonniers politiques en AzerbaĂŻdjan. Mon
prédécesseur M. Malcolm Bruce, rapporteur sur cette question, qui a pu
encore effectuer une visite d’Ă©tude en AzerbaĂŻdjan, a formulĂ© à propos
de ce cas les observations suivantes dans son rapport de 2005 :

« J’avoue avoir Ă©tĂ© particuliĂšrement interpellĂ© par le cas de Nadir
Maharramov, arrĂȘtĂ© en 2003 et condamnĂ© à perpĂ©tuitĂ© pour avoir
soi-disant fait partie du groupe de reconnaissance Garangush. Ce
groupe avait Ă©tĂ© `dissous’ en 1993 (doux euphĂ©misme pour dire que ces
membres, d’abord hĂ©ros de l’AzerbaĂŻdjan, ont Ă©tĂ© pourchassĂ©s, arrĂȘtĂ©s,
torturĂ©s et proprement liquidĂ©s !). Nadir avait 18 ans à l’Ă©poque des
faits et tous les tĂ©moignages concordent pour dire qu’il n’a jamais
fait partie de ce groupe.93 »

183. Considérant que ce groupe, aprÚs avoir perdu deux membres, en
conservait six, dont trois sont morts lors de leur arrestation ou de
leur détention et trois autres (les cas n os 66, 79 et 85 ci-dessous)
sont toujours dĂ©tenus, je ne peux qu’inviter, comme mon collĂšgue, les
autoritĂ©s à rĂ©parer l’injustice Ă©vidente faite à cet homme qui a
désormais passé un tiers de son existence en prison.

Cas n° 66 : Mammedaliyev (Mammadaliyev), Sahib Nureddin94

Cas n° 79 : Qayibov, Intiqam Yusif95

Cas n° 85 : Shahmuradov, Yashar Khasay96

184. Ces trois hommes ont été condamnés en 1993 Ã mort (condamnation
transformée par la suite en perpétuité). Ils avaient été membres du
groupe paramilitaire « Qaranqush » (Hirondelle) et partisans du
mouvement du Front populaire. Les experts indépendants ne leur ont pas
reconnu la qualitĂ© de prisonniers politiques, considĂ©rant que, mĂȘme si
le tribunal n’avait pas prĂ©cisĂ© la responsabilitĂ© individuelle de
chaque membre de la bande dans les crimes commis par elle, ils avaient
été tous les trois condamnés pour leur participation à un crime
particuliÚrement violent (meurtre avec préméditation).

185. Bien que le fait de ne pas considérer ces trois détenus comme des
prisonniers politiques prĂ©sumĂ©s me mette mal à l’aise, compte tenu du
caractĂšre politique Ă©vident de ce dur traitement rĂ©servĂ© à d’anciens «
héros », je ne souhaite pas remettre en cause a posteriori les
conclusions des experts indépendants, qui ont fondé leur décision sur
le caractÚre violent des crimes dont les intéressés ont été reconnus
coupables, conformĂ©ment aux critĂšres auxquels j’ai moi aussi souscrit
dans la premiÚre partie du présent rapport. 3.2.2.4. Autres « cas
anciens »

Cas n° 14 : Aliyev, Sadykh Mikayil97

Cas n° 67 : Mammedveliyev, Sabuhi Seyfeddin

186. Tous deux ont Ă©tĂ© arrĂȘtĂ©s en 2000 et condamnĂ©s à perpĂ©tuitĂ© en
leur qualité de membres dirigeants du groupe « Bohran » (Crise). Le
ComitĂ© de la sĂ©curitĂ© d’Etat de l’AzerbaĂŻdjan (KGB) avait crĂ©Ă© ce
groupe en 1989 pour contrer la menace qu’Ă©tait censĂ©e reprĂ©senter,
pour la sécurité, le mouvement azerbaïdjanais Front populaire. Ce
groupe aurait commis plusieurs assassinats politiques de partisans du
PrĂ©sident Heydar Aliyev, ainsi que d’autres meurtres motivĂ©s par des
raisons privĂ©es. Les experts indĂ©pendants n’ont pas reconnu à M.
Sadykh Aliyev la qualité de prisonnier politique en raison de la
nature violente des actes dont il a Ă©tĂ© reconnu coupable et la requĂȘte
qu’il avait introduite devant la Cour europĂ©enne des droits de l’homme
a été jugée irrecevable. M. Mammedveliyev figure sur la « liste des
107 » jointe en annexe du prĂ©cĂ©dent rapport de l’AssemblĂ©e sur cette
question, Ă©tabli par Malcolm Bruce. Je ne souhaite pas me dissocier de
l’apprĂ©ciation des experts indĂ©pendants ; par consĂ©quent, je ne
considĂšre pas ces deux hommes comme des prisonniers politiques
présumés.

Cas n° 51 : Karimov, Kamran Sultan

Cas n° 59 : Mahsimov (Maksimov), Rahib Shaval

Cas n° 81 : Safaraliyev, Alfat Khalid98

187. M. Karimov a été condamné en 1999 Ã une peine de 14 ans
d’emprisonnement pour ses activitĂ©s de membre du mouvement national
lezguien « Sadval » (Unité). Ce groupe serait officiellement
enregistré en Fédération de Russie, mais considéré comme un groupe
terroriste illégal en Azerbaïdjan. Il a fait campagne dans les années
1990 pour l’unification de tous les Lezguiens dans un seul et mĂȘme
Etat (le « Lezguistan ») regroupant des régions appartenant à la
Russie (le sud du Daghestan) et au nord de l’AzerbaĂŻdjan. M. Karimov a
Ă©tĂ© reconnu coupable d’avoir participĂ© à une attaque à main armĂ©e
perpétrée sur des gardes frontiÚre.

188. M. Mahsimov, chef de la branche azerbaïdjanaise de « Sadval », a
été condamné en 1994 Ã perpétuité pour sa participation supposée dans
l’attentat terroriste du mĂ©tro de Bakou en 1994, qui avait fait 14
morts.

189. Tous deux figuraient sur la « liste des 107 » nouveaux
prisonniers politiques Ă©tablie par Malcolm Bruce99. La requĂȘte
introduite par M. Mahsimov devant la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme a abouti, en ce sens que la Cour a conclu à la violation de
l’article 6, alinĂ©a 1 (procĂšs Ă©quitable), en se fondant sur le fait
que le pourvoi en cassation avait Ă©tĂ© examinĂ© par la Cour suprĂȘme
d’AzerbaĂŻdjan en l’absence de M. Mahsimov100.

190. M. Safaraliyev a été condamné en 2000 Ã une peine de 15 ans
d’emprisonnement pour complicitĂ© dans l’attentat à la bombe du mĂ©tro
de Bakou en 1994. Il aurait également participé Ã une émeute survenue
dans la prison de Qobustan en janvier 1999. Les experts indépendants
ne lui ont pas reconnu la qualité de prisonnier politique au vu de la
nature violente des actes dont il a été reconnu coupable. Je partage
ce point de vue.

Cas n° 18 : Badalov, Rovshan

Cas n° 68 : Mammedov (Mammadov), Mammad Ali

191. Les deux détenus auraient participé en tant que combattants aux
conflits de Tchétchénie et du Karabakh.

192. M. Badalov a Ă©tĂ© arrĂȘtĂ© en 2004 et condamnĂ© à une peine de neuf
ans d’emprisonnement pour homicide, cambriolage et constitution de
formations armées illégales.

193. M. Mammedov a été condamné en 2001 et 2003 Ã perpétuité pour le
meurtre d’un garde frontiĂšre alors qu’il introduisait des armes de
contrebande sur le territoire gĂ©orgien. Son avocat conteste qu’il soit
l’auteur de ce meurtre et prĂ©tend qu’il a uniquement tirĂ© en l’air et
que le tribunal a interprété les éléments de preuve de façon partiale,
au détriment de M. Mammedov, pour éviter toute implication des membres
des forces du ministĂšre de l’IntĂ©rieur azerbaĂŻdjanais dans cet
incident. M. Mammedov a obtenu gain de cause auprĂšs de la Cour
europĂ©enne des droits de l’homme devant laquelle il avait introduit
une requĂȘte101 ; elle a conclu à la violation de l’article 6 (procĂšs
Ă©quitable), mais pas à celle de l’article 3 (interdiction de la
torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants), faute
d’Ă©puisement des voies de recours internes. Les autres griefs invoquĂ©s
sur le fondement des articles 5, 6 13 et 14 de la Convention ont été
rejetés comme étant manifestement mal fondés. M. Mammedov figurait sur
la « liste des 107 ». J’hĂ©site nĂ©anmoins à reconnaĂźtre à ces deux
personnes la qualitĂ© de prisonnier politique prĂ©sumĂ©, faute d’Ă©lĂ©ments
suffisants sur les vices de forme précis dont ils ont été victimes et
sur le caractÚre « politique » des actes dont ils ont été reconnus
coupables et qui constituent, au regard de n’importe quelle norme, des
crimes commis avec violence. 4. Conclusions

194. A la lumiĂšre des diffĂ©rentes catĂ©gories de cas que j’ai examinĂ©es
et briÚvement présentées dans le présent rapport, mes conclusions
politiques sont les suivantes :

195. En Azerbaïdjan, la procédure judiciaire peut et semble toujours
ĂȘtre utilisĂ©e de maniĂšre abusive à des fins politiques, en vue
d’intimider, de rĂ©duire au silence ou de neutraliser les opposants en
qui l’Ă©lite au pouvoir voit une menace, qu’il s’agisse des militants
des partis d’opposition laĂŻcs ou religieux ou des militants
indépendants de la société civile, des avocats, des défenseurs des
droits de l’homme et des journalistes. La pression croissante qui est
exercée sur les avocats qui continuent à oser défendre les personnes
qui font l’objet d’affaires « politiques » reprĂ©sente un symptĂŽme
inquiĂ©tant, que l’ONG norvĂ©gienne « Human Rights House » a portĂ© à ma
connaissance récemment102.

196. Cette stratĂ©gie d’intimidation n’impose pas de mettre constamment
sous les verrous l’ensemble des opposants. Le « jeu » consiste
apparemment à condamner certains opposants plus lourdement que
d’autres, à laisser les uns purger l’intĂ©gralitĂ© de leur peine et Ã
libérer les autres plus tÎt, de préférence aprÚs une démonstration
publique de soumission et de repentance ; cette méthode est indigne
d’un Etat membre du Conseil de l’Europe. Tout juge professionnel qui
se respecte se doit de ne pas participer à ce « jeu » et de condamner
uniquement sur la base de la preuve crĂ©dible d’une infraction avĂ©rĂ©e.

197. Peut-on encore parler de tribunal au sens de la Convention
europĂ©enne des droits de l’homme lorsqu’un responsable politique gĂ©
peut ĂȘtre reconnu coupable de hooliganisme et condamnĂ© à une peine de
six ans d’emprisonnement, alors que les tĂ©moins à charge et la
prĂ©tendue victime elle-mĂȘme tĂ©moignent devant cette juridiction de
l’absence de toute infraction103 ? Le systĂšme de la Convention et la
Cour europĂ©enne des droits de l’homme sont-ils outillĂ©s pour traiter
d’affaires forgĂ©es de toutes piĂšces à partir de fausses preuves, comme
la drogue « trouvée » sur M. Fatullayev peu de temps aprÚs que la Cour
avait conclu, de façon exceptionnelle, que le seul moyen d’exĂ©cuter un
arrĂȘt qui constatait les nombreuses violations de la Convention
commises lorsque l’intĂ©ressĂ© avait Ă©tĂ© reconnu coupable d’un « crime »
d’opinion consistait à le libĂ©rer immĂ©diatement ? Qu’en est-il des
affaires dans lesquelles les perquisitions effectuées au domicile
d’opposants ciblĂ©s permettent de « trouver » des armes, des munitions
(parfois une seule cartouche) ou de la drogue, systématiquement en
présence de « témoins » qui sont parfois miraculeusement présents en
plusieurs lieux au mĂȘme moment ? La Cour europĂ©enne des droits de
l’homme a les moyens de constater les vices de procĂ©dure ou les autres
violations de la Convention dans les affaires de manipulations les
plus extrĂȘmes et les plus maladroites. Mais ensuite ? La constatation
mĂȘme de graves vices de procĂ©dure, gĂ©nĂ©ralement plusieurs annĂ©es aprĂšs
la décision définitive des juridictions nationales, ne conduit pas
automatiquement à rejuger le prisonnier concerné, encore moins Ã
l’acquitter et à le libĂ©rer. Le systĂšme de la Convention suppose que
l’ensemble des Etats aient la volontĂ© politique de faire respecter les
droits de l’homme et de permettre à leurs partenaires de corriger
leurs erreurs dans le cadre de la procédure de contrÎle mutuel prévue
à cette fin par la Convention. Pour ĂȘtre franc, je ne suis pas
convaincu que les autorités azerbaïdjanaises actuelles aient cette
volontĂ© politique, si j’en juge par l’absence de coopĂ©ration dont
elles ont fait preuve à mon Ă©gard lorsque j’ai tentĂ© pendant des
annĂ©es d’engager un dialogue constructif avec elles pour examiner le
problĂšme des prisonniers politiques et trouver des solutions.

198. Mais la délégation azerbaïdjanaise peut encore me démontrer que
je me trompe, en acceptant et en appuyant les propositions
pragmatiques et constructives que je soumets à l’approbation de
l’AssemblĂ©e le projet de rĂ©solution Ă©tabli sur la base du prĂ©sent
rapport. Annexe 1 – Liste rĂ©capitulative des prisonniers politiques
présumés (par ordre alphabétique)104

1. ABBASLI (Abbasly), Tural

2. ABBASOV, Elshan Sardar

3. ABBASOV, Faramiz (Faramaz)

4. Abdullayev, Shamsi Vahid

5. ABDULLAYEV, Vagif

6. AGAYEV, Farig (Farid) Nadir

7. AHUNDZADE, Ruxulla (Akhundzadeh, Rufulla)

8. ALEKBEROV, Taleh

9. ALIYEV, Ceyhun (Djeyhun/Jeyhun) Saleh

10. ALIYEV, Farhad

11. ALIYEV, Mamedali Dilavar

12. ALIYEV, Rafiq

13. ALIYEV, Rashad Ismail

14. Aliyev, Sadykh Mikayil

15. AMIRASLANOV, Elchin Samed

16. ARBAROV, Taleh

17. ASGAROV (Asgerov), Mammad Tofiq

18. Badalov, Rovshan

19. BAGIROV, Taleh Kamil

20. Bayramli, Anar

21. BAYRAMOV, Ramin

22. DADASHBEYLI, Said Alakbar

23. EYVAZLI, Zulfugar (Zulfuqar)/Eyvazov, Zulfigar

24. FARZULLAYEV, Jeyhun Hidayet

25. GANIYEV, Arif

26. GOCAYEV (Gojayev), Samir Edik

27. Gonagov, Vugar

28. Gulaliyev, Ogtay

29. Guliyev, Zaur

30. GULIYEV (Quliyev), Baybala (Beybala) Yahya

31. GURBANOV, Maarif

32. HAJILI (Hajily), Arif

33. HAJIBEYLI, Rufet (Rufat)

34. HASANLI, Shahin

35. HASANOV, Babek

36. Huseynov, Magsud Vagif (Maqsud Vaqif)

37. Huseynov, Vagif (Vaqif) Rza

38. IDRISOV, Mikayil Garib

39. ILYASOV, Fahri

40. INSANOV, Ali

41. ISKANDAROV (Isgandarov), Zaur Shalar (Toghrul)

42. ISKENDEROV (Isganderov/Isgandarli), Vivadi

43. ISMAYLOV, Araz Vasif

44. Ismaylov, Rashid Nurulla

45. ISMAYLOV, Tarlan

46. JABIYEV, Azer

47. JANIYEV, Aydin

48. Karimov (Kerimov), Dayanat Kerim

49. KARIMOV, Kamran Sultan

50. Karimov (Kerimov), Keramat Pasha

51. KARIMOV (Kerimov), Rasim Rafig

52. Khasmammadov, Taleh

53. KAZYMOV (Kazimov), Arif Nazir

54. KERIMOV (Karimov), Jahangir Ramiz

55. KERIMOV, Sahib

56. MAHERRAMOV (Maharramov), Nadir Eldar

57. MAHSIMOV (Maksimov), Rahib Shaval

58. MAJIDLI, Elnur

59. MAJIDLI, Mahammad (Mohammad)

60. Mamedov, Bakthiar

61. MAMEDRZAYEV, Firdovsi

62. MAMMADLI (Mamedli), Ahad

63. MAMMADOV (Mammedov), Hasan Alipasha

64. Mammedaliyev (Mammadaliyev), Sahib Nureddin

65. Mammedveliyev, Sabuhi Seyfeddin

66. Mammedov (Mammadov), Mammad Ali

67. MEHBALIYEV, Emin (Emil) Nuraddin

68. MUSAYEV, Ilgar

69. Mustafayev, Elshad Teyyub

70. Mustafayev, Hasan Huseyn

71. Mustafayev, Maqsad Teyyub

72. NOVRUZOV, Chingiz Farman

73. NURIYEV, Rufat Fazil

74. PANAHOV, Neymat (Panahly, Nemat)

75. POLADOV, Safa Alim

76. Qayibov, Intiqam Yusif

77. QULIYEV, Ulvi

78. Safaraliyev, Alfat Khalid

79. SAMEDOV, Dayanat

80. SAMEDOV, Movsum

81. Seyidov, Elnur

82. Shahmuradov, Yashar Khasay

83. Tahirov, Aliyusif Damet

84. VALIQULIYEV (Valiguliyev), Rashad

85. Zeynalli, Avaz Annexe 2 – Personnes figurant autrefois sur les
listes de prisonniers politiques présumés, mais qui ne sont plus
emprisonnées (par ordre alphabétique)

1. Abdullayev, Mais

Affaire du hijab, libéré en 2012.

2. Abdurahmanov (Abdurahimov), Ali

ArrĂȘtĂ© en 2009 (2008 ?). Partisan de l’ancien Premier ministre Suret
Huseynov accusĂ© d’avoir participĂ© à l’organisation d’un coup d’Etat en
1994. La qualité de prisonnier politique a été reconnue par les
experts indĂ©pendants du SecrĂ©taire GĂ©nĂ©ral à Suret Huseynov lui-mĂȘme,
qui a été libéré. Libéré le 14 août 2009.

3. Abdurahmanov (Abdurahimov), Mahir

ArrĂȘtĂ© in 2009. Partisan de l’ancien Premier ministre Suret Huseynov
accusĂ© d’avoir participĂ© à l’organisation d’un coup d’Etat en 1994. La
qualité de prisonnier politique a été reconnue à Suret Huseynov
lui-mĂȘme, qui a Ă©tĂ© libĂ©rĂ©, par les experts indĂ©pendants du SecrĂ©taire
Général. Libéré le 12 juin 2009.

4. Ahmadov, Mahir Teyyub

ArrĂȘtĂ© en 1997, condamnĂ© à une peine de 15 ans d’emprisonnement.
Affaire du meurtre du député Ali Antsukhsky (actes terroristes
supposés). Liste des 716/49. SG/Inf(2004)21, NPP. Libéré le 5 novembre
2010.

5. Aliyev, Fuad Faril

Affaire des reprĂ©sentants de la mosquĂ©e « Juma » ; arrĂȘtĂ© en 2005,
condamnĂ© à une peine de six ans d’emprisonnement. LibĂ©rĂ© le 13 avril
2011.

6. Alisli (Alyshly), Arif

Membre du Front populaire (AXCP/PPFA), parti d’opposition, condamnĂ© Ã
une peine de trois ans d’emprisonnement. A bĂ©nĂ©ficiĂ© d’une libĂ©ration
conditionnelle en janvier 2012 .

7. Bagirzade, Zeynal

Membre actif de la section du Nakhitchevan du Parti du Front populaire
; arrĂȘtĂ© le 27 dĂ©cembre 2011 et condamnĂ© le 2 mars 2012 à une peine de
sept ans et six mois d’emprisonnement pour avoir prĂ©tendument fait une
fausse dĂ©claration d’invaliditĂ© et perçu indĂ»ment des allocations.
Libéré en mai 2012.

8. Bashirli, Ruslan Djalil

M. Bashirli, ancien responsable du mouvement de jeunesse « Yeni Fikir
» du Parti du Front populaire, a vivement critiqué le gouvernement. Il
a Ă©tĂ© arrĂȘtĂ© en 2005 pour ses liens supposĂ©s avec les services secrets
armĂ©niens. L’enregistrement de ces prĂ©tendues rencontres avec les
services secrets arméniens a été diffusé Ã la télévision. Il a été
condamnĂ© à une peine de sept ans d’emprisonnement pour espionnage. La
requĂȘte qu’il a introduite devant la Cour europĂ©enne des droits de
l’homme est toujours pendante (RequĂȘte n o 32066/07).

Il a bĂ©nĂ©ficiĂ© d’une libĂ©ration conditionnelle en mars 2012, quelques
mois à peine avant le terme de sa peine, aprÚs avoir écrit une lettre
ouverte au PrĂ©sident, dans laquelle il se « repentait » de s’ĂȘtre
alliĂ© aux groupes d’opposition dans sa jeunesse, assurait le PrĂ©sident
qu’il avait rĂ©flĂ©chi à ses erreurs pendant sa dĂ©tention et qu’il Ă©tait
parvenu à la conclusion que le PrĂ©sident mĂ©ritait la plus extrĂȘme
loyautĂ© pour tout le bien qu’il avait fait pour le pays105.

9. Fatullayev, Eynulla

Journaliste (fondateur et rĂ©dacteur en chef des quotidiens GĂŒndelik
Azerbaycan et Realny Azerbaijan, connus tous deux pour leur critique
du gouvernement). ArrĂȘtĂ© le 20 avril 2007, condamnĂ© à l’issue de
procédures pénales distinctes pour deux articles à une peine totale de
huit ans et six mois d’emprisonnement (pour diffamation et « menace de
terrorisme »). La Cour europĂ©enne des droits de l’homme (RequĂȘte n o
40984/07, arrĂȘt du 22 avril 2010) a conclu à la violation de l’article
10 (libertĂ© d’expression et d’information) et de l’article 6 (procĂšs
équitable) et a ordonné sa libération. Libéré par amnistie
prĂ©sidentielle le 26 mai 2011, aprĂšs plusieurs tentatives d’engagement
de poursuites à son encontre pour détention de drogue à la suite de
l’arrĂȘt de la Cour.

10. Hajiev, Bakhtiyar

DiplĂŽmĂ© de l’universitĂ© de Harvard, membre du mouvement de jeunesse «
Vrai changement » et candidat indépendant aux élections législatives
de 2010, M. Hajiev a Ă©tĂ© arrĂȘtĂ© le 4 mars 2011 avant une manifestation
prĂ©vue le 11 mars 2011 (« Grande FĂȘte nationale »), qu’il avait
activement promue par l’intermĂ©diaire des rĂ©seaux sociaux. AccusĂ© de
s’ĂȘtre soustrait à son obligation de service militaire (en qualitĂ©
d’objecteur de conscience), il a Ă©tĂ© condamnĂ© à une peine de deux ans
d’emprisonnement. DĂ©but juin 2012, M. Haijev a bĂ©nĂ©ficiĂ© d’une
libération conditionnelle.

L’objection de conscience et le droit de faire un autre type de
service sont prévus par la Constitution azerbaïdjanaise, mais le texte
lĂ©gislatif d’application qui fixe les conditions du service alternatif
fait toujours défaut, officiellement à cause du conflit continu avec
l’ArmĂ©nie. Dix autres personnes au moins ont Ă©tĂ© reconnues coupables
de la mĂȘme infraction, sans ĂȘtre pourtant arrĂȘtĂ©es ni condamnĂ©es à une
peine d’emprisonnement.

M. Haijev affirme également avoir été frappé pendant la période qui a
précédé son procÚs, au cours de laquelle il a posté ses mésaventures
sur les réseaux sociaux. Il était assigné Ã résidence et a été
convoqué Ã plusieurs reprises au commissariat. Pendant le procÚs, il a
demandĂ© à titre de preuve qu’un mĂ©decin l’examine et que les policiers
qui l’auraient frappĂ© soient interrogĂ©s, mais le tribunal a rejetĂ© ces
deux demandes. La Cour suprĂȘme d’AzerbaĂŻdjan a rejetĂ© son recours le 6
décembre 2011.

Amnesty International considĂšre M. Hajiev comme un prisonnier de conscience.

Compte tenu de la nature politique de l’infraction pour laquelle il a
été condamné, du contexte de son arrestation, qui est intervenue dans
le cadre d’une manifestation qu’il avait aidĂ© à organiser, de ses
activités politiques de candidat indépendant aux élections
législatives et du traitement discriminatoire qui lui a été réservé,
beaucoup plus dur que les autres objecteurs de conscience, ainsi que
des mauvais traitements qui lui ont Ă©tĂ© infligĂ©s durant l’instruction
et pour lesquels les autoritĂ©s ont refusĂ© d’ouvrir une enquĂȘte, M.
Hajiev était également un prisonnier politique présumé au regard des
critĂšres du Conseil de l’Europe.

11. Hasanov, Elshan

Elshan Hasanov, militant d’un parti d’opposition, a Ă©tĂ© reconnu
coupable d’avoir pris une « part active » Ã la manifestation du 2
avril 2011 et condamnĂ© à une peine de deux ans d’emprisonnement. Il a
été libéré le 22 février 2012.

12. Israfilov, Elnur

M. Israfilov est le neveu du président de la section du district de
Narimanov du « Front populaire », parti d’opposition (AXCP/PPFA) ; il
a Ă©tĂ© condamnĂ© à une peine de deux ans et six mois d’emprisonnement
pour avoir pris une « part active » Ã la manifestation du 2 avril
2011. Il a été gracié en mars 2012.

13. Madatov, Mushfig Israfil

Ancien garde du corps du Président, libéré aprÚs avoir été gracié le
13 avril 2011.

14. Mammadov, Nurani Ahmad

Affaire du « hijab », libéré en 2012.

15. Mammedov, Mehman Qardashkan

ArrĂȘtĂ© en 2006, condamnĂ© à une peine de sept ans d’emprisonnement.
Partisan de l’ancien vice-ministre de l’IntĂ©rieur Rovshan Javadov,
accusĂ© d’avoir participĂ© à l’organisation d’un coup d’Etat en 1995.
LibĂ©rĂ© à l’occasion de l’amnistie prĂ©sidentielle de la fin 2011.

16. Marqashvili, Khyzyr

ArrĂȘtĂ© en 2004, condamnĂ© à une peine de neuf ans d’emprisonnement
prétendument pour homicide, cambriolages, constitution de formations
armées illicites. Libéré le 13 août 2008.

17. Mecidli (Macidli) Elnur Arzuman

ArrĂȘtĂ© le 10 avril 2011 et reconnu coupable d’avoir pris une « part
active » à la manifestation d’« AssemblĂ©e des citoyens » le mĂȘme jour
; libéré le 15 mai 2012.

18. Mikayilzadeh Zulfigar

Membre de l’organisation rĂ©gionale « Masally », condamnĂ© à une peine
de cinq ans d’emprisonnement pour prĂ©paration d’actes terroristes et
de coup d’Etat. LibĂ©rĂ©.

19. Milli, Emin

Blogueur et jeune militant, arrĂȘtĂ© en mĂȘme temps qu’Adnan Hajidze le
10 juillet 2009 ; deux jours plus tÎt, il avait été frappé par deux
hommes dans un restaurant, peu de temps aprÚs avoir diffusé sur les
mĂ©dias sociaux une vidĂ©o satirique critique à l’Ă©gard du gouvernement
; il a été condamné Ã une peine de deux ans et six mois
d’emprisonnement (Hajidze : deux ans), pour coups et blessures
volontaires. Ils ont été libérés tous les deux les 18/19 novembre 2010
aprĂšs une vague de protestations, notamment dans les milieux
universitaires et les médias sociaux.

20. Namazov, Anar

Neveu d’Ali Insanov (ancien ministre de la SantĂ©, toujours dĂ©tenu),
condamné le 20 avril 2007 Ã une peine de sept ans et six mois
d’emprisonnement. LibĂ©rĂ© par dĂ©cret prĂ©sidentiel du 26 mai 2011.

21. Namazov, Tapdiq Bahman

Membre de l’AXCP (Front populaire d’AzerbaĂŻdjan), arrĂȘtĂ© en 2003,
condamnĂ© à une peine de 11 ans d’emprisonnement ; liste des 107.
Libéré.

22. Orujov, Shirkhan

ArrĂȘtĂ© en mai 2011 et placĂ© en dĂ©tention provisoire en qualitĂ© de
suspect dans l’affaire du « hijab ». Le 17 octobre 2011, le tribunal
d’instance du district de Narimanov à Bakou l’a condamnĂ© à une peine
de trois ans et six mois d’emprisonnement ; le tribunal a cependant
suspendu l’exĂ©cution de la peine, suite à quoi M. Orujov a Ă©tĂ© libĂ©rĂ©.

23. Savalan(li), Jabbar

Jeune militant du parti d’opposition PPFA. ArrĂȘtĂ© au cours de la
manifestation générale pacifique organisée par Ictimai Palata
(IP/Assemblée des citoyens) le 2 avril 2011, condamné Ã une peine de
deux ans et six mois d’emprisonnement pour dĂ©tention de drogue (qui
aurait été dissimulée à dessein sur lui). Considéré par Amnesty
International comme prisonnier de conscience (voir le communiqué de
presse d’Amnesty International du 30 novembre 2011). LibĂ©rĂ© Ã
l’occasion de l’amnistie prĂ©sidentielle de fin 2011.

24. Shamuradov, Nizami Orudj

ArrĂȘtĂ© en 2007 (2008 ?), il s’est rendu volontairement aprĂšs avoir Ă©tĂ©
recherchĂ© par la police pendant 13 ans dans le cadre de l’affaire de
l’OPON, et a Ă©tĂ© condamnĂ© à une peine de sept ans d’emprisonnement.
Partisan de l’ancien vice-ministre de l’IntĂ©rieur Rovshan Javadov,
accusĂ© d’avoir participĂ© à l’organisation d’un coup d’Etat en 1995.
LibĂ©rĂ© à l’occasion de l’amnistie prĂ©sidentielle de la fin 2011.

25. Umnyashkin, Alexander

Professeur de mĂ©decine, arrĂȘtĂ© en 2005 dans le cadre de l’affaire de
l’ancien ministre de la SantĂ©, Ali Insanov (qui avait Ă©tĂ© son
professeur d’universitĂ©), condamnĂ© à une peine de trois ans
d’emprisonnement le 20 avril 2007. GraciĂ© par dĂ©cret prĂ©sidentiel en
août 2008.

26. Zahid, Quanimat

CondamnĂ© pour « hooliganisme » à la suite d’une prĂ©tendue provocation
; libéré le 17 mars 2010.

27. Zeynalov, Akif

ArrĂȘtĂ© en 2006 et condamnĂ© à une peine de 13 ans d’emprisonnement.
Partisan de l’ancien Premier ministre Suret Huseynov, accusĂ© d’avoir
participĂ© à l’organisation d’un coup d’Etat en 1994. Suret Huseynov
lui-mĂȘme a Ă©tĂ© considĂ©rĂ© comme un prisonnier politique par les experts
indépendants du Secrétaire Général et libéré. M. Zeynalov a été libéré
le 15 décembre 2007.

1. Renvoi en commission : Doc. 11468 , Renvoi 3518 du 26 janvier 2009.

2. Projet de résolution adopté par la commission le 26 juin 2012.

3. AS/Jur (2010) 28 du 17 juin 2010.

4. Voir « Azerbaijan won’t give visa to PACE rapporteur », RFE, 18
août 2011 :

5. Voir Doc. 13011 et RĂ©solution 1900 (2012) .

6. Paragraphe 14.4. b de l’ Avis 222 (2000) de l’AssemblĂ©e.

7. MM. Stefan Trechsel, ancien Président de la Commission européenne
des droits de l’homme et juge au Tribunal pĂ©nal international pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY), Evert Alkema, ancien membre du Conseil d’Etat
nĂ©erlandais et de la Commission europĂ©enne des droits de l’homme, et
Alexander Arabadjiev, ancien juge à la Cour constitutionnelle bulgare
et actuellement membre de la Cour de justice de l’Union europĂ©enne.

8. Pour de plus amples précisions, voir le document publié par le
SecrĂ©taire GĂ©nĂ©ral du Conseil de l’Europe, SG/Inf(2001)34 et ses
addenda. Les quelques affaires qui concernaient l’ArmĂ©nie ont Ă©tĂ©
rapidement rĂ©glĂ©es à l’Ă©poque.

9. Voir la décision du Comité des Ministres du 31 janvier 2001 (voir
le document SG/Inf(2001)34, Addendum I, p. 93).

10. Voir le document SG/Inf(2004)21.

11. Suivi de la RĂ©solution 1359 (2004) sur les prisonniers politiques
en AzerbaĂŻdjan. Doc. 10564 du 31 mai 2005 (rapporteur : Malcolm Bruce,
Royaume-Uni, ADLE).

12. Voir : RĂ©solution 1272 (2002) et Doc. 9310 ; Doc. 9826 ;
RĂ©solution 1359 (2004) et Doc. 10026 ; RĂ©solution 1457 (2005) ,
Recommandation 1711 (2005) et Doc. 10564 .

13. Voir par exemple le communiqué de presse des rapporteurs sur
l’AzerbaĂŻdjan du 5 janvier 2010 sur le dĂ©cret de grce prĂ©sidentiel
pris à l’occasion du Nouvel An 2010 :

?ID=5164 .

14. Voir la proposition de résolution sur le suivi de la question des
prisonniers politiques en AzerbaĂŻdjan, Doc. 11468.

15. Voir le Doc. 12270 du 31 mai 2010 (corapporteurs Andreas Herkel
(Estonie, PPE/DC) et Joseph Debono Grech (Malte, SOC)), notamment les
paragraphes 54-83, et la RĂ©solution 1750 (2010) , paragraphes 13-16.

16. Voir AS/Mon(2012)05 rev. (notamment les paragraphes 41-43 et 52-56).

17. Voir « Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights
of the Council of Europe, following his visit to Azerbaijan from 1 to
5 March 2010 » (disponible en anglais uniquement :
?id=1642017 ) et « Observations on the
human rights situation in Azerbaijan – Freedom of expression, freedom
of association, freedom of peaceful assembly » (disponible en anglais
uniquement : ?id=1839497 ).

18. Voir « Report by Thomas Hammarberg », ibid ., paragraphes 76-93.

19.
?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0228+0+DOC+XML+V0//FR (voir
notamment le paragraphe 6).

20. Voir le communiquĂ© de presse d’« Article 19 », du 12 novembre 2009
( ) et le communiqué de presse du rapporteur du 12
novembre 2009 (
?ID=2261 ).

21. Voir « The spring that never blossomed, freedoms suppressed in
Azerbaijan :
.

22. Voir Fatullayev c. Azerbaijan , RequĂȘte n o 40984/07, arrĂȘt du 22
avril 2010.

23. Voir, par exemple, les rapports sur les prisonniers politiques en
Azerbaïdjan cités dans la partie 2 ci-dessus et les rapports de Mme
Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger sur « Les circonstances entourant
l’arrestation et l’inculpation de hauts dirigeants de loukos » ( Doc.
10368 , 29 novembre 2004), « Les enquĂȘtes sur les crimes qui auraient
été commis par de hauts responsables sous le régime Koutchma en
Ukraine – l’affaire Gongadze : un exemple emblĂ©matique » ( Doc. 11686
, 11 juillet 2008), les « AllĂ©gations d’utilisation abusive du systĂšme
de justice pénale, motivée par des considérations politiques, dans les
Etats membres du Conseil de l’Europe » ( Doc. 11993 , 7 aoĂ»t 2009),
ainsi que de Christos Pourgourides sur « L’Ă©quitĂ© des procĂ©dures
judiciaires dans les affaires d’espionnage ou de divulgation de
secrets d’Etat » ( Doc. 11031 , 25 septembre 2006) et « Le devoir des
Etats membres de coopérer avec la Cour européenne des Droits de
l’Homme » ( Doc. 11183 , 9 fĂ©vrier 2007), de Dick Marty sur les «
Recours juridiques en cas de violations des droits de l’homme dans la
rĂ©gion du Caucase du Nord » ( Doc. 12276 , 4 juin 2010) et d’Erik
Jurgens sur la « Restitution des dépÎts en devises effectués dans les
filiales de l’ancienne Ljubljanska Banka situĂ©es en dehors du
territoire de la Slovénie, 1977-1991 » ( Doc. 10135 , 14 avril 2004).

24. Pour une présentation complÚte de la question, voir Stefan
Trechsel, « La notion de `prisonnier politique’ telle que dĂ©finie en
vue d’identifier des prisonniers politiques en ArmĂ©nie et en
AzerbaĂŻdjan », volume 14, Revue universelle des Droits de l’Homme
(2002), p. 169-176 (version anglaise dans le volume 23, Human Rights
Law Journal (2002), p. 293-300).

25. Voir le document AS/Jur (2010) 28, et tout particuliĂšrement son
paragraphe 17.

26. Le texte intĂ©gral de l’article 17 de la Convention est libellĂ©
comme suit : « Aucune des dispositions de la présente Convention ne
peut ĂȘtre interprĂ©tĂ©e comme impliquant pour un Etat, un groupement ou
un individu, un droit quelconque de se livrer à une activité ou
d’accomplir un acte visant à la destruction des droits ou libertĂ©s
reconnus dans la présente Convention ou à des limitations plus amples
de ces droits et libertés que celles prévues à ladite Convention ».

27. Le rapport distinct que j’ai consacrĂ© à cette question donne une
définition plus précise des prisonniers politiques ( Doc. 13011 ).

28. Voir les arrĂȘts de la Cour europĂ©enne des droits de l’homme citĂ©s
par Stefan Trechsel, op. cit ., note 24.

29. Voir le précédent cité par Stefan Trechsel, op. cit ., note 24.
Plus récemment, la Cour a jugé admissible la condamnation du
responsable politique d’extrĂȘme droite Jean-Marie Le Pen pour ses
propos xénophobes (voir la décision sur la recevabilité du 7 mai 2010
dans l’affaire Le Pen c. France (RequĂȘte n o 18788/09) ; mais la Cour
a également jugé admissible, au regard de la Convention, la
condamnation des auteurs de propos critiques particuliĂšrement
virulents et diffamatoires adressés à M. Le Pen ( Lindon, Otchakovsky,
July c. France , RequĂȘtes n os 21279/02 et 36448/02, arrĂȘt du 22
octobre 2010 (Grande Chambre)).

30. Ibid ., p. 299.

31. Voir, par exemple, les arrĂȘts rendus par la Cour europĂ©enne des
droits de l’homme dans les affaires Orhan c. Turquie le 18 juin 2000
(RequĂȘte n o 25656/94), paragraphe 266, TimurtaÅ? c. Turquie le 13 juin
2002 (RequĂȘte n o 23531/94), paragraphes 66 et 70, et Khashiyev et
Akayeva c. Russie le 24 fĂ©vrier 2005 (RequĂȘtes n os 57942/00 et
57945/00), paragraphe 137.

32. SG/Inf(2001)34 du 27 octobre 2001, Cas de prisonniers politiques
présumés en Arménie et en Azerbaïdjan, I. Informations fournies par le
Secrétaire Général, II. Rapport des experts indépendants, MM. Stefan
Trechsel, Evert Alkema et Alexander Arabadjiev, paragraphe 10.

33. Par sa RĂ©solution 1900 (2012) , l’AssemblĂ©e a rĂ©affirmĂ© son
adhésion à ces critÚres.

34. Voir note 32 ci-dessus. Rapport des experts indépendants, paragraphe 11.

35. Document CM/Del/Dec(2001)765bis, point 2.4, du 21 septembre 2001.

36. SG/Inf(2004)21 du 13 juillet 2004, paragraphe 8.

37. Voir, par exemple, la RĂ©solution 1359 (2004) , fin du paragraphe 3
: « L’AssemblĂ©e estime que les critĂšres objectifs adoptĂ©s pour dĂ©finir
les `prisonniers politiques’ en ArmĂ©nie et en AzerbaĂŻdjan sont valides
» ; Résolution 1457 (2005), paragraphes 4 et 11.

38. Lors des réunions de la commission du 24 juin 2010, du 8 mars
2011, du 5 octobre 2011 et du 26 janvier 2012.

39. Voir plus haut paragraphe 1.

40. J’aimerais Ă©galement remercier les organisations internationales
non gouvernementales ARTICLE 19, Index on Censorship, Human Rights
House Foundation et Human Rights Watch d’avoir financĂ© trĂšs
rapidement, avec le soutien de la Plate-forme de solidarité, le voyage
d’Ă©tudes de M. Mammadli et de M. Gasimli.

41. Voir plus haut point 2.4.

42. Voir plus haut paragraphe 16.

43. Voir plus haut les paragraphes 33 et 34.

44. Voir le rapport de Christos Pourgourides (Chypre, PPE/DC) sur le
devoir des Etats membres de coopérer avec la Cour européenne des
droits de l’homme ( Doc. 11183 , 9 fĂ©vrier 2007, paragraphes 77-83
(qui renvoie à des affaires dans lesquelles la Cour européenne des
droits de l’homme a statuĂ©)).

45. La mĂȘme terminologie a Ă©tĂ© utilisĂ©e par mon prĂ©dĂ©cesseur, le
rapporteur Malcolm Bruce, dans son dernier rapport consacré au « Suivi
de la RĂ©solution 1359 (2004) sur les prisonniers politiques en
AzerbaĂŻdjan » ( Doc. 10564 du 31 mai 2005), qui a rencontrĂ© la mĂȘme
difficulté.

46. Les noms des personnes mentionnées ont été orthographiés de façon
différente par les autorités et les ONG, selon que leur transcription
a Ă©tĂ© faite en anglais ou en allemand et depuis le russe ou l’azĂ©ri.
J’ai utilisĂ© les orthographes les plus rĂ©pandues (en ajoutant entre
parenthÚses une autre orthographe, de maniÚre à éviter toute méprise).

47. Disponible sur
?feature=player_embedded&v=HMOmAQXUku0 .

48. Hajili c. AzerbaĂŻdjan , RequĂȘte n o 6984/06, arrĂȘt du 10 janvier 2012.

49. Human Rights House m’a transmis une note d’information Ă©crite et
détaillée sur cette affaire, ce qui me permettra de continuer à la
suivre, y compris au cours des suites données au présent rapport.

50. Voir le communiqué de presse de Reporters sans frontiÚres du 9
mars 2012 : « Azerbaïdjan : un journaliste en ligne condamné Ã un an
et demi de prison » (
,42046.html
).

51. Voir les paragraphes 88-104 ci-dessous.

52. Voir les paragraphes 124-138 ci-dessous.

53. Voir Lord John Tomlinson (Royaume-Uni, SOC), « Les droits de
l’homme et la lutte contre le terrorisme », Doc. 12712 du 16 septembre
2011 ; Dick Marty (Suisse, ADLE), « Les recours abusifs au secret
d’Etat et à la sĂ©curitĂ© nationale : obstacles au contrĂŽle
parlementaire et judiciaire des violations des droits de l’homme »,
Doc. 12714 du 7 septembre 2011 ; « Détentions secrÚtes et transferts
illégaux de détenus impliquant des Etats membres du Conseil de
l’Europe : second rapport », Doc. 11302 du 16 novembre 2011 ; et
premier rapport, Doc. 10957 du 12 juin 2006.

54. J’ai reçu dĂ©but juin 2012 une autre liste de prisonniers
politiques supposés appartenant à différents groupes musulmans ; je
n’ai pu en tenir compte faute de temps pour procĂ©der à des recherches
approfondies.

55. ?v=rXS8mMKhfZw (traduction en anglais
disponible auprÚs du secrétariat).

56. Voir plus haut paragraphe 72, le cas n o 21.

57. Voir Reporters sans frontiĂšres, note 50.

58. RequĂȘte n o 38091/11.

59. Voir plus haut les paragraphes 88-104.

60. Au cours du procÚs, la défense a demandé au ministÚre de la Sûreté
nationale la mise à disposition des enregistrements vidéo et audio des
conversations entre les membres supposés du groupe. Mais les agents du
ministÚre ont déclaré que tous les enregistrements avaient été
dĂ©truits dans un incendie qui s’Ă©tait dĂ©clarĂ© dans le btiment du
ministĂšre.

61. Selon les avocats, MM. D. Aliyev et D. Karimov se connaissaient
vaguement, tandis que M. Dadashbeyli, M. Idrisov et M. Mehbaliyev
étaient collÚgues de travail dans une société pétroliÚre occidentale
et participaient avec d’autres collĂšgues à des activitĂ©s caritatives
en faveur des enfants.

62. Lettre qui figurerait au dossier déposé devant la Cour européenne
des droits de l’homme (RequĂȘte n o 11297/09).

63. RequĂȘte n o 5317/11.

64. RequĂȘte n o 1697/09.

65. La liste actualisée (en azéri) est disponible sur ?p=5560.

66. Les liens suivants sont ceux de vidéos publiées sur Youtube, qui
semblent confirmer cette affirmation :
?v=f4Xy9wZpgpc ; ?v=MaZ4Cee4IH0&feature=related
; ?v=73Xf8zTrsqo&feature=related.

67. L’expert Ă©tait M. Eldar Zeynalov, qui a dĂ©jà collaborĂ© avec les
experts indĂ©pendants du Conseil de l’Europe en 2001-2004 et qui a
participĂ© à l’audition organisĂ©e lors de la rĂ©union de la commission
du 26 janvier 2012.

68. Voir Annexe 2, cas n o 14.

69. Les avocats de Farhad et Rafiq Aliyev m’ont transmis une
documentation complÚte sur ces mesures de réforme, ainsi que les
déclarations faites par le ministre lors de ses visites aux Etats-Unis
et dans d’autres pays occidentaux avant son arrestation.

70. Le libellé précis, traduit en anglais, a été mis à la disposition
du rapporteur par les avocats de M. Aliyev.

71. RequĂȘte n o 37138/06, arrĂȘt du 9 novembre 2010 (dĂ©finitif).

72. Les avocats de Farhad et Rafiq Aliyev ont également procédé Ã une
analyse point par point au regard des critÚres définis par les experts
indĂ©pendants ; faute de place, il m’est impossible de la prĂ©senter ici
de façon aussi détaillée. Les avocats et les militants de défense des
droits de l’homme qui n’agissent pas pour le compte des frĂšres Aliyev
ont confirmé cette appréciation et ont notamment observé que les
peines, respectivement de dix et neuf ans d’emprisonnement pour
infractions Ă©conomiques et la confiscation de leurs avoirs Ă©taient
extraordinairement lourdes, y compris au regard des normes
azerbaĂŻdjanaises habituelles.

73. RequĂȘte n o 45875/06, arrĂȘt du 6 dĂ©cembre 2011.

74. Voir le Doc. 10564 du 31 mai 2005 de l’AssemblĂ©e (rapport de
Malcolm Bruce sur les prisonniers politiques en AzerbaĂŻdjan, Annexe
2.A (« cas pilotes »).

75. Le comité de soutien de Nemat Panahli, président du Parti national
pour la crĂ©ation de l’Etat d’AzerbaĂŻdjan, chef du Mouvement national
de libĂ©ration de l’AzerbaĂŻdjan en 1988 (lettre du 28 fĂ©vrier 2012
adressée à Andres Herkel, président de la commission de suivi de
l’AssemblĂ©e).

76. La lettre prĂ©citĂ©e mentionne l’article 89, alinĂ©as 1, 2, 4, et 5
du Code d’exĂ©cution des peines dans les Ă©tablissements pĂ©nitentiaires
de la rĂ©publique d’AzerbaĂŻdjan.

77. RĂ©solution 1545 (2007) , paragraphe 7.13.

78. Doc. 11627 du 6 juin 2008, « Le fonctionnement des institutions
démocratiques en Azerbaïdjan », paragraphe 137 et Annexe II.

79. RequĂȘte n o 16133/08 (voir la dĂ©cision partielle sur la
recevabilité du 19 novembre 2009).

80. SG/Inf(2004)21 (p. 38/Amiraslanov et 62/Kazymov), liste des
716/132, 341 et 523, cas pilotes n o 5/Amiraslanov et 15/Kazymov ;
Poladov : avis du 12 mai 2003, SG/Inf(2004)21 addendum partie I, p.
213-218.

81. Liste des 716/22 SG/Inf(2004)21 addendum partie II (p. 283-285),
avis du 12 mai 2003.

82. Liste des 716/350, SG/Inf(2004)21, Addendum partie II (p.
377-382), avis du 11 décembre 2003.

83. Liste des 716/475 SG/Inf(2004)21, Addendum partie II (p. 421-425),
avis du 11 décembre 2003.

84. Liste des 716/676 SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum partie II (p. 486-489),
avis du 7 juillet 2004.

85. Cas pilote n o 17, SG/Inf(2001)34, addendum 1, p. 67-69 ; motifs :
extradition illégale de Russie, torture (traces visibles lors de la
visite des experts en prison), intimidation de nombreux membres de la
famille, y compris de sa vieille mÚre ; 30 coaccusés qui avaient avoué
au cours de l’instruction se sont rĂ©tractĂ©s en affirmant avoir Ă©tĂ©
torturĂ©s, mais le tribunal n’en a tenu aucun compte.

86. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 352-355, avis du 15 juin 2004
(liste des 716/283).

87. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 356-361, avis du 15 juin 2004
(liste des 716/298).

88. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 366-368, avis du 12 mai 2003
(liste des 716/331).

89. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 383-389, avis du 7 juillet 2004
(liste des 716/358).

90. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 418-420, avis du 12 mai 2003
(liste des 716/474).

91. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 426-428, avis du 12 mai 2003
(liste des 716/476).

92. Mouvement civique et politique en activité entre 1989 et 1995, qui
bĂ©nĂ©ficiait d’un solide soutien de la population ; à ne pas confondre
avec le « Front populaire d’AzerbaĂŻdjan » (AXCP), parti d’opposition
créé en 1995.

93. Doc. 10564 , paragraphe 70.

94. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 398-401, avis du 11 décembre 2003
(liste des 716/386).

95. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 438-441, avis du 11 décembre 2003
(liste des 716/550).

96. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 466-469 (liste des 716/649).

97. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 306-310 (liste des 716/105).

98. SG/Inf(2004)21, addendum II, p. 458-462 (liste des 716/625).

99. Doc. 10564 du 31 mai 2005, Annexe III.

100. ArrĂȘt du 8 octobre 2009 (RequĂȘte n o 38228/05).

101. ArrĂȘt du 11 octobre 2011 (RequĂȘte n o 38073/06).

102. L’avocat Elchin Namazov, qui dĂ©fendait les participants de la
manifestation du 2 avril 2011 (voir plus haut les paragraphes 41 et
suivants) aurait Ă©tĂ© menacĂ© par le chef de la police de Ganja d’ĂȘtre
accusĂ© de dĂ©tention de drogue et d’ĂȘtre radiĂ© de l’ordre des avocats
s’il dĂ©fendait les jeunes militants Azar Jabiyev et Fakhri Ilyasov
(voir plus haut respectivement les paragraphes 133 et 93) ; le
btonnier de l’ordre l’a menacĂ© de radiation de l’ordre des avocats
s’il dĂ©fendait Bakthtiar Hajiev (voir annexe 2, n o 10) ; les agents
du ministĂšre de la SĂ»retĂ© nationale l’ont menacĂ© de radiation (sic !)
s’il dĂ©fendait le journaliste Ramin Bayramov (voir plus haut les
paragraphes 73-75). L’avocat Khalid Bagirov, qui avait assurĂ© la
défense de Vidadi Iskandarov (voir plus haut les paragraphes 61 et
suivants) et d’Elnur Mecidli (voir annexe 2, n o 17) aurait dĂ©jÃ Ă©tĂ©
suspendu du barreau. L’avocat Elchin Sadigov, spĂ©cialisĂ© dans la
protection des droits des médias, qui avait défendu notamment Eynulla
Fatullayev, a Ă©tĂ© accusĂ© d’avoir acceptĂ© d’ĂȘtre payĂ© par des
ambassadeurs Ă©trangers et des dĂ©putĂ©s gagnĂ©s à l’opposition pour faire
de la propagande contre le gouvernement. Les avocats Intigam Aliyev et
Yalchin Imanov auraient également subi réguliÚrement des pressions et
les autoritĂ©s les empĂȘchent frĂ©quemment de rencontrer leurs clients et
d’exercer leurs obligations professionnelles.

103. Voir plus haut le cas de Neymat Panahov, paragraphes 149 et suivants.

104. Les noms en majuscules désignent les personnes auxquelles la
qualité de prisonnier politique présumé a été reconnue ; les noms en
italique désignent les détenus qui figurent sur la « liste
d’observation » des personnes placĂ©es en dĂ©tention provisoire

105. Le texte de cette lettre inouïe est disponible en azéri et en
anglais sur .

vendredi 28 décembre 2012,
Stéphane ©armenews.com

From: A. Papazian

http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id_article=85689
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http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Press/StopPressVoir.asp
http://fr.rsf.org/azerbaidjan-un-journaliste-en-ligne-condamne-a-09-03-2012
http://hicab.org/
http://news.az/articles/society/56578
www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan_will_not_give_visa_to_pace_rapporteur/24300593.html.
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do
www.article19.org
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR55/011/2011/en/831dedec-1c7a-47a3-99ec-f59d1c2f3a19/eur550112011en.pdf
www.youtube.com/watch
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