TURKEY IN THE US MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM: PRIMARY ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS
Sergey Sargsyan
13.10.2011
Deputy Head of the Center for Political Studies, “Noravank” Foundation
The US signed a memorandum with Romania and Turkey (on September 13
and 14 correspondingly) on SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) ABM systems
deployment at the Deveselu air base in Romania and deployment of
AN/TPY-2 radar (old name FBR-T – Forward Based Radar -Transportable),
which acquires, identifies and tracks ballistic missiles in the active
phase of their flight, on Turkish territory. The radar will submit
data to the US ships equipped with “Aegis” combat system, which will
effect interception of ballistic missiles. According to the Russian
experts, one of the main aims of that radar, which acquires targets
at the range up to 2000km, will also be the surveillance and control
of the air area of the South Caucasus, a part of the territory of the
Central Asia as well as the south of Russia, and in particular tracking
the experimental launches of the Russian missiles at the test ranges1.
Besides, on September 15 the base agreement on deployment of the US
missile defence in Poland concluded in August 2008 in Washington and
its annex (of 2010) on deployment of SM-3 missiles on its territory
came into operation.
This is the evidence of not only a breakdown in the negotiations on
the AMB defence between the US and Russia, but it also impacts the
military and political situation in the Middle East, Black Sea and
Caspian Region and Eastern Europe.
Moreover, as the deployment of the radar in Turkey and the ABM system
base in Romania are just the first stage of implementation of the
Adapted plan on the Deployment of the ABM defence in Europe, which
was approved by the president Barak Obama in 2009, it is more likely
to stir up the processes on further large-scale and deep revision
of the current system of bilateral and multi-lateral treaties in the
sphere of the control of arms.
This system was formed in 70-90s of the last century under the
uncompromising confrontation between two ideologies and under its
influence all the states were involved in a bipolar model of the
division of the spheres of influence. After the confrontation was over
there was only one super-power, some of those treaties were annexed and
brought into accord with new geopolitical realities. But later, when
new leading global actors came forward, regional powers got stronger,
gradually a multi polar world has been formed; new challenges and
radical change of the balance of power sooner or later had to bring
to the acknowledgment of a large-scale reconsideration of the base
treaties in the sphere of arms.
The main bilateral and international treaties which has been regulating
the relations of the states in the sphere of the control of arms and
are called to support the balance of powers acceptable for all the
participants are:
â~@¢The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; â~@¢The 1987 The
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) ; â~@¢The 1990 Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE); The 1999 Agreement
on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;
â~@¢The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1); â~@¢The 1993
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2); â~@¢The 2002 Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT); â~@¢Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START-3), which came into operation on February 5, 2011.
A high level of complimentarity and interconnection of those treaties
in fact means that termination of one will bring to a situation when
for preserving the existing balance of powers it will be necessary
at least to change or more probably to terminate and substitute other
treaties either.
Unbalancing current system of treaties in the sphere of control of arms
began after the withdrawal of the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty in December 2001. The fact that Russia took it rather calmly
caused astonishment of the West connected with Moscow’s violent and
strict reaction on concrete steps of Washington taken for the planned
deployment of the so-called “third district” of the ABM system in
Europe, i.e. the deployment of the radar in the Czech Republic and
10 missiles in Poland.
But such a reaction is not an accidental; it is well considered
and caused by a number of objective reasons and is a consequence of
changes which took place in Russia and in the whole world.
Of course, a greater degree of confidence of Moscow in its powers
has been caused by a rapid economic upsurge of the country which
is in its turn conditioned by the growth of prices for the energy
carriers. But, first of all, it has been caused by the accession to
power of a new – more competent and active – leadership which has been
building (including usage of the authoritarian methods) the working
and efficient line of command and increasing the centralization and
manageability of the state.
Formation of new Russian-American relations has been essentially
influenced by such factors as the upsurge of the economic, political
and military potential of China, character of the military operations
of the US and their allies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Under such conditions the plans of the US connected with the deployment
of radar in Czech Rep. and 10 missiles in Poland, which, according to
Washington, have to protect Europe and US from the ballistic missiles
of the Islamic Republic of Iran2, gave occasion to Russia to embark
on a campaign of reconsideration of the treaties and provisions of
the treaties which are, in their opinion, of discriminative character
and are consequences of inequitable approach, and can be unilaterally
breached or ambiguously interpreted and were concluded in the times
of Gorbachev and Yeltsin weakness and lack of will.
First of all it regarded the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe which was suspended by Russia in July 2007. Currently,
especially after coming into effect of the START-3, the main
contradictions are concentrated on the approaches of the parties to
the ABM defence issue.
The main idea of the ABM Treaty was that remaining open for the
strike back of the enemy3 the parties realized lack of any prospects
of nuclear potentials build-up because of the unacceptable level of
mutual damage4.
At the same time building of the efficient system of the national
missile defence by one of the parties may attach them a belief in
their impunity and tempt them to deliver the first disarming strike.
That is why for all the seeming exclusively defencive character of
the anti-missile shield, its presence can change the balance of powers
and can cause nuclear war.
Global ABM defence, which is drafted by the US today, can be
characterized as integrated high-tech system with the complex
application of various systems of arms and target destruction
principles. In future the components, which would allow counteracting
the ballistic missiles of the potential enemy on all the phases of
the ballistic missile trajectory, are planned to be included in the
deployed system of the US ABM defence.
Back in 1996 the programme of the US National Missile Defence
(NMD) creation shifted its status from “technology development” to
“deplorability of the arms system”, and after the adoption of the
National Missile Defense Act of 1999 by the US Congress the works on
it has been stirred up.
For today systems of midcourse and terminal phases are the most
tactically efficient ones.
The G. Bush administration considered the option of starting the
deployment of the European district of the US Missile Defense from the
deployment of three-stage solid fuel GBI (Ground Based Interceptor)
in Poland and XBR (X-Band Radar) in Czech Rep. Its goal would have
been the acquiring, tracking targets and counter missiles guiding.
But after Barak Obama’s coming to the White House those plans –
and first of all the terms of their deployment – were reviewed. In
particular, this was conditioned by unwillingness to strain relations
with Moscow, which sounded the possibility of cutting back cooperation
in a number of programmes essential for Washington as counter
measures. Particularly, it regarded organization of supply support
of the coalition forces in Afghanistan through the territory of Russia.
But the most important is that Moscow seriously considered the
possibility of deployment of theatre ballistic missile systems
“Iskander-M” in Kaliningrad Oblast, and in this case the ABM defence
base in Poland would appear in its missile engagement zone. Generally,
reconsideration of Washington’s plans regarding Czech Rep. and Poland
can be considered as a tactical success of Moscow in the talks on
missile defence.
As a result, the US adopted a new plan of deployment of ABM defence
in Europe. It consists of four stages:
1. Before 2012: â~@¢Arranging of combat alert duty of three
Aegis-equipped US Navy ships with SM-3 Block IA missiles which will
be capable to destroy theatre ballistic missiles at an altitude
up to 140km and at the range up to 800km; â~@¢Deployment of mobile
AN/TPY-2 radars.
2. From 2015
â~@¢Re-equipment of “Aegis” system with more efficient SM-3 Block
IB counter-missiles, which will allow intercepting medium-range
missiles; â~@¢Deployment of a ground based analogues of sea based
“Aegis” system; â~@¢Getting 249 SM-3 missiles.
3. By 201:
â~@¢Improvement of target acquisition and target indication systems
â~@¢Further modification of SM-3 missiles – SM-3 Block IIA 4. By 2020:
â~@¢Additional armament of “Aegis” system by SM-3 Block IIB, which
will be capable to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles.
It is necessary to mention that the concerns of Russia are caused
rather by the improvement of the entire system of missile defence by
Washington, which gradually takes the shape of a global one, than
by the establishment of the 3rd district of the US ABM defence. In
order to avoid such a development Russia, taking advantage of the
“window of opportunities”, i.e. till the moment of real deployment
of the warlike equipment, came forward with a number of proposals,
particularly, on a joint running of Gabala radar station and sectoral
forming of joint European ABM(together with NATO).
Russia’s proposal on joint running of “Daryal” Radar system nearby
village of Gabala in Azerbaijan instead of ABM base deployment in
Poland and radar in Czech Rep. pursued several goals:
Firstly, it confirmed its readiness to cooperate with the US; its
real manifestation is just an organizational and technical matter.
Secondly, it put itself in a favourable light in the eyes of the global
community – readiness to make available its military object5 for the
US in order to avoid building of a new military bases in Europe and
a new round of the race of armaments.
Thirdly, it opened a gate for a broad discussion of tactical and
technical characteristics of a future European component of the US
ABM defence.
At the same time, it is necessary to mention that by its military
characteristics Gabala radar station, just like “Voronej” radar system
nearby the town of Armavir in Krasnodar region (North Caucasus), is
a tracking station and not a targeting one and it could be used only
as a supplement for the radar in Czech Rep., but not instead. Gabala
radar is more appropriate as an alternative to AN/TPY-2 radar the
United States plans to deploy in Turkey and integrate into a general
ABM defence system in December 2011 (in test mode).
In case if the US agree, the prospects of joint running of the radar
station would allow Russia to intensify using of the Gabala radar
station which is now being used with some restrictions, because of the
stance of Baku; among the reasons the concerns of its environmental
safety are mentioned. At the same time it would take the issue of
prolonging the terms of its rent (which expires in 2012) off the
table. Though radar in Armavir, which is alternative to the Gabala
radar, was put into exploitation back in 2009, Russia is interested
in continuing military and technical cooperation with Azerbaijan due
to not only military and technical aspects but also out of military
and political reasoning.
In case of refusal of the US (which is in fact confirmed by the
conclusion of the agreement with Turkey), deployment of the radar
station in the proximity of the Iranian borders automatically brings
to the aggravation of the relations between Tehran and Ankara which
will be used by Moscow in its interests.
But it should be mentioned that, besides purely technical issues of
the combinability of the Gabala radar station with the existing US
and NATO radar systems, participation of Russia in the US ABM defence
system is unacceptable for Washington in the organizational plane
either. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.
Lavrov: “Our partners from NATO say that they have liabilities on
mutual defence – Article 5 of Washington Treaty – and those liabilities
cannot be delegated to anyone” 6.
As a result, the proposal of Moscow concerning the creation of joint
ABM defence system based on territorial (i.e. sectoral) principle
of allocation of responsibility of separate countries or groups of
countries for detention and destruction of the missiles in a definite
sector of defence, was in fact voted down.
Under such conditions, besides symmetrical response, such as, for
example, merging of antiaircraft defence and ballistic missile defence
in one system of aerospace defence, which will have to increase its
efficiency, Russia also considers a number of asymmetric responses
of military-technical and organizational character, such as:
â~@¢Shift to equipping of all the modifications of “Topol” missiles by
multiple unit warheads; â~@¢Extension of a programme of rearmament of
the navy with modern nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines;
â~@¢Enhancement of maneuverability and survivability of missile
systems of Strategic Missile Forces; â~@¢Elaboration of a new systems
of ballistic and cruise missiles penetration and the improvement of
the ones in the inventory; â~@¢Elaboration of measures on suppression
or destruction of a new US ABM defence bases in Turkey and Europe in
case of necessity.
Another option is the withdrawal from the the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty (according to which Russia liquidated an entire
class of the armaments capable to bear nuclear warheads) with further
deployment of the missiles.
The missile standoff in the late 70s and early 90s developed according
to the similar scenario. In response to the deployment of the missiles
in Europe by the USSR, the US deployed 572 middle range missiles
“Pershing-2”. But if then the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies potential
in armour, aviation and artillery systems can be compared with NATO,
today the quantitative lag in more than 3 times does not allow Russia
response symmetrically (including economic aspect).
Another argument for withdrawal of Russia from the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty is the fact that many countries, including its
neigbours has either acquired such missiles or eagerly augment and
qualitatively develop their potentials.
In this situation, according to some Russian experts the deployment
of the intermediate-range missiles may become a deterrent for the
non-nuclear or restricted nuclear conflicts in both European and Far
East directions.
1.Changes in geopolitical situation caused a situation when both
the US and Russia, due to different reasons, are now interested in
changing system of the current bilateral and multi-lateral treaties
in the sphere of control of arms.
2.Today the composition, structure, system of management and funding
of the ABM defence in Europe and Middle East allow characterizing them
as rather a European component of the US ballistic missile defence
than NATO ABM defence or EuroABM defence.
3.While building a new system of relations in the military and
political spheres each of the parties will protect exclusively its own
interests. But a new system of treaties must take into consideration
both new balance of powers in the sphere of different types of arms and
coming forward of new global and regional actors. Regional actors, the
military and economic potential and advantageous geographic location of
which may influence some aspects of new military and political balance,
will try to acquire definite political and economic preferences at the
stage of structuring that system. For this purpose they will intensify
their partnership relations with leading global power centers – US,
EU, Russia and China.
4.In the system of relations between Azerbaijan and US Baku will first
of all try to enlist non-critical attitude of Washington concerning the
issues of domestic policy (authoritarian regime, violation of human
rights, total control over the mass media, corruption scandals in
ruling political elite and etc.), support on Nagorno-Karabakh issue,
further intensification of the bilateral military and technical
partnership.
5.In the system of relations between Turkey and the US, Ankara will
attempt to acquire or intensify the support of its stance on the
issue of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, carrying out
large-scale operations in the north of Iraq, on Kurdish issue as
well as intensification its foreign political and military-political
activity in the Middle East and South Caucasus.
6.On the other hand inclusion of the ship based “Aegis” systems in the
US ABM defence system in Europe in the Black Sea water area, as well
as possible deployment of intermediate range missiles in Black Sea
and Caspian region, will increase the meaning of direct negotiations
between Moscow and Ankara (Russia and Turkey take similar stances
on the issue of presence of navies of non-Black Sea states in that
water area on a continuing basis).
7.Deployment of the counter-missiles in Poland, withdrawal of
Russia from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe , as
well as possible strengthening of the military units in Kaliningrad
Special Military District and particularly deployment of “Iskander-M”
systems there (not to speak of intermediate range missiles in case of
withdrawal from INF treaty) will become an additional catalyst for the
European states to develop more independent European defence policy.
8.Russia’s counter steps as a reaction to the deployment of the
ABM defence bases in Europe will bring to the usage of the economic
leverages by Russia, including the export and amount of energy carriers
supply at least in regard to Poland and Romania (without violation
of the existing international agreements in this sphere).
This will bring to the further growth of importance of the alternative
sources of energy carriers supply, including the Caspian region,
for both Poland and Europe in general. In this context stirring up
of the project of launching of Odessa-Brodi-Polotsk oil pipeline can
be expected (or more broadly some kind of activation of the economic
activity of GUAM) 7.
9.Development of the network of all-over radar surveillance
“Caucasusnet”, as well as the appearance of the elements of ABM defence
system in Turkey and Black Sea area may bring to the strengthening
of Russian troops in Armenia and Abkhazia.
10.Involvement of Turkey in the European segment of the US ABM defence
will: 11.lower the a possibility of implementation of the plans of
development of military and technical cooperation between Turkey
and Russia. This will directly affect the results of the tender
for procurement of the air defence missile systems in which Russia
participates; â~@¢help to smooth over contradictions between Turkey
and Israel in the sphere of military-technical and military-political
cooperation. In spite of the official statement of Ankara concerning
the impermissibility of passing data from radars in Turkey to
Jerusalem, the exchange of data between the radar stations of those
two states will take place as it corresponds to the interests of all
the states taking part in the US ABM defence, one way or another;
â~@¢increase the importance of the role of Turkey in the US and Europe
security provision, and in consequence it increases its military and
political weight, particularly in the Black Sea and Caspian region.
â~@¢At the same time, it will once more prove the failure of the
foreign political course of Ankara directed to having no problems with
the neighbours, especially taking into consideration tough reaction
of Tehran on the deployment of the radar on Turkish territory.
1Radar is planned to be deployed in Kuluncak district of Malatya
province in south-eastern Turkey.
2 Here it should be spoken about the principle capability of Iran to
produce intercontinental ballistic missiles.
3 When in 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was concluded, the
parties came to an agreement that each of them would create one
district covered by the ABM defence. In the US this district was the
intercontinental ballistic missiles base in California and in the
USSR – Moscow region.
4 Conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1972 (SALT-1)
became possible only after the agreements on limitation of the national
ABM defence systems.
5 From judicial point of view – Information-analytical center “Daryal”
rented from Azerbaijan
6 ”РоÑ~AÑ~AийÑ~AкаÑ~O газеÑ~Bа”, 4 иÑ~NДÑ~O 2011 г.
7 GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – includes
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
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