NAGORNO-KARABAKH: WAR, PEACE, OR BATNA?
by Vartan Oskanian,
The Civilitas Foundation
Thursday, 04 June 2009 13:53
When Presidents Serzh Sarkisian of Armenia and Ilham Aliyev of
Azerbaijan meet in St. Petersburg, they are expected to reach a
breakthrough on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
the military phase of which was ended 15 years ago by what has become
the world’s longest self-maintained cease-fire.
This resolution is expected not just for its own sake, but because
it is perceived as a necessary determinant of many other regional
processes, including Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations, and even
Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey and Russia, among others.
There are four elements that have always affected the settlement
process, and continue to do so:
– the global and regional interests of the major powers and their
present interrelationships; – the dominant trends in international
relations as manifested in the agendas and decisions of international
organizations (such as the UN and Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe); – the conflicting sides’ own present
political and economic situations; – the conflicting sides’ diplomatic
approaches, convictions, and capacity to shape the peace process.
Since 1992, during each successive stage of diplomatic activity,
these four factors have always been consequential, although never so
significant and so fluid as today. Worse, never have they all been in
such a state of great and unpredictable flux. Regionally and globally,
the interrelationship among powers has changed dramatically. The most
obvious example is the new U.S.
administration’s zeal in this region, prompted both by domestic
pressures as well as its own outlook.
But other global changes are also significant: Russia and the
United States are "resetting" their relationship; the impact of
the Russia-Georgia war is still felt; and Europe is promoting the
Eastern Partnership with six former Soviet republics, including the
three South Caucasus states, among other reasons to find solutions
to conflicts that might affect its energy security.
Within international organizations, especially following the very
public disagreements on Kosovo’s self-determination, there are
conflicting directions. Russia, which opposed what it considered to
be the unilateral imposition of sovereignty on Kosovo, is trying to
counterbalance this process. But it ended up doing the same itself
by recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.
In other words, while both the West and Russia selectively support
independence, they continue to talk about the supremacy of the
principle of territorial integrity. This contradictory situation
created by conflicting approaches by the major players will require
delicate diplomatic maneuvering by the sides and the mediators.
The internal situations in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Karabakh
are no less important at these diplomatic crossroads. Despite
its oil wealth, Azerbaijan’s economic growth is in decline, as is
Armenia’s. Politically, although both appear stable, neither government
enjoys deep support among the population, albeit for differing reasons.
In this context, the ultimate question is what is to happen to this
no-peace, no-war situation. What is the end game? Is there a viable
political solution?
‘Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement’
There are three possible scenarios. One is the continuation of a
sustainable status quo. The second is the eruption of war and a new
situation on the ground. The third is a negotiated solution.
Although most of the international community, including the mediators,
will automatically reject the first scenario as unacceptable and
unsustainable, this is not necessarily the case. There are many
historical examples when yesterday’s unrealistic alternative became
today’s preferred and realistic solution.
The second scenario — war — is difficult to imagine. Armenians have
no reason to start a war. If the Azerbaijanis start a war, this will
be the third time they will have tried, and they will only succeed
if they aim for a "final solution." That would be a huge risk for
Azerbaijan, greater than for the Armenian side.
And finally, there is the third scenario — a negotiated solution. This
is obviously the most desirable, but would require producing a document
that includes substantive compromises. These negotiations have already
gone on for 15 long, intense years, during which five serious proposals
were presented. Four were rejected, one is still on the table.
In other words, there is no easy resolution, especially since both
sides have what negotiators call a BATNA — the Best Alternative To
a Negotiated Agreement. Azerbaijan believes its BATNA is war. Armenia
believes its BATNA is today’s status quo.
This is the backdrop to the presidents’ meeting in St. Petersburg. They
will of course be mindful that the most fundamental change in the
four parameters identified above, since their last meeting, is the
pressure resulting from the U.S. push for improved relations between
Turkey and Armenia. President Barack Obama stuck his neck out to try
to promote these relations. He believed this compensated for his not
using the term genocide on April 24.
April 24 will come around again next year, however, so the pressure
has not disappeared. Relations still need to be improved.
In addition, to be fair, both Armenia and Turkey do in fact want
such progress, albeit for differing reasons. Azerbaijan can see the
writing on the wall, but remains intransigent. Only progress in the
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process can reconcile these disparate
requirements.
This is the challenge facing the two presidents. A lasting peace will
come when each side acknowledges the other’s minimum requirements,
not their minimum demands. Before this can happen, each side must
achieve sufficient internal consensus on its bargaining position. This
hasn’t happened yet.
The prospects for peace also depend on how well and how quickly
disparate local political realities, quickly evolving international
relations and radically changing global trends can be juggled and
reconfigured.