STOPPING IRAN’S NUCLEAR MARCH IS FUTILE
By Joseph A. Kechichian
Gulf News
May 7 2009
UAE
Vartan Gregorian, the erudite president of the Carnegie Corporation
of New York, a grant-making institution founded by Andrew Carnegie in
1911, penned a thoughtful 12-page draft model letter for US President
Barack Obama to consider sending to both the Supreme Leader of Iran
as well as its President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
It is an exceptional document that contextualises key issues regarding
Iran’s quest for nuclear capabilities.
Gregorian, a Tabriz-born Armenian-American historian with a stellar
academic record, is the author of several books, including the
acclaimed Islam: A Mosaic, Not A Monolith. True to his style, the
draft letter is well thought-out, and rich in detail.
It opens with a long overdue recognition that "Americans are deeply
mindful and respectful of the renowned achievements and rich cultural
legacy of Iranian civilisation, which reflect an unparalleled degree
of historical continuity".
It then identifies three epochal contributions which etched the Iranian
character ever since. With Zoroastrianism, Gregorian summarises,
Iranians "affirmed man’s absolute free will to choose between evil
and a Divine Creator, and our common destiny to face a final Day
of Judgment".
This is a fundamental building foundation for later analysis but oh
so valuable in and of itself.
At a later stage, the academic highlights how under the Achaemenid
Empire, enlightened leaders like Cyrus and Darius defined tolerance
and pluralism.
"It was Cyrus the Great who decreed that ‘all should be free to worship
their gods without impediments or persecution’ – a proclamation unique,
not only for its time, but for centuries to come", acknowledges the
author. Few outsiders appreciate the value such ideas have in molding
Iranian perceptions.
With the advent of Islam, Gregorian underscores, "Iranians, drawing
on their own early beliefs, helped to develop and then adhered to
Shiite Islam."
He continues: "It was during this period that Iran became the seat
of Islamic learning and gave to the world its science, philosophy,
theology, arts, and architecture."
Because such an expose was seldom made public in the post-1979
US-Iranian environment, the tone of the letter sets the stage for
significant policy differences. In fact, with this putative Obama
letter, Gregorian wants the US to answer President Ahmadinajed’s
far-ranging, 18-page March 2006 dispatch to former US president George
W. Bush, which was cavalierly ignored.
It may be worth recalling that the Iranian focused on major religious
values, history, and international relations in his correspondence,
and was deeply disappointed that his initiative was brushed aside.
Prodded by pro-Israeli forces that wished to launch pre-emptive
attacks against Iran, Bush disregarded the Ahmadinejad memo,
as Washington pigeonholed Iran into his infamous ‘axis of evil’
categorisation. To his credit, Gregorian touches upon past mistakes,
invokes American understanding, and reminds Iranians that the US came
under new management on 20 January 2009.
Iranians and Americans "enjoyed remarkably positive relations", he
writes, because "the US [always] defended [the country’s] territorial
integrity". Gregorian stresses that were it "not for America’s
efforts, Iran might have been broken up" and, in frank statements,
concedes that Washington "promoted the shah’s ambitions to make Iran
a regional superpower".
He then places a few choice words in Obama’s mouth that will shock: the
US "did not recognise that a nationalist, secular, and democratic Iran
would have been a great counterforce against communism," concluding:
"We were wrong."
This is a polite way of saying that Washington was mistaken to help
organise the 1953 coup against former Iranian prime minister Mohammad
Mossadeq.
Although a slew of painful policies followed, including the
444-day hostage ordeal as well as the failed April 24, 1980, rescue
mission that cost eight American servicemen their lives, the letter
acknowledges that today Washington continues to have grave concerns
about Iran’s nuclear programmes.
Yet, even on this front, the author clarifies how Washington assisted
Tehran – as early as 1957 – to acquire nuclear power through the
Atoms for Peace programme. In 1975, then secretary of state Henry
Kissinger signed a National Security Memorandum, which affirmed that
the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing
needs of Iran’s economy and free remaining oil reserves for export
or conversion to petrochemicals".
The letter reminds Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and
Ahmadinejad that it was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who called nuclear
power ‘the work of the devil’, although doubts remained as to whether
current efforts are strictly for peaceful purposes. According to the
putative letter, Washington offers to "discuss [Iran’s] legitimate
aspirations as a regional power and to cease all talk of ‘regime
change’."
In short, everything would be done to discourage Tehran from acquiring
nuclear weapons, ostensibly to prevent a regional arms race.
While the letter closes with wishes for improved relations and a direct
quote from Imam Ali calling for tolerance, mercy, and compassion,
it does not include any references to Israel’s nuclear weapons,
or to Iranian fears of a potential assault on its nuclear facilities.
Consequently, and even if Ahmadinejad fails to win another presidential
term on June 12, Khamenei is not likely to sacrifice this critical
national security initiative. For precisely the reasons Gregorian
enunciates, Iran will become a nuclear power, sooner rather than later.
Dr. Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books
on Gulf affairs.