Month: September 2008

ERDOGAN, SARKOZY TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST IN DAMASCUS

Today’s Zaman
Sept 2 2008
Turkey

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will attend a quadripartite
summit in Damascus this week with French, Syrian and Qatari leaders
convening to discuss Lebanon and the situation in the Middle East,
Turkish officials said yesterday.

Erdogan had earlier announced that he would visit Damascus on
Sept. 4 for a working visit, coinciding with a landmark trip
by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on Sept. 3-4 to the Syrian
capital. News reports in the Arab media said Paris was the sponsor
of the meeting. Emir of Qatar Sheik Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani
and the president of host country Syria, Bashar Assad, will also
attend the talks, which will review the situation in Lebanon and the
Syrian-Israeli peace talks, currently mediated by Turkey, government
spokesman Cemil Cicek confirmed after a Cabinet meeting yesterday.

Sources said Assad, a personal friend of Erdogan, wanted the Turkish
prime minister to be part of the talks because of his contributions
to peace efforts in the Middle East. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan is
expected to accompany Erdogan in Damascus. Syria and Israel announced
in May that they were holding indirect peace talks mediated by
Turkey. Despite having held several rounds of talks so far, a process
of direct talks seems unlikely to start soon.

Sarkozy’s visit to Damascus is another step the French leader is
taking toward normalizing ties with Syria and bringing Damascus back
into the international fold by reversing a policy of exclusion that
has in recent years alienated the country from the West. Sarkozy,
whose country holds the rotating presidency of the European Union,
was the first Western leader to reward the Syrians by welcoming Assad
to the launch of a new Mediterranean Union in France and as a guest
of honor at the Bastille Day celebrations in Paris last month.

Qatar is the holder of the term presidency of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, and Syria is the term president of the Arab League. Turkey
is a member of none of the organizations but is preparing to sign a
strategic dialogue document with the Gulf Cooperation Council today
in Jeddah. The document will be signed during a visit by Babacan to
Jeddah. Turkey has also been invited to attend Arab League meetings
although it is not a member of the group, and diplomatic sources
say efforts are under way to establish an institutional relationship
between Ankara and the Arab League.

Turkish diplomats say the invitation for Turkey to attend the talks
confirm Ankara’s standing as a bridge between the East and the West
and added that Erdogan has been invited because Turkey is trusted by
both sides. Though the main agenda is the Middle East, the Damascus
talks are also expected to touch on the situation in the Caucasus
after the brief Georgian-Russian war in August, following a Georgian
offensive in the breakaway region of South Ossetia.

Erdogan is also expected to have bilateral talks with leaders
attending the quadripartite summit, though no details were immediately
available. Erdogan and Sarkozy rarely meet, and relations between
Turkey and France are tense over staunch French opposition to Turkey’s
membership in the EU. Cicek said he hoped progress in Turkey’s
accession process would also be discussed in Damascus.

Before flying to Jeddah, Babacan will host Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov today in Ä°stanbul for talks on the situation in the
Caucasus. After attending a foreign ministerial meeting of the Gulf
Cooperation Council in Jeddah, Babacan will head to Damascus to attend
the quadripartite summit on the Middle East there.

On Friday, Babacan will attend an informal meeting of the EU foreign
ministers in France. His last stop before winding up the week will most
probably be Armenia. Foreign Ministry officials remain tightlipped
on whether President Abdullah Gul will accept an invitation from his
Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sarksyan, to watch a World Cup qualifying
game between national teams of the two countries on Sept. 6, but
Erdogan suggested over the weekend that Gul will go to Armenia and
that Babacan will be accompanying him.

–Boundary_(ID_hVEcfT/pZHQA3BIlZ0UMYw)–

NOVELIST PAMUK: ERGENEKON WANTED TO KILL ME

Today’s Zaman
Sept 2 2008
Turkey

Nobel Prize-winning Turkish author Orhan Pamuk has said he was
targeted for assassination by Ergenekon, a political crime gang that
had allegedly been making preparations to topple the government and was
readying to perpetrate bloody attacks on several high-profile figures.

In an interview with the Sabah daily to promote his latest novel,
"Masumiyet Muzesi" (The Museum of Innocence), Pamuk said he believes
there are murderers in Ergenekon and that they wanted to kill him.

"It is unethical to protect those murderers for political reasons. This
is not an ethical country if mafia leaders and retired generals plan
to have people murdered and they do it over and over again, and they
blackmail people in this way. I have to say that protecting Ergenekon
members is unethical," he was quoted as saying yesterday by Sabah.

In response to a question as to whether or not he believes the
judiciary will follow through to see that the Ergenekon gang members
receive just punishment, Pamuk said he could not comment on the
subject. "You should ask this question to the politicians. It seems
believable to me that a murderer cooperated with another and that this
other one made a phone call with another, and so on, but I don’t read
about Ergenekon every day. This is not how I live my life," he said.

He noted that Ergenekon has been politicized and criticized this. "It
is not important whether they are Ataturkist, Islamist, liberal,
conservative or leftist. This is an ethical issue for me. I am
convinced that there are murderers," he stated.

The indictment against Ergenekon, made public on July 25, said
the organization incited the perpetrators of deadly attacks on
important public figures. The planned victims allegedly included
Pamuk, Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor Hrant Dink, journalist Ugur
Mumcu, businessman Ozdemir Sabancı and writer and scientist Necip
Hablemitoglu. The gang was also planning to launch bloody assaults
on several high-profile personalities, including Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, former Chief of General Staff Gen. YaÅ~_ar Buyukanıt
and journalist Fehmi Koru.

–Boundary_(ID_EPmASkk20rc45SH573bhwQ)–

EYEWITNESS SAYS OSMAN HAYAL WAS ACCOMPLICE TO DINK’S MURDERER

Today’s Zaman
Sept 2 2008
Turkey

An anonymous eyewitness in the murder case of Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink, shot dead by a teenager over a year ago,
confirmed that Osman Hayal was with Ogun Samast at the time of
the murder.

The eyewitness stated that Osman Hayal — the elder brother of Yasin
Hayal, who instigated the murder — was with Samast, who was 17 at
the time of the murder, when he murdered Dink on Jan. 19, 2007, in
broad daylight outside the office of Agos, a newspaper where Dink
was the editor-in-chief. Osman Hayal denies the eyewitness’s claims.

The anonymous eyewitness said: "Osman Hayal and another person with
curly hair were there. They were standing in front of an Akbank
on the street. After the event happened, Osman Hayal turned to the
other two people and nodded. After that he escaped in the direction
of Mecidiyeköy."

Osman Hayal rejects the claims, but police sources note that there
were serious discrepancies in Hayal’s depositions. Hayal claims that
he got on a bus at around 3 p.m. and for this reason emphasized he
was on the bus at 4 p.m. when the event took place. "I do not know
exactly where I was when the event took place, but I was probably
going to Trabzon by bus." A bus takes about 18 hours to travel from
Ä°stanbul to Trabzon but Hayal also claims that he learned about the
incident while watching TV with his mother. However, according to
Hayal’s claim about his being on the bus, he could not have been in
Trabzon before noon of the next day. He missed this important detail.

Osman Hayal had claimed previously that he was not in Ä°stanbul on
the day of murder but later it was proved that his mobile phone
signaled from Ä°stanbul’s Umraniye district on Jan. 19, 2007, at
11:27 a.m. Responding to why he lied, Hayal said: "I said I was in
Trabzon because I was very sad and bothered as my brother was involved
in this event. I said this because I was deeply hurt. I did not say
that I was in Ä°stanbul thinking that it would change anything as I
was not involved in this event."

–Boundary_(ID_h8v0PZwbTNOApkN0toi9v A)–

SARKSYAN IN MOSCOW BEFORE POSSIBLE GUL VISIT

Today’s Zaman
Sept 2 2008
Turkey

Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan is scheduled to pay an official
visit to Russia today at the invitation of his Russian counterpart,
Dmitry Medvedev, the Kremlin announced yesterday in a brief statement.

The timing of Sarkysan’s visit is widely found to be meaningful, as
it comes only days ahead of an expected visit by Turkish President
Abdullah Gul to Yerevan. While Gul said over the weekend that he was
still considering whether to accept an invitation from Sarksyan to
watch together a World Cup qualifying game between the Armenian and
Turkish national soccer teams on Saturday in Yerevan’s Hrazdan Stadium,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan indicated, also over the weekend,
that Gul would respond positively to the invitation.

Last week, Sarksyan’s office announced that he would depart for Sochi
on Tuesday for a working visit. "During the meeting the parties will
discuss the future development of the Armenian-Russian strategic
partnership and will dwell on issues of Armenia’s forthcoming
presidency of the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO]. The
interlocutors will also discuss regional and international issues,"
his office also said then.

Also this week, probably after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s
talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan today in Ä°stanbul,
a Turkish Foreign Ministry delegation will visit Yerevan to discuss
a proposed platform for the troubled Caucasus. The Caucasus Stability
and Cooperation Platform, proposed by Turkey as a mechanism to develop
conflict resolution methods among the Caucasus countries, is planned
to be made up of Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

–Boundary_(ID_8yhgxgOYLquhW+jruf8LXw)–

RUSSIA, GEORGIA… AND IRAN
by Howard Schweber

Huffington Post
Sept 1 2008
NY

Yesterday, Dmitry Medvedev said Russia will provide military aid to
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is significant for several reasons,
but the most important may be that a continued Russian presence
means a continued threat to the operation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline. Russian forces did not take over the pipeline in their
operations in Georgia, but they certainly demonstrated that the can
close it down at will and that the U.S. has no military capacity to
stop them — particularly so long as our forces are tied up in Iraq.

The obvious target of all this is Europe. Russia has established its
willingness to use its control over oil to gain leverage over European
nations, and the Europeans are very rightly afraid of the consequences
of Russian control of the pipelines in Georgia and especially the
pipeline in Ukraine. But it’s worth taking a moment to look East: what
does Russia’s presence in Georgia do to its relationship with Iran?

First, a little review is in order. First, let’s recall the U.S. moves
over the past seven years that have left Russia feeling threatened. The
Bush administration cut off participation in U.S.-Russian actions that
stretched back through the Clinton and G.H.W. Bush administrations,
abrogated the anti-ABM treaty, pushed for the expansion of NATO
right up Russia’s borders and have made noises about including
Ukraine and Georgia in the alliance, built an oil and gas pipeline
through Southern Georgia explicitly in order to ensure that it would
be outside Russia’s control, armed and trained the Georgian military
and brought the Israelis in to do the same, and reached an agreement
to station missiles and U.S. forces in Poland and Czechoslovakia on
the laughable premise that these nations need to be protected against
Iran. In the last month that pretense has been dropped completely:
Polish government representatives, in particular, are quite explicit
about their desire to have Americans standing in the way of any
Russian incursion to guarantee an American military response.

The point is that Russia is not just feeling unfriendly toward
us; Putin and Medveydev view the U.S. as something close to an
outright enemy. On August 27th Russia’s envoy to NATO stated that
U.S. assistance to Georgia would be a "declaration of war"; on August
29th Putin suggested that the U.S. had deliberately encouraged Georgia
to attack South Ossetia in order to help McCain’s presidential
campaign and that U.S. military advisors had helped the Georgian
forces during the conflict; today (Sept. 1) Russian sources are
claiming that U.S. ships carrying humanitarian aid have also been
supplying the Georgians with weapons..

Second, a quick review of the background with respect to oil and gas
pipelines. Since 2005 Russia has coveted control over the oil and
natural gas pipelines that run through Georgia, particularly since
the opening of an oil pipeline running from Azerbaijan through Georgia
and into Turkey. Control that pipeline and you control the spigot on
the flow of fuel into Armenia and points South, and into Turkey and
points West. Russia wants control over the pipelines running through
Ukraine for the same reason, which would give Russia total control
over the flow of oil and gas into Europe from the East.

But! Control over the Georgian pipelines also limits the flow
of oil from Iran West and North. In 2006, around the same time
Russia was cutting off fuel supplies to various other nations to
demonstrate its muscle, Gazprom imposed a huge price increase on
Georgia in an effort to coerce it to accept an offer to purchase the
Georgian pipelines. Georgia refused and went looking for suppliers
elsewhere. One source was Azerbeijan; the other was Iran. Russian
control over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline gives it the ability
to limit Iran’s (and Azerbaijan’s) ability to sell its own oil and
deprives Georgia of their previous security against a Russian fuel
embargo.

All of this also provokes the U.S. and Israel, which from Russia’s
perspective is also all to the good. Which brings us to the other
news of the day: a positive flurry of reports predicting imminent
military action against Iran. The Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf reports
that Dutch military intelligence has suspended an operation aimed
at sabotaging Iran’s weapons industry based on their expectation
of a U.S. attack in the coming weeks, a story that is being pushed
by Israeli sources. Then there is a report in the Sunday Telegraph
about a proposed deal in which Russia would sell sophisticated S-300
anti-aircraft missiles to Iran. A Pentagon official is quoted as
saying "Purchase of S-300 missiles would change the game." Unnamed
U.S. intelligence "operatives" are quoted as saying that Russia
plans to use the proposed sale to create a foreign policy crisis as
a way to test the incoming administration president. In response,
the Israelis reportedly have stopped providing weapons to Georgia,
and have sent representatives to Moscow to try to persuade Russia
not to sell the missiles to Iran.

>From the Russian perspective, all of this is close to ideal: they
have everybody running scared. Having demonstrated their ability to
threaten the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, they have shown Iran that
they can cut off their land route for exports – the only route that
would be available if the Straits of Hormuz were to be closed. (From
the Russian perspective, how great would it be if the U.S. were to
shut down the Straits by a blockade? True, experts have cast doubt
on the feasibility of closing the Straits completely, but no one
really knows what would happen in the event of military action.) If
Russia is really, really lucky the U.S. could remain in an expanded
Iraq-Iran quagmire for a decade or more, absorbing the brunt of
the reactions, increasing resentments throughout the Muslim world,
ensuring a steady stream of terrorist attacks, pushing the Americans to
continue bellicose support for the Israeli Right and its expansionist
strategies — all of which makes the Russians look positively benign
by comparison. Alternatively, if the U.S., its domestic political
will exhausted, pulls out altogether, to whom can the Arab states
turn for help in containing a potentially expansionist Iran?

Or, well, what is the endgame for Iraq? Five years from now, would
an independent or quasi-independent Kurdish state be interested in
hearing from new allies? The reference to a potential Kurdish state
takes us back to the days of the Great Game. During WW II both the
USSR and UK invaded Iran militarily, followed by a treaty in 1942 that
was supposed to put an end to interference, but didn’t. The Soviets
stirred up separatists movements — notably among the Kurds — in
an attempt to destabilize the country. At the end of the war Stalin
proposed that Russia and the U.S. simply split Iran between them. We
were horrified, of course, and began our 40 years of intervention in
Iranian politics (remember the Twin Pillars of Stability back in the
1970s?) There are currently 4 million Kurds in Iran, concentrated in
the western part of the country.

So try this scenario. Israel launches preemptive strikes against
Iran with U.S. support. Iran strikes back in various ways (missiles,
terrorist operations, etc.) The U.S. moves aggressively to dislodge
the current Iranian administration by force. Joining us in our war
against terror — "we have our differences but Islamic terrorism is
a therat to us all" — Russia moves forces into northern Iran after
using its control of the Georgian pipeline to compel the Azarbaijanis
to permit them to cross their territory. One has to go pretty far
South to get to major oil fields, but even in the Northwest there is
plenty of strategically interesting territory: there is a gas pipeline
into Turkey, a refinery at Tabriz. Now declare a Kurdish puppet state,
with Russian peacekeepers in place just to be sure the Turks do not
launch aggressive military action the way those evil Georgians tried
to do way back in 2008.

No matter what happens, Russia’s establishment of a strategic presence
to the South gives it tremendous indirect leverage over the Middle
East, and the missile deal announcement suggests that they want to
continue in that direction. And what opened up the possibility for
all this mischief? Our invasion of Iraq.

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS POST-SOVIET SPACE
By David Miliband

The Moscow Times
Sept 2 2008
Russia

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has seemed that new rules
were being established for the conduct of international relations
in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The watchwords
were independence and interdependence; sovereignty and mutual
responsibility; cooperation and common interests. They are good words
that need to be defended.

But the Georgia crisis provided a rude awakening. The sight of Russian
tanks in a neighboring country on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia has shown that the temptations of power
politics remain. The old sores and divisions fester. Russia remains
unreconciled to the new map of Europe. The Kremlin’s unilateral attempt
to redraw that map by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia marks not just the end of the post-Cold War period,
it is also a moment that requires countries to set out where they
stand on the significant issues of nationhood and international law.

Although President Dmitry Medvedev says he is not afraid of a new
Cold War, Europe doesn’t want one. He has a big responsibility not
to start one.

Ukraine is a leading example of the benefits that accrue when
a country takes charge of its own destiny and seeks alliances with
other countries. Its choices should not be seen as a threat to Russia,
but its independence does demand a new relationship with Russia —
one of equals, not that of master and servant.

Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis. There
can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial
integrity, democratic governance and international law. It has shown
that it can defeat Georgia’s army. But today Russia is more isolated,
less trusted and less respected than it was a month ago. It has made
short-term military gains, but over time it will feel economic and
political losses. If Russia truly wants respect and influence, it
must change course.

Although Prime Minister Vladimir Putin described the Soviet Union’s
collapse as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th
century, most people of the former Soviet bloc hardly see it that
way. It will be a tragedy for Russia if it spends the next 20 years
believing it to be the case.

Indeed, since 1991, the West has offered Russia extensive cooperation
with the European Union and NATO, as well as membership in the Council
of Europe and the Group of Eight. These outlets have been developed
not to humiliate or threaten Russia but to engage it. The EU and the
United States provided critical support for the Russian economy when
it was needed, Western companies have invested heavily, and Russia has
benefited significantly from its reintegration into the global economy.

But the Kremlin has recently met European efforts with scorn, from
suspension of its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe to harassment of business people and cyber-attacks
on neighbors. Now there is Georgia.

Of course, Russia can and should have interests in its neighbors,
but like everyone else, it must earn that influence. Indeed, these
countries do not make up some "post-Soviet space" to which Putin often
refers. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new reality —
sovereign, independent countries with their own rights and interests.

Russia also needs to clarify its attitude about the use of force to
solve disputes. Some argue that Russia has done nothing not previously
done by NATO in Kosovo in 1999. But this comparison does not hold up.

NATO’s actions in Kosovo followed dramatic and systematic abuse
of human rights, culminating in ethnic cleansing on a scale not
seen in Europe since World War II. NATO acted only after intensive
negotiations in the United Nations Security Council and determined
efforts at peace talks. Special envoys were sent to warn then-Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic of the consequences of his actions.

None of this can be said for Russia’s use of force in Georgia.

Likewise, the decision to recognize Kosovo’s independence came only
after Russia made clear that it would veto the deal proposed by the
UN secretary general’s special envoy, former Finnish President Martii
Ahtisaari. Even then we agreed to a further four months of negotiations
among the EU, the UN and Russia in order to ensure that no stone was
left unturned in the search for a mutually acceptable compromise.

By contrast, in Georgia, Russia moved from support for territorial
integrity to breaking up the country in three weeks and relied entirely
on military force to do so.

Russia must now ask itself about the relationship between short-term
military victories and long-term economic prosperity. The conflict
in Georgia has been followed by a sharp decline in investor
confidence. Russia’s foreign-exchange reserves fell by $16 billion in
one week, and Gazprom’s value fell by the same amount in one day. The
political and economic risk level in Russia has skyrocketed.

Isolating Russia would be counterproductive because its international
economic integration is the best discipline on its politics. Moreover,
isolation would only strengthen the sense of victimhood that fuels
intolerant Russian nationalism. Isolation would also compromise
the world’s interests in tackling nuclear proliferation, addressing
climate change or stabilizing Afghanistan.

But the international community is not impotent. Europeans need Russian
gas, but Gazprom needs European markets and investment. Europe’s
approach must be hard-headed engagement. That means bolstering allies,
rebalancing the energy relationship with Russia, defending the
rules of international institutions and renewing efforts to tackle
"unresolved conflicts" — not only in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
but also in Transdnestr and Nagorno-Karabakh. Each has its roots in
longstanding ethnic tensions, exacerbated by economic and political
underdevelopment.

Ukraine, with its 8 million ethnic Russians, many of them in Crimea, is
a key factor. Its strong links to Russia are firmly in both countries’
interests. But Ukraine is also a European country, which gives it the
right to apply for EU membership, an aspiration voiced by Ukraine’s
leaders. The prospect and reality of EU membership has been a force for
stability, prosperity and democracy across Eastern Europe. Once Ukraine
fulfills the EU’s criteria, it should be accepted as a full member.

Nor does Ukraine’s relationship with NATO pose a threat to Russia. The
strengthening of Ukraine’s democratic institutions and independence
that will result from it will benefit Russia in the long term.

Europe also must rebalance its energy relationship with Russia by
investing in gas storage to deal with interruptions, diversifying
supplies and establishing a properly functioning internal market,
with more interconnections between countries. It must also reduce
its dependence on gas altogether by increasing energy efficiency and
by investing in storage technology for coal, renewable resources and
nuclear power.

In all international institutions, Britain and Europe must review our
relations with Russia. I do not apologize for rejecting knee-jerk calls
for Russia’s expulsion from the G8 or for EU-Russia or NATO-Russia
relations to be broken. But we do need to examine the nature, depth and
breadth of relations with Russia. And we will stand by our commitments
to existing NATO members, while renewing our determination that Russia
will have no veto over its future direction.

The choice today is clear. No one wants a new Cold War, but we must
be clear about the foundations of lasting peace.

OPPOSITION LEADER BAYKAL IS AGAINST PRESIDENT’S POSSIBLE VISIT TO ARMENIA
Emine Ozcan

BÄ°
Sept 2 2008
Turkey

Opposition leader Baykal says President Gul should not accept the
invitation of the Armenian President to watch the Armenia-Turkey
soccer game together in Armenia. There are those who think it will
be a step in the right direction.

The possibility that President Abdullah Gul may go to Erivan to watch
the Armenia-Turkey soccer game has received harsh response from Deniz
Baykal, president of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). He said he
would have rather gone to Baku, Azerbaijan’s capitol city.

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran and journalist/writer AyÅ~_e Hur have reacted
to Baykal’s response to the President’s possible plan to visit Armenia.

Oran said, "the visit means the desire to normalize the relationships"
and Hur emphasized that solving the problems between the two countries
started by forming relations.

Baykal is for restricted relationship Armenian President Serj Sargisyan
had said that he could have taken a step that would help advance the
relations between the two countries and had invited Gul to the soccer
game in Armenia.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan confirmed that a delegation
from Turkey would go to Armenia. According to an authority from the
ministry, if Gul goes to Armenia his agenda will be the ‘Mountainous
Karabag’, the disputed enclave between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which
is under the Armenian occupation at the moment.

Baykal rests his objection on three reasons:

– Turkey’s territorial integrity has not been accepted by Armenia yet.

– Armenia supports the genocide allegation against Turkey with all
the means possible.

– Armenia occupied the Azerbaijan territory, the Upper Karabag,
and this occupation is still continuing.

According to Baykal the relationship between Armenia and Turkey should
stay restricted

"Armenia does not have a problem with its Turkish border" Oran made
the following comments about Baykal’s explanations:

– "I personally heard Vartan Oskanyan, Foreign Minister of Armenia,
saying that they did not have any problem with their Turkish
border. When the foreign ministers make declarations like this one,
they are binding."

– "As long as Turkey denies the 1915 massacres, we cannot use the
term genocide. As long as we defend the things the Ottomans did,
nobody will accept our objection to the term genocide."

– "Is it Turkey’s business to defend Azerbaijan’s interests? Azerbaijan
committee left the hall during a European Council meeting when the
subject was the Cyprus problem. For they would have been in an awkward
position if they had defended Northern Cyprus’s right to be a state,
when they were against the same right in the case of the Mountainous
Karabag."

"We could ease the problem by starting mutual relationships" According
to Hur, the solution to this particular problem could only start by
forming relations, not by satisfying Baykal’s conditions.

Emphasizing the complexity of the Karabag problem, Hur says the
relations can be improved and this way it may be possible for Turkey
to be part of the problems. Turkey can state its own opinions about
the Karabag problem. It can be a mediator. This way a new genocide
terminology can be developed as well. Putting the need to have a
relationship before anything else may be helpful to solving the
problem.

–Boundary_(ID_hOLpox8onCSTIZdMZHKlX Q)–

IS TURKEY GETTING AWAY FROM THE US IN CAUCASUS?
Sedat Laciner

Journal of Turkish Weekly
Sept 1 2008
Turkey

It was easy to see the panic and anxiety of American and European
leaders on their faces, while the Russian forces were keep going
within the borders of Georgia. Yet, along with a difference: Americans
were thinking about how to punish Russia whereas, French and German
leaders’ aim was how to stop Russia without incitement. The United
States were felt embarrassed as it could not protect Georgia and
wanted to find better options for punishing Russia as the way it
deserved. On the other hand, the EU who admits Russia as a part of
European House and is dependent on Moscow especially on energy issues
had a core objective of appeasing Russia. In these circumstances,
France, as the current EU president, has acted as an intermediary
between the fighting countries and succeeded to convince Russia to
sign the ceasefire agreement. Yet, the signed agreement was very
ambiguous and open to interpretation that Russia could do whatever
they want. Moreover, French President Sarkozy made a speech in Moscow
that seems to legitimize the Russian attacks. It should be noted that
the main barriers on Georgia’s entrance to NATO had also been set by
France and Germany in the previous NATO Summit.

There are plenty of experts who labeled German Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as "Pro-Russian". Shortly France and Germany, two main
countries of the EU, is very soft and ineffective against Russia
during the crisis.

The United States wanted to expand the American military power in
the region after the war has commenced. Americans endeavored to have
at least the air dominance on Georgian air space. But this idea was
immediately rejected by France and Germany. Nevertheless, there was
one more country surprisingly rejects the Americans: Turkey!

A Proposal Excludes America: "Caucasus Platform"

Turkey reacted similar to the EU rather than the US right after the war
erupted. Ankara neither aimed to punish Russia, nor spent effort for
it. Contrarily, it tried to prevent America’s or another country’s
(like Ukraine) intervention to the war by not allowing the armed
cargo or warplanes of these countries while Russia and Georgia were
fighting. Both Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul did not have
even the anxiety that EU leaders have. Surprisingly the Turkish leaders
considered the issue like the problem of Syria-Israel which is not that
much related to Turkey so that Turkey could only be the negotiator.

The suggestion firstly called "Caucasus Alliance" and then converted
to "Caucasus Platform" surprisingly propounded by Prime Minister
Erdogan confused the Americans at most. The Secretary of State
of the US said that they had no idea about the project and it is
surprising for them. Matt Bryza, US deputy assistant secretary of
the state for European and Eurasian affairs, said "I must say I was
surprised. I hadn’t been briefed that that was going to happen. We have
a partnership with Turkey on the Caucasus, and I presume that we’ll be
able to work together very closely now with Turkey and other allies
since we do have clearly shared interests, not to mention values,
throughout the Caucasus with Turkey." What does it mean? It obviously
means that the US was unable to work together closely with Turkey and
other allies regarding the Georgia issue. The main surprising issue for
Turkish side is offering the "Caucasus Platform" to Russia at first. In
other words, Ankara is not making an offer to her most important ally
in Caucasus, but to Moscow which invades the Georgia with armed forces.

Another surprise related to Turkey-US relations about Caucasus
Platform (or Alliance) proposal is Erdogan’s and other authorities’
repeated underlining that this cooperation should be "geographical
based". Moreover, the repeated words include that the project covers
five countries. When the project depends on "geographical base"
Russia will be part of it for sure. Besides Russia will be the
main actor. The United States could not be part of it, absolutely
neither the EU. Turkey will fairly go into the Caucasus region with
huge Russia and three small countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia). Furthermore, out of these small countries Georgia is in
intense suffering under Russian pressure, and Armenia is capitulated
by Russia voluntarily. In other words, Turkey’s proposal excludes the
United States from the region whereas includes Russia too much. It
is more likely that the Americans were especially kept out. Because
if it is really considered as "geographical based" Iran should be
included. But it is reported as "5 countries" and Iran is not listed.

It apparently shows that Georgia crisis brings new tension points to
the Turkey-US relations. Turkey has a fear of that the United States
might ruin Caucasus like Iraq or Afghanistan with using Georgia
as a cover. Ankara is convinced that Russia will appease with a
little compensation. Ankara does not want to break the relations
with Russia because of Georgia. It is easy to understand Turkey’s
concerns because there is a claim says the total trade volume will
reach up to $38 billion between two countries. Another possibility
is Russia’s alterable perspective to the PKK which may cause new
terrorist attacks in Turkey. A little negative attitude of Russia
would put Turkey in economic and politic trouble. As a matter of fact
Russia is very happy with Turkey’s attitude. During Erdogan’s visit
to Moscow both Putin and Medvedev showed him a special respect and
bid farewell to him until he departs. Thus, it seems that Erdogan
administration saves Turkish-Russian relations for now. However,
Turkish-American relations seek for new tensions.

Cost of Approach to Russia

Saving the relations with Russia is fine; however, there is the other
side of the coin. Turkey does not want the United States to start
a new war in the region; yet, has to accept that Russia has started
it. Secondly, Russia is changing the borders in the region through use
of force. Russia frankly declares that they don’t recognize Georgian
borders. Russia has already recognized the sovereignty of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. Thus, Georgia will be three separate countries now. If
"Acaristan" is included this and even if "Cevahiti Armenians" revolts,
it requires to get ready for 5 countries. In other words, Turkey’s
strongest fear comes true; borders are changed by illegal ways.

The second important problem is Russia is not punished in Georgia. In
this way, the possibility of impunity of new occupiers increases. NATO
and the West even could not protect Georgia will not interfere to
Russia in new problems. Russia’s next target country in Caucasus,
Black Sea, Eastern Europe and Middle Asia is not certain yet.

The third important problem is Russia’s obvious damage on Turkey’s
interests. Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan line is almost broken. Georgia’s
step by step moving to Russian part means that Russia-Georgia-Armenia
(even Iran) line is coming. If Turkey will not be included
in this line, Turkey’s connection with Turkish world is getting
separated. Return of Russia to the region is noting another victory for
Russia in Turkish-Russian struggle that continues since Ottoman era.

Turkey’s moderate policy is fair. Not provoking Russia and protecting
our national interests by not staying against Russia for American’s
adventures is reasonable. But we don’t have to forget that Turkey,
by itself, does not have the power to stop Russia. Russia evaluates
the proposals like "Caucasus Platform" as a piece of cake. This
proposal does not have the characteristics that may stop Russia’s local
goals. On the other hand, excluding the West and being a part of a club
only with Russia and three small countries is like entering a small
cave with a huge bear. Turkey is neither Germany nor France. Russia
is very close to us and Turkey must know at best that what Russia
can do in the region.

Actually our recent history has many fresh memories regarding
Russia. Supporting Armenian terror, behavior against the left-wing
terror and PKK shows that Russia gave a huge damage to Turkey. Even the
most threatened country during the World War II was not Nazi German,
but Stalin’s Russia. Russia outspokenly wanted Kars, Ardahan and the
surroundings after the war. Besides this, Russia asked for supremacy
rights and bases in the Bosporus. As we know Turkey is rescued by the
United States against the Soviets and took the all risks and settled
down under the NATO umbrella in order to be saved against Russia. Now
the victim is Georgia. Poland and Ukraine also feels the "bear’s claw"
very close. However Turkey is untroubled and thinks that they could
persuade Russia, even build an alliance with Russia.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

TURKEY’S PRESIDENT TO MAKE ‘POSSIBLE’ VISIT TO ARMENIA: MINISTER

Agence France Presse
August 31, 2008 Sunday 3:44 PM GMT

Turkey’s foreign minister said Sunday he is sending a diplomatic
delegation to Armenia in the coming week to draw up plans for a
"possible" landmark visit by President Abdullah Gul.

"A delegation from my ministry will travel to Armenia in the course
of the coming week to discuss the form of a possible visit by the
head of state," Ali Babacan said at a press conference.

Armenia’s President Serge Sarkissian invited Gul to attend football
World Cup qualifiers between Armenia and Turkey at Yerevan on
September 6.

His visit could help improve relations between the two foes.

Turkey has refused to establish diplomatic ties with Armenia since
the former Soviet republic gained independence in 1991 because of
Armenian efforts to secure international recognition of Armenian
massacres under the Ottoman Empire as genocide.

At an official reception on Saturday evening, Turkey’s Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan appeared to confirm the president’s visit,
saying he will "accompany my foreign minister."

However, Gul, who attended the event, said he had not yet made up
his mind.

Last week, local media reported that the president’s office said it
will announce the trip within the next few days.

If the visit takes place, it could help ease relations between the
two neighbours, whose diplomatic ties have been strained by their
conflicting versions of the fate of the Armenians during the Ottoman
Empire.

Armenia claims up to 1.5 million of its people were killed in
orchestrated massacres during World War I as the Ottoman Empire,
Turkey’s predecessor, was falling apart.

Turkey rejects the genocide label and argues that 300,000 Armenians
and at least as many Turks died in civil strife when Armenians took
up arms for independence in eastern Anatolia and sided with invading
Russian troops.

GEORGIAN MINISTER WARNS OF ‘DOMINO EFFECT’ IN CAUCASUS CRISIS

Agence France Presse
August 31, 2008 Sunday

Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili warned Sunday of the
risk of tensions snowballing across the Caucasus and into Ukraine
after Russian troops entered Georgia.

"Russia’s military hostility against the small state of Georgia could
have a domino effect in other countries of the region like Ukraine,"
Tkeshelashvili told a press conference with Turkish counterpart Ali
Babacan in Istanbul.

Babacan was hosting Tkeshelashvili two days before he is due to meet
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in the same city.

"When the weapons fall silent, it is time for diplomacy," the Turkish
minister said. But there are no plans for a three-way ministerial
meeting, a government official said earlier.

Tkeshelashvili said Tbilisi would not talk to Moscow "for as long as
the Russian Federation has not left Georgia and does not fully apply
the ceasefire."

However, in a change of stance, she also stated that Tbilisi was not
looking for European sanctions against Russia, ahead of Monday’s
emergency EU summit in Brussels aimed at agreeing on a bloc-wide
response to the Georgia-Russia conflict.

"For us, European sanctions against Russia are not a priority,"
she said, adding that measures short of formal sanctions could be
effective.

The French EU presidency has all-but ruled out sanctions, but leaders
are still debating a response that could include measures to reduce
Europe’s dependency on Russian oil and gas.

Other levers targeting individual leaders have in past cases included
travel bans or the freezing of overseas bank accounts.

Russian troops entered Georgia on August 8 to push back a Georgian
offensive to retake South Ossetia, which broke away from Tbilisi in
the early 1990s with Moscow’s backing.

Georgia and Russia accuse each other of having provoked the conflict.

Moscow had pulled out most troops after a French-mediated ceasefire
agreement but Tbilisi wants all Russian forces to leave the country.

Tkeshelashvili accused Moscow of an "expansionist policy" and called
on the international community to back Georgia’s territorial integrity.

Babacan urged Moscow and Tbilisi to keep all channels of communications
open and proposed the creation of a Platform for Cooperation and
Stability in the Caucasus which would group Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Russia and Turkey.

Tkeshelashvili welcomed the proposal but said Tbilisi’s priority was
the withdrawal of Russian troops from her country.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress