Month: August 2008

WPS AGENCY, RUSSIA
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 13, 2008 Wednesday

YEREVAN DENIES REPORTS ABOUT BOMBARDMENT OF GEORGIAN AIR BASES BY
AIRPLANES FROM THE RUSSIAN BASE IN ARMENIA;

The Defense Ministry of Armenia says that information disseminated by
Georgian and Azerbaijani mass media that Georgian air bases have been
attacked by the military airplanes based at the 102nd Russian base in
Armenia is a lie. The Armenian Defense Ministry points out that there
are no bombers at the Russian military base in Armenia and there are
only light fighters that cannot do bombing.

Source: Novosti-Armenia, August 11, 2008

Translated by InterContact

WPS AGENCY, RUSSIA
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 13, 2008 Wednesday

SOUTH WITH ELEMENTS OF NORTH

by Ivan Sukhov

CRISIS IN THE CAUCASUS COMPROMISES STABILITY OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLICS
IN THE REGION; Conflict in South Ossetia threatens to disrupt
stability of the Russian Caucasus.

The Caucasus Range whose peoples President Dmitry Medvedev guaranteed
security this Monday forms the Russian state border on the territory
between the Black and Caspian seas. It was different, once.

At first, the Caucasus was a colossal "white spot" between the Russian
domains in Georgia and its environs on the one hand and Russian
fortresses on the Terek and in Kuban on the other. Following that, it
was part of the Russian Empire. Political-administrative geography of
the USSR in the region owes its existence to the outcome of WWI that
gave life to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan within the frontiers
resembling the existing ones.

The Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, when it was already clear that
the political-administrative division the Caucasus owed to the
Bolsheviks (and the one recognized by the international community, for
that matter) included several ethnic "landmines". Some of them went
off in the late 1980s. In the first half of the 1990s therefore,
Armenia found itself at war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Russia in its turn backed two self-proclaimed formations on its
borders (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) at the cost of relations with
Georgia.

This support of the self-proclaimed republics was dictated by the
necessity to stop the bloodshed in conflict areas and, no less
importantly, prevent the lack of stability from spreading into the
Russian part of the Caucasus. It turned out all of a sudden that the
borders prevented contacts between peoples but never served as an
impenetrable barrier for weapons, gunmen, and separatist ideas. Russia
and Georgia put the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts on hold and
left them for later, for when they themselves would be stronger and
hopefully capable of settling the matter.

Accomplished through blood and efforts by the middle of Vladimir
Putin’s second presidency, relative stabilization in the Caucasus
became one of the factors that convinced Russia of its strength in the
region. Chechnya was finally pacified sufficiently to take its place
among other Federation subjects. By 2003-2005, it ceased being the
locomotive force generating lack of stability in the region and
beyond. The Kremlin replaced leaders in some other, less potentially
volatile republics. It sparked there the hope that the population
would be spared life under the semi-independent regimes selling their
loyalty to Moscow in return for subsidies. Moreover, the general level
of prosperity increased some.

The only catch is, all these successes and accomplishments are
fictitious. Pacification of Chechnya only demonstrated inability of
the federal center to accomplish elementary military objectives on a
limited territory through deployment of its own regular army and
police force and without help from the local elites who only feign
obedience and loyalty to Russia. These elites established in the
republic the regime of practically complete internal freedom from
elementary demands of the federal legislation. They rely on their own
security structures staffed with former gunmen.

In fact, Moscow’s control over Chechnya was gauged for a long period
by Putin’s control over Ramzan Kadyrov. There was a period when
charismatic Kadyrov did gain popularity and was in the position to
become a leader of the whole Caucasus. Shortcomings of this project
became apparent this May. It seems that Kadyrov’s personal popularity
increases no longer because all of Chechnya feels his insecurity.
Indeed, who is going to become the lord-protector of Chechnya now that
Russia has a new president? Other Chechens – wealthy and powerful –
began going to Moscow assuring it of their loyalty and castigating
Project Kadyrov as faulty. Chechen youths in the meantime join the
resistance so that Russian convoys in Chechnya are no longer
safe. Kadyrov is not to be blamed of course. The blame rests with the
system forced on the regions when gubernatorial elections were
abolished. After all, personal loyalty stipulates that a new suzerain
may (and probably will) have new vassals.

These tectonic shifts in the regional elites are not restricted to
Chechnya alone. They are noticed in other Russian regions. In the
Caucasus, however, they are somewhat unique because – unfortunately –
these elites are undeniably connected with the underworld. Paradoxical
as it may appear, but the local authorities are both the enemy and
sponsor of the gunmen fighting under the green Islamic flag. Some are
paying gunmen just to be left alone, others to remove an adversary. It
is hardly surprising therefore that a crime wave is reported to be
hitting all of the Russian Caucasus again. The governors (presidents,
whoever) appointed by Moscow never elbowed local crooks out but did
waste away a great deal of the population’s trust. Turf fighting and
power struggle are only to be expected as a result.

To a certain extent, local power struggle is one of the elements of
the crisis in South Ossetia. This republic has never been a Russian
region, but it has adopted a great deal of aspects of the political
systems existing in the Russian republics nearby. Creature of Russian
security structures, President Eduard Kokoity couldn’t help wondering
what the new arrangement of forces in Moscow would have on his own
lobbyist capacities. Just like some of his counterparts across the
mountains.

Sociologists in the meantime emphasize that more and more young men
from good families, once who received proper education, are joining
the regional jihad currently split into all sorts of petty splinter
groups and movements. They are not illiterate and impoverished
peasants anymore, which means that better prosperity alone does not
impede proliferation of radical Islam.

Last but not the least, there are certain channels by which the crisis
may spread from South Ossetia to the Russian Caucasus. South Ossetian
refugees in North Ossetia create pressure on the Ossetian-Ingushetian
conflict area where consequences of the bloody clashes in 1992 are
only proclaimed resolved and settled. Ingushetia is still convinced
that literally thousands were ousted from their homes in ethnic purges
in 1992. Even if refugees from South Ossetia are not as numerous as
the North Ossetians claim, their appearance in North Ossetia will
inevitably mount ethnic tension already elevated by the tragedy in
Beslan.

Source: Vremya Novostei, August 12, 2008, p. 4

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

WPS AGENCY, RUSSIA
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 13, 2008 Wednesday

TIGHTENING THE KNOT OF OIL AND GAS

by Ksana Gavshina, Vladimir Mishin

RUSSIA COULD USE ECONOMIC LEVERAGE AGAINST GEORGIA; It would be
somewhat inaccurate to talk of Russia using energy as a weapon in this
situation – but neither can we say for certain, at this stage, that
Russia won’t cut off supplies. Gazprom hasn’t made any statements as
yet about its plans for transporting fuel across Georgian territory.

There are four major pipeline systems in Georgia: the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, the
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, and the North-South gas
pipeline. Russia controls only one of the four: the North-South
pipeline, used to transport Russian gas to Armenia. As of this year,
Georgia has minimized its consumption of Russian gas in favor of
cheaper fuel from Azerbaijan. The other three pipelines transport fuel
from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. And it would be
somewhat inaccurate to talk of Russia using energy as a weapon in this
situation – but neither can we say for certain, at this stage, that
Russia won’t cut off supplies. Gazprom hasn’t made any statements as
yet about its plans for transporting fuel across Georgian
territory. When we approached Gazprom Export yesterday, we were unable
to obtain confirmation that the full volume of gas supplies is
reaching Armenia.

Experts disagree on the likely effectiveness of an embargo. Mikhail
Aleksandrov, head of the Caucasus Department at the CIS Countries
Institute, says that the sanctions Russia lifted in January 2007
should be re-imposed immediately.

This opinion is not shared by Leonid Grigoriev, president of the
Energy and Finance Institute. The Regnum news agency quotes Grigoriev
as saying: "Given the current situation, I see no possibility of
substantial economic sanctions. Georgia simply doesn’t have the kind
of economy that might be affected by sanctions."

Analysts are also noting Russia’s lack of success with imposing
economic sanctions on Georgia in 2006. Statistics indicate that
Russia’s economic boycott wasn’t as effective as expected. According
to the IMF, the Russian embargo had no substantial impact on the
Georgian economy: Georgia’s GDP growth rate was 8% in 2006. Russian
sanctions reduced that figure to 6-7% in 2007, also raising Georgia’s
balance of payments deficit by $250-300 million. But the negative
consequences of these processes were more than made up for by foreign
aid, according to analysts. A similar assessment of the
Russian-Georgian conflict’s results comes from Kakha Bendukidze,
former Georgian state minister for economic reforms: "Everyone knows
what Georgia lost from the Russian embargo: 1-1.5% of GDP growth, or
$150 million. That isn’t much."

This time, however, Georgia’s financial losses look like being far
more significant. There have already been reports from Tbilisi of
Russian efforts to disable Georgia’s energy arteries. Georgian Prime
Minister Lado Gurgenidze stated that Russian aircraft had struck at
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline on August 9, and the
parallel Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline – Georgia’s two energy
backbones. The Georgian government’s official statement says: "Out of
30 bombs dropped, 28 exploded – several exploded in direct proximity
to the oil pipeline, only five meters away." The statement goes on to
say: "This attack goes beyond bombing one of Georgia’s strategic
facilities – since this pipeline delivers oil to Turkey, Europe, and
the United States, these attacks pose a threat to the strategic
interests of those countries." Note that no independent sources have
confirmed this information as yet.

As well as the pipelines, Georgia’s oil ports – Poti, Batumi, Kulevi –
are being targeted by air-strikes. Due to fighting in those districts,
the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (GNKAR) has suspended crude oil
and petroleum products exports via these terminals and evacuated its
personnel. GNKAR CEO Rovnag Abdullayev said that imports and exports
of oil via Georgian ports were suspended as of August 7, since tankers
couldn’t enter the ports due to bombing. Tanker-loading resumed at
Kulevi yesterday, but GNKAR spokespersons said that the final decision
on continuing or suspending the company’s operations in the region
will be made today: "The tanker-unloading situation at the Georgian
ports of Poti and Batumi remains unclear. This is a force majeure
situation. We expect the situation to be more comprehensible by
Monday, and we shall decide what measures to take for exports of Azeri
petroleum products and crude oil."

Source: Gazeta, August 11, 2008, p. 3

Cape Times (South Africa)
August 13, 2008 Wednesday
e1 Edition

Basic human rights denied in south ossetia

by Julian Kitipov

Today, separatism affects many nations of our world, but often we find
those nations deliberately misusing the concept per se to launch an
assault against an ethnic class, particular community or other nation.

Is this appropriate in a time when the world needs to unite and focus
on fighting poverty, meeting the United Nations (UN) Millennium
Development Goals, establishing peace and security, presenting
opportunities for shaping global governance in a multilateral
framework, promoting good governance and human rights and, finally,
laying the foundation of international law?

The winds of war are once again sweeping through the Caucasus. Last
week, the Georgian Army, under the command of President Mikhail
Saakashvili, launched an attack against the separatists in the
breakaway region of South Ossetia, prompting military intervention by
Russia. Saakashvili’s version of democracy displays a number of
characteristics not seen in any other post-Soviet countries. What are
these special features and why did Saakashvili adopt features that led
to the escalation of the conflicts in the Caucasus?

Saakashvili came to power in 2004 after successfully managing to oust
his former chief and president, Eduard Shevardnadze. On his
inauguration, Saakashvili said that his top priorities were to seek
Georgian membership of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (Nato) and ease the relationship with
Russia. After four years of rule, none of these points has
materialised. In May, Nato rejected the Georgian application for
membership, saying it is too soon; the EU has projected possible
membership in the early 2020s; and Georgia is now at war with Russia.

The Georgian government is still largely permeated by corruption and
the boundless idolatry of its current leader. Often Saakashvili
compares his role to that of the Georgian rulers of 1918-1921, a
period associated with the rise of the Democratic Republic of Georgia,
which was subsequently terminated by the Red Army.

Furthermore, Saakashvili has embarked on an extensive programme of
destroying entire monuments that reminded people of the Soviet era and
replacing them with buildings and statues to his own pro-European era.

The Georgian government’s human rights record is disastrous. Political
prisoners have filled the prisons on ridiculous charges, such as
displaying posters demanding that Saakashvili step down. Cases of
physical intimidation of opposition leaders, or even disappearances,
are common. Moreover, Saakashvili has embarked on a policy of the
assimilation of the entire non-Georgian population. What seemed to be
just the intimidation of the Ossetian or Abkhaz population turned into
the denial of basic human rights such as education, free movement and
a free press in their native tongue.

On numerous occasions Saakashvili has been accused by Amnesty
International of using hate speech and very poorly handling mass
demonstrations against his government. Arguably, Georgia has never
experienced a real, genuine de-communisation and democratisation. All
the complexities of post-communism are still there, unsolved and never
talked about.

The "Rose" revolution, which was very skilfully and spectacularly
organised by Saakashvili, was accomplished with propagandistic acumen
against Russia, and most of the democratisation agenda was utterly
demagogic. I suspect that Saakashvili played the Titoist card
primarily to consolidate his international image, especially for the
EU, and to create for himself the status of a democratic leader. Under
these circumstances, the cult of Saakashvili has become the main
instrument to continue a pro-European leadership.

But during all those years, Saakashvili’s main concern was the growing
expansion of the separatists’ power in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The
two separatist territories decided to break away from the rest of
Georgia after the country proclaimed independence with the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. Both territories have their own political
systems with governments and parliaments, but both of them lack
recognition from the capital Tbilisi and the international community,
including the Russian Federation.

In 1992, the Commonwealth of Independent States, in its attempt to
avert possible war in the separatist areas, agreed to station
peacekeepers there, although Saakashvili, since his inauguration, has
strongly opposed these peacekeeping missions, arguing that the
majority of the personnel are Russian citizens, which makes the
missions partisan.

There are a number of reasons why these two areas would like to break
away from Georgia. First is the lack of dialogue with Tbilisi. In
order to discourage the separatists, Saakashvili has embarked on a
mission to isolate the two areas from the rest of the world. He
stopped the supply of fresh water and electricity to the areas, thus
forcing the separatist governments to seek help from neighbouring
Russia and international aid agencies.

Furthermore, Saakashvili deliberately continues to obstruct UN aid
efforts and, more specifically, the efforts of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees. Since 2007, Saakashvili’s government has
not allowed a single UN truck with aid and construction materials to
reach refugee camps in the two areas.

The second reason is the ongoing supply of the Georgian Armed Forces
by Nato countries and the military buildup around their borders. The
Georgian army consists of 37 000 soldiers, which is double the usual
amount for a Nato country of its size. In 2007, the Georgian
government agreed to increase defence spending to about $989 million,
which is a 50% boost in the last five years. More recently, the
Georgian army has purchased, from the United States and Turkey,
armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, helicopters,
and tanks. Moreover, the Georgian army is five times stronger than the
Abkhaz and Ossetian armies put together.

Therefore, were it not for the peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, Saakashvili would have overthrown the local governments
with ease.

The third reason is Saakashvili himself. In 2007, the president stated
in a public appearance that anyone who does not feel Georgian should
leave the country. Perhaps one should remind Saakashvili that Georgia
is a multi-ethnic country with a large minority population (Azeris,
Armenians, Russians, Ossetians and Turks). His comments wage a cruel
war on the ethnically diverse population, something that even the EU
should step up and criticise.

The latest developments in South Ossetia have had only one objective:
to show off Georgia’s new sophisticated (Nato) military
technology. Saakashvili’s military assault in South Ossetia aimed to
speed up Georgia’s impending Nato membership and to induce Nato
statesmen to re-think their decision.

However, Saakashvili’s impulsive and provocative leadership could
gradually plunge his state into chaos. Yes, Nato membership would
certainly bring political and economic incentives for Saakashvili, but
the million dollar question remains whether Georgia will ever be at
peace having Russian and Nato soldiers standing on its soil
simultaneously.

Furthermore, Saakashvili should not dismiss the Kosovo factor. Since
the declaration of independence of the Serbian breakaway province,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have demanded international recognition
from the world. Even though there was no response to their calls,
except from Moscow, which tried to unfreeze this issue at the UN
Security Council, but failed to secure US and British backing, South
Ossetia and Abkhazia managed to receive, finally after 16 years,
international media coverage. As outlined above, these two territories
have been left with no choice but to seek self-determination.

With the latest military assault on South Ossetia; the 30 000 refugees
who fled to North Ossetia – which is half of the South Ossetian
population – and the killings of nearly 3 000 civilians in the capital
Tskhinvali, I doubt that any Ossetians would ever want to stay in
Georgia. Moreover, this assault could easily qualify as genocide at
The Hague, but most likely Saakashvili will escape with a final
warning from his Western counterparts.

What does Saakashvili really expect from South Ossetia and Abkhazia? A
thank you note?

It takes years to build peace, yet it takes only one gunshot to go to
war. In concluding this overview of Saakashvili, there is an
interesting analogy from the Cold War that could be used to highlight
his governance.

In the 1960s, the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion Maurer, visited his
Greek counterpart. The Greek statesman asked Maurer what was the
secret of Romanian survival and Maurer responded in two words:
"Corruption and cowardice."

l Kitipov is an assistant lecturer in the department of political
sciences, University of Pretoria. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS) or the
University of Pretoria.

ABC Newspaper , Spain
Aug 13 2008

Georgian leader’s "worst’ decision" was to use force

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made one of his worst decisions
when he chose to use force to solve a problem his country has had
since 1991. He did not take into account the likelihood that Russia
would behave in the worst way – as it did – and respond with such a
level of violence that a nation as small as Georgia had no chance of
resisting. After observing for decades how Russia dealt with the
problem of Chechnya, it was not reasonable to hope that the Kremlin
would behave with any moderation regarding a region like South
Ossetia, whose inhabitants it claimed to be defending. Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin with his own style of a forceful Russian military
response, did not have a moment’s doubt when he ordered the Army to
respond as forcefully as possible, with no concern for possible
civilian victims.

After a precarious ceasefire, the world is now rediscovering a
territory that is small in area but huge in complexity and full of
political and military land mines. Russia is trying to maintain its
monopoly on the transit of hydrocarbon fuels that come from the
Caspian Sea and Central Asia, crossing Georgia -because the alternate
route through Armenia is closed by Turkey – and it does not want its
southern border with the Muslim Middle East to be controlled by hands
it considers unstable. Kremlin leaders are especially alarmed over the
possibility that Georgia -and even worse, Ukraine – might enter the
Atlantic Alliance. After this short and intense war, it is hard to
determine whether the Alliance will try to speed up any ties with
Georgia, because the predictable Russian reaction could not worsen the
already-delicate NATO-Russian relations or, fearing that the situation
will be aggravated, they will decide to place Georgia’s NATO
aspirations on hold for a time. The Russian offensive, which President
Medvedev announced had ended yesterday, has given the West an idea of
Russia’s military capacity and its determination to use it when it
sees its interests threatened.

Russia’s petroleum wealth has revitalized the country’s economy, and
the long era of "Putinism" has restored classic imperial images, for
which NATO should prepare for a period of serious instability with its
principal neighbour: giving in to Russia’s demands could undermine our
credibility, but resisting what Russia is doing has a price that we
will have to be ready to pay.

Most of the consequences of this crisis will fall on the Atlantic
Alliance and the European Union because the UN has again gotten mired
down in its own contradictions. The origin of the Security Council’s
right of veto lie in the victory in World War II, and it is useless to
negotiate condemnations or demands when the country at whom they are
directed has this right. Nor has the UN done anything to defend
International law in the case of independence for Serbian Kosovo
region, the first effects of which we are seeing in the case of South
Ossetia. The UN would not be able to deny the Ossetians what it has
conceded to the Kosovar Albanians, and it is quite probable that fear
that this tendency would spread was one of the reasons Saakashvili
made such an erroneous decision. Maybe it is now impossible for
Georgia to regain sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as the
president had promised the most nationalist faction of his
followers. Russia has destroyed the military capability of his
country, not to mention the immediate costs. Recent plans to for new
gas pipelines across Georgia have gone up in smoke.

[translated from Spanish]

Hayots Ashkharh , Armenia
Aug 9 2008

Europe’s ‘peaceful attack’ and our strategy

by Karen Nahapetyan

Almost all European entities recently started dealing with the South
Caucasus conflicts, in particular with the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict,
enthusiastically and consistently. Such activity and consistency of
the united Europe can go even beyond the framework of the OSCE Minsk
Group and become an independent political initiative.

Under such conditions two closely interrelated issues arise
immediately:

a) what model of settlement Europe will adopt regarding the issues of
the conflicts in the region, including the Karabakh conflict;

b) what will be the first steps that the European entities would take
to settle the Karabakh conflict.

One reality becomes obvious at present – the European Union, viewing
the South Caucasus as one whole, tries to find a model of settlement
for the Karabakh conflict which would be based on the ideology and
behaviour of forming this whole. This means that Europe views both us
and the Azerbaijanis as the potential bearers of its values.

In Europe’s view, the issue of the self-determination of the Karabakh
people should comply with the general standards, necessary for the
integration of the whole [South Caucasus] region. This was marked in
proposals made during the previous years. Experience shows that
application of European standards of settlement in environments which
have homogenous culture and civilization, has produced positive
results (let’s remember the case of Aland Islands).

However, the same process shows that in environments that have
heterogeneous culture and civilization (the Balkans, Cyprus) these
models failed numerously.

A question arises: standards of what environment are adequate for
Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis?

The answer is more than obvious – definitely the second one, as like
both in the Balkans and Cyprus, here as well we deal with the fact of
contact between Christian and Islamic civilizations.

A number of typical examples of imposing such standards of coexistence
on peoples, which have civilizations of different orientations, exist
in the world. Their final result was the same, with minor
differences. This impulsion transformed into a more severe and bloody
fight for survival. Moreover, as a rule, peoples, which belong to the
European civilization, suffered as a result.

Even in Lebanon, which has been established as a state of Christian
Arabs – Maronites, as a result of the establishment of the standards
of such an existence, the Christian Arabs not only lost their
majority, but are facing the threat of disappearance.

Thus, Europe, exporting models based on its own level of development
and, most importantly on homogeneity, to our region, will sooner or
later face a difficult dilemma. It will have to either transform the
South Caucasus into new Balkans or realize the obvious fact that
before uniting the peoples of the region it is first of all necessary
to dissociate them.

What strategy has to be adopted at present in view of Europe’s
possible "peaceful attack"? We believe in this regard that a decisive
condition to resist the ordeals facing Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh
is increasing Nagornyy Karabakh’s role in the negotiations
process. Armenia should give an opportunity to Karabakh to free its
hands – including in the issue of deciding the fate of the liberated
territories [Azerbaijan’s territories currently under Armenian
control]. Because if the Europeans demand that they be returned to
Azerbaijan, Nagornyy Karabakh can definitely raise the issue of its
status.

[translated]

Interfax, Russia
Aug 13 2008

Armenian president calls Russia’s Medvedev, offers relief aid for S
Ossetia

Moscow, 13 August: Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev and Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan had a phone conversation on Wednesday [13
August] at the initiative of the Armenian side, the Kremlin’s press
service has said.

"On behalf of his nation, the Armenian president expressed his
condolences over the tragic events in South Ossetia and mass death of
people. He also voiced readiness to send humanitarian aid to the
population in distress," the press service reported.

The heads of states "spoke in favour of taking all possible measures
to prevent a repeat of what happened and to ensure the normalization
of the situation in the region," the Russian president’s press service
added.

Aravot , Armenia
Aug 12 2008

Senseless War

It is still early to comment on the Russian-Georgian (yes, right this
way) war, let alone to predict its numerous and various consequences.
The hostilities are continuing – although it is obvious that the war
will end with Georgia’s defeat in the coming days (if not today). So
far it is possible to speak only about a general impression.

The timeline is as follows: Georgia attacked South Ossetia to restore
its "territorial integrity", and afterwards Russia attacked Georgia
but not to save the Ossetians (which would be natural), but to weaken
the Georgian state, to bring it to its knees, and maybe also to
destroy it. [Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s behaviour is, of
course, an adventure. One needs not to be a political or state
official to understand that a) Russia would respond to the attack on
Tskhinvali in precisely that way; b) Georgia cannot win a war against
Russia using its own forces; and c) neither NATO, nor the EU, nor the
USA will engage in hostilities against Russia "for Georgia’s sake" or
start the third world war. If Saakashvili did not understand these
basic things, then it only remains to condole with our neighbouring
people for having such a president.

Russia’s behaviour is outstanding for its cruelty and cynicism. This,
in essence, is a flexing of imperial "muscles" – concealed under the
unconvincing rhetoric of "peacekeeping". Waging hostilities on
Georgia’s whole territory, in particular bombing areas quite far from
Ossetia (including the Georgian capital), as well as ousting the
Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge "at odd moments" cannot be
justified by any "humanitarian" purposes. All of this is accompanied
by unprecedented brainwashing on Russian TV channels which present
very one-sided information. The Armenians coming back from their
holidays in [the Georgian region of] Ajaria say that the local
population curses Russians: the irresponsible leaders of the two sides
[Russia and Georgia] seem to have managed to finally cause enmity
between the two (equally friendly for us) people.

Armenia’s official position, should, naturally, be totally
neutral. The government has to ensure a quick and safe return of
Armenian residents who still remain in Georgia. I believe that our
country should provide asylum to both Russian tourists leaving Georgia
and Georgian refugees. After the end of the war – [should] help the
neighbouring state [Georgia] to quickly restore the Poti port
[Georgian port via which Armenia receives freights] and everything
that is connected with our economy.

[translated]

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Ekho, Azerbaijan
Aug 13 2008

Russia to help Armenia if Karabakh war resumes

Baku does not rule out that in case of resumption of hostilities in
Nagornyy Karabakh, Russia will assist Armenia which is a member of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, Azerbaijani military expert
Uzeyir Cafarov has told Russian-language daily Ekho.

Cafarov said that Armenia was indirectly involved in the
Russian-Georgian conflict, as there was no doubt that Russian planes
had taken off from Armenia’s Gyumri military base to bomb Georgian
territory.

In the meantime, pro-government MP Zahid Oruc has said that Armenia’s
position in this conflict has once again demonstrated its dangerous
policy in the region and that everyone should draw a conclusion from
this. The Kremlin has always used the ethnic factor to colonize the
Caucasus, the MP added.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization includes Russia, Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

[translated]

Interfax, Russia
Aug 14 2008

Russia to allocate over 20 million rubles for modernization of CIS
missile defense system

DUSHANBE Aug 14

Russia will allocate over 20 million rubles for the modernization of
the combined CIS missile defense system in 2008, Sergei Bulkin, a
representative of the secretariat of the CIS Council of Ministers,
said at a meeting of the Council of Ministers’ coordination committee
on ABM (Anti Ballistic Missile) issues in Dushanbe on Wednesday.

"Every year, Tajikistan and other CIS countries receive funds for
modernization of their ABM systems. This year, Tajikistan has received
4 million rubles for this purpose," said Bulkin.

An estimated 21.5 million rubles will be allocated for the development
of the CIS ABM system this year, not taking into account Russia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

Belarus will receive 4.3 million rubles for the repair and
modernization of its air defense missile systems, Armenia will receive
3.5 million rubles for modernization of its radar stations, and
Kazakhstan will get 3.1 million rubles for parts for C-200 air defense
missile systems.

The coordination committee is also considering the possibility of
supplying Kazakhstan with equipment for the regional command point and
the headquarters of the combined CIS missile defense system in central
Asia.

In addition, Uzbekistan will probably receive 6.6 million rubles to
buy parts for its missile defense systems.