Month: August 2008

The Daily Star
In Georgia, Russia sends clear message US, Israeli influence will not be
tolerated
By Theodore Karasik

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

Analysis BY Theodore Karasik
DUBAI: South Ossetian separatists, supported by Moscow, escalated their
machine-gun and mortar-fire attacks against neighboring Georgian villages
last week. In response, Georgia attacked the separatist capital South
Ossetian Tskhinvali with artillery to suppress fire. Tskhinvali suffered
severe damage, thus providing the pretext for Moscow’s invasion of Georgia.
Russians in Abkhazia are also fighting the Georgians.
As Russia responded with overwhelming force, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
flew from the Beijing Olympics to Vladikavkaz, taking control of the
military operations. Putin sidelined his successor, Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev, thereby leaving no doubt as to who is in charge. Medvedev’s role
is to handle the international diplomatic front which seems to be not on the
table. Under Putin’s orders, the 58th Russian Army of the North Caucasus
Military District rolled into South Ossetia, reinforced by the 76th Airborne
"Pskov" Division. Cossacks from the neighboring Russian territories moved in
to combat the Georgians as well.
The Black Sea Fleet is blockading Georgia from the sea, while Russian
ballistic missiles and its air force are attacking Georgian military bases
and cities including Tbilisi. What Russia is trying to do – and looking like
she may succeed – is to establish a pro-Russian regime in Georgia that will
also bring the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the
Baku-Erzurum (Turkey) gas pipeline under Moscow’s control.
More importantly and with immense strategic implications, Russia is also
trying to send Israel a clear message that Tel Aviv’s military support for
Tbilisi in organizing, training and equipping Georgia’s army will no longer
be tolerated. Private Israeli security firms and retired military officials
are actively involved in Georgian security. Further, Israel’s interest in
Caspian oil and gas pipelines is growing and Russia seeks to stop this
activity at this time. Intense negotiations about current and future
pipelines between Israel, Turkey, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are
tied to receiving oil at the terminal at Ashkelon and on to the Red Sea port
of Eilat. Finally, Russia is sending a clear message that it will not
tolerate US influence in Georgia nor Tbilisi’s interests – supported by the
pro-US Georgian President Mikhal Saakashvili – in joining NATO. Overall, the
military crisis will push Moscow to punish Israel for its assistance to
Georgia, and challenge the US to do more than voice rhetoric.
In the Gulf, there are several broad implications. First is the impact of
the war on Gulf investment in the Caucasus and in Russia. The Russian damage
to Ras al-Khaimah’s investment plan in Georgia is troublesome. The Ras
al-Khaimah government has recently invested in the Georgian port of Poti
where its real-estate development arm Rakeen is developing a free zone.
Rakeen is also developing some mixed-use projects near the capital Tbilisi.
The firm has three projects in Georgia – Tbilisi Heights and Uptown
Tbilisi – with a total value of $1.98 billion, while a third is being
planned. But Ras al-Khaimah’s other major investment did not remain unhurt.
The Georgian harbor Poti, which is majority owned by the Ras al-Khaimah
Investment Authority (Rakia), was badly damaged in Russian air raids. In
April 2008, Georgia sold a 51 percent stake in the Poti port area to Rakia
to develop a free economic zone (FEZ) in a 49-year management concession,
and to manage a new port terminal. The creation of FEZ, to be developed by
Rakeen, was officially inaugurated by Saakashvili on April 15, 2008.
Previously the trend in Russo-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations
focused on strengthening the "north-south" economic corridor between the two
regions; this linkage may now be in jeopardy if more Gulf investment goes up
in smoke.

The second implication is the growing military presence in both Gulf waters
and the Mediterranean Sea by the West and Russia that cannot be separated
from the Russo-Georgian conflict. There is an unprecedented build-up of
American, French, British and Canadian naval and air assets – the most since
the 2003 invasion of Iraq – that are to be in place shortly for a partial
naval blockade of Iran. Three US strike forces are en route to the Gulf
namely the USS Theodore Roosevelt, the USS Ronald Reagan and the USS Iwo
Jima. Already in place are the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea
opposite Iranian shores and the USS Peleliu which is cruising in the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aden.
There is also a growing Russian Navy deployment begun earlier this year to
the eastern Mediterranean comprising the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov
with approximately 50 Su-33 warplanes that have the capacity for mid-air
refueling along with the guided-missile heavy cruiser Moskva. This means the
Russian aircraft could reach the Gulf from the Mediterranean, a distance of
some 1360 kilometers, and would be forced to fly not only over Syria but
Iraq as well, where the skies are controlled by the US military. The Russian
task force is believed to be composed of a dozen warships and several
submarines. While the West is seeking to defend Gulf oil sources destined to
the West and the Far East, Russia is increasing its desire to control
Caspian oil resources and setting herself in a strategic position near the
Levant.
A final implication is what may be a complete collapse of any back channel
communications via Russia to Iran regarding Tehran’s preparation for
confrontation with the West and slowing down Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear
weapon. In the past year, Russia acted as an intermediary between the US,
Israel, the GCC – specifically Saudi Arabia – and Tehran. With the
Russian-Georgian war, the door may now slam shut between these players.
Saudi Arabia, for instance, is attempting to halt the Russian sale of the
S-300 anti-air defense system to Tehran and also is seeking to purchase
large amounts of Russian weapons to "buy-off" Moscow’s pursuit of selling
conventional weapons to Iran. As a consequence of the Russo-Georgian war,
Russia may start to play hardball with going through with arms sales to Iran
and dropping support for sanctions against Iran that may invite a unilateral
Israeli strike on Iran.
As further evidence of the heightening of tensions, Kuwait is activating its
"Emergency War Plan" as the massive US and European flotilla is heading for
the region. Part of Kuwait’s plan is to put strategic oil assets in reserve
in the Far East and outside the forthcoming battle space. And Israel is
building up its strike capabilities for an attack on Iran, purchasing 90
F-16I planes that can carry enough fuel to reach Iran. Israel has also
bought two new Dolphin submarines from Germany capable of firing
nuclear-armed warheads, in addition to the three already in service with its
navy. Many strategic and tactical pieces for a confrontation are falling
into place.
Overall, analysts have argued that there might be a series of triggers that
could force a confrontation between the West and Iran. Some maintained that
this trigger may occur in the Gulf or in the Levant – whether accidental or
on purpose. There were potential triggers before-the April 2007 seizure of
British sailors in the Gulf, the September 2007 Israeli attack on a
suspected Syrian nuclear facility, and Hizbullah’s seizure of west Beirut in
May 2008. Now it appears that a more serious trigger may be the
Russo-Georgian war – despite geographical distance – that may carry dire
consequences for all-especially in the Gulf littoral.
Theodore Karasik is the director for research and development at the
Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis.

SERGEY MARKEDONOV: "GEORGIA IS NOT THE COUNTRY FOR WHICH AZERBAIJAN SHOULD ARGUE WITH RUSSIA"

Today.Az
18 August 2008 [16:50]

Day.Az interview with Sergey Markedonov, famous Russian political
scientist and chief of department of problems of international
relations under the Institute of political and military analysis.

– How will the world change following the next Caucasus war? Is it
possible to say that it has become bipolar?

– It is absolutely not like this. The world will be neither homopolar
nor bipolar. The terms of the cold war are completely inappropriate
in this situation.

Cold war requires ideological counteraction. The point is the
protection of Russian interests in the Caucasus, though, I think, the
Kremlin’s rhetoric was aimed at curbing NATO, that is at more global
ideas. I think, not merely global interests, but protection of the
North-Caucasus borders of Russia is important. Considering that the
latter thesis is not global, Russian leaders apply larger rhetorics,
pointing that we have averted the third world war.

Everything is just more simple. We did not want to settle the
situation, connected with the South Ossetia conflict, surrender our
positions in the North Caucasus and lose prestige.

– Some experts state that the events in South Ossetia were a
premeditated provocation of Moscow…

– The events in South Ossetia should not be regarded as events of
August 8.

They have a gap of four years. Georgia has initiated the conflict
defreezing since 2004. There are quotes, speeches, actions of Mikhail
Saakashvli. The first armed clashes occurred four years ago. The South
Ossetian conflict has had a positive dynamics, unlike Nagorno-Karabakh
and Abkhaz conflict. South Ossetia maintained contracts with Georgia,
it had joint markets, Georgian settlements, transport communication and
so on. Accelerated execution of the program for Georgia’s reintegration
started in 2004, when Saakashvili’s came to power.

In the result of the South-Ossetian conflict Mikhail Saakashvili lost
South Ossetia and Abkhazia completely. Let’s imagine that some Russian
hawks were interested in such a script, which makes punishment of
the Georgian leader possible. But it does not mean that Saakashvili
started to move towards Tkhinvali by the instruction of the Russian
special services. I think such a version is absurd.

– Don’t Moscow’s actions show that it intends to annex South Ossetia
to its territory by all means?

– Russia’s official approach on the South Ossetian conflict is
represented in Dmitri Medvedev’s six points, pointing at the wide
international discussion of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian state. For
the first time the Russian leader challenged the territorial integrity
of Georgia, which had never been made before. The final form of the
resolution of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz problem, whether it will
be an annexation or something else", has never been voiced so far. In
this case, the implied are the statements of officials-the President,
Prime Minister, state duma and others. Alexander Dugin even speaks of
assault against Tbilisi. We will not speak about Moscow’s position
on Dugin’s statements. The first step on the rejection to recognize
the territorial integrity of Georgia has already been made.

– How will the further events in Georgia proceed?

– The optimal variant is the non-increase of the number of the
potential participants of the conflict. Most depends on Russia’s
actions-whether we will move in the Tbilisi direction or no. I think
Georgian issue should not be interfered with. The tasks on South
Ossetia and Abkhazia have been fulfilled and there is no sense of
moving forward. Russian public does not approve Russia’s presence
in Georgia and it will hardly be possible to replace Saakashvili
with another one. It would be better to leave him one-on-one with
the Georgian people. He has destroyed many positive things, that
have been left since the moment of the revolution of roses, with his
adventures. Saakshvili made the wrong step towards refugees. Georgians
lived in normal conditions in South Ossetia. He used it as a live
shield. They have become refugees.

Now let the Georgian people ask Saakashvili about the support of the
USA which was to come to Georgia already on the second day. Until
Russian forces are in Georgia, people will not demand explanations
from Saakashvili.

– Why do you think Azerbaijan has not made a stake on the forced
resolution of Nagorno karabakh conflict, though it has economic and
military advantages as compared to Georgia?

– This is because the Azerbaijani leadership is wiser than
Georgia’s. War is a great policy. In this sense, Saakashvili has
stronger media positions than Azerbaijan. If Georgia was supported by
the United States and West in the South-Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts,
in case of Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijan will get the pro-Armenian
position of the West. Therefore, the concepts of economic and military
resources should be considered through the prism of the 18th century. A
prince invaded the neighbor kingdom and everyone accepted it. But we
live in a completely different world today.

In case war is initiated, Azerbaijan will face serious isolation. If
for Russia isolation is bearable enough, it will become critical for
Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani leadership is aware of it.

I think Baku’s reaction on the recent events in the region was
adequate.

The first reaction was: "we support the territorial integrity of
Georgia".

And then, realizing that Georgia was unable to win in the
South-Ossetian conflict, Baku took the position of silence.

Georgia is not the country for which Azerbijan should argue with
Russia, not speaking of the West and the United States. The third
world war will not start because of Georgia, while Georgian government
overestimated its capacities. Unlike Mikhail Saakashvili, Ilham Aliyev
is able to assess his capacities correctly.

CITIZENS OF ARMENIA DIDN’T SUFFER FROM THE MILITARY ACTIONS IN GEORGIA

armradio.am
18.08.2008 16:20

The "Novosty – Gruzia" agency informed the RA Embassy in Georgia that
the citizens of Armenia didn’t suffer from the military actions in
Georgia. "We don’t have information about any suffered Armenian. In
the name of the Armenian community in Georgia I can say that there
are no victims but there are Armenian refugees from Gory and other
villages", the Embassy informed. To note, the tourists have mainly
been moved from Georgia to Armenia. It was stressed that except of
the citizens of Armenia many foreigner were transported from Georgia
to Armenia. "Last week about 18000 people have been transported. The
45 % of them were citizens of Armenia the others were foreigners",
the Embassy informs.

RA PRESIDENT HAD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF GEORGIA

armradio.am
18.08.2008 16:20

The RA President Serzh Sargsyan had a telephone talk with the President
of Georgia Michail Sahakashvili on Friday evening. The Press Office
of the President informed that Serzh Sargsyan sympathized with the
President of Georgia for the innocent victims of the last events. The
RA President added that Armenia is ready to be a "humanitarian passage"
and to provide them by humanitarian help.

National Review
August 14, 2008 Thursday

Talk Is Cheap

by Kara S. Flook

Despite the optimism of Nicolas Sarkozy’s peace plan, the conflict in
Georgia seems to be far from over. Not only do many details of the
plan still lack agreement (the plan is based largely on Russian
demands), but Russian troops are moving farther into Georgia, breaking
their agreement to return to their August 6 positions. As the
situation worsens, it is important to understand how and why it came
about, and to consider the long-term implications for both the region
and U.S. involvement.

On August 8, after a week of fighting between Georgian troops and
South Ossetian separatists, Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili,
responded by launching a full-scale offensive on the South Ossetian
capital, Tskhinvali, in order to restore constitutional order in the
region. Russia, which had begun amassing troops on its border with
South Ossetia four days earlier, quickly sent in troops, claiming the
need to reinforce Russian peacekeeping troops (who had failed to stop
South Ossetian fire over the past week) and protect "Russian
citizens."

South Ossetia, like Abkhazia, is a separatist region which, despite
its claims to independence, is internationally recognized as part of
Georgia. Russia supports both South Ossetian and Abkhazian claims
(though it does not recognize either as independent) and has
maintained a peacekeeping presence in Tskhinvali since 1992 and
Abkhazia since 1994. Despite it’s supposedly neutral role, Russia
supported South Ossetia’s demands for significant concessions from
Georgia before coming to the negotiating table, and severely hampered
its objectivity by granting Russian passports (and, in effect, Russian
citizenship) to the majority of South Ossetians.

Russia claimed that its peacekeeping role in South Ossetia gave it the
right to send in troops in response to Georgia’s offensive against
Tskhinvali, and quickly overstepped those bounds, conducting air raids
on military bases, roads, the oil port of Poti, and other strategic
targets all around Georgia, and sending a flotilla from the Black Sea
Fleet to the Georgian coast to fire on Georgian targets. Russian
troops advanced from South Ossetia into Georgia to take up a position
near Gori (some reports indicate that they temporarily occupied the
town), while other troops poured into Abkhazia, supporting Abkhaz
separatists in an attack on Georgian troops in the Kodori Gorge before
advancing into Georgia, first to Zugdidi and then to Senaki.

On the morning of August 12, just before Nicholas Sarkozy’s arrival in
his capacity as president of the European Council, Russian president
Medvedev declared an end to military operations in Georgia, declaring
"The aggressor has been punished," but he left a loophole, instructing
the military to take care of pockets of resistance. As already
mentioned, Sarkozy offered a peace plan biased toward the Russians;
Medvedev agreed to return troops to their August 6 positions, but this
has not happened.

Furthermore, some of Russia’s earlier actions indicate that they
expect the conflict to be of long duration: Among the troops sent to
the area were the GRU Spetsnaz (Military Intelligence Directorate
Special Forces) Battalions "Vostok" (East) and "Zapad" (West), both
stationed in Chechnya and known for both their effectiveness and their
brutality. It is unlikely they would have been removed from Chechnya,
where their presence has been important to ensuring the Kremlin’s
control over the region, for any minor operation.

Medvedev has also ordered investigations into allegations of genocide
against Saakashvili and the Georgian government in South
Ossetia. Allowing his 150 forensic experts to carry out their
investigation to his satisfaction will certainly require not only
maintaining Russian control on the ground, but ensuring that the area
is off-limits to all others.

Though Georgia chose to launch its offensive on August 8, it is clear
that Russia provoked the conflict and chose its basic timing and
location. Not only did Russia begin amassing troops on their border
with South Ossetia on August 4, but Russia has also been inciting
South Ossetian actions for some time.

It is highly suspicious that just as the situation in Abkhazia began
to cool down and international pressure on Russia and Abkhazia to
negotiate increased, South Ossetia heated up. What is behind Russia’s
actions? NATO expansion and the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi
are both strong motivating factors. Shortly after NATO announced that
Georgia would soon become a member in April 2008, Russia expanded its
relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This had the dual benefit of further complicating Georgia’s attempts
to resolve its "frozen" conflicts (which had been mentioned in
refusing Georgia a Membership Action Plan at the same NATO meeting)
and opening up trade routes with Abkhazia, on which Russia is heavily
dependent for the raw materials (lumber, sand, gravel, and cement) and
labor needed to prepare Sochi for the Olympics. Russia has a strong
need to maintain the stability of this supply chain within its
control.

This second factor is one of the reasons Russia chose South Ossetia
for the location of the conflict. Not only was a conflict in South
Ossetia unexpected (Abkhazia has been much more volatile), allowing
the Russians to better paint a picture of an aggressive Georgia
attacking innocent civilians, but any major conflict in Abkhazia would
disrupt the supply chain for the Sochi Olympics. Tskhinvali has been
destroyed in the conflict; Russia could not risk that with Sukhumi
(the capital of Abkhazia).

Russia’s aggression is very dangerous for the stability of the
region. Neighboring countries were quick to take sides, with
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states quickly declaring
their support for Georgia and condemning Russia’s acts, while most of
Central Asia supported Russia. Though Armenia, Iran and Turkey all
have declared neutrality, Armenia and Iran both lean heavily toward
Russia, while Turkey leans toward Georgia.

#page#

This split of the region mirrors the general split of influence — a
split Russia would like to do away with. The states supporting Georgia
are all westward-leaning and pro-U.S., while those supporting Russia
are strongly tied to it. Russia deeply resents U.S. involvement in
what it perceives as its sphere of influence — the Caucasus and the
greater region of the former Soviet states — and has gambled on this
act decreasing that influence. A weak U.S. reaction, such as we have
seen thus far, greatly diminishes U.S. standing in the region and,
arguably, as a world power. Georgia, a friend and ally, has been left
to the mercies of Russia, and partners and potential partners such as
Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are all taking note.

Ukraine must be particularly nervous, as they are likely next in the
line of fire. Recent Russian rhetoric has been very aggressive in
threatening Ukraine about NATO membership and asserting territorial
claims to the Crimea. The presidents of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Poland issued a Joint Declaration shortly after Russia’s invasion,
stating their concern: "Following the unilateral military actions of
the Russian military forces, we will use all means available to us as
Presidents to ensure that aggression against a small country in Europe
will not be passed over in silence or with meaningless statements
equating the victims with the victimizers." Poland’s cooperation with
the U.S. over the proposed missile shield has earned it direct threats
from Russia, while the Baltic States have been the victims of
oil-based punishment when their policies incurred Russia’s
displeasure.

The current response to the situation in Georgia does not bode well
for U.S. influence in the region. The U.S. has failed to protect its
friend and ally, an ally that had the third-largest troop presence in
Iraq, after the U.S. and Britain, and is sending the message that our
assurances and promises are meaningless. Russia is trying to show the
world that it is the only meaningful power in the region, and the
U.S. has done nothing to disprove that.

In order to regain its lost ground, the U.S. needs to offer more than
words. The U.S. should firmly tell Russia that unless its troops pull
back to their August 6 positions, the U.S. will provide military aid
to Georgia, demand and help author a more neutral peace plan, require
all future peacekeeping forces in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia be
truly international, and move quickly to reassure other U.S. allies by
convincing NATO to extend Article 5 protection to Ukraine. It may not
be easy, and it may take a lot of political capital, especially to
spur NATO to action, but if strong steps are not taken, the political
capital and trust that the U.S. will lose will be much greater.

— Kara S. Flook is a research assistant in Foreign and Defense Policy
Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

39 LORRIES WENT TO GEORGIA FOR OIL

Panorama.am
19:54 18/08/2008

Yesterday 39 lorries went to Georgia to import the rest of oil stocked
in Batumi, said Susanna Tonoyan, the press secretary of the Ministry
of Transport and Communication to Panorama.am. Currently the lorries
reached the border line with Georgia.

According to the source a group of experts have also left for Georgia
to help the local experts to reconstruct Yerevan-Batumi-Yerevan
railway. The Georgian side informed the Ministry of Transport and
Communication of Armenia that most probably the reconstruction will
finish in a day.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

"FIVE STARS: INTERVISION" COMPETITION STARTS IN SOCHI

Panorama.am
19:51 18/08/2008

On August 28 "Five Stars: Intervision" musical is to start in Sochi
organized by Russian public TV. Since the previous year singers
from CIS member countries have an opportunity to take part in the
competition.

This year Iosif Kobzon will lead the jury’s group. Armenian
representative in the jury staff will be Robert Amirkhanyan.

Armenia will be presented in the competition by Armenia singer Razmik
Amyan who will sing an international hit, a song in its original
version and the one in retro style.

This year the winner of the competition will be announced via short
SMS voting.

TURKEY, IRAN: ANKARA’S PRIORITIES SHIFT

The FINANCIAL
Aug 18 2008
Georgia

STRATFOR — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to
Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have
touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the
Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current
situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for
Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan. Read STARTFOR analysis.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to
Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been
hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase
to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two
principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.

But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks
do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger
things on its mind, namely the Russians.

Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the
southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive
military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests
in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on
keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging
in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.

The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and
linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the
Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian
tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned,
Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.

However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the
1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially
Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has
shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched
by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as
their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the
disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region– especially if it thinks it can
look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.

The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of
Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources
told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military
jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This
development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s
military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied
that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into
Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee
Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and
Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move
against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support,
the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks
into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO
member Turkey and Russia have every interest in avoiding.

The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The
two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly
in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and
Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest
trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy
sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the
natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic
position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the
Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made
it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy
security will still depend on MOSCOW ‘s good graces.

Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act
as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced
offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in
Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue
their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.

For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in
the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in
MOSCOW and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi . During
his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President
Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the
idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and
Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than
a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual
understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a
comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows.

The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran
has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia,
the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic
gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed,
Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members
for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major
powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran
by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing
a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas,
preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United
States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the
attention that it is seeking at the moment.

The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping
the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for
Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara
when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a
common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree
to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use
their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot
and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light
of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down
on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year
fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through
Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.

While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians,
it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the
Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s
diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting
interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.

THE ARTIC PRESENTS: YOUSUF KARSH: REGARDING HEROES EXHIBITION

TAXI Design Network
5&monthview=0&month=8&year=2008
Aug 18 2008
NY

Yousuf Karsh’s portraits are instantly recognizable. Ernest Hemingway,
Georgia O’Keeffe, Albert Einstein, Winston Churchill, and Marian
Anderson, true visual icons of the 20th century, each sat before his
photographic lens.

This master portraitist, however, came from humble beginnings. As a
teenager the Armenian Karsh fled his native Turkey to live first in
Syria and then in Canada with his photographer uncle. Always connected
with traditional photographic methods, he honed his skills first as
an apprentice in Boston from 1928 to 1931 and then in his own studio
in Ottawa from 1932 until 1992.

In 1941, his portrait of Winston Churchill immediately earned him an
international reputation. The image exemplified "the roaring lion"
standing alone against the fascists that had overrun continental
Europe. His fame was further enhanced with state commissions of
political and military leaders during WWII, and his renown continued
to skyrocket after the war and through the early 1960s when he began
adding writers, actors, artists, musicians, scientists, statesmen,
and celebrities to his portfolio of accomplished individuals.

To mark the centenary of his birth, this retrospective will display
Karsh’s best portrait subjects in the prints he himself preferred. The
100 photographs in the exhibition are drawn from a set of over 200
master prints given to the museum as a promised gift by his widow,
Estrellita Karsh.

The exhibition’s fully illustrated catalogue, written by exhibition
curator David Travis and issued by Boston publisher David R. Godine,
traces Karsh’s artistic development and reassesses his place in the
history of photography.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PULLOUT ANNOUNCED AFTER FURTHER INCURSION
By Mikheil Svanidze

The Messenger
Aug 18 2008
Georgia

Russian troops will begin to pull out of Georgia proper from today,
Russian President Medvedev said yesterday, after German Chancellor
Angela Merkel visited Russia and Georgia to discuss the practical
implementation of the ceasefire. President Medvedev had signed a
six-point ceasefire agreement on August 16, but was claiming there was
no exact timetable for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia.

"Starting tomorrow, Russia will begin to withdraw its military forces,
which were deployed to support Russian peacekeepers due to Georgian
Aggression against South Ossetia," a statement on the official
Kremlin website reads, though it adds that Russian forces will stay
in the territory of the security zone and in South Ossetia. Merkel,
heading to Tbilisi from Russia, reiterated that NATO’s decision on
eventual Georgian membership hasn’t changed. She also noted that
Russian troops must "immediately" pull out of Georgia.

United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had visited Tbilisi
on August 15, negotiating the signing of the six-point ceasefire
treaty by the Georgian side. President Saakashvili signed the agreement
that day. Speaking afterwards at a joint press conference with Rice,
Saakashvili slammed the European media and officials for their
"muted reaction" when he spoke about Russia’s preparations for a
military action against Georgia after April, as a result of Georgia
been denied a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO at a summit in
Bucharest. Both The President and the Secretary of State clarified
that talks on the implementation of an international monitoring
mechanism on the ground would continue. They also claimed that the
ceasefire plan did not guarantee the internationalization of this,
as this would be the subject of subsequent talks.

The ceasefire plan itself, which was brokered by French President
Nicolas Sarkozy and signed by the Georgian and Russian Presidents,
continues to provoke debate. Georgian State Minister for Reintegration
Issues Temur Iakobashvili claimed there were two versions of the
document, one signed by the Presidents of Georgia and France, and the
"Russian" one, signed by Medvedev and the Presidents of the breakaway
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgian officials reiterate
that the document should be signed by the Russian and Georgian sides
only, and the mediator, in front of President Sarkozy, who would thus
be a witness.

The six-point plan commits the signatories not to resort to further
force, declares a definitive end to the hostilities, opens a corridor
for humanitarian aid, returns Georgian and Russian troops to their
positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities and opens international
talks on stability and security arrangements in Georgia’s breakaway
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The fifth point of this plan
was subject to different interpretations. According to the document,
"pending an international mechanism, Russian peacekeepers will
undertake additional security measures". According to various analysts,
both Georgian and Western, this implies that Russian peacekeepers
have the right to patrol the region outside the conflict area, south
of South Ossetia, 3 to 15 kilometres inside Georgia proper. According
to Georgian analyst Ramaz Sakvarelidze, Russian troops may thus stay
in control of the vital highway connecting Georgia’s East and West.

"It seems as if they [Russian forces] will control a bigger zone than
they did it was before [the outbreak of hostilities]," Sakvarelidze
told The Messenger. "One of the aims of this operation was to take
control of Georgia’s main transport routes and undermine Georgia’s
importance as a transit corridor between East and West," he said.

Russian President Medvedev said they he would not be against an
international mechanism in the conflict zones, but observed that there
was a need to ask breakaway regions’ administrations. "The problem is
that Ossetians and Abkhazians do not have confidence in anyone else
except Russia, because the history of last 15 years shows that the only
troops capable of defending their interests are Russian troops," he
said. "For that reason, they consider that Russian troops are the only
guarantors of their interests and this should be taken into account."

Russian forces continue to occupy the city of Gori. Georgian National
Security Council Chief Aleksandre Lomaia has been patrolling the
town alongside the Russian forces for the last few days. Gori remains
practically empty of civilians as a large part of its population has
fled to Tbilisi. A railway bridge near Kaspi, a town between Gori and
Tbilisi, was also blown up on August 16. Georgian officials blamed
Russia, but Russian Deputy Chief of General Staff Anatoly Nogovistyn
has strongly denied the accusation. "I can say with all honesty –
this cannot be true," Nogovitsyn said. "Now, at a time of ceasefire,
why do we need to blow up bridges, when we should rebuild them?" The
railway connects Tbilisi with various locations in Western Georgia,
including Batumi and Zugdidi. The link with Armenia was also broken by
this action, as many Armenian tourists take the Yerevan-Tbilisi-Batumi
train to spend their holidays at the seaside.

Hostilities between Georgia and South Ossetia started late on August
7, as the Georgian side vowed to "restore constitutional order"
in response to the alleged bombing of Georgian controlled villages
in South Ossetia. The Russian and separatist sides claimed Georgia
had begun a military invasion of South Ossetia and started a "peace
enforcement operation", ousting Georgian troops from the breakaway
republic and breaking deep into Georgian territory, taking control
of the towns of Poti, Senaki,Zugdidi and Gori.